14 Amendments of Miguel URBÁN CRESPO related to 2018/0256M(NLE)
Amendment 4 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that Morocco is a privileged EU partner in the Southern Neighbourhood, with which the EU has built up a strong and broad partnership that covers political, economic and social aspects, but also security and migration; reiterates, nevertheless, that political, economic and trade interests can never take priority over respecting and upholding human rights and international law;
Amendment 14 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Stresses that it is important for this agreement to give guarantees regarding respect for international law, including human rights, in the territories concerned; in this regard, condemns the human rights violations taking place in both Occupied Western Sahara and Morocco, and points out that this is in breach of the human rights clause, which legally speaking is regarded as a key part of the trade agreements ratified by the European Union;
Amendment 21 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Deplores the flagrant breaches of human rights committed in occupied Western Sahara, including infringements of the freedom of expression and of assembly that the European Commission has recognised, the torture and abuse reported by political prisoners, unfair trials, crackdowns on demonstrations (including cases of torture and murder), and observers and the international press being prevented from freely entering the occupied territories; condemns, furthermore, the breaches of basic rights committed on Moroccan territory: the jailing,often following unfair trials, of journalists and demonstrators calling for social justice and political rights, the failure to investigate reports of prisoners or detainees being tortured, impunity with regard to past breaches of human rights, and the excessive use of force against migrants;
Amendment 27 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes that this agreemente European Union does not imply recognition ofse Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara and that the EU’s position remains that of supporting UN efforts to secure a fair, lasting and mutually acceptable settlement of the Western Sahara conflict, on the basis of the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people and in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions; reiterates, therefore, its full support to the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Mr Horst Köhler, in helping the parties to achieve this settlement; points out that the inclusion of occupied Western Sahara in the EU-Morocco agreement undermines the UN peace process and the chances of reaching an agreement to put an end to the conflict; takes the view, furthermore, that restricting the application of the agreement to Sahrawi territory under Moroccan occupation exacerbates the division of territory in the Sahara and is a breach of international law, including the fundamental principle of territorial integrity;
Amendment 35 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Takes the view that, if the European Union wishes to back UN efforts to guarantee a solution to the conflict in Western Sahara and support the new round of talks which is to be launched in Geneva in December after the negotiations had been on ice since 2012, it would not be a good signal to send, and far less a sign of support for the successful development of the negotiations, for the European Parliament (including the relevant committees) to vote in favour of this agreement;
Amendment 46 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
Amendment 56 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Points out that the Court of Justice of the European Union clearly ruled in its judgment of 21 December 2016 that no trade or association agreement with Morocco could be applied to the territory of Western Sahara, recognising the latter as a different and separate territory from Morocco, to which it is not linked through any tie of sovereignty; points out that in point 106 of that ruling, the Court stated that the people of Western Sahara were to be regarded as a third party in EU- Morocco relations, and that in order for any bilateral agreement to affect the third-party territory of Western Sahara, express consent must be obtained from the Sahrawi people;
Amendment 61 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 b (new)
Paragraph 4 b (new)
4b. Is deeply concerned at the insufficient consultation procedure carried out by the Commission, as a result of which it has not been possible to obtain the free and informed consent of the Sahrawi people; points out that the Polisario Front, as recognised by the United Nations, is the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people and that the conclusion of an agreement without their consent constitutes an infringement of the rights of the peoples of non-autonomous territories whose interests must be paramount, as laid down in Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations;
Amendment 63 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 c (new)
Paragraph 4 c (new)
4c. Expresses concern at civil society reports that 83% of the associations or groups included on the list of stakeholders annexed to Commission staff working document SWD(2018) 346 final which the Commission says took part in a ‘consultation’ on trade in Western Sahara, were never asked to take part, or did not take part, in any consultation process; regrets the fact that the Commission, rather than seeking the consent of the people of Western Sahara, carried out a consultation procedure in which it only actually listened to Moroccan elected officials and business people, and four Moroccan civil society organisations;
Amendment 65 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 d (new)
Paragraph 4 d (new)
4d. Rejects the idea of replacing the notion of the Sahrawi ‘people’ by the notion of ‘population’, which now comprises a majority of Moroccan colonists and excludes the majority of the people of Western Sahara, who fled their territory either during the war or as a result of the grave human rights situation under the Moroccan occupation; condemns the fact that the 173 000 Sahrawi refugees living in the Tindouf refugee camps have not been consulted;
Amendment 67 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 e (new)
Paragraph 4 e (new)
4e. Points out that in point 106 of the Court of Justice’s judgment of 21 December 2016 it is established that the benefits of a trade agreement are irrelevant when assessing its legality; expresses concern at the fact that Commission has been unable to provide reliable information on preferential imports of products from Western Sahara to back up the claim that the agreement is beneficial for the territory, given that the Commission acknowledges that it is ‘generally impossible to distinguish between Moroccan imports and imports from Western Sahara’; points out that the Commission has also admitted that it is impossible to distinguish between the Sahrawi and Moroccan populations when it comes to benefits in terms of jobs, but recognises that the proportion of Sahrawi employees in the relevant sectors is minimal; as there is insufficient comparative data, is doubtful that the Commission will be able to carry out an appropriate impact assessment with regard to the new agreement that is on the table; with that in mind, calls for the products concerned to be labelled correctly, and calls on the Commission to press ahead with efforts to improve this aspect, especially with a view to compiling clear, reliable statistics;
Amendment 68 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 f (new)
Paragraph 4 f (new)
4f. Given that the new agreement fails to comply with the judgment handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union, emphasises the legal uncertainty that would be created if it were to be implemented, bearing in mind the possibility of a fresh application being brought before the courts; points out that the trade relations established under this new agreement could be subject to subsequent legal action for damages, including compensation;
Amendment 69 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
Amendment 77 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Highlights the doubts that certain Member States, social organisations, the Polisario Front and the European Parliament’s Legal Service have expressed about the possible legal and political repercussions that consenting to this agreement would have with regard to the exercise of Western Sahara’s right to self-determination; in this regard, calls for the agreement to be rejected because it does not comply with any of the relevant elements of the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and therefore calls on the Committee on International Trade, as the committee responsible, to propose that Parliament decline to give its consent;