BETA

49 Amendments of Gunnar BECK related to 2021/2184(INI)

Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 38 a (new)
— having regard to Article 140(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 38 b (new)
— having regard to Articles 114 and 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 38 c (new)
— having regard to the ECB´s Targeted Review of Internal Models, published in April 2021;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas the BU is open to all EU Member States, provided the conditionality of meeting the ERM II requirements;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
B a. whereas a Banking Union requires first and foremost accelerated efforts by various Member States to reduce their high levels of non-performing loans and prevent their increase in the future;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
B b. whereas sound public finances are a necessary condition for the macro- financial stability of the Banking Union;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B c (new)
B c. whereas the near zero interest rates greatly reduce the profitability of banks in one of their most important areas of business activity, the provision of credit for long-term investments;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas the problems of the banking sector mayare likely to worsen after the temporary support measures introduced during the COVID-19 crisis are lifted;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas some financial institutions in the BU are heavily invested in the debt of their own home sovereign, with total sovereign exposure of banks in the euro area currently amounting to EUR 2.9 trillion, i.e. a substantial 9% of total assets, including EUR 2.1 trillion claims on domestic governments; whereas sovereign risk on bank balance sheets has still not been tackled, in contrast to other risk mitigation measures introduced by the Banking Union; whereas the pandemic´s surge in public debt highlights the need for reform;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas the rolestability of the banking sector, including strong capital buffers, is crucial to the recovery and transition to a low-carbon economy;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
G. whereas there is a need for effective anti-money laundering supervisionare still important loopholes in the EU AML framework, such as the explicit exemption of the non- profit sector from anti-money laundering reporting and transparency requirements as non-obliged entities, even though certain non-profit organisations and other non-financial entities operate with larger amounts of money than numerous European banks;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
H. whereas consumers, investors and all depositors should be well protectedArticle 169 of the TFEU states that EU measures shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent consumer protection measures provided that they are compatible with the Treaties; in this way EU law provides a common basic level of protection for all consumers residing in the EU; recalls that there is no consistent and uniform definition of consumer protection in EU law, which justifies divergences amongst the Member States;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)
I a. whereas in carrying out its supervisory activities, the ECB has so far failed to take the proportionality principle sufficiently into account;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that onthe goal of the BU is the security of the banking system and the prevention of bank bailouts by taxpayers; supports efforts to strengthen the BU; stresses that a solid BU will result in increased confidence in the banking sectortresses that increased confidence in the banking sector requires accelerated efforts by various Member States to reduce their high levels of non-performing loans and to prevent their increase in the future;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. Recalls that the Commission assessed in the 2020 Country Specific Recommendations for Croatia that despite several Action Plans, issues of corruption and conflicts of interest remain widespread in Croatia, and that further efforts to strengthen the prevention and sanction of corruption are needed to ensure the transparent and efficient use of public funds; recalls that Article 140(1) TFEU requires the Commission and European Central Bank’s convergence reports to take account of 'other factors' relevant to economic integration and convergence, such as corruption; recalls that the Commission criticised Bulgaria in its 2020 Rule of Law report for its disregard for the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary; concludes that Bulgaria and Croatia are not ready for accession to the Banking Union;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Stresses that the relatively good performance of banks during the COVID- 19 crisis is related to the policies implemented by the Member States during the pandemic, as well as to temporary measures under Regulation (EU) 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation), proving that equity and not debt is the solution to solve crises and build up resilience against economic and financial shocks;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Expresses deep concern about the findings of the ECB´s Targeted Review of Internal Models, published in April 2021, which shows that the biggest euro area banks have repeatedly been too optimistic in their risk-modelling, confirming longstanding suspicions among regulators and analysts that larger banks have often artificially inflated the strength of their balance sheets by underestimating the riskiness of their assets, giving them a short-term advantage over more cautious competitors; is alarmed that the Review resulted in more than 5.800 deficiencies and 253 supervisory corrections of internal models by the ECB, which pushed up the banks’ risk-weighted assets by EUR 275 billion, a 12 per cent increase in the models examined, which reduced their average common equity tier one ratios by 0.71 percentage points;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 160 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Deplores the ECB´s role in massively inflating the money supply and expanding its balance sheet up to over 80% of euro area GDP; recalls that banks in the northern euro area hold a disproportionately high amount of deposits with the ECB, and pay disproportionately high penalty interest to the ECB; by contrast, banks in the southern euro area benefit disproportionately from the negative interest rates on TLTRO loans;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 163 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5 b. Recalls that the Targeted Long Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs) further zombify the European economy and deteriorate the real income prospects, especially of young Europeans;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 164 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 c (new)
5 c. Is concerned about the high levels of legacy non-performing exposures many institutions had, even before the pandemic;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 184 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Recalls that cash is anonymous and it is impossible for banks or central banks to control the direct expenditure of cash holders, which safeguards their privacy; recalls that central bank digital currency (CBDC) is not anonymous, since central banks will be able to trace consumer behaviour and spending patterns of all citizens; recalls that CBDC would give central banks absolute control over the transactions of citizens, meaning that the ECB will have both the power and the technical capacity to control transactions, including disabling certain transactions; expresses deep concern over giving the ECB such far-reaching powers, which are obviously not within its mandate;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 191 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. Notes the accelerated pace of digitalisation in the banking sector; looks forward to the further development of DORA and its effect on digital operational resilience for the financial sector; calls on the ESAs and ENISA to step up their efforts in monitoring and mitigating the risks concerning third country ICT third parties, if these third-parties have or are suspected of having ties to foreign governments or foreign militaries;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 204 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Notes that there is a prospect ofCalls for the gradually phasing out of emergency measures and returning to pre-COVID-19 capital requirements;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 206 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9 a. Takes the view that supervision continues to focus solely on credit risk, underestimating the importance of financial risk;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Is concerned about the rising level of sovereign debt on the balance sheets of banks in the BU; notes that government bondhadow banking and the exposure of Union banks; points out that the figures are not risk-free assets and that risks are differentiated; emphasises that the issue of regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures requires an in-depth examination of the consequences of different approachesported by the SSM analysis in its SREP 2021 exercise show a steady increase over time and that the related risks are not adequately supervised;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 226 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11 a. Recalls that total sovereign exposure of banks in the euro area currently amounts to EUR 2.9 trillion, i.e. a substantial 9% of total assets, and that claims on domestic governments account for the bulk of that with EUR 2.1 trillion;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 230 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 b (new)
11 b. Is concerned that as Member States sell increasing amounts of sovereign bonds, their share in banks’ balance sheets grows, potentially aggravating the doom loop; points out that this trend is exacerbated by the zero risk weight assigned to sovereign exposures that incentives excessively large positions in sovereign exposures; stresses the need to modify incentives for banks so that they scale back their investment in public bonds, by introducing non-zero risk weights for sovereign exposures;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 232 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 c (new)
11 c. Stresses that the rising public debt levels following the pandemic make an appropriate treatment of sovereign exposures more pressing;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 239 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Notes that the transition to a low- carbon economy presents new challenges and risks related to the preference for sustainable investments; stresses the need for an in-depth analysis of the economic efficiency of and the consequences of oversubsidising sustainable investments in order to avoid a future bubble of green assets; calls for clear guidelines for banks based on economic data;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 271 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14 a. Stresses the importance to consider the impact of potentially rising interest rates on banks’ balance sheets;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 272 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 b (new)
14 b. Calls on the ECB to end its stimulus packages immediately, including phasing out TLTRO;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 273 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 c (new)
14 c. Is concerned that loose monetary policy contributes to lower long-term economic growth and creates an incentive to delay the implementation of necessary structural reforms;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 274 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Indicates thaExpressed deep concern about the trend towards increased consolidation in the banking sector, which is likely to increase further as a result of the pandemic; recognises the challenges posed to banking supervision by large systemically important institutions, whose possible problems may affect financial stability in many jurisdictions; regrets in this respect the calls of Andrea Enria to further latinise the European banking market through consolidation; rejects this pathway to institutionalising the risk of 'too big to fail'; proposes rather to break up banks, instead of consolidating them;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 276 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Indicates that the trend towards consolidation in the banking sector is likely to increase as a result of the pandemic; recognises the challenges posed to banking supervision by large systemically important institutions, whose possible problems may affect financial stability in many jurisdictions; calls for a regulatory firewall between savings banks and investment banks, in order to improve the stability of the financial and banking system and to prevent financial and banking crises due to negative financial contagion effects between savings banks and investment banks, which have proven to be often at the very heart of financial and banking crises;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 280 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15 a. Stresses that strict application of the proportionality principle is key in banking supervision, especially for smaller institutions;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 281 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)
15 b. Stresses the stabilising effect of small- and medium-sized banks to the EU`s economy in times of crisis;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 282 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 c (new)
15 c. Stresses the benefits of a diversified banking sector in Europe, composed of banks with different business models, legal structures and sizes;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 289 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Notes the problems and challenges related to home/host issues; points out that greater market integration requires credible safeguards in EU law for host Member States;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 295 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Stresses the need for an effective anti- money laundering supervisionory framework; notes the Commission’s adoption of the anti-money laundering (AML) package of proposals; regrets the further explicit exemption of non-profit organisations from the anti-money laundering transparency and reporting requirements as non-obliged entities, in spite of numerous reports by FATF, Europol and the European Court of Auditors asking for more scrutiny on the non-profit sector, as entities which are prone to be used as vehicles for money laundering and terrorist financing;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 302 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17 a. Requests increased transparency standards in banking supervision, for instance in the outcomes of the supervisory review and evaluation process, in order to reinforce the trust of capital and financial markets, companies and citizens, as well as to ensure consistency of treatment across Member States; welcomes improved and refined information-sharing between supervisory institutions;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 313 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18 a. Calls on the supervisory authorities to monitor financial risks closely, in particular those linked to the shadow banking system, and to take appropriate steps wherever necessary; calls on the supervisory authorities, further, to monitor closely aspects linked to the professionalism of and generational change in governance, in particular in the smallest banks;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 316 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)
18 b. Notes that a detailed assessment of the systemic risks to the European banking system should remain the key priority for the SSM; takes the view that financial risk is being underestimated, in particular as regards the exposure of the shadow banking system;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 333 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20 a. Believes that the Banking Union will further disintegrate due to moral hazard and lead to a permanent Transfer Union if mechanisms such as the backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) are implemented; regrets that insufficient progress in risk reduction in some member states serves as an argument for mutualisation of deposit insurance schemes, creating incentives for some member states not to reduce risk, or even to engage in even more excessive risk-taking; points out that the absence of a proper impact assessment of the EDIS proposal is fundamentally at odds with the principles of sound governance;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 343 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21 a. Requests increased transparency standards in banking resolution, for instance in the outcomes of the resolution review and evaluation process, in order to reinforce the trust of capital and financial markets, companies and citizens, as well as to ensure consistency of treatment across Member States;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 356 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Recalls that the SSM and the SRM operate at EU level, while deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) are operated at national level; recognises that a European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) would improve protection for depositors in the EUunderlines that depositors across the Banking Union are exposed to varying levels of credit, market and operational risk, which justifies varying levels of protection;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 369 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23 a. Regrets that insufficient progress in risk reduction in some Member States serves as an argument for mutualisation of deposit insurance schemes, creating incentives for some Member States not to reduce risk, or even to engage in even more excessive risk-taking; points out that the absence of a proper impact assessment of any EDIS proposal is fundamentally at odds with the principles of sound governance;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 384 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Considers that the main obstacles for EDIS are concerns about risks in somUnderlines that depositors across the bBanking systems; stresUnion are exposesd that the implementation of credible and effective risk reduction measures could enable an agreement on EDISo varying levels of credit, market and operational risk, which justifies varying levels of protection;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 393 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
25. Points out that any EDISfurther harmonisation of deposit insurance schemes should take into account clear rules for the participation or non- participation of non-euro area Member States;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 397 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)
26 a. Recalls that gold is money and fiat is debt; welcomes the fact that the German Bundesbank, for the first time since the introduction of the euro, has started to buy gold, thereby taking the necessary precautions for the inevitable; welcomes the fact that the Polish central bank has repatriated its gold reserves; welcomes the recent statement by the Dutch Central Bank that if there were to be a major monetary reset, gold stock can serve as a basis to rebuild the global monetary system; highly welcomes the decision of central bank of Hungary to treble its gold reserves to more than 94.49 tons; underlines that gold bolsters confidence in the stability of the central bank’s balance sheet and creates a sense of security; calls, therefore, on all national central banks, especially those in the euro area, to hold on to sufficient amounts of physical gold, and repatriate any gold reserves currently kept outside the national borders;
2022/02/17
Committee: ECON