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Activities of Miguel VIEGAS related to 2017/0358(COD)

Shadow reports (1)

2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2017/0358(COD)
Documents: PDF(1 MB) DOC(160 KB)

Amendments (21)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 20

(20) To align remuneration with the risk profile of investment firms and to guarantee a level-playing field, investment firms should be subject to clear principles on corporate governance arrangements and rules on remuneration that take into account the differences between credit institutions and investment firms. Small and non-interconnected investment firms should however be exempted from those rules because the provisions on remuneration and corporate governance under Directive 2014/65/EU are sufficiently comprehensive for those types of firms.

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Recital 22

(22) It is also appropriate to offer some flexibility to investment firms in the way they use non-cash instruments when paying variable remuneration, as long as such instruments are effective in achieving the objective of aligning the interest of staff with the interest of various stakeholders, such as shareholders and creditors, and contribute to the alignment of variable remuneration with the risk profile of the investment firm. However, the ratio between the fixed and variable component should never be less than 1.

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Recital 23

(23) The revenues of investment firms in the form of fees, commissions and other revenues in relation to the provision of different investment services are highly volatile. Limiting the variable component of remuneration to a portion of the fixed component of remuneration would affect the firm’s ability to reduce remuneration at times of reduced revenues and could lead to an increase of the firm's fixed cost base, leading in turn to risks for the firm’s ability to withstand times of economic downturn or reduced revenues. To avoid those risks, a single maximum ratio between the variable and the fixed elements of remuneration should not be imposed on non-systemic investment firms. Instead, those investment firms should set appropriate ratios themselves.deleted

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point h

(h) an investment firm is found liable for a ~~serious~~ breach of national provisions adopted pursuant to Directive (EU) 2015/84942 ; _________________ 42 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73).

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 18.º – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall ensure that competent authorities publish on their official website any administrative penalties and measures imposed in accordance with Article 16 and which has not been appealed or can no longer be appealed, without undue delay. That publication shall include information on the type and nature of the breach and the identity of the natural or legal person on whom the penalty is imposed or against whom the measure is taken. ~~The information shall only be published after that person has been informed of those penalties or measures and to the extent the publication is necessary and proportionate.~~

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 18.º – paragraph 3

3. Competent authorities shall publish the administrative penalties or measures imposed in accordance with Article 16 on an anonymous basis in any of the following cases: (a) the penalty has been imposed on a natural person and publication of that person’s personal data is found to be disproportionate; (b) an ongoing criminal investigation or the stability of financial markets; (c) the publication would cause disproportionate damage to the investment firms or natural persons involved.deleted the publication would jeopardise

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 22 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Competent Authorities shall be empowered to review regularly the strategies and processes under paragraph 1 applied by the investment firms and to make changes when deemed necessary.

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 23.º – paragraph 2

2. This Section shall not apply where, on the basis of the assessment referred to in paragraph 1, an investment firm determines that it meets all of the conditions set out in Article 12(1) of [Regulation (EU) ---/----[IFR].deleted

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 23.º – paragraph 3

3. An investment firm that, on the basis of the assessment referred to in paragraph 1, determines that it does not meet all of the conditions set out in that Article 12(1) of [Regulation (EU) ---/---- [IFR], it shall comply with this Section as of the financial year following the financial year in which that assessment took place.deleted

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 25.º – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Member States shall require investment firms to publicly disclose by Member State and by third country in which the investment firm has a branch or a subsidiary that is a financial institution as defined in Article 4(1)(26) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the following information on an annual basis:

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 28.º – paragraph 1 – point h – point ii

(ii) variable remuneration, which reflects a sustainable and risk adjusted performance of the employee, as well as performance in excess of the employee's job description., and shall never exceed fixed remuneration;

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 28 – paragraph 2

2. For the purposes of point (i) of paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that investment firms set the appropriate ratios between the variable and the fixed component of the total remuneration in their remuneration policies, taking into account the business activities of the investment firm and associated risks, as well as the impact that different categories of individuals referred to in paragraph 1 have on the risk profile of the investment firm. The variable component of the remuneration shall not exceed 100% of the fixed component.

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Member States shall ensure that where an investment firm benefits from extraordinary public financial support as defined to in Article 2(1)(28) of Directive 2014/59/EU, the ~~following requirements apply:~~payment of any kind of variable remuneration is forbidden.

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) where variable remuneration would be inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base of an investment firm and its timely exit from extraordinary public financial support, variable remuneration of all staff shall be limited to a portion of net revenue;deleted

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b

~~(b) investment firms shall establish limits to the remuneration of the members of the management body of the investment firm;~~deleted

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point c

~~(c) the investment firm shall only pay variable remuneration to members of the management body of the investment firm where such remuneration has been approved by the competent authority.~~deleted

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 30.º – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)

(aa) Variable remuneration may not exceed fixed remuneration on an annual basis;

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 36 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point g

(g) to require investment firms to ~~limit~~suspend variable remuneration ~~as a percentage of net revenues~~ where that remuneration is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base;

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 37 – paragraph 1 – point e

(e) the investment firm ~~repeatedly~~ fails to establish or maintain an adequate level of additional capital as set out in Article 38(1).

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. If the competent authority determines that the investment firm remains inactive over a period of six months after the additional capital requirements have been determined by the competent authority these requirements shall become binding level 1 requirements.

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 40.º – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) require investment firms to use specific media and locations and in particular their internet sites for publications other than the financial statements;

2018/06/04
Committee: ECON