BETA

30 Amendments of Lieve WIERINCK related to 2016/0365(COD)

Amendment 227 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
(14) In light of the consequences that the failure of a CCP and the subsequent actions may have on the financial system and the economy of a Member State, as well as the possible ultimate need to use public funds as a last resort to resolve a crisis, the Ministries of Finance or other relevant ministries in the Member States should be closely involved, at an early stage, in the process of recovery and resolution.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 233 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22 a (new)
(22a) Recovery plans should explicitly set out actions to be taken by the CCP in case of cyber-attack where there is a potential effect of leading to a significant deterioration of their financial situation or a risk of breaching their prudential requirements under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 248 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 37
(37) The prime objectives of resolution should be to ensure the continuity of critical functions, to avoid adverse effects on financial stability, and to protectavoid the use of public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support to failing CCPs.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 266 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 60
(60) Should all other options be practically unavailable or be demonstrably insufficient to safeguard financial stability, government participation in the shape of equity support or temporary public ownership should be possible, in accordance with applicable rules on State aid, including a restructuring of the operations of the CCP, and enable the deployed funds to be recouped from the CCP over time. The use of government stabilisation tools is notwithstanding the role of central banks in providing liquidity to the financial system even in times of stress.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 271 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 a (new)
(7a) 'default event’ means a scenario where a clearing member fails to honour its financial obligations to the CCP;
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 273 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 b (new)
(7b) ‘non-default event’ means a scenario where losses for the CCP arise from any event other than a default event, such as a business, custody, investment, legal or operational failure;
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 294 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point a
(a) exchange information relevant for the development of resolution plans, for assessing the CCP's interconnectedness with other financial market infrastructures, with other financial institutions and with the financial system in general, and for the application of preparatory and preventative measures and for resolution;
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 295 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point e a (new)
(ea) exchange recovery and resolution plans of clearing members and assess potential impact and interconnectedness with the CCP;
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 302 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 5 – point g a (new)
(ga) making sure the college members exchange all relevant information in a timely manner for the exercise of their tasks under this Regulation.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 307 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1
1. Competent authorities and, resolution authorities and ESMA shall cooperate closely in the preparation, planning and application of resolution decisions.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 323 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1
1. Resolution authorities and, competent authorities shall, on request, provideand ESMA shall spontaneously and on request, provide, in a timely manner, each other with all therelevant information relevant for the exercise of their tasks under this Regulation.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 326 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1
1. CCPs shall draw up and maintain a comprehensive recovery plan providing for measures to be taken in order to restore their financial positionthe case of both default and non-default events in order to restore their financial position without any public financial support in order to enable them to continue to provide clearing services following a significant deterioration of their financial situation or a risk of breaching their prudential requirements under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 329 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
Those indicators shall be based on the CCP's risk profile. CCPs, resolution authorities, competent authorities and ESMA shall cooperate closely in order to assess regularly at least the financial, operational and cyber risk profile of the CCP.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 330 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
CCPs shall put in place appropriate arrangements for the regular monitoring of the indicators. CCPs shall regularly report to ESMA and competent authorities on the outcome of this monitoring.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 333 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
Any decision taken pursuant to paragraph 3 and its justification shall be notified to the competent authority without delay. Where a CCP intends to activate its recovery plan, it shall inform the competent authority and ESMA of the nature and magnitude of the problems it has identified, setting out all relevant circumstances and indicating the recovery measures or other measures it intends to take to address the situation.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 334 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
When activating the recovery plan, in default and non-default cases, CCPs, resolution authorities, competent authorities and ESMA shall cooperate closely in order to assess the CCP's interconnectedness with other financial market infrastructures, other financial institutions and with the financial system in general. Recovery and resolution plans from clearing members shall be taken into account during this assessment.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 336 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
Where the competent authority considers that a recovery measure that the CCP intends to take may cause significant adverse effects to the financial system, it may, after consultation with ESMA, require the CCP to refrain from taking that measure.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 351 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 8
8. The board of the CCP shall assess, taking into account the advice of the risk committee in accordance with Article 28(3) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, and approve the recovery plan before submitting it to the competent authority and to ESMA.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 360 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 3
3. When assessing the recovery plan, the competent authority shall, in cooperation with ESMA, take into consideration the CCP's capital structure, its default waterfall, the level of complexity of the organisational structure and the risk profile of the CCP, including in terms of financial, operational and cyber risks, and the impact that the implementation of the recovery plan would have on clearing members, their clients, financial markets served by the CCP and on the financial system as a whole.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 375 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1
1. The resolution authority shall, after consultation with the competent authority and ESMA and in coordination with the resolution college, in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 15, draw up a resolution plan for each CCP.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 398 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. A CCP shall exchange information on a timely manner with competent authorities and ESMA in order to facilitate the assessment of the risk profiles of the CCP and the interconnectedness with other financial market infrastructures, other financial institutions and with the financial system in general as defined in Articles 9 and 10 of this Regulation.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 443 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 a (new)
Article 20a Issuance of instruments of ownerships in future profits to clearing members and clients that have suffered losses due to non-default losses at the CCP Where a CCP in Recovery has suffered non-default losses and allocated them to clearing members and their clients, and has not entered Resolution as a result, the Competent Authority of the CCP may, once a matched book has been restored, require the CCP to recompense the participants for their loss, either through cash payments or, where appropriate, may require the CCP to issue instruments of ownership in future profits of the CCP. The value of instruments of ownership in future profits of the CCP issued to each affected clearing member, which must be passed on to clients in a suitable form, shall be proportionate to its loss and shall be based on a valuation conducted in accordance with Article 24(3). These instruments of ownership shall entitle the possessor to receive payments from the CCP on an annual basis until the loss has been recouped in full up to a maximum of 15 years from the date of issuance. Up to 90% of the CCP’s annual profits shall be used towards payments relating to these instruments of ownership.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 452 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) to protectavoid the use of public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support;
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 454 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point c
(c) a resolution action is necessary in the public interestto maintain market liquidity and to achieve the resolution objectives where winding down the CCP under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those objectives to the same extent.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 455 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
Without prejudice to subparagraph 1, in case of a non-default event the conditions for resolution shall considered to be met if: (a) the CCP is mismanaged according to the resolution authority; and (b) a resolution action is necessary to maintain market liquidity and to achieve the resolution objectives where winding down the CCP under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those objectives to the same extent.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 470 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. The decision to take a resolution action in relation to a CCP as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 1a may only be challenged on the basis that this decision was arbitrary and unreasonable at the time of the decision, based on the information then readily available to the resolution authority.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 483 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 2
2. IOnly in the event of a systemic crisis, and only if it is necessary to maintain market liquidity, the resolution authority may also provide extraordinary public financial support by using government stabilisation tools in accordance with Articles 45, 46 and 47 on the condition of prior and final approval under the Union State aid framework.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 498 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 9 – point c a (new)
(ca) from any clearing member, to the extent that a clearing member does not incur greater losses than it would have incurred if the resolution authority would not have taken resolution action in relation to the CCP and they would instead have been subject to possible outstanding obligations pursuant to the CCP's recovery plan or other arrangements in its operating rules or the CCP had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 520 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Following a non-default event the resolution authority shall only reduce the value of gains payable as referred to in paragraph 1 if this tool is deemed to be the only tool available to avoid the use of public funds.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 582 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 62 a (new)
Article 62a Recoupment of payments The resolution authority shall recover any reasonable expenses incurred in connection with a payment as referred to in Article 62 in any of the following ways: (a) from the CCP under resolution, as a preferred creditor; (b) from any consideration paid by the purchaser where the sale of business tool has been used; (c) from any proceeds generated as a result of the termination of the bridge CCP, as a preferred creditor; (d) from any clearing member, to the extent that a clearing member does not incur greater losses than it would have incurred if the resolution authority would not have taken resolution action in relation to the CCP and they would instead have been subject to possible outstanding obligations pursuant to the CCP's recovery plan or other arrangements in its operating rules or the CCP had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON