12 Amendments of Răzvan POPA related to 2017/0358(COD)
Amendment 41 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 4
Recital 4
(4) Many of the requirements that stem from Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council framework are designed to address common risks faced by credit institutions. Accordingly, the existing requirements are largely calibrated to preserve the lending capacity of credit institutions through economic cycles and to protect depositors and taxpayers from possible failure, and are not designed to address the different risk- profiles of investment firms. Investment firms do not have large portfolios of retail and corporate loans and do not take deposits. The likelihood that their failure can have detrimental impacts for overall financial stability is lower than in the case of credit institutions. The risks faced and posed by investment firms are thus substantially different to the risks faced and posed by credit institutions and such difference should be clearly reflected in the prudential framework of the Union.
Amendment 43 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 5
Recital 5
(5) Differences in the application of the existing framework in different Member States threaten the level playing-field for investment firms within the Union. Those differences stem from the overall complexity of the application of the framework to different investment firms based on the services they provide, where some national authorities adjust or streamline such application in national law or practice. Given that the existing prudential framework does not address all the risks faced and posed by some types of investment firms, large capital add-ons have been applied to certain investment firms in some Member States. Uniform provisions addressing those risks should be established in order to ensure clear harmonised prudential supervision of investment firms across the Union.
Amendment 44 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 7
Recital 7
(7) There may be Member States in which the authorities competent for the prudential supervision of investment firms are different from the authorities that are competent for the supervision of market conduct. It is therefore necessary to create a mechanism of cooperation and exchange of information between those authorities in order to ensure harmonised prudential supervision of investment firms across the European Union.
Amendment 46 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
Recital 9
(9) The required level of initial capital of an investment firm should be based on the services and activities which that investment firm is authorised to provide, and respectively perform, according to Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. The possibility for Member States to lower the required level of initial capital in specific situations, as provided for in Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, on the one hand, and the situation of uneven implementation of that Directive, on the other hand, have led to a situation where the required level of initial capital diverges across the Union. To end that fragmentation, the required level of initial capital should be harmonised accordingly for all investment firms in the European Union.
Amendment 47 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) The proper functioning of the internal market requires that the responsibility for supervising the financial soundness of an investment firm, and in particular its solvency, lies with the competent authority of its home Member State. To achieve an effective supervision of investment firms also in other Member States where they provide services or have a branch, close cooperation and exchange of information with the competent authorities of these Member States should be ensured.
Amendment 49 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 13
Recital 13
(13) To protect commercially sensitive information, competent authorities should be bounconstrained by rules of professional secrecy when conducting their supervisory tasks and when exchanging confidential information.
Amendment 52 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 18
Recital 18
(18) Investment firms should have internal capital available, which is adequate in quantity, quality and distribution to cover the specific risks to which they are or may be exposed. Competent authorities should ensure that investment firms have the adequate strategies and processes in place to asses and maintain the adequacy of their internal capital.
Amendment 53 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 20
Recital 20
(20) To align remuneration with the risk profile of investment firms and to guarantee a level-playing field, investment firms should be subject to clear principles on corporate governance arrangements and rules on remuneration that take into account the differences between credit institutions and investment firms. Small and non-interconnected investment firms should however be exempted from those rules because the provisions on remuneration and corporate governance under Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council are sufficiently comprehensive for those types of firms.
Amendment 56 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 24
Recital 24
(24) In response to the growing public demand for tax transparency and to promote investment firms' corporate responsibility, it is appropriate to require that investment firms disclose on a yearly basis certain information, including information on profits made, taxes paid and any public subsidies received.
Amendment 58 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point a
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) competent authorities, as parties to the ESFS, cooperate with trust and full mutual respect, in particular when ensuring the flow of appropriate and reliabl, reliable and comprehensive information between them and other parties to the ESFS;
Amendment 60 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point c
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) competent authorities make every efforthave to comply with the guidelines and recommendations issued by EBA pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council38 and to respond to the warnings and recommendations issued by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council39 ; _________________ 38 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12). 39 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1).
Amendment 64 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 11 – paragraph 5
Article 11 – paragraph 5
5. Competent authorities of the home Member State that disagree with the measures of the competent authorities of the host Member State may refer the matter to EBA, which shall act in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. Where EBA acts in accordance with that Article, it shall adopt its decision wias early as possible and no later thian one month.