37 Amendments of Sander LOONES related to 2018/2101(INI)
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2
Citation 2
– having regard to the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the ECB, in particular Article 15 and article 21 thereof,
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 3
Citation 3
– having regard to Article 123, Article 127(1) and (2) and Article 284 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)
Citation 6 a (new)
– having regard to the Annual Economic Report 2017 of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS),
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas the measuring of inflation used by the ECB is restricted to consumer prices and ignores the development of asset prices;
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)
Recital I a (new)
Ia. Whereas there is still uncertainty and scepticism whether the APP falls within the scope of mandate of the ECB and constitutes de facto fiscal financing policy2a; _________________ 2a DG IPOL "Policy options and risks of an extension of the ECB’s quantitative easing programme: An analysis", PE 569.994.
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas the ECB Governing Council confirmed its expectations to keep the key interest ratesinterest rate on the main refinancing operations and the interest rates on the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility unchanged at 0.00%, 0.25% and - 0.40% respectively unchanged until at least the end of summer 2019, and in any event until there has been a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its medium-term objective;
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
K. whereas at the end of 2017 the size of the Eurosystem balance sheet had reached an all-time high of EUR 4.5 trillion, growing by 0.8 trillion compared to the end of 2016; whereas concerns continue to exist that the balance sheet of the ECB contains rising levels of risk;
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L a (new)
Recital L a (new)
La. whereas the members of the ECB Executive Board have consistently emphasised the importance of implementing productivity-enhancing structural reforms in the euro area, as well as growth-friendly fiscal policies, within the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact;
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L b (new)
Recital L b (new)
Lb. whereas Article 123 TFEU and Article 21 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank prohibit the monetary financing of governments;
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Whereas a decade after the outbreak of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), and after real GDP has expanded for five consecutive years, the monetary policy stance of the ECB has remained extraordinary accommodative,
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Notes that the EU economy grew at its fastest rate in 10 years in 2017 and that all Member States saw their economies expand; welcomes the role ofnotes the impact of the extraordinary accommodative monetary policy pursued by the ECB and the structural reforms undertaken in some Member States as part of the ongoing cyclical recovery; regrets that the heavy reliance on monetary policy to support the post-crisis recovery has also had unintended negative consequences
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Notes that the EU economy grew at its fastest rate in 10 years in 2017 and that all Member States saw their economies expand; welcomes the role of the ECB and the structural reforms undertaken in some Member States as part of the ongoing recovery;
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Recalls that both monetary and fiscal expansions work to a considerable extent by bringing spending forward in time; believes that the structural contribution that monetary policy makes to sustainable growth is limited; urges policy makers to maintain the current economic upswing beyond the short term by taking productivity-enhancing structural reforms;
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Warns, however, of the rise of uncertainties, which stem from the threat of increased protectionism, the Brexit negotiations and rising divergences between Member States on the future of European integrationconcerns on increased deficits and the sustainability of debt burdens in some countries, among other causes;
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Emphasises the great importance, at this juncture, of maintaining a favourable environment for public and private investment, which is still lagging behind pre-crisis levels; encouragerecalls theat ECB to take the necessary measures, in line with its mandate, to help realise this objective;can have favourable effects on financing conditions and investment, but warns that credit driven expansions can lead to a costly misallocation of real resources(“malinvestments”),
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Considers that monetary policy alone is not sufficient to achieve a sustainable economic recovery, and that investments should be encouraged, as well as structural reforms in the Member States;
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Notes the ECB’s positive viewview on risk reduction and on the establishment of a European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) as the third pillar of the banking union; recognises that risk sharing is, as ECB President Draghi has stated, an effective rreduction measures are essential building blocks laying the foundations for an EDIS; notes, in thisk reduction method and that thespect, the Commission’s more proportionate ‘new approach’ two should go hand in handan EDIS as put forward in its communication of 11 October 2017;
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Regrets that the ECB has still not been able to start the normalisation of monetary policy and fears that the business cycle could turn even before interest rates have become positive; notes that the ECB has limited tools left at its disposal to fight a possible next financial crisis; warns that also governments have very limited fiscal space tools to react to it; suggests making private and public debt restructuring easier in order to cope with the next financial crisis
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5b. Warns that according to the BIS there have been signs of a build-up of financial imbalances, especially in countries largely spared by the GFC because, in contrast to countries at the heart of the turmoil, no private sector deleveraging has taken place there; notes that the imbalances have taken the form of strong increases in private sector credit, often alongside similar increases in property prices;
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. StressNotes that the ECB’s non- standard monetary policy measures have proven successful in forestalling the risks of deflation that were still present at the beginning of 2016 and in initiating a recovery in credit tokept interest rates low, thereby forestalling member states and highly indebted private enterprises from defaulting on their unsustainable debts; notes that in the private sector, whose annual growth was around 3 % in mid-2018 compared to 0 % in 2015;
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Stresses that the ECB’s non- standard monetary policy measures have ostensibly proven successful in forestalling the risks of deflation that were still present at the beginning of 2016 and in initiating a recovery in credit to the private sector, whose annual growth was around 3 % in mid-2018 compared to 0 % in 2015;
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Calls for vigilance against the risk of a resurgence in real estate bubbles and excessive household and private sector indebtedness in some Member States;
Amendment 137 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Considers that the ECB bond- buying programmes violate at least the intent, if not the letter, of Article 123 TFEU; urges the ECB to refrain from assuming a political role and monetary financing government deficits;
Amendment 143 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Urges countries with high level of debts to reduce them before interest rates start to rise again, as this would reveal that the level of government debt has indeed risen to unsustainable levels, possibly leading to a new sovereign debt crisis
Amendment 154 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Welcomes the transparency provided by the ECB through its forward guidance; deems it appropriate to keep interest rates low, in the light of uncertainties in the global environmenturges the ECB to normalize interest rates as soon ats presentossible;
Amendment 155 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Welcomes the transparency provided by the ECB through its forward guidance; deems it appropriate to keep interest rates low, in the light of uncertainties in the global environmentstart normalising monetary policy as soon ats presentossible;
Amendment 157 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Recognises the existence of distributional consequences of the ECB policies; believes that wealth inequality has been exacerbated by the inflation of financial asset prices as financial assets are primarily held by the very wealthy;
Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 b (new)
Paragraph 11 b (new)
11b. notes that the ECB's measurement of inflation is focused on consumer prices and does not take into account unsustainable asset price developments such as real estate bubbles; asks the ECB to evaluate including asset prices into its measurement of inflation; calls on Eurostat to incorporate the owner- occupied housing price index into HICP in order to make the ECB policies more responsive to development in the housing market;
Amendment 160 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 c (new)
Paragraph 11 c (new)
11c. Welcomes the commitments made by Commissioner Vestager in the structured dialogue with the Committee for Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 November 2017 to reflect on possible distortions of competition arising from the European Central Bank’s Corporate Sector Purchase Programme and to report back with a qualitative answer; emphasises, in this regard, that the notion of selectivity in state aid is an essential criterion that needs to be investigated thoroughly; further points in this regard to Article 4(3) TEU, which contains the so-called principle of loyalty;
Amendment 170 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Calls for the continuationphasing out of the targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO), which provide banks with medium-term financing at attractive conditions and in accordance with their efforts to grant new credit to the real economy;
Amendment 173 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Reiterates its concern about the increase in TARGET2 balances indicating continued capital outflows from the euro area periphery; and calls on the ECB to clarify the underlying factors and the potential risks relating to the imbalances that this could cause;
Amendment 174 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Is concerned that certain southern European countries have profited in a disproportionate way from the PSPP, since national central banks and the ECB have purchased Spanish and Italian government bonds whose volume exceeds Spain's and Italy's share in GDP by respectively 43 billion and 51 billion euros, well above the average of 14.4% of GDP for the entire Eurozone; stresses that this strengthens the suspicion that the main goal of the PSPP is fiscal stabilisation of southern Europe, which falls outside the scope of the mandate of the ECB.
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Believes that a stronger EMU requires first and foremost decisive actions at the national level and full compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact; believes far-reaching transfers of competence to the European level are unnecessary; underlines that a fiscal capacity as a shock-absorber is not required since governments with access to financial markets can play this role themselves;
Amendment 212 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Stresses the importance of the ECB being accountable towards Parliament; welcomes, in this respect, the permanent dialogue between the ECB and Parliament, and the regular appearances of the President of the ECB and, where applicable, other Members of the Executive Board, before the ECON committee and Plenary; encourages the ECB to continue this dialogue and, when necessary, to better explain its decisions and policies; decides to review and improve the setup of the monetary dialogue following the examples of the UK Parliament and the US Congress and the feedback provided by the monetary experts commissioned by ECON in March 2014(see PE 518.753);
Amendment 215 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Regrets the negative attitude of the ECB regarding the European Ombudsman’s case 1697/2016/ANA on the ECB President’s membership in the “Group of Thirty”; calls on the ECB to put an end to the President's membership of the G30, to re-examine the Ombudsman’s recommendations and to carefully review its internal policies in order to protect itself from potential cognitive capture by the financial sector;
Amendment 226 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Recalls the Parliaments demands that the ECB should ensure the independence of the members of its internal Audit Committee; urges the ECB, in order to prevent conflicts of interest, to publish declarations of financial interests for its Governing Council members; urges the ECB to ensure that the Ethics Committee is not chaired by a former President or other past members of the Governing Council of the ECB, nor by anyone liable to conflict of interest; calls the ECB Governing Council to follow the EU Staff Regulations and Code of Conduct and require a two-year professional abstention period for its outgoing members after the conclusion of their mandate;
Amendment 230 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21b. Calls for a full external audit of the ECB;