BETA

105 Amendments of Sander LOONES related to 2015/0270(COD)

Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
(4) While key steps have been made towards ensuring the efficient functioning of the Banking Union, with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (the 'SSM') established by Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201311 ensuring that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions in the euro area Member States and those non euro area Member States who choose to participate in the SSM (the 'participating Member States') is implemented in a coherent and effective manner and with the Single Resolution Mechanism (the ‘SRM’) established by Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 ensuring a consistent framework for the resolution of banks that are failing or likely to fail in the participating Member States, further steps are still needed to complete the Banking Unionreduce overall risks and risks specific to national banking systems before the Banking Union could be completed. __________________ 11 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 114 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
(5) In June 2015, the Five Presidents Report on Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union pointed out that a single banking system can only be truly single if confidence in the safety of bank deposits is the same irrespective of the Member State in which a bank operates. This requires single bank supervision, single bank resolution and single deposit insurance. The Five Presidents report therefore proposed to complete the Banking Union by establishing a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking Union alongside bank supervision and resolution. Concrete steps in that direction should already be taken as a priority, with a re-insurance system at the European level for the national deposit guarantee schemeonly if and when conditions set out in this Regulation have been met. In other words, only if and when sufficient progress has a first step towards a fully mutualised approach. The scope of this reinsurance system should coincide with that of the SSMbeen made with respect to risk reduction and all banks in the Banking Union are deemed to be in a comparable, financially stable position, could a fair EDIS be established.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 125 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
(7) The great disparity in risks specific to national banking systems and the absence of a homogenous level of depositor protection can distort competition and create an effective barrier for the freedoms of establishment and free provision of services by credit institutions within the internal market. A commoOnly if and when sufficient progress has been made with respect to risk reduction and all banks in the Banking Union are deemed to be in a comparable, financially stable position, can a European deposit insurance scheme is therefore essbe instrumential forto the completion of the internal market in financial services.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 134 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) AlthoughWhile Directive 2014/49/EU already significantly improves the capacity of national schemes to compensate depositors, more efficient deposit guarantee arrangements are neededdesirable at the level of the Banking Union to ensure sufficient financial means to underpin the confidence of all depositors and thereby safeguard financial stability. EDIS wouldA well- designed deposit insurance system should not harm the level of protection that depositors currently enjoy and has the potential to increase the resilience of the Banking Union against future crises by sharing risk more widely and wouland offer equal protection for insured depositors, supporting the proper functioning of the internal market.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 144 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) The establishment of an well- designed EDIS, with decision-making, monitoring and enforcement powers centralised and entrusted to the Single Resolution and Deposit Insurance Board ("the Board"), will be esscould be instrumential in achieving the objective of a more harmonised deposit guarantee framework. The uniform application of the deposit guarantee requirements in the participating Member States willcould be enhanced as a result of it being entrusted to such a central authority. In this way, the operation of EDIS shcould facilitate, by supporting and providing a framework for the establishment and subsequent implementation of uniform rules on deposit guarantee arrangements, the harmonisation process in the field of financial services.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) Furthermore, EDIS is part of the wider EU rules harmonising prudential supervision and recovery and resolution, which are complementary aspects of the internal market for banking services. Supervision can onpotentially be more effective and meaningful if an adequate deposit insurance scheme, corresponding to the developments in the field of supervision well-designed EDIS, preceded by measures aimed at reducing overall risks in the Banking Union and risks specific to national banking systems, is created. EDIS is thereforcould be instrumental to a wider process of harmonisation and its objectives are closely linked to the Union framework on prudential supervision and recovery and resolution whose centralised application are mutually dependant. For instance, adequate coordination at the level of supervision and deposit guarantee is needed in cases where the European Central Bank (ECB) envisages withdrawing an authorisation to a credit institution or where a credit institution does not comply with the obligation to be a member of a DGS. A similar high level of integration is needed between the resolution actions and the deposit insurance tasks attributed to the Board.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 147 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) This Regulation applies only in respect of banks whose home supervisor is the ECB or the national competent authority in Member States whose currency is the euro or in Member States whose currency is not the euro which have established a close cooperation in accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. The scope of application of this Regulation is linked to the scope of application of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. Indeed, bearing in mind the significant level to which the supervisory tasks attributed to the SSM and deposit guarantee actions are interwoven, the establishment of a centralised system of supervision operated under Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is fundamentally important to the process of harmonisation of deposit guarantee in participating Member States. The fact of being subject to supervision by the SSM constitutes a specific attribute that places the entities falling within the scope of application of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 in an objectively and characterised distinct position for deposit guarantee purposes. It is necessary to adopt measures to create a single deposit insurance scheme aimed at reducing overall risks in the Banking Union and risks specific to national banking systems, before all Member States participating in the SSM in order to more harmonised deposit insurance scheme, potentially facilitateing the proper and stable functioning of the internal market, could be established.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 163 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
(17) EDIS should progressively evolve from a reinsurance scheme into a fully mutualised co-insurance scheme over a number of years. In the context of efforts to deepen the EMU, together with the work on the establishment of bridge- financing arrangements for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and on developing a common fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to reduce the bank/The establishment of EDIS balances, on the one hand, the objective of breaking the bank-sovereign link, and on the other hand, the objective of preventing risks and perverse incentives related to moral hazard. A single European deposit insurance scheme could indeed potentially lead to more risks, in particular those related to moral hazard, since the large majority of national economic and fiscal policy measures may affect banks' balance sheets and national banking systems as a whole. For this reason, EDIS provides only liquidity support. Also, in order to assist in the achievement of the objective to break the bank-sovereign link, it is necessary to make sure that the insolvereign links in individual Member States by means of steps towards risk sharing among all the Member States in the Banking Union, and thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in achieving its key objective. However, such risk sharing implied by steps to reinforce Banking Union must proceed in parallel with risk reducing measures designed to break the bank-sovereign link more directly. ncy of a Member State does not immediately result in the insolvency of the banks in the Member State concerned, and hence in recourse to EDIS because of sovereign default. That is why one of the conditions that need to be fulfilled prior to the establishment of EDIS should be the application of legislation introducing non-zero risk weights for sovereign exposures or measures to address concentration risks, such as large exposure limits. Moreover, as risks, for instance those related to non-performing loans, still differ greatly between different national banking systems, it is essential to prevent legacy sharing, which is unfair to the depositors that currently enjoy high levels of protection, by making sufficient progress with respect to measures aimed at reducing overall risks and risks specific to national banking systems before a more harmonised European deposit insurance scheme could be established.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 175 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
(18) EDIS should be established in three sequential stages, first a reinsurance scheme that covers a share of the liquidity shortfall and of the excess losses of participating DGSs, followed by a co- insurance scheme that covers a gradually increasing share of the liquidity shortfall and losses of participating DGSs and eventually resulting in a full insurance scheme that covers all liquidity needs and losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes.deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 188 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
(19) In the reinsurance stage, and in order to limit the liability for the European Deposit Insurance Fund (“the Deposit Insurance Fund”) and tEDIS shall cover a gradually increasing share of the liquidity shortfall of participating DGSs. To reduce moral hazard risk at the national level, assistance from the European Deposit Insurance Fund can only be requested if the national DGS has raised ex-ante contributions in accordance with a precise funding path, and if it("the Deposit Insurance Fund") will only be available if the national DGS has raised a sufficient amount of ex-ante contributions, and if the national DGS first depletes theseits own funds. However, to the extent that a national DGS has collected funds over and above that which is required by the funding path, it only needs to use up the funds it had to collect to comply with the funding pathrequirement before being able to receive coverage by EDIS. Therefore, DGSs which have collected more funds than is needed to comply with the funding pathrequirement should not be in a worse position than those which have collected funds not exceeding the levels set out in the funding pathfunding requirement.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 194 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20
(20) As the Deposit Insurance Fund, in the re-insurance stage, would only provide an additional source of funding and would only weaken the link between banks and their national sovereign, without however ensuring that all depositors in the Banking Union enjoy an equal level of protection, the reinsurance stage should, after three years, gradually progress into a co-insurance scheme and ultimately into a fully mutualised deposit insurance scheme.deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 205 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
(21) While the reinsurance and coinsurance stages would share many common features, ensuring a smooth gradual evolution, pay-outs under the co- insurance stage would be shared between national DGS and the Deposit Insurance Fund as of the first euro of loss. The relative contribution from the Deposit Insurance Fund would gradually increase to 100 percent, resulting in the full mutualisation of depositor risk across the Banking Union after four years.deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 212 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22
(22) Safeguards should be built into EDIS so as to limit moral hazard risk and to ensure that the coverage by EDIS is only provided where nationals DGSs act in a prudent manner. Firstly, national DGSs should comply with their obligations under this Regulation, the Directive 2014/49/EU and other relevant EU law, in particular their obligation to build up their funds in accordance with Article 10 of Directive 2014/49/EU as further specified in this Regulation. In order to benefit from coverage by EDIS, participating DGSs need to raise a sufficient amount of ex- ante contributions in accordance with a precise funding pathrequirement. This also implies that the possibility of a target level reduction in accordance with Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU is no longer available if the DGS wants to benefit from EDIS. Secondly, in case of a pay-out event or where its funds are used in resolution, a national DGS should bear athe fairst share of the loss themselves. It should thereforealso be required to collect ex-post contributions from its members to replenish its fund and to repay EDIS to the extent that the initially received funding exceeds the share of loss to be borne by EDIS. Thirdly, following a pay- out event, the national DGS should maximise the proceeds from the insolvency estate and repay the Board and the Board should have sufficient powers to safeguards its rights. Fourthly, the Board should have the powers to recover all or part of funding in case of a participating DGS did not comply with key obligations.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 219 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
(23) The Deposit Insurance Fund is an essential element without which the progressive establishment of EDIS could not be achieved. Different national systems of funding would not provide for homogenous deposit insurance across the Banking Union. Throughout the three stages, the Deposit Insurance Fund should help ensuring the stabilising role of DGSs, a uniform high level of protection to all depositors in a harmonised framework throughout the Union and avoiding the creation of obstacles for the exercise of fundamental freedoms or the distortion of competition in the internal market due to different levels of protection at national level.deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 229 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24
(24) The Deposit Insurance Fund should be financed by direct contributions from bankparticipating DGSs. Decisions taken within the EDIS, requiring the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund or of a national deposit guarantee scheme should not impinge on the fiscal responsibilities of the Member States. In that regard, only extraordinary public financial support should be considered to be an impingement on the budgetary sovereignty and fiscal responsibilities of the Member States.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 237 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26
(26) Contributions would be directly levied on bankparticipating DGSs to finance the Deposit Insurance Fund. The Board would collect the contributions and administer the Deposit Insurance Fund, while national DGSs would continue to collect national contributions and administer national funds using their own methodology. In order to ensure fair and harmonised contributions for participating bankDGSs and provide incentives to operate under a model which presents less risk, both contributions to EDIS and to national DGS should be calculated on the basis of covered deposits and a risk-adjustment factor per bank. During the re-insurance period tparticipating DGS. The risk-adjustment factor should consider the degree of risk incurred by a bank relative to all other banks affiliated to the same participating DGS. Once the stage of co-insurance is reached, the risk- adjustment factor should consider the degree of risk incurred by a bank relative to all other bankparticipating DGS and its affiliated credit institutions relative to all other participating DGSs and their affiliated credit institutions established in the participating Member States. This would ensure that, overall, EDIS is cost- neutral for banks and national DGSs and avoid any redistribution of contributions during the build-up phase of the Deposit Insurance Fund.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 245 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
(27) In principle, contributions should be collected from the industry prior to, and independently of, any deposit insurance action. When prior funding of the participating DGS is insufficient to cover the losses or costs incurred by the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, additional contributions should be collected to bear the additional cost or loss. Moreover, the Deposit Insurance Fund shouldiquidity shortfall, additional contributions should be collected. Moreover, the Board should, to a certain extent, be able to contract borrowings or other forms of support from credit institutions, financial institutions or other third parties in the event that the ex- ante and ex post contributions are not immediately accessible or do not cover the expenses incurred by the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund in relation to deposit insurance actions in accordance with this Regulation.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 253 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29
(29) The initial and final target level of the Deposit Insurance Fund should be established as a percentage of the total minimum target levels of participating DGS. It should progressively reach 20% of four ninth of the total minimum target levels by the end of the reinsurance period and the sum of all minimum target levels by the end of the co-insurance period5 % of the aggregated minimum target level that participating DGSs shall reach in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU. The possibility to apply for approval to authorise a lower target level in accordance with Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU should not be considered when setting the initial or final target levels of the Deposit Insurance Fund. An appropriate time frame should be set to reach the target level for the Deposit Insurance Fund.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 271 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 34
(34) In order to guarantee its full autonomy and independence when undertaking deposit insurance actionsng under this Regulation, the Board should have an autonomous budget with revenues from obligatory contributions from the institutions in the participating Member States. This Regulation should be without prejudice to the ability of Member States to levy fees to cover the administrative expenses of their national DGSs or designated authorities.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 274 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36
(36) The Board should operate in joint- plenary, plenary and executive sessions. The Board, in its executive session, should prepare all decisions concerning pay-out procedures and, to the fullest extent possible, adopt those decisions. Regarding the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, it is important that there is no first-mover advantage and that the outflows of the Deposit Insurance Fund are monitored. Once the net accumulated use of the Deposit Insurance Fund in the previous consecutive 12 months reaches the threshold of 25% of the final target levelFor this reason, the plenary session should evaluate, on an annual basis, the application of the deposit insurance actions or the participations in resolution actions and the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, and. It should also provide guidance which the executive session should follow in subsequent decisions. Guidance to the executive session should, in particular, focus on ensuring the non-discriminatory application of deposit insurance actions or participation in resolution actions, on measures to be taken to avoid a depletion of the Deposit Insurance Fund.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 287 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
2. In addition, this Regulation establishes a European Deposit Insurance Scheme ('EDIS') in three successive stages:that provides a gradually increasing level of liquidity support for participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41a. The establishment shall be contingent upon the fulfilment of the conditions set out in paragraph 2a of this article.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 298 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 1
- a reinsurance scheme that, to a certain extent, provides funding and covers a share of the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41a;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 303 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 2
- a co-insurance scheme that, to a gradually increasing extent, provides funding and covers losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41c;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 308 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 3
- a full insurance scheme that provides the funding and covers the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41e.deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 313 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 1 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Part IIa and Section 1a and 2 of Chapter 2 of Title V of Part III of this Regulation shall apply from no earlier than the fulfilment of the following conditions: (a) the application, immediately or where relevant after the expiry of the transposition period, of the international standard for Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) for Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), and of revised rules in relation to a minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL), for all credit institutions affiliated to the participating DGSs; (b) the application, immediately or where relevant after the expiry of the transposition period, of an insolvency ranking for credit institutions, harmonised at Union level, in relation to subordinated debt; (c) the application, immediately or where relevant after the expiry of the transposition period, of a Union framework for business insolvency in relation to the early restructuring of companies in order to prevent and better handle the pressing issue of non- performing loans; (d) the application, immediately or where relevant after the expiry of the transposition period, of an act amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU, resulting in a binding leverage ratio requirement with additional requirements for G-SIBs; (e) the application of legislation introducing moratorium powers for supervisors and resolution authorities in respect of credit institutions affiliated to the participating DGSs; (f) the application of legislation introducing non-zero risk weights for sovereign exposures or measures to address concentration risks, such as large exposure limits; (g) adherence by all credit institutions to the minimum capital requirements in the baseline scenario of an Asset Quality Review (AQR) for all credit institutions affiliated to the participating DGSs, to be conducted between 1 January 2020 and 31 December in 2022. Without prejudice to subparagraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council shall, on the basis of verification by the Commission of compliance with the conditions in subparagraph 1, to be conducted no earlier than 1 January 2023, adopt a legislative act in order to establish the exact date of application of Part IIa and Section 1a and 2 of Chapter 2 of Title V of Part III of this Regulation.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 315 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) credit institutions affiliated to participating deposit-guarantee schemes, excluding the entities referred to in Article 2(5) of Directive 2013/36/EU and branches of credit institutions established in third countries referred to in Article 15 of Directive 2014/49/EU.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 344 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Part IIa - title I - title
TITLE I: ESTAGESBLISHMENT OF EDIS
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 348 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Part IIa – title I – chapter 1 – title
Reinsurance Insurance
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 355 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41a – title
Partial funding and excess loss coverLiquidity support
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 364 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41a – paragraph 1
1. As from the date of application set out inby the legislative act referred to in subparagraph 2 of Article 99(51 (2 a), participating DGSs are reinsured by EDIS in accordance with this Chapter for a period of three years (‘reinsurance period’).
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 369 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41a – paragraph 2
2. In casWhere a participating DGS encounters a payout event or is used in resolution in accordance with Article 79 of this Regulation, it may claim funding from the DIF of up to 20% offor its liquidity shortfall as set out in Article 41b. The share of liquidity shortfall coverage a participating DGS may claim from the DIF is set out in paragraph 2a.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 374 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41a – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. The share of coverage under the second paragraph shall increase as follows: - in the first year it shall be 40 %; - in the second year it shall be 70 %; - in the third and subsequent years it shall be 100 %.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 378 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41a – paragraph 3
3. The DIF shall also cover 20% of the excess loss of the participating DGS as set out in Article 41c. The participating DGS shall repay the amount of funding it obtained under paragraph 2 of this Article, less the amount of excess loss cover, in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 41o.deleted
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 387 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41a – paragraph 4
4. Neither the funding nor the excess loss coverThe liquidity support shall not exceed the lower of 20% of the initialone third of the target level of the DIF as set out in Article 74b(1) of this Regulation and 105 times the target level of the participating DGS as defined in the first subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 388 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41a – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. The Member State in which the DGS is registered shall be held liable for the rest of the liquidity shortfall of the DGS concerned, when the liquidity shortfall exceeds the limits set out in paragraph 4 of this Article.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 394 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41b – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Deposits referred to in Article 6(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU shall be excluded from the calculation of the liquidity shortfall as determined in paragraph 1 and 2. The DIF shall not provide funding for measures referred to in Article 11(3) and (6) of Directive 2014/49/EU.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 397 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41c
1. encounters a payout event, its excess loss shall be calculated as the total amount it repaid to depositors in accordance with Article 8 of Directive 2014/49/EU less: (a) recovered from subrogating to the rights of depositors in winding up or reorganisation proceedings under the first sentence of Article 9(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU; (b) means the participating DGS should have at the time of the payout event if it had raised ex-ante contributions in accordance with Article 41j; (c) contributions the participating DGS may raise in accordance with the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 10(8) of Directive 2014/49/EU within one calendar year, which shall contain the amount raised in accordance with point (b) of Article 41b(1) of this Regulation. 2. participating DGS are used in resolution proceedings, its excess loss shall be the amount determined by the resolution authority in accordance with Article 79 less: (a) participating DGS was paid in accordance with Article 75 of Directive 2014/59/EU; (b) means the participating DGS should have at the time of the determination if it had raised ex-ante contributions in accordance with Article 41j.Article 41c deleted Excess loss In case the participating DGS the amount the participating DGS the amount of available financial the amount of ex-post In case the funds of the the amount of any difference the the amount of available financial
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 409 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Part IIa – title I – chapter 2
[...]Chapter 2 deleted Co-insurance
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 425 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Part IIa – title I – chapter 3
[...]Chapter 3 deleted Full insurance
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 453 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Part IIa – title I – chapter 4 – title
Common provisions Conditions for coverage
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 458 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation No 806/2014
Article 41i – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. A participating DGS shall not be covered by EDIS in the reinsurance, co- insurance or full insurance phase, if the Commission, acting on its own initiative or upon a request of the Board or a participating Member State, decides and informs the Board accordingly, the DGS, the designated authority of the participating Member State within the meaning of point 18 of Article 2 of Directive 2014/49/EU, and the national competent authority or authorities, that at least one of the following disqualifying conditions is met:
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 464 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation No 806/2014
Article 41i – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the participating DGS has failed to comply with the obligations under this Regulation or under Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 10 of Directive 2014/49/EU;
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 468 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41i – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. The Board shall monitor compliance with the provisions set out in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) on a continuous basis. If the Board identifies instances of non-compliance with any of the obligations under paragraph 1 (a) and (b), it shall immediately inform the Commission thereof.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 469 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41i – paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. If the Commission considers that at least one of the disqualifying conditions is met, it shall deliver a letter of formal notice to the DGS concerned and to the designated authority of the participating Member State within the meaning of point 18 of Article 2 of Directive 2014/49/EU, as well as to the national competent authority or authorities. It shall also inform the Member State or Member States concerned. In that letter, the Commission shall set out the reasons for considering disqualifying the participating DGS from coverage by EDIS. Within two months of receipt of such formal notice, the designated authority, in close cooperation with the DGS concerned and the national competent authority, shall: (a) take prompt corrective action to address the shortcomings identified and to ensure that the disqualifying conditions are no longer met; (b) submit to the Commission a reply in which they set out in detail the corrective action they have taken.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 470 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41i – paragraph 1 c (new)
1c. The Commission shall disqualify the participating DGS from coverage by EDIS in accordance with paragraph 1, where it, having assessed the corrective action taken and consulted with the Board, considers that the DGS or the designated national authority remain non-compliant.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 471 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation No 806/2014
Article 41i – paragraph 2
2. When funding has already been obtained by a participating DGS and at least one of the disqualifying conditions referred to in paragraph 1 is met in relation to a payout event or a use in resolution, the Commission may order full or partial repayment of the funding to the DIFshall immediately order full repayment of the funding to the DIF within two years. The Member State in which the participating DGS is registered shall be held liable for full repayment, if, within the time limit set out in the first subparagraph, the participating DGS fails to repay in full the funding obtained.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 486 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41j – paragraph 1
1. A participating DGS shall only be reinsured, co-insured or fully insured by EDIS during the year following any of the dates set out below, if, by that date,insured by EDIS if its available financial means raised by contributions referred to in Article 10(1) of Directive 2014/49/EU amount to at least the following percentages0.60% of the total amount of covered deposits of all credit institutions affiliated to the participating DGS: – by 3 July 2017: 0.14%; – by 3 July 2018: 0.21%; – by 3 July 2019: 0.28%; – by 3 July 2020: 0.28%; – by 3 July 2021: 0.26%; – by 3 July 2022: 0.20%; – by 3 July 2023: 0.11%; – by 3 July 2024: 0%. This is without prejudice to the first subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 502 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation No 806/2014
Article 41j – paragraph 2
2. The Commission, after consulting the Board, may approve a derogation from the requirements set out in paragraph 1 for duly justified reasons linked to the business cycle in the respective Member State, the impact pro-cyclical contributions may have, or to a payout event which occurred at national levelonly where, at national level, a participating DGS has encountered a payout event or has been used in resolution in accordance with Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU or Article 79 of this Regulation. Thoseis derogations must be tempor shall last no longer than five yearys and may be subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 509 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 k
Where a participating DGS has been informed by the competent authority about, or has otherwise become aware of, circumstances relating to a credit institution affiliated to that participating DGS that are likely to result in a payout event or its use in resolution proceedings, it shall inform the Board about such circumstances without delay if it intends to request coverage by EDIS. In this case the participating DGS shall also provide the Board with an estimate of the expected liquidity shortfall or liquidity need.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 511 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 l – paragraph 1
1. In case a participating DGS encounters a payout event or is used in resolution in accordance with Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU or Article 79 of this Regulation, it shall immediately notify the Board and submit all necessary information in order to allow the Board to assess whether the conditions for the provision of funding and loss cover in accordance with Article 41a, 41d and 41h of this Regulation are met.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 523 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 n – paragraph 1
The Board shall provide funding under Articles 41a(2), 41d(2) and 41h(2) in accordance with the following provisions:
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 528 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 n – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
(ba) within 3 months of the determination referred to in Article 41m, the Board shall establish a repayment plan that ensures that the funding provided by the Board under Article 41n will be repaid in full within five years by the participating DGS.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 532 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – title
Article 41o Repayment of funding and determination of excess loss and loss
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 534 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 1
1. The participating DGS shall repay in full the funding provided by the Board under Article 41n, less the amount of any excess loss cover in case of coverage under Article 41a or any loss cover in case of coverage under Article 41d or Article 41h.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 536 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. The repayment plan established by the Board in accordance with Article 41n shall take into account: (a) the expected recoveries from the insolvency or resolution procedure of the credit institution concerned; and (b) the amount of ex-post contributions the participating DGS may raise in accordance with the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 10(8) of Directive 2014/49/EU within one calendar year, which shall include the amount raised in accordance with point (b) of Article 41b(1) of this Regulation.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 537 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. The following conditions for the repayment plan shall apply: (a) the minimum annual repayment by the participating DGS shall be 15 % of the funding provided by the Board under Article 41n; and (b) each year, the Board shall reassess the level of expected recoveries and recalibrate the repayment plan for the remaining years in accordance with that assessment.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 538 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 2
2. Until the termination of the insolvency or resolution procedure, the Board shall determine, on an annual basis, the amount the participating DGS has already recovered from the insolvency procedure or has already been paid in accordance with Article 75 of Directive 2014/59/EU. The participating DGS shall provide to the Board all information necessary to make this determination. The participating DGS shall pay to the Board a share of that amount which corresponds to the share that is covered by EDIS in accordance with Article 41a, Article 41d or Article 41h.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 541 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 3
3. In case of coverage under Article 41a, tThe participating DGS shall also pay to the Board, by the end of the first calendar year after the funding was provided, an amount equal to the ex-post contributions that the participating DGS may raise within one calendar year in accordance with the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 10(8) of Directive 2014/49/EU, less the amount of ex-post contributions it raised in accordance with point (b) of Article 41b(1) of this Regulation. This amount of ex-post contributions to be paid to the Board by the participating DGS by the end of the first calendar year after the funding was provided shall not exceed the liquidity shortfall as set out in Article 41b.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 544 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. The repayment plan shall also establish the refunding path for the participating DGS to return to its target level as set out in Article 41j. The minimum yearly refunding of the participating DGS to return to its target level shall be 0.05 % of covered deposits or the amount remaining until the target level has been reached. In the event of insufficient funds, the repayment plan shall provide that the repayment of the funds provided by the DIF to the participating DGS shall take priority over the refunding of the participating DGS.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 545 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 3 b (new)
3b. The Member State in which the participating DGS is registered shall be held liable for full repayment, if the participating DGS fails to repay in full the funding obtained within the time limit set out in point (b a) of Article 41n.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 546 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 4
4. After the termination of the insolvency procedure or resolution procedure of the credit institution concerned, the Board shall without delay determine the excess loss in accordance with Article 41d or the loss in accordance with Article 41h. Where this determination results in a repayment obligation of the participating DGS that differs from the amounts repaid in accordance with the second and third paragraph, the difference shall be settled between the Board and the participating DGS without delay.deleted
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 558 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 50 a – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) once the net accumulated use of the DIF in the last consecutive 12 months reaches the threshold of 25% of the final target level, evaluateevaluate, an annual basis, the application of EDIS, in particular the use of the DIF, and provide guidance which the executive session shall follow in subsequent payout decisions, in particular, if appropriate, differentiating between the provision of funding and loss cover;
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 565 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 54 – paragraph 2 – point g
(g) determine the payout loss and loss cover in accordance with Article 41o;deleted
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 572 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 a – paragraph 1
1. The DIF is hereby established. It shall be filled by risk-based contributions owed to the Board by credit institutions affiliated to participating DGSs. The risk-based contributions shall be calculated and invoiced, on behalf of the Board, by participating DGSs by the Board.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 576 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 a – paragraph 1a (new)
1a. The risk-based contributions to be paid by credit institutions to participating DGSs shall be calculated and invoiced by the participating DGSs.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 578 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 a – paragraph 2
2. The Board shall use the DIF only in order to provide the funding to, and cover the losses of, participating DGS in the different stages set out in Article 1(2) andliquidity support to participating DGS in accordance with the objectives and the principles governing EDIS referred to in Article 6. Under no circumstances shall the Union budget or the national budgets be held liable for expenses or losses of the Fund.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 581 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 a – paragraph 3
3. The owner of the DIF shall be the Board. The Board's activities under this Regulation may under no circumstances engage the budgetary liability of the Member States. This is without prejudice to Articles 41a (4 a), 41i (2), 41o (3 b) and 74g (3 a).
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 585 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 a – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. The DIF shall consist of: (a) individual risk-based subfunds, which are to be filled by each participating DGS; (b) a joint European risk-based subfund, which is to be filled by all participating DGSs.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 588 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 a – paragraph 3b (new)
3b. When liquidity shortfall as set out in Article 41b is made available to a participating DGS, this shall be financed from: (a) in the first instance, the individual risk-based subfund of the participating DGS that receives the support; (b) in the second instance and after the individual risk-based subfund is exhausted, the joint risk-based subfund; (c) in the third instance and after the joint risk-based subfund is exhausted, the individual risk-based subfunds of all other participating DGSs, proportionate to the level of covered deposit of the participating DGSs.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 593 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 b – paragraph 1
1. By the end of the re3 July of the third year following the date of application set by the legislative act referred to in surance periodbparagraph 2 of Article 1 (2 a), the available financial means of the DIF shall reach an initial target level of 205 % of four ninth of the sum of thethe aggregated minimum target levels that participating DGSs shall reach in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 602 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 b – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. The target level for each individual risk-based subfund shall be equal to 12.5% of the minimum target level that participating DGSs shall reach in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 605 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 b – paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. The target level for the joint European risk-based subfund shall be equal to 12.5 % of the aggregated minimum target level that participating DGSs shall reach in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 608 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 b – paragraph 1 c (new)
1c. The individual risk-based subfunds and the joint risk-based subfund shall each adhere to the following funding path as a percentage of covered deposits: – by 3 July of the first year following the date of application set by the legislative act referred to in subparagraph 2 of Article 1 (2 a): 0,04%; – by 3 July of the second year following the date of application set by the legislative act referred to in subparagraph 2 of Article 1 (2 a): 0,07%; – by 3 July of the third year following the date of application set by the legislative act referred to in subparagraph 2 of Article 1 (2 a): 0,1%.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 615 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 b – paragraph 2
2. By the end of the co-insurance period the available financial means of the DIF shall reach the sum of the minimum target levels that participating DGSs shall reach under the first subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU.deleted
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 621 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 b – paragraph 3
3. During the reinsurance and co- insurance periods contributions to the DIF calculated in accordance with Article 74c shall be spread out in time as evenly as possible until the respective target level is reachdeleted.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 628 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 b – paragraph 4
4. After the target level specified in paragraph 2 has been reached for the first time and where the available financial means have subsequently been reduced to less than two-thirds of the target level, the contributions calculated in accordance with Article 74c shall be set at a level allowing to reach the target level within six years.deleted
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 632 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 b – paragraph 5
5. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 93 to specify the following: (a) time of the contributions to the DIF calculated under paragraph 2; (b) criteria for establishing the annual contributions provided for in paragraph 4.criteria for the spreading out in
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 639 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 1
1. Each year during the reinsurance and co-insurance period, the Board shall, after consulting the ECB and the national competent authority and in close cooperation with the participating DGSs and designated authorities, determine for each participating DGS the total amount of ex-ante contributions that it may claim from the credit institutions affiliated to the respective participating DGS in order to reach or maintain the target levels provided for in Article 74b. The total amount of contributions shall not exceed the target levels provided for in Article 74b (1) and (2).
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 648 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
During the reinsurance period each participating DGS shall calculate, on the basis of the total amount determined by the Board under paragraph 1,The Board shall invoice and collect the required contributions of the participating DGSs. For their part, the participating DGSs shall invoice and collect the contribution of each affiliated credit institution affiliated to it. It shall apply the risk-based method established by the delegated act according to the second subparagraph of paragraph 5. Both the Board and the participating DGS shall do so on an annual basis. The contributions are due on 31 May of each year.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 651 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
After the reinsurance period, the Board itself shall calculate the contribution of each credit institution affiliated to a participating DGS. The Board shall apply the risk-based method established by the delegated act according to the third subparagraph of paragraph 5s regards the individual risk-based subfund, participating DGSs may collect the required amount of risk-based contributions from affiliated credit institutions using their own methodology.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 655 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
In all stages of EDIS the participating DGS shall invoice, on behalf of the Board, the contribution of each credit institution on an annual basis. Credit institutions shall pay the invoiced amount directly to the Board. The contributions shall become due on 31 May of each yearAs regards the joint risk-based subfund, the Board shall determine the required total amount of risk-based contributions to be raised by the participating DGSs using an additional risk-based methodology to determine the share to be paid by each participating DGS in accordance with paragraph 5.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 663 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 4
4. The contributions that credit institutions affiliated to a participating DGS pay into the DIF in accordance with this Article shall count towards the minimum target level that the participating DGS shall reach in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU. If the participating DGS, by 3 July 2024 or any later date, has followed the funding path set out in Article 41j and credit institutions affiliated to it paid to the DIF all ex-ante contributions that, until 3 July 2024, had to be paid to the DIF, these contributions shall constitute the full contribution owed in order to reach the target level in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU. Member States may provide that a participating DGS may consider the contributions that credit institutions affiliated to it paid into the DIF when setting the level of their ex-ante contributions or may reimburse these credit institutions from its available financial means to the extent they exceed the amounts set out in Article 41j on the relevant date.deleted
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 670 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
The Commission ishall be empowered to adopt a delegated acts in accordance with Article 93 in order to specifyupplement this Regulation by specifying, in accordance with this paragraph, a risk-based method for the calculation of risk-based contributions in accordance withof participating DGSs to the joint risk-based subfund as referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 677 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
It shall adopt onethat delegated act specifying the method for the calculation of risk- based contributions payable toby participating DGSs and, for the reinsurance period only, to the DIFto the joint risk-based subfund. In thisat delegated act the calculation of these contributions shall be based on the amount of covered deposits and the degree of risk incurred by each credit institutionparticipating DGS relative to all other credit institutions affiliated to the same participating DGSs.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 678 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 a (new)
The risk-based contributions to be paid by participating DGSs to the joint risk-based subfund shall range between 50 % and 200 % aggregate risk weighting (ARW) of covered deposits.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 680 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 b (new)
On the basis of that delegated act and in accordance with the criteria laid down in subparagraph 4, the Board shall place participating DGSs in one of the following seven different ARW categories: (a) 50% ARW of risk-based contributions to the joint risk-based subfund; (b) 75% ARW of risk-based contributions to the joint risk-based subfund; (c) 100% ARW of risk-based contributions to the joint risk-based subfund; (d) 125% ARW of risk-based contributions to the joint risk-based subfund; (e) 150% ARW of risk-based contributions to the joint risk-based subfund; (f) 175% ARW of risk-based contributions to the joint risk-based subfund; (g) 200% ARW of risk-based contributions to the joint risk-based subfund.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 681 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 c (new)
The Board may set a wider interval upon the duly justified grounds that the limitation of the interval to 50%-200% does not sufficiently reflect the differences in business models and risk profiles of participating DGSs and would artificially group together participating DGSs with very different risk profiles.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 683 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 3
It shall adopt a second delegated act specifying the method for the calculation of the contributions payable to the DIF as from the co-insurance period. In this second delegated act the calculation shall be based on the amount of covered deposits and the degree of risk incurred by each credit institution relative to all other credit institutions referred to in point (b) of Article 2(2).
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 686 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
BothThe delegated acts referred to in the first subparagraph shall include a calculation formula, specific indicators, risk classes for memberparticipating DGSs, thresholds for risk weights assigned to specific risk classes, and other necessary elements. The degree of risk shall be assessed on the basis of the following criteria:
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 691 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point a
(a) the level of loss absorbing capacity of thecredit institutions affiliated to a participating DGS;
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 692 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point b
(b) the ability of credit institutions abffilityated to a participating DGS to meet its their short- and long-term obligations;
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 694 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point c
(c) the stability and variety of the institutions sources of funding and itssources of funding of credit institutions affiliated to a participating DGS and their unencumbered highly liquid assets;
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 698 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point d
(d) the quality of the assets of credit institutions assetsffiliated to a participating DGS;
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 701 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point e
(e) the institution’s business model and management of credit institutions affiliated to a participating DGS;
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 704 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point f
(f) the degree to which the assets of credit institutions assetsffiliated to a participating DGS are encumbered.;
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 709 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point f a (new)
(fa) the potential for a participating DGS to achieve a full and timely recovery from insolvency procedures;
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 714 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point f b (new)
(fb) the level and diversification of exposure to sovereign debt by credit institutions affiliated to a participating DGS.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 721 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 d
Article 74d Extraordinary ex-post contributions 1. period, the available financial means are not sufficient to cover the losses, costs or other expenses incurred by the DIF following a payout event, extraordinary ex-post contributions from the credit institutions affiliated to participating DGSs shall be raised in order to cover the additional amounts. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 3, the amount of ex- post contributions to be raised shall be equal to the shortfall of available financial means but shall not exceed the maximum share of total covered deposits of all credit institutions within the scope of EDIS laid down by delegated act of the Commission in accordance with paragraph 5. 2. contribution of each credit-institution affiliated to each participating DGS. It shall apply the risk-based method specified in the delegated act adopted by the Commission in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 74c(5). The third subparagraph of Article 74c(2) shall apply by analogy. 3. initiative after consulting the relevant competent authority, or upon proposal by the relevant competent authority, defer, in whole or in part, in accordance with the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 4, an institution's payment of extraordinary ex-post contributions if it is necessary to protect its financial position. Such a deferral shall not be granted for a period of longer than six months but may be renewed on request of the institution. The contributions deferred pursuant to this paragraph shall be made later at a point in time when the payment no longer jeopardises the institution's financial position. 4. empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 93 to specify the annual limits referred to in paragraph 1 and the circumstances and conditions under which the payment of ex-post contributions by an entity referred to in point (b) of Article 2(2) may be partially or entirely deferred pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article.deleted Where, after the reinsurance The Board shall itself calculate the The Board shall, on its own The Commission shall be
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 730 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 d a (new)
Article 74da Attribution of repaid funding to subfunds 1. The Board shall attribute the received repayments of the funding provided to a participating DGS for a particular insolvency or resolution case to the different subfunds of the DIF. 2. To the extent necessary, received repayments will first be used to repay any alternative funding that was contracted by the Board for the purpose of providing funding to a participating DGS for a particular insolvency or resolution case. 3. Once all alternative funding is repaid, the allocation of the received repayments shall occur in the reverse order of the hierarchy established by Article 74a(3b). This allocation shall be based on the amount of funding provided from each subfund to a participating DGS for a particular insolvency or resolution case.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 739 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 g – paragraph 1
1. The Board may contract for the DIF borrowings or other forms of support from institutions, financial institutions or other third parties, which offer better financial terms, at the most appropriate time so as to optimise the cost of funding and preserve its reputation. The proceeds of such borrowings shall be used exclusively to meet payment obligations towards participating DGSs, in the event that the amounts raised in accordance with Articles 74c and 74d are not immediately accessible or do not cover the amounts claimed from the DIF in relation to payout events.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 742 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 g – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Where the Board decides to make a disbursement from the DIF to the participating DGS, the Board shall raise temporary funding by alternative means, such as from capital markets, to the equivalent of that determined disbursement in order to maintain, to the greatest extent possible, the target level and the disbursement capacity of the DIF. The temporary funding shall cover the period between the provision of liquidity shortfall to a participating DGS and the repayment in accordance with Articles 41n, 41o and 74 d a. The borrowing costs of such lending shall be borne by the affiliated participating DGS. The DIF shall subrogate to the claims which the participating DGS has, in accordance with Article 9(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU, on the credit institution concerned. It may use those claims as collateral for raising the alternative means of funding. This is without prejudice to the role of the participating DGS in collecting the deposit claims which it subrogated to in accordance with Article 9(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU. The repayment of the funding provided in accordance with Article 41o shall be used to repay the funds raised from alternative means, including interest payments.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 747 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 g – paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. The total amount of outstanding borrowings or other forms of support contracted by the Board for the DIF in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 1a shall not be higher than 25% of the aggregated minimum target level that participating DGSs shall reach in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 748 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 g – paragraph 2
2. The borrowing or other forms of support referred to in paragraph 1 shall be fully recoupepaid in accordance with paragraph 1a and Articles 74c and 74da.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 749 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 g – paragraph 3
3. Any expenses incurred by the use of the borrowings specified in paragraph 1 shall be borne by Part III of the budget of the Board and not by the Union budget or the participating Member StatesDGS concerned.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 751 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 g – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. The Member State in which the participating DGS is registered shall be liable for the liquidity shortfall of the participating DGS, when all available financial means of the DIF have been depleted, and when the DIF has, in accordance with paragraph 1b, exhausted the measures set out in paragraph 1 and 1a.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON