BETA

Activities of Gunnar BECK related to 2020/2122(INI)

Plenary speeches (1)

Banking Union - annual report 2020 (debate)
2021/10/06
Dossiers: 2020/2122(INI)

Amendments (35)

Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 43 a (new)
— having regard to the answer by Commissioner Johansson to parliamentary question E-003462/2020,
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 43 b (new)
— having regard to Article 140(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 43 c (new)
— having regard to the ECB´s Targeted Review of Internal Models, published April 2021,
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 43 d (new)
— having regard to the answer of Commission Vice-President Dombrovskis to written question E-003152/2019,
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas overall, the banking sector has responded to the COVID-19 pandemic with resilience, mostly founded on the regulatory reforms enacted since the global financial crisis and further supported by extraordinary public poliincreased capital requirements, indicating that equity and solvency arelief measures and capital conservation practices key to tackle financial and economic shocks instead of ever- increasing debt financing;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas climate change, environmental degradation, increased red tape in the context of climate reporting for financial institutions, which could be referred to as "green tape", and the transition to a low-carbon economy bring new risks to banks’ balance sheets;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
D a. Expresses deep concern about the findings of the ECB´s Targeted Review of Internal Models, published in April 2021, which shows that the biggest euro area banks have repeatedly been too optimistic in their risk-modelling, confirming longstanding suspicions among regulators and analysts that larger banks have often artificially inflated the strength of their balance sheets by underestimating the riskiness of their assets, giving them a short-term advantage over more cautious competitors; is alarmed that the Review resulted in more than 5.800 deficiencies and 253 supervisory corrections of internal models by the ECB, which pushed up the banks’ risk-weighted assets by € 275 billion, a 12 per cent increase in the models examined, which reduced their average common equity tier one ratios by 0.71 percentage points;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas consumer protection varies across the Banking Union; Article 169 of the TFEU states that EU measures shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent consumer protection measures provided that they are compatible with the Treaties; in this way EU law provides a common basic level of protection to all consumers residing in the EU; recalls that there is no consistent and uniform definition of consumer protection in EU law, which justifies divergences amongst the Member States;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas prudential and anti-money laundering supervision is necessary; there are still important loopholes in the EU AML framework, such as the explicit exemption of the non- profit sector from anti-money laundering reporting requirements, even though certain NGOs and other non-financial entities (NFEs) operate with larger amounts of money than numerous European banks;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
G. whereas the withdrawal of the UK from the EU has resulted in the relocation of certain banking services to the EU;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
J. whereas depositors across the Banking Union should enjoy the sameare exposed to varying levels of credit, market and operational risk, which justifies varying levels of protection;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. WelcomeRegrets the entry of Bulgaria and Croatia into the Banking Union; especially in the light of both countries' sharp drop in the Corruption Perception Index 2020, where Bulgaria now takes last place, and increasing worries about corruption in Croatia, such as the contested government order forcing banks to retroactively convert loans from Swiss francs to euros and pay out over € 1.1 billion in reimbursement to customers it had lent money to, as well as ongoing corruption charges against the HDZ party (EPP), the Agrokor scandal involving finance minister Maric, or the Sanader case; calls on the EU not to expand the euro area with such corrupt regimes;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Recalls that the Commission assessed in the 2020 Country Specific Recommendations for Croatia that despite several Action Plans, issues of corruption and conflicts of interest remain widespread in Croatia, and that further efforts to strengthen the prevention and sanction of corruption are needed to ensure the transparent and efficient use of public funds; recalls that Article 140(1) TFEU requires the Commission and European Central Bank’s convergence reports to take account of "other factors" relevant to economic integration and convergence, such as corruption; recalls that the Commission criticized Bulgaria in its 2020 Rule of Law report for its disregard for the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary; concludes that Bulgaria and Croatia are not ready for accession to the Banking Union;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Recalls thatwhereas the Banking Union has delivered the institutional set-up for greater market integration, through the SSM and the SRM, while a European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) is still lackingwill further disintegrate due to moral hazard and lead to a permanent Transfer Union if mechanisms such as the backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) are implemented; regrets that insufficient progress in risk reduction in some member states serves as an argument for mutualisation of deposit insurance schemes, creating incentives for some member states not to reduce risk, or even engage in even more excessive risk-taking; points out that the absence of a proper impact assessment of the EDIS proposal is fundamentally at odds with the principles of sound governance;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Considers that banks’ response to the current crisis demonstrates that the regulatory reforms in the past decade, as well as the institutional set-up, have resulted in better-capitalised and less- leveraged banks, proving that equity and not debt is the solution to solve crises and build up resilience against economic and financial shocks;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Takes the view that supervision continues to focus too much on credit risk, underestimating the importance of financial risk;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3b. Calls on the supervisory authorities to monitor financial risks closely, in particular those linked to the shadow banking system, and to take appropriate steps wherever necessary; calls on the supervisory authorities, further, to monitor closely aspects linked to the professionalism of and generational change in governance, in particular in the smallest banks;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Considers that while the good relationship between the SSM and the SRB has been fundamental from the inception of the system, a strengthened approach to cooperation between the two pillars is particularly important in the current context;deleted
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 113 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Underlines the vital contribution to addressing the crisis of public guarantee schemes, moratoria on loan repayments for borrowers in financial difficulty, the central banks’ liquidity programmes and the ECB’s targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO) and pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP)Deplores the ECB's role in massively inflating the money supply and expanding its balance sheet up to over 70% of euro area GDP; recalls that banks in the northern euro area hold a disproportionately high amount of deposits with the ECB, and pay disproportionately high penalty interest to the ECB; by contrast, banks in the southern euro area benefit disproportionally from the negative interest rates on TLTRO loans;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Deplores that PEPP has had an overwhelming influence on the narrowing of yield spreads and has ensured that southern European government bonds from highly indebted Member States were viewed by investors as less risky5a, which shows that PEPP is disproportionately directed towards highly indebted euro area Member States, and that the ECB is thereby guaranteeing the liquidity of highly indebted euro countries; _________________ 5aLeibniz Centre for European Economic Research, https://www.zew.de/presse/pressearchiv/di e-stabilitaet-der-eurozone-haengt-am- tropf-der-ezb
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5 b. Recalls that The Targeted Long- Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs) further zombify the European economy and deteriorate the real income prospects, especially of young Europeans;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 c (new)
5 c. Calls on the ECB to end its stimulus package immediately, including phasing out TLTRO;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. NotesExpresses concern about the the ‘quick fix’ to the Capital Requirements Regulation31 extending transitional arrangements in order to support banks’ lending capacity32 ; seriously doubts whether supporting further debt- financing is a sustainable way to recapitalize the European economy and to fostering economic growth; _________________ 31Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1). 32 Regulation (EU) 2020/873 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 575/2013 and (EU) 2019/876 as regards certain adjustments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (OJ L 204, 26.6.2020, p. 4).
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 160 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Notes the accelerated pace of digitalisation in the banking sector, while pointing to the insufficient level of investment in this arealooks forward to the further development of DORA and its effect on digital operational resilience for the financial sector; calls on the ESAs and ENISA to step up their efforts in monitoring and mitigating the risks concerning third country ICT third- parties, if these third-parties have or are suspected of having ties to foreign governments or foreign militaries;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 167 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. WelcomesExpresses concern about the ECB’s report on the digital euro and the outcome of its public consultation and expects further analysis of the implications for the banking sector, consumer protection and consumer data protection;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10 a. Recalls that cash is anonymous and it is impossible for banks or central banks to control the direct expenditure of cash holders, which safeguards their privacy; recalls that CBDC is not anonymous, since central banks will be able to trace consumer behaviour and spending patterns of all citizens; recalls that CBDC would give central banks absolute control over the transactions of citizens, meaning that the ECB will have both the power and the technical capacity to control transactions, including disabling certain transactions; expresses deep concern over giving the ECB such far-reaching powers, which are obviously not within its mandate;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 189 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Regrets the failure to ensure full gender balance in EU financial institutions and bodies;deleted
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 207 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Notes that sound management of credit risk should remain the key priority for the SSMa detailed assessment of the systemic risks to the European banking system should remain the key priority for the SSM, and takes the view that financial risk is being underestimated, in particular as regards the exposure of the shadow banking system;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 214 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Stresses that ensuring proper and timely management of deteriorated exposures will be key to preventing a build-up of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the short term; asks for more efforts to come forward with ambitious solutions to the issue of sovereign exposures and a substantial reductions of the stock of non- performing loans, especially in the lights of the expiring debt-moratoria in the Member States on loans for SMEs that have suffered tremendously under the national and regional lockdown measures;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 238 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Notes that the expected credit losses, together with the current low interest environment, might further negatively affect the already subdued profitability of banks, as confirmed by the Commission in its answer to written question E- 003152/2019; is deeply concerned about the fact that negative interest rates have costed European banks 8.5 billion euros in 2020; recalls that commercial banks are required to place their excess deposits with the ECB, which pays them at a negative interest rate, currently set at - 0.5%, which means that banks have to pay the central bank for their regulatory deposits; calls on the ECB to normalise its interest rate policy without delay;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 246 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Stresses the benefitWarns of banking consolidation inas a supposed solution to addressing the overcapacities and fragmentation of the banking sector; regrets in this respect the calls of Andrea Enria to further latinize the European banking market through consolidation; rejects this pathway to institutionalising the risk of "too big to fail"; proposes rather to break up banks, instead of consolidating them;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 298 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
28. Trusts thatRegrets the introduction of a backstop into the SRF earlier than originally envisaged is positive for the strengthening of the crisis management framework; recalls that the introduction of the backstop was conditional on sufficient risk reduction in the banking sector; highlights that the November 2020 Financial Stability Review clearly indicates increasing credit risk, rising sovereign exposure, elevated negative rating outlooks, the risk of a property market correction, increased risk from a sovereign-corporate-bank nexus, declining bank profitability, lower interest income, rise in banks’ exposure to domestic government debt and an abrupt increase in funding costs from rating downgrades; the report also indicated that lending in 2020 was strongly driven by government loan guarantees;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 326 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
31. Invites the Commission, following detailed study and consultation with national authorities and parliaments, to reflect on the potential for further harmonisation of specific aspects of existing national insolvency laws in order to ensure a consistent and effective application of the crisis management framework;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 347 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
35. Notes the importance of depositors across the Banking Union enjoying the same level of protection of their savings; takes note of the Commission proposal to further strengthen citizens’ confidence in the protection of deposits by introducing an EDISregrets that insufficient progress in risk reduction in some Member States serves as an argument for mutualisation of deposit insurance schemes, creating incentives for some Member States not to reduce risk, or even to engage in even more excessive risk-taking; points out that the absence of a proper impact assessment of the EDIS proposal is fundamentally at odds with principles of sound governance;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 369 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
36. Notes the Commission’s launch of the review of the CMDI framework, including the op; asks for more efforts to come forward with ambitious solutions to the issue of sovereign exposures and a substantial reductions of a hybrid EDISthe stock of non-performing loans;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON