BETA

1988 Amendments of Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Amendment 22 #

2023/2077(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Calls on the Commission to safeguard the integrity of the single market; recalls that the response to the US Inflation Reduction Act must not be solely based on use of State aid, but also on a renewed competition framework, providing speed and flexibility for companies investing and competing fairly in Europe;deleted
2023/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 29 #

2023/2077(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Highlights that the US Inflation Reduction Act attaches social conditionalities to public support schemes promoting, such as good pay, apprenticeship places or unionized jobs; emphasizes that the US Inflation Reduction Act is planned to be financed through fair taxation of the largest corporations and extraordinarily wealthy households; calls on Member States and the Union to apply social conditionalities and fair taxation in their own public support schemes;
2023/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 32 #

2023/2077(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Stresses that competition policy should not be an obstacle to the implementation of an active industrial strategy; calls on Member States and the Union to pursue an active industrial policy underpinned by strong public investment to fight social and regional inequality, decarbonise industry and bolster autonomy in key economic sectors, while contributing globally to even and sustainable economic development; calls for a coordinated flexibilisation of State aid rules and the introduction of a dedicated permanent European solidarity funds to counterbalance uneven industrial support and development across Member States;
2023/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 56 #

2023/2077(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Is deeply concerned that “rising corporate profits account for almost half the increase in Europe’s inflation over the past two years as companies increased prices by more than spiking costs of imported energy”1a; condemns this misuse of market power by corporations leading to higher levels of inflation and exacerbating the cost of living crisis; considers this development of a sellers’ inflation a failure of the framework and enforcement of competition policy in the Union; calls on Member States and the Commission to introduce permanent and general windfall taxes and to reform competition law in order to enable competition authorities to investigate and intervene systematically at sectoral level with unfair price hikes; _________________ 1a IMF Working Paper No. 2023/13 retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/202 3/06/26/europes-inflation-outlook- depends-on-how-corporate-profits- absorb-wage-gains
2023/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 60 #

2023/2077(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5b. Is deeply concerned about the current food price crisis and the high levels of market concentration and financial ownership in food supply chains potentially disincentivising competition and facilitating unfair price hikes; calls for a thorough sectoral investigation of market power and financial ownership in EU food chains and the implementation of structural remedies including preventions of further mergers and acquisitions; calls for a revision of EU competition law to align its enforcement with the objective that corporate conduct has to respect the fundamental right of consumers to affordable food;
2023/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 73 #

2023/2077(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Is concerned about the Commission’s ongoing in-depth investigations into a potential breach of EU State aid rules in the cases of the support measures for public rail freight operators Fret SNCF and DB Cargo; deplores that the investigations are causing pressure to restructure the sector threatening substantial amounts of jobs in Germany and France and contravening the decarbonisation of the transport sector; calls on the Commission to consult trade unions and ensure rail freight workers' rights; calls on the Commission to drop its investigations in the light of the objectives established by the sustainable and smart mobility strategy under the European Green Deal aimed at doubling rail freight traffic and reducing overall transport emissions by 90 % by 2050; stresses that competition policy should not prevent progress in the green transition for which rail freight is key;
2023/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 79 #

2023/2077(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Supports the principle that the use of public money should entail public ownership and control; calls for public investment enabling public ownership and public control over strategic company decisions such as closures, reductions in production and relocations to be prioritised over the use of subsidies as State aid;
2023/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #

2023/2077(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)
8b. Stresses that State aid should not amount to a transfer of public wealth to private shareholders; calls for a ban on the distribution of dividends to shareholders and bonuses to upper management in companies receiving State aid;
2023/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 84 #

2023/2077(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 c (new)
8c. Stresses that the purpose of State aid is not to serve the private interests of companies but to support and guide sustainable industrial development in the public interest; calls on Member States to attach social conditionalities to the provision of State aid with the objective of fostering good working conditions and pay, labour participation and collective bargaining rights and the maintenance and creation of new jobs and apprenticeships;
2023/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 86 #

2023/2077(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 d (new)
8d. Calls on Member States to attach environmental conditionalities to the provision of State aid with the objective of promoting a zero-emissions and zero- waste economy as well as the conservation of biodiversity;
2023/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 100 #

2023/2077(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Calls for mandatory consultation and participation rights for workers in merger and acquisition decisions;
2023/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 103 #

2023/2077(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)
10b. Calls on the Commission to ban any merger or acquisition for companies that are currently defined as gatekeepers according to Article 3 of the Digital Markets Act;
2023/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 121 #

2023/2077(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Welcomes the opening of a formal investigation into possible anti-competitive practices by Microsoft regarding Teams; calls on the Commission to carefully assess the concessions, unilaterally offered by Microsoft, with the undertakings involved, in order to ensure that they address the concerns of existing consumers, as well as interoperability and pricing issues;
2023/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 127 #

2023/2077(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Insists that the current EU framework for competition policy failed to protect consumers from unjustified price hikes driven by market power of companies; calls for unbundling to also be a structural remedy in situations where abuse of a dominant position on a relevant market cannot be ascertained, but conditions for competition, or other key objectives as the fundamental right to affordable food, would improve significantly if unbundling measures were applied;
2023/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 133 #

2023/2077(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Regrets the absence of booking.com from the gatekeepers list; calls on the Commission to open a market investigation on short time rental platforms to ensure that all eligible services are designated in order to restore fair and equal competition in the short term rental market;
2023/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 173 #

2023/2077(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Stresses that Parliament should play an active role in shaping competition policy and be more involved in the activity of working parties and expert groups; calls for the ordinary legislative procedure to be fully extended to cover competition policy legislation;
2023/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 6 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas the economic recovery and the climate crisis increase the need to mobilise more resources, increase public investment and re-evaluate current taxation policies in the Member States;
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 10 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas net public investment as a proportion of GDP fell sharply in the EU after the financial crisis, hitting particularly strongly the Southern European countries and reaching in some cases negative levels; whereas this ratio has not fully recovered since then due to fiscal consolidation pressure under the former EU economic governance rules1a; whereas the revision of such rules must guarantee that Member Sates have the flexibility to cover their needs of public investment to promote climate transition and conversion, in order to achieve the climate goals defined in Paris Agreement; _________________ 1a A Permanent EU Investment Fund in the Context of the Energy Crisis, Climate Change and EU Fiscal Rules, Philipp Heimberger and Andreas Lichtenberger
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 13 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
Ab. whereas EU past experience showed the limits of fiscal consolidation, namely on public debt sustainability; whereas debating further options of revenues through fair taxation should complement the current debate on EU fiscal rules;
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 18 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas rising corporate profits account for almost half of the increase in inflation in the EU over the past two years, as companies increased prices by more than the spiking costs of imported energy; a recent study of IMF2a underlines profits were about 1 percent above their pre-pandemic level in the first quarter of 2023 and compensation of employees was about 2 percent below trend; whereas rising corporate profits account for almost half of the increase in inflation in the EU over the past two years, as companies increased prices by more than the spiking costs of imported energy; whereas the profit share of GDP will have to diminish in order for inflation to return to its target; _________________ 2a Euro Area Inflation after the Pandemic and Energy Shock: Import Prices, Profits and Wages
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 23 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas ECB raised interest rates to a 22-year high of 3,75% in July; whereas the current cycle of restrictive monetary policy is still ongoing; whereas the full set of economic and social consequences are yet to be fully assessed, such as further pressure on the EU and national budgets, on the stability of the financial system, and hardships for households;
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 31 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas a recent OECD working paper3a shows that (1) dividend income and capital gains are generally subject to lower effective tax rates than wage income at the personal level, (2) in many Member States, capital income is tax- favoured even when considering taxes paid by both firms and individuals, and (3) this differential tax treatment of labour and capital income can affect the efficiency and equity of tax systems; _________________ 3a The taxation of labour vs. capital income: A focus on high earners, Diana Hourani, Bethany Millar-Powell, Sarah Perret, Antonia Ramm, August 2023
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 38 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas women are typically more impacted by crises since pre-existing structural inequalities are amplified; whereas during the Covid-19 pandemic different examples of such were registered: (1) gender based violence increased4a and support services were negatively impacted4b; (2) women were more represented among front-line workers4c; (3) gender poverty gaps worsened4d, (4) women’s unpaid care work increased4e; (5) spending on women’s rights, protection and services received less financial support than the private sector in some countries4f; _________________ 4a UN FPA, Gender-Based Violence and COVID-19: Actions, Gaps and the Way Forward, August 2022, available from https://reliefweb.int/report/world/gender- based-violence-and-covid-19-actions- gaps-and-way-forward 4b IBID 4c UN Women, From Insights to Action – Gender Equality in the Wake of Covid-19, 2020, https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital- library/publications/2020/09/gender- equality-in-the-wake-of-covid-19 4d IBID 4e IBID 4f UN Women, From Insights to Action – Gender Equality in the Wake of Covid-19, 2020, https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital- library/publications/2020/09/gender- equality-in-the-wake-of-covid-19
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 41 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas women face implicit tax biases, as they typically rely more on labour income than capital income and spend a higher proportion of their income on consumption; whereas in the EU, secondary earners are predominantly women, earning on average about one third of the household’s joint income; whereas in many EU countries, such as France and Portugal, the secondary earners are penalized by income taxation because the total income of the household is taxed jointly; whereas in many EU countries, such as France, child support is taxed as any other labour income, and more than capital income; whereas women rely on public services to a greater extent;
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas Europe, as well as the rest of the globe, is facing environmental challenges of unprecedented scale and urgency;
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 45 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)
Fb. whereas the wealthiest individuals have ecological footprints beyond the planetary carrying capacity; whereas the industrial extraction of fossil fuels, minerals, raw materials or agricultural commodities often generate extraordinary profits given their oligopolistic market structures and production based on a finite resource; whereas these sectors are simultaneously responsible for half of the world’s carbon emissions and more than 80% of biodiversity loss, toxic wastes and significant air and water pollution5a; _________________ 5a https://www.unep.org/explore- topics/extractives/why-does-extractives- matter
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital J
J. whereas between 2020 and 2022, the shipping industry generated as much profit as it had during the previous six decades combined; whereas it still faces low global taxation; whereas the OECD/G20 agreement on multinationals exempted this sector;
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 66 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital K
K. whereas SMEs are especially affected by the complexities of the tax system, in particular tax compliance, compared to MNEs, which take advantage of such complexity for aggressive tax planning;
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 70 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Highlights that tax systems and fiscal capacities in the Member States are facing severe shocks, an ageing population and challenges related to the green transition, the digital transformation of their labour markets and the existing tax gap9 , all of which emphasise the need for large public investments in order to achieve a sustainable economic recovery, mobilise private capital and attract entrepreneurship; _________________ Notes that research suggests that 85% of the world’s population will be impacted by austerity measures in 20237a _________________ 7a Ortiz, Isabelle and Cummins, Matthew, ‘End Austerity - A Global Report on Budget Cuts and Harmful Social Reforms in 2022-25’, September 2022, p3, available from 9 European Commission, ‘Tax policies in the European Union – 2020 survey’, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2020.
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 93 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. ObserveRegrets with concern that inflation has been partially driven by companies increasing their profit margins, with, for example, Maersk’s annual pre-tax income soaring from USD 967 million in 2019 to USD 30.2 billion in 2022;
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 96 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Regrets the fact that that MNEs that realise excess profits in times of crisis and wealthy individuals who realise significant capital gains through speculation are often undertaxed; Is concerned that insufficient transparency, information exchange and administrative cooperation undermine states’ ability to adequately tax profits, wealth and capital gains8a _________________ 8a European Court of Auditors, ‘Exchanging tax information in the EU: solid foundation, cracks in the implementation’, p5, March 2021,
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 137 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Calls on the Commission to assess the effectiveness of the temporary VAT reductions applied in Member States and to take measures if deemed necessary; Calls on the Commission to assess the different price control schemes carried out by Member States to support the development of measures to protect consumers, especially vulnerable households;
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 151 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Regrets that Member States such as Portugal, Germany and Malta designed tax benefits specifically targeted to attract crypto-assets leading to harmful tax practices and losses of tax revenues;
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 161 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Notes with concern that income inequality has increased in the last 30 years, with wealth being even more concentrated than income and capital gains being mostly realised by the top decile of the population; considers that the Member States should more effectively redistribute income and wealth through the taxation of capital gains, property and wealth; supports calls to start international-level negotiations to establish a progressive wealth tax, in the same veinto be negotiated ast the OECD/G20 global tax deal for corporationsUnited Nations level;
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 173 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Welcomes the adopted solidarity contribution in the EU; regrets, however, its limited scope and short time span; calls on the Commission to consider a permanent excess profit tax on all sectors, in light of the growing evidence that inflation is parmostly profit driven; believ and the inadequacy of the current restrictive monetary policy; calls on Member States to individually implement such excess profit taxes, permanent and covering all sectors; stresses that such taxes would curb the oligopolistic power of certain companies and boost competitiveness, while fighting inflation and raising revenue;
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 178 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Highlights specifically the case of the windfall profits of the banking sector as a consequence of the current monetary policy and a high level of market concentration; Stresses that according to the economist Eric Dor, a deposit facility rate of 3 % – the rate in March 2023 – means that banks in the euro zone will make no less than 122 billion euros per year in revenue from the liquid assets they have placed in central banks; Reminds that the ECB raised its rates since then to 3,75%, meaning a even higher value of revenues; Highlights that according to the same economist, this effortless profit would amount to 183 billion euros per year for a rate of 4.5 % - which will be attained if ECB continues the cycle of restrictive monetary policy; Stresses that a growing number of countries is taxing such profits, namely Czech Republic, France, Italy, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom;
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 187 #

2023/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Regrets the political stall of the USA to apply Pillar 1 of the OECD/G20 agreement and underlines the consequential lack of 7 to 15% of the revenues needed to pay back the RRF8a;Calls for the Commission to come up with an alternative digital levy; _________________ 8a EU Tax Observatory - The Long Road to Pillar One Implementation: Impact of Global Minimum Thresholds for Key Countries on the Effective Implementation of the Reform
2023/09/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 142 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
The European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 145 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 a (new)
(1 a) The review of economic governance should not lead to a set of transitionary band-aid measures that perpetuate the flaws of the current model while being unable to cope with the challenges ahead. It should instead give birth to a framework that enhances social progress and convergence and fosters the ecological transition. The EU economic governance should aim at eradicating poverty and inequalities, provide a high- level of social protection, qualitative public services, individual and collective well-being through the fulfillment of essential needs of all citizens; and ecological planification.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 146 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 a (new)
(1 a) The Global Financial Crisis and the following Sovereign Debts Crisis revealed the economic and political risks of EU lacking a lender-of-last-resort that can support Member States in times of crisis and impede a further fragmentation of the Euro Area.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 147 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 b (new)
(1 b) The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warns that the window of opportunity to secure a liveable and sustainable future for all is rapidly closing and calls for urgent near-term integrated climate action 1a; the transgression of six out of nine planetary boundaries suggests that Earth is now well outside of the safe operating space for humanity ; all EU and Member States' efforts should be directed towards the radical transformation of production and consumption patterns to secure a liveable future for all. Any revised EU economic governance framework that may result in hindering, lowering the ambition of, or delaying investments in a fair and ecological transition by putting a cap on investments or conditioning them to the achievement of arbitrary and misguided fiscal targets or macroeconomic stability would be disconnected from scientific reality and completely unfit to address the challenges ahead. _________________ 1a IPCC, 2023: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, H. Lee and J. Romero (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, pp. 1-34, doi: 10.59327/IPCC/AR6-9789291691647.001 https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downlo ads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 148 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
(2) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which initially consisted of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/9719 , Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 199720 and the Resolution of the European Council of 17 June 1997 on the Stability and Growth Pact21 , is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for. Such framework failed in promoting full employment sustainable and inclusive growth, and employment. _________________ 19 Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1). 20 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6). 21 Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact Amsterdam, 17 June 1997 (OJ C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 1)overall macroeconomic convergence between Member States.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 149 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2 a (new)
(2 a) The limits of 3% and 60% of GDP for government deficit and public debt, respectively, lack a sound economic justification. Evidence shows the compliance by Member States with such rules is unrealistic, this is especially clear regarding the public debt threshold.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 150 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2 b (new)
(2 b) The Commission recognizes the large amount of public and private investment to accomplish the EU’s climate goals and the even higher when referring to the climate goals set in the Paris Agreement. However, evidence shows that EU net public investment as a proportion of GDP has not fully recovered since its sharp fall after the financial crisis, especially serious in Southern Europe, due to fiscal consolidation pressure under the former EU economic governance rules. Moreover, recent independent studies show that the current Commission’s proposal fails to guarantee sufficient fiscal capacity to Member States to promote the investment needed to promote climate transition and conversion.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 151 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2 c (new)
(2 c) EU's past experience showed the limits of fiscal consolidation in promoting sustainable public finances and promoting full-employment. Recently, the IMF published evidence that, on average, fiscal consolidation does not reduce debt- to-GDP ratio. Moreover, the so-called Troika programs failed to accomplish their own economic goals and accentuated the economic downturn.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 154 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
(4) The involvement of social partnernational parliaments, representatives of workers' associations, civil society organisations and other relevant stakeholders in the European SemesterSocial and Environmental Guidelines is key to ensure ownership and, transparent and inclusive policy-making.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 155 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
(4) The involvement of the European Parliament, national parliaments, social partners, civil society organisations and other relevant stakeholders in the European Semester is key to ensure ownership and transparent and inclusive policy-making.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 166 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 a (new)
(5 a) Fiscal rules have incentivized governments of the Member States to carry out fiscal adjustments detrimental to long-term investments, contributing to a drop of total public investment as share of GDP during the decade 2011-2020 following the financial crisis. Public investment is crucial to guarantee a high level of citizens’ well-being, address existing and new social needs and foster the transition to a fair and sustainable economy. At the scale of the EU the additional investments needed in the decarbonation of the economy, in social infrastructures such as health, education, social housing and in the maintenance of public infrastructures amount to at least 520 billion euros, 142 billion euros, and 190 billion euros per year respectively, the majority of which should come from public sources to support a fair a democratic transition.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 169 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 b (new)
(5 b) Backloading of investments and failure to mitigate and adapt to climate change fast enough will not only have catastrophic human consequences but will also be much more costly in sheer economic terms, hence contradicting the very purpose of the fiscal rules to support sound public finances.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 170 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 c (new)
(5 c) The proposed fiscal rules would result in practice in a cap on investments ; analyses show that only four countries in the EU would be able to comply with the fiscal framework while at the same time making enough investments to achieve their Paris Agreement targets1a and that, absent any new investment in climate, expenses due to demographic ageing and the tightening of financing conditions will already cause most countries to be over the required debt and deficit ratios.2a _________________ 1a New Economics Foundation, New EU fiscal rules jeopardise investments needed to combat climate crisis, 31 August 2023 https://neweconomics.org/2023/08/new- eu-fiscal-rules-jeopardise-investment- needed-to-combat-climate-change 2a Dezernat Zukunft, Introductory statement at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament Public Hearing, 30 November 2022 https://www.dezernatzukunft.org/wp- content/uploads/2022/12/Introductory- statement-PSG-SENT-2.pdf
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 172 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
(6) The economic governance framework of the Union should put debt sustainability and sustainable and inclusive growth at its core and therefore differentiate between Member States by taking into account their public debt challenges and allowing country-specific fiscal trajectorifull- employment and the achievement of the climate goals set in the Paris Agreement as well as in the European Pillar of Social Rights at its core and therefore differentiate between Member States by taking into account their country-specific challenges. This framework should allow a true ownership and democratic scrutiny of such choices.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 173 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
(6) The economic governance framework of the Union should put debt sustainability and sustainable and inclusive growth at its core and therefore differentiate between Member States by taking into account their public debt challenges and allowing country-specificthe transformation towards a fair, democratic, need-based, and ecologically sustainable economic system at its core and therefore get rid of its emphasis on public debt and fiscal trajectoriesy.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 197 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9 a (new)
(9 a) Instead of promoting budgetary cuts and harmful structural reforms in the name of debt reduction, the EU economic governance should establish a framework that favours and facilitates the collection by Member States and at EU level of additional resources through fair taxation, in particular taxes on the wealthiest and multinational companies, in particular on windfall profits; taxes on ecologically harmful products and services; the cancellation of ineffective and unfair tax and social contributions exemptions; the fight against tax dodging and tax evasion of rich individuals and multinational companies.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 203 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) The presentation of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan should band the preceded by a technical dialogue with the Commission to ensure compliance with the provisions of this Regulation. On the basis of a recommendation from the Commission, the Council should set the net expenditure path and endorse the reform and investment commitments, including those taken for the possible extension of the adjustment period, as appropriateference trajectory should be approved in the national parliament of the Member State concerned, in line with its national rules and traditions. These plans and trajectories may be revised in case a new government takes power.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 208 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) In order to simplify the Union fiscal framework and increase transparency, a single operational indicapromote national ownership, Member States should be responsible for presenting their own reference trajectory anchored in debt sustainability should serve as a basis for setting the fiscal path and carrying out annual fiscd the correspondent national medium-term fiscal-structural plan. Such trajectory should treat on an equal footing the goals of achieving full-employment and the climate goals surveillance for each Member State. That single operational indicator should be based on nationally financed net primary expenditure, that is to say expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures and excluding interest expenditure as well as cyclical unemployment expenditure and expenditure on Union programmes fully matched by revenue from Union funds. This indicator allows for macro-economic et in the Paris Agreement, as well as promoting the sustainability of public debt and primary deficit. Moreover, due to the recognized public investment needs, as well as other urgent expenditures to promote energy transition, a safeguard should be estabilisation as it is not affected by the operation of automatic stabilisers, including revenue and expenditure fluctuations outside the direct control of the governmenthed to guarantee that this type of expenditure does not account for the primary deficit of each Member State.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) To provide guidance to the Member States in the drafting of their medium-term fiscal-structural plan, the Commission should put forward a technical trajectory based on the minimum fiscal adjustment that brings the debt trajectory of the Member State on a plausibly downward path or maintains debt at a prudent level. It should also ensure that the public debt ratio at the end of the planning horizon declines below its level in the year before the start of the technical trajectory. The sustainability of that debt reduction should result from appropriate fiscal policies.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 224 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 a (new)
(13 a) The IMF, long-time supporter of austerity and structural adjustments, acknowledges that fiscal consolidation is not effective, on average, at lowering debt-to-GDPs ratios.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 225 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 b (new)
(13 b) In addition to being dependent on arbitrary assumptions over 14 to 17 years in the future, including policy-based assumptions, the Debt Sustainability Analysis underpinning the technical trajectory relies on an outdated macroeconomic model that does not acknowledge the embeddedness of economic activities in the biosphere, and therefore does not take into account their increasing exposure to climate change, resource scarcity, environmental degradation and natural disasters in the future. This highly problematic feature of the DSA will lead to misguided perceptions of economic risks and misguided economic projections that will in turn influence the whole economic governance.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 227 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
(14) The technical trajectory put forward by the Commission should also ensure that the government deficit is brought and maintained below the 3% of gross domestic product (GDP) reference value.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 231 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
(15) In order to assess whether further adjustments are required towards the end of the four-year implementation period of the national medium-term fiscal- structural plan, the Commission should reassess the situation and put forward a new technical trajectory if the public debt of the Member State is still above 60% of GDP reference value or its government deficit is higher than 3% of GDP reference value.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 236 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15 a (new)
(15 a) Debt sustainability depends on many factors beyond the mere quantitative debt-to-GDP ratio and financial markets are less concerned by the debt stock than the overall resilience and strength of a country’s economy. Anticipation of negative reactions from markets to high debt ratios should not be used to legitimate the perpetuation of arbitrary debt targets and their usual corollary : budget cuts, under-financing of public services and unfair structural and reforms weakening social protection and workers' rights.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 238 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
(16) EachThe national medium-term fiscal- structural plan should mention its status in the context of national procedures, notably whether the plan was presented to the national parliament and whether there has been parliamentary approval of the plan. Tparliament of the Member State concerned should approve the reference trajectory presented and the national medium-term fiscal- structural plan should also indicate whether the national parliament had the opportunity to discuss the Council recommendation on the previous plan and, if relevant, any other Council recommendation or decision, or any Commission warningin accordance with its national rules and traditions. Moreover, further exchanges should also require parliamentary approval.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 246 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
(18) Since Member States could face additional costs at the end of their medium-term fiscal-structural plan such as ageing costs or an unfavourable interest-growth differential, they should ensure that the headline balance at the end of the adjustment period will be sufficient to ensure that the deficit durably stays below the 3% of GDP reference value.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 248 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18 a (new)
(18 a) Key interest rates have reached unprecedented levels since the creation of the euro zone and are foreseen to remain at a high level, increasing debt servicing while having no effect on jugulating an inflation that originates primarily from the rise in companies’ profit margins, as acknowledged by the ECB and the IMF.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 254 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
(21) In order to ensure the implementation of the medium-term fiscal-structural plans, the Commission and the Council should monitor the reform and investment commitments made in these plans under the European Semester, based on the annual progress reports submitted by the Member States, and in accordance with the provisions of Articles 121 and 148 TFEU. To that effect, they should engage in a European Semester dialogue with the European Parliament.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 258 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22
(22) To ensure a more gradual debt reduction, the adjustmenthe implementation period can be extended by a maximum of 3 years if the Member State underpins its medium-term fiscal-structural plan with a set of verifiable and time-bound reforms and investment that, taken altogether: are growth-enhancing, support fiscalpromote full-employment and reduce poverty; help to achieve the climate goals set in the Paris Agreement and the necessary green energy transition; promote debt and deficit sustainability,; address the common priorities of the Union,; address relevant country-specific recommendations addrethe social and environmental guidelines issued toby the Member State under the European Semester, and address the country-specific investment priorities without leading to cuts in oCommission; ensure that the overall level of nationally financed public investment over the lifetime of ther nationally financed public investment over the adjustment period in order to ensure a macroeconomic impact of investments and avoid crowding out of other investment priorities medium-term fiscal-structural plan, as a share of GDP, is higher than the medium-term level before the period of that plan; comply with the do no significant harm principle; guarantee universal access to basic public services; guarantee added value to the national economy.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 264 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23 a (new)
(23 a) High inflation is hitting people head on, with half of Europeans in deprivation from health, heating, and/or food over the last six months; the reintroduction of the fiscal rules and the subsequent return of austerity would only make this situation worse. The required fiscal adjustment would amount on average to more than 2% of GDP in the medium-term and be equivalent to 30 billion euros per year over 4 years.3a Not only is this debt reduction path totally irrealistic but would it also have terrible social consequences due to excessive and brutal contraction of the economy, decline in social spending, deterioration of public services and structural reforms weakening workers' rights and social protection in line with the general orientation of the EU economic governance so far. _________________ 3a Darvas, Z., L. Welslau and J. Zettelmeyer (2023) ‘A quantitative evaluation of the European Commission´s fiscal governance proposal’, Working Paper 16/2023, Bruegel https://www.bruegel.org/sites/default/files/ 2023-09/WP%2016_3.pdf
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 273 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
(27) Independent fiscal institutions should have a proven their capacity to foster fiscal discipline and strengthen thluralistic and multidisciplinary board, where minority views have credibility of Member States’ public finances. Ipresentation as well as workers' associations, in order to truly enhance national ownership, the role of. Moreover, when requested by the Member State concerned, such independent fiscal institutions, traditionally mandated to monitor compliance with the national framework, should be expanded to the economic governance framework of the Union should be responsible to produce the forecasts and the impact assessments needed to the budgetary practices.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 283 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29
(29) Particular attention should be given to significant risks of divergences of budgetary positions from the net expenditure path set by the Council. Therefore it is appropriate to complement the multilateral surveillance procedure set out in Article 121(3) and (4) TFEU with an early warning system whereby the Commission pursuant to Article 121(4) TFEU alerts a Member State at an early stage about the need to take the necessary budgetary corrective action in order to prevent its government deficit becoming excessive. Moreover, in the event of persistent budgetary slippage the Council should reinforce its recommendation and make it public.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 284 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30
(30) In case of major shocks tofor the Member State concerned or in the euro area or the Union as a whole, it is necessary to have a general escape clause to be able to deal with a severen economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole by allowing for a deviation from the net expenditure path provided that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium termby allowing for a deviation from the reference trajectory.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 294 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 32
(32) This Regulation is part of a package together with Council Directive [XXX amending 2011/85/EU] and Council Regulation [XXX amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97]. Together, they establish a reformed Union economic governance framework that incorporates into Union law the substance of Title III ‘Fiscal Compact’ of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) in the Economic and Monetary Union27 , in accordance with Article 16 thereof. By building on the experience with the implementation of the TSCG by the Member States, the proposed legislative package retains the Fiscal Compact’s medium-term orientation as a tool to achieve budgetary discipline and growth promotion. The package includes a strengthened country- specific dimension aimed at enhancing national ownership, including by means of a stronger role for Independent Fiscal Institutions, which draws essentially on the Fiscal Compact’s common principles proposed by the Commission28 in accordance with Article 3(2) of the TSCG. The analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures for the overall assessment of compliance required by the Fiscal Compact is set out in this Regulation. As in the Fiscal Compact, temporary deviations from the medium-term plan are allowed only in exceptional circumstances in this Regulation. In a similar vein to the Fiscal Compact, in case of significant deviations from the medium-term plan, measures should be implemented to correct the deviations over a defined period of time. The package strengthens fiscal surveillance and enforcement procedures to deliver on the commitment of promoting sound and sustainable public finances and sustainable and inclusive growth. The economic governance framework reform, thus, retains the fundamental objectives of budgetary discipline and debt sustainability set out in the TSCG. _________________ 27 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of 2 March 2012. 28 Communication COM(2012) 342 final of 20 June 2012 from the Commission ‘Common principles on national fiscal correction mechanismsMember States being the ones deciding on their fiscal choices and requiring its parliamentary approval.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 299 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1
This Regulation sets out rules ensuring effective coordination of economic policies of the Member Statesand strategic investments of the Member States under close democratic scrutiny, thereby supporting the achievefullfilment of the Union’s objectives for growth and employmentcitizens' essential needs, a high-level of social protection and well-being for all, reduction of inequalities and ecological planification.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 309 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2
It lays down detailed rules concerning the content, submission, assessment and monitoring of national medium-term fiscal-structural plans as part of multilateral budgetary surveillance by the Council and the Commission so as to promote debt sustainability and sustainable and inclusive growth in the Member States and prevent the occurrence of excessive government deficitplans under close democratic scrutiny so as to promote the fulfillment of citizens' essential needs, a high-level of social protection and well-being for all, reduction of inequalities and ecological planification in the Member States, by medium-term planning.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 314 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2 a (new)
The 3% deficit-to-GDP and 60% debt-to- GDP threshold are no longer targets to be reached nor pursued in the framework of the EU economic governance.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 365 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – title
The European SemesterSocial and Environmental Guidelines
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 366 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1
In order to ensure closer coordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of the economic, employment, environmental and social performance of the Member States, the Council and the Commission shall conduct multilateral surveillance within the European Semester in accordance with the objectives and requirements set out in the TFEU. Multilateral surveillance shall rely on high quality and independent statistics, produced in accordance with the principles laid down in Regulation (EC) No 223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Councilmmission shall issue social and environmental guidelines and evaluate their applicability.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 378 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
The European Semester shall includguidelines shall detail measures on how to promote:
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 379 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the formulation, and the surveillance of the implementcreation, of the broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union in accordance with Article 121(2) TFEU, of country-specific recommendations and of the recommendation on the economic policy of the euro areaquality jobs and traineeships;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 382 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) the formulation, and the surveillance of the implementation, of the employment guidelines that are to be taken into account by Member States in accordance with Article 148(2) TFEU, including the European Pillar of Social Rights, and of the related country-specific recommenduniversal access to basic public services, such as health, education, housing and transportations;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 386 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) the submission, assessment and endorsement of Member States’ medium- term fiscal-structural plans, as well as their monitoring via the annual progress reportsclimate goals set in the Paris Agreement and the necessary green energy transition;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 390 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point d
(d) the surveillance to prevent and correct macroeconomic imbalances pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011;a fair tax system, eliminating tax avoidance and evasion practices.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 392 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point d a (new)
(d a) the goals laid out in the European Pillar of Social Rights.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 393 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point e
(e) other multilateral surveillance procedures established by the European Parliament and the Council pursuant to Article 121(6) TFEU.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 404 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4
1. Where necessary, following the assessment pursuant to this Regulation of the medium-term fiscal-structural plans, the annual progress reports and the socio- economic situation of the Member States concerned, the Council shall, on the basis of recommendations from the Commission, address recommendations to those Member States making full use of the legal instruments provided in Articles 121 and 148 TFEU and related secondary legislation. 2. Member States shall take due account of the broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States, of the employment guidelines and of the recommendations referred to in Article 3, second paragraph, points (a) and (b) before taking key decisions in the development of their economic, employment and budgetary policies. Progress shall be monitored by the Commission. 3. Failure by a Member State to act upon the guidance received may result in: (a) further country-specific recommendations; (b) a warning by the Commission or a recommendation by the Council pursuant to Article 121(4) TFEU; (c) measures under this Regulation, Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/9731 or Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011. _________________ 31 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6).Article 4 deleted Implementation of the European Semester
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 420 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1
For e1. Each Member State shaving a public debt above the 60% of GDP reference value or a government deficit above the 3% of GDP reference value, the Commission shall put forward, in a report to the Economic and Financial Committee, a technical trajectory for net expenditure covering a minimum adjustmentll present a reference trajectory for the primary balance net of the expenditures related to: (a) productive public investment to achieve its common priorities as set out in Annex VI and the specific goals as set out in paragraph 2; (b) expenditure deemed as urgent to achieve the climate goals set on the Paris Agreement. 2. Such trajectory shall guarantee that the following goals are achieved: (a) full-employment; (b) the goals set in the Paris Agreement; (c) access to basic public services, including health, social care, housing and education; d) the goals set in the European Pillar of Social Rights; (e) a sustainable level of public debt and of period of 4 years of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, and its possible extension by a maximum of 3 years pursuant to Article 13. The Commission shall make the report publicmary deficit. 3. The Member State shall complement the presentation of the primary balance trajectory with a broader set of macroeconomic targets to achieve and the corresponding budgetary plan, including the expected revenues, expenditures, and public debt-to-GDP ratio. 4. The Member State shall make public its analysis of plausibility for debt sustainability and the underlying data, models and assumptions used. Such analysis shall encompass the non- exhaustive list of factors laid down on Annex V.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 434 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6
Requirements for the technical trajectory The technical trajectory shall ensure that: (a) the public debt ratio is put or remains on a plausibly downward path, or stays at prudent levels; (b) the government deficit is brought and maintained below the 3% of GDP reference value; (c) the fiscal adjustment effort over the period of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan is at least proportional to the total effort over the entire adjustment period; (d) the public debt ratio at the end of the planning horizon is below the public debt ratio in the year before the start of the technical trajectory; and (e) national net expenditure growth remains below medium-term output growth, on average, as a rule over the horizon of the plan. The technical trajectories shall be differentiated for each Member State. The criteria for setting the technical trajectories are set out in Annex I.Article 6 deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 511 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – title
Prior guidanceRemarks by the Commission
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 512 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. By [1 March] of the year [xxxx] in which the Member States have to submit for the first time their medium-The Commission may bilaterally provide remarks on possibly betterm fiscal-structural plans or, as appropriate, within 3 weeks from the request of the Member State to submit a new plan, the Commission shall publish: options to achieve the macroeconomic targets chosen by the Member State on the reference trajectory.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 517 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the underlying medium-term public debt projection framework and results;deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 522 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) its macroeconomic forecast and assumptions;deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 529 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) the technical trajectory, if required under Article 5, and the corresponding structural primary balance.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 536 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2
2. For Member States having a government deficit below the 3% of GDP reference value and public debt below the 60% of GDP reference value, the Commission shall provide technical information regarding the structural primary balance necessary to ensure that the headlSuch remarks shall be duly justified with the underlyineg deficit is maintained below the 3% of GDP reference value without any additional policy measures over a 10- year period after the end of the national medium-term fiscal-structural planata, models and assumptions used.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 542 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 3
3. The Commission shall update the technical trajectories and the quantitative guidance at least once every 4 years in time for the submission of the next cycle of medium-term fiscal-structural plans.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 548 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8
To assess plausibility that the projected public debt ratio of the Member State concerned is on a downward path or remains at a prudent level, the Commission shall use the methodology referred to in Annex V. The Commission shall make public its analysis of plausibility and the underlying data.Article 8 deleted Assessment of plausibility
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 574 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1
Each Member State shall submit to the Council and to the Commission a national medium-term fiscal-structural plan before end-April following the entry into force of this Regulation. The Member State concerned and the Commission may agree to extend this deadline by a reasonable period if necessary.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 590 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Each Member State shall ensure that representatives of workers' associations, civil society organizations and other relevant stakeholders are given early and effective opportunities to participate in the preparation of the national medium-term fiscal structural plans.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 592 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – title
Technical dialogueApproval in the national parliament
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 593 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1
Prior to the submission of itsThe reference trajectory and national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, of the Member State concerned shall hold with the Commission a technical dialogue, with the objective of ensuring that the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan complies with Articles 11, 12 and 14be debated and approved in the national parliament in accordance with national procedures and traditions.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 610 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
The national medium-term fiscal-structural plan shall also describe the actions of the Member State concerned to address the country-specific recommendations, including those that are relevant for the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, and the warnings by the Commission, where applicable, or the recommendations by the Council, where applicable, made pursuant to Article 121(4) TFEUsocial and environmental guidelines issued by the Commission as laid down in Article 3.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 618 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 2
2. Where the national-medium-term fiscal-structural plan includes a higher net expenditure trajectory than in the technical trajectory issued by the Commission pursuant to Article 5, the Member State shall provide in its plan sound and verifiable economic arguments explaining the difference.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 630 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) ensure the fiscal adjustment necessary to put or keep public debt on a plausibly downward path by the end of the adjustment period at the latest, or remain at prudent levels, and to bring and maintain the government deficit below the 3% of GDP reference value over the medium termat public debt and primary deficit are put or kept on a plausibly sustainable path, starting after the implementation period;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 648 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) explain how it will ensure the delivery of investment and reforms responding to the main challenges identified within the European Semester, in the country-specific recommendations, correct the identified macroeconomic imbalances under the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure if applicable,Social and Environmental Guidelines issued by the Commission and address the common priorities of the Union referred to in Annex VI of this Regulation, including the European Green Deal, European Pillar of Social Rights and the Digital Decade while being consistent with the updated National Energy and Climate Plans and the National Digital Decade Roadmaps;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 704 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point i
(i) be growth enhancingpromote full-employment and reduce poverty;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 739 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point v a (new)
(v a) comply with the do no significant harm principle;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 741 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point v b (new)
(v b) guarantee universal access to basic public services;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 765 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 1
1. A Member State may request toshall submit a revised national medium-term fiscal-structural plan to the Commission before the end of its adjustment period if there are objective circumstances preventing the implementation of the originalreference trajectory and a revised national medium-term fiscal- structural plan tor if the subCommission of a new national medium-term fiscal- structural plan is requested byin case a new government takes power.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 788 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 4
4. Where a revised national medium- term fiscal-structural plan is submitted, Articles 12 and 15 to 19 shall apply.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 804 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) whether the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan ensures that public debt is put or kept on a plausibly downward path by the end of the adjustment period at the latest, or stays at prudent levelssustainable path, starting after the implementation period;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 816 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) whether the governmentprimary deficit is maintained below the 3% of GDP reference value throughout the duration of the plan or whether the government deficit returns swiftly below the 3% of GDP reference valuput or kept on a plausibly sustainable pat the latest by the end of the adjustment period when the deficit is above this reference value ath, starting after the time of submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural planplementation period;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 820 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) whether the government deficit is maintained below the 3% of GDP reference value in the absence of further budgetary measures over a period of 10 years;deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 828 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – point d
(d) whether the fiscal adjustment effort over the period of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan is at least proportional to the total effort over the entire adjustment period;deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 836 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – point e
(e) whether for the years that the Member State concerned is expected to have a deficit above the 3% of GDP reference value, and the excess is not close and temporary, the fiscal adjustment is consistent with the benchmark referred to under Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure as amended by Regulation [X]; andeleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 845 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – point f
(f) whether the public debt ratio at the end of the planning horizon is below the public debt ratio in the year before the start of the technical trajectory.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 859 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – point f a (new)
(f a) whether representatives of workers' associations , civil society organisations and other relevant stakeholders were consulted and how their opinions have been taken into account.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 874 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16
Endorsement of the national medium- term fiscal-structural plan by the Council The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, shall adopt a recommendation setting the net expenditure path of the Member State concerned and, if applicable, endorsing the set of reform and investment commitments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period included in its national medium-term fiscal-structural plan within four weeks of the adoption of the Commission recommendation as a rule. Where the national medium-term fiscal- structural plan serves as the corrective action plan required for the correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances, as provided for in Article 30, the Council shall also endorse in that recommendation the reforms and investment necessary to correct the imbalances.Article 16 deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 887 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17
Council Recommendation for a revised national medium-term fiscal-structural Where it considers that the plan does not comply with the requirements set out in Article 15 (2) and (3) point (a), the Council shall, on a recommendation from the Commission, recommend that the Member State concerned submits a revised national medium-term fiscal- structuralArticle 17 deleted plan.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 893 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18
The Council shall, on a recommendation from the Commission, recommend to the Member State concerned that the technical trajectory issued by the Commission be the net expenditure path of the Member State where: (a) the Member State concerned fails to submit a revised national medium-term fiscal-structural plan within one month of the recommendation by the Council; (b) the Council considers that the revised national medium-term fiscal-structural plan does not comply with the requirements set out in Article 15(2) and (3), point (a); (c) the Member State fails to submit a new national medium-term fiscal-structural plan at the end of the period covered by the previous national medium-term fiscal- structural plan.Article 18 deleted Council Recommendation in case of failure by the Member State
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 909 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19
satisfactorily comply with its commitments Where a Member State has been granted an extension of its adjustment period but fails to satisfactorily comply with its set of reform and investment commitmentsArticle 19 deleted Failure by a Member State to underpinning thean extension referred to in Article 13(1), the Council may on a recommendation from the Commission, recommend a revised net expenditure path with a shorterof its adjustment period.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 930 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21
Monitoring by the Commission The Commission shall monitor the implementation of the national medium- term fiscal-structural plan, and in particular, the net expenditure path. The Commission shall set up a control account, functioning in accordance with Annex IV, and shall keep track of cumulative upward and downward deviations of actual net expenditures from the net expenditure path.Article 21 deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 960 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23
recommendation for policy measures 1. In the event of a significant risk of deviation from the net expenditure path or a risk that the government deficit may exceed the 3% of GDP reference value, the Commission may address a warning to the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 121(4) TFEU. 2. On the basis of a Commission recommendation, the Council shall, within one month of the Commission warning referred to in paragraph 1, adopt a recommendation to the Member State concerned for the necessary policy measures, in accordance with Article 121(4) TFEU.Article 23 deleted Commission warning and Council
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 974 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – title
Severe eEconomic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a wholMember State
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 975 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1
On a recommendation from the Commission, the Council may adopt a recommendation allowing Member States to deviate from their net expenditure pathThe Member State concerned can deviate from its reference trajectory, in the event of a severen economic downturn on a national level or in the euro area or the Union as a whole, provided it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The Council shall specify a time-limit for such deviation. An extension can be taken more than once.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 986 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 3
The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, may extend the period during which Member States may deviate from the net expenditure paths, provided that the severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole persists. An extension may be granted more than once. However, each extension shall be for an additional period of one year at most.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 990 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – title
Exceptional circumstances outside the control of the Member StateSocial or ecological circumstances leading to a majorsignificant impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 992 #

2023/0138(COD)

On a recommendation from the Commission, the Council may adopt a recommendation allowing a Member State to deviate from its net expenditure path where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the Member State lead to a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, provided it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The Council shall specify a time-limit for such a deviationThe Member State is allow to deviate from its reference trajectory where social or ecological circumstances with a significant impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned occur. An extension can be taken more than once.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1003 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 2
The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, may extend the period during which the Member State may deviate from the net expenditure path, provided that the exceptional circumstances persist. An extension may be granted more than once. However, each extension shall be for an additional period of one year at most.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1011 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 a (new)
Article25a European Central Bank support The ECB shall do everything in its power to support the sustainability of public debt of Member States and prevent a significant divergence of the spreads of Member State’s sovereign debts.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1012 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26
European Semester Dialogue The European Parliament shall be duly involved in the European Semester in order to increase the transparency and ownership of, and the accountability for the decisions taken, in particular by means of an economic dialogue. The Economic and Financial Committee, the Economic Policy Committee, the Employment Committee and the Social Protection Committee shall be consulted within the framework of the European Semester where appropriate. Relevant stakeholders, in particular the social partners, shall be involved within the framework of the European Semester, on the main policy issues where appropriate, in accordance with the provisions of the TFEU and national legal and political arrangements. In order to enhance the dialogue between the institutions of the Union, in particular the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to ensure transparency and accountability, the European Parliament may invite the President of the Council, the Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the European Council or the President of the Eurogroup to appear before it to discuss the policy guidance to Member States issued by the Commission, conclusions drawn by the European Council and the results of multilateral surveillance carried out under this Regulation. The President of the Council, and the Commission in accordance with Article 121 TFEU, and, where appropriate, the President of the Eurogroup, shall report annually to the European Parliament and to the European Council on the results of the multilateral surveillance.Article 26 deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1020 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27
The Council is expected to, as a rule, follow the recommendations and proposals of the Commission or explain its position publicly.Article 27 deleted Comply or explain rule
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1021 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 1
Where the Council addresses a recommendation to a Member State pursuant to Article 23(2) in the event of a significant risk of deviation from the net expenditure path, the European Parliament may offer the opportunity to thatThe European Parliament may invite Member State,s to participate in an exchange of views when it deems relevant to do so.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1029 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 30
Interaction with the Macro-Economic 1. Where a Member State fails to implement the reform and investment commitments included in its national medium-term fiscal-structural plan to address the country-specific recommendations that are relevant for the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure established by Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, and where the Commission considers that the Member State concerned is affected by excessive imbalances in accordance with Article 7(1) of that Regulation, the procedure laid down in Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 shall apply. 2. In that case, the Member State for which an excessive imbalance procedure is opened in accordance with Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, it shall submit a revised plan in accordance with Article 14 of this Regulation. The revised plan shall follow the Council recommendation adopted in accordance with Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011. The submission of the revised plan shall be subject to the endorsement by the Council in accordance with Articles 16 to 19 of this Regulation. The revised plan shall be assessed in accordance with Article 15 of this Regulation. 3. Where a Member State submits a revised medium-term fiscal-structural plan pursuant to paragraph 2, that revised plan shall serve as the corrective action plan required under Article 8(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 and shall set out the specific policy actions the Member State concerned has implemented or intends to implement and shall include a timetable for those actions. In that case, in accordance with Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, the Council, on the basis of a Commission assessment, shall assess the revised plan within 2 months of its submission. The monitoring and assessment of the implementation of the revised plan shall be made in accordance with Article 21 of this Regulation and Articles 9 and 10 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011.Article 30 deleted Imbalance Procedure
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1037 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 31
A Member State subject to enhanced surveillance under Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council33 shall take into account any recommendations addressed to it under Article 23 of this Regulation when adopting measures aimed at addressing the sources or potential sources of difficulties pursuant to Article 3(1) of that Regulation. Where a Member State is subject to a macroeconomic adjustment programme and the changes thereto in accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013, it shall not be required to submit a medium-term fiscal-structural plan pursuant to Article 9 of this Regulation and an annual progress report pursuant to Article 20 of this Regulation. _________________ 33 Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (OJ L 140, 27.5.2013, p. 1).rticle 31 deleted Interaction with the enhanced surveillance procedure
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1051 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. When modifying Annexes I, II and VI the European Commission will ask for the opinion of European workers' associations.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1053 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 35
In-depth surveillance missions 1. The Commission may undertake in- depth surveillance missions in Member States which are the subject of recommendations issued pursuant to Article 23 for the purposes of on-site monitoring. 2. When the Member State concerned is a Member State whose currency is the euro or a Member State that is participating in ERM2, the Commission may invite representatives of the European Central Bank, if appropriate, to participate in surveillance missions.Article 35 deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1060 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 36 – paragraph 2
2. The report referred to in paragraph 1 shall review: (a) the effectiveness of this Regulation, particularly whether the provisions governing decision-making have proved sufficiently efficient in ensuring a downward path for public debt ratios or maintaining them at prudent levels in accordance with the relevant Council recommendations; (b) the progress in ensuring closer coordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of economic performances of the Member States.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1079 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I
Criteria for setting the technical trajectory for Member States having a public debt above 60% of GDP reference value or government deficit above 3% of GDP reference value For Member States having public debt above the 60% of GDP reference value or government deficit above the 3% of GDP reference value, the technical trajectory shall ensure that: (a) by the end of the adjustment period, at the latest, the 10-year debt trajectory in the absence of further budgetary measures is on a plausibly downward path or stays at prudent levels; (b) the government deficit is brought and maintained below the 3% of GDP reference value in the absence of further budgetary measures over the same 10- year period; (c) for the years that the Member State concerned is expected to have a deficit above the 3% of GDP reference value, and the excess is not close and temporary, the technical trajectory is also consistent with the benchmark referred to under Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure as amended by Regulation [X]; (d) the adjustment effort is not postponed towards the final years of the adjustment period, that is to say the fiscal adjustment effort over the period of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan is at least proportional to the total effort over the entire adjustment period; (e) the public debt ratio at the end of the planning horizon is below the public debt ratio in the year before the start of the technical trajectory; and (f) national net expenditure growth remains below medium-term output growth, on average, as a rule over the horizon of the plan.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1108 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex II – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) Information on implicit liabilities related to ageing, and contingent liabilities with a potentially large impact on government budgets, including government guarantees, non-performing loans, and liabilities stemming from the operation of public corporations, including the extent thereof, potential expenses and obligations arising from court cases and, to the extent possible, information on disaster and climate contingent liabilities. It shall also include risks correlated to ineffective taxation systems, tax evasion and avoidance, and the correspondent impact on inequalities;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1109 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex II – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) The main assumptions about expected economic developments and main economic variables which are relevant for ensuring consistency with a convergence of public debt towards prudent levels and maintaining the government deficit below the 3% of GDP reference value.sustainable level of public debt and primary deficit;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1142 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)
(d a) Detailed information on how representatives of workers' associations, civil society organizations and other relevant stakeholders are being involved in the implementation of the commitments;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1143 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) Information for the following year on how the Member State intends to address the country-specific recommendations of the previous year, including, where applicable, the recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1150 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – paragraph 1 – point l
(l) An analysis of the evolution of the macroeconomic imbalances identified under the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure and of the impact on them of the implementation of the relevant reforms and investment reported in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan in accordance with Annex II, point (n), where applicable.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1156 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex IV
Functioning of the Control Account The control account for each Member State referred to in Article 21 will record a debit when the actual net expenditure in the Member State in a given year is above the net expenditure path set by the Council. The control account will record a credit when the actual net expenditure in the Member State in a given year is below the net expenditure path set by the Council. The cumulated balance of the control account in a given period is the sum of the yearly debits and credits registered during that period.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1171 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex VI – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
(c a) The UN 2030 Agenda for sustainable development, including its Sustainable Development Goals.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1172 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex VI – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence - For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security.38 _________________ 38 Council of the European Union, COPS 130.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1176 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex VII
[...]deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
The European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 3 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
(1) The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union, as provided for by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), entails compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments. All this framework curtails the sovereignty of Member States.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 4 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
(2) The economic governance framework of the Union, which comprises an elaborate system of policy coordination and surveillance of Member States’ economic policies, has guidfailed Member States in achieving their economic and fiscal policy objectives. Since the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, the framework has helped achievefailed in promoting macroeconomic convergence, safeguard sound public finances and address macroeconomic imbalancesas well complying with the goals for public debt and government deficit. Together with a common monetary policy and a common currency in the euro area, the framework has createdfailed in creating the conditions for economic stability, sustainable and inclusive economic growth and higher employment for citizens of the Union.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 5 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3
(3) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which initially consisted of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/9719 , Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 199720 and the Resolution of the European Council of 17 June 1997 on the SGP21 , is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainabl. Such framework failed in promoting full employment, sustainable and inclusive growth, and employmentoverall macroeconomic convergence between Member States. __________________ 19 Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1). 20 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6). 21 Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact Amsterdam, 17 June 1997 (OJ C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 1).
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 6 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 a (new)
(3a) The set goals of 3% and 60% of GDP for government deficit and public debt, respectively, lack a sound economic justification. Moreover, evidence shows the compliance by Member States with such rules is unrealistic, especially clear regarding the public debt threshold.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 7 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 b (new)
(3b) The Commission recognizes the large amount of public and private investment to accomplish the EU’s climate goals and the even higher when referring to the climate goals set in the Paris Agreement. However, evidence shows that EU net public investment as a proportion of GDP has not fully recovered since its sharp fall after the financial crisis, especially serious in Southern Europe, due to fiscal consolidation pressure under the former EU economic governance rules. Moreover, recent independent studies show that the current Commission’s proposal fails to guarantee sufficient fiscal capacity to Member States to promote the investment needed to promote climate transition and conversion.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 8 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 c (new)
(3c) EU's past experience showed the limits of fiscal consolidation in promoting sustainable public finances and promoting full-employment. Recently, the IMF published evidence that, on average, fiscal consolidation does not reduce debt- to-GDP ratio. Moreover, the so-called Troika programmes failed to accomplish its own economic goals and accentuated the economic downturn.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 9 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
(4) In stage three of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Member States are, according to Article 126(1) TFEU, under the obligation to avoid excessive government deficits.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 12 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
(5) The economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to better take into account the macroeconomic divergences and disparities in production capacities, growing heterogeneity of fiscal positions, sustainability risks and other vulnerabilities across Member States. The strong policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic proved effective in mitigating the economic and social damage of the crisis, but resulted in a significant increase in public- and private-sector debt ratios, underscoring the importance of reducing debt ratios to prudent levels in a gradual, sustained and growth-friendly manner and addressing macroeconomic imbalances, while paying due attention to employment and social objectives. At the same time, the economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to help address the medium- and long-term challenges facing the Union, including achieving a fair digital and green transition, including the Climate Law22 , ensuring energy security, open strategic autonomy, addressing demographic change, strengthening social and economic resilience, and implementing the strategic compass for security and defence, all of which requires reforms and sustained high levels of investment in the years to come. __________________ 22 The European Climate Law sets a Union-wide climate neutrality objective by 2050 and requires Union institutions and Member States to progress in enhancing adaptive capacity, requiring significant public investment to reduce the negative socio-economic impacts of climate change on the EU and its Member States, including negative impacts on growth and fiscal sustainability.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 14 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
(6) The economic governance framework of the Union should put debt sustainability and sustainable growthfull employment and the achievement of the climate goals set in the Paris Agreement at its core and therefore differentiate between Member States by taking into account their public debt challenges and allowing country-specific fiscal trajectoricountry-specific challenges. Moreover, it should allow for true ownership and democratic scrutiny of such choices.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 18 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
(7) At the same time, to ensure a transparent and common Union framework based on the reference values referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the TFEU and the Treaty on the European Union (TUE), stronger enforcement underpinning multilateral surveillance should be the necessary counterpart of a risk-based surveillance framework that allows for country-specific fiscal trajectories.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 20 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) In order to simplify the Union fiscal framework and increase transparency, a single operational indicator anchored in debt sustainability should serve as a basis for setting the fiscal path and carrying out annual fiscal surveillance for each Member State. That single indicator should be based on nationally financed net primary expenditure, that is to say expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures and excluding interest expenditure as well as cyclical unemployment expenditure and expenditure on Union programmes fully matched by revenue from Union funds. This indicator allows for macro-economic stabilisation as it is not affected by the operation of automatic stabilisers, including revenue and expenditure fluctuations outside the direct control of the government.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 25 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) The excessive deficit procedure (EDP) for breaches of the deficit reference value of 3 % of gross domestic product (GDP) (‘deficit-based EDP’), referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 is a well-established element of the Union’s fiscal surveillance framework that has been effective in influencing fiscal policy in the Member States.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 27 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
(10) To strengthen the EDP for breaches of the debt criterion of 60 % of GDP (‘debt-based EDP’), referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 the focus should be on departures from the fiscal path set by the Council under Regulation (EU) […] of the European Parliament and of the Council23 . __________________ 23 Regulation (EU) […] of the European Parliament and of the Council of […] [on the effective coordination of economic policies and multilateral budgetary surveillance] (OJ L …, …, p….).deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 29 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) On the basis of Article 126(2) TFEU, the deficit criterion is also fulfilled where the excess over the reference value of 3 % of GDP is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value. Therefore, a temporary breach that remains close to the reference value should not lead to the opening of a deficit-based EDP if it results from exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a majorWhen social or ecological circumstances with a significant impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, which includes a severe occur, or an economic downturn in the Member State concerned, the excess of a primary deficit should be considered exceptional.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 31 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) Moreover, in case of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole, and following the application of Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council may decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 33 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) In accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council, following a recommendation from the Commission, can allow Member States tocan deviate from the net expenditure path set by the Council underreference trajectory they set that Regulation in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole, or in the event of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, provided that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. As a consequence, such a deviation should not lead to the opening of a debt-based EDP.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 37 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
(14) When assessing the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission should take into account, as a keyll relevant factor, the degree of debt challenge in the Member State concerned. A substantial public debt challenge established according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor should be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an EDP as a rule. Since, in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEUs on equal footing. Besides the sustainability of public debt, the Commission is toshould take into account all other relevant factors, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concerned, that should include in particular the developments in the medium-term economic position and the developments in the medium-term budgetary position, and the ithe progress on the national targets on empleoymentation of structural reforms and investment. In order to increase national ownership,, skills and poverty reduction and the implementation of investment. In order to increase national ownership, national parliaments, representatives of workers' associations and the independent fiscal institutions referred to in Article 8 of Council Directive [on the national budgetary frameworks]24 , should provide an opinion on the relevant factors. __________________ 24 Council Directive […] of […] [amending Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States] (OJ L …, …, p….).
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 41 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
(15) To keep track of actual and planned annual deviations from the net expenditure path as set out in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission should set up a control account for each Member State summing those deviations over time. The information in the control account should be the basis of enforcement actions, in particular of a report pursuant to Article 126(3) TFEU following a deviation from the net expenditure path. At the same time, the degree of ambition of the net expenditure path in the national medium- term fiscal-structural plan referred to in Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] should be considered when deciding on the opening of a debt-based EDP. In particular, if the Member State’s net expenditure path set by the Council is more ambitious than the medium-term technical trajectory put forward by the Commission in accordance with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] and the deviation from the path is not significant when measured against this trajectory, the opening of an excessive deficit procedure should be avoided.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
(16) TWhe corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should bring or keep the general government deficit durably below the reference value of 3 % of GDP referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 by the deadline established by the Council. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should also ensure sufficient progress during the period covered by the recommendation regarding putting the projected debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or remaining at a prudent level. When setting the corrective net expenditure path under the EDP, the Council should also ensure that there is no back-loading of the required fiscal adjustment effort. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP would in principle be the one originally set by the Council, while taking into account the need to correct the deviation from that path. In case the original path is no longer feasible, due to objective circumstances, the Council should be able to set a different path under the EDPn a Member State, in dialogue with the Commission and the Council, defines primary deficit as excessive, it should present a detailed economic explanation, including a list of growth- enhancing investments and a budgetary plan laying down the expenditure and revenue options, to overcome it.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 49 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
(17) For Member States under an EDP, the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, should continue to be able to extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit where it establishes the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], or in the case of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of an individual Member State and provided that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. Such extension should require that the overall size of the shock exceeds a normal range, for example costs of natural disasters should be anticipated within bandwidths.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 50 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
(18) Specific provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 related to the contributions to second pillar pension systems should be deleted since the net expenditure path set by the Council should already take into account the revenue loss related to such contributions.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
(19) Independent fiscal institutions have proven their capacity to foster fiscal discipline and strengthen the credibility of Member States’ public finances. Ishould have a pluralistic and multidisciplinary board, where minority views have representation as well as representatives of workers' associations, in order to truly enhance national ownership, the role of. Moreover, when requested by the Member State concerned, such independent fiscal institutions, traditionally mandated to monitor compliance with the national framework, should be expanded to the economic governance framework of the Union should be responsible to produce the forecasts and the impact assessments needed to the budgetary practices.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 54 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20
(20) Clear conditions should be laid down for abrogation of excessive deficit procedures. Abrogation should require the deficit to remain credibly below the reference value of 3 % of GDP referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 and, for a debt-based EDP, that the Member State demonstrates compliance with the net expenditure path under the EDP.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 56 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
(21) The fines provided for in Article 126(11) TFEU should not provide for a minimum amount but they should accumulate until effective action is taken, in order to constitute a real incentive for compliance with the notices given to Member States under an EDP in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 59 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
(23) This Regulation is part of a package together with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] and Directive (EU) […] amending 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. Together, they establish a reformed Union economic governance framework that incorporates into Union law the substance of Title III ‘Fiscal Compact’ of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) in the Economic and Monetary Union25 , in accordance with Article 16 thereof. By building on the experience with the implementation of the TSCG by the Member States, the package retains the Fiscal Compact’s medium- term orientation as a tool to achieve budgetary discipline and growth promotion. The package includes a strengthened country-specific dimension aimed at enhancing national ownership, including by means of a stronger role for independent fiscal institutions, which draws on the Fiscal Compact’s common principles proposed by the Commission26 in accordance with Article 3(2) of the TSCG. The analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures for the overall assessment of compliance required by the Fiscal Compact is set out in Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. As in the Fiscal Compact, temporary deviations from the medium-term plan are allowed only in exceptional circumstances in Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. Similarly, in case of significant deviations from the medium-term plan, measures should be implemented to correct the deviations over a defined period of time. The package strengthens fiscal surveillance and enforcement procedures to deliver on the commitment of promoting sound and sustainable public finances and sustainable growth. The economic governance framework reform, thus, retains the fundamental objectives of budgetary discipline and debt sustainability set out in the TSCGhe package includes a strengthened country-specific dimension aimed at enhancing national ownership, including by Member States being the ones deciding on their fiscal choices and requiring its parliamentary approval. __________________ 25 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of 2 March 2012. 26 Communication COM(2012) 342 final of 20 June 2012 from the Commission ‘Common principles on national fiscal correction mechanisms’.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 63 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point a a (new)
(aa) 'reference trajectory' means the trajectory for the primary balance each Member State shall present, as set in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council [on the preventive arm]*;
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 64 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures and other budgetary variables outside the control of the government, as defined in Annex II, point (a) of Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council [on the preventive arm]*;deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) ‘technical trajectory’ means the net expenditure trajectory put forward by the Commission in accordance with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm];deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 77 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
(d) ‘net expenditure path’ means the multi-annual trajectory for net expenditure of a Member State as set by the Council in accordance with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm];deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 80 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point e
(e) ‘control account’ means a record of a Member State’s cumulated deviations of the actual net expenditure from the net expenditure path.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 81 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1
The excess of a government deficit over the reference value shall be considered exceptional, in accordance with Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), where the CouncilMember State concerned has established the existence of a severen economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] or of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned,significant social or ecological circumstances with a significant impact on the public finances in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 84 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
In addition, the excess over the reference value shall be considered temporary where budgetary forecasts as provided by the CommissionMember State indicate that the deficit will fallorient towards below the reference value following the end of the severe economic downturn or the exceptional circumstances referred to in the first subparagraph.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1a
1a. WThen it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) shall be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with Article 126(2), point (b), TFEU if the Member State concerned respects its net expenditure path Member State shall present a detailed economic explanation, including a list of growth-enhancing investments and a budgetary plan laying down the expenditure and revenue options, to overcome such excessive primary deficit.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 97 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 2
2. The Commission and the Council, when assessing and deciding upon the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) to (6) TFEU, mayshall consider an excess over the reference value resulting from a severen economic downturn as exceptional in the sense of Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), TFEU where the CouncilMember State concerned establishes the existence of exceptional circumstances in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]paragraph 1.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 104 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of debt challenges in the Member State concerned. In particular, where the Member State faces substantial public debt challenges according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor, it shall be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an excessive deficit procedure as a rule, on an equal footing, all relevant factors as indicated in that Article 126(3) TFEU, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of the sustainability of the primary deficit and public debt criteria of the Member State concerned.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 117 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
TAdditionally, when preparing the report the Commission shall also take into account all other relevant factors as indicated in Article 126(3) TFEU, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concernedthe economic and social circumstances of the Member State in relation to progress on the national targets on employment, skills and poverty reduction and measures implementing Directive 2022/2041. Moreover, the report needs to also take into account progresses toward the common priorities as referred to in Annex VI of the Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] with the specific aim to analyse how an excessive deficit procedure would affect investments needed to enable an energy transition.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 123 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point a
(a) the developments in the medium- term economic position, in particular inflation developments and cyclical developments compared to the assumptions underlying the net expenditure path;
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 124 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b
(b) the developments in the medium- term budgetary positions, including, in particular, the size of the actual deviation from the net expenditure path, in annual and cumulative terms as measured by the control account, and the extent to which the deviation is due to a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole or to exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned in accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. Where relevant, the deviation compared to the technical trajectory shall also be taken into account when considering the size of the deviation;
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 132 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point c
(c) the evolution of the government debt stock, but also its position and its financing, including possible ECB temporary support put in place, and the related risk factors, including in particular the debt structure, maturity structure, and the currency denomination of the debt and contingent liabilities;
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 137 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d
(d) the implementation of reforms and investments including, in particular policies to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances and policies to implement the common growth and employment strategy of the Union including those supported by NextGenerationEU, and the overall quality of public finances, in particular the effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 148 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4
The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any oll ther factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteriathe sustainability of primary deficit and public debt and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and achieving the policy goals of the Union. The opinion submitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall include the opinion of its national independent fiscal institution on relevant factors.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 150 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and achieving the policy goals of the Union. The opinion submitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall include the opinion of its nationsubmitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall independent fiscal instituclude the opinion on relevant factors, but also the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation, on relevant factorsf the: (i) national parliament of the state concerned; (ii) representatives of workers' associations; (iii) national independent fiscal institution.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 155 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
The Council and the Commission shall make a balanced overall assessment of all the relevant factors, specifically, the extent to which they affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and/or the debt criteria as aggravating or mitigating factors.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 160 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
When assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit criterion, if the ratio of the government debt to GDP exceeds the reference value, those factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit provided for in Article 126(4), (5) and (6) TFEU only if the double condition of the overarching principle — that, before these relevant factors are taken into account, the general government deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary — is fully met.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 163 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3
However, those factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit when assessing compliance on the basis of the debt criterion.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 166 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 5
5. Where Member States are alloweddecides to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a wholereference trajectory in accordance with paragraph 1 pursuant to Article 24 and Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment, mayshall decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 175 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 6
If the Council, acting under Article 126(6) TFEU, decides that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the Council and the Commission shall, in the subsequent procedural steps of that Article of the TFEU, take into account the relevant factors referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, as they affect the situation of the Member State concerned, including as specified in Article 5(2) of this Regulation, in particular in establishing a deadlinthe deadline agreed with the Member State for the correction of the excessive deficit and eventually extending that deadline. However, tThose relevant factors shall notalso be taken into account for the decision of the Council under Article 126(12) TFEU on the abrogation of some or all of its decisions under Article 126(6) to (9) and (11) TFEU.’;
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 181 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 3
3. TThe Member State, the Commission and the Council shall decide on the 3. existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(6) TFEU, as a rule within four months of the reporting dates established in Article 3(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 479/2009primary deficit. When it decides that an excessive deficit exists, the Commission and the Council shallmay at the same time make recommendations to the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU. The Council shall make its decisions and recommendations shall be made public.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 182 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of six months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. When warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the deadline for effective action may be three months. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. In its recommendaMember State shall agree with the Commission and the Council on a maximum deadline for effective action, the Council shall also request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path, which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value within the deadline set in the recommendation. For the years when the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective net expenditure path shall be consistent with a minimum annual adjustment of at least 0,5% of GDP as a benchmarko be taken and for the correction of the excessive deficit.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 192 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or keep it at a prudent level having regard to the criteria established in Annex I of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. The corrective net expenditure path shall ensure that the average annual fiscal adjustment effort in the first three years is at least as high as the average annual fiscal effort of the total adjustment period.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 199 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 5
5. Within the deadline provided for in 5. paragraph 4 of this Article, tThe Member State concerned shall report to the Council and the Commission on action taken in response to the Council’s recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The report shall include: (i) the targets for government expenditure and revenue and for the discretionary measures on both the expenditure and the revenue side consistent with the Council’s recommendation, as well as information on the measures taken and the nature of those envisaged to achieve the targets. (ii) an analysis on the impact that such measures may have in relation to progress on the national targets on employment, skills and poverty reduction and measures implementing Directive 2022/2041 (iii) an analysis on the progresses toward the common priorities of which in Annex VI of the Regulation [preventive arm] with the specific aim to analyse how an excessive deficit procedure would affect investments needed to enable an energy transition. The report shall also include the opinion of the national parliament and the independent fiscal institution of the Member State concerned on the adequacy of the measures taken and envisaged with respect to the targets. The Member State shall make the report public.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 201 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 6
6. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path recommended by the Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that recommendation, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The revised recommendation, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU provided that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised recommendation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.;deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 209 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 4
(3) Article 4 is replaced by the following:deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 212 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 5
(4) Article 5 is amended as follows:deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 236 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 6
(5) in Article 6, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: ‘ 1. whether effective action has been taken in response to its notice made in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU, shall base its decision on the report submitted by the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 5(1a) of this Regulation and its implementation, as well as on any other publicly announced and sufficiently detailed decisions by the government of the Member State concerned. The outcome of the surveillance mission carried out by the Commission in accordance with Article 10a of this Regulation shall be taken into account.; ’deleted The Council, when considering
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 238 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 8
(6) Article 8 is replaced by the following: ‘ Article 8 1. Article 126(11) TFEU to intensify sanctions shall be taken no later than two months after the reporting dates pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009. 2. Article 126(12) TFEU to abrogate some or all of its decisions shall be taken as soon as possible and in any event no later than two months after the reporting dates pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009. 3. taken pursuant to Article 126(12) TFEU where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commisdeleted Any Council decision iundicate that the deficit has been brought durably below the reference value and, where the excessive deficit procedure was opened on the basis of the debt criterion, the Member State concerned respected the corrective net expenditure path set by the Council in accordance with Article 3(4) or Article 5(1) of this Regulation over the previous 2 years and is projected to continue to do so in the current year on the basis of the Commission forecast.; ’er Any Council decision under A Council decision shall only be
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 243 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) where the Member State concerned acts in compliance with recommendations made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEUemploys active economic and fiscal measures to address its fiscal situation, taking under consideration the public recommendations made by the Commission and the Council;
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 244 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) where the participating Member State concerned acts in compliance with notices given in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU.;deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 246 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10 – paragraph 1
1. The Council and the Commission shall regularly monitor the implementation of action taken: — response to recommendations made under Article 126(7) TFEU; — by the participating Member State concerned in response to notices given under Article 126(9) TFEU.deleted by the Member State concerned in
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 248 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10 – paragraph 2
2. Where action by a participating Member State is not being implemented or, in the Council's view, is proving to be inadequate, the Council shall immediately take a decision under Article 126(9) TFEU or Article 126(11) TFEU respectively.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 249 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10 – paragraph 3
3. Where actual data pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 indicate that an excessive deficit has not been corrected by a participating Member State within the time limits specified either in recommendations issued under Article 126(7) TFEU or notices issued under Article 126(9) TFEU, the Council shall immediately take a decision under Article 126(9) TFEU or Article 126(11) TFEU respectively.;deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 250 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point a
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10a – paragraph 1
1. The Commission shall ensure a permanent dialogue with authorities of the Member States in accordance with the objectives of this Regulation. To that end, the Commission shall, in particular, carry out missions, for the purpose of the assessment of the actual economic situation in the Member State and the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation and allow an exchange with national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders, including the national independent fiscal institutions.; During such dialogue, the Commission shall invite representatives of workers' associations to offer their views on the socio-economic situation in the Member State and the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 254 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10a – paragraph 2
2. Following the adoption by the Council of a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, the Commission shall carry out a dedicated surveillance mission to the Member State concerned to discuss the measures that the Member State intends to take in response to the measures judged necessary following the notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. Upon invitation by the parliament of the Member State concerned, the Commission may present its assessment of the economic and fiscal situation in the Member State. Enhanced surveillance may be undertaken for Member States which are the subject of recommendations and notices issued following a decision pursuant to Article 126(8) TFEU and decisions under Article 126(11) TFEU for the purposes of on-site monitoring. The Member States concerned shall provide all necessary information for the preparation and the conduct of the surveillance mission.;Upon invitation by the parliament of the Member State concerned, the Commission may present its assessment of the economic and fiscal situation in the Member State.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 261 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 1
1. The amount of the fine shall amount to up to 0,05% of GDP for a 6- month period and be paid every 6 months until the Council assesses that the Member State concerned has taken effective action in response to the notice issued under Article 126(9) TFEU.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 265 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 2
2. In each 6-month period following that in which a fine is imposed, until the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit is abrogated, the Council shall assess whether the participating Member State concerned has taken effective action in response to the Council notice in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU. In this semi-annual assessment the Council shall decide, in accordance with Article 126(11) TFEU, to intensify the sanctions, unless the participating Member State concerned has complied with the Council’s notice.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 267 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 3
3. The cumulated amount of the fines referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exceed 0,5 % of GDP.;deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 270 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 14
1. In accordance with Article 126(12) TFEU, the Council shall abrogate the sanctions referred to in Article 126(11), first and second indent, TFEU depending on the significance of the progress made by the participating Member State concerned in correcting the excessive deficit.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 271 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 15
In accordance with Article 126(12) TFEU, the Council shall abrogate all outstanding sanctions if the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit is abrogated. Fines imposed in accordance with Article 12 of this Regulation will not be reimbursed to the participating Member State concerned.;deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 275 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 17b – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, shall adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU to Member States subject to a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or to a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU on [date of entry into force of amending Regulation], and that have taken effective action.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 276 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 17b – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
It shall adopt the revised recommendation or notice together with the adoption of the recommendation pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] setting the net expenditure path.;deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 2 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive
The European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 11 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 8
(8) This Directive is part of a package together with Regulation (EU) [XXX]22 of the Parliament and of the Council replacing Regulation (EC) No 1466/9723 (the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact) and Council Regulation [XXX]24 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/9725 (the corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact). Together, they establish a reformed Union economic governance framework that incorporates into Union law the substance of Title III ‘Fiscal Compact’ of the inter- governmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) in the Economic and Monetary Union26 , in accordance with Article 16 thereof. Title III is binding on the Member States whose currency is the euro and, on a voluntary basis, on Bulgaria, Denmark and Romania. By building on the experience with the implementation of the TSCG by the Member States, the package retains the Fiscal Compact’s medium- term orientation as a tool to achieve budgetary discipline and growth promotion. The package includes a strengthened country-specific dimension aimed at enhancing national ownership, including by means of a stronger role for independent fiscal institutions, which draws on the Fiscal Compact’s common principles proposed by the Commission27 in accordance with Article 3(2) of the TSCG. The analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures for the overall assessment of compliance required by the Fiscal Compact is set out in Regulation [XXX] replacing Regulation (EC) No 1466/97. As in the Fiscal Compact, temporary deviations from the medium-term plan are allowed only in exceptional circumstances in Regulation [XXX]replacing Regulation (EC) No 1466/97. Similarly, in case of significant deviations from the medium-term plan, measures should be implemented to correct the deviations over a defined period of time. The package strengthens fiscal surveillance and enforcement procedures to deliver on the commitment of promoting sound and sustainable public finances and sustainable growth. The economic governance framework reform, thus, retains the fundamental objectives of budgetary discipline and debt sustainability set out in the TSCG. __________________ 22 Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council of [insert date] [insert full title] (OJ L ..). 23 Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1). 24 Regulation (EU) of the Council of [insert date] [insert full title] (OJ L ..). 25 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6). 26 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of 2 March 2012. 27 Communication COM(2012) 342 final of 20 June 2012 from the Commission ‘Common principles on national fiscal correction mechanisms’.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 15 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
(11) Biased and unrealistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts for the annual and multiannual budget legislations can considerably hamper the effectiveness of fiscal planning and consequently impair commitment to budgetary discipline. To improve baseline assumptions and provide unbiased assessments of the fiscal impact of various policy measures, the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts of the Member States should be endorsed or produced by an independent fiscal institution when requested by the Member State concerned.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 14
(14) In order to achieve strengthened responsibility in fiscal policy, fiscal institutions should have a highpluralistic board, where minority views have representation as well as representatives of workers' associations and environmental organizations, the necessary degree of operational independence, the necessary resources to perform their tasks and extensive and timely access to necessary information.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 24 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 14 a (new)
(14 a) In order to promote the ownership of Member States, national parliaments shall be responsible for endorsing the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts and the impact assessments produced by the independent fiscal institutions.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 29 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 18
(18) Similarly, transparency regarding the type and size of tax expenditures, namely tax benefits as well as tax avoidance and evasion practices, and resulting revenue losses is necessary to provide a more profound understanding of the extent to which fiscal policy and budgetary planning are aligned with government priorities.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 39 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 3 – point a Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 4 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that annual and multiannual fiscal planning is based on realistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts using the most up-to- date information. Budgetary planning shall be based on the most likely macrofiscal scenario or on a more prudent scenario. The macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts shall be either produced or endorsed by independent fiscal institutions established in accordance with Article 8. They shall be compared with the most updated forecasts of the Commission. Significant differences between the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts of the Member State and the Commission’s forecasts shall be explained, including where the level or growth of variables in external assumptions departs significantly from the values contained in the Commission’s forecasts, when requested by the Member State concerned.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 3 – point a a (new) Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)
(aa) the following paragraph 1a is inserted: 1 a. The Commission shall make public the methodologies, assumptions and relevant parameters that underpin its macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts.’
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 46 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 3 – point b Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 4 – paragraph 4
(b) paragraph 4 is deleted.replaced by the following: '4. Within the framework of a sensitivity analysis, the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts shall examine paths of main fiscal variables under different assumptions as fiscal multipliers and reference interest rates.';
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 48 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 3 – point c Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 4 – paragraph 5
5. Member States shall specify which institution is responsible for producing macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts. At least annually, tThe Member States and the Commission shall engage, when deemed necessary by the Member State concerned, in a technical dialogue concerning the assumptions underpinning the preparation of macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 5 – point b Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 6 – paragraph 2
If numerical fiscal rules contain escape clauses, such clauses shall set out a limited number ofthe specific circumstances to be used, consistent with the Member States’ obligations deriving from the TFEU in the area of budgetary policy and Regulation [XXX(EU) [on the preventive arm of the SGP], and stringent], and procedures in which temporary non-compliance with the rules is permitted. Escape clauses shall have clear time limitsHowever, the Member States shall be able to apply an escape clause when an economic downturn or stagnation takes place.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 8 Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 8 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. The Member States shall guarantee that: (i) minority views have representation; (ii) representatives of workers' associations have representation; (iii) environmental organizations have representation.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 68 #

2023/0136(NLE)

(a) producing the annual and multiannual macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts underlying the government’s medium-term planning or endorsing those used by the budgetary authorities, when requested by the Member State;
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 72 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 8 Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 8 – paragraph 4 – point b
(b) producing debt sustainability assessments underlying the government’s medium-term planning or endorsing those provided by the budgetary authorities;deleted
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 88 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b – point i Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) comprehensive and transparent multiannual budgetary objectives as referred to in Article 2, point (e) in terms of the general governmentprimary deficit, debt and any other summary fiscal indicator such as expenditure, ensuring that they are consistent with any country-specific numerical fiscal rules as provided for in Chapter IV of this Directive and the relevant provisions of Regulation [XXX preventive arm of the SGP]. set of relevant fiscal indicators;
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b – point ii Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) a description of medium-term policies, including investment and reforms, envisaged with an impact on general government finances, the energy transition and sustainable and inclusive growth, broken down by major revenue and expenditure item, showing how the adjustment towards the national budgetary objectives over the medium term as referred to in Article 2, point (e), is achieved compared to projections under unchanged policies.;
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 98 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 10 Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 10
Annual budget legislation shall be consistent with the national budgetary objectives over the medium term as referred to in Article 2, point (e). Any severe departure shall be duly explained.’;
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 106 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 13 Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 14 – paragraph 3
3. For all subsectors of general government, Member States shall publish relevant information on contingent liabilities with potentially large impact on public budgets, including government guarantees, non-performing loans, and liabilities stemming from the operation of public corporations, potential expenses and obligations arising from court cases, tax benefits expenditures and potential losses arising from tax avoidance and evasion, including the extent thereof. Member States shall also publish information on disaster and climate-related contingent liabilities to the extent possible. Member States shall publish information on past calls on one-off guarantees and expenditure recorded for standardised guarantees. Published information shall include information on economic losses incurred due to disasters and climate-related shocks, including the fiscal costs borne by the public sector and the instruments used to mitigate or cover them. Member States shall publish information on the participation of general government in the capital of private and public corporations in respect of economically significant amounts.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 244 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13
Member States shall ensure that the requirements of this Article are applied proportionately to national institutional protection schemes so as not to unduly hinder the operation of their preventive measures.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 35 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 a (new)
(1a) The Union resolution framework is not a substitute for structural reforms in the banking sector. The systemic risks to financial stability associated with institutions that are "too big to fail" remain. Therefore, structural measures, including the separation of investment banking from commercial banking, need to be taken over and above the resolution framework.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 36 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 b (new)
(1b) The Union resolution framework is not a substitute for the establishment of strong safeguards to protect the Union from financial instability. For this reason, not only must the Basel III framework be implemented in full and without derogations, but stronger regulatory capital requirements, going beyond international standards, should be implemented in the Union.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 47 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
(9) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business modelcertain institutions, if the tools available under national law are not adequate to manage its failure. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In particular, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical even if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services only at regional level.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 145 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 46
(46) Given the possibility to use DGS in resolution, it is necessary to specify further the way in which the DGS contribution can count towards the calculation of the requirements to access resolution financing arrangements. If the contribution made by shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution through reductions, write- down or conversion of their liabilities, summed with the contribution made by the DGS, amounts to at least 8 % of the institution’s total liabilities including own funds, the institution should be able to access the resolution financing arrangement to receive further funding, where necessary to ensure effective resolution in line with the resolution objectives. If those conditions are met, the contribution of the DGS should be limited to the amount necessary to enable access to the resolution financing arrangement. To ensure that resolution continues to be primarily financed by the institution’s internal resources and to minimise distortions of competition, the possibility to use the DGS contribution to ensure access to resolution financing arrangements should only be possible for institutions for which the resolution plan or the group resolution plan does not provide for their winding up in an orderly manner in case of failure, given that the MREL determined by resolution authorities for those institutions has been set at a level that includes both the loss absorption and the recapitalisation amounts.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 156 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 35
(35) ‘critical functions’ means activities, services or operations the discontinuance of which is likely in one or more Member States to lead to the disruption of services that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt financial stability at national or regional level, due to the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross- border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations;;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 237 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2
Competent authorities and resolution authorities shall ensure that those measures and actions are consistent, coordinated and effective.; The provisions of this Article shall not prejudice the proper functioning of national institutional protection schemes. Member States may decide to exempt national institutional protection schemes from the requirements of this Article.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 260 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point b – point i
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 4 – point d
(d) extraordinary public financial support is required except where such support is granted in one of the forms referred to in Article 32c; or in the form of transferring all or part of the institution concerned into public ownership.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 292 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Before granting public financial support, Member States shall consider transferring all or part of the institution concerned into public ownership. If the Member State decides to grant public financial support instead of transferring all or part of the institution concerned into public ownership, it shall provide for a public statement in writing and before the national parliament explaining the reasons for its decision. Member States shall ensure that extraordinary public financial support outside of resolution action may be granted to an institution or entity as referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), on an exceptional basis only in one of the following cases and provided that the extraordinary public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework:
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 314 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
TMember States shall ensure that the support measures for the institution concerned are conditional on behavioural or structural measures that promote the public interest, including the reduction of risks associated with the complexity, interconnectedness and size of institutions in the banking sector. In addition, the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), shall fulfil all of the following conditions:
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 348 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point b
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 44 – paragraph 5 – point a
(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1), and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 109 where relevant;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 427 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1
(a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: ‘ 1. their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors: (a) (b) located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union; (c) subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.; ’deleted Member States shall ensure that in deposits; deposits made through branches deposit guarantee schemes
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 a (new)
(3a) The skyrocketing electricity prices exposed the inadequacy of the current electricity market design, specifically the shortcomings of the merit order system and of the liberalisation and financialisation of the electricity market in general. The new electricity framework should pave the way for the provision of electricity as a public good based on renewable energy sources with the objective of guaranteeing access and affordability to households, ensuring security of supply and preventing speculation, inflationary pressures and unjust windfall profits.
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 23 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
(19) Consumers and suppliers need effective and efficient forward markets to cover their long-term price exposure and decrease the dependence on short-term prices. To ensure that energy customers all over the EU can fully benefit from the advantages of integrated electricity markets and competition across the Union, the functioning of the Union’s electricity forward market should be improved via the establishment of regional virtual hubs with a view to overcome the existing market fragmentation and the low liquidity experienced in many bidding zones. Regional virtual hubs should cover multiple bidding zones while ensuring an adequate price correlation. Some bidding zones may not be covered by a virtual hub in terms of contributing to the hub reference price. However, market participants from these bidding zones should still be able to hedge through a hub.deleted
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 25 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
(21) To enhance the possibilities of market participants for hedging, the role of the single allocation platform established in accordance with Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1719 should be expanded. The single allocation platform should offer trading of financial long-term transmission rights between the different bidding zones and the regional virtual hubs. The orders submitted by market participants for financial transmission rights shall be matched by a simultaneous allocation of long term cross zonal capacity. Such matching and allocation should be performed on a regular basis, to ensure enough liquidity and, hence, efficient hedging possibilities to market participants. The long-term transmission rights should be issued with frequent maturities (ranging from month ahead to at least three years ahead), in order to be aligned with the typical hedging time horizon of market participants. The single allocation platform should be subject to monitoring and enforcement to ensure that it performs its tasks properly.deleted
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 31 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 53
(53) Public interventions in price setting for the supply of electricity constitute, in principle, a market- distortive measure. Such interventions may therefore only be carried out as public service obligations and are subject to specific conditions. Under this Directive regulated prices are possible for energy poor and vulnerable households, including below costs, and, as a transition measure, for households and micro- enterprises. In times of crisis, when wholesale and retail electricity prices increase significantly, and this is having a negative impact on the wider economy, Member States should be allowed to extend, temporarily, the application of regulated prices also to SMEs. For both households and SMEs, Member States should be temporarily allowed to set regulated prices below costs as long as this does not create distortion between suppliers and suppliers are compensated for the costs of supplying below cost. However, it needs to be ensured that such price regulation is targeted and does not create incentives to increase consumption. Hence, such price regulation should be limited to 80% of median household consumption for households, and 70% of the previous year’s consumption for SMEs. The Commission should determine when such an electricity price crisis exists and consequently when this possibility becomes applicable. The Commission should also specify the validity of that determination, during which the temporary extension of regulated prices applies, which may be for up to one year. To the extent that any of the measures envisaged by the present Regulation constitute State aid, the provisions concerning such measures are without prejudice to the application of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. Electricity should be considered an essential service, a common, necessary to ensure a life with dignity that no one should be deprived of. Access to a basic amount of energy, covering the basic needs of households in terms of health and dignity, should be considered a basic right and must be provided for free or an affordable price. This amount of energy should guarantee adequate heating, cooling, light and energy for power appliances that are essential services ensuring a decent standard of living and health. 1a _________________ 1a https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32 020H1563 Commission Recommendation EU 2020/1563 of 14/10/2020 on energy poverty
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 35 #

2023/0077(COD)

(53a) Electricity disconnections of households should be strictly banned all year long to protect citizens' dignity, basic needs and ability to cope with irregular meteorological events. A household with financial difficulties is a vulnerable household that has reduced its budget for food, leisure or health before delaying a payment in energy bills.
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 36 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 53 b (new)
(53b) Definitions of what constitutes a vulnerable consumer differs considerably between Member States. In view of the exposure of energy-poor households to the negative impact of rising electricity prices, Member States should ensure that their definition of vulnerable consumer, pursuant to Article 28 of Directive (EU) 2019/944, encompasses energy-poor households, so that these households may benefit from specific public interventions and support schemes.
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 39 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point a
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 1 – point b
(b) set fundamental principles for well- functioning, integrated electricity markets, which allow all resource providers and electricity customers non- discriminatory market access, enable the development of forwardthe provision of electricity as a public good based on renewable sources of energy in order to ensure affordability and accessibility of electricity, markets to allow suppliers and consumers to hedge or protect themselves against the risk of future volatility in electricity prices, empower consumers, ensure competitiveness on the global market, enhance flexibility through demand response, energy storage and other non- fossil flexibility solutions, ensure energy efficiency, facilitate aggregation of distributed demand and supply, and enable market and sectoral integration and market-based remuneration of electricity generated from renewable sourceintain security of supply, prevent inflationary pressures, avoid harmful speculative activities and windfall profits and prevent environmental damages and risks;
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 42 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 9
[...] d e [...] l e t e d
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 19a
Article 19adeleted
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 56 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 19a – Title
Power purchase agreementsdeleted
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 57 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 19a – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall facilitate power purchase agreements (‘PPAs’) with a view to reaching the objectives set out in their integrated national energy and climate plan with respect to the dimension decarbonisation referred to in point (a) of Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999, while preserving competitive and liquid electricity markets.deleted
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 58 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 19a – paragraph 2
2. Member States shall ensure that instruments such as guarantee schemes at market prices, to reduce the financial risks associated to off-taker payment default in the framework of PPAs are in place and accessible to customers that face entry barriers to the PPA market and are not in financial difficulty in line with Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. For this purpose, Member States shall take into account Union-level instruments. Member States shall determine what categories of customers are targeted by these instruments, applying non-discriminatory criteria.deleted
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 60 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 19a – paragraph 3
3. Guarantee schemes for PPAs backed by the Member States shall include provisions to avoid lowering the liquidity in electricity markets and shall not provide support to the purchase of generation from fossil fuels.deleted
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 65 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 19a – paragraph 4
4. In the design of the support schemes for electricity from renewable sources, Member States shall allow the participation of projects which reserve part of the electricity for sale through a PPA or other market-based arrangements and endeavour to make use of evaluation criteria to incentivise the access to the PPA market for customers that face entry barriers. In particular, such evaluation criteria may give preference to bidders presenting a signed PPA or a commitment to sign a PPA for part of the project’s generation from one or several potential buyers that face entry barriers to the PPA market.deleted
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 66 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 19a – paragraph 5
5. PPAs shall specify the bidding zone of delivery and the responsibility for securing cross-zonal transmission rights in case of a change of bidding zone in accordance with Article 14.deleted
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 67 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 19a – paragraph 6
6. PPAs shall specify the conditions under which customers and producers may exit from PPAs, such as any applicable exit fees and notice periods, in accordance with Union competition law.deleted
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 69 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 19b – Title
Direct price support schemes for new investments inelectricity generation.
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 70 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 19b – paragraph 1
1. Direct price support schemes for new investments for the generation of electricity from the sources listed in paragraph 2 shall take the form of a two- way contract for differences. New investments for the generation of electricity shall include investments in new power-generating facilities, investments aimed at repowering existing power-generating facilities, investments aimed at extending existing power- generating facilities or at prolonging their lifetimeSuch contracts shall be compulsory for electricity generation from sources listed in paragraph 2 .
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 73 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 19b – paragraph 2
2. Paragraph 1 shall apply to new investments inthe generation of electricity from the following sources:
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 76 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
REGULATION (EU) 2019/943
Article 19b, paragraph 2(e)
(e) nuclear energy;deleted
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 78 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 19b – paragraph 3 – point a
(a) be designed so that the revenues collected when the market price is above the strike price are distributed to all finalthe following electricity customers based on their share of consumption (same cost / refund per MWh consumed);: i) households; ii) SMEs; iii) undertakings operating in electricity intensive economic activities; iv) charitable organisations.
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 94 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive (EU) 2019/944
Article 66a – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) very high prices in wholesale electricity markets at least two and a half times the average price during the previous 5 years which is expected to continue for at least 6 months;
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 97 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive (EU) 2019/944
Article 66a – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) sharp increases in electricity retail prices of at least 750% occur which are expected to continue for at least 6 months; and
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 99 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive (EU) 2019/944
Article 66a – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) energy poverty is increasing or the wider economy is being negatively affected by the increases in electricity prices.
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 105 #

2023/0077(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive (EU) 2019/944
Article 66a – paragraph 4 – point a
(a) the price set for households only applies to at most 80% of median household consumption, or 100% for vulnerable consumers, and retains an incentive for demand reduction;
2023/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 32 #

2023/0076(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point j
Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 18 a (new)
(18a) ‘high-frequency algorithmic trading technique’ means an algorithmic trading technique characterised by: (a) infrastructure intended to minimise network and other types of latencies, including at least one of the following facilities for algorithmic order entry: co- location, proximity hosting or high-speed direct electronic access; (b) system-determination of order initiation, generation, routing or execution without human intervention for individual trades or orders; and (c) high message intraday rates which constitute orders, quotes or cancellations;
2023/06/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 46 #

2023/0076(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011
Article 5a – paragraph 1
1. A market participant that engages in algorithmic trading shall have in place effective systems and risk controls suitable to the business it operates to ensure that its trading systems are resilient and have sufficient capacity, are subject to appropriate trading thresholds and limits and prevent the sending of erroneous orders to trade or the systems otherwise functioning in a way that may create or contribute to a disorderly market. The market participant shall also have in place effective systems and risk controls to ensure that the trading systems comply with this Regulation and with the rules of an organised market place to which it is connected. The market participant shall have in place effective business continuity arrangements to deal with any failure of its trading systems and shall ensure its systems are fully tested and properly monitored to ensure that they meet the requirements laid down in this paragraph. The use of high-frequency algorithmic trading techniques shall be prohibited.
2023/06/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 50 #

2023/0076(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011
Article 5a – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
3. A market participant tshatll be prohibited from providesing direct electronic access to an organised market place shall notify the competent authorities of its home Member State and the Agency accordingly.
2023/06/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 19 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 29 a (new)
– having regard for United Nations resolution A/C.2/77/L.11/Rev.1 on “Promotion of inclusive and effective international tax cooperation at the United Nations”, adopted by consensus by the UN General Assembly on 23 November 20221a _________________ 1a “begin intergovernmental discussions in New York at United Nations Headquarters on ways to strengthen the inclusiveness and effectiveness of international tax cooperation through the evaluation of additional options, including the possibility of developing an international tax cooperation framework or instrument that is developed and agreed upon through a United Nations intergovernmental process, taking into full consideration existing international and multilateral arrangements”. Paragraph 2, A/C.2/77/L.11/Rev.1 on “Promotion of inclusive and effective international tax cooperation at the United Nations”, adopted by consensus by the UN General Assembly on 23 November 2022.
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 24 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas Member States are free to decide on their own economic policies, in particular their own tax policies within the boundaries of the EU Treaties; whereas, although tax policy largely remains a responsibility of the Member States, the single market requires coordination in setting tax policy in order to further single market integration; whereas Member States should be entitled to implement countermeasures that would defend their tax base, such as: a) non-deductibility of costs; b) withholding tax measures; c) limitation of participation exemption; d) special documentation requirements, especially regarding transfer pricing ;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 25 #

2022/2146(INI)

A. whereas Member States are free to decide on their own economic policies, in particular their own tax policies within the boundaries of the EU Treaties; whereas, although tax policy largely remains a responsibility of the Member States, the single market and free circulation of capital requires coordination in setting tax policy in order to further single market integration and to avoid harmful tax competition which often leads to a race to the bottom;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 27 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas Member States are free to decide on their own economic policies, in particular their own tax policies within the boundaries of the EU Treaties; whereas, although tax policy largely remains a responsibility of the Member States, the single market requires coordination in setting tax policy in order to further single market integration; whereas their tax policies should not deprive other member states tax resources;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 37 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas some European companies are battling strong headwinds as a result of the current adverse economic and social situations when some MNEs are making windfall profits;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 39 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas windfall profits are not restricted to the energy sector; whereas some multinational companies such as CMA-CGM (maritime transport), the Louis Dreyfus Company (agricultural goods), BNP-Paribas (banking), Apple (technology) and LVMH (luxury goods) made record profits during the crisis; whereas the profits of listed companies are reaching a historic peak and are mostly redistributed as dividends to their shareholders; whereas the dividends of large European companies increased by 28.7 % in the second quarter of 2022, when the crisis was surging;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
Bb. whereas ExxonMobil, Shell, BP, Chevron, and TotalEnergies, the world’s biggest fossil fuel companies, reported a total of around $200 billion in profits in 2022, nearly 120% more than the previous year, and the highest level in the industry’s history1b; _________________ 1b https://www.ft.com/content/fe60488e- 58bb-4cee-bdbb-c915e2155cd6 , https://www.cnbc.com/2023/02/08/big-oil- rakes-in-record-annual-profit-fueling- calls-for-higher-taxes.html
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 45 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B c (new)
Bc. whereas these five oil and gas giants together returned $102 billion in profits to benefit their investors, paying out $48 billion in dividends, and spending $54 billion on shares buy-back1c; whereas at the same time those companies’ capital investments into renewable power and the energy transition remain marginal1d; _________________ 1c https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaig ns/fossil-gas/crisis-year-2022-brought- 134-billion-in-excess-profit-to-the-wests- five-largest-oil-and-gas-companies/ 1d https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 2023-06-25/big-oil-s-pullback-from-clean- energy-matters-less-than-you-d- think?cmpid=BBD062523_GREENDAIL Y&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ne wsletter&utm_term=230625&utm_campai gn=greendaily≤adSource=uverify%20wall
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 47 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B d (new)
Bd. whereas many environmentally harmful activities, such as the burning of kerosene to power aircraft, bunker fuels burned in ships, air pollution from factories, harmful substances leaking into the air, water and soil from agricultural practices, deforestation, and the depletion of freshwater sources, remain tax free;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 49 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas the BEPS action plan managed to establish a globaln OECD consensus on many issues regarding the fight against aggressive tax planning;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas the EU led by example in transposing international agreements into a high number of tax directives improving coordination and the EU’s fight against aggressive tax planning; whereas the EU transposition only stick to the international agreements instead of being more ambitious and leading by example;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 68 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas tax policy fragmentation creates various obstacles for citizens and companies in the single market, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); whereas these obstacles discourage cross-border economic activity and can distort the single market and allows a special treatment for MNEs, encouraging an unfair competition with SMEs;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 83 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital G
G. whereas the debt-equity bias in corporate taxation allows fora significant number of generous tax deductions on interest payments; whereas equity financing costs cannot be deducted in a similar manner, in particular intra-groups, facilitate harmful tax practices; whereas the debt-equity bias shall be resolved by limiting such types of reductions, instead of creating new deductions to equity financing costs;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 91 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas many tax incentives are exploited by MNEs to pay less than their fair share; whereas this consequently makes MNEs pay less tax than SMEs and deprives the resources of the member states;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 93 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital G b (new)
Gb. whereas corporate income tax represents a higher share of tax revenues and gross domestic product in developing countries than in rich countries; whereas losses in developing countries due to global corporate taxation avoidance are estimated to range from 6 to 13 % of total tax revenue, compared with 2 to 3 % in member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)1e; _________________ 1e United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report entitled ‘Tackling Illicit Financial Flows for Sustainable Development in Africa’, 2020, p. 21: https://unctad.org/system/files/official- document/aldcafrica2020_en.pdf
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 98 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital G c (new)
Gc. whereas the share of tax revenues coming from corporate tax has decreased throughout the last decades when on the opposite the share of tax revenues coming from tax impacting mostly modest households like consumption tax has increased;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 99 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital G d (new)
Gd. whereas the European Central Bank acknowledges current inflationary pressure is driven by some companies raising prices in excess of their costs at the expense of consumers and wage earners1f; _________________ 1f https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/ 2023/html/ecb.sp230605~0aadd43ce7.en. html
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 100 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital G e (new)
Ge. Whereas according to the Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021, nine EU Member States feature among the 25 most harmful corporate tax havens, namely Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Cyprus, Belgium, France, Spain, Germany and Hungary1g; _________________ 1g Tax Justice Network, Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021, available from https://cthi.taxjustice.net/en/
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 101 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital G f (new)
Gf. Deplores the use of harmful tax practices by the Member States, which are a root cause of tax evasion and avoidance; supports an extension of the EU tax haven blacklist to cover EU tax havens, such as Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands and Cyprus;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 105 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that EU Member States cooperating on corporate taxation is not a goal in itself, but rather a tool to avoid harmful tax complete, improve and further develop the single marketition leading to a race to the bottom and lower public resources;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 112 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Welcomes the European Council conclusions of 23 March 2023 calling for the general regulatory environment to be simplified and for the administrative burden to be reduced, and the Commission communication of 16 March 2023 underlining that the EU tax framework is key in supporting growth and private investment, in particular by removing tax barriers to cross-border investment;deleted
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 118 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Underlines that it is paramount to fight aggressive profit shifting while promoting fiscal fairness, transparency and certainty, and while keeping taxes at levels that support sustainable economic growth;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 129 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Takes note of the numerous tax directives since 2011 that have led to fairer, simpler and more effective corporate taxation in the EU, and to a high number of tax compliance obligations on companies within the EU21 ; However, also underlines significant directives that were blocked in the Council, such as Financial Transaction Tax, the recast of the Interest and Royalties Directive, or the CCTB and CCCTB proposals; Deplores that corporate tax avoidance continues to have a severe impact on Member States and third countries21a; _________________ 21 See notably the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives (ATAD I and ATAD II), the amendments of the Directive on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation (DAC 1 to DAC 7), the revision of the Parent Subsidiary Directive, the EU Dispute Settlement Directive, the Public Country-by-Country Reporting Directive, or the Pillar Two Directive. 21a Estimates by Tax Justice Network suggest approximately US$312 billion is lost to cross-border corporate tax abuse by multinational corporations (‘State of Tax Justice 2021’, p6). In the European Union (EU), the annual loss to profit shifting by multinational corporations is conservatively estimated to be €50-70 billion per year (European Parliament Research Service (2015), ‘Bringing transparency, coordination and convergence to corporate tax policies in the European Union. I – Assessment of the magnitude of aggressive corporate tax planning). Losses are even more severe in the Global South, where the problem of corporate tax avoidance is exacerbated by the unfair and antiquated international tax rules and financial architecture (‘State of Tax Justice 2021’, p31).
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 133 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Deplores the fact that the Member States have implemented and applied tax dirCalls Member States to pursue additional national measures to increase the ambition and effectiveness in a divergent manner, undermining the proper functioning of the single market and leading to misalignment iddressing corporate tax avoidance and harmful tax practices and notes that national initiatives are often taxhe bases, more red tape and higher compliance costsis for increased political will for EU action;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 140 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Welcomes the solidarity contribution implemented by the European Commission; notes with concern that some of the largest energy companies in the EU may not be subject to the contribution and that non energy companies will not be subject to the contribution even though they make windfall profits; Underlines that windfall profits are not limited to the energy sector and specifically to the fossil fuel industries; recalls that both the International Monetary Fund and the chief economist of the ECB support a windfall tax covering all sectors; calls, therefore, on the Commission to redesign its proposal for a solidarity contribution to cover all sectors with windfall profits; recalls that this windfall tax should not be limited to 2022 profits, but should be designed as a permanent tax, which could be reactivated in future crises in the event that such windfall profits are made again by the large multinational enterprises; recalls that the International Monetary Fund is calling for a permanent windfall tax;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 144 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5b. Calls on the Commission and EU Member States to introduce progressive excessive ecological footprint taxes designed to operationalise the polluter pays principle, including progressive taxation on material and land-use footprints, to make corporate users of natural resources pay for their use as well as for any associated negative consequences (such as health and climate impacts) that would otherwise be passed on to individuals or society at large;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 156 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Calls on the Commission to present an overall evaluation of actions taken on corporate taxation since 2011 and to immediately ease the burden on businesses by invoking a regulatory moratorium and delaying those tax acts that would unnecessarily increase costs for businesses already under strain; calls on the Commission to carry out competitiveness checks for new legislative tax proposals, as requested by the European Council for all new proposals on 22 March 2023; ; calls on the Commission to carry out competitiveness checks for new legislative tax proposals, as requested by the European Council for all new proposals on 22 March 2023; Recalls the European Union and Member States’ commitments to policy coherence for development; Calls on the Commission to undertake a spillover analysis of the impacts of EU tax policies on developing countries’ domestic revenue mobilisation and exposure to corporate tax avoidance;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 157 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Calls on the Commission to present an overall evaluation of actions taken on corporate taxation since 2011 and to immediately ease the burden on businesses by invoking a regulatory moratorium and delaying those tax acts that would unnecessarily increase costs for businesses already under strain; calls on the Commission to carry out competitiveness checks for new legislative tax proposals, as requested by the European Council for all new proposals on 22 March 2023;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 165 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Welcomes the proposal of the Conference on the Future of Europe of 9 May 2022 for a competitiveness check to analyse the impact, among other things, of new tax legislation on companies and their business environments; awaits impatiently the implementation of the announcement by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen of 19 October 2022 introducing a standard competitiveness check in EU regulation;deleted
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 171 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Takes note of the renewed debate on tax incentives following the US Inflation Reduction Act; calls on the Commission to allow for experimentation with tax credits; insists, nevertheless, that all decisions should be taken in a coordinated manner to preserve the functioning of the single market and that tax credits and tax incentives often create new ways for MNEs to reduce their taxes, which at the end makes them pay less tax than SMEs; Calls for an impact assessment of all the tax credits and tax incentives in order to abolish all of them which have negative social and ecological consequences;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 178 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Calls on the Member States to engage in policies of full expensing for capital investments and to make capital allowance provisions permanent in order to improve real investments and to assist Europe’s competitiveness;deleted
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 186 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Calls on the Member States, in the light of high inflation rates, to use the additional revenues based on higher energy prices directly to relieve the burden on companies, especially SMEsSMEs and people in financial difficulty;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 187 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Recalls that secrecy around corporate taxation plays an enabling role in corporate tax avoidance; Notes that the national transposition of EU Directive 2021/2101 is ongoing, but only introducing a limited form of public country by country reporting; Regrets that the scope of that EU directive will not require large multinational corporations to publish information on a country by country basis for the vast majority of countries worldwide undermining the effectiveness and value of the measure;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 190 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 b (new)
11b. Condemns the fact that the Commission has proactively approached Member States with an information letter on gold plating without informing the European Parliament; Reminds that the Directive sets a minimum standard that Member States are free to improve and that the Commission has no political mandate to influence the Member States on that issue;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 197 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Takes note of the two-pillar solution reached at the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on the allocation of taxing rights and the application of a minimum effective tax rate of 15 % on the global profits of MNEs; Regrets, however, that the final agreement was significantly watered down, leaving a large space for improvement; notes that the agreement was criticised by the Tax Justice Network1a and the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation1b, which pointed out that developing countries in particular will not really benefit from it; regrets that the global minimum rate will only be 15 % and that according to the EU Tax Observatory tax deficit simulator, the gain for the EU would have been EUR 168 billion with a 25 % rate; regrets that the ‘carve-out’ included in the deal would ‘allow companies to escape taxation as long as they have sufficient operations (assets and employees) in tax havens’ and thus ‘reduce tax revenues by 15 % to 30 % in the EU relative to a minimum tax without carve-out’, according to a note from the EU Tax Observatory1c; Calls Member States to implement the minimum effective tax rate directive with more ambitious standards, like a higher effective tax rate of 25%; _________________ 1a Tax Justice Network, ‘OECD tax deal fails to deliver’, 8 October 2021. 1b Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation, ‘ICRIT open letter to G20 leaders: “A global tax deal for the rich”’, 12 October 2021. 1cEU Tax Observatory, ‘Minimizing the Minimum Tax? The Critical Effect of Substance Carve-Outs’.
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 200 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Notes that the Member States should not wait to strike an ambitious agreement with tax havens to move forward; calls on the Member States, therefore, to introduce and collect the tax deficit of multinationals: the difference between what a corporation pays in taxes globally and what it would have to pay if all of its profits were subject to a minimum tax rate in each of the countries in which it operates; underlines that such a solution could encourage other states to follow this move and progressively lead to an ambitious global solution;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 205 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Observes that, in addition to coping with a volatile business environment and an increasing number of EU tax directives, companies are focusing their financial and human resources on applying the Pillar Two rules; calls on the Commission to give companies breathing space and enough time to prepare for the possible new BEFITNotes that BEFIT rules could help to lower the compliance costs of SMEs by uniformizing the rules;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 212 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Reiterates that the Commission should submit a legislative proposal for a digital levy or a similar measure in the event of a lack of progress on the implementation of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/G20 Inclusive Framework Pillar 1 Agreement until the end of 2023;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)
13b. Stresses the need for further strengthening of global tax cooperation on corporate tax matters; calls for the EU to support the setting up of a UN framework convention on tax, which includes further measures to combat corporate tax avoidance and related illicit financial flows;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 220 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3
Towards a simplified corporate tax regime that addresses tax avoidance and tax competition
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 229 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Calls on the Commission to guide all the Member States towards a simplified tax system to reduce the administrative burden for companies, especially SMEs; acknowledges that simplifying refund procedures, deductions and litigation are other solutions to reduce the administrative burden, especially for SMEs; notes that abrogating most of the tax credits and other tax loopholes will simplify the rules and makes the competition between SMEs and MNEs fairer;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 244 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Welcomes the Commission’s plan to work on a BEFIT proposal, expected in the third quarter of 2023, with a view to designing a new and single EU corporate tax rulebook, based on a fair, comprehensive and effective formulary apportionment and a common tax base of income taxation for businesses, which will provide clarity and predictability for companies; Notes that this proposal should provide more tax revenues for Member States, by targeting MNEs which currently use the differences in the EU tax systems to artificially pay less tax than they should; Calls on the Commission to use a formula that includes criteria on employees, as well as sales and assets, in order to recognise where value is created;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 254 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Takes note of the BEFIT objectives, as addressed in the Commission’s call for evidence for an impact assessment, to increase businesses’ resilience by reducing the complexity of tax rules and the compliance costs faced by EU businesses with cross-border operations, to remove obstacles to cross- border investment and make the single market a more attractive location for international investment, to create an environment conducive to fair and sustainable growth by paving the way for administrative simplification, and to provide sustainable tax revenue, which is particularly important in the current challenging economic climate; Notes with concern that the Commission in this call for evidence does not state an aim of addressing tax competition and corporate tax avoidance; Calls on the Commission to ensure these aims have primacy within the forthcoming proposal; Calls on the Commission to exclude tax incentives, such as notional interest deductions or elements of the DEBRA proposal from BEFIT;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 275 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Takes note of the Commission proposal of 11 May 2022 addressing the debt-equity bias; deplorestakes note of the Council decision of 6 December 2022 to suspend the examination of the proposal; calls on the Council to relaunch negotiations on this proposal; stresses that limiting interest deductions, instead of creating equity allowances, would allow larger tax revenues for Member States;
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 282 #

2022/2146(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Highlights that tax incentives applied in a fiscally responsible manner for private research and development (e.g. via tax credits, enhanced allowances or adjusted depreciation schedules) can help lift an economy’s overall spending towards research and development, which often comes with positive externalities; recalls that corporate spending on research and development was equal to 1.5 % of EU GDP in 2020, compared to 2.6 % in the US and Japan, according to the European Investment Bank’s 2022/2023 investment report; calls on the Commission to present an assessment of tax incentives for private research and development; several Member States use patent boxes and that evidence in the literature suggests that patent boxes do not necessarily stimulate R&D and are often used as a profit-shifting instrument1a; _________________ 1a https://op.europa.eu/en/publication- detail/-/publication/22508340-1149-11ed- 8fa0-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format- PDF/source-262413960
2023/07/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 25 #

2022/2062(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Welcomes the EIB’s investment of EUR 72.4 billion of financing in 2022 and the bank’s focus on the EU’s long-term challenges of competiveness, productivitysocial cohesion, climate change, sustainability, social cohesion and digital transformation;
2023/03/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #

2022/2062(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Welcomes the fact that the EIB supports and, in line with the Operational Plan for 2023-2025, will continue to support the EU defence industry and joint procurement on the basis of the dual-use principle;deleted
2023/03/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #

2022/2062(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Reiterates its call on the EIB to complement efforts to build a data-driven society, with a particular focus on SMEs’ competitiveness;deleted
2023/03/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 76 #

2022/2062(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Stresses the need for the EIB to have a strong focus on start-ups and projects directed at tackling the growing problem of youth unemployment; and regional inequality within and across Member States;
2023/03/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 88 #

2022/2062(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Encourages the EIB to use its operations to facilitate the implementation of the goals of the Green Deal and a Just Transition, particularly because the affordability and security of food has deteriorated worldwide in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine;
2023/03/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 119 #

2022/2062(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Welcomes the fact that EIB Global supported EUR 9.1 billion in global investment outside the EU in 2022; expects EIB investments in non-EU countries to be fully aligned with EU and EU external action policies;the UN sustainable develpment goals.
2023/03/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 122 #

2022/2062(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
25. Recalls the EU’s overarching commitment to defending and promoting EU values and the rule of law in its operations outside the EU;
2023/03/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 142 #

2022/2062(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
32. Expresses once more its serious concerns about allegations regarding harassment, the working environment and working conditions at the EIB; recognises that efforts have been made by the EIB to address these and other relevant staff issues; urges the EIB to ensure that a policy of zero- tolerance towards all types of harassment is effectively implemented, including preventive and protective measures and proper and reliable complaint and victim support mechanisms; urges the EIB’s management to engage in genuine dialogue with staff representatives in order to address their concerns;
2023/03/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 16 #

2022/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas competition policy should aim to support the European Green Deal, high quality jobs and the fight against the cost of living crisis;
2023/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 37 #

2022/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that EU competition policy protects market structures against should dissolve concentrations and accumulations of market power, just as it advances and promote workers' welfare, consumers' welfare and sustainability;
2023/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #

2022/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Calls on the Commission to safeguard the integrity of the internal market and is deeply concerned about the risk of increasing fragmentation within the internal market due to excessive use of subsidies in responfor an active approach to industrial policy by Member States and the Union underpinned by large-scale public investment to fight social and regional inequality, decarbonise industry and bolster autonomy in key economic se cto the US Inflation Reduction Act; understands the need for additional public investments; considersrs, while contributing globally to even and sustainable economic development; calls for a coordinated flexibilisation of State aid rules and the introduction of a dedicated permanent, if necessary debt-financed, European investment funds to be a better policy response European solidarity funds to counterbalance uneven industrial support and development across Member States; calls for the promotion of public ownership and public veto powers in strategically important economic sectors to protect public interests;
2023/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 126 #

2022/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Considers rising energy and food prices to be the main drivers of the current hike in inflation; deplores some undertakings’ freeriding in the context of rising energy and food prices and reiterates that the Commission must make use of all the available tools under competition law to tackle market distortions and unfairthat energy and food price hikes are fuelled by commodity speculation and the misuse of market power to gain windfall profits aggravating the cost of living crisis; deplores the lack of suitable tools under competition law, or the failure to apply existing tools, to tackle market power and price manipulation in the energy and food markets; calls for consumer vulnerability to be taken into consideration when assessing the abusiveness of a dominant undertaking’s conduct;
2023/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 135 #

2022/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Calls for a permanent market investigation mechanism, which should be triggered automatically upon the fulfilment of certain conditions, such as a specific rise in prices, in order to prevent any future freeriding effectsunjustified or socially harmful price hikes; highlights that these should be met with appropriate interventions as, for example, windfall taxes, price controls or antitrust proceedings; calls for public reporting obligations on price formation for large companies in order to enhance market transparency and subject private price formation to public and parliamentary scrutiny, especially in sectors of significant general interest as energy, food, communication and housing;
2023/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 140 #

2022/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Points out that the US Inflation Reduction Act includes the objective to support lower-income communities and workers; welcomes the attachment of social conditionalities to public support schemes under the US Inflation Reduction Act promoting, for example, good pay, apprenticeship places or unionised jobs; welcomes that the US Inflation Reduction Act is planned to be financed through fair taxation of the largest corporations and extraordinarily wealthy households; calls on Member States and the Union to apply social conditionalities and fair taxation in their own public support schemes;
2023/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 152 #

2022/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Calls for the quantitative jurisdictional thresholds in the EC Merger Regulation to be reviewed and lowered; calls for the introduction of a rebuttable presumption that effective competition is significantly impeded by any concentration leading to a dominant position in a relevant market or any concentration involving a very large market operator or a gatekeeper; calls for matters of public interest, such as climate protection, general costs of living, sustainability and the rule of law, to be taken into account when examining the impact of a concentration on the internal market; calls for the inclusion of review clauses in decisions approving a concentration with a view to introducing more stringent conditions;
2023/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 161 #

2022/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Is strongly concerned about the authorisation of mergers and acquisitions by the Commission that substantially increase market concentration and power as shown in the case of Bayer’s acquisition of Monsanto in the agricultural and chemical sector or the merger between Orange and MasMovil in Spain's mobile market;
2023/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 173 #

2022/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Stresses the need to strengthen the involvement of workers in merger and acquisition decisions; calls for mandatory consultation and veto rights for workers in merger and acquisition decisions;
2023/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 188 #

2022/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Calls for the introduction of an explicit legal base for the unbundling of undertakings as a structural remedy for antitrust violations; considersalls for unbundling to also be a structural remedy in situations where abuse of a dominant position on a relevant market cannot be ascertained, but conditions for competition would improve significantly if unbundling measures were applied;
2023/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 210 #

2022/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Stresses that competition law remains relevant to digital markets despite the entry into force of the DMA; underlines that competition law should make use of the information provided to the Commission under Article 14 of the DMA; considers that violations of privacy rights can constitute abusive practices;
2023/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #

2022/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Calls for a swift implementation of the global tax agreement reached by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS in order to approach a level playing field for businesses worldwide; calls on Member States to go beyond the minimum tax rate of 15% proposed in pillar 2 and adopt higher minimum tax rates to avoid a race to the bottom with harmonisation of the tax rates at 15%; underlines that higher tax rates will help to reach a more ambitious multilateral agreement in the future; deplores that pillar 1 will only target a hundred companies worldwide and is still far from being implemented, even at EU-level;
2023/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 233 #

2022/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the presentation by the Commission of draft guidelines for sustainability agreements; underlines the need for a broad understanding of consumer welfare, which should include not only price levels, but also sustainability considerations; considers thatalls for the extension of similar authorisations should be extended to agreements that improve animal welfare, prevent deforestation, or provide for livingdecent wages;
2023/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 268 #

2022/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Stresses that public investment that creates public ownership and public control over strategic company decisions as closures, production reductions or relocations are to be prioritised over the use of subsidies;
2023/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 271 #

2022/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21b. Stresses that State aid should not amount to a transfer of public wealth to private shareholders; calls for a ban on the distribution of dividends to shareholders and bonuses to upper management in companies receiving State aid;
2023/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 273 #

2022/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 c (new)
21c. Stresses that the purpose of State aid is not to serve the private interests of companies but to support and guide sustainable industrial development in the public interest; calls on Member States and the Union to provide and allow for State aid only under the condition that consultation and veto rights are granted to workers and local authorities in strategic company decisions, especially regarding mergers and relocations; calls on Member States to attach social conditionalities to the provision of State aid with the objective of fostering good working conditions and pay, labour participation and collective bargaining rights and the maintenance and creation of new jobs and apprenticeships;
2023/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 275 #

2022/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 d (new)
21d. Calls on Member States to attach environmental conditionalities to the provision of State aid with the objective of promoting a zero-emissions and zero- waste economy as well as the conservation of biodiversity;
2023/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 283 #

2022/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22a. Calls for the ordinary legislative procedure to be fully extended to cover competition policy legislation;
2023/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 27 #

2022/2051(INL)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Notes that the fiscal rules prohibiting Member States from exceeding a deficit level of 3 % and a debt ratio of 60 % of GDP are arbitrary, make no proven economic sense and have no proven economic effectiveness; points out that Member States have breached those thresholds more than 170 times since the European Semester was established in 2011 and that that was before exceptional budgetary expenditure was triggered in connection with their response to the COVID-19 pandemic; points out that 14 Member States are currently above the 60 % debt-to-GDP threshold;
2022/11/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 28 #

2022/2051(INL)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Calls for the long-term suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact so as to allow Member States more fiscal space;
2022/11/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 29 #

2022/2051(INL)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 c (new)
2c. Regrets the fact that the Stability and Growth Pact and the European Semester are encouraging the implementation of a set of neoliberal reforms involving fiscal austerity, wage moderation, a business-friendly supply- side policy, privatisation of and competitive tendering for public services, and the weakening of social protection; acknowledges the need for a European macroeconomic governance framework, however, and calls for the current Stability and Growth Pact to be replaced by economic coordination and convergence based on combating poverty and inequality and on the green transition;
2022/11/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 30 #

2022/2051(INL)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 d (new)
2d. Advocates abandoning the growth objective in the European Treaties and the macroeconomic governance framework; calls for the introduction of binding alternative indicators to GDP that are based on well-being, social equality and respect for planetary boundaries;
2022/11/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 41 #

2022/2051(INL)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Takes the view that the free movement of goods and capital within the EU is an obstacle to controlling the economy on the basis of social and ecological criteria; considers, by the same token, that the objectives of developing world trade, phasing out restrictions on international trade and foreign direct investment and reducing customs barriers are incompatible with the Commission's and Member States' stated objective of relocalising the economy and with the objectives of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and biodiversity harm; proposes therefore that the European Treaties be revised so as to give the EU and the Member States greater leeway to implement public policies in keeping with social justice and planetary boundaries, even if they were to hinder the free movement of goods and capital and international trade;
2022/11/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 60 #

2022/2051(INL)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Stresses the need to restore political oversight, in particular by the European Parliament, over monetary policy; recommends, in order to achieve that, that ECB independence be ended;
2022/11/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 62 #

2022/2051(INL)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 b (new)
4b. Notes that price stability is the primary purpose of the ECB's actions; points out that the monetary policy that follows on from that is helping to widen inequalities and is hampering the green transition; urges that the ECB’s terms of reference be overhauled in the interests of climate change action and combating poverty and inequality; stresses in particular the need to allow the ECB to lend directly to Member States rather than using private banks as intermediaries;
2022/11/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 78 #

2022/2051(INL)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Stresses the importance of increasing the Union’s own resources; calls on the Commission and Member States to introduce a genuine financial transaction tax capable of raising more than EUR 50 billion per year; calls on the Commission and Member States to introduce a kerosene tax, which could raise EUR 27 billion per year, and to allocate it for planning the build-down of the aviation sector, supporting its employees and developing alternative means of transport; proposes the introduction at Union level of a universal tax on multinationals, which would enable the EU to recover an additional EUR 170 billion;
2022/11/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 100 #

2022/2051(INL)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Points out that it is crucial for Member States to be able to provide financial support for, and freely organise, economic sectors supplying services or products of general interest; notes that the relaxation granted by the Temporary Crisis Framework for State Aid to support the economy in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine demonstrates the need for a thorough revision of the state aid rules;
2022/11/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 101 #

2022/2051(INL)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6b. Highlights the considerable leverage effect of public procurement to guide the economy according to social, environmental and human rights criteria, and to give preference, for example, to local suppliers; calls therefore for a thorough revision of European competition law and public procurement rules;
2022/11/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 102 #

2022/2051(INL)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 c (new)
6c. Believes it necessary to learn all the lessons from the crises encountered with the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war against Ukraine and the consequences thereof; restates the importance of universal public services for combating precariousness and inequalities; suggests that health and energy should be common goods that are not governed by market rules;
2022/11/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 73 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 a (new)
(3a) By harmonising rules on data collection and sharing in the sector of short-term rentals in the internal market, this Regulation can play a decisive role in enhancing enforcement in the Member States. As a result of more effective enforcement, consumers should be able to assume that only legal listings are online and hosts of short-term rentals generally comply with the legal requirements and offer their services under fair conditions.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 76 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
(4) Rules should be laid down to harmonise transparency requirements for the provision of short-term accommodation rental services through online short-term rental platforms in cases where Member States decide to impose such transparency requirements. Accordingly, harmonised rules should be provided for registration schemes and data-sharing requirements concerning online short-term rental platforms should Member States decide to put in place such schemes or requirements. To achieve effective harmonisation, and to ensure a uniform application of the rules, Member States will not be able to legislate on access to data from online short-term rental platforms outside the specific regime laid down in the present Regulation. That is in order to ensure that Member States do not regulate the requests in question without putting in place the necessary registration schemes, databases and single digital entry point and to facilitate proportionate, privacy-compliant and secure data sharing by online short-term rental platforms within the internal market. This Regulation does not affect Member States’ competence to adopt and maintain market access requirements relating to the provision of short-term accommodation rental services by hosts, including health and safety requirements, minimum quality standards or, quantitative restrictions or restrictions by area or type of building, provided that such requirements are necessary and proportionate to protect public interest objectives, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council25. T. In this respect, the Court of Justice of the European Union has acknowledged that combatting housing shortage is an overriding reason of public interest justifying the setting up of authorisation schemes to provide short-term rental accommodation services. Therefore, the availability of reliable data on a uniform basis should support Member States’ efforts in developing policies and regulations that comply with Union law. In fact, as the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union made clear, Member States are required to justify possible market access restrictions for hosts on the basis of data and evidence. _________________ 25 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, p. 36).
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 92 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) Where the information and documentation provided by hosts via the registration procedure is valid for a limited period of time, for example in the case of an identity document or a fire or other safety certificate, hosts should be able to update the information or documentation. Where a host fails to submit the updated information and documentation, the competent authorities should have the power to suspend the validity of the registration number until the updated information or documentation has been submitted. The information and documentation submitted by the host should be retained for the entire period of validity of the registration number and for a maximum period of 13 years following the host’s request for removal of a unit from the registry, in order to allow competent authorities to perform any relevant checks even after the removal of the unit from the registry.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 93 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
(14) The information and documentation provided by hosts via the registration procedure should be verified by competent authorities only after the issuance of the registration number. It is appropriate to enable hosts, within a reasonable period of time, to rectify the information and documentation submitted which a competent authority considers to be incomplete or inaccurate. During the rectification period, the competent authority may suspend the registration number and, where appropriate, adopt interim measures to avoid the commercialisation of the unit during the suspension period. Where the host fails to rectify the information and documentation within the period indicated, the competent authority should have the power to suspendwithdraw the validity of the registration number. The competent authority should have the power to suspendwithdraw the validity of the registration number also in cases where it finds that there are manifest and serious doubts as regards the authenticity and validity of the information or documentation provided by the host. In those cases, competent authorities should inform hosts about their intention to suspend the validity of the registration number andcases of suspension or withdrawal of the registration number competent authorities should inform hosts of the reasons for it. Hosts should have the possibility to be heard and, where appropriate, to rectify the information and documentation provided within a reasonable period of time. Where the validity of the registration number has been suspended or withdrawn, competent authorities should have the power to issue an order requesting the online short-term rental platforms to remove or disable access toeither provide information regarding the affected unit or remove the listing relating to the unit in question without undue delay. Those orders should include all necessarythe available information to identify the listing, including the individual Uniform Resource Locator (URL) of the listings.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 96 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
(15) Where a registration procedure applies, hosts should be required to provide online short-term rental platforms with their registration numbers, display them in each respective unit listing and provide guests with the unit’s registration number. Members States should ensure that, where a registration procedure applies, national law enables competent authorities to order online short-term rental platforms to provide information regarding a specific unit, as well as to order online short-term rental platforms to remove listings related to units offered without a registration number or offered with an invalid registration number. Where a registration procedure applies, hosts should not be allowed to list a unit without a valid registration number. Where it finds that the registration number is not valid or missing, or, where appropriate, that the authorisation has not been granted, the competent authority may order the online short-term rental platforms to remove access to the illegal listing without undue delay.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 108 #

2022/0358(COD)

(18) Competent authorities that wish to receive from online short-term rental platforms information about hosts’ activities and have registration systems in place should be able to obtain activity data from online platforms on a regular basis. The type of data that may be obtained should be fully harmonised and include information on the number of nights for which a registered unit has been rented, the number of guests that stayed in the unit per nighte unit was rented for per night, the detailed address, the registration number and the URL of the listing of the unit, which is needed in order to facilitate the identification of the host and the unit offered for short-term accommodation rental services in cases where the registration number is missing or incorrect. Only online platforms that have effectively facilitated the conclusion of direct transactions between hosts and guests are covered by the obligation to provide the activity data, the registration number and the URL of the listing of the unit, as only those platforms are in a position to collect data, such as on the number of nights for which a unit is rented and the number of guests that stayed in the unit per night. Member States should not maintain or introduce measures that require platforms to report on short-term accommodation rental service providers and their activities diverging from those laid down in this Regulation, unless otherwise provided under Union law.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 111 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
(23) The Single Digital Entry Points should facilitate the ability of online short- term rental platforms to randomly check the validity of a registration number or the accuracy of self-declarations, in order to reduce errors and inconsistencies as regards data transmission and to ease their compliance burden. The Single Digital Entry Point should, while not requiring the actual storage of the registration number, allow the performance of random checks either automatically by means of Application Programming Interface allowing the verification of a registration number against the given entries in the registry of the individual registration procedures in a Member State connected to the Single Digital Entry Point or manually, for example, by entering a registration number in an online interface and receiving a confirmation on its validity. Online short- term rental platforms should be free to perform additional checks through the Single Digital Entry Point. Member States should continue enforcing registration obligations using the tools already available to them.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 117 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26
(26) A proportionate, limited and predictable framework at Union level is necessary for ensuring hosts are informed about applicable rules and procedures and for the transparent sharing of activity data and registration numbers, in compliance with the requirements of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council31. To achieve this, Member States should list the competent authorities at national, regional and local level that have established or maintain a registration procedure to request activity data for units located on their territory. Such data should only be processed for purposes of monitoring compliance with registration procedures or implementing rules concerning access to and provision of short-term accommodation rental services. In the latter case, such processing should only be permitted if the rules in question are non-discriminatory, proportionate, and, the areas where an authorisation scheme applies in their territory and the areas where offering short-term accommodation rental services is not permitted in their territory. Such data should only be processed for purposes of monitoring complyiance with Union law, including the rules on free movement of services, freedom of establishment, and the rules in Directive 2006/123registration procedures or implementing rules concerning access to and provision of short-term accommodation rental services. For purposes of complying with Union law on data protection, any rules concerning access to and provision of short-term accommodation rental services should set out the purpose of processing the data in accordance with the requirements of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Activity data, not including personal data, is also essential for authorities that are developing such rules as part of efforts to promote a balanced tourism ecosystem, including effective and proportionate rules for the access to, and the provision of, short-term accommodation rental services. A retention period of maximum 13 years should allow competent authorities to ensure compliance with rules and regulations applicable to hosts or concerning units rented and for policy development. _________________ 31 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 121 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29
(29) In order to facilitate the implementation of this Regulation, each Member State should designate an authority that should monitor its implementation and report to the Commission every two years.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 122 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31
(31) Member States should ensure an effective enforcement of this Regulation as regards the provisions of this Regulation concerningfrom which clear obligations arise for hosts and platforms. This includes, among others, the verification by the competent authorities, the declarations of the hosts, the results of the random checks, the obligation to include a reference to the information to be made available by Member States on rules governing the provision of short-term accommodation rental services and the data sharing obligations of short-term rental platforms. Due to the specific nature of those obligations, it should be for authorities designated by the Member State of the Single Digital Entry Point, in which the relevant unit is located, respectively for the competent authorities to enforce them. Member States should also lay down rules setting out penalties for the infringement of these provisions of this Regulation that apply to online short-term rental platforms and hosts and should ensure that such penalties are implemented and notified in accordance with Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council32 . Such penalties should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. These penalties should ensure an effective enforcement of this Regulation, notably as regards data sharing obligations. Where a registration procedure applies, Member States should ensure that national law enables competent authorities to order providers of online short-term rental platforms to remove listings related to units offered without a registration number or offered with an invalid registration number. Where an authorisation procedure applies, Member States should ensure that national law enables competent authorities to order providers of online short-term rental platforms to remove listings related to units offered without an authorisation by the competent authority. In both cases, competent authorities should have the power to order platforms to provide information. Member States should be able to lay down rules on respective penalties. _________________ 32 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce') (OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, p. 1).
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 124 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 34
(34) The Commission should periodically evaluate this Regulation and monitor its effects on the provision of short-term accommodation rental services offered through online short-term rental platforms in the Union. That evaluation should include any effects on providers of online short-term rental platforms and any effects of the increased availability of data, on the availability, quality and usability of data relating to the provision of short-term accommodation rental services and on the content and proportionality of national, regional and local rules relating to the provision of short-term accommodation rental services. In order to obtain a broad view of developments in the sector, the evaluation should take into account the experiences of Member States and relevant stakeholders, including in particular the effectiveness of cross-border cooperation and enforcement mechanisms.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 172 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that, where an authorisation scheme applies, the issued registration number is not used to offer a unit on an online short-term rental platform until the authorisation procedure is completed.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 176 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Member States may limit the validity of the registration number and request active prolongation by the host.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 178 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point a – point 1
(1) the detailed address of the unit, including floor, apartment or mailbox number, cadastral reference or any other type of information that allows its precise identification;
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 183 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point a – point 4 a (new)
(4a) where applicable, whether an authorisation has been granted to offer short-term accommodation rental services;
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 193 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 5
5. Member States shall ensure that the information or documentation submitted pursuant to a registration procedure referred to in Article 4 is retained in a secure and confidential manner and only for a period which is necessary for the identification of the unit and for a maximum of 13 years after the host has indicated via the functionality referred to in Article 4(2), point (f) that the unit should be removed from the registry. Member States shall ensure that the information and documentation provided by the host pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 is only processed for the purpose of issuing the registration number and ensuring compliance with the applicable rules of the Member State concerning the access to and provision of short-term accommodation rental services.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 194 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Access to the information transmitted pursuant to Article 5(1a) shall be granted to authorities tasked with developing laws, regulations or administrative provisions concerning access to and the provision of short-term accommodation rental services.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 196 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2
2. Where a competent authority, after verification pursuant to paragraph 1, finds that the information or documentation submitted pursuant to Article 5(1) and 5(2) is incomplete or incorrect, that competent authority shall have the power to suspend the registration number and to ask the host to rectify the information and documentation provided via the functionality referred to in Article 4(2), point (d), within a period to be specified by the competent authority. While the registration number is suspended, That competent authority may issue an order requesting online short-term rental platforms to provide information and to remove any listings relating to the unit or units in question without undue delay.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 203 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 3
3. Where a host fails to rectify the requested information pursuant to paragraph 2, the competent authority shall have the power to suspend the validity ofwithdraw the affected registration numbers and to issue an order requesting online short-term rental platforms to remove or disable access to any listing relating to the unit or units in question without undue delay.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 207 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 4
4. Where a competent authority, after verification pursuant to paragraph 1, finds that there are manifest and serious doubts as regards the authenticity and validity of the information or documentation submitted pursuant to Article 5(1) and 5(2), it shall have the power to suspend the validity ofwithdraw the affected registration numbers and to issue an order requesting online short-term rental platforms to remove or disablprovide information and to remove access to any listing relating to the unit or units in question without undue delay.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 209 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Where a competent authority, after verification pursuant to paragraph 1, finds that the information given by the host pursuant to Article 5(1) conflicts with the offering of short term accommodation in a specific unit due to applicable rules of the Member State concerning the access to and the provision of short-term accommodation, it shall have the power to withdraw the affected registration numbers and to issue an order requesting online short-term rental platforms to remove any listing relating to the unit or units in question without undue delay.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 211 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 5
5. Where a competent authority intends to suspend the validity of aor withdraw the registration number or numbers pursuant to paragraphs 3 or 4,2, 3, 4 or 4a (new) it shall notify the host in writing stating the reasons for that intention. The host shall be given the opportunity to be heard and, where appropriate, to rectify the information or documentation in question within a reasonable period to be specified by the competent authority. Where, after having heard the host, the competent authority confirms its intention to suspend the validity ofor withdraw a registration number or numbers, it shall notify the host in writing of that decision, accompanied by a copy of the order referred to in paragraphs 3 or 42, 3, 4 or 4a (new).
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 213 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 6 – introductory part
6. Orders issued pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 4 a (new) and 10 shall contain at least the following information:
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 218 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 7
7. The validity of a registration number shall remain suspended or withdrawn until the host has rectified the relevant information and documentation with the competent authorities. Upon reception, via the functionality referred to in Article 4(2), point (d), and verification of the accuracy, completeness and correctness of the information and documentation provided by the host, the competent authorities shall reinstate the registration number.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 222 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Where an authorisation procedure or other applicable rules apply, Member States shall ensure that national law enables competent authorities to order providers of online short-term rental platforms to provide information and, where appropriate, remove listings related to units offered without authorisation.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 230 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) make reasonable efforts to randomly check the declaration of the hosts concerning the existence or not of aprevent the listing of a unit located in an area where a registration procedure has been established or applies without a valid registration procedurenumber, taking into account the list made available pursuant to Article 13(1), point (a), and, where such a procedure exists, make reasonable efforts on a regular basis to randomly check, at least quarterly, the validity of the registration number provided by the host, including through the use of the functionalities offered by the Single Digital Entry Points referred to in Article 10(2), point (b), after allowing the offering of the short-term accommodation rental services by the host.;
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 235 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
(ca) refrain from charging more than 1% commission fee from the host by night;
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 236 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – point c b (new)
(cb) limit the possibility of units offered for short-term accommodation rental services to 10 units per host per country on their online interface.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 237 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2
2. Online short-term rental platforms shall inform without delay the competent authorities, the authorities referred to in Article 14 and the hosts of the results of the random checks referred to in paragraph 1, point (c), concerning incorrect declarations of hosts or invalid, invalid registration numbers or duplicates of registration numbers. The transmitted results shall include for all listings of the random sample the URL of the listing, the registration number and, where applicable, an indication of misuse of registration numbers.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 242 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 3
3. Online short-term rental platforms shall include, in a specific section of the online interface that is directly and easily accessible, a reference to the information to be made available by Member States pursuant to Article 17(1), and make reasonable efforts to regularly and adequately inform and update hosts of the applicability in a given area of registration procedures or data sharing obligations or authorisation schemes, taking into account the lists made available pursuant to Article 13(1).
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 245 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1
1. When a listing concerns a unit located in an area included in the list referred to in Article 13(1), point (b), providers of online short-term rental platforms shall collect and, on a monthly basis, transmit to the Single Digital Entry Point of the Member State wthere the unit is located, activity data per unit detailed address of the unit, activity data per unit, including data, on whether the host is providing a short-term accommodation rental service on a professional or non- professional basis, together with the corresponding registration number as provided by the host and the URL of the listing. That transmission shall take place by machine-to-machine communication means.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 250 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2
2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, small or micro online short- term rental platforms that did not, in the previous quarter, reach a monthly average of 2 500 or more active hosts shall transmit the activity data per unit, including data, on whether the host is providing a short- term accommodation rental service on a professional or non-professional basis together with the corresponding registration number and detailed address of the unit and the URL of the listing, at the end of the quarter, by machine-to- machine communication means or manually, to the Single Digital Entry Point of the Member State where the unit is located.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 254 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Online short-term rental platforms shall be responsible for the correctness, completeness and accuracy of the datasets they transmit to competent authorities pursuant to this Article.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 264 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 4
4. The Single Digital Entry Point referred to in paragraph 1 shall not store information containing personal data. It shall ensure the automatic, intermediate and transient processing of personal data that is strictly necessary for the purpose of giving access to the authorities referred to in Article 12 to activity data, registration numbers, the detailed address of the unit and URL of listings provided by online short-term rental platforms.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 266 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 5
5. The Commission may adopt implementing acts laying down common technical specifications and procedures to ensure interoperability of solutions for the functioning of the Single Digital Entry Points and the seamless exchange of data, including the structure of the registration numbers and the detailed addresses of the units. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 16(2).
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 272 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
3. Competent authorities listed pursuant to paragraph 1 shall retain activity data in a secure and confidential manner as long as necessary for the purposes referred to in paragraph 2 and no longer than 13 years after their receipt. Those competent authorities may, in accordance with the laws of the Member State, share activity data without any data that can identify individual units or hosts, including registration numbers and URLs, in particular with the following:
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 275 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – point a – indent 1 (new)
- activity data, including data, on whether the host is providing a short-term accommodation rental service on a professional or non-professional basis
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 276 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – point a – indent 2 (new)
- the corresponding registration number
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 277 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – point a – indent 3 (new)
- the URL of the listing
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 278 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – point a – indent 4 (new)
- the detailed address of the unit
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 279 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – point b – indent 1 (new)
- activity data, including data, on whether the host is providing a short-term accommodation rental service on a professional or non-professional basis
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 280 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – point b – indent 2 (new)
- the corresponding registration number
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 281 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – point b – indent 3 (new)
- the URL of the listing
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 282 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – point b – indent 4 (new)
- the address of the unit up to the postal code
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 289 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(aa) list of areas where an authorisation scheme applies in their territory;
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 294 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 1
Each Member State shall designate an authority, which shall monitor the implementation of the obligations laid down by this Regulation on their territory and report on this implementation every two years to the Commission.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 304 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 1
1. No later than 53 years after the date of application of this Regulation, the Commission shall evaluate this Regulation and submit a report on its main findings to the European Parliament, the Council and to the European Economic and Social Committee. This report shall be based on the evaluations submitted by national supervisory authorities pursuant to Article 14.
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 306 #

2022/0358(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) the impact of this Regulation on the availability, quality and usability of data relating to the provision of short-term accommodation rental services offered in the Union by hosts through online short- term rental platforms; and
2023/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 197 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1
1. The general objective of the Initiative is to support large-scale technological capacity building and innovation throughout the Union to enable development and deployment of cutting- edge and next generation semiconductor and quantum technologies that will reinforce the Union advanced design, systems integration and chips production capabilities in order to ensure security of supply, as well as contribute to the achievement of the twin dia social-ecologitcal and green transition.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 201 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point d – point 2
(2) address the skills shortage, attracting and mobilising new talentincluding via reskilling and supporting the emergence of a suitably skilled workforce for strengthening the semiconductor sector, including via reskilling and upskilling of workerskilling of workers, while ensuring job and social security, employment growth and the highest standards regarding working conditions and labour rights.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 203 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point e – point 1 a (new)
(1 a) ensuring social, democratic and ecologically sustainable business operations by linking Union or state support for private companies to the conditions set out in paragraph 2, points (ea) and (eb), of this Article.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 204 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point e – point 2
(2) providing support to companies facing difficulties in accessing finance, in particular by implementing special support schemes for companies self- managed by workers, and addressing the need to underpin the economic resilience of the Union and its Member States;
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 205 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point e a (new)
(e a) contributing to the development of an economy based on the principle of zero-emissions and zero-waste.That operational objective shall be achieved through: (1) favouring companies that are committed to the objective of developing zero-emissions and zero-waste production or services, as far as practicable, in any support scheme provided for by the Union or Member States under this Initiative; (2) linking a commitment to the objective of developing zero-emissions and zero- waste production or services, as far as practicable, as a precondition to private companies for receiving any kind of support provided for by the Union or Member States under this Initiative, including for the operation of Integrated Production Facilities and EU Open Foundries; (3) directing the supply of semiconductor chips towards the demand of industries or companies that, given the technological and organizational limitations, are committed to the principle of zero- emissions and zero-waste production or services; (4) including well-established civil society organisations dedicated to environmental protection in the decision-making processes of any governing body established to implement this Regulation, including the European Chips Infrastructure Consortium, with powers equal to any other party involved in those processes with distinctive interests as private companies and labour organisations or their representatives.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 206 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point e b (new)
(e b) contributing to the development of a social and democratic economy.That operational objective shall be achieved through: (1) linking a commitment to the highest standards for employment protection, working conditions and labour rights, including equal representation and participation rights for workers in all strategic decisions, as a precondition to private companies for receiving any kind of support provided for by the Union or Member States under this Initiative, including for the operation of Integrated Production Facilities and EU Open Foundries; (2) including labour organisations or labour representatives in the decision- making processes of any governing body established to implement this Regulation, including the European Chips Infrastructure Consortium and the European Semiconductor Board, with powers equal to any other party involved in those processes with distinctive interests as private companies, or their representatives, and civil society organisations.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 207 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) consist of at least three legal entities from at least three Member States and be operated as a public-private sector consortium with the participation on equal terms of the Member States, and private legal entities, trade unions as well as works councils and civil society organisations dedicated to the protection of the environment;
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 208 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 3 – point a
(a) a request to the Commission to set up the ECIC, including a list of the proposed legal entities, trade unions, works councils and civil society organisations, equally represented on the list, that are forming the ECIC consortium;
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 209 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 3 – point b
(b) the draft Statutes of the ECIC that shall include at least the provisions on: the procedure for setting-up, membership, budget, legal seat, applicable law and jurisdiction, ownership of the results, governance, including decision making procedure ensuring equal representation and participation between private entities, workers' organisations and civil society organisations, and specific role and if applicable voting rights of Member States and the Commission, winding-up, reporting and liability.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 210 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 4 – point f a (new)
(f a) equal representation and participation of private entities, workers' organisations and civil society organisations dedicated to the protection of the environment.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 214 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point e
(e) developing and managing specific training actions on semiconductor technologies to support the development of the talent pool in the Union, including targeted programmes to support the skills development of the existing workforce.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Member States shall ensure that the workforce is provided with the highest standards of employment protection and social security during the participation in training measures, including targeted support schemes where appropriate.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 216 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1
1. Integrated Production Facilities are first-of-a-kind semiconductor design and manufacturing facilities of highest social and ecological standards , including front- end or back- end, or both, in the Union that contribute to the security of supply for the internal market.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 218 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) it qualifies as a first-of-a-kind facility;deleted
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 223 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2 – point d a (new)
(d a) it commits to the objective of developing zero-waste and zero-emissions production as far as practicable given technological and organisational possibilities;
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 225 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2 – point d b (new)
(d b) it operates with the highest standards regarding labour rights and working conditions, including full respect for the workers' right of collective action and bargaining.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 226 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2 – point d c (new)
(d c) it operates on the basis of the principle of codetermination granting labour representatives equal decision- making power and the right to veto all strategic decisions, including investment decisions.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 230 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 1
1. Open EU Foundries are first-of-a- kind semiconductor front-end or back-end, or both, manufacturing facilities of highest social and ecological standards in the Union that offer production capacity to unrelated undertakings and thereby contribute to the security of supply for the internal market.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 232 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) it qualifies as a first-of-a-kind facility;deleted
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 234 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 2 – point d a (new)
(d a) it commits to the objective of developing zero-waste and zero-emissions production as far as practicable given technological and organisational possibilities;
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 236 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 2 – point d b (new)
(d b) it operates with the highest standards regarding labour rights and working conditions including full respect for the workers' right of collective action and bargaining.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 237 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 2 – point d c (new)
(d c) it operates on the basis of the principle of codetermination granting labour representatives equal decision- making power and the right to veto all strategic decisions, including investment decisions.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 241 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. The Commission shall favour applications that are conducive to a more even economic development in the Union, in particular applications that are beneficial to regions affected by deindustrialisation, underemployment or outward migration.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 244 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. An Integrated Production Facility or an Open EU Foundry shall be publicly owned by the local authorities of the region in which it is located, and those local authorities shall have voting rights in all strategic decisions in proportion to the share of direct public funding provided to the Integrated Production Facility or Open EU Foundry in the form of grants or equity investment.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 247 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 b (new)
2 b. In order to ensure that the public interest is protected, the Commission or any Member State involved is empowered to veto strategic decisions of an Integrated Production Facility or an Open EU Foundry that may have a substantial negative impact for local communities or the natural environment, including geographical relocation plans, if it was supported significantly with resources from the Union or a Member State.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 254 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2
2. Member States shall inviteensure that the main users of semiconductors and other relevant stakeholders to provide information regarding significant fluctuations in demand and known disruptions of their supply chain. To facilitate the exchange of information, Member States shall provide for a mechanism and administrative set-up for these updates.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 269 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 4
4. The use of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall be proportionate and restricted to what is necessary for addressing serious disruptions of vital societal functions or economic activities in the Union and must be in the best interest of the Union. The use of these measures shall avoid adversely affecting workers and placing disproportionate administrative burden on SMEs..
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 271 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 2
2. The obligation under paragraph 1 can also be imposed to other semiconductor undertakings which have accepted such possibility in the context of receiving public support.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 275 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 5 – introductory part
5. The undertaking concerned shall be obliged to accept and prioritise a priority rated order. The undertaking or its works council may request the Commission to review the priority rated order where it considers it to be duly justified based on one of the following grounds:
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 278 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 5 – point b
(b) if acceptance of the order would place an unreasonable economic burden and entail particular hardship for the undertaking or its employees.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 283 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. The details of the procurement procedures, of the negotiations with the economic operators, including individual producers, and of the concluded contracts shall be made public by the Commission.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 285 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1
1. The European Semiconductor Board shall be composed on equal terms of representatives of the Member States an, workers' organisations, private companies and relevant civil society organisations dedicated to environmental protection. The European Semiconductor Board shall be chaired by a representative of the Commission.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 286 #

2022/0032(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 4
4. The Commission may establish standing or temporary sub-groups for the purpose of examining specific questions. Where appropriate, the Commission may invite organisations representing the interests of the semiconductor industry, including the Industrial Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor Technologies and user and organisations representing the interest of the employees of the semiconductors at Union level, industry to such sub-groups in the capacity of observers. A sub-group including Union Research and Technology Organisations shall be established for the purpose of examining specific aspects on strategic technology directions and reporting on this to the European Semiconductor Board.
2022/09/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 4 #

2021/2201(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 10 a (new)
— having regard to the speech of Mr. Fabio Panetta Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at Columbia University. New York, 25 April 2022, “For a few cryptos more: the Wild West of crypto finance”,
2022/05/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 48 #

2021/2201(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital I
I. whereas tax policy is a national competence, but strong cooperation between Member States is essential to respond to the challenges posed to the integrity of the single market, namely by the increasing the use of crypto-assets; whereas a framework of 27 significantly different approaches to crypto-assets taxation could lead to significant obstacles for the fulfilment of the objectives of the European digital single marketharmful tax competition and significant obstacles for efficient tax collection;
2022/05/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 49 #

2021/2201(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital J
J. whereas the European Union and its single market must ensure an innovation- friendly environment for companies (namely small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups) regarding new technologies in the area of financial services and crypto-assets; whereas this main goal requires a strong commitment from Member States with policies, namely on taxation, that ensure a stable, clear and certain legal framework for businesses to thrive and contribute to economic growth; whereas, finally, this effort requires strong commitment tothat it safeguards citizens’ rights, as taxpayers and consumers of financial services;
2022/05/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #

2021/2201(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
J a. Reminds that income paid in crypto-assets and gains made on them are, as a rule, taxable like any other income or gain and that crypto-assets held are liable for inclusion in the calculation of wealth taxes;
2022/05/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 59 #

2021/2201(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital J b (new)
J b. whereas according to some simulations by the European Commission, the revenue potential of taxing capital gains on bitcoin across the EU in 2020 alone would have amounted to about €900 million, or 0.3% of the total tax revenue from property taxation in the EU;
2022/05/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 66 #

2021/2201(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Points out that adapting the IT capacities of tax authorities through new emerging technologies, such as potential distributed ledger technologies like blockchain or artificial intelligence, promises tomay foster intelligent, effective and efficient tax and administrative procedures, facilitate tax compliance by citizens and businesses, and increase the traceability and identification of taxable transactions in a globalised environment where cross- border transactions have increased;
2022/05/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 70 #

2021/2201(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Highlights the need to identify the best ways to use technology to strengthen the analytical capacity of tax administrations (through better data analysis), to standardise data to reduce administrative burdens on SMEs, to ensure that taxation better reflects the business environment in the digital age and at the same time guarantees high levels of data protection;
2022/05/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 90 #

2021/2201(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Considers that crypto-assets must be subject to fair, transparent and effective taxation, in order to guarantee fair competition between businesses in the area of financial services; understands that decisions on the taxation of crypto-assets lie with Member States, according to the Treaties; stands for an innovation- friendly environment in the digital single market, where entrepreneurs, SMEs and start-ups can thrive, generate growth, create jobs and contribute to economic recovery through tax revenueffective taxation taking into account their negative externalities where they exist, in order to guarantee fair competition between businesses in the area of financial services;
2022/05/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 93 #

2021/2201(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Is strongly concerned about the negative externalities of crypto-asset markets including financial stability risks, disproportionate levels of energy expenditure and pollution as well as illicit usages, given that the trade in crypto- assets does not perform any apparent social or economic function such as funding consumption or investment;
2022/05/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 96 #

2021/2201(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7 b. Calls on Member States and the Commission to assess different types of taxes on crypto-assets as instruments to mitigate the negative externalities arising from the trade with crypto-assets;
2022/05/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 97 #

2021/2201(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 c (new)
7 c. Notes that some crypto-assets pride themselves on a high level of anonymity and secrecy that are fundamentally at odds with the needs of modern tax authorities to carry out their job; stresses therefore that the legal and political pressure should be placed on the providers of these crypto-assets to change and engage with tax authorities and not the other way around;
2022/05/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 118 #

2021/2201(INI)

13. Calls on the Member States to consider the dimension of crypto-assets in their national tax reforms, and to consider implementing more effective systems that ensure less compliance costs and administrative burden, but that guarantee, at the same time, the fair, transparent and effective taxation of crypto-assets; underlines the role ofguarantee taxation of crypto-assets taking into account their additional negative externalities; warns against the creation of tax loopholes and the intensification of harmful tax competition by creating tax incentives and exemptions in promotingthe name of technological innovation and developmentveness;
2022/05/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 130 #

2021/2201(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Points out that the crypto-asset landscape is global and requires an international approach; understands, in this regard, the need to further negotiate international instruments on the matter; calls, in this regard for crypto-assets to be included within the scope of the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) developed by the OECD in 2014;
2022/05/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 131 #

2021/2201(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14 a. Is strongly concerned about the highly volatile and speculative nature of crypto-asset trading and the financial stability risks posed by crypto-asset markets; stresses that the Financial Stability Board warned that the “scale, structural vulnerabilities and increasing interconnectedness with the traditional financial system” may turn into a “threat to global financial stability”1a;calls on the Commission to present a proposal for the implementation of a Financial Transaction Tax on crypto-asset transactions within the Union to address financial stability risks; _________________ 1a Financial Stability Board, “Assessment of the Risks to Financial Stability from Crypto-Assets”, 16 February 2022, p. 1, https://www.fsb.org/2022/02/assessment- of-risks-to-financial-stability-from-crypto- assets/
2022/05/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 135 #

2021/2201(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 b (new)
14 b. Is strongly concerned about the extreme levels of energy expenditure and pollution arising from the use of crypto- assets; warns that the network of the market leader Bitcoin “consumes about 0.36 percent of the world’s electricity - comparable to the consumption of Belgium or Chile”2a; calls on Member States to consider the implementation of a “green tax” on crypto-assets to mitigate the ecological impact; calls on the Commission to present a proposal for an EU-wide framework for a “green tax” on crypto-assets; _________________ 2a International Monetary Fund, “Global Financial Stability Report: COVID-19, Crypto, and Climate: Navigating Challenging Transitions”, Oct 2021, p. 53, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFS R/Issues/2021/10/12/global-financial- stability-report-october-2021
2022/05/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 10 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
A a. whereas independent research1a suggests EU member states collectively lose more corporate tax revenues to other EU member states than to third countries; _________________ 1aThomas Tørsløv, Ludvig Wier and Gabriel Zucman, The Missing Profits of Nations, Working Paper, April 2020, available from https://missingprofits.world/
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 17 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework on BEPS agreed on the key components of a two-pillar reform of the international tax system in order to address the challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy, including a minimum effective corporate tax rate of 15 %; whereas the result of the final negotiations is weaker than the initial proposal;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 20 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas withholding taxes can reduce the risk of tax evasion and avoidance, thus remaining a reliable policy tool until the implementation of the above-mentioned agreement by the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework on BEPS; whereas Member States are entitle to have countermeasures to protect their tax base;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 27 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas complex non-standardized refund procedures increase the administrative burden for cross-border investments and may create an obstacle to market integration, making the process lengthy and more prone to fraud;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 36 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas the Interest and Royalties Directive (IRD) and the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (PSD) both exempt certainspecific cross- border payments that take place within the EU for associated companies and are related to interest, royalties and dividends from withholding tax with the aim of eliminating double taxation; whereas negotiations on a revision of the IRD have stalled in the Council for several years because 7 Member States voted against the inclusion of an effective minimum taxation rate;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 38 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
F a. whereas the IRD states that “It is necessary to ensure that interest and royalty payments are subject to tax once in a Member State”; whereas withholding taxes on interest and licence fee payments intra-EU may be considered compatible with the IRD, since the directive only applies to payments between associated companies with a direct minimum holding of 25% and given the fact that the source country may ask for legal justification of such payments as a condition for the exemption;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 41 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)
F b. whereas research2a shows that IRD and PSD have been used by Member States to circulate untaxed royalties, interests and dividends payments in the EU with the aim of reaching a third- country jurisdiction with low or no taxes as a final destination; whereas researc2b shows that the top 10 conduit countries include nine European countries, among which the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are the most importantones; _________________ 2aVan ’t Riet M. and A. Lejour, 2020, A Common Withholding Tax On Dividend, Interest And Royalties In The European Union 2bVan ’t Riet M. and A. Lejour, 2018, Optimal Tax Routes: a network analysis of FDI diversion, International Tax and Public Finance 25(5), 321-1371.
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F c (new)
F c. whereas the Commission has put forward a proposal for the revision of the IRD and the European Parliament adopted a legislative resolution stating that “the benefits of the Directive should only be applicable when the income derived from the payment is effectively subject to tax in the Member State of the receiving company or in the Member State where the recipient permanent establishment is situated, without there being the possibility of exemption or a substitution or replacement by payment of another tax”;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 48 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital G
G. whereas the cum-ex and cum-cum schemes both involve reclaims of dividend withholding tax to which the beneficiaries were not entitled and are estimated to have imposed a total cost to taxpayers of about EUR 55 billion between 2001 and 2012 in the 11 Member States concerned; whereas new revelations on October 2021 updated those values to EUR 140 billion;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Notes that despite continuous efforts, the system of withholding taxes in the EU has remained largely fragmented, creating loopholes which could be abused to shift profits and barriers to cross-border investments in the single marketallow for fraud schemes;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 62 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Welcomes the agreement reached by the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework on a two-pillar reform, including a global minimum effective tax rate; considers this an important step towards ending the practice of shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions; regrets the fact that the scope isfinal agreement has been weakened as a result of the negotiations and the scope has been limited to multinational enterprises with a global consolidated turnover of at least EUR 750 million; in addition, regrets the fact that the minimum tax rate has been set at 15% (while the initial proposal was 21%), as well as the inclusion of carve-out clauses that lead to a lower effective corporate tax rate and the fact that the principle of taxing profits where the business activity happens is not really respected;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 67 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Is pleased that 136 countries and jurisdictions have supported the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework agreement on a two-pillar reform; regrets the fact that one Member State, Cyprus, is not part of the Inclusive Framework;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 76 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Regrets the fact that base erosion and profit shifting are still ongoing and are facilitated by the tax regimes of certain Member States; recalls that the Commission, in the context of the European Semester and the assessment of the National Recovery and Resilience Plans, found that more reforms are needed in order to address aggressive tax planning in six Member StateCyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and the Netherlands, where the absence or limited application of withholding taxes on outbound payments are likely to be misused for aggressive tax planning;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 85 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to set up a harmonised withholding tax framework that ensures that all dividend, interest and royalties payments flowing out the EU are taxed at a minimum effective tax rate; recalls that recent research3a shows large differences in the application of withholding taxes in EU Member-States - the rates can vary between 0 and 35% - and points to the fact that withholding tax rates in tax treaties are often 5 to 10 percentage points lower than the standard rates; deplores, in particular, Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia and Malta for not levying withholding taxes on neither dividend, interest or royalties payments and Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden for not levying it on interest and royalties; _________________ 3aVan’t Riet M. and A. Lejour, 2020, A Common Withholding Tax On Dividend, Interest And Royalties In The European Union
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. Stresses that non-taxed circulation of dividend, interest and royalties payments insidethe EU is used as a conduit for these flows to leave the EU towards low-tax jurisdictions, as has happened in such cases as the double Irish-Dutch sandwich or the Danish beneficial ownership regime;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 90 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6 b. Stresses that IRD and PSD can incentivise companies to create holding structures in under-taxed Member States in order to benefit from withholding taxes exemptions; Stresses that harmful tax practices in EU Member States result in significant revenue losses; Calls on the Commission and the Member States to set up a harmonized withholding tax framework for payments within the EU; stresses that a system of tax credits could be put in place in order to guarantee that no double taxation would occur;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 95 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Recalls the proposal by 10 Member States to include an effective minimum tax rate for royalties and interest in the context of the IRD; stresses that 7 Member States voted against it and notes that these votes should be publicly known; urges the Council to swiftly resume and conclude the negotiations on the IRD and encourages the inclusion of such a measure in the announced directive for the implementation of Pillar II;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 100 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. NotStresses that the lack of an effective minimum tax rate on dividend payments to shareholders has triggered a race to the bottom in this field; calls for the adoption of an effective minimum tax rate for dividend payments to shareholders in the EU, thereby reducing harmful tax competition in this realm;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 104 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. Recalls the OECD principle of taxing the business activity where it happens; Calls for the repeal of both the IRD and the PSD if no concrete changes are made in the current texts in order to guarantee an effective minimum tax rate in all interest, royalties and dividends payments circulating within the EU and to ensure a clear identification of the beneficial owners, possibly aligning this concept with the Anti-Money Laundering and transparency laws;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 120 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls that in October 2018, an investigation disclosed that 11 Member States had lost up to EUR 55.2 billion in tax revenue as a result of cum-ex and cum- cum schemes; stresses that a new investigation in October 2021 updated those values to EUR 140 billion;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 127 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. NotStresses that although Directive 2014/107/EU has facilitated the exchange of information, other obstacles to the detection of cum-ex and cum-cum schemes exist, including the timeliness of exchanges, the scope of the exchange of information on capital gains, and the insufficient spontaneous exchange of information;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 135 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13 a. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for establishing an Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism at a European level, solving the problem of what entity has the mandate to investigate and act upon cases of dividend arbitrage; regrets, however, the lack of supervision and transparency when dealing with payments flowing out of the EU, for example, to the US;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 137 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)
13 b. Stresses that the introduction of a comprehensive Financial Transaction Tax would not only raise tax revenues, but also require better data on this kind of transactions and taxpayers;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 140 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. NotWelcomes the Commission’s intention to put forward a proposal by the end of 2022 establishing a European withholding tax framework for dividend, interest or royalty payments, accompanied by a mechanism for the exchange of information and cooperation among tax administrations;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 150 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Encourages the development of a harmonised EU procedure for withholding tax refunds for all Member States, thereby addressing the concerns about regulatory discrepancies; Stresses that the main concern should be to tackle the possibilities of fraud;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 157 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. NotStresses that digitalising these procedures and improving cooperation between national tax administrations couldan reduce the administrative burden and uncertainty in cross-border investments;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 163 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16 a. Stresses that a fully-fledged common EU relief at source system undermines the nature of withholding taxes, which is to curb abusive tax practices in which income is shifted to low-tax jurisdictions;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 164 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16 b. Asks the Commission and the Member States to consider as an alternative establishing a system in which all withholding taxes paid to a foreign tax administration would receive a tax credit by the Member State where the income is declared and taxed; stresses this would solve the problem of costly and lengthy reimbursement procedures;
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 165 #

2021/2097(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Takes note of the option to establish an EU system for relief at source; highlights that a move towards this type of system cannot be detrimental to the fight against tax abuse; stresses that, in all circumstances, compliance by the destination state with the agreement reached by the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework must be a prerequisite for relief at source;deleted
2021/11/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 31 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas although tax policy largely remains a Member State responsibility, the single market requires a minimum degree of coordination in setting tax policy1 ,especially concerning the fight against tax evasion; _________________ 1 As laid down in Articles 110-118 TFEU.
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 36 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas tax policy fragmentation may creates various obstacles for companies and citizens in the single market, including legal uncertainty, red tape, the risk of room for tax arbitrage and so risks such as double non-taxation and difficulties claiming tax refunds; whereas these obstacles discour; whereas it can also create various obstacles for SME wanting to engage in cross-border economic activity and citizens in the single market; whereas policy fragmentation also creates risks for tax authorities such as double non-taxation and arbitrage possibilities (such as tax planning), including legal uncertainty and red tape;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 42 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas within the EU’s social market economy, adequate tax levels and simple and clear tax laws should not distort economic actors’ decision-making; whereas sound taxsound tax policies should collect tax revenue to finance public policies and should support the creation of jobs and economic growth and improve the competitiveness of the EU and its Member Statesbe design in a progressive fashion, in order to fulfil their redistributive role;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 45 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
D a. whereas tax competition in Europe appears to have influenced the decline in CIT rates that has brought the average European CIT rate below the average rate in OECD countries1a;whereas according to the Commission’s Annual Report on Taxation 2021, an estimated EUR 36-37 billion of corporate income tax (CIT) revenue are lost per year due to tax avoidance in the EU; _________________ 1aIMF report, Taxing Multinationals in Europe, 2021: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Depa rtmental-Papers-Policy- Papers/Issues/2021/05/25/Taxing- Multinationals-in-Europe-50129
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 51 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
D b. whereas independent research2a suggests EU member states collectively lose most corporate tax revenues to other EU member states than third countries; underlines that the main cause for this loss of revenues is the lack of legislative action against intra-EU aggressive tax practices and harmful tax competition; _________________ 2aThomas Tørsløv, Ludvig Wier and Gabriel Zucman, The Missing Profits of Nations, Working Paper, April 2020, available from https://missingprofits.world/
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 53 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas the overall level of taxation differs considerably between Member States, as demonstrated by the fact that the tax-to-GDP ratio varied between 22.1 % in Ireland and 46.1 % in Denmark in 20192 ; whereas on aggregate, the tax burden in the EU (40.1 %) is high even when compared to other advanced economies (the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average was 34.3 % in 2018); _________________ 2Commission Annual Report on Taxation 2021, p. 24.
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
F a. whereas regressive changes in the taxation of labour, corporations, consumption and wealth, observable in recent decades across the Member States, have resulted in a weakening of the redistributive power of tax systems and contributed to the trend in rising income inequality; whereas this structural change in taxation has shifted the tax burden towards low-income groups;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 71 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that Member States are free to decide on their own economic policies and in particular their own tax policies; recalls, however, that Member States must exercise this competencethe last decades have been marked by unfair competition and, consistequently with Union law, by a decreasing trend of corporate tax rates leading to a race to the bottom; stresses the urgent need for coordination in tax policy by Member States;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 74 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Highlights the non-binding nature of the Code of Conduct and that the report of 21 July 2021 on reforming the EU policy on harmful tax practices (including the reform of the Code of Conduct Group) asked for it to become binding; deplores the fact that Member States could maintain a harmful regime without facing any repercussions, highlighting in this regard that EU blacklisted countries are responsible for less than 2 percent of global tax losses, while in comparison, EU member states are responsible for 36 percent3a; _________________ 3aThe State of Tax Justice 2020 - Tax Justice Network
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 77 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1 b. Stresses that the design of taxation policies should take into account how it impacts in different social groups, especially for low-income earners and woman; Reiterates, in this context, the points from European Parliament resolution of 15 January 2019 on gender equality and taxation policies in the EU; Calls on the Member States not to reduce the progressive nature of their personal income tax systems, for example by attempting to simplify personal income taxation;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 79 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 c (new)
1 c. Notes the current decision making process in the Council has proved inefficient in responding to the legislative needs to foster coordination among Member States and fight harmful tax practices; call for all possibilities offered by the TFEU to be explored; recalls that the procedure laid down in Article 116 TFEU can be applied when harmful tax practices are distorting the condition of competition in the internal market and that this Treaty provision does not alter the distribution of competences between the Union and the Member States;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 81 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 d (new)
1 d. Highlights that some bilateral tax treaties established between EU countries and developing countries have harmful effects on the latter, including by raising the levels of poverty; Notes that this is inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation predicted in the TFEU;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 e (new)
1 e. Underlines that unfair and regressive taxes such as VAT show an upward trend in the European Union and represent 7,1% of GDP, whereas fairer taxes such as corporate taxes are decreasing and represent only 2,8% of GDP; stresses that this trend does not go in the right direction as the gap between those figures was one percentage point lower in 2006;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 83 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 f (new)
1 f. Regrets that the Commission seems to put more efforts on monitoring and reducing public spending included in the Member States’ recovery plans than on setting up sufficient own resources to finance the recovery plan;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 87 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Highlights that differences in national tax regimes present obstacles to SMEs trying to operate across borders; stresses that compared to multinational enterprises, SMEs have fewer resources to spend on tax compliance and tax optimisation; points out that the share of expenditure used for tax compliance purposes is higher for SMEs than forplanning and are therefore jeopardized by national measures aimed at attracting multinational enterprises’ profits;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 94 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Notes that tax base harmonisation such as the common corporate tax base or the ‘Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation’ could reduce the cost of tax compliance for SMEs that operate in more than one Member State, while also contributing to design a fairer taxation system in the EU;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 103 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that many Member States as well as the EU have introduced dedicated regimes favouring SMEs such as special VAT rules in order to offset the higher effective tax rates and higher tax compliance costs for SMEs; stresses that such special treatment, while generally positive, could risk introducing further distortions, further possibilities of tax dodging and further increasing the overall complexity of the system;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 113 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Notes that the EU has developed coordination mechanisms such as peer review procedures within the Code of Conduct Group and country-specific recommendations in the context of the European Semester; points out that the Commission has recommended to six Member Stateregrets however the criteria used to assess Member States is weaker than the one used regarding third- country jurisdictions in the EU listing process; points out that the Commission has recommended to Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and the Netherlands that they curb aggressive tax planning as part of the 2020 country- specific recommendations;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 121 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Highlights that the ideal level for tax policy coordination is on the international stage through the G20/OECD; stresses nevertheless that developing countries should be fully included in the negotiation process; notes that EU tax proposals based on international agreements have historically been more likely to be adopted by the Council; stresses, however, that neither OECD nor G20 have legislative authority, in this sense, calls on the Commission to make progresses by transposing the last results from the negotiations to EU law, and to be more ambitious by implementing a 25% minimum corporate tax rate;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 127 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Highlights the crucial role of cooperation among national tax administrations to coordinate better collection of revenue and fighting abusive tax practices; Reiterates, in this line, the recommendations from European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2021 on the implementation of the EU requirements for exchange of tax information: progress, lessons learnt and obstacles to overcome; more specifically: enlarging the scope of DAC framework to add items of income or non-financial assets, stressing the limited quality of the information exchanged, calling for stronger enforcement procedures at Member State level and an assessment of the effectiveness of their monitoring schemes;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 131 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7 b. Deeply regrets the fact that almost all Member States – with the exception of Finland and Sweden – have refused to grant Parliament access to the relevant data to assess the implementation of DAC provisions; deplores the fact that the Commission did not grant Parliament access to the relevant data in its possession; notes that this refusal is not consistent with calls for greater transparency and cooperation in tax matters;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 134 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 c (new)
7 c. Welcomes the latest advances on the pCBCR, stressing the importance of transparent and standardized data on corporates' activity, allowing for better scrutiny; regrets, however, that, in order to reach a compromise, the Council restricted the obligation for companies to publicly report information only for their operations in EU member states and the countries listed in the EU’s list of non- cooperative jurisdictions, ruling out third countries that in facto behave as tax havens but are not yet listed; included in the text a “corporate-get-out-clause” allowing a reporting exemption for “commercially sensitive information”; and that is only to be applied to companies with an annual consolidated turnover above EUR 750 million, which excludes 85 - 90 per cent of multinationals;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 135 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 d (new)
7 d. Welcomes the Task Force on Tax Planning Practices in 2013 to follow up on public allegations of favourable tax treatment of certain companies (in particular in the form of tax rulings);
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 143 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Notes that digitalisation and a heavy reliance on intangible assets that pose challenges to the current tax system warrant a high degree of policy coordination; deplores the fact that some Member States have pressed ahead with the introduction of national digital taxes despite ongoing negotiations at EU and OECD levels; stresses that these national measures should be phased out following the implementation of an effective international solution; notes that Digital businesses models in the EU face a lower effective average tax burden than traditional business models, a cross-border digital business model is subject to an effective average tax rate of only 9.5%, which represents a significant difference when compared to a rate of 23.2% of a cross- border traditional business4a; _________________ 4a ZEW et al. (2017) referenced in Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence and Proposal for a Council Directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services {COM(2018) 147 final} - {COM(2018) 148 final} - {SWD(2018) 82 final
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 147 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9 a. Recognizes the importance of the ongoing negotiations at G20 and OECD level; stresses, nevertheless, the progressive weakening of the initial intentions and the long-time taken; sees initiatives of national digital taxes introduced by some Member States as a legitimate interim solution to tax the digital economy, facilitating the collection of revenue;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 149 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9 b. Shows concern that the proposal on an EU-wide digital levy as a new own resource to help finance the NGEU will be withdrawn as a result of the international negotiations, possibly resulting in an extra future budgetary burden on the Member States;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 150 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. DeploresRecognizes as a problem the debt equity bias in corporate taxation that allows for generous tax deductions on interest payments, while equity financing costs cannot be deducted in a similar manner; highlights the structural disadvantage facing companies that rely on equity financing, which are often young and small companies with poor access to creditcreating room for harmful tax practices from multinationals via intra-group operations; Calls for the Commission to take a more complete impact assessment on the DEBRA initiative, specifically showing estimates of tax revenue losses, comparing the scenario of limiting interest deduction or implementing an Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE);
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 152 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10 a. Notes that a massive adherence by SME to capital markets is not a reality in the European Union and the banking sector remains the most common source of financing; notes that banking sector is easier to regulate and to align with other EU goals, such as the EU taxonomy; looks cautiously to how Capital Markets Union will be regulated; calls for further regulation of the banking system, especially on the links with the shadow banking;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 154 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)
10 b. Takes note that in the latest Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises in the euro area by the European Central Bank, published in November 2020, points out that euro area SMEs reported that “difficulty in finding customers was the dominant concern for their business activity, while access to finance was considered to be among the least important obstacles”;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 157 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Notes that debt equity bias varies considerably between the Member States; welcomes the factnotes that some Member States have introduced allowances for corporate equity to address this issue; stresses that a common European approach would be preferable in order to avoid distortions in the single market;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 158 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Looks forward to the Commission’s proposal for a debt equity bias reduction allowance5 ; _________________ 5Commission communication of 18 May 2021 on business taxation for the 21st century (COM(2021)0251).deleted
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 163 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12 a. Welcomes the implementation of Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) in 2016, and more specifically article 4, which contemplates a rule for limiting interest deduction; Calls on the Commission to design DEBRA in the same direction;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 164 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 b (new)
12 b. Regrets that the original Commission’s proposal for an EU-wide Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) was not approved in the Council and that only ten Member States are undergoing negotiations by enhanced cooperation; Stresses the relevance of this measure as it would generate tax revenue curb speculative transactions and foster financial stability; Stresses that, in order to be efficient in its goals, this proposal should have the broadest scope possible, covering derivatives, the “repo” market, “market making” activities, intra-group transactions, the OTC market, pension funds and government bonds;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 168 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Notes that the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) is often a decisive factor for corporations making investment decisionused to engage in unfair competition practices; notes that there is considerable variation in the EMTR across Member States; invites the Commission to look into whether some Member States are distorting competition by artificially lowering their EMTR, e.g. through accelerated depreciation schedules or adjusting the tax deductibility of certain items;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 176 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Highlights that tax incentives for private research and development (e.g. via tax credits, enhanced allowances or adjStresses that certain types of tax incentives such as patent box / intellectual property box regimes do little to increase research and development spending, may actually distort the single market and be usted depreciation schedules) can help to lift an economy’s overall spending towards research and development, which often comes with positive externalities; is concerned, however, that certain types of tax incentives such as pas a profit-shifting instrument, leading to significant revenue losses; Notes that the Italian government has recently repealed the country’s Patent bBox / intellectual property box regimes do little to increase regime due to its inefficiency in stimulating innovation; stressearch and development spending and may actually distort the single markets that other Member-States should follow this example;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 182 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15 a. Stresses that research conducted by the European Trade Union Institute5a shows that a general trend for the last years was that an increasing share of net profits was not translated into new private investment projects but rather being distributed as dividends; Calls for Member States to consider adopting new revenue measures such as raising progressive taxes on more affluent individuals and those relatively less affected by the crisis such as suggested by IMF5b;this could include increasing tax rates on higher income brackets, high-end property, capital gains, wealth or high- end luxury goods; _________________ 5aMatthieu Méaulle: Chapter 3 - Profit, investment and inequality: a preliminary view in https://www.etui.org/fr/publications/livres/ the-future-of-europe 5b IMF October 2020 World Economic Outlook - A Long and Difficult Ascent
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 187 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)
15 b. Reminds that the Commission stated in a communication published on 27th May 2021 that : "Companies that draw huge benefits from the EU single market and will survive the crisis, also thanks to direct and indirect EU and national support, could contribute to rebuilding it in the recovery phase. This could include an own resource based on operations of enterprises which, depending on its design, could yield around EUR 10 billion annually"6a;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 192 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 c (new)
15 c. Highlights that other solutions should be implemented to avoid tax dodging of multinational companies in all sectors; calls on States to introduce and collect the tax deficit of multinationals: the difference between what a corporation pays in taxes globally and what this corporation would have to pay if all its profits were subject to a minimum tax rate in each of the countries where it operates; Underlines that such solution could encourage other States to follow the move and progressively lead to a global solution;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 195 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 d (new)
15 d. Recalls that budgetary cuts in tax administrations harm States’ capacity to fight against tax dodging and have a negative impact on their tax revenues;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 196 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 e (new)
15 e. Stresses that corporate tax avoidance is possible due to free movements of capital, allowing companies to reallocate their gains and increasing the room for double non-taxation; welcomes that measures are being taken to prevent these practices when it comes to third countries, but regrets their scope doesn’t apply to the European Single Market;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 197 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 f (new)
15 f. Highlights that Member States can take legitimate countermeasures to protect their tax bases, such as the non- deductibility or limited deductibility of costs (interests, royalties and services payments), withholding measures, the limitation of participation exemptions and special documentation requirements; Notes that ATAD represents a step forward but stresses that it stills encompasses loopholes that could be explored for harmful tax practices; Calls on the Commission to further develop legislation in the same direction;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 198 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 g (new)
15 g. Calls the Commission to follow-up the intention mentioned in the communication Business Taxation for the 21st Century of going further on the fight against abusive use of shell companies; calls for the definition of substance requirements to assess legal entities and to further banning them if those requirements aren’t met;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 199 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 h (new)
15 h. Welcomes the recommendation of Corporate Europe Observatory to fight corporate lobbying in tax policy decision process by implementing measures such as not allowing big accounting companies to receive public contracts for tax-related studies and impact assessments, ending privileged access, and implementing tougher rules regarding the revolving door between tax intermediaries and the European institutions, including on secondments and internships;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 200 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 i (new)
15 i. Calls on Member States to study better options for environmental taxes and calls on the Commission to issued guidelines on how to design them; Stresses this measures should be accompanied by regulatory requirements and public investment to assure green alternatives;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 201 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 j (new)
15 j. Welcomes that the revision of the Energy Tax Directive focus on setting higher minimum taxes for fossil fuels at national level;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 202 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 k (new)
15 k. Calls on the Commission to study the possibility of creating an allowance for tax deductibility for companies according to the same logic as taxonomy; Highlights that the European Union should consider progressive environmental taxes, based on the carbon consumption, as serious options for a fair and effective environmental taxation;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 203 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 l (new)
15 l. Highlights that the current global tax system is outdated, and the arm’s length principle applied to transfer prices no longer fits the globalized reality; Supports the implementation of an apportioned formula to define tax rights among jurisdictions for cross-border economic activity; Calls on the Commission to continue the proposal for a for a common (consolidated) corporate tax base (C(C)CTB)); Looks forward for more details on the design of ‘BEFIT - Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation’;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 204 #

2021/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Takes note ofWelcomes the Commission’s ongoing work on an EU taxation scoreboard and calls on the Commission to inform Parliament about its political intentions and the possible financial implications of this system; Stresses that the criteria used to assess the MS should be: the existing criteria used by the code of conduct group on business taxation; the criteria used to list third country jurisdictions as part of the EU list of non- cooperative jurisdictions; the past and ongoing infringement procedures launched against Member States for lack of conformity or lack of implementation of European legislation on tax and money laundering matters; the inclusion of economic criteria, in particular to consider whether FDI and passive income are disproportionate compared to the country GDP;
2021/10/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 18 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas the European Semester plays an essential role inis supposed to coordinatinge economic and budgetary policies in the Member States; deplores that from the introduction of the European Semester in 2011 to 2018, the Commission recommended 63 times that governments cut spending on healthcare or privatise health services;
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H
H. whereas the reference values of up to 3 % of planned or actual government deficit and 60 % of debt to GDP, ares defined by the TFEU, are not underpinned by solid economic reasoning, are detached from current reality and no longer viable;
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 56 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Ha. whereas when those rules were adopted in the 1990s, the prevailing economic conditions in the EU were significantly different to those that prevail today : in 1997 interest rates were approximately 5 per cent for long-term government borrowing, the average public debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU was between 65 and 70 per cent of GDP, the median public debt among the 11 initial eurozone members was around 60 per cent of GDP, the forecast GDP growth rate was 3 per cent annually, and inflation was forecast at 2 per cent;
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 63 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital I
I. whereas aspects relating to the possible future of the EU economic governance framework were dealt with by the review of the macroeconomic legislative framework in the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of 22 June 2021 dedicated to that issue; regrets the lack of ambition in this report to call for changes to the Treaties and fundamentally transform the EU's economic governance in a progressive spirit;
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 85 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Points out that the roll-out of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) will helpis supposed to make EU economies and societies more sustainable, inclusive, resilient and better prepared for thea just green and digital transitions; notes that the facility, which is the centrepiece of NextGenerationEU, will provide large- scale financial support to Member States of up to EUR 672.5 billion in grants and loans to finance reforms and investments; regrets that larger part of the financial support consists of loans; highlights that investment financed through loans is projected to have less of a positive impact on output in comparison to investment financed through grants1a; _________________ 1aECB (January 2021) Occasional Paper Series, No 225. The macroeconomic impact of the Next Generation EU instrument on the euro area: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops /ecb.op255~9391447a99.en.pdf
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 92 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Calls for an exclusion EU-issued debt from the ECB’s monetary financing prohibition using provisions of Article 125 TFEU and following similar specifications made in Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993;
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 109 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that the general escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact will continue to be applied in 2022 and is concerned that it is expected to be deactivated as of 2023; notes, furthermore, that the decision to deactivate the general escape clause should be taken as an overall assessment of the state of the economy based on quantitative criteria, with the level of economic activity in the EU compared to pre-crisis insists that it needs to remain activated until the EU framework for fiscal policy has been fundamentally transformed; notes that the existing headline debt and deficit benchmarks are complevtels as the key quantitative criterion; points out that country-specific situations will continue to be taken into account after the deactivation of the general escape clausey detached from reality and insists that their application is discontinued;
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 127 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Is concernedNotes that according to the baseline scenario of the Commission’s latest Debt Sustainability Monitor, the debt ratio in the euro area is to peak at 104.6 % in 2024 and 2025, while the debt ratio in the Union is to peak at 96.5 % in 2024, before declining once again; however, recognises that the low interest rate environment reduces pressure on fiscal policy by reducing sovereign debt servicing costs; insists that the implications of the low interest rates and monetary policy measures be properly factored into the analysis of the medium- term sustainability of sovereign debt;
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 133 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Calls for the cancellation of public debt already purchased by the ECB to support Member States in making the necessary investment to recover from the crisis;
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 138 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Is convinced that coordination of national fiscal policies remains crucial in underpinning the recovery; notes that the overall fiscal stance, taking into account national budgets and the RRF, should remain supportive in 2021 and 2022;
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 143 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Highlights that fiscal policy should remain agile and adjust to the evolving situation as warranted, and that a premature withdrawal of fiscal support should be avoided; further highlights the expectation that economic activity will gradually normalise in the second half of 2021 and agrees that Member States’ fiscal policies should become more differentiated in 2022, duly taking into account the state ofges the Commission and Council to not return to austerity policies as implemented in response to the global financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis; stresses that cuts to public spending have a contractionary impact on the economy and calls for a rejection of this approach in the recovery, fiscal sustainability and the need to reduce economic, social and territorial divergencesrom the pandemic; notes that these damaging policies are enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact rules as well as the Six-Pack and Two-Pack, and that a break with this framework will require significant legislative change;
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 161 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Notes that Member States with high debt should use the RRF to finance additional investment to support the recovery, while pursuing a prudent fiscal policy; sStresses the importance of the Member States using the potential of the RFF to support the necessary structural changes and the just transformation to more globally competitive, future-proof, agile industries; agrees that the growth of nationally future fit industries; highlights the signifincanced current expenditure should be kept under of public investment, which should be excluded from the constrol and be limited for Member States with high debt,aints of debt and deficit rules; allowing fiscal measures to maximise support to the recovery without pre- empting future fiscal trajectories and creating a permanent burden on public financesand the digital, ecological and social transformation;
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 210 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Calls for a focus on fiscal structural reforms, including reforms enhancing efficient spending, and acknowledges that high-quality public finance resource management is crucial; calls on the Member States to take action to further tackle tax fraud, tax avoidance, and tax evasion, as well as money laundering; reiterates that effective actions in this area from Member States instil confidence in the governance of public finances;
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 225 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. WelcomNotes the fact that the updated New European Industrial Strategy, the European Digital Strategy and all the other relevant strategies set out the framework for speeding up Europe’s recovery and transition towards a cleaner, more digital, and more resilient economic and industrial model, as well as for building a stronger and more resilient single market; highlights that all measures, and notably those linked to the digital and green transformations, should also be assessed from a social perspective in order to avoid risks for job destruction or labour market disruption, risks of employment polarization due to the destruction of middle skilled jobs and ensure that digitalisation and green transition processes of companies are not used as an excuse for labour cost reduction strategies;
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 235 #

2021/2061(INI)

16. Highlights that tackling structural challenges is crucial for a sustainable recovery and continued growth, and that implementing reforms to address structural vulnerabilities is key not only to improving the ability to withstand and cope with existing challenges but also to accomplishing the twin transitions in a sustainable and fair mannerjust manner; stresses, however, that reforms must not aim for the promotion of cost competitiveness through downward wage flexibility; instead, calls for measures that promote wage-led growth by means of high quality employment ensuring stable contracts, decent wages, collective bargaining coverage and social protection floors, including decent pensions substantially above the poverty threshold;
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 240 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Is concerned that the Commission identified macroeconomic vulnerabilities related to imbalances and excessive imbalances in 12 Member States; is particularly worried that the nature and source of Member States’ imbalances remain largely the same as prior to the pandemic; calls on the Member States to take advantage of the unprecedented opportunity provided by the RRF to significantly reduce existing macroeconomic imbalances;deleted
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 257 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Recallgrets that Member States, in their recovery and resilience plans, are required to effectively address all or a significant subset of challenges identified in the relevant CSRs, including the fiscal aspects thereof, and that beyond the scope of the RRF, those recomme; rejects the policy- conditionality attached to the RRF as past experiences with policy-condaitions that are not addressed remain valid and will continue to be monitored under the European Semester frameworkality gave rise to valid opposition given the lack of democratic legitimacy and the inadequacy of the policy-measures that caused social damage;
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 262 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Is seriously concerned that from the introduction of the European Semester in 2011, the specific policy measures demanded in the country- specific recommendations focus on limiting wage growth, increasing the threshold age for receiving a pension, privatising state-owned enterprises, cutting public spending on health care provision, promoting longer working hours, reducing job security, and cutting funds to social services - all of which have contributed to weakening states', institutions' and individuals' capacity to respond to the outbreak of the pandemic;
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 281 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Regrets the fact that the Commission has not promoted fiscal CSRs that promote medium-term fiscal sustainability, despite the fact that the activation of the general escape clause obliges Member States not to endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term;deleted
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 287 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Welcomes the Council’s recommendation to increase the level of public investment and to ensure the effective involvement of social partners in policymaking, and strengthen social dialogue and collective bargaining;
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 293 #

2021/2061(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 b (new)
20b. Welcomes the Council’s recommendation to address the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy and make further progress to combat aggressive tax planning and support a shift towards carbon pricing and environmental taxation;
2021/07/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 3 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 4
— having regard to the Commission proposals pending for adoption, in particular on the Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB) , the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)4 , and the digital taxation package5 , and public country-by- country reporting (CBCR) 5a , as well as Parliament’s positions on these proposals, 5b _________________ 4Proposal of 25 October 2016 for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB), COM(2016)0685 and of 25 October 2016 on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2016)0683. 5 The package consists of the Commission communication of 21 March 2018 entitled ‘Time to establish a modern, fair and efficient taxation standard for the digital economy’ (COM(2018)0146), the proposal of 21 March 2018 for a Council directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence (COM(2018)0147), the proposal of 21 March 2018 for a Council directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services (COM(2018)0148) and the Commission recommendation of 21 March 2018 relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence (C(2018)1650). 5aProposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 April 2016 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of income tax information by certain undertakings and branches (COM(2016)0198) 5bEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 15 March 2018 on the proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) (COM(2016)0683 – C8- 0471/2016 – 2016/0336(CNS)); European Parliament legislative resolution of 15 March 2018 on the proposal for a Council directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base (COM(2016)0685 – C8-0472/2016 – 2016/0337(CNS)); European Parliament resolution of 24 October 2019 on the state of play on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of income tax information by certain undertakings and branches (2016/0107(COD)), known as public country-by-country reporting (2019/2882(RSP))
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 9 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 a (new)
— having regard for the option of negotiating a UN Tax Convention, as noted in the United Nations Financing for Development in the Era of COVID-19 and Beyond finance ministers’ discussion paper in September 2020 11a , _________________ 11aUnited Nations, Financing for Development in the Era of COVID-19 and Beyond, Menu of Options for the Considerations of Ministers of Finance Part II, September 2020, pp 123 – 123, https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/ part_ii- _detailed_menu_of_options_financing_fo r_development_covid19.pdf
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 10 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 b (new)
— having regard for the ongoing work of the United Nations Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters on the Tax Challenges Related to the Digitalization of the Economy,
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 11 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 c (new)
— having regard to the outcomes of various relevant meetings at the United Nations, including the 2015 Summit on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa 11b ,as well as the ongoing work of the United Nations Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters on Tax Consequences of the Digitalized Economy 11c _________________ 11bhttps://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp- content/uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome .pdf 11c https://www.un.org/development/desa/fina ncing/sites/www.un.org.development.desa. financing/files/2020- 10/CITCM%2021%20CRP.41_Digitalizati on%2010102020%20Final%20A.pdf
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 24 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas the BEPS Action Plan succeeded in establishing a global consensus on many issues in order to fight tax evasion, aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance; whereas, however, there was no agreement on addressing the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy, which led to the adoption of the separate BEPS Action 1 – 2015 Final Report;
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 26 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas the Commission put forward two proposals on the taxation of the digital economy in 2018, including a short-term solution introducing a digital services tax (DST), and a long-term solution defining a significant digital presence (SDP) as a nexus for corporate taxation which should replace the DST; whereas Parliament supported these proposals, but they were not adopted in the Council because Member States could not reach the unanimous agreement needed in the realm of taxation at EU level; whereas the Commission put forward a Proposal of 25 October 2016 for a Council Directive on a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) (COM(2016)0683); whereas the Commission put forward a proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of income tax information by certain undertakings and branches (2016/0107(COD));
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 31 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas, in accordance with a mandate given by G20 Finance Ministers in March 2017 and following the adoption of a Programme of Work (PoW) in May 2019, the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS (IF), through its Task Force on the Digital Economy, has been working on a consensus-based global solution based on two pillars: Pillar One on the allocation of taxing rights through new profit allocation and nexus rules and Pillar Two on addressing the remaining BEPS issues and introducing measures to ensure a minimum level of tax;
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 63 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Regrets the shortcomings of the international tax system, which is unfit for properly addressing the challenges of globalisation and digitalisation; welcomes recognition of the value of taxing multinational corporations on the basis of their global consolidated profits, with taxing rights being allocated between governments based on an agreed formula; recalls that the Commission proposal on a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) (COM(2016)0683) aims to introduce such a system within the EU; deplores the fact that the Member States were not able to agree on a joint approach regarding the C(C)CTB; calls for an international agreement aiming for a fair and effective tax system;
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 68 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. Regrets that the approaches outlined the Blueprints for Pillar One and Pillar Two would largely maintain the existing transfer pricing system; Regrets that the approach proposed by Pillar Two gives priority to residence country rules; Recalls the Parliament’s support for balance between source and residence country taxation rights 13a; _________________ 13aRecital 341, European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2019 on financial crimes, tax evasion and tax avoidance (2018/2121(INI)), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/doc ument/TA-8-2019-0240_EN.html
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 69 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2 b. Notes that corporate tax avoidance is not limited to highly digitalised companies; regrets the focus on consumer facing businesses in the Pillar 1 proposal; Notes that this severely undermines the fairness and effectiveness of the proposed outcome 13b; _________________ 13bRecital 14, European Parliament resolution of 18 December 2019 on fair taxation in a digitalised and globalised economy: BEPS 2.0 (2019/2901(RSP))
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 76 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Highlights the need to address the under-taxation of the digital economy, while ensuring a fair distribution of taxing rights among all countries where the economic activity and value creation of multinational digital companies takes place;
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 91 #

2021/2010(INI)

4 a. Highlights that digitalisation affects the whole economy, and many firms use multi-channel models, thus, instead of creating special regimes for digital businesses, international tax rules should be reformed, based on a principal of neutrality between different business models, both digital and non-digital, but also regardless of the extent or form of digitalisation, including multi-channel models; adopting an approach to taxation of corporations which would treat them in accordance with the economic reality that they operate as global firms 13c; _________________ 13cBEPS Monitoring Group comment to the HM Treasury Consultation on CORPORATE TAX AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, of January 2018.
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 96 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Welcomes the efforts in the G20/OECD IF to reach a global consensus on a multilateral reform of the international tax system to address the challenges of the digitalised economy; acknowledges the progress of discussions on the proposals at technical level, despite the delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and calls for a swift agreement by mid-2021; highlights the value of the G20/OECD IF for guaranteeing multilateral solutions and finding support at the global and EU level;
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 102 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Welcomes the fact that the two pillar approach suggested in the G20/OECD IF does not ring fence the digital economy but seeks a comprehensive solution to the new challenges of the digital economy; acknowledges that both pillars are complementary, and supports a holistic solution in which one pillar is not adopted without the other; considers that any minimum rate should be set at a fair and sufficient level to discourage profit shifting and prevent damaging tax competition; notes the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation has recommended a rate of 25 per cent 13d ; _________________ 13dIndependent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAX REFORM: Towards a fair and comprehensive solution, 2019, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a0 c602bf43b5594845abb81/t/5d979e6dc5f7c b7b66842c49/1570217588721/ICRICT- INTERNATIONAL+CORPORATE+TAX +REFORM.pdf
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 128 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. Recognises that there are concerns that developing countries could not participate in the negotiations on an equal footing; calls for a major effort and political will in facilitating empowerment of all countries and a genuine inclusive mechanism indecision-making; Reiterates the Parliament’s support for the creation of an intergovernmental tax body within the framework of the UN, which should be well equipped and have sufficient resources and, where appropriate, enforcement powers, would ensure that all countries can participate on an equal footing in the formulation and reform of a global tax agenda 13e; _________________ 13eRecital 341, European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2019 on financial crimes, tax evasion and tax avoidance (2018/2121(INI)), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/doc ument/TA-8-2019-0240_EN.html
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 129 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)
8 b. Welcomes the work of the United Nations Expert Committee on International Cooperation in Tax Matters to develop a new Article 12B for the UN Model Tax Convention on taxation of income from automated digital services, and calls on the UN, its Member States and the members of the committee to ensure that this work is completed before the end of the mandate of the current committee 13f; _________________ 13fUnited Nations Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, Tax consequences of the digitalized economy – issues of relevance for developing countries, October 2020, https://www.un.org/development/desa/fina ncing/sites/www.un.org.development.desa. financing/files/2020- 10/CITCM%2021%20CRP.41_Digitalizati on%2010102020%20Final%20A.pdf
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 139 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Regrets that the failure of the G20/OECD IF to find a solution in October 2020 will prolong the under-taxation of the digital economy; stresses that the COVID 19 pandemic has largely benefited digital businesses and accelerated the transition to a digital economy, thereby re-emphasising the need to reform the current tax system in order to ensure a fair contribution from the digital economy; recalls that digital businesses are among the group of companies that registered excess profits during the COVID-19 pandemic compared with previous years; highlights that governments need to collect unprecedented resources to recover from the COVID-19 crisis and the mobilisation of revenues from under-taxed sectors can contribute in avoiding austerity measures and cut of public services;
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 157 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Insists therefore that, regardless of the progress of the negotiations at the G20/OECD IF, the EU should stand ready to roll out its own solutions for taxing the digital economy by the end of 2021; stresses the importance of ensuring that the outcome of the OECD/G20 IF negotiations does not prevent the EU and individual countries from taking more ambitious action; calls on the Commission to present proposals by June 2021, while anticipating their compatibility with the reform by the G20/OECD IF to be agreed on; stresses the need to create a level playing field for providers of traditional services and digital services in the EU by ensuring that the latter are taxed at an adequate rate; invites the Commission to consider in particular introducing a European Digital Services Tax as a necessary first step; the rate of the European Digital Service Tax should be set at 5%. It should apply to companies with total annual EU revenues above EUR 50 000 000. Taxable revenues should be those resulting from the provision of the following: (i) the placing on a digital interface of advertising targeted at users of that interface; (ii) the making available of multi-sided digital interfaces which allow users to find other users and to interact with them, and which may also facilitate the provision of underlying supplies of goods or services directly between users (sometimes referred to as "intermediation" services); (iii) the transmission of data collected about users and generated from such users' activities on digital interfaces (iv) the supply of digital content such as videos, audio or text; and (v) the sale of goods or services sold via a digital interface;
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 165 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11 a. Calls on the Commission to include or develop an additional proposal for an European excess profit tax (EEPT) to collect revenues from businesses that profit from the Covid-19 crisis, while the economy as a whole is in a severe downturn, with a view to finance the extraordinary public expenditure incurred by member states and the EU in reaction to the crisis;
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 176 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Understands that some Member States consider the taxation of digital economy an urgent issue and have therefore introduced digital services taxes at national level; recalls that these national measures should be phased out once aif an effective multilateral solution is found; calls on Member States to refrain from introducing national solutions unilaterally, as they create a risk of fragmentation of the single market; recalls that although taxation is primarily a Member State competence, they must exercise it in coherence with the common principles of EU law in order to ensure coherence between national frameworks, thereby allowing for fair competition and avoiding a negative impact on the overall coherence of EU taxation principles;
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 200 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Regrets that the Council did not agree on any of the Commission’s related proposals, i.e. the digital services tax, the significant digital presence or the CCTB and CCCTB; calls on the Member States to reconsider their position on these proposals, in light of the unprecedented circumstances of the COVID-19 crisis, and to consider all options provided for by the Treaties if no unanimous agreement can be reached;
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 220 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Calls for a stronger role for Parliament in legislative procedures in the area of taxation; the Parliament and the Council should have equal weight in the decision making process regarding EU tax policy initiatives; takes note of the Commission’s proposed roadmap to qualified majority voting in its communication entitled ‘Toward a more efficient and democratic decision-making in EU tax policy’;
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 224 #

2021/2010(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15 a. Stresses the need for ensuring comprehensive and effective EU level public country by country reporting (CBCR) for all sectors; reiterates its urgent call on the Member States to break the deadlock within the Council and to conclude their first reading on the public CBCR proposal and to enter interinstitutional negotiations with Parliament in order to finalise the legislative process as soon as possible and to respect the principle of sincere cooperation as laid down in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 13g; urgently calls on the Portuguese Presidency of the Council to seek a general approach and enter into interinstitutional negotiations with the European Parliament without delay; _________________ 13gEuropean Parliament, European Parliament resolution of 24 October 2019 on the state of play on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of income tax information by certain undertakings and branches (2016/0107(COD)), known as public country-by-country reporting (2019/2882(RSP)), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/doc ument/TA-9-2019-0048_EN.html
2021/03/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 49 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 2
(2) In a continued effort to put an end to tax practices of MNEs which allow them to shift profits to jurisdictions where they are subject to no or very low taxation, the OECD has further developed a set of international tax rules to ensure that MNEs pay a fair share of tax wherever they operate. This major reform aims to put a floor on competition over corporate income tax rates through the establishment of a global minimum level of taxation. By removing a substantial part of the advantages of shifting profits to jurisdictions with no or very low taxation, the global minimum tax reform will level the playing field for businesses worldwide and allow jurisdictions to better protect their tax bases. However, a wide scope for tax competition between Member States will remain. The minimum tax should not be regarded as an optimal level of corporate taxation and Member States should not use this opportunity to lower their corporate taxation levels, either through the nominal rate as increasing allowances.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 65 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 7
(7) While it is necessary to ensure that tax avoidance practices are discouraged, adverse impacts on smaller MNEs in the internal market should be avoided. For this purpose, this Directive should only apply to entities located in the Union that are members of MNE groups or large-scale domestic groups that meet the annual threshold of at least EUR 7540 000 000 of consolidated revenue. This threshold would be consistent with the threshold of existing international tax rules such as the country-by-country reporting rules9 . Entities within the scope of this Directive are referred to as constituent entities. Certain entities should be excluded from the scope based on their particular purpose and status. Excluded entities would be those that are not profit- driven and perform activities in the general interest and which are, for these reasons, not likely to be subject to tax in the Member State in which they are located. In order to protect those specific interests, it is necessary to exclude from the scope of the Directive governmental entities, international organisations, non-profit organisations and pension funds from the scope of this Directive. Investment funds and real estate investment vehicles should also be excluded from the scope when they are at the top of the ownership chain, since, for those so-called flow-through entities, the income earned is taxed at the level of the owners. _________________ 9 Council Directive (EU) 2016/881 of 25 May 2016 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation, OJ L 146/8 (3 Jun. 2016) [DAC 4] and non-profit organisations.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 72 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 12
(12) The ETR of an MNE group in each jurisdiction where it carries out activities or of a large-scale domestic group should be compared to the agreed minimum tax rate of 125 % in order to determine whether the MNE group or large-scale domestic group is liable to pay a top-up tax and consequently should apply the IIR or the UTPR. The minimum tax rate of 15 % agreed by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS reflects a balance minimum standard amongst corporate tax rates worldwide. In cases where the ETR of an MNE group falls below the minimum tax rate in a given jurisdiction, the top-up tax should be allocated to the entities in the MNE group that are liable to pay the tax in accordance with the application of the IIR and the UTPR, in order to comply with the globally agreed minimum effective rate of 15 % or the minimum effective rate of 25% agreed at Union level. In cases where the ETR of a large- scale domestic group falls below the minimum tax rate, the UPE at the top of the large-scale domestic group should apply the IIR in respect of its low- taxed constituent entities, in order to ensure that such group is liable to pay tax at an effective minimum rate of 15 %.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 73 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 12
(12) The ETR of an MNE group in each jurisdiction where it carries out activities or of a large-scale domestic group should be compared to the agreed minimum tax rate of 125 % in order to determine whether the MNE group or large-scale domestic group is liable to pay a top-up tax and consequently should apply the IIR or the UTPR. The minimum tax rate of 15 % agreed by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS reflects a balance and a minimum standard amongst corporate tax rates worldwide. In cases where the ETR of an MNE group falls below the minimum tax rate in a given jurisdiction, the top-up tax should be allocated to the entities in the MNE group that are liable to pay the tax in accordance with the application of the IIR and the UTPR, in order to comply with the globally agreed minimum effective rate of 15 % or the minimum effective rate of 25% agreed at Union level. In cases where the ETR of a large- scale domestic group falls below the minimum tax rate, the UPE at the top of the large-scale domestic group should apply the IIR in respect of its low- taxed constituent entities, in order to ensure that such group is liable to pay tax at an effective minimum rate of 15 % as defined by the relevant jurisdiction.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 76 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 13
(13) In order to allow Member States to benefit from the top-up tax revenues collected on their low-taxed constituent entities located in their territory, Member States should be able to electhave the option to apply a domestic top-up tax system. Constituent entities of an MNE group that are located in a Member State which has elected to implement rules equivalent to the IIR and the UTPR in their own domestic tax system should pay the top-up tax to this Member State. While leaving Member States some flexibility in the technical implementation of the domestic top-up tax system, such system should ensure the minimum effective taxation of the qualifying income or loss of the constituent entities in the same, or in an equivalent manner, to the IIR and UTPR of this Directive. Stresses that the creation of the national top up tax ensures an automatic floor on the Total Tax paid by the companies covered by the current directive and simultaneously places a floor on competition over Corporate Taxation collected by the source country. However, it does not create a floor on tax competition for companies under the proposed threshold. Member States should work with the European institutions in order to establish a roadmap for the upward convergence on corporate taxation in the internal market. Furthermore, calls on the European Commission to monitor possible national measures that aim to compensate for the potential increase in corporate income tax, making sure that effective taxation level is not lowered.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 77 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 14
(14) To ensure a proportionate approach, this exercise should take into consideration certain specific situations in which BEPS risks are reduced. Therefore, the Directive should include a substance carve-out based on the costs associated with employees and the value of tangible assets in a given jurisdiction. This would allow to address, to a certain extent, situations where an MNE group or a large-scale domestic group carries out economic activities which require material presence in a low-taxed jurisdiction as in such case BEPS practices would be unlikely to flourish. The specific case of MNE groups that are at the first stages of their international activity should also be considered in order not to discourage the development of cross-border activities for MNE groups that benefit from low taxation in their domestic jurisdiction where they are predominantly operating. Thus, the low- taxed domestic activities of such groups should be excluded from the application of the rules for a transitional period of five years, and provided that the MNE group does not have constituent entities in more than six other jurisdictions. In order to ensure equal treatment for large-scale domestic groups, the income from the activities of such groups should also be excluded for a transitional period of five years.deleted
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 15
(15) Due to its highly volatile nature and the long economic cycle of this industry, the shipping sector is traditionally subject to alternative or supplementary taxation regimes in Member States. To avoid undermining that policy rationale and allow Member States to continue applying a specific tax treatment to the shipping sector in line with international practice and State aid rules, shipping income should be excluded from the system.deleted
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 83 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 16
(16) In order to achieve a balance between the objectives of the global minimum tax reform and the administrative burden for tax administrations and taxpayers, this Directive should provide for a de minimis exclusion for MNE groups or large-scale domestic groups that have an average revenue of less than EUR 10 000 000 and an average qualifying income or loss of less than EUR 1 000 000 in a jurisdiction. Such MNE groups or large-scale domestic groups should not pay a top-up tax even if their ETR is below the minimum tax rate in that jurisdiction.deleted
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 85 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 17
(17) The application of the rules of this Directive to MNE groups and large-scale domestic groups that fall within its scope for the first time could give rise to distortions resulting from the existence of tax attributes, including losses from prior fiscal years, or from timing differences, and require transitional rules to eliminate such distortions. A gradual decrease of the rates for the payroll and the tangible assets carve-outs over ten years should also apply to allow a smooth transition to the new tax system.deleted
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 18
(18) For an efficient application of the system, it is crucial that procedures are coordinated at a group level. It will be necessary to operate a system ensuring the unobstructed flow of information within the MNE group and towards tax administrations where constituent entities are located. The primary responsibility of filing the information return should lie on the constituent entity itself. A waiver of such responsibility should however apply where the MNE group has designated another entity to file and share the information return. It could be either a local entity or an entity from another jurisdiction that has a competent authority agreement in place with the Member State of the constituent entity. In the first twelve- months after its entry into force, the Commission should review this Directive, via relevant delegated acts, in line with the agreement reached by the Inclusive Framework on filing requirements under the GloBE implementation framework. Considering the compliance adjustments that this system requires, groups that fall within the scope of this Directive for the first time should be granted a period of 18 months to comply with the information requirements.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 98 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 21 a (new)
(21 a) The GloBE Model Rules are likely to be modified, in particular the rules relating to safe harbours that aim to simplify filing requirements for constituent entities, for which this Directive should ensure the adequate safeguard for control. Therefore, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission to ensure this Directive remains aligned with the international commitments of Member States.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 103 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 24 a (new)
(24 a) The Pillar 2, besides the national domestic laws introduced by the current directive, consists of the treaty-based rule Subject to Tax Rule (STTR), that allows source jurisdictions to impose limited source taxation on certain related party payments that are subject to tax below a minimum rate. The European Commission should recommend Member- States to change their bilateral tax agreements with low-income countries in order to dully include it.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 110 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1
1. This Directive shall apply to constituent entities located in the Union that are members of an MNE group or a large-scale domestic group which has an annual revenue of EUR 7540 000 000 or more in its consolidated financial statements in at least two of the last four consecutive fiscal years. Each Member State may apply an income inclusion rule in accordance with this Directive also to MNE groups which have annual revenues above a nationally defined lower threshold if the ultimate parent entity is tax resident in this Member State. The same threshold shall then apply to large- scale domestic groups of this Member State.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 114 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – point a
(a) a governmental entity, an international organisation, and a non-profit organisation, a pension fund, an investment entity that is an ultimate parent entity and a real estate investment vehicle that is an ultimate parent entity; or
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 115 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – point b
(b) an entity that is owned at a minimum of 95 % by one or more entities referred to in point (a), directly or through several such entities, except pension services entities, and that: (i) operates exclusively, or almost exclusively, to hold assets or invest funds for the benefit of the entity or entities referred to in point (a); or (ii) exclusively carries out activities ancillary to those performed by the entity or entities referred to in point (a); ordeleted
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 116 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – point c
(c) an entity that is owned at a minimum of 85 % by one or more entities referred to in point (a), directly or through one or several such entities, provided that substantially all of its income is derived from dividends or equity gains or losses that are excluded from the computation of the qualifying income in accordance with point (b) of Article 15(2).deleted
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 129 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 32 – point a
(a) a refundable tax credit designed in such a way that it is payable as a cash payment or a cash equivalent to a constituent entity within fourtwo years from the date when the constituent entity is entitled to receive the refundable tax credit under the laws of the jurisdiction granting the credit; or
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 134 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
The Commission may adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 52 in order to lay down definitions of more concepts, or to modify any of the above definitions other than the one for the ‘minimum tax rate’, especially in the light of future refinements of the GloBE Model Rules.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 137 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 a (new)
Article 4 a Anti-avoidance rules 1. For the purposes of calculating the top- up tax to be levied under the rules of this Directive, a Member State shall disregard an arrangement or a series of arrangements which, having been put in place for the essential purpose of obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the object or purpose of this Directive, are not genuine, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances. An arrangement may comprise more than one step or part. 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, an arrangement or a series of arrangements shall be regarded as non-genuine where they are not put in place for valid commercial reasons that reflect economic reality. 3. Arrangements or a series of arrangements that are disregarded in accordance with paragraph 1 shall be treated, for the purpose of calculating the tax base, by reference to their economic substance. 4. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 52 in order to lay down more detailed rules against tax avoidance, especially in the light of future refinements of the GloBE Model Rules.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 146 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. The Commission may, by means of implementing acts, further specify the meaning of the terms used in paragraphs 5 and 6. The implementing acts referred to in the first subparagraph shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 53a (1).
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 149 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 8 b (new)
8 b. The Commission may adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 52 in order to modify the formula of paragraph5, so as to accommodate for a corresponding change of the GloBE Model Rules.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 154 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 15 – paragraph 11 a (new)
11 a. The Commission may adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 52 in order to modify any of the definitions of paragraph 1, or to amend any of the items for which adjustments are provided for under paragraphs 2, 3, 6, 7, 10 and 11, especially in the light of future refinements of the GloBE Model Rules.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 156 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 16
[...]deleted
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 162 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 19 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. The Commission may, by means of implementing acts, further specify the meaning of the terms used in paragraph 1. The implementing acts referred to in the first subparagraph shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 53a (1).
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 167 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 21 – paragraph 7 – introductory part
7. A deferred tax liability that is not paid or reversed within the fivthree subsequent fiscal years shall be recaptured to the extent it was taken into account in the total deferred tax adjustment amount of a constituent entity.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 169 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 21 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 1
The amount of the recaptured deferred tax liability determined for the fiscal year shall be treated as a reduction to the covered tax of the fifththird preceding fiscal year and the effective tax rate and top-up tax of such fiscal year shall be recomputed in accordance with Article 28(1).
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 170 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 21 – paragraph 8 – point c
(c) research and development expenses;deleted
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 177 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 25 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point a
(a) the qualifying income of the constituent entities is the sum of the qualifying income of all constituent entities located in the jurisdiction determined in accordance with Chapter III, taking into account, where applicable, the international shipping income exclusion in accordance with Article 16;
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 180 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 27
[...]deleted
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 190 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 29
1. By way of derogation from Articles 25 to 28, at the election of the filing constituent entity, the top-up tax due for the constituent entities located in a jurisdiction shall be equal to zero for a fiscal year if, for such fiscal year: (a) the average qualifying revenue of the constituent entities located in that jurisdiction is less than EUR 10 000 000; and (b) the average qualifying income or loss of that jurisdiction is a loss or is less than EUR 1 000 000. The election shall be made annually in accordance with Article 43(2). 2. The average qualifying revenue or average qualifying income or loss referred to in paragraph 1 shall be the average of the qualifying revenue or qualifying income or loss of the constituent entities located in the jurisdiction for the fiscal year and the two preceding fiscal years. If there are no constituent entities with qualifying revenue or qualifying loss located in the jurisdiction in the first or second preceding fiscal years, such fiscal years shall be excluded from the calculation of the average qualifying revenue or qualifying income or loss of that jurisdiction. 3. The qualifying revenue of the constituent entities located in a jurisdiction for a fiscal year shall be the sum of the revenues of the constituent entities located in that jurisdiction, reduced or increased by any adjustment carried out in accordance with Chapter III. 4. The qualifying income or loss of a jurisdiction located in a jurisdiction for a fiscal year shall be the net qualifying income or loss of that jurisdiction as computed in accordance with Article 25(2). 5. The de minimis exclusion shall not be applicable to stateless entities and investment entities. The revenue and qualifying income of such entities shall be excluded from the computation of the de minimis exclusion.9 deleted De minimis exclusion
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 195 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 5
5. The outstanding balance, if any, of the deemed distribution tax recapture account at the end of the fourthsecond fiscal year after such account was established, shall be treated as a reduction to the adjusted covered taxes in accordance with Article 28(1) for the fiscal year in which such account was established.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 200 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 42 – paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt the measures necessary to implement the filing obligations under this Directive.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 208 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 44 – paragraph 2
2. A constituent entity that does not comply with the requirement to file a top- up tax information return pursuant to Article 42 for a tax year within the prescribed deadline or makes a false declaration shall be charged an administrative pecuniary penalty amounting to 510 % of its turnover in the relevant fiscal year. This penalty shall only apply after the constituent entity has not provided the top-up tax information return pursuant to Article 42, following any reminder issued, within a period of 6 months.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 211 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 46
Transitional relief for the substance- 1. For the purpose of Article 27(3), the value of 5 % shall be replaced with the values set out in the following table: [...] 2. For the purpose of applying Article 27(4), the value of 5 % shall be replaced the values set out in the following table: [...]Article 46 deleted based income exclusion
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 47
Exclusion from the IIR and UTPR of MNE groups in the initial phase of their 1. The top-up tax due by an ultimate parent entity located in a Member State in accordance with Article 5(2) shall be reduced to zero in the first five years of the initial phase of the international activity of the MNE group notwithstanding the requirements laid down in Chapter V. 2. Where the ultimate parent entity of an MNE group is located in a third country jurisdiction, the top-up tax due by a constituent entity located in a Member State in accordance with Article 13(2) shall be reduced to zero in the first five years of the initial phase of the international activity of that MNE group notwithstanding the requirements laid down in Chapter V. 3. An MNE group shall be considered to be in the initial phase of its international activity if: (a) it has constituent entities in no more than six jurisdictions; and (b) the sum of the net book value of the tangible assets of all the constituent entities of the MNE group other than the constituent entities located in the reference jurisdiction does not exceed EUR 50 000 000. For the purpose of point (b), reference jurisdiction means the jurisdiction in which the constituent entities of the MNE group have the highest sum of the net book value of tangible assets in the fiscal year in which the MNE group falls within the scope of this Directive for the first time. 4. The period of five fiscal years referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall start from the beginning of the fiscal year in which the MNE group falls within the scope of this Directive for the first time. For MNE groups that are within the scope of this Directive when it enters into force, the five-year period referred to in paragraph 1 shall start on 1 January 2023. For MNE groups that are within the scope of this Directive when it enters into force, the five-year period referred to in paragraph 2 shall start on 1 January 2024. 5. The ultimate parent entity shall inform the tax administration of the Member State in which it is located of the start of the initial phase of itsArticle 47 deleted international activity.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 227 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 48
Transitional relief for filing obligations Notwithstanding Article 42(7), the top-up tax information return and the notifications referred to in Article 42 shall be filed with the tax administration of the Member States no later than 18 months after the last day of the fiscal year that is the transitional year.Article 48 deleted
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 228 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 50
1. The top-up tax due by an ultimate parent entity located in a Member State in accordance with Article 49 shall be reduced to zero in the first five fiscal years, starting from the first day of the fiscal year in which the large-scale domestic group falls within the scope of this Directive for the first time. 2. For large-scale domestic groups that are in scope of this Directive when it enters into force, the five-year period abovementioned shall start on 1 January 2023.Article 50 deleted Transitional rules
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 246 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 53 a (new)
Article 53 a Review The Commission shall, three years after the entry into force of this Directive, review its application and report to the Council on the operation of this Directive. The report shall address whether there is a need to amend this Directive in light of changes and developments in the international tax context, in particular regarding the implementation of the GloBE Model Rules outside the EU and the development of other, unilateral approaches towards minimum effective taxation of MNE groups. The Commission shall submit further such reports to the Council every three years. Where appropriate, the report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal. In that report the Commission shall undertake a thorough analysis in particular of the effectiveness and efficiency of this Directive, including whether the scope of the Directive should be extended to cover MNE groups and large-scale domestic groups with a lower annual revenue threshold than the one laid down in Article 2(1) and whether the minimum tax rate of Article 3 item (12) should be increased.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 247 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 53 b (new)
Article 53 b Delimitation clause 1. This Directive shall not affect the application of domestic or agreement- based provisions on controlled foreign company rules within the meaning of Article 7 of Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164, including the right of Member States under Article 3 of said Directive to adopt provisions aimed at safeguarding a higher level of protection for domestic corporate tax bases, especially where stricter controlled foreign company rules follow the recommendations of the 2015 Final Report on Action 3 of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project. 2. This Directive shall not affect the application of domestic provisions on alternative forms of minimum taxation of domestic groups or companies.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 248 #

2021/0433(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 53 c (new)
Article 53 c Derogations After the entry into force of this Directive a Member State may derogate from the provision on the annual revenue threshold of Article 2(1) or on the minimum tax rate of Article 3 item (12) so as to apply a lower annual revenue threshold or to apply a higher minimum tax rate.
2022/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #

2021/0381(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 8
8. ‘targeting or amplification techniques’ means techniques that are used either to address a tailored political advertisement only to a specific poffered by political advertising publisherson or gproup of persons or to increase the circulation, reach or visibility of a political advertisementviders of advertising services to the sponsors of political advertisements to address a political advertisement only to a specific person or group of persons;
2022/07/20
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 216 #

2021/0381(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 8 a (new)
8 a. ‘ad delivery techniques’ means automated techniques that are used by political advertising publishers or providers of advertising services to determine which person or group of persons a political advertisement is delivered to.
2022/07/20
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 325 #

2021/0381(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – title
12 Specific requirements related to targeting and amplificationd delivery
2022/07/20
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 327 #

2021/0381(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1
1. Targeting or amplificationd delivery techniques tshall not involve the processing of personal data referred to in Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 in the context of political advertising are prohibited.
2022/07/20
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 348 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point 8 a (new)
(8a) ‘criminal organisation’ means a criminal organisation as defined in Article 1, point (1), of Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA1a. _________________ 1a Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime (OJ L 300, 11.11.2008, p. 42).
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 349 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point 8 b (new)
(8b) ‘large corporate entity’ means a corporate entity which had an annual revenue of EUR 40 000 000 or more in its consolidated financial statements in at least two of the last four consecutive fiscal years.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 389 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
To that end, the Commission shall, at the latest by [43 years after the date of transposition of this Directive], draw up a report identifying, analysing and evaluating those risks at Union level. Thereafter, the Commission shall update its report every fourthree years. The Commission may update parts of the report more frequently, if appropriate.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 392 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – point -a (new)
(-a) identification and ranking of Member States, analysing their financial and legal structures in relation to risks of money laundering and terrorist financing and covering at least the following issues: (i) compliance with Union and international anti-money laundering standards; (ii) lack of corporate transparency; (iii) financial secrecy legislation and bank secrecy; (iv) financial size of Member States' financial sector; (v) functioning of whistleblower protection mechanisms; (vi) legislation on corporate tax and corporate tax disclosure; (vii) facilitation and reception of inward and outward illicit financial flows.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 393 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) the most widespread means used to launder illicit proceeds, including, where available, those particularly used in transactions between Member States and third countries, including the setting up of shell companies, trade mis-invoicing, and storing funds in lower tax jurisdictions, independently of the identification of a third country pursuant to Section 2 of Chapter III of Regulation [please insert reference – proposal for Anti-Money Laundering Regulation - COM/2021/420 final];
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 399 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 7 – paragraph 3
3. The Commission shall make recommendations to Member States on the measures suitable for addressing the identified risks. In the event that Member States decide not to apply any of the recommendations in their national AML/CFT regimes, they shall notify the Commission thereof and provide a justification for such a decision. The Commission's recommendations and the Member States' decisions in response to the recommendations, including the justification in case of non-application, shall be made public.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 401 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 7 – paragraph 4
4. By [3 years after the date of transposition of this Directive], AMLA, after consultation of other Union bodies, offices and agencies involved in the AML/CFT framework such as Europol, shall issue an opinion addressed to the Commission on the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the Union. Thereafter, AMLA shall issue an opinion every two years. The opinions issued by AMLA shall be made public.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 410 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Each Member State shall carry out a national risk assessment to identify, assess, understand and mitigate the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting it. It shall keep that risk assessment up to date and review it at least every fourthree years.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 421 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 4 – point b a (new)
(ba) Identify the typical ownership and control structure of local legal persons, considering at least: (i) number of layers, (ii) type of legal vehicle in each layer (e.g. company, trust, partnership, etc.), (iii) nationality of layers, (iv) number of legal owners and beneficial owners.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 431 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 4 – point f a (new)
(fa) assess the performance of national bodies involved in the supervision of obliged entities;
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 432 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 4 – point f b (new)
(fb) assess the appropriateness of the human and financial resources allocated to the competent authorities.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 435 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
In the national risk assessment, Member States shall describe the institutional structure and broad procedures of their AML/CFT regime, including, inter alia, the FIU, tax authorities and, prosecutors and whistleblower prostecutortion mechanisms, as well as the allocated human and financial resources to the extent that this information is available.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 437 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
In the national risk assessment, Member States shall describe the institutional structure and broad procedures of their AML/CFT regime, including, inter alia, the FIU, tax authorities and prosecutors, as well as the allocated human and financial resources toand the extent that this information is availableof Union and international cooperation.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 441 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 5
5. Member States shall make the results of their national risk assessments, including their updates, available to the Commission, to AMLA and to the other Member States. Any Member State may provide relevant additional information, where appropriate, to the Member State carrying out the national risk assessment. A summary of tThe assessment shall be made publicly available. That summaryHowever, the assessment made available to the public shall noteither contain classified information. The nor information contained therein shall nothat permit the identification of any natural or legal person.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 444 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) data measuring the reporting, investigation and judicial phases of the national AML/CFT regime, including the number ofand value of transactions involved in suspicious transaction reports made to the FIU, the follow-up given to those reports, the information on cross- border physical transfers of cash submitted to the FIU in accordance with Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1672 together with the follow-up given to the information submitted and, on an annual basis, the number of cases investigated, the number of persons prosecuted, the number of persons convicted for money laundering or terrorist financing offences, the types of predicate offences identified in accordance with Article 2 of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 of the European Parliament and of the Council45 where such information is available, and the value in euro of property that has been frozen, seized or confiscated, broken down by types of offenses and types of property; _________________ 45 Directive (EU) 2018/1673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on combating money laundering by criminal law (OJ L 284, 12.11.2018, p. 22).
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 449 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) if available, data identifying the number and percentage of reports resulting in further investigation, together with the annual report drawn up by FIUs pursuant to Article 21;
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 453 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point g a (new)
(ga) number of discrepancies reported to the Central Register referred to in Article 10, including measures or sanctions imposed by the entity in charge of the central register, the number of on- site and off-site inspections, types of typical discrepancies and patterns identified in the verification process by entities in charge of the central register;
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 459 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 9 – paragraph 5
5. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts laying down the methodology for the collection of the statistics referred to in paragraph 2 and the arrangements for their transmission to the Commission and AMLA, AMLA and other Union bodies, offices and agencies involved in the AML/CFT framework. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 54(2).
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 462 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 9 – paragraph 6
6. The Commission shall publish a biennial report summarising and explaining the statistics referred to in paragraph 2, which shall be made available to the public on its website.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 465 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Member States shall ensure that beneficial ownership information referred to in Article 44 of Regulation [please insert reference – proposal for Anti-Money Laundering Regulation - COM/2021/420 final] and information on nominee arrangements referred to in Article 47 of that Regulation is held in a central register in the Member State where the legal entity is incorporated or where the trustee or person holding an equivalent position in a similar legal arrangement is established or resides. Such requirement shall not apply to companies listed on a regulated market that are subject to disclosure requirements equivalent to the requirements laid down in this Directive or subject to equivalent international standards.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 485 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 10 – paragraph 3 – point b a (new)
(ba) (c) the details on the 10 natural persons holding the majority of shares or voting rights or, where the size of the entity in question does not allow for the identification of 10 natural persons, the details on all natural persons holding shares or voting rights.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 504 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 10 – paragraph 5 – point b a (new)
(ba) the entity in charge of the central registers shall verify, when beneficial ownership information is submitted and on a regular basis thereafter, that that information is adequate, accurate and up to date, including through: (i) cross-checks against other government or private databases accessible to it as well as international and Union sanction lists, (ii) analysis of domestic ownership structures, thereby identifying suspicious outliers for inspection.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 506 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 10 – paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. By [two years after the date of entry into force of this Directive] AMLA shall issue guidelines on the methods and procedures to be employed by entities in charge of the central registers to verify beneficial ownership information and by the obliged entities and competent authorities to identify and report discrepancies regarding beneficial ownership information.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 524 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 10 – paragraph 8
8. In the case of corporate and other legal entities, Member States shall ensure that the entity in charge of the central beneficial ownership register is empowered to request information and carry out checks, including on-site investigations at the premises or registered office of the legal entity, in order to establish the current beneficial ownership of the entity and to verify that the information submitted to the central register is accurate, adequate and up-to- date. The right of the central register to verify such information shall not be restricted, obstructed or precluded in any manner.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 532 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 10 – paragraph 9
9. Member States shall ensure that the entity in charge of the central register is adequately resourced and empowered to impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive measures or sanctions for failures to provide the register with accurate, adequate and up-to-date information about their beneficial ownership. Sanctions shall include monetary penalties and restrictions in the access to certain professions and in the exercise of certain functions within a legal entity or arrangement, restrictions in the exercise of ownership rights of a legal entity or in the ability to receive dividends and the suspension or discontinuation of the business activities. In the event of repeated failures to ensure the register contains up-to-date, accurate and adequate information, sanctions shall be increased to ensure compliance. By [2 years after entry into force of this Directive], AMLA shall adopt draft regulatory technical standards regarding indicators to classify the level of gravity of breach and criteria for such repeated failures and submit them to the Commission for adoption. The Commission is empowered to supplement this Directive by adopting the regulatory standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 38 to 41 of Regulation [please insert reference- proposal for establishment of an Anti-Money Laundering Authority - COM/2021/421 final]. AMLA shall organise peer-reviews on a regular basis of the entities in charge of the central registers across the Member States to review their performance regarding the provision of accurate, adequate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 546 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 11 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that competent authorities have timely, unrestricted and free access to the information held in the interconnected central registers referred to in Article 10, without alerting the entity or arrangement concerned. That information shall also be made available to competent authorities as machine-readable data.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 566 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) in the case of legal entities, at least the name, the month and year of birth and the country of residence and nationality of the beneficial owner as well as the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held and, if applicable, the status as a domestic or foreign politically exposed person (PEP) of the beneficial owner;
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 567 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) in case of express trusts or similar legal arrangements, the name, the month and year of birth and the country of residence and nationality of the beneficial owner as well as the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held, provided that a legitimate interest can be demonstrated. and, if applicable, the status as a domestic or foreign politically exposed person (PEP) of the beneficial owner;
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 575 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 12 – paragraph 2
2. Member States may choose to make beneficial ownership information held in their central registers available to the public on the condition of authentication using electronic identification means and relevant trust services as set out in Regulation (EU) 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council46 andshall make the information referred to in paragraph 1 available to the public through online access and without requiring the payment of any fee, which shall not exceed the administrative costs of making the information available, including costs of maintenance and developments of the register. _________________ 46 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 73)s. However, Member States shall prohibit the use and processing of that information for commercial purposes.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 589 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 14 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Member States shall put in place centralised automated mechanisms, such as a central registers or central electronic data retrieval systems, which allow the identification, in a timely manner, of any natural or legal persons holding or controlling payment accounts and, bank accounts identified by IBAN, as defined by Regulation (EU) No 260/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council47 , securities accounts and safe-deposit boxes held by a credit institution within their territory. _________________ 47 Regulation (EU) No 260/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing technical and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro and amending Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 (OJ L 94, 30.3.2012, p. 22).
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 591 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 14 – paragraph 3 – point a
(a) for the customer-account and securities-account holder and any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer: the name, complemented by either the other identification data required under Article 18(1) of Regulation [please insert reference – proposal for Anti-Money Laundering Regulation] or a unique identification number;
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 592 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 14 – paragraph 3 – point b
(b) for the beneficial owner of the customer-account or securities-account holder: the name, complemented by either the other identification data required under Article 18(1) of Regulation [please insert reference – proposal for Anti-Money Laundering Regulation] or a unique identification number;
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 609 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) the common criteria according to which beneficial ownership information is available through the system of interconnection of registers, depending on the level of access granted by Member States;
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 617 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point f
(f) the payment modalities where access to beneficial ownership information is subject to the payment of a fee according to Article 12(2) taking into account available payment facilities such as remote payment transactions.deleted
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 622 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Chapter II – Section 3 – title
3 Real estate registAsset registers and unexplained wealth orders
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 641 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 16 a (new)
Article 16a Asset Registers 1. Each Member State shall put in place a central asset register (CAR) which shall allow the identification, in a timely manner, of any natural person or beneficial owner of a legal person owning the following assets within its territory, including where the legal person is a foreign legal entity or arrangement: (a) land; (b) real estate; (c) aircraft, watercraft or motor vehicles, whose estimated value is above EUR 100 000 or the equivalent in national currency; (d) equity or debt securities with a total value above EUR 100 000 or the equivalent in national currency, with the exception of products and services referred to in Annex II, points (a), (b), (c) and (d) of this Regulation. 2. The following information about the natural person or the beneficial owner of the legal person owning the assets referred to in paragraph 1 shall be accessible through the CAR: (a) the name, the month and year of birth and the country of residence and nationality; (b) the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held, if the beneficial interest is shared with other persons; (c) if applicable, their status as a domestic or foreign politically exposed person (PEP). 3. The Member States shall ensure that the information held in their CARs are directly accessible to national FIUs and competent authorities to enable them to fulfil their obligations under this Directive, including as machine-readable data. A summary of the information shall also be made available to the public in such a way that individual natural persons cannot be identified, unless such person is a politically exposed person (PEP) or the beneficial owner of more than 10 % of the shares or voting rights of a large corporate entity. 4. By [3 months after the date of transposition of this Directive], the Member States shall notify to the Commission a list of the competent authorities that have been granted access to the CARs and the type of information available to them. The Member States shall update such notification when changes to the list of competent authorities or to the type of information available to them occur. The Commission shall make that information, including any change to it, available to the other Member States. 5. The CARs shall be interconnected via the CAR single access point that shall be developed and operated by the Commission and be fully operational by [4 years after the date of entry into force of this Directive]. The Commission is empowered to adopt, by means of implementing acts, the technical specifications and procedures for the connection of the Member States' registers to the CAR single access point. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 54(2). 6. National FIUs shall be granted access to the information on the ownership of assets in other Member States available through the CAR single access point interconnecting the CARs, insofar as that information is relevant to the FIU to fulfil its obligations under this Directive. Member States shall cooperate among themselves and with the Commission in order to implement this paragraph. Member States shall ensure that the staff of the national FIUs maintain high professional standards of confidentiality and data protection, are of high integrity and are appropriately skilled.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 646 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 16 b (new)
Article 16b Interconnection of the BAR single access point and the CAR single access point with the European Central Platform 1. The BAR single access point, referred to in Article 14(5), and the CAR single access point, referred to in Article 16a(5), shall be interconnected with the European Central Platform, referred to in Article 10 (11), in such a way that the information held in the BAR and CAR about a beneficial owner registered in the European Central Platform is directly linked to and accessible via the beneficial ownership information held in the European Central Platform. 2. Accessibility to the information held in the BAR and CAR via the European Central Platform shall be given to FIUs, national competent authorities and the public in accordance with Articles 14 and 16a(3) and (6). 3. The interconnection of the BAR single access point and the CAR single access point with the European Central Platform shall be developed and operated by the Commission and shall be fully operational by [4 years after the date of entry into force of this Directive]. The Commission is empowered to adopt, by means of implementing acts, the technical specifications and procedures for that interconnection. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article54(2).
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 647 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 16 c (new)
Article 16c Unexplained Wealth Orders 1. The Member States shall establish the possibility for enforcement authorities to apply at court for an Unexplained Wealth Order (UWO) with respect to any tangible or intangible asset held within their territories. 2. An UWO referred to in paragraph 1 is an order requiring the respondent to provide a statement explaining at least: (a) the nature and extent of the respondent’s interest in the asset in respect of which the order is made; (b) how the respondent obtained the asset, in particular with respect to any costs incurred in obtaining it. 3. The Member States’ courts shall only grant an UWO if, at least, the following conditions are met: (a) the court has reasonable cause to believe that the respondent holds the asset and that the value of the asset is greater than EUR 100 000 or the equivalent in national currency; (b) the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the known sources of the respondent’s lawfully obtained income are insufficient for the purposes of enabling the respondent to obtain the asset; (c) the court is satisfied that the respondent is a politically exposed person (PEP) or that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the respondent, or a person connected with the respondent, is or has been involved in a serious crime. 4. The Member States shall ensure that respondents are granted sufficient time to respond to an UWO. In the case of non-compliance, Member States shall establish a procedure for the issuing of warnings and setting of deadlines that after a repeated failure to comply may lead to the freezing or confiscation of the property.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 649 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 1
1. Each Member State shall establish an FIU in order to prevent, detect and effectively combat money laundering and terrorist financing. With respect to money laundering, the FIUs shall operate on the basis of proportionality, prioritising the detection and combating of larger and complex schemes of money laundering associated with criminal organisations.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 655 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
With respect to money laundering, the analyses shall be conducted in particular with a view to detecting and combating larger and complex schemes of money laundering associated with criminal organisations.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 664 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. AMLA shall organise training events for the staff of FIUs. AMLA may, where appropriate, organise those training events in cooperation with other Union bodies, offices and agencies involved in the AML/CFT framework, such as Europol. FIUs shall grant their staff five days of additional leave per year to take part in such training events.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 668 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 7
7. Each Member States shall ensure that its FIU is able to make arrangements or engage independently with other domestic competent authorities and with Union bodies, offices and agencies involved in the AML/CFT framework, pursuant to Article 45 on the exchange of information.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 670 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. AMLA shall coordinate the organisation of periodical peer reviews of FIUs for the purposes of assessing whether the requirements set out in this Article have been fulfilled. When carrying out those periodical peer reviews, special attention shall be given to the performance of FIUs in the treatment of cases affecting, or potentially affecting, politically exposed persons (PEPs) or large corporate entities. In case a peer review indicate substantial shortcomings in the operation of a FIU, AMLA shall issue recommendations for improvement to that FIU. In case AMLA considers that the shortcomings are caused by conditions external to the capacities of that FIU, AMLA shall report to and issue a recommendation to the Commission and the Member State concerned.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 683 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – point a – point i a (new)
(ia) information contained in the national CARs in accordance with Article 16a;
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 684 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – point a – point i b (new)
(ib) the interconnected information accessible through the interconnection of the BAR single access point, the CAR single access point and the European Central Platform in accordance with Article 16b;
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 690 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – point a – point vi
(vi) information on securities including from central securities depositories (CSD);
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 697 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – point c – introductory part
(c) direct or indirect access to the following law enforcement information: access to the following law enforcement information in accordance with Article 8 of Directive (EU) 2019/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council1a: _________________ 1a Directive (EU) 2019/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 laying down rules facilitating the use of financial and other information for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of certain criminal offences, and repealing Council Decision 2000/642/JHA (OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 122).
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 706 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – point c – point i
(i) any type of information or data which is already held by competent authorities in the context of preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting criminal offences, insofar as that information or data is relevant to the FIU to fulfil its obligations under this Directive;
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 707 #

2021/0250(COD)

(ii) any type of information or data which is held by public authorities or by private entities in the context of preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting criminal offences, insofar as that information or data is relevant to the FIU to fulfil its obligations under this Directive, and which is available to competent authorities without the taking of coercive measures under national law.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 709 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
The information referred to in point (c) may include criminal records, information on investigations, information on the freezing or seizure of assets or on other investigative or provisional measures and information on convictions and on confiscations. Where there are objective grounds for assuming that the provision of such information would have a negative impact on ongoing investigations or analyses, or, in exceptional circumstances, where disclosure of the information would be clearly disproportionate to the legitimate interests of a natural or legal person or irrelevant with regard to the purposes for which it has been requested, the law enforcement authority shall be under no obligation to comply with the request for information.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 717 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 18 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. In the context of its functions, each FIU shall be able to request, obtain and use information from the owner of the real property registered in national real estate registers, electronic data retrieval systems, land and cadastral registers or similar registers, insofar as that information or data is relevant to the FIU to fulfil its obligations under this Directive. Member States shall lay down the rules on sanctions applicable to infringements of this provision. The sanctions shall be appropriate and proportionate.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 772 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 22 – paragraph 1
Member States shall ensure that FIUs cooperate with each other and with their counterparts in third countries to the greatest extent possible, regardless of their organisational status. Member States shall provide their FIUs with adequate financial, human and technical resources in order to ensure effective and efficient cooperation.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 783 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 23 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Following a peer review in accordance with Article 17(7a), AMLA may suspend access to FIU.net for a specific FIU where the report of the peer review concludes that requirements relating to the independence, integrity, professionalism, confidentiality or security of the FIU, as set out in Article17, have not been fulfilled. With the decision of suspension, AMLA shall issue an assessment which explains and indicates the follow-up measures necessary to comply with, in order to the suspension to be lifted. AMLA shall evaluate the actions taken by the FIU concerned no later than 3 months after issuing the decision.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 794 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 24 – paragraph 6
6. Member States shall ensure that where an FIU is requested to provide information pursuant to paragraph 1, it shall respond to the request as soon as possible and in any case no later than sefiven days after the receipt of the request. In exceptional, duly justified cases, this time limit may be extended to a maximum of 140 calendar days. Where the requested FIU is unable to obtain the requested information, it shall inform the requesting FIU thereof.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 796 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 24 – paragraph 7 – introductory part
7. Member States shall ensure that in exceptional, justified and urgent cases and, by way of derogation from paragraph 6, where pursuant to paragraph 1 an FIU is requested to provide information which is either held in a database or registry directly accessible by the requested FIU or which is already in its possession, the requested FIU shall provide that information no later than 24 hours after the receipt of the request.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 802 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 25 – paragraph 3 – point b a (new)
(ba) an FIU’s operational analysis may affect a politically exposed person (PEP) or a large corporate entity.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 804 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 25 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
A request for the setting up of a joint analysis team may be made by any of the FIUs concerned or by AMLA.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 821 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 6 – introductory part
6. Member States shall ensure that financial supervisors, supervisors of crypto-asset service providers and supervisors in charge of gambling operators have powers additional to those referred to in paragraph 5, including the power to investigate the business premises of the obliged entity without prior announcement where the proper conduct and efficiency of inspection so require, and that they have all the necessary means to carry out such investigation.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 827 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 31 – paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Member States shall ensure that Supervisors, self-regulatory bodies, and authorities overseeing self-regulatory bodies as referred to in Article 38, produce a detailed annual activity report and that a summary of that report is made publicly available. The summary of the report referred to in the first subparagraph shall present: (a) the tasks of the supervisors; (b) an overview of its supervisory activities; (c) the number of on-site and off-site supervisory actions; including patterns identified after inspections; (d) the number of breaches identified on the basis of supervisory actions and sanctions or administrative measures applied by supervisory authorities and self-regulatory bodies pursuant to Section4 of Chapter IV. The annual activity report referred to in the first subparagraph shall be transmitted to the designated authority or mechanism referred to in Article 8(2) and to AMLA. The designated authority shall provide feedback and propose possible improvements, and shall be able to make recommendations to change the allocation of supervisory responsibilities and the arrangements for carrying out supervisory tasks.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 880 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 3 – point b
(b) issue instructions to a self- regulatory body for the purpose of remedying a failure to perform its functions under Article 29(1) or to comply with the requirements of paragraph 5 and 6 of that Article, or to prevent any such failures. When issuing such instructions, the authority shall consider any relevant guidance it provided or that has been provided by AMLA.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 897 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 40 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) Section 1 of Chapter II (internal controls).
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 898 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 40 – paragraph 2
2. Member States shall ensure that in the cases referred to in paragraph 1, the maximum pecuniary sanctions that can be applied amountto legal persons amount to at least EUR 2 000 000 or at least 8 % of the total annual turnover, whichever is higher, and to natural persons at least to twice the amount of the benefit derived from the breach where that benefit can be determined, or at least EUR 12 000 000.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 903 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 40 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
3. Member States shall ensure that, by way of derogation from paragraph 2, where the obliged entity concerned is a credit institution or, financial institution or large corporate entity, the following sanctions can also be applied:
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 905 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 40 – paragraph 3 – point a
(a) in the case of a legal person, maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least EUR 10 000 000 or 105 % of the total global annual turnover according to the latest available accounts approved by the management body, whichever is higher; where the obliged entity is a parent undertaking or a subsidiary of a parent undertaking which is required to prepare consolidated financial accounts in accordance with Article 22 of Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council49 , the relevant total annual turnover shall be the total annual turnover or the corresponding type of income in accordance with the relevant accounting regime according to the last available consolidated accounts approved by the management body of the ultimate parent undertaking; _________________ 49 Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (OJ L 182, 29.6.2013, p. 19).
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 909 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 40 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. In addition to pecuniary sanctions referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3, Member States shall empower competent authorities to impose on legal persons a prohibition or suspension on the right to conclude contracts within the Union in case the breach of the requirements referred to in paragraph 1 are deemed sufficiently serious.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 936 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 43 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Member States shall ensure that the person providing information can use safe channels to communicate the information directly to AMLA instead of national supervisory authorities or self- regulatory bodies, where the person providing information deems this necessary to ensure protection from hostile or legal action or to ensure effective follow-up on the information provided.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 937 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 43 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) specific procedures for the receipt of reports on breaches by both anonymous and non-anonymous individuals and their follow-up;
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 939 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 43 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) appropriate protection for employees or persons in a comparable position,as well as access to legal and financial advice for employees, board members, shareholders, contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, trainees and former workers of obliged entities who report breaches committed within the obliged entity;
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 940 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 43 – paragraph 2 – point b a (new)
(ba) the obligation for supervisors to follow up on reports and keep the whistleblower informed within a reasonable timeframe.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 942 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 43 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
3. Member States shall ensure that individuals, including employees and representatives of the obliged entity referred to in Article 2(b) who report potential or actual breaches of Regulation [please insert reference – proposal for Anti-Money Laundering Regulation - COM/2021/420 final] internally or to the FIU, civil society organisations and organisations acting in the public interest are legally protected from being exposed to threats, retaliatory or hostile action, and in particular from adverse or discriminatory employment actions.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 943 #

2021/0250(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 43 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
Member States shall ensure that individuals who are exposed to threats, hostile actions, or adverse or discriminatory employment actions for reporting potential or actual breaches of Regulation [please insert reference – proposal for Anti-Money Laundering Regulation - COM/2021/420 final] internally or to the FIU are entitled to present a complaint in a safe manner to the respective competent authorities. Without prejudice to the confidentiality of information gathered by the FIU, Member States shall also ensure that such individuals have the right to effective remedy to safeguard their rights under this paragraph and to full reparation of damages through financial compensation and non-financial remedies.
2022/06/27
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 100 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
(17) This Regulation should also apply without prejudice toProcessing of personal data under this Regulation should take place in full compliance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council46 . Further processing of personal data for commercial purposes should be strictly prohibited. The fight against money laundering and terrorist financing is recognised as an important public interest ground by all Member States. In applying this Regulation, the transfer of personal data to a third country must be carried out in accordance with Chapter V of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 . It is important that payment service providers and crypto-asset service providers operating in multiple jurisdictions with branches or subsidiaries located outside the Union should not be prevented from transferring data about suspicious transactions within the same organisation, provided that they apply adequate safeguards. In addition, the crypto-asset service providers of the originator and the beneficiary, the payment service providers of the payer and of the payee and the intermediary payment service providers should have in place appropriate technical and organisational measures to protect personal data against accidental loss, alteration, or unauthorised disclosure or access. __________________ 46 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 104 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20
(20) In order to reflect the special characteristics of national payment and crypto-asset transfer systems, and provided that it is always possible to trace the transfer of funds back to the payer or the transfer of crypto-assets back to the beneficiary , Member States should be able to exempt from the scope of this Regulation certain domestic low-value transfers of funds, including electronic giro payments, or low-value transfers of crypto-assets, used for the purchase of goods or services.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 108 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22
(22) In order not to impair the efficiency of payment systems and crypto-asset transfer services , and in order to balance the risk of driving transactions underground as a result of overly strict identification requirements against the potential terrorist threat posed by small transfers of funds or crypto-assets , the obligation to check whether information on the payer or the payee , or, for transfers of crypto-assets, the originator and the beneficiary, is accurate should, in the case of transfers of funds where verification has not yet taken place, be imposed only in respect of individual transfers of funds or crypto-assets that exceed EUR 1000, unless the transfer appears to be linked to other transfers of funds or transfers of crypto-assets which together would exceed EUR 1000, the funds or crypto-assets have been received or paid out in cash or in anonymous electronic money, or where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting money laundering or terrorist financing.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 119 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27 a (new)
(27a) In the case of a transfer of crypto- assets from or to a distributed ledger address not linked to a crypto-asset service provider, known as an 'unhosted wallet', the crypto-asset service provider or other obliged entity should obtain and retain the required originator and beneficiary information from their customer, whether originator or beneficiary, or, wherever possible and appropriate, from the agent behind the unhosted wallet. The crypto-asset service provider should verify the accuracy of the information with respect to its own customer. In addition, in case of a transfer from or to an unhosted wallet, crypto-asset service providers should also verify the accuracy of information with respect to the external originator or beneficiary behind the unhosted wallet. An exception regarding the obtainment, verification or retention of information with respect to the external agents behind unhosted wallets cannot be provided, as such exception would favour these distributed ledger addresses that are not linked to an obliged entity, undermining the possibilities to detect and report suspicious transactions. However, in order to provide for a period of adjustment, the provisions regarding the obligation to verify information with respect to the agents behind unhosted wallets should come into effect three years after this Regulation enters into force.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 120 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27 b (new)
(27b) The European Banking Authority in cooperation with the European Securities and Markets Authority should provide guidelines for crypto-asset service providers on the obtainment, verification and retention of the required originator or beneficiary information with respect to unhosted wallets taking into account and supporting the development of technological solutions.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 126 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33
(33) As regards transfers of crypto- assets, the crypto-asset service provider of the beneficiary should implement effective procedures to detect whether the information on the originator or the beneficiary is missing or incomplete. These procedures should include, where appropriate, monitoring after or during the transfers, in order to detect whether the required information on the originator or the beneficiary is missing. It should not be required that the information is attached directly to the transfer of crypto-assets itself, as long as it is submitted immediately and securely, and available upon request to appropriate authorities.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 127 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 34
(34) Given the potential threat of money laundering and terrorist financing presented by anonymous transfers, it is appropriate to require payment service providers to request information on the payer and the payee. In line with the risk- based approach developed by FATF, it is appropriate to identify areas of higher and lower risk, with a view to better targeting the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. Accordingly, the crypto-asset service provider of the beneficiary, the payment service provider of the payee and the intermediary payment service provider should have effective risk-based procedures that apply where a transfer of funds lacks the required information on the payer or the payee, or where a transfer of crypto-assets lacks the required information on the originator or the beneficiary, in order to allow them to decide whether to execute, reject or suspend that transfer and to determine the appropriate follow-up action to take. In order to detect the use of anonymising services such as mixers or tumblers, crypto-asset service providers should develop and apply monitoring and tracing procedures.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 135 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 40
(40) As it may not be possible in criminal investigations to identify the data required or the individuals involved in a transaction until many months, or even years, after the original transfer of funds or transfer of crypto-assets , and in order to be able to have access to essential evidence in the context of investigations, it is appropriate to require payment service providers or crypto-asset service providers to keep records of information on the payer and the payee or the originator and the beneficiary for a period of time for the purposes of preventing, detecting and investigating money laundering and terrorist financing. That period should be limited to five years, after which all personal data should be deleted unless national law provides otherwise. If necessary for the purposes of preventing, detecting or investigating money laundering or terrorist financing, after carrying out an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the measure, Member States should be able to allow or require retention of records for a further period of no more than five years, without prejudice to national criminal law on evidence applicable to ongoing criminal investigations and legal proceedings.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 137 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 41
(41) In order to improve compliance with this Regulation, and in accordance with the Commission Communication of 9 December 2010 entitled ‘Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial services sector’, the power to adopt supervisory measures and the sanctioning powers of competent authorities should be enhanced. Member States should ensure that competent authorities have appropriate resources to effectively fulfil their tasks. Administrative sanctions and measures should be provided for and, given the importance of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, Member States should lay down sanctions and measures that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Member States should notify the Commission and the Joint Committee of EBA, EIOPA and ESMA (the ‘ESAs’) thereof.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 146 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. This Regulation shall also apply to transfers of crypto-assets executed by means of kiosks connected to a distributed ledger network known as crypto-asset automated teller machines (“crypto- ATMs”).
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 150 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
However, this Regulation shall apply for any transfer effectuated with a crypto- asset debit card, including to pay for goods or services, and when a payment card, an electronic money instrument or a mobile phone, or any other digital or IT prepaid or postpaid device with similar characteristics, is used in order to effect a person-to-person transfer of funds or crypto-assets .
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 152 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 – point b
(b) they constitute transfers of funds or crypto-assets to a public authority as payment for taxes, fines or other levies within a Member State;
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 158 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 5 – introductory part
5. A Member State may decide not to apply this Regulation to transfers of funds or transfers of crypto-assets within its territory to a payee's payment account or a beneficiary’s account permitting payment exclusively for the provision of goods or services where all of the following conditions are met:
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 161 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 5 – point a
(a) the payment service provider or the crypto-asset service provider of the payee or the beneficiaryf the payee is subject to [please insert reference – proposal for a regulation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and repealing Directive (EU) 2015/849];
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 164 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 5 – point b
(b) the payment service provider of the payee or the crypto-asset service provider of the beneficiary is able to trace back, through the payee, by means of a unique transaction identifier, the transfer of funds or, for transfers of crypto-assets, through the beneficiary, by means allowing to identify individually the transfers of crypto-assets on the distributed ledger, from the person who has an agreement with the payee or the beneficiary for the provision of goods or services;
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 170 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 5 – point c
(c) the amount of the transfer of funds or crypto-assets does not exceed EUR 1000.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 176 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 10
(10) ‘transfer of crypto-assets’ means any transaction at least partially carried out by electronic means on behalf of an originator through a crypto-asset service provider, with a view to making crypto- assets available to a beneficiary through a crypto-asset service providerwith the aim to moving crypto-assets from one distributed ledger address or crypto-asset account to another, carried out or received by at least one crypto-asset service provider acting on behalf of either an originator or a beneficiary, irrespective of whether the originator and the beneficiary are the same person and irrespective of whether the crypto-asset service provider of the originator and that of the beneficiary are one and the same.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 182 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 17 a (new)
(17a) ‘unhosted wallet‘ means a distributed ledger address that is not linked to a crypto-asset services provider;
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 214 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. The crypto-asset service provider or other obliged entity of the originator shall ensure that transfers of crypto-assets are accompanied by the following information on the originator:
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 217 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) the originator’s wallet address, where available, and the crypto-asset account number of the originator, where an account is used to process the transaction;
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 225 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. The crypto-asset service provider or other obliged entity of the originator shall ensure that transfers of crypto-assets are accompanied by the following information on the beneficiary:
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 227 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) the beneficiary’s account number's wallet address, where available, and the crypto-asset account number of the beneficiary, where such an account exists and is used to process the transaction.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 233 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 3
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, point (b), and paragraph 2, point (b), in the case of a transfer not made from or to an account, the crypto-asset service provider of the originator shall ensure that the transfer of crypto-assets can be individually identified and record the originator and beneficiary address identifiers on the distributed ledger.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 236 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 4
4. The information referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 does not have toshall accompany a transfer of funds in a way that allows for the full application of Regulation 2016/679, as appropriate, including rules on rectification of data or deletion of data once retention periods have expired. Where the crypto-asset service provider of the beneficiary is a regulated entity established within the Union, or where the crypto-asset service provider of the beneficiary is established in a third country that is subject to an adequacy decision in accordance with Article 45 of Regulation 2016/679, the information referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be transferred in a secure manner and immediately with the transfer of crypto- assets. In all other cases, the crypto-asset service provider of the originator shall proceed with the execution of the transfer without transmitting the information referred to in paragraph 1 and 2. Such information shall however be retained and made available to competent authorities upon request. The information referred to in paragraph 1, points (a) and (c), and paragraph 2, point (a), shall not be attached directly to, or be included in, the transfer of crypto- assets.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 239 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. In the case of a transfer of crypto- assets to an unhosted wallet, the crypto- asset service provider of the originator or other obliged entity shall obtain and retain the information referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 from its customer or, if possible, in case of the information referred to in paragraph 2, from the beneficiary behind the unhosted wallet and make such information available to competent authorities upon request.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 242 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. In case of a transfer of crypto- assets to an unhosted wallet, the crypto- asset service provider of the originator or other obliged entity shall, in addition to the provisions laid out in paragraph 5, verify the accuracy of the information referred to in paragraph 2 on the basis of documents, data or information obtained from a reliable and independent source, before transferring crypto-assets.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 243 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 6 – point a
(a) the identity of the originator has been verified in accordance with Article 16, 18(3) and 37 of Regulation [please insert reference – proposal for a regulation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and repealing3 of Directive (EU) 2015/849] [ and the information obtained pursuant to that verification has been stored in accordance with Article 5640 of Regulation [please insert reference – proposal for a regulation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and repealing Directive (EU) 2015/849]that Directive or
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 245 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 6 – point b
(b) Article 21(2) and (3) of Regulation [please insert reference – proposal for a regulation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and repealing14(5) of Directive (EU) 2015/849] applies to the originator.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 247 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Verification as referred to in paragraph 5a shall be deemed to have taken place where: (a) the identity of the crypto-assets transfer beneficiary has been verified, as for a customer relationship, in accordance with Article 13 of Directive(EU) 2015/849 and the information obtained pursuant to that verification has been stored in accordance with Article 40 of that Directive; (b) Article 14(5) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 applies to the crypto-assets transfer beneficiary.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 249 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 6 b (new)
6 b. The provisions laid out in paragraph 5a and 6a shall come into effect three years after this Regulation has entered into force. The European Banking Authority in cooperation with the European Securities and Markets Authority shall provide guidelines for crypto-asset service providers on the obtainment, verification and retention of information referred to in paragraph 4a, 5a and 6a for the case of a transfer of crypto-assets to an unhosted wallet.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 253 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1
1. In the case of a batch file transfer from a single originator, Article 14(1) shall not apply to the individual transfers bundled together therein, provided that the batch file contains the information referred to in Article 14(1), (2) and (3), that that information has been verified in accordance with Article 14(5), (5a), (6), (6a) and (6b), and that the individual transfers carry the payment account numberare accompanied by the wallet address, where available and the crypto- asset account number, where an account is used to process the transaction, of the originator or, where Article 14(3) applies the individual identification of the transfer.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 256 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2
2. By way of derogation from Article 14(1), transfers of crypto-assets not exceeding EUR 1 000 that do not appear to be linked to other transfers of crypto- assets which, together with the transfer in question, exceed EUR 1 000, shall be accompanied by at least the following information: (a) the beneficiary; (b) originator and of the beneficiary or, where Article 14(3) applies, the insurance that the crypto-asset transaction can be individually identified; By way of derogation from Article 14(5), the crypto-assets service provider of the originator shall only verify the information on the originator referred to in this paragraph, first subparagraph, points (a) and (b), in the following cases: (a) of the originator has receiveddeleted the names of the originator and of the account number of the the crypto-assets service provider the crypto- assets to be transferred in exchange of cash or anonymous electronic money; (b) of the originator has reasonable grounds for suspecting money laundering or terrorist financing.service provider
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 262 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1
1. The crypto-asset service provider of the beneficiary shall implement effective procedures, including, where appropriate, monitoring after or during the transfers, in order to detect whether the information referred to in Article 14(1) and (2), on the originator or the beneficiary is included in, or follows,submitted with the transfer of crypto-assets or batch file transfer.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 263 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. In the case of a transfer of crypto- assets from an unhosted wallet, the crypto-asset service provider or other obliged entity of the beneficiary shall obtain and retain the information referred to in Article 14 paragraphs (1) and (2) from its customer or, if possible, in case of the information referred to in Article 14 paragraph (1), from the originator behind the unhosted wallet and make such information available to competent authorities upon request.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 267 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 2
2. In the case of transfers of crypto- assets exceeding EUR 1 000, whether those transfers are carried out in a single transaction or in several transactions which appear to be linked, bBefore making the crypto-assets available to the beneficiary, the crypto- asset service provider of the beneficiary shall verify the accuracy of the information on the beneficiary referred to in paragraph 1 on the basis of documents, data or information obtained from a reliable and independent source, without prejudice to the requirements laid down in Articles 83 and 84 of Directive (EU) 2015/2366.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 271 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. In case of a transfer of crypto- assets from an unhosted wallet, the crypto-asset service provider or other obliged entity of the beneficiary shall, in addition to the provisions laid out in paragraph 2, verify the accuracy of the information on the originator referred to in Article 14 paragraph 1 on the basis of documents, data or information obtained from a reliable and independent source, before making the crypto-assets available to the beneficiary, without prejudice to the requirements laid down in Articles 83 and 84 of Directive (EU) 2015/2366.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 274 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 3
3. In the case of transfers of crypto- assets not exceeding EUR 1 000 that do not appear to be linked to other transfers of crypto-asset which, together with the transfer in question, exceed EUR 1 000, the crypto-asset service provider of the beneficiary shall only verify the accuracy of the information on the beneficiary in the following cases: (a) provider of the beneficiary effects the pay- out of the crypto-assets in cash or anonymous electronic money; (b) provider of the beneficiary has reasonable grounds for suspecting money laundering or terrorist financing.deleted where the crypto-asset service where the crypto-asset service
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 279 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 4 – introductory part
4. Verification as referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be deemed to have taken place where one of the following applies:
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 280 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 4 – point a
(a) the identity of the crypto-assets transfer beneficiary has been verified in accordance with [replace with right reference in AMLR to replace Articles 16, 18(3) and 37 of Regulation [please insert reference – proposal for a regulation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and repealing3 of Directive (EU) 2015/849] and the information obtained pursuant to that verification has been stored in accordance with Article 56 of Regulation [please insert reference – proposal for a regulation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and repealing Directive (EU) 2015/849]40 of that Directive;
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 282 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 4 – point b
(b) Article 21(2) and (3) of Regulation [please insert reference – proposal for a regulation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and repealing14(5) of Directive (EU) 2015/849] applies to the crypto-assets transfer beneficiary.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 284 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Verification as referred to in paragraph 2a shall be deemed to have taken place where: (a) the identity of the originator has been verified, as for a customer relationship, in accordance with Article 13 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 and the information obtained pursuant to that verification has been stored in accordance with Article 40 of that Directive, or (b) Article 14(5)of Directive (EU) 2015/849 applies to the originator.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 286 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 4 b (new)
4 b. The provisions laid out in paragraph 2a and 4a shall come into effect three years after this Regulation has entered into force. The European Banking Authority in cooperation with the European Securities and Markets Authority shall provide guidelines for crypto-asset service providers on the obtainment, verification and retention of information referred to in paragraph 1a, 2a and 4a for the case of a transfer of crypto-assets from an unhosted wallet.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 291 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Where the crypto-asset service provider of the beneficiary becomes aware, when receiving transfers of crypto-assets, that the information referred to in Article 14(1) or (2) or Article 15 is missing or incomplete, the crypto-asset service provider shall reject the transfer or ask for the required information on the originator and the beneficiary before or after making the crypto- assets available to the beneficiary, on a risk-sensitive basis.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 294 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Where a crypto-asset service provider repeatedly fails to provide the required information on the originator or the beneficiary, the crypto- asset service provider of the beneficiary shall take steps, which may initially include the issuing of warnings and setting of deadlines, and return the transferred crypto-assets to the originator’s account or address. Alternatively, the crypto-asset service provider of the beneficiary may hold the transferred crypto-assets without making them available to the beneficiary, pending review by the competent authority responsible for monitoring compliance with anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing provisions.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 297 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Where a crypto-asset service provider repeatedly or systematically fails to provide the required information pursuant to Articles 14 and 16, it shall no longer be authorized to operate in the EU and, in case of a third country, shall not make or receive any transfers to or from EU registered service providers.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 299 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 a (new)
Article 18 a Joint obligations on crypto-asset service providers 1. Crypto-asset service providers shall develop and apply monitoring and tracing procedures for the specific purpose only to detect any possible illicit origin of a transfer or the use of tumblers, mixers or other methods of concealing the origin of transfers. Any such suspicious or illicit activity uncovered by the monitoring procedures shall be reported to the FIU immediately and, if possible, the transferred crypto-assets shall be held back by the crypto-asset service provider without making them available to the beneficiary, pending review by the competent authority responsible for monitoring compliance with anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing provisions. 2. Crypto-asset service providers or other obliged entities shall apply enhanced customer due diligence measures in case of a transfer of crypto-assets from or to a crypto-asset provider identified by the European Banking Authority as a crypto- asset provider subject to enhanced due diligence measures. 3. Crypto-asset service providers or other obliged entities shall not facilitate any transfer of crypto-assets from or to a crypto-asset service provider identified by the European Banking Authority as subject to a prohibition of crypto-asset transfers. 4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the European Banking Authority shall set up non-exhaustive public registers of crypto-asset providers within or outside of the European union of: (a) crypto-asset service providers subject to enhanced due diligence measures; (b) crypto-asset service providers subject to a prohibition of crypto-asset transfers. 5. In order to identify crypto-asset service providers to be included in the registers referred to in paragraph 4 (a) and (b), the European Banking Authority shall conduct a risk assessment taking into account: (a) whether the crypto-asset service provider is registered or has a contact point in any recognised jurisdiction, or is registered or domiciled in a country included in the top tier of the financial secrecy index or the corporate tax havens index of the tax justice network, the EU AML/CFT list of high risk third country or in a sanctioned jurisdiction, or in the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes; (b) whether the crypto-asset service provider frequently facilitates transfers from or to unhosted wallets with or without conducting any form of identification and verification of the agents behind the unhosted wallets; (c) whether the crypto-asset service provider conducts any form of customer due diligence measures and whether these are conducted to an appropriate extent; (d) whether the crypto-asset service provider offers mixing or tumbling services, privacy wallets, or other anonymising services for transfers of crypto-assets; (e) whether the crypto-asset service provider offers services of transfers of crypto-assets in the Union without the required authorisation under Regulation [Regulation on Markets in Crypto-assets]; (f) whether the crypto-asset service provider has proven links to illegal activities; (g) whether the crypto-asset service provider appears to have been involved in suspicious activities based on monitoring procedures applied by other obliged entities in accordance with paragraph 1. 6. For the purpose of applying enhanced due diligence measures referred to in paragraph 2, obliged entities shall increase the degree and nature of the application of monitoring and tracing procedures for transfers of crypto-assets referred to in paragraph 1, in order to determine whether the transaction appears suspicious. 7. The European Banking Authority in cooperation with the European Securities and Markets Authority shall develop guidelines for the obligations established in this Article.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 311 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Where, on [the date of application of this Regulation], legal proceedings concerned with the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of suspected money laundering or terrorist financing are pending in a Member State, and an obliged entity holds information or documents relating to those pending proceedings, the obliged entity may retain that information or those documents, in accordance with national law, for a period of 5 years after the end of a business relationship from [the date of application of this Regulation]. Member States may, without prejudice to national criminal law on evidence applicable to ongoing criminal investigations and legal proceedings, allow or require the retention of such information or documents for a further period of 5 years after the end of a business relationship where the necessity and proportionality of such further retention have been established for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of suspected money laundering or terrorist financing.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 316 #

2021/0241(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 4
4. In accordance with Article 39 of [please insert reference – proposal for a directive on the mechanisms to be put in place by the Member States for the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and repealing Directive (EU) 2015/849], competent authorities shall have appropriate resources and all the supervisory and investigatory powers that are necessary for the exercise of their functions. In the exercise of their powers to impose administrative sanctions and measures, competent authorities shall cooperate closely to ensure that those administrative sanctions or measures produce the desired results and coordinate their action when dealing with cross-border cases.
2022/03/03
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 247 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17 a (new)
(17a) As part of the process of directly supervising selected obliged entities, the Authority’s aim should be to improve the ability of obliged entities and of supervisors to better understand, manage and mitigate the risks identified. The assessment process could take into consideration different types of risks, with the understanding that some of them might be inherent in, or related to, the types of products, services or the geographical location of customers. To that end, the aim should not necessarily be a reduction of all types of risk, which could lead to de-risking and other severe unintended consequences such as financial exclusion and discriminatory policies. Instead, the Authority should ensure that obliged entities and supervisors understand how to manage AML/CFT risks proportionately, in accordance with the level of services offered under Directive 2014/92/EU, in particular Articles 15 and 16(2) thereof.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 281 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 40
(40) For the purposes of voting and taking decisions, each Member State should have one voting representative. Therefore, the heads of public authorities should appoint a permanent representative as the voting member of the General Board in supervisory composition. Alternatively, depending on the subject-matter of the decision or agenda of a given General board meeting, public authorities of a Member State may decide on an ad-hoc representative. In their appointments to the General Board, they should take into account the principles of gender balance, in particular with regard to the composition of the Board as a body. The practical arrangements related to decision- making and voting by the General Board members in supervisory composition should be laid down in the Rules of Procedure of the General Board, to be developed by the Authority.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 317 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 3 – point b
(b) contributing to identify and assess risks of money laundering, especially of the broader and more complex schemes of money laundering associated with criminal organisation, and terrorist financing across the internal market, as well as risks and threats originating from outside the Union that are impacting, or have the potential to impact the internal market;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 319 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1
(1) ‘selected obliged entity’ means a credit institution, a financial institution, or a group of credit or financial institutions at the highest level of consolidation in the Union, or a crypto-asset service provider or a legal entity buying and selling real property, which is under direct supervision by the Authority pursuant to Article 13;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 325 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2
(2) ‘non-selected obliged entity’ means a credit institution, a financial institution, or a group of credit institutions or financial institutions at the highest level of consolidation in the Union, or a crypto- asset service provider or a legal entity buying and selling real property, other than a selected obliged entity;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 339 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 5 a (new)
(5a) ‘criminal organisation’ means a criminal organisation as defined in Article 1, point (1), of Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA1a. _________________ 1a Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime (OJ L 300, 11.11.2008, p. 42).
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 340 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 5 b (new)
(5b) 'significant digital presence' means the presence of an undertaking established in a jurisdiction through the provision of digital services by means of a digital interface, independently of whether the undertaking has a physical presence in that jurisdiction, that meets at least one of the following conditions: (a) the total annual revenue obtained from the provision of such digital services to users located in that jurisdiction exceeds EUR 7 000 000 in two consecutive calendar years; (b) the number of users of such digital services located in that jurisdiction exceeds 100 000 in two consecutive calendar years; (c) the number of commercial contracts concluded by users located in that jurisdiction for the provision of any such digital service exceeds 3 000 in two consecutive calendar years.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 341 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 5 c (new)
(5c) 'high net worth individual’ means a natural person who holds at least EUR 2 million, or the equivalent in national currency, in liquid financial assets;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 342 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 5 d (new)
(5d) 'large undertaking' is an undertaking as provided for in Article 3(4) of Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 352 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) monitor developments across the internal market and assess threats, vulnerabilities and risks in relation to ML/TF, with a special focus on the broader and more complex schemes of ML associated with criminal organisation;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 368 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point f
(f) monitor and support the implementation of asset freezes under the Union restrictive measures across the internal market and publish data sets on asset freezes and confiscations;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 373 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point h a (new)
(ha) establish a central contact point and secure channels to receive reports on suspicious transactions concerning politically exposed persons in accordance with Article 6a.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 376 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point a a (new)
(aa) ensure the proportionate application of customer due diligence in accordance with Articles 15 and 16 of [please insert reference – proposal for a Regulation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing – COM/2021/420 final], in accordance with the level of services offered under Directive 2014/92/EU, in particular with Articles 15 and 16(2).
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 437 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 a (new)
Article 6a Receipt of reports on suspicious transactions concerning politically exposed persons 1. The Authority shall establish secure and efficient channels to directly receive reports on suspicious transactions concerning politically exposed persons (PEP) where employees or directors of the reporting obliged entities deem it necessary to report to the Authority instead of the national FIU in order to ensure protection against hostile or legal action at national level or to ensure effective follow-up in respect of the information provided. Such channels shall ensure that the identity of persons providing the information is known only to the Authority. 2. The Authority shall assess the significance of a report received in accordance with paragraph 1 in a timely and risk-based manner. If the report is deemed to be significant, the Authority shall disseminate it to the respective national FIU, and monitor the FIU's follow-up in respect of the report, or request a joint analysis in accordance with Article 33(1a) in order to ensure an objective analysis of the case, independently of political developments in the Member State concerned. 3. The Authority shall share information on the identity of the person reporting the information to a FIU only in cases where that person consents. Otherwise, the Authority shall act as an intermediary between the person reporting information and national FIUs.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 451 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) approaches to supervisory review of obliged entities’ internal policies and procedures of obliged entities, including customer due diligence policies and their application in accordance with Articles 15 and Article 16(2) of Directive 2014/92/EU;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 457 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 3
3. The methodology shall reflect high supervisory standards at Union level and shall build on relevant international standards and guidance. The Authority shall periodically review and update its supervisory methodology, taking into account the evolution of risks affecting the internal market and prioritising, with respect to ML risks, the risks arising from broader and more complex schemes of ML associated with criminal organisation.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 480 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. The Authority shall publish the information collected pursuant paragraph 2, points (a), (b), (g) and (h). A summary of non-confidential findings regarding the information collected pursuant paragraph 2, points (c) to (f) shall be made available to obliged entities and to the public.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 489 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. The Authority shall collect information from competent authorities relating to weaknesses identified during ongoing supervision and authorisation procedures in the processes and procedures, governance arrangements, business models and activities of financial sector operators and obliged entities from the non-financial sector in relation to preventing and countering money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as measures taken by competent authorities in response to the identified material weaknesses with regard to the prevention and countering the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering or of terrorist financing;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 514 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. For the purposes of carrying out the tasks listed in Article 5(2), the Authority shall carry out a periodic assessment of the following obliged entities, based on criteria and following the process specified in paragraphs 2 to 6 of this Article and in Article 13:, of credit institutions, financial institutions, crypto- asset service providers and legal entities buying and selling real property that are established in at least four Member States, including the Member State of establishment, the Member States where they operate through subsidiaries or branches and the Member States where they have a significant digital presence.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 520 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) credit institutions that are established in at least seven Member States, including the Member State of establishment and the Member States where they are operating via subsidiaries or branches;deleted
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 530 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) other financial institutions that operate in at least ten Member States, including the Member State of establishment, another Member State where they are operating via a subsidiary or a branch, and all other Member States where they are operating by means of direct provision of services or via a network of representative agents.deleted
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 539 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2
2. The inherent risk profile of the assessed obliged entities referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) or (b) shall be classified as low, medium, substantial or high in each jurisdiction they operate in, based on the benchmarks and following the methodology set out in the regulatory technical standard referred to in paragraph 5.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 550 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – point j a (new)
(ja) crypto-asset service providers;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 553 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – point j b (new)
(jb) legal entities buying and selling real property.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 559 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 4 – introductory part
4. For each category of obliged entities referred to in paragraph 43, the benchmarks in the assessment methodology shall be based on the risk factor categories related to customer, products, services, transactions, delivery channels and geographical areas. The benchmarks shall be established for at least the following indicators of inherent risk in any Member State they operate in:
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 561 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 4 – point a
(a) with respect to customer-related risk: (i) the share of non-resident customers, that qualify as high net worth individuals; (ii) the presence and share of customers identified as Politically Exposed persons (‘PEPs’); (iii) the presence and share of customers located in offshore jurisdictions; (iv) the presence and share of customers located in jurisdictions listed in the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes; (v) the presence and share of customers located in jurisdictions identified and designated as referred to in Chapter III Section 2 of [please insert reference – proposal for a Regulation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing – COM/2021/420 final];
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 588 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 5 – introductory part
5. The Authority shall develop draft regulatory technical standards setting out the methodology with the benchmarks referred to in paragraph 4 for classifying the inherent risk profile of any cross- border credit or financial institutionthe obliged entities that have been assessed in accordance with paragraph 1 in each Member State it operates in as low, medium, substantial or high.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 589 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. The concept of offshore jurisdiction referred to in paragraph 4(a) shall be defined by the Authority on the basis of the following criteria: (a) no effective tax on the relevant income; (b) lack of automatic exchange of information; (c) lack of effective bank oversight and judicial cooperation; (d) lack of transparency; (e) lack of substantial activities. A detailed explanation of the definition developed and applied by the Authority shall be made public. The Authority shall periodically review the appropriateness of its definition and take into account the opinion of other Union bodies, offices and agencies involved in the AML/CFT framework and civil society organisations having competence in the field of preventing money laundering and combating terrorist financing, as well as relevant evaluations, assessments, reports or public statements drawn up by them.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 721 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 1
1. The Authority shall perform periodic assessments of some or all of the activities of one, several, or all financial supervisors, including the assessment of their tools and resources to ensure high level supervisory standards and practices. . As part of each assessment, the Authority shall assess the extent to which a financial supervisor monitors effectively, and takes the necessary steps to ensure, compliance by the obliged entities it supervises with applicable Union law. The assessments shall include a review of the application of the AML/CFT supervisory methodology developed pursuant to Article 8 and shall cover all financial supervisors in a single assessment cycle. The length of each assessment cycle shall be determined by the Authority and shall not exceed seven years. At the end of each assessment cycle, the Authority shall present its findings to the European Parliament and the Council.
2022/06/29
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 737 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 4
4. Financial supervisors shall make every effort to comply with the specific follow-up measures addressed to them as a result of the assessment. Financial supervisors shall provide regular updates to the Authority on the type of measures they have implemented in response to the report. Supervisors shall document the steps taken in order to comply with the follow-up measures addressed to them. Each consecutive assessment shall reflect on the compliance of previously addressed follow-up measures. At the end of each assessment cycle the Authority shall present its findings to the European Parliament and the Council.
2022/06/29
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 806 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 3 – point d a (new)
(da) where relevant, the effectiveness of the tasks performed by the authority overseeing self-regulatory bodies as laid down in Article 38 of [please insert reference –proposal for 6th Anti-Money Laundering Directive - COM/2021/423 final]
2022/06/29
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 839 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the Authority shall be empowered to initiate a request for a joint analysis without the prior request of a national FIU in cases where Article 6a(2) applies. The Authority shall request the participation of the FIU of the Member State from which the suspicious transaction report referred to in Article 6a(1) originated and invite at least one other FIU of a different Member State to take part in the joint analysis, which is deemed suitable for the purpose of ensuring an objective analysis in accordance with Article 6a(2). To that end, the Authority shall use secure channels of communication. The FIUs in all the relevant Member States shall consider taking part in the joint analysis. The Authority shall ensure that the joint analysis is launched within 20 days of the initial notification.
2022/06/29
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 872 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 a (new)
Article 37a Peer reviews of FIUs 1. The Authority shall coordinate the organisation of periodical peer reviews of FIUs for the purposes of assessing whether the requirements set out in Article 17 of Directive [please insert reference proposal for 6th Anti-Money Laundering Directive - COM/2021/423final] have been fulfilled. When carrying out those periodical peer reviews, special attention shall be given to the performance of FIUs in the treatment of cases affecting, or potentially affecting, politically exposed persons (PEPs) or large undertakings. 2. Where a peer review indicates substantial shortcomings in the operation of a FIU, the Authority shall issue recommendations for improvement to that FIU. If the Authority considers that the shortcomings are caused by conditions external to the capacities of that FIU, the Authority shall report to and issue a recommendation to the Commission and the Member State concerned.
2022/06/29
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 895 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 45 – paragraph 1 – point 4 a (new)
(4a) a Civil Society Advisory Body, which shall exercise the tasks set out in Article -59a
2022/06/29
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 900 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 46 – paragraph 2 – point c a (new)
(ca) one representative of the Civil Society Advisory body, without the right to vote;
2022/06/29
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 907 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 46 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
The heads of the supervisory authorities referred to in the first subparagraph, point (b) in each Member State shall share a single vote and shall agree on a single common representative for each meeting and voting procedure. When agreeing on their representative to the General Board, they shall take into account the principle of gender balance. That common representative shall be the ad-hoc voting member for the purposes of that meeting or voting procedure. The public authorities in a Member State may also agree on a single permanent common representative who shall be a permanent voting member. Where items to be discussed by the General Board in supervisory composition concern the competence of several public authorities, the ad-hoc or permanent voting member may be accompanied by a representative from up to two other public authorities, who shall be non-voting.
2022/06/29
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 952 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 56 – paragraph 1
1. The Chair of the Authority shall be selected on the basis of merit, skills, knowledge, recognised standing and experience in the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and other relevant qualification, following an open selection procedure which shall respect the principle of gender balance and which shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The Commission shall draw up a shortlist of two qualified candidates for the position of the Chair of the Authority. The Council, after approval by the European Parliament, shall adopt an implementing decision to appoint the Chair of the Authority.
2022/06/29
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 967 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 58 – paragraph 4
4. The Executive Director shall be selected on the grounds of merit and documented high-level administrative, budgetary and management skills, following an open selection procedure, which shall respect the principle of gender balance, and which shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union, and, as appropriate, other press or internet sites. The Commission shall draw up a shortlist of two qualified candidates for the position of the Executive Director. The Executive Board shall appoint the Executive Director.
2022/06/29
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 969 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 58 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
The Executive Director may be removed from office by the Executive Board on proposal by the European Parliament or by the Commission.
2022/06/29
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 974 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 59 a (new)
Article 59a Civil Society Advisory Body 1. The Authority shall establish a Civil Society Advisory Body for the purpose of advising it when exercising its powers listed in Article 38, 42 and 43. 2. The General Board shall determine the composition of the Civil Society Advisory Body upon the recommendation of the Commission and after consultation of the European Parliament. 3. The Civil Society Advisory Body shall be consulted, whenever the Authority or the Commission is required to conduct public consultations in particular with regard to the adoption of regulatory technical standards under Article 38(1)and (3), implementing technical standards under Article 42(1) and (3) and guidelines and recommendations under Article 43(2), unless such consultation is disproportionate in relation to the particular urgency of the matter. If such consultation is not conducted, the Authority or the Commission respectively shall clearly justify such decision. 4. When carrying out the tasks conferred upon them by this Regulation, the members of the Civil Society Advisory Body shall act independently and objectively in the sole interest of the Union as a whole and shall neither seek nor take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices nor agencies from any government or any other public or private body. 5. The Civil Society Advisory body shall be provided with sufficient resources and expertise to assess the exercise of the powers of the Authority under this Regulation. 6. The General Board shall lay down the practical arrangements for the prevention and the management of conflict of interest of the members of the Civil Society Advisory Body.
2022/06/29
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 1006 #

2021/0240(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 72 – paragraph 4
4. The Authority shall reply orally or in writing to questions put to it by the European Parliament as soon as possible and in any case at the latest within five weeks of their notification to the Authority.
2022/06/29
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 191 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 49 a (new)
(49a) With the aim of developing an open, transparent and neutral methodology for identifying third countries with significant strategic deficiencies in their national AML/CFT, third countries with compliance weaknesses in their national AML/CFT regime, and third countries which pose a specific and serious threat to the financial system of the Union, the Commission should set up an independent advisory board consisting of a range of external experts from both within and outside the Union. Those experts should include experts from independent civil society organisations, Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, academia, OLAF, national law enforcement authorities, the banking sector, the European Banking Authority, AMLA and representatives from FIUs. For the purposes of establishing this new methodology, the independent advisory board should develop a new set of ML/TF risk indicators. The independent advisory board should use those ML/TF risk indicators to empirically assess, against observed evidence of money laundering, whether a third country has significant strategic deficiencies in its national AML/CFT regime, has compliance weaknesses in its national AML/CFT regime or poses a specific and serious threat to the financial system of the Union. Such assessments should be transparent and replicable. The independent advisory board should carry out such assessments on the basis of independent, neutral and non-biased research by international institutions specialising in anti-money laundering, Union institutions and bodies and non- governmental organisations whose sponsoring is transparent and who do not depend diplomatically on those they evaluate.
2022/07/04
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 253 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the measures to be applied by obliged entities to prevent and uncover money laundering and terrorist financing;
2022/07/04
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 254 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) measures to limit and uncover the misuse of bearer instruments.;
2022/07/04
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 256 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
(ca) the prohibition of citizenship and residence by investment schemes.
2022/07/04
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 257 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1
(1) ‘money laundering’ means the conduct as set out in Article 3, paragraphs 1(1), (2), (3), point (c), and 5 of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 including aiding and abetting, inciting and attempting to commit that conduct, whether the activities which generated the property to be laundered were carried out on the territory of a Member State or on that of a third country. Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of that conduct may be inferred from objective factual circumstances;
2022/07/04
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 271 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 14 a (new)
(14a) ‘high-selling professional football club’ means a legal entity established in a Member State which owns or manages a professional football club with a net turnover of EUR 200 million, or the equivalent in national currency, in a given financial year;
2022/07/04
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 272 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 14 b (new)
(14b) ‘sports agent in the football sector’ means a natural person who provides private job placements in the football sector for prospective paid football players or for employers with a view to signing employment contracts for paid football players;
2022/07/04
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 284 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 22
(22) ‘beneficial owner’ means any natural person who ultimately owns or controls, controls or benefits from a legal entity or express trust or similar legal arrangement, as well as any natural person on whose behalf or for the benefit of whom a transaction or activity is being conducted;
2022/07/04
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 303 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 25 a (new)
(25a) ‘high-net-worth individual’ means a natural person who owns at least EUR 2 million, or the equivalent in national currency, in liquid financial assets;
2022/07/04
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 305 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 26 – point c
(c) the parents and the siblings;
2022/07/04
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 332 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point b – point i
(i) buying and selling of real property or business entities, including the acquisition of shares of a company the business operations of which are essentially limited to the management of one or more properties;
2022/07/04
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 364 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point l
(l) investment migration operators permitted to represent or offer intermediation services to third country nationals seeking to obtain the citizenship of or residence rights in a Member State in exchange of any kind of investment, including capital transfers, purchase or renting of property, investment in government bonds, investment in corporate entities, donation or endowment of an activity to the public good and contributions to the state budget.
2022/07/04
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 366 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point l a (new)
(la) sports agents in the football sector;
2022/07/04
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 368 #

2021/0239(COD)

(lb) high-level professional football clubs;
2022/07/04
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 369 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point l c (new)
(lc) football associations in Member States which are members of the Union of European Football Associations.
2022/07/04
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 372 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1
1. With the exception of casinos, online gambling services and any gambling services offered on a cross- border basis, Member States may decide to exempt, in full or in part, providers of gambling services from the requirements set out in this Regulation on the basis of the proven low risk posed by the nature and, where appropriate, the scale of operations of such services.
2022/07/04
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 377 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 3
3. Member States, in cooperation with AMLA, shall establish risk- based monitoring activities or take other adequate measures to ensure that the exemptions granted pursuant to this Article are not abused.
2022/07/04
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 392 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 a (new)
Article 6a Prohibition of citizenship and residence by investment schemes Member States shall not grant citizenship or residence rights in exchange for any kind of investment, such as capital transfers, the purchase or renting of property, investments in government bonds, investments in corporate entities, the donation or endowment of an activity contributing to the public good or contributions to the state budget.
2022/07/04
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 413 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
(ca) the conclusions drawn from past infringements of this Regulation by the obliged entity in question or any connection of the obliged entity in question with a case of money laundering or terrorist financing.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 419 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9
[...]deleted
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 440 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 a (new)
Article 9a Compliance manager and compliance officer 1. In order to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, obliged entities shall have in place effective risk management arrangements that are appropriate to the nature and scale of their business. They shall appoint as compliance manager one executive member of their board of directors or, where there is no board, of their equivalent governing body. Compliance managers shall be responsible for ensuring compliance with this Regulation. To that end, each compliance manager shall appoint a qualified compliance officer, with the agreement of the other members of the board of directors or, where there is no board, of the equivalent governing body for a minimum period of two years. Compliance managers shall give the supervisory authority advance notice of the appointment of compliance officers. A compliance manager shall, at the request of the supervisory authority, revoke the appointment of a compliance officer where the person appointed as compliance officer does not have the necessary qualifications. 2. Obliged entities shall ensure that compliance officers are provided with adequate resources, including staff and technology, proportionate to the size of the obliged entity in question, the nature of its business relationships and transactions and the risks involved. Obliged entities shall ensure that compliance officers have the necessary powers to carry out the duties set out in paragraph 2 and have access to all information, data, records and systems that might be of relevance in connection with the performance of their duties. 3. The compliance officer shall be responsible for ensuring that the daily operations of the obliged entity concerned comply with this Regulation. To that end, the compliance officer shall develop and implement appropriate and effective policies, controls and procedures. In the case of parent undertakings, the compliance officer shall develop and implement group-wide policies, controls and procedures. The compliance officer shall be the contact point for law enforcement authorities, security authorities and supervisory authorities with regard to compliance with this Regulation. The compliance officer shall be responsible for reporting suspicious transactions in accordance with Article 50(6). In carrying out the duties set out in this paragraph, the compliance officer shall not be subject to the senior management’s right to issue instructions. 4. Compliance officers shall not be penalised in anyway, in connection with their employment, as a result of carrying out their duties. Compliance officers shall not be dismissed or given notice prior to the end of their term of appointment unless facts emerge that make it unreasonable for the obliged entity concerned to retain the person. Compliance officers may be given notice within one year of the end of their term of appointment where there is just cause. 5. Compliance managers shall notify the supervisory authority of the dismissal of compliance officers. Such notifications shall state the reasons for the dismissal. Within one year of the end of terms of appointment, compliance managers shall notify the supervisory authority of the fact that they have given notice to compliance officers. Such notifications shall state the reasons for giving notice. 6. Once a year or, where appropriate, more frequently, compliance officers shall submit a report to the board of directors of the obliged entity concerned or, if there is no board, its equivalent governing body on the implementation of the obliged entity’s internal policies, controls and procedures. Compliance officers shall keep the board of directors of the obliged entity concerned or, if there is no board, its equivalent governing body informed of the outcome of any reviews. The governing body shall take the necessary actions to remedy any deficiencies identified in a timely manner. 7. Where necessary in view of an obliged entity’s size and business structure, an obliged entity may appoint a well qualified external third party as compliance officer in order to ensure that the effort involved in carrying out the compliance officer's duties is commensurate with the quality of the work. Paragraphs 2 to 5 shall apply mutatis mutandis to that third party. 8. Where the obliged entity is a natural person or a legal person whose activities are performed by one natural person only, that natural person may perform the tasks under this Article.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 443 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Obliged entities shall have in place adequate procedures to ensure that responsibility for a business relationship changes from one employee to another at appropriate intervals. Where the size of the obliged entity or the need for special qualifications does not allow for the establishment of such a procedure, the compliance officer shall carry out, in a risk-based manner, a special examination of the affected business relationships at appropriate intervals.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 449 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
Obliged entities shall take measures to ensure that employees, managers or agent, agents, shareholders, contractors, subcontractors, suppliers and trainees who report breaches pursuant to the first subparagraph are legally protected against retaliation, discrimination andin accordance with Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council1a from being exposed to threats, retaliatory or hostile action and, in particular, adverse or discriminatory employment actions. _________________ 1a Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament anyd of ther unfair treatment. Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 17).
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 468 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 3
3. Providers of gambling services shall apply customer due diligence upon the collection of winnings, the wagering of a stake, or both, when carrying out transactions amounting to at least EUR 2 000 or the equivalent in national currency, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in linked transactions or, in the case of online gambling services, transactions amounting to at least EUR 500 or the equivalent in national currency, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in linked transactions. Providers of online gambling services shall apply customer due diligence measures each time a customer opens a gambling account with that provider.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 476 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Member States shall ensure that the application of customer due diligence under this Article complies with Article 15 and Article 16(2) of Directive 2014/92/EU.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 483 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
(ba) identify any possible nominee shareholder or nominee director of a corporate or other legal entity, where appropriate;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 488 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Obliged entities shall ensure that the customer due diligence measures under this Article apply proportionately, in accordance with the level of services offered under Directive 2014/92/EU.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 492 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 3
3. By [2 years after the date of application of this Regulation], AMLA, after consulting with Europol, shall issue guidelines on the risk variables and risk factors to be taken into account by obliged entities when entering into business relationships or carrying out occasional transactions.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 495 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Member States shall ensure that the requirements for obliged entities under this Article comply with Article 15 and Article 16(2) of Directive 2014/92/EU.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 499 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Where an obliged entity is unable to comply with the customer due diligence measures laid down in Article 16(1), it shall refrain from carrying out a transaction or establishing a business relationship, and shall terminate the business relationship and consider filingfile a suspicious transaction report to the FIU in relation to the customer in accordance with Article 50.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 512 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Where, after having exhausted all possible means of identification pursuant to the first subparagraph, no natural person is identified as beneficial owner, or where there is any doubt that the person(s) identified is/are the beneficial owner(s), obliged entities shall identify the natural person(s) holding the position(s) of senior managing official(s) in the corporate or other legal entity and shall verify their identity. Obliged entities shall also identify the 10 natural persons holding the majority of shares or voting rights or, where the size of the entity in question does not allow for the identification of 10 natural persons, they shall identify all natural persons holding shares or voting rights, and shall verify their identity. Obliged entities shall keep records of the actions taken as well as of the difficulties encountered during the identification process, which led to and shall file a suspicious transaction resporting to the identification of a senior managing officialFIU in accordance with Article 50.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 573 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 a (new)
Article 22a Special provisions regarding online gambling 1. Providers of gambling services, to the extent that they provide a service which involves wagering a stake with monetary value in games of chance, including those with an element of skill such as lotteries, casino games, poker games and betting transactions that are provided by any means at a distance, by electronic means or any other technology for facilitating communication, shall be subject to this Article. 2. A provider of gambling services may only admit a person as a player to a service as referred to in paragraph 1 provided that it has set up a gambling account for the player in that player's name. 3. Providers of gambling services shall not accept any deposits or other refundable monies from players in gambling accounts that are not used for the immediate purpose of gambling. The balance in a gambling account shall not bear any interest. 4. Providers of gambling services shall ensure that transactions from players to gambling accounts are made only from payment accounts as defined in Article 4, point (12), of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 which were set up in the name of the player concerned with an obliged entity under Article 1, point (1)(a) and (d), of that Directive. Providers of gambling services shall ensure that payment transactions are only executed by means of the following payment services within the meaning of Article 4, point (3), of Directive (EU) 2015/2366: (a) a direct debit; (b) a payment transaction through a payment card or similar device; or (c) a credit transfer. 5. A provider of gambling services shall refund a player only by executing a payment transaction within the meaning of Article 4, point (5), of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 to a payment account set up in the name of that player with a payment service provider as referred to in Article 1, point (1)(a) and (d), of that Directive. A provider of gambling services shall specify the payment reference in the payment transaction in such a manner that the reason for the payment transaction is transparent to the payment service provider or an outside observer. The competent authorities may designate standard wording to be used by providers of gambling services for the purposes of the payment reference. 6. By way of derogation from Article 19, point (1), the provider of gambling services may carry out a provisional identification of a player for whom it sets up a gambling account. The provisional identification may be based on an electronic copy or copy sent by post of a document where there is little risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. Where a provider of gambling services carries out a provisional identification of a player, it shall carry out a full verification of the identity of the player and of the beneficial owner as soon as possible after setting up the gambling account.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 574 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article -23 (new)
Article -23 Independent advisory board 1. The Commission shall set up an independent advisory board consisting of a range of external experts from both within and outside the Union. Those experts shall include experts from independent civil society organisations, Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, academia, OLAF, national law enforcement authorities, the banking sector, the European Banking Authority and AMLA and representatives from FIUs. The independent advisory board shall advise the Commission in relation to: (a) identifying third countries with significant strategic deficiencies in their national AML/CFT regimes; (b) identifying third countries with compliance weaknesses in their national AML/CFT regimes; (c) third countries which pose a specific and serious threat to the financial system of the Union; and (e) assessing whether third countries comply with their national AML/CFT regime. 2. For the purposes of the second subparagraph of paragraph 1, the independent advisory board shall develop a set of ML/TF risk indicators. The independent advisory board shall use those ML/TF risk indicators to empirically assess, against observed evidence of money laundering, whether third countries have significant strategic deficiencies in their national AML/CFT regime, have compliance weaknesses in their national AML/CFT regime or pose a specific and serious threat to the financial system of the Union. Such assessments shall be transparent and replicable. The independent advisory board shall carry out such assessments on the basis of independent, neutral and non-biased research by international institutions specialising in anti-money laundering, Union institutions and bodies and non- governmental organisations whose sponsoring is transparent and who do not depend diplomatically on those they evaluate. The independent advisory board shall communicate the results of such assessments to the Commission and make available to the public. When assessing whether a third country has significant strategic deficiencies in its national AML/CFT regime or whether a third country poses a significant threat to the financial system of the Union, the independent advisory board shall also use the criteria set out in Article 25(2).
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 575 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1
1. The Commission shall identify third countries with significant strategic deficiencies in their national AML/CFT regimes shall be identified by the Commission and. For the purposes of establishing whether a third country has significant strategic deficiencies in its national AML/CFT regime, the Commission shall consider any relevant assessments by the independent advisory board under Article -23(2) and shall use the ML/TF risk indicators referred to in Article -23(2) to assess whether the third country would meet the criteria set out in Article 25(2). Where the Commission assesses that a third country would not meet those criteria, it shall designated it as a ‘high- risk third countries’risk third country’. The Commission shall make its assessments of such third countries publicly available.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 581 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 3
3. For the purposes of paragraph 2, the Commission shall take into accountwork together with the independent advisory board and take into consideration calls for the application of enhanced due diligence measures and additional mitigating measures (‘countermeasures’) by independent civil society organisations, academia, Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies involved in the AML/CFT framework, international organisations and standard setters with competence in the field of preventing money laundering and combating terrorist financing, as well as relevant evaluations, assessments, reports or public statements drawn up by them.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 589 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1
1. The Commission shall identify third countries with compliance weaknesses in their national AML/CFT regimes shall be identified by the Commission. . For the purposes of establishing whether a third country has compliance weaknesses in its national AML/CFT regime, the Commission shall follow the relevant assessments of the independent advisory board referred to in Article - 23(2).
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 594 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 3
3. The Commission, when drawing up the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 2 shall work together with the independent advisory board and take into account information on jurisdictions under increased monitoring by independent civil society organisations, academia, Union institutions and bodies involved in the AML/CFT framework, international organisations and standard setters with competence in the field of preventing money laundering and combating terrorist financing, as well as relevant evaluations, assessments, reports or public statements drawn up by them.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 600 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1
1. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 60shall identifying third countries that pose a specific and serious threat to the financial system of the Union and the proper functioning of the internal market other than those covered by Articles 23 and 24.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 602 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. In order to identify the countries referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 60 to supplement this Regulation where a specific and serious threat to the financial system of the Union and to the proper functioning of the internal market other than those covered by Articles 23 and 24 has been identified.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 603 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. The Commission, when drawing up the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 1a, shall take into account, in particular, any assessments by the independent advisory board under Article -23(2) identifying third countries as posing a specific and serious threat to the financial system of the Union and the following criteria:
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 608 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 2 – point a – point v a (new)
(va) the position of that third country on the Union list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 609 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 2 – point a – point v b (new)
(vb) the prevalence of cooperate opacity and financial secrecy laws;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 618 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 3
3. For the purposes of determining the level of threat referred to in paragraph 1, tThe Commission may request AMLA to adopt an opinion aimed at assessing the specific impact on the integrity of the Union’s financial system due to the level of threat posed by a third country.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 621 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 4
4. The Commission, when drawing up the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 1a, shall take into account in particular relevant evaluations from independent civil society organisations, independent academia, Union institutions and bodies involved in the AML/CFT framework, assessments or reports drawn up by international organisations and standard setters with competence in the field of preventing money laundering and combating terrorist financing.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 631 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1
1. By [3 years from the date of entry into force of this Regulation], AMLA shall, in cooperation with the independent advisory board, adopt guidelines defining the money laundering and terrorist financing trends, risks and methods involving any geographical area outside the Union to which obliged entities are exposed. AMLA shall take into account, in particular, the assessments provided by the independent advisory board and the risk factors listed in Annex III. Where situations of higher risk are identified, the guidelines shall include enhanced due diligence measures that obliged entities shall consider applying to mitigate such risks.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 674 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b – point v a (new)
(va) imposing a financial penalty on obliged entities that maintain business relationships with legal entities in the third country concerned.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 684 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – title
Specific provisions regarding politically exposed persons and high-net-worth individuals
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 685 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 1
1. In addition to the customer due diligence measures laid down in Article 16, obliged entities shall have in place appropriate risk management systems, including risk-based procedures, to determine whether the customer or the beneficial owner of the customer is a politically exposed person or a high-net- worth individual.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 687 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. With respect to transactions or business relationships with politically exposed persons or high-net-worth individuals, obliged entities shall apply the following measures:
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 688 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) obtain senior management approval for establishing or continuing business relationships with politically exposed persons or high-net-worth individuals;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 689 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) take adequate measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds that are involved in business relationships or transactions with politically exposed persons or high-net-worth individuals;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 693 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 3 – point b
(b) the level of risk associated with a particular category of politically exposed person or high-net-worth individual, their family members or persons known to be close associates, including guidance on how such risks are to be assessed after the person no longer holds a prominent public function for the purposes of Article 35.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 726 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 40 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) the drawing up and approval of the obliged entity’s policies, controls and procedures to comply with the requirements of this Regulation;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 734 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 40 – paragraph 2 – point e
(e) the identification of criteria for the detection of suspicious or unusual transactions and activities;deleted
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 737 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 40 – paragraph 2 – point f
(f) the reporting of suspicious activities or threshold-based declarations to the FIU pursuant to Article 50.deleted
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 747 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. In case of corporate entities, the beneficial owner(s) or owners as defined in Article 2(22) shall be the natural person(s) who control(s) or persons who own, control or benefit from, directly or indirectly, the corporate entity, either through an ownership interest or through control via other means.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 762 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
For the purpose of this Article, ‘control through an ownership interest’ shall mean an ownership of 25% plus one of that least one shares or voting rights or other ownership interest in the corporate entity, including through bearer shareholdings, on every level of ownership.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 767 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point a
(a) the right to appoint or remove more than halfany of the members of the board or similar officers of the corporate entity;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 775 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point e a (new)
(ea) a power of attorney to manage or dispose of the corporate entity’s assets or income, in particular its bank or financial accounts.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 782 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 3
3. Member States shall notify to the Commission by [3 months from the date of application of this Regulation] a list of the types of corporate and other legal entities existing under their national laws with beneficial owner(s) identified in accordance with paragraph 1 and paragraph 5a. The notification shall include the specific categories of entities, description of characteristics, names and, where applicable, legal basis under the national laws of the Member States. It shall also include an indication of whether, due to the specific form and structures of legal entities other than corporate entities, the mechanism under Article 45(3) applies, accompanied by a detailed justification of the reasons for that.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 783 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. By … [3 months from the date of application of this Regulation], Member States shall notify the Commission of any type of legal vehicle explicitly excluded from the list referred to in paragraph 3 and any type of legal vehicle implicitly excluded from that list, such as where a legal vehicle is not considered a legal person, and provide a justification for such an exclusion. The Commission shall make such notifications public.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 790 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 5 – introductory part
5. The provisions of this Chapter shall notalso apply to:
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 792 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 5 – point a
(a) companies listed on a regulated market that is subject to disclosure requirements consistent with Union legislation or subject to equivalent international standards; and
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 793 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, first subparagraph, the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 60 to supplement this Regulation in order to identify on a risk-sensitive basis specific categories of low-risk corporate or other legal entities existing in Member States for which ‘control through an ownership interest’ shall mean an ownership of 5% or, where appropriate, 10% plus one of the shares or voting rights or other ownership interest in the corporate entity on every level of ownership.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 794 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 5 b (new)
5b. For the purposes of paragraph 5a, the Commission shall take into account the opinion of AMLA and other Union bodies, offices and agencies involved in the AML/CFT framework and civil society organisations with competence in the field of preventing money laundering and combating terrorist financing, as well as relevant evaluations, assessments, reports or public statements drawn up by them. The Commission shall also take into account the findings of the risk assessments referred to in Article 7 and 8 of Directive [please insert reference – proposal for 6th Anti-Money Laundering Directive - COM/2021/423 final]. The identified categories of low-risk corporate or other legal entities referred to in paragraph 5a shall be made public by the Commission accompanied by a justification.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 795 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 5 c (new)
5c. The Commission shall review the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 5a on a regular basis to ensure that the identification of specific categories of low-risk corporate and other legal entities is proportionate and adequate to the development and changes in AML/CFT risks.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 799 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 43 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) any other natural person exercising ultimate control over the express trust by means of direct or indirect ownership or by other means, including through a chain of control or ownership, irrespective of any threshold.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 815 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 45 – paragraph 2
2. Where, after having exhausted all possible means of identification pursuant to Articles 42 and 43, no person is identified as beneficial owner, or where there is any doubt that the person(s) identified is the beneficial owner(s), the corporate or other legal entities shall keep records of the actions taken in order to identify their beneficial owner(s). and file a suspicious transaction report to the FIU in accordance with Article 50.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 823 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 45 – paragraph 3 – point b a (new)
(ba) the details on the 10 natural persons holding the majority of shares or voting rights or, where the size of the entity in question does not allow for the identification of 10 natural persons, the details on all natural persons holding shares or voting rights.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 832 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 48 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) enter into or hold a business relationship with an obliged entity;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 834 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 48 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) acquire or hold real estate in their territory.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 838 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 48 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Where, after having exhausted all possible means of identification pursuant to Articles 42 and 43, no person is identified as beneficial owner, Article 45(2) and (3) shall apply. However, where a foreign legal entity or another legal arrangement is incorporated or administered in a third country identified as a 'high-risk third country' in accordance with Article 23 or as a third country posing a threat to the Union’s financial system in accordance with Article 25 and no person is identified as beneficial owner, that foreign legal entity or other legal arrangement shall be prohibited from entering into a business relationship with an obliged entity or from acquiring real estate in a Member State.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 839 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 49 – paragraph 1
Member States shall lay down the rules on sanctions applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Chapter and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The sanctions provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The sanctions provided for shall include, at least in cases of repeated infringements of the provisions of this Chapter, the suspension of the right to conclude, or a prohibition on concluding, contracts within the Union with respect to corporate and other legal entities.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 858 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 50 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
A suspicion is based on the characteristics of the customer, the size and nature of the transaction or activity, the link between several transactions or activities and any other circumstance known to the obliged entity, including the consistency of the transaction or activity with the risk profile of the client and the characteristics of the transaction or customer when linked to patterns highlighted by the risk assessments conducted in accordance with Articles 7 and 8 of Directive [please insert reference proposal for 6th Anti- Money Laundering Directive - COM/2021/423 final].
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 861 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 50 – paragraph 3
3. By [two years after entry into force of this Regulation], AMLA shall develop draft implementing technical standards and submit them to the Commission for adoption. Those draft implementing technical standards shall specify the format to be used for the reporting of suspicious transactions pursuant to paragraph 1 and establish a risk-based classification system to establish the level of priority of suspicious transaction reports.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 864 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 50 – paragraph 5
5. AMLA shall, following a consultation with other Union bodies, offices and agencies involved in the AML/CFT framework, issue and periodically update guidance on indicators of unusual or suspicious activity or behaviours.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 875 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 51 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Obliged entities and, where applicable, the directors and employees engaging with politically exposed persons may report suspicious transactions related to politically exposed persons directly to AMLA through secure channels established by AMLA for that purpose. AMLA shall notify the respective national FIU and monitor the FIU's follow-up on the report in a risk-based manner or request a joint analysis in accordance with Article 25 of Directive [please insert reference –proposal for 6th Anti-Money Laundering Directive -COM/2021/423 final].
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 933 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 59 – paragraph 2
2. Member States may adopt lower 2. limits following consultation of the European Central Bank in accordance with Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC57 provided that financial inclusion is guaranteed in accordance with Article 15 and Article 16(2) of Directive 2014/92/EU. Any lower limit adopted by Member States shall be in accordance with the status and functioning of euro banknotes as legal tender and shall not be set at a lower level than objectively necessary to serve the public interest of preventing or uncovering money laundering or terrorist financing. Those lower limits shall be notified to the Commission within 3 months of the measure being introduced at national level. _________________ 57 Council Decision of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 937 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 59 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Member States shall ensure that the FIU is informed where there are indications that payments in cash, below or above the threshold of EUR 10 000, are related to criminal activity.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 939 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 59 – paragraph 4 b (new)
4b. Persons trading in real property shall be prohibited from accepting cash payments for a transaction involving real property.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 942 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 60 – paragraph 2
2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Articles 23, 24, 25 and 2542(5a) shall be conferred on the Commission for an indeterminate period of time from [date of entry into force of this Regulation].
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 943 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 60 – paragraph 3
3. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Articles 23, 24, 25 and 2542(5a) may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 944 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 60 – paragraph 6
6. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Articles 23, 24, 25 and 2542(5a) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or the Council within a period of one month of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by one month at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 950 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 63 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) further lowering the limit for large cash paymentsimits to large cash payments established by the Union and individually by Member States, following consultation with the European Central Bank.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 958 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex II – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point a
(a) Member States identified in the Commission’s supra-national risk assessment in Article 7 of Directive [please insert reference – proposal for 6th Anti-Money Laundering Directive - COM/2021/423 final], as having on average a low risk in relation to money laundering and terrorist financing;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 959 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex II – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point b
(b) third countries having effective AML/CFT systems as identified by the Commission upon assessment of an independent advisory board in Article 23;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 960 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex II – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point c
(c) Member States and third countries identified by credible sources as having a low level of corruption or other criminal activity;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 961 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex II – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point d
(d) Member States and third countries which, on the basis of credible sources such as mutual evaluations, detailed assessment reports or published follow-up reports, have requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing consistent with the revised FATF Recommendations and effectively implement those requirements.
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 975 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point a
(a) third countries subject to increased monitoring or otherwise identified by the FATF due to theidentified by the Commission upon assessment of an independent advisory board in Article 23 as having compliance weaknesses in their AML/CFT systems;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 977 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point b
(b) Member States and third countries identified by credible sources/ acknowledged processes, such as mutual evaluations, detailed assessment reports or published follow-up reports, as not having effective AML/CFT systems;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 979 #

2021/0239(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point c
(c) Member States and third countries identified by credible sources/ acknowledged processes as having significant levels of corruption or other criminal activity;
2022/07/05
Committee: ECONLIBE
Amendment 3241 #

2021/0106(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – paragraph 1 – point 8 a (new)
8 a. Others a) AI systems intended to be used for the delivery of online advertising to internet users
2022/06/13
Committee: IMCOLIBE
Amendment 36 #

2020/2263(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Takes the view that applying a multitude of reduced rates aggravates the complexity and opacity of the tax system, facilitates fraud and increases compliance costs; stresses, however, that any measure of simplification should not lead to higher VAT rates;
2021/10/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #

2020/2263(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Notes digitalisation’s potential to reduce compliance costs; maintains that digital innovations23 are likely to reduce compliance costs and help increase the transparency of commercial transactions and fight VAT fraud; stresses the need to ensure data security and individual and corporate privacy; highlights the potential of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) to prevent VAT fraud as, e.g. Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud; _________________ 23Such as AI, big data and blockchain technology.
2021/10/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 69 #

2020/2263(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. StresRecognises that a well-designedthe VAT system is neutral and should not affect trade, but that in practice this principle is difficult to verify at global levelot neutral, potentially affecting trade, given the application of VAT exemptions, the ineffectiveness of refund systems, the wide variety of rates – incurring higher compliance costs – and the fact that VAT has superseded income taxes with a view to encouraging trade;
2021/10/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 72 #

2020/2263(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9 a. Considers whether the non- neutrality of the VAT system could also be used to the benefit of macroeconomic coherence and cooperation in the EU; calls on the Commission to assess how reduced VAT rates could be applied to address intra-Community trade imbalances;
2021/10/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 78 #

2020/2263(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Observes that the application of reduced rates does not systematically give rise to permanent price reductions for the consumer; that the effectiveness of a reduced rate depends on a number of factors, such as the extent to which businesses pass it on to consumers, and its duration over time, the size of the reduction and the complexity of the rate system; that the passing-on of reductions in their entirety is therefore a random process and should not be the basis for policy-making; that it is impossible to target low-income household; considers that price interventions might be necessary to ensure reduced VAT rates translate into reduced prices for consumers;
2021/10/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 81 #

2020/2263(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10 a. Is deeply concerned about the regressive nature of consumption taxes; stresses that VAT should be kept at low rates as it burdens lower income households disproportionately, exacerbating the inequality in the distribution of wealth;
2021/10/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #

2020/2263(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)
10 b. Rejects strongly tax reforms that replace progressive taxation with regressive taxation, e.g. reducing income tax rates for top earners or corporate taxes, while increasing VAT; warns against the regressive distributional consequences of such reform efforts; stresses that, in general, an equitable, inclusive and well-designed public revenue system is based on progressive taxation with high rates and low-rated consumption taxes;
2021/10/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 83 #

2020/2263(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 c (new)
10 c. Stresses that efforts to simplify or harmonise the VAT system in the EU must not lead to higher standard or non- standard VAT rates; warns that higher VAT rates do not only aggravate distributional inequality but do also affect aggregate demand negatively and therefore, potentially, employment and economic growth;
2021/10/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 87 #

2020/2263(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Recalls that for it to have a leverage effect, green taxation must be inclusive, and strive for social equity and not undermine businesses’ international competitiveness; observes that the effectiveness of reduced rates in promoting this type of goods and services or, in a broader sense, merit goods (e.g. culture, health, biodiversity) is chieflyalso a function of the extent to which they are used to promote such goods;
2021/10/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 92 #

2020/2263(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Stresses that reduced rates are not an effective way of achieving social or environmental objectives since they incur high costs for governments owing to the size of the rate gap, reduced tax revenues, increased administrative costs, costly checks and inspections, pressure from lobby groups, compliance costs, economic distortions or even tax evasion, and the difficulty of reaching the target groups;deleted
2021/10/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 102 #

2020/2263(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Takes the view that direct tax incentives, such as direct grants or tax credits targeting specific consumers and producers, are morcan also be effective, flexible, visible and cost-effective tools for achieving these social and environmental objectives;
2021/10/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 107 #

2020/2263(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. StresseConsiders that a uniform VAT system, combined with a direct tax incentive tool such as the income-based tax credit scheme for low-income households, together with a raft of social reforms, would be a winning strategy; recallcould be a coherent strategy, as long as these do not place an administrative burden on low-income households; considers that New Zealand has a flat-rate VAT system and applies tax credit for low- income households; points out that flat-rate subsidies and information campaigns are an option for the promotion of merit goods;
2021/10/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 111 #

2020/2263(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Recalls that VAT revenue is one of the chief sources of public revenue, accounting for some 21% of total tax revenue in the EU on average; that the VAT gap stands at 10% on average; and that VAT also constitutes an own resource for the EU budget; stresses that any reduction in the VAT base leads to less revenue for public finances; calls on national tax authorities to take initiatives to reduce the VAT gap in order to help lift Member States out of the current socio- economic crisis;
2021/10/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 115 #

2020/2263(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Endorses the findings of the DIW Econ study which stresses that on average the standard rate was applied to 71% of the total tax base in the Member States in 2019; points out that diversified VAT systems impose costs on businesses, particularly SMEs via increased compliance costs, create distortions in the internal market and trade, and incur costs on government through lost revenue; adds that reduced rates are an insufficient means of achieving revenue-distribution or environmental objectives;
2021/10/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 124 #

2020/2263(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Notes the difficulties in reducing the VAT gap between Member States owing to the justified need to maintain a number of VAT exemptions for certain goods and services and the willingness of Member States to maintain reduced rates of at least 5%; acknowledges that Member States need to conserve the flexibility to set their own VAT rates given the importance of this tax as a budgetarpolicy instrument;
2021/10/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 126 #

2020/2263(INI)

17 a. Calls on Member States to consider a special consumption tax for a limited range of high-end luxury goods as an additional source of public revenue in light of the extraordinary public costs incurred for the containment of the pandemic;
2021/10/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 134 #

2020/2263(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Calls for a simplified VAT system, with limits on exemptions andout increasing standard or non- standard rates to be introduced, with a view ton promoting competitivenessdistributional justice;
2021/10/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 136 #

2020/2263(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Stresses that the VAT gap is chiefly attributable to the ineffectiveness of enforcement and control measures, particularly those against tax fraud, evasion and avoidance and aggressive tax planning; calls on the Commission to assess how the introduction and implementation of reverse-charge procedures to combat Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud can be simplified and made more effective in the EU;
2021/10/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 3 #

2020/2262(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls the importance, for a properly functioning and, competitive, sustainable and fair internal market, of effective better law- making tools that take subsidiarity, transparency and proportionality fully into account when drawing up scientifically based and balanced, sustainable and inclusive legislation, particularly for consumers and SMEs;
2021/02/24
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 10 #

2020/2262(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
2. Reiterates that internal market objectives such as improving competitiveness, digitalisation, sustainability and consumer protection should be underpinned by the enhanced use of scrutiny instruments suchwhile ast the regulatory fitness and performance programme (REFIT) and the Regulatory Scrutiny Boardsame time guaranteeing that the ‘Community method’ is uphold and that the European Parliament is duly involved in the scrutiny processes;
2021/02/24
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 20 #

2020/2262(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
3. Underlines that SMEs in particular will continue to face serious repercussions due to the COVID-19 pandemic and need more flexibility to react quickly to the ever-changing demands of our economy; reiterates that next to cutting red tape, the ‘think small first’ principle and fostering a society that values entrepreneurshiptogether with sustainable and inclusive objectives need to be priorities within internal market legislation;
2021/02/24
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 23 #

2020/2262(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
4. Calls on the Member States’ authorities at national and regional level, and on stakeholders to become more closely involved at an early stage of the decision-making process, with subsidiarity and proportionality checks and administrative burden assessments of EU legislation; calls further on the Member States to ensure the swift and consistent transposition, implementation and enforcement of legislation, and to avoid ‘gold-plating’ that can undermine the smooth functioning of the internal market;
2021/02/24
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 36 #

2020/2262(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
5. Warns that legislation which increases administrative burdens in an unjustified and disproportional way greatly affects SMEs and consumers by hindering competitiveness and preventing the single market from unlocking its full potential; calls on the Commission, with a view to providing evidence on the added value of EU action and the better-law making agenda, and its costs and benefits, to strengthen the SME fitness check.
2021/02/24
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 39 #

2020/2262(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Regrets that with the better-law making agenda criteria for evaluating, monitoring, tracking and reporting has disproportionately increased , as has the number of support structures and consultation processes; raises concerns in this regard that according to the European Commission itself, between 150 and 280 full-time equivalent staff are deployed on better regulation-related activities and are supported by external contractors providing services amounting to between EUR 10 to 37 million annually;
2021/02/24
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 48 #

2020/2262(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5b. Regrets that with the better-law making agenda some decision-making processes have become less transparent and are controlled by fewer individuals;
2021/02/24
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 10 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas the unprecedented impact and magnitude of the COVID-19 crisis on the economy has led to a decrease in tax revenues and an increase in fiscal expenditures to protect society and the economy, and is leading to a sharp increase in government debt; whereas tax fraud and tax evasion undermines government revenues, as well as the sustainability of public finances and taxation systems; whereas it is paramount to keep taxes low to support the growth of the economythroughout European history, when facing crisis, some countries greatly modified their taxation system, for example France introduced an excess profit tax during World War I, which sometimes led to a long-term modification of their taxation system;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 16 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas a swift recovery requires a strong economic and fiscal policy response ensuring, inter alia: (i) an effective level playing field for businesses, reducing or eliminating tax benefits that unfairly create disadvantages to SMEs, including less red tape to promote both domestic trade and trade within the Single Market, supported by a simple and more predictable tax environment; (ii) securing tax revenues for Member States to finance the recovery and reduce debt to GDP and (iii) fair taxation of businesses and citizens, enhancing both trust in society and fair competition;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 18 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas the Commission’s Action Plan is part of a wider Union tax strategy in the area of VAT, business and individual taxation; whereas the Action Plan sets out a dual approach combining actions for combating tax fraud and tax evasion and simplifying steps to remove unnecessary obstacles and administrative burdens for taxpayercitizens and SMEs;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 35 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital G
G. whereas increased transparency in the area of corporate taxation can improve tax collection and is also necessary to strengthen fair competitiveness in the single market, which will make the work of tax authorities more efficient; whereas the final agreement on the public country-by- country reporting is far from being enough as it will not provide disaggregated data for more than 80% of the countries in the world; whereas the use of technology and digitalisation focused on a more efficient use of the available data can support efficiency and transparency of tax authorities and reduce the costs of compliance and increase the trust of the public;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 38 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the Commission's Action Plan and supports its thorough implementation; observes that the majority of the 25 actions are related to VAT, which is appropriate due to the high level of revenue losses in the area of VAT; supports the effort of reducing the VAT gap in order to prevent the possible need to increase the tax rates on consumption; considers however that an impact assessment should be carried out, before presenting concrete legislative proposals to better apprehend the potential effects on taxpayers and businesses; stresses, however, that the Commission’s Action Plan should have also a focus on corporate taxation and anti-money laundering mechanisms in alignment with the international momentum;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Underlines that regressive taxes such as VAT show an upward trend in the Union and represent 7,1% of GDP, whereas fairer taxes such as corporate taxes are decreasing and represent only 2,8% of GDP; stresses that this trend does not go in the right direction as the gap between those figures was one percentage point lower in 2006;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 49 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Welcomes the Commission's proposal to modernise, simplify and harmonise VAT requirements, using transaction-based 'real time' reporting and e-invoicing; notes that such reporting needs to be taxpayer-friendly while allowing tax administrations to have an overview of the various transactions in real-time, facilitating the prevention and detection of fraud and risky economic operators; considers that reporting requirements and tax forms should converge across the Member States; believes that the use of the data-mining tool Transaction Network Analysis (TNA) represents an available way to reduce tax fraud and promotes its further development and sharing of best practices among Member States; however, stresses that, according to a study requested by TAX 3 in 20181a, no data is collected regarding business activity in Member States that do not participate in it, and that each participating Member State is allowed to set a ‘white list’ of actors in respect of which the TNA will not be able to collect VIES and VOW data; _________________ 1a LAMENSCH M. and CECI E. (2018) VAT fraud - Economic impact, challenges and policy issues, in https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ etudes/STUD/2018/626076/IPOL_STU(20 18)626076_EN.pdf
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 53 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls that any tax measures, temporary or not, should foster and not hamper the competitiveness of European businesses; sStresses that the reporting requirements should not generate higher administrative costs for economic actors, notably for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); notes that to effectively address lost tax revenues, better quality and possible higher quantities of data may be needed, but only data effectively used, and collected from taxpayers only once with utmost security, should be collectedcollected in a way that respects taxpayers security; notes that data should aim to simplify various obligations of taxpayers, while artificial intelligence (AI) and various softwares should be used to maximise the effectiveness of the use of data;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 67 #

2020/2254(INL)

5. Is of the opinion that better estimates of overall tax losses in the Union are essential for efficient proposals on ways to effectively reduce tax losses; calls on the Commission to launch a coordinated effort by the Member States to establish a joint system of collecting statistics on VAT ‘carousel fraud’; points out that such a system could build upon practices already used in some Member States;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 83 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Notes that the Union decision- making process is not promoting change, as tax policy is a national prerogative and subject to unanimity; regrets that the current situation sometimes leads to an uneven or inconsistent application of tax regulations; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure more harmonised and consistent tax rules and their implementation, to protect the functioning of the single market and to assure the principle of “taxing where profit is generated”;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Takes note of the existing limits on decision making in the Council and calls for exploring all legal options as provided in the Treaties on taxation especially in order to ensure functionality of the single market and preserve Union competitiveness in the global marketto fight harmful competition practices;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 104 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9 a. Stresses that economically relevant VAT fraud schemes are mainly driven by multinationals and wealthy individuals, through schemes such as Missing Trader Intra Community, the buying and selling of cars as they were second-hand, and air craft leasing; stresses that, according to Europol estimates, between EUR 40billion and EUR 60 billion of the annual VAT revenue losses of Member States are caused by organised crime groups, and 2 % of those groups are behind 80 % of MTIC fraud; considers that it is necessary to focus on these issues when fighting VAT fraud;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 113 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10 a. Stresses that VAT frauds like “carrousel fraud” have a direct impact on VAT-based own resources and therefore the composition of EU revenue2a _________________ 2aBUDG committee briefing - EU Own Resources (2020) in https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ etudes/BRIE/2020/647459/IPOL_BRI(20 20)647459_EN.pdf
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 118 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)
10 b. Stresses the importance of a swift exchange of information between Member States to combat tax fraud; welcomes, in this context, the proposal announced in the Commission’s communication of further developing Eurofisc;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 121 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 c (new)
10 c. Welcomes the start of operations by the European Public Prosecutor Office (EPPO) in June of 2021;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 123 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 d (new)
10 d. Calls on Member States to facilitate the exchange of information with judicial and law enforcement authorities such as Europol and OLAF, as recommended by the Court of Auditors;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 124 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 e (new)
10 e. Asks for the Commission to relaunch the discussion on a definitive VAT regime; stresses however that VAT fraud typologies are multifaceted, evolving and concern many economic sectors, possibly changing to adapt to a new legal framework; a study requested by TAX 3 in 20183a stresses that “A new type of ‘missing trader’ is therefore likely to arise under the proposed ‘definitive system' (the seller becoming the missing trader in this case)”; _________________ 3aLAMENSCH M. and CECI E. (2018) VAT fraud - Economic impact, challenges and policy issues, in https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ etudes/STUD/2018/626076/IPOL_STU(20 18)626076_EN.pdf
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 129 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Highlights that the current global tax environment is outdated, and can only be fully addressed on a global level; considers that athe multilateral agreement negotiated OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS iwas a unique opportunity to make international tax architecture more consistent with the development of the economy by further addressing the distortions of fair competition in the market, which was accentuated during the COVID-19 crisis and highlighted problems related to the taxing of large multinational enterprises (MNEs);
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 130 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11 a. Stresses, however, the significant loopholes that undermine the potential power of this agreement, more specifically: the carve-outs translating in a less than 15% effective minimum corporate tax rate and the fact that taxing rights are allocated to the jurisdictions where the headquarters are located, which does not respect the principle of taxing the economic activity where it happens;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 131 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 b (new)
11 b. Calls on the Commission to pass the international agreement into Union law and to be more ambitious, by implementing a 25% minimum effective corporate tax rate;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 134 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Welcomes the efforts of the Commission to address the problem at least partially by introducing various initiatives, but; stresses the high importance of the Union inin particular the proposal on the fight against abusive use of shell companies; recalls that recent research by the IMF shows that two Member States (Luxembourg and the Netherlands) host nearly half of the globe’s phantom Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) through empty corporate shells with zero or few employees in the host countributing to the success of global negotiations towards the ongoing necessary reforms;y4a; calls for the definition of substance requirements to assess legal entities and to further banning them if those requirements are not met; _________________ 4aDamgaard, J., Elkjaer, T. and Johannesen, N. (2019). What Is Real and What Is Not in the Global FDI Network?. IMF Working Paper No. 19/274. The authors find that “phantom investment into corporate shells with no substance and no real links to the local economy may account for almost 40 percent of global FDI”, and that some of countries benefiting the most from such harmful tax practices include Luxembourg and the Netherlands, as well as Ireland, Cyprus, Malta and Hungary (all of which are EU Member States).
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 146 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Welcomes the two-pillar agreement reached at the G7/G20 levels on the allocation of taxing rights and the application of a minimum effective tax rate of at least 15% on the global profits of MNEs; notes the need forregrets however the low level of the rate agreed, given that it had originally been set at 21%; stresses that the Union needs to undertake an effective implementation; calls on the Commission to make the necessary legislative proposals to implement the agreement into Union law as quickly as possible after the finalisation of the technical work on the OECD approach;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 152 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14 a. Calls on the Union to implement a temporary excess profit tax, to tax multinational enterprises which benefited from the crisis to increase their profits;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 153 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 b (new)
14 b. Calls on States to introduce and collect the tax deficit of multinationals: the difference between what a corporation pays in taxes globally and what this corporation would have to pay if all its profits were subject to a minimum tax rate in each of the countries where it operates; underlines that such a solution could encourage other States to follow the move and progressively lead to a global solution;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 154 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 c (new)
14 c. Calls on the Union to implement a progressive taxation on the wealth of the richest households;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 155 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Recalls that future Union policy options and political choices in the area of business taxation should be based on tax fairness, efficiency and transparency, while also taking into account the need to strengthen Member States tax revenues, given the decisive role of the governments in fostering a sustainable economic recovery from the pandemic; in this sense, stresses that these policy choices should leading to fairly shared taxes for all types of multinational companies, while reducing costs of compliance for taxpayers, specially low-income earners and SMEs, as well as removing sources of business distortions in the Union single market, trade and investments;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 168 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Considers, however, that the BEFIT initiative should be supported by the political process inRegrets the fact that previous CCTB and CCCTB proposals were not approved in the Council; looks forward to the details on the BEFIT initiative; notes that, in order to building political support for change and that, the initiative should be accompanied by a thorough impact assessment to shape future proposals, which should contribute to reaching a consensus between Member States;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 170 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17 a. Welcomes the latest advances on the pCBCR, stressing the importance of transparent and standardised data on corporate activity, allowing for better scrutiny; regrets, however, that, in order to reach a compromise, the Council restricted the obligation for companies to publicly report information only for their operations in Member States and the countries listed in the Union’s list of non- cooperative jurisdictions, ruling out third countries that in fact serve as tax havens but are not yet listed; include in the text a “corporate-get-out-clause” allowing a reporting exemption for “commercially sensitive information” which is only to be applied to companies with an annual consolidated turnover above EUR 750 million, which excludes 85 - 90 per cent of multinationals; calls for further development by the European Commission in order to advance with fully disaggregated data;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 174 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Considers that the new corporate tax agenda should include a mechanism to address the debt-equity bias through an incentive system, helping to support the resilience of companies in adverse economic circumstances in the futureRecognises as a problem the debt- equity bias in the treatment of tax benefits, creating room for multinationals that engage in harmful tax practices via intra- group operations; considers that the best option to tackle it should be the limitation of interest deductions, in line with the legislative spirit already introduce by ATAD in Article 4;
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 178 #

2020/2254(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18 a. Calls on the Commission to carry out a more complete impact assessment on the DEBRA initiative, specifically showing estimates of tax revenue losses, comparing the scenario of limiting interest deduction or implementing an Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE);
2021/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 15 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas the shock is symmetrical but the impact varies considerably among Member States, reflecting the severity of the pandemic and the stringency of their containment measures, but also their specific economic exposures and initial conditions, including their available scope for discretionary fiscal policy responses; whereas this scope for action has been limited as a result of the surge in public debt levels in the “peripheral” member states after 2008 and the key factors behind this were: (1) the policies of the EU institutions and member states in organising a coordinated rescue of the financial sector, socialising massive levels of private debt; (2) the ECB’s actions in failing to intervene to provide credit to the crisis-affected states for an extended period of time, causing the market borrowing costs for these states to surge; and (3) the contractionary austerity programmes imposed by the Troika;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 63 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Is concerned at the negative impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the global economy, trade, income inequalities and poverty; notes that fiscal policy is one of the most important ways a state has to redistribute wealth and contain or reduce income and wealth inequality1a, and that both investment-led growth and the social transfers made through government expenditure, which are vital for redistribution of wealth and preventing inequality from rising, have been reduced and constrained by the debt and deficit rules; notes that access to free or affordable, high-quality public services also plays a crucial role in addressing existing inequalities; _________________ 1aEuropean Economic and Social Committee, 2017. 'Wealth inequality in Europe: the profit-labour split between Member States'. Adopted on 06/12/2017. https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/agenda/ou r-events/events/wealth-inequality-europe- profit-labour-split/opinions.
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 69 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Is concerned that from the introduction of the European Semester in 2011, the specific policy measures demanded by the Commission in the country-specific recommendations focus on limiting wage growth; increasing the threshold age for receiving a pension; privatising state-owned enterprises, cutting public spending on healthcare provision; promoting longer working hours; reducing job security; and cutting funds to social services - all of which have contributed to weakening states', institutions' and individuals' capacity to respond to the outbreak of the pandemic; notes that the Commission has engaged in significant overreach through the European Semester process when it comes to public policy areas that legally fall under the competence of the member states under the TFEU, such as pensions and the provision of healthcare;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Notes that as a result of the pandemic, the ECB predicts public debt will reach 200 per cent of GDP in Greece, 160 per cent in Italy, 130 per cent in Portugal and 120 per cent in France and Spain, and that on average, eurozone debt will rise from its pre-pandemic level of 86 percent of GDP to above 100 per cent, while average deficits will be eight percent of GDP1a; expresses concern that several states including Italy, Spain, France and Portugal will have to refinance large proportions of their debt within the next year, which may put pressure on vulnerable sovereigns; notes that the Commission acknowledges that “Government finances may be permanently weakened”1b notes that this presents a unique problem in the eurozone due to the ‘no bailout clause’ in the Treaty that prohibits direct monetary financing of government debt by the central bank, and the Stability and Growth Pact rules that impose a deflationary dynamic in a downturn; calls for these self-imposed constraints to be ended as part of the review of the macroeconomic framework; _________________ 1aEuropean Central Bank, Financial Stability Review, May 2020. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financial- stability/fsr/html/ecb.fsr202005~1b75555f 66.en.html#toc1 1b European Commission. Identifying Europe's Recovery Needs. Staff Working Document, 27/05/20. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/ec onomy- finance/assessment_of_economic_and_in vestment_needs.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1kxXW wWAUV8FLV8OMTBidRqeKIiwNCthC4 xEdoHdBWpzCYIND04rsUIiU
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 100 #

2020/2078(INI)

5. Welcomes the swift and strong response to the crisis in the area of monetary and fiscal policy, at both EU and Member State level, as well as the European Recovery Plan; is concerned that the recovery element of the Next Generation plan amounts to only 0.56% of EU GDP each year for four years1a, an amount that is clearly insufficient to deal with the scale of the recession we face and is unlikely to be able to provide the assistance required by the worst-affected member states; urges the Commission and Council to seek a new and additional package that goes beyond this figure; considers it essential that the recovery package is fully aligned with the EU’s new growth strategy, i.e. in accordance with the principles of the European Green Deal (EGD), the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and with the aim to protect women’s rights and achieve gender equality; demands that funds and resources be directed to projects and beneficiaries that comply with our Treaty-based fundamental values and that recipient firms protect their workers, pay their fair share of taxes, and refrain from paying out dividends or offering share buy- back schemes aimed at remunerating shareholders; _________________ 1aMünchau, Wolfgang. 'Why it is not 500 billion'. Eurointelligence, 30/05/20. http://www.eurointelligence.com/professio nal/briefings/2020-05- 29.html?cHash=a03f37f075470a52d93b1 a43be5102d9
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 106 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Welcomes the swift and strong response to the crisis in the area of monetary and fiscal policy, at both EU and Member State level, as well as the European Recovery Plan; considers it essential that the recovery package is fully aligned with the EU’s new growth strategy, i.e. in accordance with the principles of the European Green Deal (EGD), the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and with the aim to protect women’s rights and achieve gender equality; demands that funds and resources be directed to projects and beneficiaries that comply with our Treaty-based fundamental values and that recipient firms protect their workers, pay their fair share of taxes, and refrain from paying out dividends or offering share buy-back schemes aimed at remunerating shareholders; calls for the full separation of the recovery funds from the European Semester process;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 108 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Welcomes the swift and strong response to the crisis in the area of monetary and fiscal policy, at both EU and Member State level, as well as the European Recovery Plan; considers it essential that the recovery package is fully aligned with the EU’s new growth strategy, i.e. in accordance with the principles of the European Green Deal (EGD), the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and with the aim to protect women’s rights and achieve gender equality; demands that funds and resources be directed to projects and beneficiaries that are legally required by the Commission to comply with our Treaty- based fundamental values and that recipient firms protect their workers, pay their fair share of taxes, and refrain from paying out dividends or offering share buy- back schemes aimed at remunerating shareholders and inflating stock prices;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 112 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Notes that under the Next Generation plan, the Commission’s €750bn debt will be repaid using three possible options, with the Commission President stating her preference is for the EU to raise new own resources in future, such as a digital tax, a carbon border adjustment tax, the expansion of the emissions trading scheme, and a tax on large multinationals; is concerned that raising significant new own resources will be difficult without Treaty change ending unanimous voting on taxation in the Council, where many progressive proposals on taxation have failed or stalled due to the opposition of the EU’s tax haven member states, including the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Belgium, Hungary, Malta and Cyprus; expresses serious concern that the other two options for repayment will add to member states' pubic debt levels, and are to pay back the funds through future EU budgets, either through increased member state contributions or reduced programmes, meaning that the recovery funds will either add to member states' national debt or reduce the level of funds and services their citizens benefit from;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 121 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Welcomes the activation of the general escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact, and expecinsists that it will remain activated at least until the end of 2021 in order to support the efforts of the Member States to recover from the pandemic crisis and strengthen their economic and social resiliencePact is repealed or fundamentally transformed; notes that the existing headline debt and deficit benchmarks are completely detached from reality and insists they are never reapplied; believes that if any new goals are agreed in a future macroeconomic framework, they must be directed towards climate and wellbeing indicators;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 153 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. Notes that European Court of Auditors found that, in relation to the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, the way in which the Commission classifies member states with imbalances “lacks transparency”; that the country- specific recommendations issued by the Commission under the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure do not actually stem from identified imbalances; and that, in general, there is a lack of public awareness, visibility and understanding of the procedure and its implications1a; calls for the review of the macroeconomic framework to improve transparency and accountability over the classification and recommendation processes; _________________ 1aEuropean Court of Auditors. 2018. Is the main objective of the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact delivered? Special report no 18/2018. https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocI tem.aspx?did=46430
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 156 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Is concerned about the significant but uneven negative impact of the COVID- 19 crisis on government deficit and private debt, which further aggravates the situation of Member States that are particularly affected by the pandemic and/or pre- existing high levels of government debt; calls for a solution that guarantees the sustainability of public debt; believes that this requires the introduction on common bonds that would allow governments to spend in response to the health and economic crisis caused by coronavirus in a way that does not add to their national debt and keeps borrowing costs relatively low; or, preferably, for the cancellation of the public debt purchased by the ECB under the Pandemic Emergency Purchasing Programme, or the crediting of national government accounts by the ECB on a per capita basis to directly finance pandemic related spending;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 174 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Considers it essential that the revision of the EU’s fiscal and economic policy framework should be completed by the time the escape clause is repealed and should enable fiscal policy to respond with discretion to shocks in the short term, and to reduce high public debt ratios to an agreed reference value in the long term, while allowing a sufficient level of public investment, progressive tax policies and the repayment of loans in a cycle- comfortable manner, and the long-term modernisationstrengthening of public commodities;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 176 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Urges the Commission and Council, in the process of reviewing the macroeconomic framework, to acknowledge that the prevailing economic conditions in the EU in the 1990s were significantly different to those that prevail today; notes that in 1997 interest rates were approximately 5 per cent for long- term government borrowing, the average public debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU was between 65 and 70 per cent of GDP, the median public debt among the 11 initial eurozone members was around 60 per cent of GDP, the forecast GDP growth rate was 3 per cent annually, and inflation was forecast at 2 per cent; notes that according to these economic conditions, maintaining the public debt to GDP ratio at or below 60 per cent would require governments to keep budget deficits limited to 3 per cent of GDP; insists that if any new goals are agreed in a future macroeconomic framework, they must reflect current economic realities and be directed towards climate and wellbeing indicators; notes that this will require a revision of the Treaty;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 205 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Welcomes the refocus of the European Semester Spring Package aimed at providing an immediate economic policy response to tackle and mitigate the health and socio-economic impact of COVID-19 and reboot economic activity; supports the Commission’s announcement of a reform of the European Semester to convert it into a tool to coordinate the recovery measures, framed by the principles of the EGD, the EPSR and the SDGs; is convinced that this has to include the coordination of measures concerning state aid and tax policies; underlines the need for the integration of a new set of binding sustainability and wellbeing indicators and alternative measurements of growth performance; urges the Commission and Council not to return to the austerity policies that were implemented in response to the global financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis; notes that these damaging policies are enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact rules as well as the Six-Pack and Two-Pack, and that a break with this framework will require significant legislative change;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Expresses concern that, despite strong criticism of the methodology and findings of the “expansionary austerity” theory, the Commission has heavily depended on this theory since 2009; notes that a wide body of counter-evidence shows that austerity routinely results in lower GDP growth, higher unemployment and depressed demand; acknowledges the findings of the IMF's then-chief economist in 2013 that for every dollar governments had cut from their budgets, economic output was reduced by $1.501a; calls on the EU institutions and decision- makers to acknowledge the evidence that cuts to public spending have a contractionary impact on the economy and to reject this approach in the recovery from the pandemic lockdowns; _________________ 1aBlanchard, Olivier, and D. Leigh. 2013. ‘Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers’. American Economic Review, Vol. 103, No. 3, pp. 117–20.
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 220 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 b (new)
12b. Notes that research shows that fiscal multipliers are bigger in a slump in general, and particularly so when the impact of monetary policy is weakened, such as in the zero lower bound1a; notes that further research shows that public investment also has a much larger impact in the context of the zero lower bound, i.e., that if the short-term interest rates are low or at zero, the fiscal multiplier for spending is stronger1b; calls on the Commission and Council to consider this evidence during the review of the macroeconomic framework and during the collective response to the pandemic recession; _________________ 1aJordà, Òscar, and A. M.Taylor. 2013. ‘The Time for Austerity: Estimating the Average Treatment Effect of Fiscal Policy’. NBER Working Paper No. 19414. 1bBatini, Nicoletta, L. Eyraud, L. Forni, and A. Weber. 2014.‘Fiscal Multipliers: Size, Determinants, and Use in Macroeconomic Projections.’IMF Fiscal Affairs Department Technical Notes and Manuals.https://www.imf.org/external/pu bs/ft/tnm/2014/tnm1404.pdf.
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 221 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. RecogniseRejects the prole that the 13. Commission has allotted toposed role of the European Semester in the Recovery Plan; notes, however, that the effectivenes that the Commission's country- specific recommendations aund success of the alignment of Member States’ inveer the SGP and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure since 2011 made consistment and reform programmes to the Semester process will depend on the progress of the Semester redemands for reductions in public spending, and that the Commission has specifically singled out pensions, healthcare provision, wage growth, job security and unemployment benefits form and the above-mentioned reform of the Stability and Growth Pactttack; believes these policy priorities must be abandoned by the EU institutions; calls for the full separation of the European Semester process from the Recovery Plan;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 230 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Recognises the strong criticism from economists and academics1a of the Commission’s model to determine the output gap, used to calculate the structural deficit in the Stability and Growth Pact and European Semester process, where the Commission has linked the size of the output gap and the fiscal adjustment requirements it imposes; notes that the output gap is unobservable and can only amount to a guess based on the experience and data of the recent past; notes that according to this model, in a period of strong economic growth the potential output of an economy will increase, meaning that its fiscal stance will appear to be well-balanced, and the EU’s double-dip recession has led to the opposite effect, causing the gap between real output and potential output to shrink; is concerned that this method resulted in the bizarre situation in 2018-19 where the Commission demanded that Italy (then in a recession and with a GDP 8 per cent smaller than in 2007) cut public spending lest its economy overheat; _________________ 1aSee Heimberger, Phillipp, and JKapeller. ‘How economic policy drives European (dis)integration’. Article, September 22, 2016. https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectiv es/blog/how-economic-policy-drives- european-disintegration; and Tooze, Adam. ‘Output gap nonsense’. Social Europe, April 30, 2019. https://www.socialeurope.eu/output-gap- nonsense.
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 239 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Reiterates its call for the strengthening of Parliament’s democratic role in the economic governance framework in any upcoming Treaty change and, in the meantime, for an Interinstitutional Agreement on Sustainable European Governance granting Parliament a right of consent on the policy recommendations presented in the Annual Sustainable Growth Survey, the euro area fiscal package and the Country Specific Recommendations; calls for the ending of the reverse-qualified majority voting procedure in the Excessive Deficit Procedure in the Council that was introduced as part of the Six-Pack;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 249 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Underlines that public revenues are essential to finance the post-pandemic recovery and the just transition to a sustainable economy; recalls that tax evasion and tax avoidance at EU level amount to up to EUR 160-190 billion each year, constituting missing revenues for the treasuries; calls for the end to unanimous voting on taxation in the Council; urges the German Council Presidency to make rapid progress in finding an agreement on an EU Financial Transaction Tax, which should include derivatives; and to proceed immediately with an EU-level digital tax on technology giants now that the US has withdrawn from OECD-level talks;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 40 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 (new)
-1. Deplores that the European Union economy is in constant crisis mode since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007 and stresses that since then socio- economic disparities have increased both between Member States and within Member States especially for the younger generations and for low wage earners 1a; regrets that the existing tools of macroeconomic and fiscal policy coordination as for example expressed in the country specific recommendations have exacerbated these disparities; _________________ 1aThe Social Divide in Europe - OECD report for the Open Society Foundation Europe EU inequality got worse before Covid crisis, data shows | ETUC Inequality and Poverty across Generations in the European Union (imf.org).
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 41 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 a (new)
-1a. Deplores that the design of current macroeconomic legislative framework abolishes or constraints member states’ capacities to employ monetary and fiscal policy for purposes of macroeconomic stabilisation in the euro area 1b; regrets the consequent promotion of international price competitiveness through downward wage flexibility as means of economic adjustment; highlights that former Commissioner László Andor warned that the consequence is social damage due to layoffs and wage cuts in the public and private sector1c; _________________ 1bDesign Failures of the Eurozone - Can They be Fixed? - LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Papers, Paul de Grauwe, 2013, vol. 57; Forced Structural Convergence in the Eurozone - Or a Differentiated European Monetary Community -Max Planck Institute für Gesellschaftsforschung Discussion Paper 16/15, Fritz Scharpf, 201. 1cDeveloping the Social Dimension of a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union - László Andor, 13 September 2013.
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 42 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 b (new)
-1b. Is highly worried about the multiple long-term challenges the European Union is confronted with: public health crisis, climate crisis, lack of investment in public infrastructure aggravating socio-economic disparities and fuelling centrifugal tendencies of the Union;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 43 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 c (new)
-1c. Takes note of the ultra-low interest rate policy of ECB which has only become necessary due of insufficient fiscal policy; strongly deplores its side effects namely fuelling asset and real estate prices, which mainly benefitted capital owners and rent seekers;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #

2020/2075(INI)

-1d. Strongly believes that in order to tackle these challenges and to escape the vicious crisis cycle a decisive and concerted effort is indispensable that cannot be achieved with the current tools of macroeconomic and fiscal policy coordination;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the Commission communication of 3 March 2021 entitled ‘One year since the outbreak of COVID- 19: fiscal policy response’ and takes note of the proposed conditions for deactivating the general escape clause (GEC); highlights that deactivation of the GEC shwould be conditional upon the health, social and economic situation across Member States in order to ensure that fiscal support is provided for as long as neededentail fiscal consolidation, which will be detrimental to economic growth, employment and public investment; recalls that the latter is urgently needed over the long run to promote a social, ecological and digital transformation;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 65 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Agrees withTakes note of the opinion of the European Fiscal Board (EFB) on the importance of having a clear pathway towards a reformed fiscal framework prior to the deactivation of the GEC;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 83 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Considers that economic indicators and adjustment paths need to be interpreted cautiously, and therefore calls for the code of conduct of the Stability and Growth Pact to be revised vis-à-vis the benchmarks needed to calculate such adjustment needs and paths; stresses that fiscal guidance should avoid pro-cyclical biases, promote upward convergence and counteract macroeconomic imbalancavoid negative effects on employment as well as wages and counteract macroeconomic imbalances through symmetrically coordinated macroeconomic policies; calls for special accounting treatment for loans from Next Generation EU (NGEU) related spending and from other national initiatives for public investment;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 95 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Calls for a continued expansionary fiscal stance for as long as needed and for it to be shifted to support the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and a green, digital and inclusive transformation while ensuring fiscal sustainability in the long term;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 96 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Stresses that the discretionary use of fiscal policy is a key tool for macroeconomic stabilization; highlight that such discretionary use is of special significance in times of economic downturns and to promote structural transformation;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 100 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Calls on the Member States to embed the high-quality fiscal support in credible medium-term frameworks, bearing in mind that emergency measures are temporary, limited and targeted; calls on the Member States to monitor fiscal risks, namely contingent liabilities, as appropriate;deleted
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 137 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Stresses the importance of complementarity between monetary and fiscal policies to deliver the required support post-COVID-19; considers that the low interest rate environment has implications for fiscal policy; warns against the negative consequences of a premature tightening of monetary and fiscal policy; is highly concerned about the distributional effects of to the low interest rate environment;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 155 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Calls for an appropriate fiscal and monetary policy mix that work together towards achieving; highlights that the financial and economic crisis of 2008-13 showed that the lender of last resort function of central banks is an indispensable instrument of fiscal and macroeconomic stabilization; calls for a reconsideration of the EUCB’s objectivmandate with a view on ensuring the stability of public finances;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 169 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Highlights that debt levels have increased and that some Member States already have a sizeable debt legacy; notes that circumstances have changed since the Maastricht criteria were defined and that inflation and interest rate levels are considerably lower; recalls the ongoing consultation on the ECB monetary policy, and the need for the ECB to consider full employment and ecological transition on par with its price stability mandate;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 185 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Stresses that debt service costs are expected to remain low for the foreseeable future and primary deficits are likely to be offset by favourable interest-growth differentials; further considers that as long as the differentials are negative it is possible to sustain and progressively reduce high debt levels, while continuing supporting the economy;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 202 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Recalls the importance of growth- enhancing policies and public investment aimed at increasing growth potential and, achieving the EU’s objectivesfull employment and directing a social, ecological and digital transformation;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 206 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Stresses the importance of pursuing a broad and transparent DSA in order to set an appropriate country-specific path, using innovative tools and techniques such as stress tests and stochastic analysis to better reflect risks to public debt dynamics; stresses however that DSA methodologies are intrinsically flawed and incomplete since a DSA amounts to making predictions about an unknowable future, and cannot factor in the future stance of monetary policy or irrational market behaviours;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 6
A revampednew EU fiscal framework
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 221 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Calls on the Commission to relaunch the debate on the reform of the economic governance of the Union with a view to coming forward with a legislative proposal by the end of 2021; calls for a rethink of EU fiscal rulesframework, also in view of the legacies of the pandemic, and supports the EFB’s conclusion that the fiscal framework has to be adapted; calls for a replacement of the principle of rules-based fiscal policy with the principle of discretionary fiscal policy;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 229 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Recalls that the “problem is with the very concept of fiscal rules”, as shown by Blanchard, Leandro and Zettelmeyer1d; highlights that the question whether debt becomes a risk depends on uncertain economic and political factors; stresses therefore that it is impossible to define adequate fiscal policy rules ex-ante that could account for the contingencies involved; _________________ 1dRedesigning EU fiscal rules: From rules to standards - PIIE Working Paper, Olivier Blanchard, Álvaro Leandro and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, February 2021.
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 233 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for the rea newed fiscal framework to promote sustainability and cyclical stabilisation and to improve the quality of public expenditure through sustainable investments and reforms; calls for well-defined, transparent, simple, flexible and enforceable rules embedded in a credible and democratic frameworkhat facilitates the use of discretionary fiscal policy by Member States to support country-specific macroeconomic and social objectives; calls for a flexible and democratic framework of fiscal policy coordination that takes into account the specificities of Member States and promote upward economic and social convergeand particular policy objectives of Member States and promotes symmetric macroeconomic policies with a view on reducing intra-euro area imbalances;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 252 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Suggests focusing the fiscal targets on the achievement of a single credible debt anchor aimed at reducing high debt ratios in a realistic and reasonable period of time and differentiated according to the existing debt level of the Member States;deleted
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 262 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Proposes an expenditure rule with a ceiling20 on nominal public expenditure when a country’s public debt exceeds a certain threshold; _________________ 20A ceiling fixed for 3-5 years that would depend on the expected potential output growth, expected inflation and the distance from the debt anchor.deleted
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 273 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Notes that the country-specific path outcome should result from a discussion between each Member States and the Commission, after a consultation with the EFB in the context of the European Semester; considers that the expenditure rule should also include a correction mechanism to remove cyclical items in the context of strong democratic control;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 277 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. UnderlinNotes that expenditure rules allow for automatic stabilisers to operate and are under the direct control of the government; argues that while potential output growth is unobservable and has to be estimated, it is less likely to be subject to revisions than the output gaprecalls however that expenditure rules will constrain the implementation of a discretionary fiscal stimulus; stresses that concepts as potential output growth cannot be adequately measured, nor observed, and can therefore not provide an adequate basis for policy design;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 290 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Proposes, in line with the EFB, ‘ one general escape clause, triggered based on independent economic judgedemocratic deliberation in the European parliament;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 329 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Agrees with the opinion of the EFB and others21 that a deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) would be helped by a central fiscal capacity, which could help cushion idiosyncratic shocks, whether common or country-specific, in a timely manner; stresses that a central fiscal capacity needs to respect fully the outcomes of national democratic decision-making by parliaments and referenda and shall not be linked to the promotion of reforms in Member States, neither as policy conditionality, nor as incentives; _________________ 21International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank.
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 336 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
25. Welcomes the creation of the NGEU, which is financed through debt issuance guaranteed by the EU budget; regrets the limited size of the grants component of the NGEU, especially compared to the fiscal stimulus measures provided by other jurisdictions; underlines that EU-issuance debt22 will provide a new supply of European high- quality assets, which is a step towards a permanent EU safe asset; proposes to exclude EU-issued debt from the ECB’s monetary financing prohibition using provisions of Article 125 TFEU and following similar specifications made in Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993; _________________ 22 NGEU & SURE bonds.
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 350 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
26. Stresses the importancTakes note of the MIP in identifying and taking preventive and corrective actions against emerging imbalances; regrets the asymmetric nature of the MIP scoreboard and its bias towards the promotion of international cost competitiveness; points out, however, that the potential of this mechanism has not been fully exploited on account of its structural weaknesses; is concerned about the lack of democratic oversight in the MIP; calls for a strengthening of the role of the European parliament and democratic accountability;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 366 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
27. Calls for the MIP to be reformoverhauled to make its indicators and recommendations more forward-looking and symmetrical with regard to over- and undershooting target values, and to focus on indicators under the control of policymakers and geared towards reducing intra-euro area imbalances by means of a symmetrical approach instead of a one- sided promotion of international cost competitiveness; considers that greater compliance with pared-back recommendations must be achieved and MIP-relevant country-specific recommendations should focus on policy actions that can have a direct impact on imbalances; stresses that the MIP must respect Article 153 TFEU entailing that recommendations are not to intervene with national wage policy and collective bargaining;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 401 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
30. Calls for a renewed European Semester as the mainfundamentally changed economic and social policy coordination framework supporting the EU’s long-standing goals of sustainability and upward convergence with stronger national ownershipMember States distinct economic paths ways as decided by their elected parliaments and governments; calls for more rigorous democratic scrutiny and for Parliament’s full involvement in defining the overarching goals and the guidance;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 413 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
32. Calls for more involvement of national productivity councils in the MIP process;deleted
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 423 #

2020/2075(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
33. Underlines that for better enforcement the right balance should be sought between peer support, peer pressure, financial benefits and financial consequemechanisms, especially financial sanctions, have deteriorated public trust in the Union fuelling a crisis of legitimacy; calls for a cancelation of enforcement mechanism related to the economic governances;
2021/04/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 15 #

2020/2022(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
2. States that in general the limited liability provisions as set out in the e- Commerce Directive1 mustshould be maintained and strengthened in the Digital Services Act, particularly in order to protect freedom of expression and the freedom to provide services; underlines the importance of these protections to the growth of European SMEs; considers nevertheless that for commercial activities on online market places a tailored liability regime with proper enforcement mechanisms is necessary in order to guarantee consumer protection and product safety; further considers ex-ante rules for "gate keepers" necessary in order to restore a level playing field in the digital economy; _________________ 1 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’), OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, p. 1.
2020/05/07
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 29 #

2020/2022(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
3. Recognises that SMEs and large players have differing capabilities with regard to the moderation of content; warns that overburdening businesses with disproportionate new obligations could further hinder the growth of SMEs and require recourse to automatic filtering tools, which may often lead to the removal of legal content; therefore, demands that when automatic filtering tools are applied, robust safeguards for transparency and accountability should be introduced with highly skilled independent and impartial public oversight;
2020/05/07
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 63 #

2020/2022(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Considers that practices like profiling deeply interfere with people's rights and freedoms; recognizes that the General Data Protection Regulation framework does not adequately protect consumers against profile building and unjustified automated decisions; therefore is the opinion that in order to ensure adequate protection of consumers, personal data should only be used where it’s necessary to provide the service requested;
2020/05/07
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 15 #

2020/2019(INL)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Stresses that in view of commercial activities on online market places, self- regulation has proven to be insufficient and, therefore, asks the Commission to introduce strong safeguards and obligations for product safety and consumer protection for commercial activities on online market places, accompanied by a tailored liability regime with proper enforcement mechanisms;
2020/05/07
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 66 #

2020/2019(INL)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Asks the Commission to include in a future Digital Services Act an obligation for interoperability for “digital gate keepers”, in order to restore a level playing field for SMEs, thus enlarging consumer choices and therefore providing more diversity online;
2020/05/07
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 76 #

2020/2019(INL)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
8. Stresses that any future legislative proposals should seek to remove current and prevent potentially new barriers in the supply of digital services by online platforms; underlines, at the same time, that new Union obligations on platforms must be proportional and clear in nature in order to avoid unnecessary regulatory burdens or unnecessary restrictions; underlines the need to prevent gold- plating practices of Union legislation by Member States.deleted
2020/05/07
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 12 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 7 a (new)
- having regard to the study by Dr Melanie Smith "Enforcement and cooperation between Member States in a Digital Services Act", commissioned by the European Parliament’s Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, Luxembourg, 2020,
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 17 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 7 b (new)
- having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions (ECONVI/048) from 5 December 2019 on “a European framework for regulatory responses to the collaborative economy”,
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 37 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas a small number of companies developed a market dominance by acquiring an unprecedented level of knowledge about people’s lives;
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 135 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Considers that the Digital Services Act should be based on a European public values of the Union protecting citizens’ rights approach going beyond the economic sphere, protecting all fundamental rights, including non- discrimination, privacy, dignity, fairness as well as free speech and rule of law and should aim to foster the creation of a rich and diverse online ecosystem with a wide range of online services, favourable digital environment and legal certainty to unlock the full potential of the Digital Single Market;
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 143 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
(1) Considers that while the horizontal approach of the E-Commerce Directive should be maintained, a “one-size-fits-all” approach is not suitable to address all the new challenges in today´s digital landscape; stresses therefore, that the diversity of actors and services offered online need a tailored regulatory approach;
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 192 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Stresses that the Digital Services Act should achieve the right balance between the internal market freedoms and theensure that fundamental rights and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union are reflected in the internal market freedoms;
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 254 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Stresses that existing obligations, set out in the E-Commerce Directive and the Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directiveʼ)3 on transparency of commercial communications and digital advertising should be strengthened; points out that pressing consumer protection concerns about profiling, targeting and personalised pricing cannot be addressed by transparency obligations and left to consumer choice alone; considers that practices like profiling deeply interfere with people's rights and freedoms; recognises that the General Data Protection Regulation framework does not adequately protect consumers against profile building and unjustified automated decisions; is of the opinion that in order to ensure adequate protection of consumers, personal data should only be used where it’s necessary to provide the service requested; __________________ 3 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to- consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, p. 22).
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 278 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
(17a) Considers it necessary to end the “attention- seeking” profiling business model of digital markets, where algorithms priorities controversial content and thus contribute to its spread online; stresses thus, that users should have more control on how rankings are presented, e.g. by giving them the choice to arrange them alternatively;
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 284 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Considers that consumers should be properly informed in an understandable and easily accessible way and their rights should be effectively guaranteed when they interact with automated decision-making systems and other innovative digital services or applications; believes that it should be possible for consumers to request checks and corrections of possible mistakes resulting from automated decisions, as well as human intervention and consumers should have the right to seek redress for any damage related to the use of automated decision-making systems; considers that the set of rights of consumers should be expanded to better protect them in the digital world, in particular the right to accountability and control and the right to fairness which should be considered in order to foster the necessary trust of consumers in AI applications;
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 331 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Considers that voluntary actions and self-regulation by online platforms across Europe have brought some benefits, but additional measures are needed in order to ensure the swift detection and removal of illegal content online; considers that instead of applying algorithms for automated filtering technologies, a solid reform of the “notice and take down” framework should be introduced; stresses that in case filters are used, they need to be accompanied by robust safeguards for transparency and accountability with highly skilled independent and impartial public oversight; rejects therefore a “good samaritan clauses” for dominant platforms;
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 401 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
25. Stresses that it is unacceptable that Union consumers are exposed to illegal and unsafe products, containing dangerous chemicals, as well as other safety hazards; stresses that in view of commercial activities on online market places, self regulation provided to be insufficient and therefore, asks the Commission to introduce strong safeguards and obligations for product safety and consumer protection for commercial activities on online market places, accompanied by a tailored liability regime with proper enforcement mechanisms;
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 433 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 7
Ex ante regulation of systemicdominant platforms
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 434 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
27. Notes that, today, some markets are characterised by large platforms with significant network effects which are able to act as de facto “online gatekeepers” of the digital economy large platforms acquired a huge amount of data and replaced services of a diverse and decentralised system with open standards by “walled gardens” with locked- in users; stresses that as a consequence some markets are characterised by large platforms with significant network effects which are able to act as de facto “online gatekeepers” of the digital economy; considers it therefore necessary to introduce additional obligations regarding data protection, transparency, user choice and interoperability in order to guarantee a level playing field and consumer welfare;
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 457 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 a (new)
(1) Considers that increased transparency from platforms on data sharing is crucial in view of guaranteeing the functioning of an ex-ante rule regulation; notes that self-reporting without the ability to audit is not sufficient and therefore, stresses that authorities should have powers to compel data from dominant platforms and need to be equipped with staff and resources to properly interpret that data;
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 466 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
29. Believes that, in view of the cross- border nature of digital services, effective supervision and cooperation between Member States is key to ensuring the proper enforcement of the Digital Services Act; stresses therefore, that it is not only necessary that competent authorities of the country of destination receive all the data required for public administration to fulfil their tasks needed to enforce law, but considers necessary to enlarge the derogations from article 3 in the Annex by adding provisions related to tax and housing policies;
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 515 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – part I – paragraph 3
The Digital Services Act should provide consumers and economic operators, especially micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, with legal certainty and transparency and should not apply a "one- size-fits-all" approach;
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 521 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – part I – paragraph 4
The Digital Services Act should respect the broad framework of fundamental European rights of users and consumers, such as the protection of privacy, data, non- discrimination, dignity, fairness and free speech;
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 559 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – part II – paragraph 3
The Digital Services Act should maintain and consider extending the derogation set out in the Annex of the E-Commerce Directive and, in particular, the derogation of contractual obligations concerning consumer contracts;
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 596 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – part III – paragraph 1 – indent 5
- define “systemicdominant operator” by establishing a set of clear economic indicators that allow regulatory authorities to identify platforms with a “gatekeeper” role playing a systemic role in the online economy; such indicators could include considerations such as whether the undertaking is active to a significant extent on multi-sided markets, the size of its network (number of users), its financial strength, access to data, vertical integration, the importance of its activity for third parties’ access to supply and markets, etc.
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 671 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – part IV – paragraph 1 – subheading 4 – indent 3 a (new)
- establish more transparency regarding ranking results and end the “attention- seeking” profiling business model of digital markets, in order to reduce the spread of controversial content and to give users more choice on how rankings are presented;
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 706 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – part V – paragraph 1 – indent 3
- preserve the underlying legal principle that online intermediaries should not be held directly liable for the acts of their users and that online intermediaries can continue moderating legal content under fair and transparent terms and conditions of service, provided that they are applicable in a non-discriminatory manner;. In case filters are applied, they need to be accompanied by robust safeguards for transparency and accountability with highly skilled independent and impartial public oversight.
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 769 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – part V – subheading 2 – indent 4
- If the redress and counter-notice have established that the notified activity or information is not illegal, the online intermediary should restore the content that was removed without undue delay or allow for the re-upload by the user, without prejudice to the platform's terms of service.
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 790 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – part V – paragraph 4
The Digital Services Act should protect and, uphold and adapt the current limited exemptions from secondary liability for information society service providers (online intermediaries) provided for in Article 12, 13, and 14 of the current E- Commerce Directive to new challenges in the digital landscape. Therefore, the Digital Services Act should introduce a tailored liability regime with proper enforcement mechanisms for commercial activities on online market places in order to guarantee consumer protection and product safety.
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 877 #

2020/2018(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – part VII – paragraph 2 – indent 5
- ensure that the rights, obligations and principles of the GDPR – including data minimisation, purpose limitation, data protection by design and by default, legal grounds for processing – must be observed and that shortcomings in view of profile building must be addressed in order to ensure adequate protection of consumers;
2020/05/18
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2 #

2020/2013(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that it follows from Directive (EU) 2018/958 that humans must always bear ultimate responsibility for decision-making that involves risks to the achievement of public interest objectives; underlines that any AI technology should be subject to human oversight;
2020/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 17 #

2020/2013(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
2. Notes that in the COVID-19 health crisis, several Member States have launched the development of mobile apps to protect public health by alerting citizens to past contact with someone who has tested positive for the virus; calls for a common EU approach to AI-enabled mobile apps, the development of which must remain under state controlt is not yet proven that mobile apps to protect public health launched in the COVID-19 crisis are effective; calls on Member States to only launch such mobile apps if the voluntary, transparent and temporary character of the apps are ensured and when location data are excluded from delocalised collection on the devices;
2020/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 41 #

2020/2013(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
5. Believes that Member States and the Commission should promote AI technologies that work for people; calls on the Member States, in close cooperation with the Commission, to develop AI applications aimed at automating and facilitating e-government services, for example in the area of tax administration; underlines that explainable algorithms are importantessential to ensure that businesses and consumers benefit from better, non- discriminatory and reliable public services at a lower cost.
2020/06/05
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 122 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) By approximating diverging national laws, obstacles to the freedom to provide and receive services, including retail services, within the internal market should be eliminated. A targeted set of harmonised mandatory rules should therefore be established at Union level to ensure contestable, sustainable and fair digital markets featuring the presence of gatekeepers within the internal market.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 138 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) In particular, online intermediation services, online search engines, online browser, operating systems, online social networking, video sharing platform services, streaming services, number- independent interpersonal communication services, cloud computing services, voice- controlled virtual assistants and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike, which entails a risk of unfair business practices. They therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this Regulation. Online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services, and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in Annex II to Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council32 . In certain circumstances, the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users, but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users, such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. _________________ 32Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services, OJ L 241, 17.9.2015, p. 1.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 143 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) By approximating diverging national laws, obstacles to the freedom to provide and receive services, including retail services, within the internal market should be eliminated. A targeted set of harmonised mandatory rules should therefore be established at Union level to ensure contestable, sustainable and fair digital markets featuring the presence of gatekeepers within the internal market.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 143 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
(15) The fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. It is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position, or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future, that such concerns arise. Accordingly, the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this Regulation should apply only to undertakings designated on the basis of two of these three objective criteria, and they should only apply to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 151 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
(18) A sustained market capitalisation of the provider of core platform services at or above the threshold level over three or morewo years should be considered as strengthening the presumption that the provider of core platform services has a significant impact on the internal market.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 154 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
(21) An entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. This is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service in at least three Member States to a very high number of business users and end users during at least threewo years.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 159 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
(23) Providers of core platform services which meet the quantitative thresholds but are able to present sufficiently substantiated arguments to demonstrate that, in the circumstances in which the relevant core platform service operates, they do not fulfil the objective requirements for a gatekeeper, should not be designated directly, but only subject to a further investigation. The burden of adducing evidence that the presumption deriving from the fulfilment of quantitative thresholds should not apply to a specific provider should be borne by that provider In its assessment, the Commission should take into account only the elements which directly relate to the requirements for constituting a gatekeeper, namely whether it is an important gateway which is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market with an entrenched and durable position, either actual or foreseeable. Any justification on economic grounds seeking to demonstrate efficiencies deriving from a specific type of behaviour by the provider of core platform services should be discarded, as it is not relevant to the designation as a gatekeeper. The Commission should be able to take a decision by relying on the quantitative thresholdsdesignate the gatekeeper where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the Commission.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 162 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) In particular, online intermediation services, online search engines, online browser, operating systems, online social networking, video sharing platform services, streaming services, number- independent interpersonal communication services, cloud computing services, voice- controlled virtual assistants and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike, which entails a risk of unfair business practices. They therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this Regulation. Online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services, and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in Annex II to Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council32 . In certain circumstances, the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users, but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users, such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. _________________ 32Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services, OJ L 241, 17.9.2015, p. 1.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 169 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
(15) The fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. It is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position, or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future, that such concerns arise. Accordingly, the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this Regulation should apply only to undertakings designated on the basis of two of these three objective criteria, and they should only apply to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 175 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31
(31) To ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper, the gatekeepers should inform the Commission of all of their intended and concluded business acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. Such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above, regarding the status of individual gatekeepers, but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this Regulation and under merger control law.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 179 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
(18) A sustained market capitalisation of the provider of core platform services at or above the threshold level over three or morewo years should be considered as strengthening the presumption that the provider of core platform services has a significant impact on the internal market.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 182 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
(21) An entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. This is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service in at least three Member States to a very high number of business users and end users during at least threewo years.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 185 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36
(36) The conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data, thereby raising barriers to entry. To ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services, they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a lessnot personalised alternative. The options should be presented in an equally appealing way to the end user. The possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data, including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites, and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit, clear and straightforward manner.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 186 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
(23) Providers of core platform services which meet the quantitative thresholds but are able to present sufficiently substantiated arguments to demonstrate that, in the circumstances in which the relevant core platform service operates, they do not fulfil the objective requirements for a gatekeeper, should not be designated directly, but only subject to a further investigation. The burden of adducing evidence that the presumption deriving from the fulfilment of quantitative thresholds should not apply to a specific provider should be borne by that provider In its assessment, the Commission should take into account only the elements which directly relate to the requirements for constituting a gatekeeper, namely whether it is an important gateway which is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market with an entrenched and durable position, either actual or foreseeable. Any justification on economic grounds seeking to demonstrate efficiencies deriving from a specific type of behaviour by the provider of core platform services should be discarded, as it is not relevant to the designation as a gatekeeper. The Commission should be able to take a decision by relying on the quantitative thresholdsdesignate the gatekeeper where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the Commission.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 189 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 37
(37) Because of their position, gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions, including price, through other online intermediation services or through the business users own direct online sales channels. Such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services, limiting inter- platform contestability, which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. To ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users, it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions, including price or availability. Such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect, such as for example increased commission rates, de- ranking or de-listing of the offers of business users.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 193 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 39
(39) To safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. For example, business users, end users or civil society organisations may want to complain about different types of unfair practices, such as discriminatory access conditions, unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. Any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress, for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms, should therefore be prohibited. This should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms, including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective Union and national law This should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 197 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31
(31) To ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper, the gatekeepers should inform the Commission of all of their intended and concluded business acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. Such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above, regarding the status of individual gatekeepers, but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this Regulation and under merger control law.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 199 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 41
(41) Gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. Gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. The mere offering of a given product or service to end users, including by means of pre- installation, as well the improvement of end user offering, such as better prices or increased quality, would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 206 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 43
(43) A gatekeeper may in certain circumstancesshould not have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users, while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users. In these circumstances, aThe gatekeeper mayshould not take advantage of its dual role to use data, generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform, for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services to that of its business users. This may be the case, for instance, where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users, and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users. To prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role, it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data, which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. This obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole, including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 212 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36
(36) The conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data, thereby raising barriers to entry. To ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services, they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a lessnot personalised alternative. The options should be presented in an equally appealing way to the end user. The possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data, including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites, and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit, clear and straightforward manner.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 217 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 49
(49) In such situations, the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service, whether through legal, commercial or technical means, in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls. To ensure that this obligation is effective, it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair. Ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence, including display, rating, linking or voice results. To ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. The guidelines adopted pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation.34 _________________ 34Commission Notice: Guidelines on ranking transparency pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 424, 8.12.2020, p. 1).
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 218 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 37
(37) Because of their position, gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions, including price, through other online intermediation services or through the business users own direct online sales channels. Such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services, limiting inter- platform contestability, which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. To ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users, it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions, including price or availability. Such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect, such as for example increased commission rates, de- ranking or de-listing of the offers of business users.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 219 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 50
(50) Gatekeepers should not restrict or prevent the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. This would allow more providers to offer their services, thereby ultimately providing greater choice to the end user. Gatekeepers should ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and shall not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. The mere offering of a given product or service to consumers, including by means of pre-installation, as well as the improvement of the offering to end users, such as price reductions or increased quality, should not be construed as constituting a prohibited barrier to switching.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 221 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 51
(51) Gatekeepers can hamper the ability of end users to access online content and services including software applications. Therefore, rules should be established to ensure that the rights of end users to access an open internet are not compromised by the conduct of gatekeepers. Gatekeepers can also technically limit the ability of end users to effectively switch between different Internet access service providers, in particular through their control over operating systems or hardware. This distorts the level playing field for Internet access services and ultimately harms end users. It should therefore be ensured that gatekeepers do not unduly restrict end users in choosing their Internet access service provider.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 233 #

2020/0374(COD)

(39) To safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. For example, business users, end users or civil society organisations may want to complain about different types of unfair practices, such as discriminatory access conditions, unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. Any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress, for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms, should therefore be prohibited. This should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms, including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective Union and national law This should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 241 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 57
(57) In particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. In view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores, those, gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions, including pricing conditions, that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. Pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. The following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. This obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in Regulation [Digital Services Act].
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 244 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 41
(41) Gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. Gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. The mere offering of a given product or service to end users, including by means of pre- installation, as well the improvement of end user offering, such as better prices or increased quality, would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 246 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 58
(58) To ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this Regulation, while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers, it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them, in full respect of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, consumer protection, cyber security and product safety. The gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this Regulation by design. The necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. However, it may in certain cases be appropriate for the Commission, following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned, to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. This possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the Regulation.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 249 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 43
(43) A gatekeeper may in certain circumstancesshould not have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users, while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users. In these circumstances, aThe gatekeeper mayshould not take advantage of its dual role to use data, generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform, for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services to that of its business users. This may be the case, for instance, where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users, and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users. To prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role, it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data, which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. This obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole, including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 251 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 59
(59) As an additional element to ensure proportionality, gatekeepers should be given an opportunity to request the suspension, to the extent necessary, of a specific obligation in exceptional circumstances that lie beyond the control of the gatekeeper, such as for example an unforeseen external shock that has temporarily eliminated a significant part of end user demand for the relevant core platform service, where compliance with a specific obligation is shown by the gatekeeper to endanger the economic viability of the Union operations of the gatekeeper concerned.deleted
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 253 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 60
(60) In exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public morality, public health or public security, the Commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. Affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. The regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this Regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability.deleted
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 259 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 62
(62) In order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this Regulation, the Commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this Regulation; whether systematic non- compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies; and whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets should be identified. Such assessment should be based on market investigations to be run in an appropriate timeframe, by using clear procedures and legally binding deadlines, in order to support the ex ante effect of this Regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector, and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 262 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 64
(64) The Commission should investigate and assess whether additional behavioural, or, where appropriate, structural remediesstructural remedies or equally effective behavioural are justified, in order to ensure that the gatekeeper cannot frustrate the objectives of this Regulation by systematic non- compliance with one or several of the obligations laid down in this Regulation, which has further strengthened its gatekeeper position. This would be the case if the gatekeeper’s size in the internal market has further increased, economic dependency of business users and end users on the gatekeeper’s core platform services has further strengthened as their number has further increased and the gatekeeper benefits from increased entrenchment of its position. The Commission should therefore in such cases have the power to impose any remedy, whether behavioural or structural, having due regard to the principle of proportionality. Structural remedies, such as legal, functional or structural separation, including the divestiture of a business, or parts of it, should only be imposed either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. Changes to the structure of an undertaking as it existed before the systematic non-compliance was established would only be proportionate where there is a substantial risk that this systematic non-compliance results from the very structure of the undertaking concerned.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 268 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 67
(67) Where, in the course of a proceeding into non-compliance or an investigation into systemic non- compliance, a gatekeeper offers commitments to the Commission, the latter should be able to adopt a decision making these commitments binding on the gatekeeper concerned, where it finds that the commitments ensure effective compliance with the obligations of this Regulation. This decision should also find that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission.deleted
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 276 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 72
(72) The Commission should be able to take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in this Regulation. Such actions should include the ability of the Commission to appoint independent external experts, such as and auditors to assist the Commission in this process, including where applicable from competent independent authorities, such as data or consumer protection authorities. The experts may be embedded within the gatekeeper to ensure the monitoring process.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 278 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 49
(49) In such situations, the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service, whether through legal, commercial or technical means, in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls. To ensure that this obligation is effective, it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair. Ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence, including display, rating, linking or voice results. To ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. The guidelines adopted pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation.34 _________________ 34Commission Notice: Guidelines on ranking transparency pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 424, 8.12.2020, p. 1).
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 279 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 75
(75) In the context of proceedings carried out under this Regulation, the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the Commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. While ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned, in particular, the right of access to the file and the right to be heard, it is essential that confidential information be protected. Furthermore, while respecting the confidentiality of the information, the Commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. Finally, under certain conditions certain business records, such as communication between lawyers and their clients, may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met.deleted
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 282 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 79 a (new)
(79 a) A small number of companies developed a market dominance by acquiring an unprecedented level about people’s lives and replaced services of a diverse and decentralised system with open standards by “walled gardens” with locked-in users; therefore, this Regulation should introduce additional obligations regarding data protection, transparency, user choice and interoperability in order to guarantee a level playing field and consumer welfare.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 283 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 50
(50) Gatekeepers should not restrict or prevent the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. This would allow more providers to offer their services, thereby ultimately providing greater choice to the end user. Gatekeepers should ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and shall not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. The mere offering of a given product or service to consumers, including by means of pre-installation, as well as the improvement of the offering to end users, such as price reductions or increased quality, should not be construed as constituting a prohibited barrier to switching.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 283 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 79 b (new)
(79 b) In order to guarantee proper enforcement of this regulation, the Commission should be equipped with sufficient staff to guarantee harmonised enforcement, proper monitoring of compliance by gatekeepers and qualitative market investigations across the EU. Therefore, the estimated budget for the number of staff should be raised in order to sufficiently prepare the Commission to face all the task attributed by this regulation.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 284 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 79 c (new)
(79 c) The proposal for an ‘empowered and strategic’ High Level Multi stakeholder Body for Digital Cooperation in the UN´s "Roadmap for Digital Cooperation" runs counter and calls for stronger regulation of digital companies. While international cooperation is of highly importance, a genuinely democratic approach for global digital governance should be upheld. To that end, obligations for gatekeepers and enforcement measurers of this Regulation should contribute to the development of appropriate global norms and polices.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 286 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1
1. This Regulation lays down harmonised rules ensuring contestable, sustainable and fair markets in the digital sector across the Union where gatekeepers apre presentvent with their monopolistic ecosystems a level playing field.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 287 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 51
(51) Gatekeepers can hamper the ability of end users to access online content and services including software applications. Therefore, rules should be established to ensure that the rights of end users to access an open internet are not compromised by the conduct of gatekeepers. Gatekeepers can also technically limit the ability of end users to effectively switch between different Internet access service providers, in particular through their control over operating systems or hardware. This distorts the level playing field for Internet access services and ultimately harms end users. It should therefore be ensured that gatekeepers do not unduly restrict end users in choosing their Internet access service provider.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 291 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
5. Member States shall not impose on gatekeepers further obligations by way of laws, regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. This is without prejudice to rules pursuing other legitimate public interests, in compliance with Union law. In particular, nNothing in this Regulation precludes Member States from imposing obligations, which are compatible with Union law, on undertakings, including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this Regulation in order to protect consumers or to fight against acts of unfair competition.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 300 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 6
6. This Regulation is without prejudice to the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It is also without prejudice to the application of: national rules prohibiting anticompetitive agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings, concerted practices and abuses of dominant positions; national competition rules prohibiting other forms of unilateral conduct insofar as they are applied to undertakings other than gatekeepers or amount to imposcluding additional obligations on gatekeepers; Council Regulation (EC) No 139/200438 and national rules concerning merger control; Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 and Regulation (EU) …./.. of the European Parliament and of the Council39 . _________________ 38Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1). 39Regulation (EU) …/.. of the European Parliament and of the Council – proposal on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 305 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 57
(57) In particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. In view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores, those , gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions, including pricing conditions, that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. Pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. The following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. This obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in Regulation [Digital Services Act].
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 315 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 58
(58) To ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this Regulation, while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers, it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them, in full respect of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, consumer protection, cyber security and product safety. The gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this Regulation by design. The necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. However, it may in certain cases be appropriate for the Commission, following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned, to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. This possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the Regulation.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 321 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 59
(59) As an additional element to ensure proportionality, gatekeepers should be given an opportunity to request the suspension, to the extent necessary, of a specific obligation in exceptional circumstances that lie beyond the control of the gatekeeper, such as for example an unforeseen external shock that has temporarily eliminated a significant part of end user demand for the relevant core platform service, where compliance with a specific obligation is shown by the gatekeeper to endanger the economic viability of the Union operations of the gatekeeper concerned.deleted
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 321 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point h a (new)
(h a) streaming services
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 322 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point h b (new)
(h b) voice-controlled virtual assistants;
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 324 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 60
(60) In exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public morality, public health or public security, the Commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. Affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. The regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this Regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability.deleted
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 324 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point h c (new)
(h c) online browsers;
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 333 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 62
(62) In order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this Regulation, the Commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this Regulation; whether systematic non- compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies; and whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets should be identified. Such assessment should be based on market investigations to be run in an appropriate timeframe, by using clear procedures and legally binding deadlines, in order to support the ex ante effect of this Regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector, and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 338 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 64
(64) The Commission should investigate and assess whether additional behavioural, or, where appropriate, structural remediesstructural remedies or equally effective behavioural are justified, in order to ensure that the gatekeeper cannot frustrate the objectives of this Regulation by systematic non- compliance with one or several of the obligations laid down in this Regulation, which has further strengthened its gatekeeper position. This would be the case if the gatekeeper’s size in the internal market has further increased, economic dependency of business users and end users on the gatekeeper’s core platform services has further strengthened as their number has further increased and the gatekeeper benefits from increased entrenchment of its position. The Commission should therefore in such cases have the power to impose any remedy, whether behavioural or structural, having due regard to the principle of proportionality. Structural remedies, such as legal, functional or structural separation, including the divestiture of a business, or parts of it, should only be imposed either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. Changes to the structure of an undertaking as it existed before the systematic non-compliance was established would only be proportionate where there is a substantial risk that this systematic non-compliance results from the very structure of the undertaking concerned.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 348 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 67
(67) Where, in the course of a proceeding into non-compliance or an investigation into systemic non- compliance, a gatekeeper offers commitments to the Commission, the latter should be able to adopt a decision making these commitments binding on the gatekeeper concerned, where it finds that the commitments ensure effective compliance with the obligations of this Regulation. This decision should also find that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission.deleted
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 358 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. A provider of core platform services shall be designated as gatekeeper if two of the following criteria apply:
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 360 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 72
(72) The Commission should be able to take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in this Regulation. Such actions should include the ability of the Commission to appoint independent external experts, such as and auditors to assist the Commission in this process, including where applicable from competent independent authorities, such as data or consumer protection authorities. The experts may be embedded within the gatekeeper to ensure the monitoring process.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 365 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 75
(75) In the context of proceedings carried out under this Regulation, the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the Commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. While ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned, in particular, the right of access to the file and the right to be heard, it is essential that confidential information be protected. Furthermore, while respecting the confidentiality of the information, the Commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. Finally, under certain conditions certain business records, such as communication between lawyers and their clients, may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met.deleted
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 375 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) the requirement in paragraph 1 point (c) where the thresholds in point (b) were met in each of the last threewo financial years.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 378 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 79 a (new)
(79 a) A small number of companies developed a market dominance by acquiring an unprecedented level about people’s lives and replaced services of a diverse and decentralised system with open standards by “walled gardens” with locked-in users; therefore, this regulation should introduce additional obligations regarding data protection, transparency, user choice and interoperability in order to guarantee a level playing field and consumer welfare.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 380 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 79 b (new)
(79 b) In order to guarantee proper enforcement of this regulation, the Commission should be equipped with sufficient staff to guarantee harmonised enforcement, proper monitoring of compliance by gatekeepers and qualitative market investigations across the EU. Therefore, the estimated budget for the number of staff should be raised in order to sufficiently prepare the Commission to face all the task attributed by this regulation.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 381 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
3. Where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2, it shall notify the Commission thereof within three month10 days after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. That notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). The notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b).
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 382 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 79 c (new)
(79 c) The proposal for an ‘empowered and strategic’ High Level Multi stakeholder Body for Digital Cooperation in the UN´s "Roadmap for Digital Cooperation" runs counter calls for stronger regulation of digital companies. While international cooperation is of highly importance, a genuinely democratic approach for global digital governance should be uphold. To that end, obligations for gatekeepers and enforcement measurers of this regulation should contribute to the development of appropriate global norms and polices.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 385 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1
1. This Regulation lays down harmonised rules ensuring contestable, sustainable and fair markets in the digital sector across the Union where gatekeepers apre present.vent with their monopolistic ecosystems a level playing field
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 389 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – introductory part
4. The Commission shall, without undue delay and at the latest 630 days after receiving the complete information referred to in paragraph 3, designate the provider of core platform services that meets all the thresholds of paragraph 2 as a gatekeeper, unless that provider, with its notification, presents sufficiently substantiated arguments to demonstrate that, in the circumstances in which the relevant core platform service operates, and taking into account the elements listed in paragraph 6, the provider does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 393 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
5. Member States shall not impose on gatekeepers further obligations by way of laws, regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. This is without prejudice to rules pursuing other legitimate public interests, in compliance with Union law. In particular, nNothing in this Regulation precludes Member States from imposing obligations, which are compatible with Union law, on undertakings, including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this Regulation in order to protect consumers or to fight against acts of unfair competition.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 394 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 6 – introductory part
6. The Commission may identify as a gatekeeper, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 15, any provider of core platform services that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1, but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2, or has presented sufficiently substantiated arguments in accordance with paragraph 4.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 406 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 6
6. This Regulation is without prejudice to the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It is also without prejudice to the application of: national rules prohibiting anticompetitive agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings, concerted practices and abuses of dominant positions; national competition rules prohibiting other forms of unilateral conduct insofar as they are applied to undertakings other than gatekeepers or amount to imposcluding additional obligations on gatekeepers; Council Regulation (EC) No 139/200438 and national rules concerning merger control; Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 and Regulation (EU) …./.. of the European Parliament and of the Council39 . _________________ 38Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1). 39Regulation (EU) …/.. of the European Parliament and of the Council – proposal on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 406 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 – point f a (new)
(f a) the employment of data- intelligence to coordinate, organise and control the entire set of activities and actors involved, often described as digital ecosystems.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 410 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 3
Where the provider of a core platform service that satisfies the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the Commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations, the Commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper.deleted
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 413 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 4
Where the provider of a core platform service that does not satisfy the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the Commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations, the Commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on facts available.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 424 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 8
8. The gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 within sixtwo months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Article.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 427 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Where the Commission, on the basis of that review pursuant to the first subparagraph, finds that the facts on which the designation of the providers of core platform services as gatekeepers was based, have changed, it shall adopt a corresponding decision and shall be made public.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 430 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point h a (new)
(h a) streaming services
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 434 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) refrain from combining and, or cross-using personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services, and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data, unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. The specific choice shall not subvert or impair consumers’ autonomy, decision-making, or choice via the structure, function or manner of operation of their online interface or any part thereof;
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 435 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point h b (new)
(h b) voice-controlled virtual assistants;
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 436 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) refrain fromnot combininge personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from other core platform services, any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services, and fromnot sign ing in business users and end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data, unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. ;
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 439 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point h c (new)
(h c) online browsers;
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 445 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services and through own direct online sales channels of the business user at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 456 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) refrain from preventing or restricting business or end users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers;
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 462 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) refrain from requiring business users to use, offer or interoperate with an identificationancillary service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper;
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 475 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point g
(g) provide advertisers and publishers to which it supplies advertising services, upon their request, with information concerning all non-price criteria in the auction process, the price paid by the advertiser and publisher, as well as the amount or remuneration paid to the publisher, for the publishing of a given ad and for each of the relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 480 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
(g a) not avail themselves of consent by way of derogation from Regulation (EU) 2016/679, as a legal ground for processing of personal data in order to target natural persons for purposes of digital advertising;
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 483 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point g b (new)
(g b) allow users to un-install any pre- installed software applications or change default settings on its core platform service, without prejudice to the possibility for a gatekeeper to restrict such un- installation in relation to software applications that are essential for the functioning of the operating system or of the device and which cannot technically be offered on a standalone basis by third parties;
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 487 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point g c (new)
(g c) refrain from using, in competition with business users, any data not publicly available, which is generated through activities by those business users, including by the end users of these business users, of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 489 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point g c (new)
(g c) not pre-install any software applications on its core platform services, unless those applications are essential for the integrity of the service, operating system or the device and cannot technically be offered on a standalone basis by third-parties;
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 492 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) refrain from using, in competition with business users, any data not publicly available, which is generated through activities by those business users, including by the end users of these business users, of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users;deleted
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 493 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. A provider of core platform services shall be designated as gatekeeper if two of the following criteria apply:
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 498 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) allow end users to un-install any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service without prejudice to the possibility for a gatekeeper to restrict such un-installation in relation to software applications that are essential for the functioning of the operating system or of the device and which cannot technically be offered on a standalone basis by third-parties;deleted
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 519 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) the requirement in paragraph 1 point (c) where the thresholds in point (b) were met in each of the last threewo financial years.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 525 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) refrain from technically restricting the ability of and non- technical tactics to restrict end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper, including as regards the choice of Internet access provider for end users;
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 528 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
3. Where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2, it shall notify the Commission thereof within three month10 days after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. That notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). The notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b).
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 530 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point f
(f) allow business users, end users and providers of ancillary servicesservices to have, to the fullest extent technically supported, access to and interoperability with the same operating system, hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any core and ancillary services by providing complete and accurate information, while guaranteeing a high level of security and personal data protection;
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 535 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point f
(f) allow business users, end users and providers of ancillary or core services access to and interoperability with the same operating system, hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary or core services;
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 538 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – introductory part
4. The Commission shall, without undue delay and at the latest 630 days after receiving the complete information referred to in paragraph 3, designate the provider of core platform services that meets all the thresholds of paragraph 2 as a gatekeeper, unless that provider, with its notification, presents sufficiently substantiated arguments to demonstrate that, in the circumstances in which the relevant core platform service operates, and taking into account the elements listed in paragraph 6, the provider does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 539 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point g
(g) provide advertisers and publishers, upon their request a continuous, real-time and free of charge, with access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers and publishers to carry out their own independentprovide for full disclosure and transparency of the parameters and data used for decision making, execution and measurement of the intermediation services. A gatekeeper shall further provide, free of charge, reliable, non-aggregated, granular and complete data necessary for advertisers and publishers to carry out their own independent high-quality and real- time evaluation of intermediation services, including verification of the ad inventory;
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 544 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 6 – introductory part
6. The Commission may identify as a gatekeeper, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 15, any provider of core platform services that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1, but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2, or has presented sufficiently substantiated arguments in accordance with paragraph 4.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 561 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 – point f a (new)
(f a) the employment of data- intelligence to coordinate, organize and control the entire set of activities and actors involved, often described as digital ecosystems
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 563 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 3
Where the provider of a core platform service that satisfies the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the Commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations, the Commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper.deleted
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 566 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 4
Where the provider of a core platform service that does not satisfy the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the Commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations, the Commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on facts available.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 571 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point k b (new)
(k b) ensure that its services, including user interfaces, are accessible to persons with disabilities in accordance with Article 13 of Directive (EU) 2019/882. It shall also ensure that business users which rely on its core platform services to reach consumers for offering services and products in the scope of Directive(EU) 2019/882, comply with the requirements of Directive (EU) 2019/882;
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 573 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point k a (new)
(k a) refrain from practices that obstruct the option to unsubscribe from a core platform service, whereas the subscription is easily facilitated. In practice, both processes shall be equally demanding for business and end users;
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 577 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point k c (new)
(k c) refrain from having a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users, while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users;
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 582 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 8
8. The gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 within sixtwo months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Article.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 582 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point k d (new)
(k d) refrain from any act of concentration within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, unless the gatekeeper can demonstrate that the act of concentration promotes competition and consumer welfare significantly.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 589 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Where the Commission, on the basis of that review pursuant to the first subparagraph, finds that the facts on which the designation of the providers of core platform services as gatekeepers was based, have changed, it shall adopt a corresponding decision and shall be made public.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 591 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1
1. The measures implemented by the gatekeeper toshall ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 shall be effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation. The gatekeeper shall ensure that these measuresthat the measures implemented to comply with Article 5 and 6 are implemented in compliance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, and with legislation on cyber security, consumer protection and product safety.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 598 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2
2. Where the Commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1, or has implemented, do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in Article 6, it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. The Commission shall adopt such a decision within sixthree months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to Article 18 and make that decision public.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 599 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) refrain from combining and, or cross-using personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services, and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data, unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of Regulation (EU) 2016/679.The specific choice shall not subvert or impair consumers’ autonomy, decision-making, or choice via the structure, function or manner of operation of their online interface or any part thereof ;
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 611 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5
5. In specifying the measures under paragraph 2, the Commission shall ensure that the measures are effective in achieving the objectives of the relevant obligation and proportionate in the specific circumstances of the gatekeeper and the relevant service.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 613 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services and through own direct online sales channels of the business user at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 613 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 7
7. A gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to Article 18 for the Commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under Article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. A gatekeeper may, with its request, provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances.deleted
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 621 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8
1. The Commission may, on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper, exceptionally suspend, in whole or in part, a specific obligation laid down in Articles 5 and 6 for a core platform service by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4), where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger, due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper, the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the Union, and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. The Commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest 3 months following receipt of a complete reasoned request. 2. Where the suspension is granted pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall review its suspension decision every year. Following such a review the Commission shall either lift the suspension or decide that the conditions of paragraph 1 continue to be met. 3. The Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper, provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1. In assessing the request, the Commission shall take into account, in particular, the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the Union as well as on third parties. The suspension may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the Commission in order to ensure a fair balance between these interests and the objectives of this Regulation. Such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the Commission pursuant to paragraph 1.Article 8 deleted Suspension
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 630 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1
1. The Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative, by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4), exempt it, in whole or in part, from a specific obligation laid down in Articles 5 and 6 in relation to an individual core platform service identified pursuant to Article 3(7), where such exemption is justified on the grounds set out in paragraph 2 of this Article. The Commission shall adopt the exemption decision at the latest 3 months after receiving a complete reasoned request.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 634 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 3
3. The Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative, provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1. In assessing the request, the Commission shall take into account, in particular, the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the grounds in paragraph 2 as well as the effects on the gatekeeper concerned and on third parties. The suspension may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the Commission in order to ensure a fair balance between the goals pursued by the grounds in paragraph 2 and the objectives of this Regulation. Such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the Commission pursuant to paragraph 1.deleted
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 636 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1
1. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 34 to update the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 where, for reasons of public interest or based on a market investigation pursuant to Article 17, it has identified the need for new obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 638 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2
2. A practice within the meaning of paragraph 1 shall be considered to be unfair or limit the contestability of core platform services where: (a) there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or (b) the contestability of markets is weakened as a consequence of such a practice engaged in by gatekeepers.deleted
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 639 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) refrain from preventing or restricting business or end users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers;
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 642 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on end users or business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 654 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) refrain from requiring business users to use, offer or interoperate with an identificationancillary service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper;
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 654 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 3
3. A gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in Articles 5 and 6, or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. The gatekeeper shall not subvert or impair consumers’ autonomy, decision-making, or choice via the structure, function or manner of operation of their online interface or any part thereof while those consumers are exercising those rights or specific choices.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 657 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. A gatekeeper shall not obstruct or dissuade end users from switching to software applications and services nor directly or indirectly circumvent any of the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 nor by use manipulative choice architectures.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 662 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. A gatekeeper shall inform the Commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a Union competition authority under Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 670 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2
2. The notification pursuant to paragraph 1 shall at least describe for the merger or acquisition targets their EEA and worldwide annual turnover, for any relevant core platform services their respective EEA annual turnover, their number of yearly active business users and the number of monthly active end users, as well as the rationale of the intended concentration. The rationale shall demonstrate that the intended concentration will not stifle but promote competition and consumer welfare. The Commission shall publish the notification.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 675 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. The information gathered pursuant to this Article may be used in parallel competition cases, especially for purposes of merger control.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 676 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. The Commission shall publish annually the list of acquisitions of which it has been informed by gatekeepers.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 677 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point g
(g) provide advertisers and publishers to which it supplies advertising services, upon their request, with information concerning all non-price criteria in the auction process, the price paid by the advertiser and publisher, as well as the amount or remuneration paid to the publisher, for the publishing of a given ad and for each of the relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 681 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1
Within six months after its designation pursuant to Article 3, a gatekeeper shall submit to the Commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumersemployment of data-intelligence to coordinate, organize and control the entire set of activities and actors involved including techniques for profiling of consumers, especially in view of pricing, offers and ranking that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to Article 3. This description shall be updated at least annually.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 683 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 1
1. When the Commission intends to carry out a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of decisions pursuant to Articles 15, 16 and 17, it may consider the advice of end users and civil society organisations, and shall adopt a decision opening a market investigation.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 685 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1
1. The Commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(6), or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(7). It shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4) within twelvesix months from the opening of the market investigation.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 688 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2
2. In the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within six months from the opening of the investigation. In the preliminary findings, the Commission shall explain whether it considers, on a provisional basis, that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(6).deleted
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 691 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 3
3. Where the provider of core platform services satisfies the thresholds set out in Article 3(2), but has presented significantly substantiated arguments in accordance with Article 3(4), the Commission shall endeavour to conclude the market investigation within five months from the opening of the market investigation by a decision pursuant to paragraph 1. In that case the Commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings pursuant to paragraph 2 to the provider of core platform services within three months from the opening of the investigation.deleted
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 694 #

2020/0374(COD)

(g a) not avail themselves of consent by way of derogation from Regulation (EU) 2016/679, as a legal ground for processing of personal data in order to target natural persons for purposes of digital advertising;
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 695 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 4
4. When the Commission pursuant to Article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations, but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future, it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in Article 5(b) and Article 6(1) points (e), (f), (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. The Commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. The Commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 4.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 699 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point g b (new)
(g b) allow to un-install any pre- installed software applications or change default settings on its core platform service without prejudice to the possibility for a gatekeeper to restrict such un- installation in relation to software applications that are essential for the functioning of the operating system or of the device and which cannot technically be offered on a standalone basis by third- parties;
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 700 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – title
Market investigation into systematic non- compliance
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 701 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1
1. Where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under Article 3(1), the Commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this Regulationstructural or equally effective behavioural remedies. The Commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelvesix months from the opening of the market investigation.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 705 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point g c (new)
(g c) refrain from using, in competition with business users, any data not publicly available, which is generated through activities by those business users, including by the end users of these business users, of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users;
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 705 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 2
2. The Commission may only impose structural remedies pursuant to paragraph 1 either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the gatekeeper concerned than the structural remedy.deleted
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 707 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 3
3. A gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non- compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6, where the Commission has issued at least three non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to Articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of five years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this Article.deleted
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 708 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) refrain from using, in competition with business users, any data not publicly available, which is generated through activities by those business users, including by the end users of these business users, of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users;deleted
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 713 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 4
4. A gatekeeper shall be deemed to have further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under Article 3(1), where its impact on the internal market has further increased, especially in new segments of the market, its importance as a gateway for business users to reach end users has further increased or the gatekeeper enjoys a further entrenched and durable position in its operations.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 715 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 6
6. The Commission may at any time during the market investigation extend its duration where the extension is justified on objective grounds and proportionate. The extension may apply to the deadline by which the Commission has to issue its objections, or to the deadline for adoption of the final decision. The total duration of any extension or extensions pursuant to this paragraph shall not exceed six months.The Commission may consider commitments pursuant to Article 23 and make them binding in its decisionthree months.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 716 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. In order to ensure effective compliance by the gatekeeper with its obligations laid down in Articles 5 or 6, the Commission shall regularly review the remedies imposed in accordance with paragraph 1 or commitments accepted in accordance with paragraph 6. The Commission shall be entitled to require changes to the imposed remedies if, following an investigation, it finds that the remedies are not effective.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 718 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1
The Commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this Regulation. It shall issue a public report at the latest within 124 months from the opening of the market investigation.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 719 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) allow end users to un-install any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service without prejudice to the possibility for a gatekeeper to restrict such un-installation in relation to software applications that are essential for the functioning of the operating system or of the device and which cannot technically be offered on a standalone basis by third-parties;deleted
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 725 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 1 a (new)
When the Commission adopts a decision opening a proceeding, all relevant findings and information shall be gathered in a report, which is to be presented to the European Parliament and the Member States and be made accessible publicly on the official website of the European Commission.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 735 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23
1. If during proceedings under Articles 16 or 25 the gatekeeper concerned offers commitments for the relevant core platform services to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6, the Commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4) make those commitments binding on that gatekeeper and declare that there are no further grounds for action. 2. The Commission may, upon request or on its own initiative, reopen by decision the relevant proceedings, where: (a) there has been a material change in any of the facts on which the decision was based; (b) the gatekeeper concerned acts contrary to its commitments; (c) the decision was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information provided by the parties. 3. Should the Commission consider that the commitments submitted by the gatekeeper concerned cannot ensure effective compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6, it shall explain the reasons for not making those commitments binding in the decision concluding the relevant proceedings.Article 23 deleted Commitments
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 743 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 2
2. The actions pursuant to paragraph 1 may include the appointment of independent external experts and auditors to be embedded within the gatekeeper and to assist the Commission to monitor the obligations and measures and to provide specific expertise or knowledge to the Commission.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 747 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. The Commission shall, within six month from opening a proceeding according to Article 18, adopt a non- compliance decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4) where it finds that a gatekeeper does not comply with one or more of the following:
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 748 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) commitments made legally binding pursuant to Article 23.ted
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 754 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 3
3. In the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadlinetwo month and to provide explanations on how it plans to comply with the decision.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 757 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – title
Fines and remedies
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 758 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. In the decision pursuant to Article 25, the Commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 10% of its total turnover in the preceding financial year or structural and equally effective behavioural remedies where it finds that the gatekeeper, intentionally or negligently, fails to comply with:
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 764 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) refrain from technically restricting the ability ofand non- technical tactics to restrict end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper, including as regards the choice of Internet access provider for end users;
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 765 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3
However, the Commission shall not require payment pursuant to the second or the third subparagraph from undertakings which show that they have not implemented the infringing decision of the association and either were not aware of its existence or have actively distanced themselves from it before the Commission started investigating the case.deleted
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 771 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 1
1. The powers conferred on the Commission by Articles 26 and 27 shall be subject to a threfive year limitation period.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 775 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Before adopting a decision pursuant to Article 7, Article 8(1), Article 9(1), Articles 15, 16, 22, 23, 25 and 26 and Article 27(2), the Commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings concerned, including third parties affected by the conduct of the gatekeeper concerned, the opportunity of being heard on:
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 776 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point f
(f) allow business users, end users and providers of ancillary or core services access to and interoperability with the same operating system, hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary or core services;
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 788 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 a (new)
Article 32 a Users Panel Each designated gatekeeper shall have a dedicated users panel compo-sed of an equal number of randomly selected representatives of business users and end users. a) The process of selection of the user representatives in the user panel shall be based on online, voluntary application submission mechanisms followed by methods of sortition, as a random sample from a larger pool of voluntary candidates. b) The user panel shall inform the Commission about unfair behaviour of the gatekeeper or potential non- compliance with Articles 5 and 6. c) The user panel has the right to be informed before the Commission adopts relevant decisions concerning Articles 5 and 6.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 791 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1
1. When threone or more designated authorities of the Member States request the Commission to open an investigation pursuant to Article 15, 16 or 17 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper that there are new core platform services and practices to be added, or that a gatekeeper is violating their obligations under Articles 5 and 6, or that there is a situation of (systemic) non-compliance, the Commission shall within fourthree months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. If the Commission decides not to open an investigation, the Commission shall publish the respective reasons.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 792 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1
1. When threone or more Member States request the Commission to open an investigation pursuant to Article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper, or that a gatekeeper is violating their obligations under Articles 5 and 6, or because they have information according to which there are reasonable grounds to add new services and new practices. On that basis, the Commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 795 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1
1. When three or more Member States request the Commission to open an investigation pursuant to Article 15, 16 and 17 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper, does not comply with this regulation or its new services and practices need to be examined, the Commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 800 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. For the effective enforcement of this Regulation, Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the Parliament and of the Council on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law shall apply. To this end, persons pursuant to Article 4 of Directive (EU) 2019/1937 shall be encouraged to report breaches of Union law to a competent national authority, which shall transmit it to the Commission and the Digital Markets Advisory Committee. The reported transgression shall be assessed and enforced within three months of transmission to the Commission and the Digital Market Advisory Committee.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 806 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 34 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. Meetings between representatives of gatekeepers and members of the Digital Market Advisory Committee and the Commission shall be registered and published monthly in line with the EU transparency register. To this end, the registration in the EU transparency register shall be mandatory for gatekeepers, undertakings and associations of undertakings pursuant to Article 3(1) of this Regulation.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 807 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 36 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
(b a) further specification of accessibility requirements of point (m - new) of Article 6;
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 819 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 39 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. This Regulation shall apply from sixthree months after its entry into force.
2021/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 824 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point k a (new)
(k a) refrain from practices that obstruct the option to unsubscribe from a core platform service, whereas the subscription is easily facilitated. In practice, both processes shall be equally demanding for business and end users.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 827 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point k b (new)
(k b) ensure their services, including user interfaces, are accessible to persons with disabilities in accordance with Article 13 of Directive (EU) 2019/882. They shall also ensure that business users which rely on their core platform services to reach consumers for offering services and products in the scope of Directive(EU) 2019/882, comply with the requirements of Directive (EU) 2019/882.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 831 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point k c (new)
(k c) refrain to have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users, while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 845 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1
1. The measures implemented by the gatekeeper toshall ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 shall be effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation. The gatekeeper shall ensure that these measuresthat the measures implemented to comply with Article 5 and 6 are implemented in compliance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, and with legislation on cyber security, consumer protection and product safety.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 857 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2
2. Where the Commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1, or has implemented, do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in Article 6, it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. The Commission shall adopt such a decision within sixthree months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to Article 18 and make them public.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 876 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5
5. In specifying the measures under paragraph 2, the Commission shall ensure that the measures are effective in achieving the objectives of the relevant obligation and proportionate in the specific circumstances of the gatekeeper and the relevant service.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 883 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 7
7. A gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to Article 18 for the Commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under Article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. A gatekeeper may, with its request, provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances.deleted
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 889 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8
1. The Commission may, on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper, exceptionally suspend, in whole or in part, a specific obligation laid down in Articles 5 and 6 for a core platform service by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4), where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger, due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper, the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the Union, and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. The Commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest 3 months following receipt of a complete reasoned request. 2. Where the suspension is granted pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall review its suspension decision every year. Following such a review the Commission shall either lift the suspension or decide that the conditions of paragraph 1 continue to be met. 3. The Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper, provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1. In assessing the request, the Commission shall take into account, in particular, the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the Union as well as on third parties. The suspension may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the Commission in order to ensure a fair balance between these interests and the objectives of this Regulation. Such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the Commission pursuant to paragraph 1.Article 8 deleted Suspension
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 905 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1
1. The Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative, by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4), exempt it, in whole or in part, from a specific obligation laid down in Articles 5 and 6 in relation to an individual core platform service identified pursuant to Article 3(7), where such exemption is justified on the grounds set out in paragraph 2 of this Article. The Commission shall adopt the exemption decision at the latest 3 months after receiving a complete reasoned request.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 910 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 3
3. The Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative, provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1. In assessing the request, the Commission shall take into account, in particular, the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the grounds in paragraph 2 as well as the effects on the gatekeeper concerned and on third parties. The suspension may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the Commission in order to ensure a fair balance between the goals pursued by the grounds in paragraph 2 and the objectives of this Regulation. Such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the Commission pursuant to paragraph 1.deleted
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 914 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1
1. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 34 to update the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 where, for reasons of public interest or based on a market investigation pursuant to Article 17, it has identified the need for new obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 921 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2
2. A practice within the meaning of paragraph 1 shall be considered to be unfair or limit the contestability of core platform services where: (a) there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or (b) the contestability of markets is weakened as a consequence of such a practice engaged in by gatekeepers.deleted
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 924 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on end users or business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 945 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 3
3. A gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in Articles 5 and 6, or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. The gatekeeper shall not subvert or impair consumers’ autonomy, decision-making, or choice via the structure, function or manner of operation of their online interface or any part thereof while exercising those rights or specific choices.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 954 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. A gatekeeper shall inform the Commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a Union competition authority under Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 969 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. 4. The Commission shall publish annually the list of acquisitions of which it has been informed by gatekeepers.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 974 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1
Within six months after its designation pursuant to Article 3, a gatekeeper shall submit to the Commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumersemployment of data-intelligence to coordinate, organize and control the entire set of activities and actors involved including techniques for profiling of consumers, especially in view of pricing, offers and ranking that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to Article 3. This description shall be updated at least annually.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 977 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 1
1. When the Commission intends to carry out a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of decisions pursuant to Articles 15, 16 and 17, it may consider the advise of end users and civil society organisations, and shall adopt a decision opening a market investigation.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 983 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1
1. The Commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(6), or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(7). It shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4) within twelvesix months from the opening of the market investigation.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 985 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2
2. In the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within six months from the opening of the investigation. In the preliminary findings, the Commission shall explain whether it considers, on a provisional basis, that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(6).deleted
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 993 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 3
3. Where the provider of core platform services satisfies the thresholds set out in Article 3(2), but has presented significantly substantiated arguments in accordance with Article 3(4), the Commission shall endeavour to conclude the market investigation within five months from the opening of the market investigation by a decision pursuant to paragraph 1. In that case the Commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings pursuant to paragraph 2 to the provider of core platform services within three months from the opening of the investigation.deleted
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 996 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 4
4. When the Commission pursuant to Article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations, but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future, it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in Article 5(b) and Article 6(1) points (e), (f), (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. The Commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. The Commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 4.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1004 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – title
Market investigation into systematic non- compliance
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1010 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1
1. Where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under Article 3(1), the Commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this Regulationstructural or equally effective behavioural remedies. The Commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelvesix months from the opening of the market investigation.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1015 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 2
2. The Commission may only impose structural remedies pursuant to paragraph 1 either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the gatekeeper concerned than the structural remedy.deleted
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1018 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 3
3. A gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non- compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6, where the Commission has issued at least three non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to Articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of five years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this Article.deleted
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1027 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 4
4. A gatekeeper shall be deemed to have further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under Article 3(1), where its impact on the internal market has further increased, especially in new segments of the market, its importance as a gateway for business users to reach end users has further increased or the gatekeeper enjoys a further entrenched and durable position in its operations.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1032 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 6
6. The Commission may at any time during the market investigation extend its duration where the extension is justified on objective grounds and proportionate. The extension may apply to the deadline by which the Commission has to issue its objections, or to the deadline for adoption of the final decision. The total duration of any extension or extensions pursuant to this paragraph shall not exceed six months.The Commission may consider commitments pursuant to Article 23 and make them binding in its decisionthree months.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1034 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1
The Commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this Regulation. It shall issue a public report at the latest within 124 months from the opening of the market investigation.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1046 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 1
1. Where the Commission intends to carry out proceedings in view of the possible adoption of decisions pursuant to Article 7, 25 and 26, it shall adopt a decision opening a proceeding. 2. When the Commission adopts a decision opening a proceeding, all relevant findings and information shall be gathered in a report, which is to be presented to the European Parliament and the Member States and be made accessible publicly on the official website of the European Commission.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1071 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23
1. If during proceedings under Articles 16 or 25 the gatekeeper concerned offers commitments for the relevant core platform services to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6, the Commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4) make those commitments binding on that gatekeeper and declare that there are no further grounds for action. 2. The Commission may, upon request or on its own initiative, reopen by decision the relevant proceedings, where: (a) there has been a material change in any of the facts on which the decision was based; (b) the gatekeeper concerned acts contrary to its commitments; (c) the decision was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information provided by the parties. 3. Should the Commission consider that the commitments submitted by the gatekeeper concerned cannot ensure effective compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6, it shall explain the reasons for not making those commitments binding in the decision concluding the relevant proceedings.Article 23 deleted Commitments
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1081 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 2
2. The actions pursuant to paragraph 1 may include the appointment of independent external experts and auditors to be embedded within the gatekeeper and to assist the Commission to monitor the obligations and measures and to provide specific expertise or knowledge to the Commission.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1084 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. The Commission shall, within six month from opening a proceeding according to Article 18, adopt a non- compliance decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4) where it finds that a gatekeeper does not comply with one or more of the following:
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1085 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) commitments made legally binding pursuant to Article 23.ted
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1090 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 3
3. In the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadlinetwo month and to provide explanations on how it plans to comply with the decision.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1097 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – title
Fines and remedies
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1098 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. In the decision pursuant to Article 25, the Commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 10% of its total turnover in the preceding financial year or structural and equally effective behavioural remedies where it finds that the gatekeeper, intentionally or negligently, fails to comply with:
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1106 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3
However, the Commission shall not require payment pursuant to the second or the third subparagraph from undertakings which show that they have not implemented the infringing decision of the association and either were not aware of its existence or have actively distanced themselves from it before the Commission started investigating the case.deleted
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1115 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 1
1. The powers conferred on the Commission by Articles 26 and 27 shall be subject to a threfive year limitation period.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1120 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Before adopting a decision pursuant to Article 7, Article 8(1), Article 9(1), Articles 15, 16, 22, 23, 25 and 26 and Article 27(2), the Commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings concerned, including third parties affected by the conduct of the gatekeeper concerne, the opportunity of being heard on:
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1157 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1
1. When three or more Member States request the Commission to open an investigation pursuant to Article 15, 16 and 17 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper, does not comply with this regulation or its new services and practices need to be examined, the Commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1173 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. 3. For the effective enforcement of this Regulation, Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the Parliament and of the Council on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law shall apply. To this end, persons pursuant to Article 4 of Directive (EU) 2019/1937 shall be encouraged to report breaches of Union law to a competent national authority, which shall transmit it to the Commission and the Digital Markets Advisory Committee. The reported transgression shall be assessed and enforced within three months of transmission to the Commission and the Digital Market Advisory Committee.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1182 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 34 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Meetings between representatives of gatekeepers and members of the Digital Market Advisory Committee and the Commission shall be registered and published monthly in line with the EU transparency register. To this end, the registration in the EU transparency register shall be mandatory for gatekeepers, undertakings and associations of undertakings pursuant to Article 3(1) of this Regulation.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1184 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 36 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
(ba) further specification of accessibility requirements of point (m - new) of Article 6.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1199 #

2020/0374(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 39 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. This Regulation shall apply from sixthree months after its entry into force.
2021/07/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 192 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4 a (new)
(4a) Online advertisement plays an important role in the online environment, including in relation to the provision of the information society services. However, certain forms of online advertisement can contribute to significant risks, ranging from advertisement that is itself illegal content, to contributing to creating financial incentives for the publication or amplification of illegal or otherwise harmful content and activities online, to misleading or exploitative marketing or the discriminatory display of advertising with an impact on the equal treatment and the rights of consumers. Consumers are largely unaware of the volume and granularity of the data that is being collected and used to deliver personalised and micro-targeted advertisements, and have little agency and limited ways to stop or control data exploitation. The significant reach of a few online platforms, their access to extensive datasets and participation at multiple levels of the advertising value chain has created challenges for businesses, traditional media services and other market participants seeking to advertise or develop competing advertising services. In addition to the information requirements resulting from Article 6 of Directive 2000/31/EC, stricter rules on targeted advertising and micro-targeting are needed, in favour of less intrusive forms of advertising that do not require extensive tracking of the interaction and behaviour of recipients of the service. Therefore, providers of information society services may only deliver and display online advertising to a recipient or a group of recipients of the service when this is done based on contextual information, such as keywords or metadata. Providers should not deliver and display online advertising to a recipient or a clearly identifiable group of recipients of the service that is based on personal or inferred data relating to the recipients or groups of recipients. Where providers deliver and display advertisement, they should be required to ensure that the recipients of the service have certain individualised information necessary for them to understand why and on whose behalf the advertisement is displayed, including sponsored content and paid promotion.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 209 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) Such a substantial connection to the Union should be considered to exist where the service provider has an establishment in the Union or, in its absence, on the basis of the existence of a significant number of users in one or more Member States, or the targeting of activities towards one or more Member States. The targeting of activities towards one or more Member States can be determined on the basis of all relevant circumstances, including factors such as the use of a language or a currency generally used in that Member State, or the possibility of ordering products or services, or using a national top level domain. The targeting of activities towards a Member State could also be derived from the availability of an application in the relevant national application store, from the provision of local advertising or advertising in the language used in that Member State, or from the handling of customer relations such as by providing customer service in the language generally used in that Member State. A substantial connection should also be assumed where a service provider directs its activities to one or more Member State as set out in Article 17(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council27 . On the other hand, mere technical accessibility of a website from the Union cannot, on that ground alone, be considered as establishing a substantial connection to the Union. __________________ 27 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ L351, 20.12.2012, p.1).
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 220 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
(10) For reasons of clarity, it should also be specified that this Regulation is without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council30 and Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council,31 , Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council32 and Regulation […/…] on temporary derogation from certain provisions of Directive 2002/58/EC33 as well as Union law on consumer protection, in particular Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council34 , Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council35 and Directive 93/13/EEC of the European Parliament and of the Council36 , as amended by Directive (EU) 2019/2161 of the European Parliament and of the Council37 , and on the protection of personal data, in particular Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council.38 The protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data is solely governed by the rules of Union law on that subject, in particular Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC. This Regulation is also without prejudice to the rules of Union or national law on working conditions, collective agreements and social security systems. __________________ 30Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 (OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 1). 31 Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services (OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 57). 32Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37. 33Regulation […/…] on temporary derogation from certain provisions of Directive 2002/58/EC. 34Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to- consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) 35Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. 36Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts. 37Directive (EU) 2019/2161 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directives 98/6/EC, 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the better enforcement and modernisation of Union consumer protection rules 38Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 228 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) In order to achieve the objective of ensuring a safe, predictable and trusted online environment, for the purpose of this Regulation the concept of “illegal content” should be defined broadly and also covers information relating to illegal content, products, services and activities. In particular, that concept should be understood to refer to information, irrespective of its form, that under the applicable law is either itself illegal, such as illegal hate speech or terrorist content and unlawful discriminatory content, or that relates to activities that are illegal, such as the sharing of images depicting child sexual abuse, unlawful non- consensual sharing of private images, online stalking, the sale of non-compliant or counterfeit products, the provision of illegal services such as accommodation services on short-term rental platforms non-compliant with Union or national law, the non-authorised use of copyright protected material or activities involving infringements of consumer protection law. In this regard, it is immaterial whether the illegality of the information or activity results from Union law or from national law that is consistent with Union law and what the precise nature or subject matter is of the law in question.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 260 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
(18) The exemptions from liability established in this Regulation should not apply where, instead of confining itself to providing the services neutrally, by a merely technical and automatic processing of the information provided by the recipient of the service, the provider of intermediary services plays an active role of such a kind as to give itthe provider of intermediary services has knowledge of, or control over, that information. Those exemptions should accordingly not be available in respect of liability relating to information provided not by the recipient of the service but by the provider of intermediary service itself, including where the information has been developed under the editorial responsibility of that provider.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 287 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
(23) In order to ensure the effective protection of consumers when engaging in intermediated commercial transactions online, certain providers of hosting services, namely, online platforms that allow consumers to conclude distance contracts with traders, should not be able to benefit from the exemption from liability for hosting service providers established in this Regulation, unless they comply with certain due diligence obligation of this regulation and in so far as those online platforms present the relevant information relating to the transactions at issue in such a way that it leads consumers to believe that the information was provided by those online platforms themselves or by recipients of the service acting under their authority or control, and that those online platforms thus have knowledge of or control over the information, even if that may in reality not be the case. In that regard, is should be determined objectively, on the basis of all relevant circumstances, whether the presentation could lead to such a belief on the side of an average and reasonably well-informed consumer.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 297 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25
(25) In order to create legal certainty and not to discourage activities aimed at detecting, identifying and acting against illegal content that providers of intermediary services may undertake on a voluntary basis, it should be clarified that the mere fact that providers undertake such activities does not lead to the unavailability of the exemptions from liability set out in this Regulation, provided those activities are carried out in good faith and in a diligent manner. In addition, it is appropriate to clarify that the mere fact that those providers take measures, in good faith, to comply with the requirements of Union law, including those set out in this Regulation as regards the implementation of their terms and conditions, should not lead to the unavailability of those exemptions from liability. Therefore, any such activities and measures that a given provider may have taken should not be taken into account when determining whether the provider can rely on an exemption from liability, in particular as regards whether the provider provides its service neutrally and can therefore fall within the scope of the relevant provision, without this rule however implying that the provider can necessarily rely thereon.deleted
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 395 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 42
(42) Where a hosting service provider decides to remove or disable information provided by a recipient of the service, for instance following receipt of a notice or acting on its own initiative, including through the use of automated means, that provider should inform the recipient of its decision, the reasons for its decision and the available redress possibilities to contest the decision, in view of the negative consequences that such decisions may have for the recipient, including as regards the exercise of its fundamental right to freedom of expression. That obligation should apply irrespective of the reasons for the decision, in particular whether the action has been taken because the information notified is considered to be illegal content or incompatible with the applicable terms and conditions. Available recourses to challenge the decision of the hosting service provider should always include judicial redress.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 402 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 43
(43) To avoid disproportionate burdens, the additional obligations imposed on online platforms under this Regulation should not apply to micro or small enterprises as defined in Recommendation 2003/361/EC of the Commission,41 unless their reach and impact is such that they meet the criteria to qualify as very large online platforms under this Regulation. The consolidation rules laid down in that Recommendation help ensure that any circumvention of those additional obligations is prevented. The exemption of micro- and small enterprises from those additional obligations should not be understood as affecting their ability to set up, on a voluntary basis, a system that complies with one or more of those obligations. __________________ 41 Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium- sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36).
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 430 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 a (new)
Article 13 a Targeting of digital advertising 1. Providers of intermediary services shall not collect or process personal data as defined by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 for the purpose of showing digital advertising. 2. This provision shall not prevent intermediary services from displaying targeted digital advertising based on contextual information such as keywords, the language setting communicated by the device of the recipient or the digital location where the advertisement is displayed. 3. The use of the contextual information referred to in paragraph 2 shall only be permissible if it does not allow for the direct or, by means of combining it with other information, indirect identification of a natural person or a clearly identifiable group of recipients/persons, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 510 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 66
(66) To facilitate the effective and consistent application of the obligations in this Regulation that may require implementation through technological means, it is important to promote voluntary industry standards covering certain technical procedures, where the industry can help develop standardised means to comply with this Regulation, such as allowing the submission of notices, including through application programming interfaces, or about the interoperability of advertisement repositories. Such standards could in particular be useful for relatively small providers of intermediary services. The standards could distinguish between different types of illegal content or different types of intermediary services, as appropriate.deleted
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 514 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 67
(67) The Commission and the Board should encourage the drawing-up of codes of conduct to contribute to the application of this Regulation. While the implementation of codes of conduct should be measurable and subject to public oversight, this should not impair the voluntary nature of such codes and the freedom of interested parties to decide whether to participate. In certain circumstances, it is important that very large online platforms cooperate in the drawing-up and adhere to specific codes of conduct. Nothing in this Regulation prevents other service providers from adhering to the same standards of due diligence, adopting best practices and benefitting from the guidance provided by the Commission and the Board, by participating in the same codes of conduct.deleted
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 519 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 68
(68) It is appropriate that this Regulation identify certain areas of consideration for such codes of conduct. In particular, risk mitigation measures concerning specific types of illegal content should be explored via self- and co-regulatory agreements. Another area for consideration is the possible negative impacts of systemic risks on society and democracy, such as disinformation or manipulative and abusive activities. This includes coordinated operations aimed at amplifying information, including disinformation, such as the use of bots or fake accounts for the creation of fake or misleading information, sometimes with a purpose of obtaining economic gain, which are particularly harmful for vulnerable recipients of the service, such as children. In relation to such areas, adherence to and compliance with a given code of conduct by a very large online platform may be considered as an appropriate risk mitigating measure. The refusal without proper explanations by an online platform of the Commission’s invitation to participate in the application of such a code of conduct could be taken into account, where relevant, when determining whether the online platform has infringed the obligations laid down by this Regulation.deleted
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 524 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 69
(69) The rules on codes of conduct under this Regulation could serve as a basis for already established self- regulatory efforts at Union level, including the Product Safety Pledge, the Memorandum of Understanding against counterfeit goods, the Code of Conduct against illegal hate speech as well as the Code of practice on disinformation. In particular for the latter, the Commission will issue guidance for strengthening the Code of practice on disinformation as announced in the European Democracy Action Plan.deleted
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 551 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 85
(85) Where a Digital Services Coordinator requests another Digital Services Coordinator to take action, the requesting Digital Services Coordinator, or the Board in case it issued a recommendation to assess issues involving more than three Member States, should be able to refer the matter to the Commission in case of any disagreement as to the assessments or the measures taken or proposed or a failure to adopt any measures. The Commission, on the basis of the information made available by the concerned authorities, should accordingly be able to request the competent Digital Services Coordinator to re-assess the matter and take the necessary measures to ensure compliance within a defined time period. This possibility is without prejudice to the Commission’s general duty to oversee the application of, and where necessary enforce, Union law under the control of the Court of Justice of the European Union in accordance with the Treaties. A failure by the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment to take any measures pursuant to such a request may also lead to the Commission’s or the Board´s intervention under Section 3 of Chapter IV of this Regulation, where the suspected infringer is a very large online platform
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 554 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 87
(87) In view of the particular challenges that may emerge in relation to assessing and ensuring a very large online platform’s compliance, for instance relating to the scale or complexity of a suspected infringement or the need for particular expertise or capabilities at Union level, Digital Services Coordinators should have the possibility to request, on a voluntary basis, the Commission or the Board to intervene and exercise its investigatory and enforcement powers under this Regulation.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 564 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 90
(90) For that purpose, the Board should be able to adopt decisions, opinions, requests and recommendations addressed to Digital Services Coordinators or other competent national authorities. While not legally binding, the decision to deviate therefrom should be properly explained and could be taken into account by the Commission in assessing the compliance of the Member State concerned with this Regulation.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 570 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 92
(92) The Commission, through the Chair, should participate in the Board without voting rights. Through the Chair, the Commission should ensure that the agenda of the meetings is set in accordance with the requests of the members of the Board as laid down in the rules of procedure and in compliance with the duties of the Board laid down in this Regulation.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 574 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 96
(96) Where the infringement of the provision that solely applies to very large online platforms is not effectively addressed by that platform pursuant to the action plan, only the Commission of the Board may, on itstheir own initiative or upon advice of the Boardrequest, decide to further investigate the infringement concerned and the measures that the platform has subsequently taken, to the exclusion of the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment. After having conducted the necessary investigations, the Commission or respectively the Board should be able to issue decisions finding an infringement and imposing sanctions in respect of very large online platforms where that is justified. ItThey should also have such a possibility to intervene in cross-border situations where the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment did not take any measures despite the Commission’s or the Board´s request, or in situations where the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment itself requested for the Commission of the Board to intervene, in respect of an infringement of any other provision of this Regulation committed by a very large online platform.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 577 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 97
(97) The Commission should remain free to decide whether or not it wishes to intervene in any of the situations where it is empowered to do so under this Regulation. OnceOnce the Board or the Commission initiated the proceedings, the Digital Services Coordinators of establishment concerned should be precluded from exercising their investigatory and enforcement powers in respect of the relevant conduct of the very large online platform concerned, so as to avoid duplication, inconsistencies and risks from the viewpoint of the principle of ne bis in idem. However, in the interest of effectiveness, those Digital Services Coordinators should not be precluded from exercising their powers either to assist the Board or the Commission, at its request in the performance of its supervisory tasks, or in respect of other conduct, including conduct by the same very large online platform that is suspected to constitute a new infringement. Those Digital Services Coordinators, as well as the Board and other Digital Services Coordinators where relevant, should provide the Commission with all necessary information and assistance to allow it to perform its tasks effectively, whilst conversely the Commission should keep them informed on the exercise of its powers as appropriate. In that regard, the Commission should, where appropriate, take account of any relevant assessments carried out by the Board or by the Digital Services Coordinators concerned and of any relevant evidence and information gathered by them, without prejudice to the Board´s or Commission’s powers and responsibility to carry out additional investigations as necessary.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 581 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 98
(98) In view of both the particular challenges that may arise in seeking to ensure compliance by very large online platforms and the importance of doing so effectively, considering their size and impact and the harms that they may cause, the Board and the Commission should have strong investigative and enforcement powers to allow it to investigate, enforce and monitor certain of the rules laid down in this Regulation, in full respect of the principle of proportionality and the rights and interests of the affected parties.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 586 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 99
(99) In particular,The Board and the Commission should have access to any relevant documents, data and information necessary to open and conduct investigations and to monitor the compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in this Regulation, irrespective of who possesses the documents, data or information in question, and regardless of their form or format, their storage medium, or the precise place where they are stored. The Board and the Commission should be able to directly require that the very large online platform concerned or relevant third parties, or than individuals, provide any relevant evidence, data and information. In addition, the Board and Commission should be able to request any relevant information from any public authority, body or agency within the Member State, or from any natural person or legal person for the purpose of this Regulation. The Board and the Commission should be empowered to require access to, and explanations relating to, data-bases and algorithms of relevant persons, and to interview, with their consent, any persons who may be in possession of useful information and to record the statements made. The Board and the Commission should also be empowered to undertake such inspections as are necessary to enforce the relevant provisions of this Regulation. Those investigatory powers aim to complement the Board´s and the Commission’s possibility to ask Digital Services Coordinators and other Member States’ authorities for assistance, for instance by providing information or in the exercise of those powers
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 588 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 101
(101) The very large online platforms concerned and other persons subject to the exercise of the Board´s or Commission’s powers whose interests may be affected by a decision should be given the opportunity of submitting their observations beforehand, and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. While ensuring the rights of defence of the parties concerned, in particular, the right of access to the file, it is essential that confidential information be protected. Furthermore, while respecting the confidentiality of the information, the Board and the Commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of its decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that lead up to the decision.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 590 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 102
(102) In the interest of effectiveness and efficiency, in addition to the general evaluation of the Regulation, to be performed within five years of entry into force, after the initial start-up phase and on the basis of the first three years of application of this Regulation, the Commission should also perform an evaluation of the activities of the Board and on its structure.deleted
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 596 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 106 a (new)
(106a) A small number of companies developed a market dominance by acquiring an unprecedented level about people’s lives and replaced services of a diverse and decentralised system with open standards by “walled gardens” with locked-in users; therefore, this Regulation should introduce additional obligations regarding data protection, transparency, user choice and interoperability in order to guarantee a level playing field and consumer welfare.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 597 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 106 b (new)
(106b) The “attention- seeking” profiling business model of digital markets, where algorithms priorities controversial content and thus contribute to its spread online, undermines consumer´s trust in the digital markets. Therefore, this Regulation should put an end to this practice and should give users more control on how rankings are presented.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 598 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 106 c (new)
(106c) The proposal for an ‘empowered and strategic’ High Level Multi stakeholder Body for Digital Cooperation in the UN´s "Roadmap for Digital Cooperation" runs counter calls for stronger regulation of digital companies. While international cooperation is of highly importance, a genuinely democratic approach for global digital governance should be uphold. To that end, obligations for gatekeepers and enforcement measurers of this Regulation should contribute to the development of appropriate global norms and polices.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 601 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) a framework for the conditional exemption from liabilityliability framework of providers of intermediary services;
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 607 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) set out uniform rules for a safe, accessible, predictable and trusted online environment, where fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter are effectively protected and enforced.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 615 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b – point 1 (new)
1) Establish a foundation that allows the creation of a European platform economy and facilitates the build-up of digital resilience within the Union.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 616 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b – point 2 (new)
2) protect consumers making use of the services falling under this Regulation.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 620 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 3
3. This Regulation shall apply to intermediary services provided to recipients of the service that have their place of establishment or residence in the Union, irrespective of the place of establishment of the providers of those services.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 654 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point d – introductory part
(d) ‘to offer services in the Union’ means enabling legal or natural persons in one or more Member States to use the services of the provider of information society services which has a substantial connection to the Union; such a substantial connection is deemed to exist where the provider has an establishment in the Union; in the absence of such an establishment, the assessment of a substantial connection is based on specific factual criteria, such as:given where activities are targeted towards one or more Member states.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 657 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point d – indent 1
— a significant number of users in one or more Member States; ordeleted
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 662 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point d – indent 2
— the targeting of activities towards one or more Member States.deleted
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 733 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point q a (new)
(qa) overriding reasons of public interest’ means reasons recognised as such in the case law of the Court of Justice, including the following grounds: public policy; public security; public safety; public health; preserving the financial equilibrium of the social security system; the protection of consumers, recipients of services and workers; the protection of youth; fairness of trade transactions; combating fraud; the protection of the environment and the urban environment; the health of animals; intellectual property; the conservation of the national historic and artistic heritage; social policy objectives and cultural policy objectives; housing.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 741 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point q b (new)
(qb) ‘competent authority’ means any Member States’ legal and natural person that is designated by the Member States in accordance with their national law to carry out tasks which include tackling illegal content online, including law enforcement authorities and administrative authorities charged with enforcing law, irrespective of the nature or specific subject matter of that law, applicable in certain particular fields.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 744 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point q c (new)
(qc) ‘online market places’ means a service using software, including a website, part of a website or an application, operated by or on behalf of a trader, which allows consumer to conclude distance contracts with other traders or consumers, in accordance with Directive 2005/29/EC.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 746 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 a (new)
Article 2a 1. Providers of information society services shall only deliver and display advertising that is based on contextual information such as keywords, language context, or the approximate geographical region of the recipient of the service to whom an advertisement is delivered or displayed. 2. The use of the contextual information referred to in paragraph 1 shall only be permissible if the advertisement is delivered in real time, that related data are not stored and that it does not involve the direct or, by means of combining it with other information, indirect identification of a natural person or group of persons, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, precise location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person or group of persons. 3. Providers of information society services that deliver and display advertising on their online interfaces or on third-party services shall ensure that the recipients of the service can identify, for each specific advertisement displayed to each individual recipient, in a clear and unambiguous manner and in real time: (a) that the information displayed is an advertisement; (b) the natural or legal person on whose behalf the advertisement is displayed; (c) detailed information about the main parameters used to determine the recipient to whom the advertisement is delivered and displayed.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 764 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply: (a) where the recipient of the service is acting under the authority or the control of the provider. ; (b) to market places which are considered to be very large platforms according to Article 25 and which do not comply with the Articles 11, 13, 14(1), 19(1), 22, 24 and 29 with regards to the due diligence obligations (c) to very large platforms according to Article 25 if they do not comply with the obligations under Article 9 of this Regulation
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 782 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1
Providers of intermediary services shall not be deemed ineligible for the exemptions from liability referred to in Articles 3, 4 and 5 solely because they carry out voluntary own-initiative investigations or other activities aimed at detecting, identifying and removing, or disabling of access to, illegal content, or take the necessary measures to comply with the requirements of Union law, including those set out in this Regulation.deleted
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 794 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1
No general obligation to monitor the information which providers of intermediary services transmit or store, nor actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity shall be imposed on those providers. No provision of this Regulation shall be understood as mandating, requiring or recommending the use of automated decision-making, or the monitoring of the behaviour of a large number of natural persons.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 924 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1
1. Providers of intermediary services shall include information on any restrictions that they impose in relation to the use of their service in respect of information provided by the recipients of the service, in their terms and conditions. That information shall include information on any policies, procedures, measures and tools used for the purpose of content moderation, including algorithmic decision-making and human review. It shall be set out in clear and unambiguous language and shall be publicly available in an easily accessible format. A summary of the terms and conditions, setting out the most important points in concise, clear and unambiguous language shall also be publicly available. The provider of the intermediary services shall ensure the possibility for a recipient of a service to unsubscribe from intermediary services, whereas the subscription is easily facilitated. In practice, both processes shall be equally demanding for any recipient of a service.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 944 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2
2. Providers of intermediary services shall act in a fair, transparent, non- discriminatory, diligent, objective and proportionate manner in applying and enforcing the restrictions referred to in paragraph 1, with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of all parties involved, including the applicable fundamental rights of the recipients of the service as enshrined in the Charter.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1008 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to providers of intermediary services that qualify as micro or small enterprises within the meaning of the Annex to Recommendation 2003/361/EC.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1047 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) a clear indication of the electronic location of that information, in particular the exact URL or URLs, where possible, and, where necessary, additional information enabling the identification of the illegal content;
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1055 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 3
3. Notices that include the elements referred to in paragraph 2 shall be considered to give rise to actual knowledge or awareness for the purposes of Article 5 in respect of the specific item of information concerned.deleted
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1071 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 6
6. Providers of hosting services shall process any notices that they receive under the mechanisms referred to in paragraph 1, and take their decisions in respect of the information to which the notices relate, in a timely, diligent and objective manner, in any case no longer than 72 hours. Where they use automated means for that processing or decision-making, they shall include information on such use in the notification referred to in paragraph 4. This shall include meaningful information about the procedure followed, the technology used and the criteria and reasoning supporting the decision, as well as the logic involved in the automated decision-making.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1136 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – title
Exclusion for micro and small enterprises
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1142 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1
This Section shall not apply to online platforms that qualify as micro or small enterprises within the meaning of the Annex to Recommendation 2003/361/EC.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1150 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Online platforms shall provide recipients of the service, for a period of at least six monthsone year following the decision referred to in this paragraph, the access to an effective internal complaint-handling system, which enables the complaints to be lodged electronically and free of charge, against the following decisions taken by the online platform on the ground that the information provided by the recipients is illegal content or incompatible with its terms and conditions:
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1226 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point c
(c) the dispute settlement is easily accessible, including for people with disabilities, through electronic communication technology;
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1235 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d
(d) it is capable of settling dispute in a swift, efficient, including for people with disabilities, and cost-effective manner and in at least one official language of the Union;
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1249 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
The fees charged by the body for the dispute settlement shall be reasonable and shall in any event not exceed the costs thereof. Out-of-court dispute settlement procedures should preferably be free of charge for the consumer. In the event that costs are applied, the procedure should be accessible, attractive and inexpensive for consumers. To that end, costs shall not exceed a nominal fee.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1277 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) it represents collectivepublic interests and is independent from any online platform or state law enforcement;
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1329 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 2
2. Online platforms shall suspend, for a reasonable period of time and after having issued a prior warning, the processing of notices and complaints submitted through the notice and action mechanisms and internal complaints- handling systems referred to in Articles 14 and 17, respectively, by individuals or entities or by complainants that frequently submit notices or complaints that are manifestly unfounded. This paragraph does not apply to trusted flaggers according to Article 19.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1485 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Online platforms that display advertising on their online interfaces, per default it shall not be based on profiling unless users genuinely opt-in, in line with the requirements established under Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Online platforms shall not subvert or impair consumers’ autonomy, decision-making, or choice via the structure, function or manner of operation of their online interface or any part thereof. In addition online platforms shall ensure that the recipients of the service can identify, for each specific advertisement displayed to each individual recipient, in a clear and unambiguous manner and in real time:
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1500 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
By way of derogation from Regulation 2016/679, providers shall not avail themselves of consent as a legal ground for processing of personal data in order to target natural persons for purposes of digital advertising.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1646 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 3
3. The Commission, in cooperation with the Digital Services Coordinators,Board and the Commission may issue general guidelines on the application of paragraph 1 in relation to specific risks, in particular to present best practices and recommend possible measures, having due regard to the possible consequences of the measures on fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of all parties involved. When preparing those guidelines the Commission shall organise public consultations.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1690 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 1
1. Very large online platforms that use recommender systems shall set out in their terms and conditions, in a clear, accessible and easily comprehensible manner, the main parameters used in their recommender systems, as well as any options for the recipients of the service to modify or influence those main parameters that they may have made available, including at least one option which is not based on profiling, within the. Online platforms shall ensure consumers are not profiled by default, unless consumers genuinely opt-in, in line with the requirements established under Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Online platforms shall not subvert or impair consumers’ autonomy, decision-making, or choice via the structure, function or meaningner of Article 4 (4) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. operation of their online interface or any part thereof.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1752 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 1
1. Very large online platforms shall provide the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment or the Commission, upon their reasoned request and within a reasonable period, any case no longer than 72 hours, specified in the request, access to data that are necessary to monitor and assess compliance with this Regulation. That Digital Services Coordinator and the Commission shall only use that data for those purposes.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1774 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 5
5. The Commission shall, after consulting the Board, adopt delegated acts laying down the technical conditions under which very large online platforms are to share data pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 and the purposes for which the data may be used. Those delegated acts shall lay down the specific conditions under which such sharing of data with vetted researchers can take place in compliance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679, taking into account the rights and interests of the very large online platforms and the recipients of the service concerned, including the protection of confidential information, in particular trade secrets, and maintaining the security of their service.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1778 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 6 – introductory part
6. Within 153 days following receipt of a request as referred to in paragraph 1 and 2, a very large online platform may request the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment or the Commission, as applicable, to amend the request, where it considers that it is unable to give access to the data requested because one of following two reasons:
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1781 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 6 – point b
(b) giving access to the data will lead to significant vulnerabilities for the security of its service or the protection of confidential information, in particular trade secrets.deleted
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1784 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 7
7. Requests for amendment pursuant to point (b) of paragraph 6 shall contain proposals for one or more alternative means through which access may be provided to the requested data or other data which are appropriate and sufficient for the purpose of the request. The Digital Services Coordinator of establishment or the Commission shall decide upon the request for amendment within 15 days and communicate to the very large online platform its decision and, where relevant, the amended request and the new time period to comply with the request.deleted
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1793 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 3 – point a
(a) cooperating with the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment and, the Commission and the Board for the purpose of this Regulation;
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1803 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 3
3. Where a very large online platform considers that the publication of information pursuant to paragraph 2 may result in the disclosure of confidential information of that platform or of the recipients of the service, may cause significant vulnerabilities for the security of its service, may undermine public security or may harm recipients, the platform may remove such information from the reports. In that case, that platform shall transmit the complete reports to the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment and the Commission, accompanied by a statement of the reasons for removing the information from the public reports.deleted
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1810 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 a (new)
Article 33a Interoperability of very large platforms 1. Very large platforms shall offer, through technical interfaces, options for other platforms to interoperate with their core services. 2. Measures under paragraph one shall complement, without prejudice to their application, the rules under the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 3. Interfaces for ensuring interoperability should be easy to use and personal data shall be processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data. The obligation under paragraph one shall not be construed as preventing platforms from taking reasonable efforts to address security issues.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1824 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 34 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
(fa) accessibility of elements and functions of online platforms and digital services for persons with disabilities
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1844 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 35
1. shall encourage and facilitate the drawing up of codes of conduct at Union level to contribute to the proper application of this Regulation, taking into account in particular the specific challenges of tackling different types of illegal content and systemic risks, in accordance with Union law, in particular on competition and the protection of personal data. 2. within the meaning of Article 26(1) emerge and concern several very large online platforms, the Commission may invite the very large online platforms concerned, other very large online platforms, other online platforms and other providers of intermediary services, as appropriate, as well as civil society organisations and other interested parties, to participate in the drawing up of codes of conduct, including by setting out commitments to take specific risk mitigation measures, as well as a regular reporting framework on any measures taken and their outcomes. 3. 1 and 2, the Commission and the Board shall aim to ensure that the codes of conduct clearly set out their objectives, contain key performance indicators to measure the achievement of those objectives and take due account of the needs and interests of all interested parties, including citizens, at Union level. The Commission and the Board shall also aim to ensure that participants report regularly to the Commission and their respective Digital Service Coordinators of establishment on any measures taken and their outcomes, as measured against the key performance indicators that they contain. 4. shall assess whether the codes of conduct meet the aims specified in paragraphs 1 and 3, and shall regularly monitor and evaluate the achievement of their objectives. They shall publish their conclusions. 5. and evaluate the achievement of the objectives of the codes of conduct, having regard to the key performance indicators that they may contain.Article 35 deleted Codes of conduct The Commission and the Board Where significant systemic risk When giving effect to paragraphs The Commission and the Board The Board shall regularly monitor
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1878 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 36
Codes of conduct for online advertising 1. and facilitate the drawing up of codes of conduct at Union level between, online platforms and other relevant service providers, such as providers of online advertising intermediary services or organisations representing recipients of the service and civil society organisations or relevant authorities to contribute to further transparency in online advertising beyond the requirements of Articles 24 and 30. 2. The Commission shall aim to ensure that the codes of conduct pursue an effective transmission of information, in full respect for the rights and interests of all parties involved, and a competitive, transparent and fair environment in online advertising, in accordance with Union and national law, in particular on competition and the protection of personal data. The Commission shall aim to ensure that the codes of conduct address at least: (a) held by providers of online advertising intermediaries to recipients of the service with regard to requirements set in points (b) and (c) of Article 24; (b) held by providers of online advertising intermediaries to the repositories pursuant to Article 30. 3. the development of the codes of conduct within one year following the date of application of this Regulation and their application no later than six months after that date.Article 36 deleted The Commission shall encourage the transmission of information the transmission of information The Commission shall encourage
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1896 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 37
[...]deleted
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1908 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
2. Member States shall designate one of the competent authorities as their Digital Services Coordinator. The Digital Services Coordinator shall be responsible for all matters relating to application and enforcement of this Regulation in that Member State, unless the Member State concerned has assigned certain specific tasks or sectors to other competent authorities. The Digital Services Coordinator shall in any event be responsible for ensuring coordination at national level in respect of those matters and for contributing to the effective and consistent application and enforcement of this Regulation throughout the Union.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1924 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 39 – paragraph 3
3. Paragraph 2 is without prejudice to the tasks of Digital Services Coordinators within the system of supervision and enforcement provided for in this Regulation and the cooperation with other competent authorities in accordance with Article 38(2). Paragraph 2 shall not prevent supervision of the authorities concerned in accordance with national constitutional law. To this end, Digital Services Coordinators shall protocol their carried- out tasks and exercised power in form of a report, which is to be published in the information sharing system pursuant to Article 67 of this Regulation and present it to the European Parliament.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1940 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 40 – paragraph 4
4. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 are without prejudice to the second subparagraph of Article 50(4) and the second subparagraph of Article 51(2) and the tasks and powers of the Board and the Commission under Section 3.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1943 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 41 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a
(a) the power to accept the commitments offered by those providers in relation to their compliance with this Regulation and to make those commitments binding;deleted
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1985 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 45 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Where the Board has reasons to suspect that a provider of intermediary services infringed this Regulation in a manner involving at least three Member States, it may recommendshall request the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment to assess the matter and take the necessary investigatory and enforcement measures to ensure compliance with this Regulation.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1990 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 45 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. A request or recommendation pursuant to paragraph 1 shall at least indicate:
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1995 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 45 – paragraph 3
3. The Digital Services Coordinator of establishment shall take into utmost account the request or recommendation pursuant to paragraph 1. Where it considers that it has insufficient information to act upon the request or recommendation and has reasons to consider that the Digital Services Coordinator that sent the request, or the Board, could provide additional informationIf the request does not include the elements mentioned under 2 (a) and (b), it may request such information once. The time period laid down in paragraph 4 shall be suspended until that additional information is provided.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2000 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 45 – paragraph 4
4. The Digital Services Coordinator of establishment shall, without undue delay and in any event not later than twoone months following receipt of the request or recommendation, communicate to the Digital Services Coordinator that sent the request, or the Board, its assessment of the suspected infringement, or that of any other competent authority pursuant to national law where relevant, and an explanation of any investigatory or enforcement measures taken or envisaged in relation thereto to ensure compliance with this Regulation.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2004 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 45 – paragraph 5
5. Where the Digital Services Coordinator that sent the request, or, where appropriate, the Board, did not receive a reply within the time period laid down in paragraph 4 or where it does not agree with the assessment of the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment, it may refer the matter to the Commission, providing all relevant information. That information shall include at least the request or recommendation sent to the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment, any additional information provided pursuant to paragraph 3 and the communication referred to in paragraph 4.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2008 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 45 – paragraph 6
6. The Board or the Commission shall assess the matter within threewo months following the referral of the matter pursuant to paragraph 5, after having consulted the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment and, unless it referred the matter itself, the Board.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2013 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 45 – paragraph 7
7. Where, pursuant to paragraph 6, the Commission or the Board concludes that the assessment or the investigatory or enforcement measures taken or envisaged pursuant to paragraph 4 are incompatible with this Regulation, it shall request the Digital Service Coordinator of establishment to further assess the matter and take the necessary investigatory or enforcement measures to ensure compliance with this Regulation, and to inform it about those measures taken within twoone months from that request.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2015 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 46 – title
Joint investigations and requests for Commission or Board intervention
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2023 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 46 – paragraph 2
2. Where a Digital Services Coordinator of establishment hasor the Digital Services Coordinators of at least three Member States have reasons to suspect that a very large online platform infringed this Regulation, it may either request the Commission or the Board to take the necessary investigatory and enforcement measures or launch a joint investigation to ensure compliance with this Regulation in accordance with Section 3. Such a request shall contain all information listed in Article 45(2) and set out the reasons for requesting the Commission or the Board to intervene.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2028 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 47 – paragraph 1
1. AIn independent advisory group of Digital Services Coordinators on the supervision of providers of intermediary services named ‘European Board for Digital Services’ (torder to ensure the consistent application of this Regulation, the ‘European Board for Digital Services’ (the ‘Board’) is established as a body of the Union. The Board shall have legal personality. The board shall act independently when performing its task or exercising its powers. The ‘Bboard’) is established shall be represented by its Chair.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2034 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 47 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. The Board shall advise the Digital Services Coordinators and the Commistake decisions in accordance with this Regulation to achieve the following objectives:
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2037 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 47 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) Contributing toEnsuring the consistent application across the Union of this Regulation and effective cooperation of the Digital Services Coordinators and the Commission with regard to matters covered by this Regulation;
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2041 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 47 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) coordinating and contributing toproviding guidance and analysis of the Commission and Digital Services Coordinators and other competent authorities on emerging issues across the internal market with regard to matters covered by this Regulation;
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2059 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 48 – paragraph 3
3. The Board shall be chaired by the Commission. The Commissiona president elected within its members. The chair of the board shall not be allowed to lead any national regulatory office in their respective Member states at the same time. The chair mandate should be limited to a maximum of 3 years, renewable once. The chair of the Board shall convene the meetings and prepare the agenda in accordance the tasks of the Board pursuant to this Regulation and with its rules of procedure.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2065 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 48 – paragraph 5
5. The Board may invite experts and observers to attend its meetings, and mayshall cooperate with other Union bodies, offices, agencies and advisory groups, as well as external experts as appropriate. The Board shall make the results of this cooperation publicly available.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2069 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 48 – paragraph 6
6. The Board shall adopt its rules of procedure, following the consent of the Commissionby a two-thirds majority of its members and shall organise its own operational arrangements.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2087 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 49 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) advise the Commissiondecide to take the measures referred to in Article 51 and, where requested by the Commission, adopt opinions on draft Commission measures concerning very large online platforms in accordance with this Regulation;
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2096 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 50 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Where the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment adopts a decision finding that a very large online platform has infringed any of the provisions of Section 4 of Chapter III, it shall make use of the enhanced supervision system laid down in this Article. It shall take utmost account of any opinion and recommendation of the Commission and the Board pursuant toThe Board, this acting on its own initiative or upon request of at least three Digital Services Coordinators of destination, shall, where it has reasons to suspect that a very large online platform infringed any of those provisions, make use of the enhanced supervision system laid down in this Aarticle.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2104 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 50 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
Within one month following receipt of the action plan, the Board shall communicate its opinion on the action plan to the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment. Within one month following receipt of that opinion, that Digital Services Coordinator shall decide whether the action plan is appropriate to terminate or remedy the infringement.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2110 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 50 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
4. The Digital Services Coordinator of establishmentBoard shall communicate to the Commission, the Board and the very large online platform concerned its views as to whether the very large online platform has terminated or remedied the infringement and the reasons thereof. It shall do so within the following time periods, as applicable:
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2111 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 50 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) within threone months from the decision on the action plan referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 3, where no such audit was performed;
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2113 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 50 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
Pursuant to that communication, the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment shall no longer be entitled to take any investigatory or enforcement measures in respect of the relevant conduct by the very large online platform concerned, without prejudice to Article 66 or any other measures that it may take at the request of the Commission or the Board.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2114 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 51 – title
Intervention by the Commission and the Board and opening of proceedings
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2118 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 51 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. The Commission or the Board, acting either upon the Board’s recommendation or on its own initiative after consulting the Boardf at least three Digital Services Coordinators of destination or on their own initiative, may initiate proceedings in view of the possible adoption of decisions pursuant to Articles 58 and 59 in respect of the relevant conduct by the very large online platform that:
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2123 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 51 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) is suspected of having infringed any of the provisions of this Regulation and the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment requested the Board or the Commission to intervene in accordance with Article 46(2), upon the reception of that request;
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2128 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 51 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Where the Board or the Commission decides to initiate proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1, it shall notify all Digital Services Coordinators, the Board and the very large online platform concerned.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2142 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 1
1. In order to carry out the tasks assigned to it under this Section, the Commission and the Board may by simple request or by decision require the very large online platforms concerned, as well as any other persons acting for purposes related to their trade, business, craft or profession that may be reasonably be aware of information relating to the suspected infringement or the infringement, as applicable, including organisations performing the audits referred to in Articles 28 and 50(3), to provide such information within a reasonable time period.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2148 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 3
3. Where the Commission or the Board requires the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in Article 52(1) to supply information by decision, it shall state the legal basis and the purpose of the request, specify what information is required and set the time period within which it is to be provided. It shall also indicate the penalties provided for in Article 59 and indicate or impose the periodic penalty payments provided for in Article 60. It shall further indicate the right to have the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice of the European Union.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2151 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 5
5. At the request of the Commission or the Board, the Digital Services Coordinators and other competent authorities shall provide the Commission or the Board with all necessary information to carry out the tasks assigned to it under this Section.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2153 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 53 – paragraph 1
In order to carry out the tasks assigned to it under this Section, the Commission and the Board may interview any natural or legal person which consents to being interviewed for the purpose of collecting information, relating to the subject-matter of an investigation, in relation to the suspected infringement or infringement, as applicable.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2156 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 54 – paragraph 1
1. In order to carry out the tasks assigned to it under this Section, the Commission or the Board may conduct on-site inspections at the premises of the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in Article 52(1).
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2158 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 54 – paragraph 2
2. On-site inspections may also be carried out with the assistance of auditors or experts appointed by the Commission or the Board pursuant to Article 57(2).
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2160 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 54 – paragraph 3
3. During on-site inspections the Commission or the Board and auditors or experts appointed by it may require the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in Article 52(1) to provide explanations on its organisation, functioning, IT system, algorithms, data- handling and business conducts. The Commission and auditors or experts appointed by it may address questions to key personnel of the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in Article 52(1).
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2162 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 54 – paragraph 4
4. The very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in Article 52(1) is required to submit to an on-site inspection ordered by decision of the Commission or the Board. The decision shall specify the subject matter and purpose of the visit, set the date on which it is to begin and indicate the penalties provided for in Articles 59 and 60 and the right to have the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice of the European Union.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2167 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 55 – paragraph 1
1. In the context of proceedings which may lead to the adoption of a decision of non-compliance pursuant to Article 58(1), where there is an urgency due to the risk of serious damage for the recipients of the service, the Commission or the Board may, by decision, order interim measures against the very large online platform concerned on the basis of a prima facie finding of an infringement.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2169 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 56
1. Section, the very large online platform concerned offers commitments to ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of this Regulation, the Commission may by decision make those commitments binding on the very large online platform concerned and declare that there are no further grounds for action. 2. request or on its own initiative, reopen the proceedings: (a) change in any of the facts on which the decision was based; (b) platform concerned acts contrary to its commitments; or (c) incomplete, incorrect or misleading information provided by the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in Article 52(1). 3. that the commitments offered by the very large online platform concerned are unable to ensure effective compliance with the relevant provisions of this Regulation, it shall rejectArticle 56 deleted Commitments If, during proceedings under this The Commission may, upon where there has been a material where the very large online where the decision was based on Where those cCommitments in a reasoned decision when concluding the proceedings.ssion considers
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2180 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 57 – paragraph 1
1. For the purposes of carrying out the tasks assigned to it under this Section, the Commission and the Board may take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with this Regulation by the very large online platform concerned. The Commission and the Board may also order that platform to provide access to, and explanations relating to, its databases and algorithms.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2184 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 57 – paragraph 2
2. The actions pursuant to paragraph 1 may include the appointment of independent external experts and auditors to assist the Commission and the Board in monitoring compliance with the relevant provisions of this Regulation and to provide specific expertise or knowledge to the Commission and the Board .
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2188 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 58 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. The Commission and the Board shall adopt a non- compliance decision where it finds that the very large online platform concerned does not comply with one or more of the following:
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2191 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 58 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) commitments made binding pursuant to Article 56,deleted
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2192 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 58 – paragraph 2
2. Before adopting the decision pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission or the Board shall communicate its preliminary findings to the very large online platform concerned. In the preliminary findings, the Commission or the Board shall explain the measures that it considers taking, or that it considers that the very large online platform concerned should take, in order to effectively address the preliminary findings.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2195 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 58 – paragraph 3
3. In the decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 the Commission or the Board shall order the very large online platform concerned to take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with the decision pursuant to paragraph 1 within a reasonable time period and to provide information on the measures that that platform intends to take to comply with the decision.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2198 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 58 – paragraph 4
4. The very large online platform concerned shall provide the Commission or the Board with a description of the measures it has taken to ensure compliance with the decision pursuant to paragraph 1 upon their implementation.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2204 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 58 – paragraph 5
5. Where the Commission or the Board finds that the conditions of paragraph 1 are not met, it shall close the investigation by a decision.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2207 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 59 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. In the decision pursuant to Article 58, the Commission or the Board may impose on the very large online platform concerned fines not exceeding 6% of its total turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that that platform, intentionally or negligently:
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2211 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 59 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) fails to comply with a voluntary measure made binding by a decision pursuant to Articles 56.deleted
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2213 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 59 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. The Commission or the Board may by decision impose on the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in Article 52(1) fines not exceeding 1% of the total turnover in the preceding financial year, where they intentionally or negligently:
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2216 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 59 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) fail to rectify within the time period set by the Commission or the Board, incorrect, incomplete or misleading information given by a member of staff, or fail or refuse to provide complete information;
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2220 #

2020/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 59 – paragraph 3
3. Before adopting the decision pursuant to paragraph 2, the Commission or the Board shall communicate its preliminary findings to the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in Article 52(1).
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 80 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Notes that, in view of the climate change emergency, the EU’s Annual Growth Survey (AGS) has now been renamed the Annual Sustainable Growth Survey (ASGS), and considers that this implies a change in the positioning of the report and the implementation of ecological indicators; stresses that this needs to be more than a semantic aspect in the report, and requires serious and ambitious proposals to tackle climate change and promote environmental sustainability within the EU not downsizing the social dimension.
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 94 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Notes the role of the European Green Deal as the EU’s new strategy defining ecological issues and the wellbeing of citizens as principal goals for the Union; notes, with regard to the scope of the European Semester, the inclusion of the SDGs and of the principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR), which will require the adjustment of existing indicators and the creation of new ones to monitor the implementation of EU economic, environmental and social policies, as well as coherence between policy goals and budgetary means; notes the need to implement long-term planning to tackle climate change; notes that the Commission’s Green New Deal proposal is clearly insufficient to address the climate emergency; notes that, according to the scientific community, in order to comply with the targets on the Paris Agreement and limit the temperature rise to 1,5 degrees, it is necessary to cut carbon emissions by 65% until 2030; Notes that the Commission does not strengthen the EU budget, and proposes cuts to cohesion and agricultural funds, a decision which would be inconsistent with the ambitious social and environmental goals that are being set.
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 115 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Considers achieving a fair transition to climate neutrality to be a major responsibility for the EU’s citizens and economy and its role in the world; calls for appropriate support and policies, with involvement for and of the public, the various sectors, regions and Member States with a view to benefiting from this transformation and making it a success; calls on the Commission to undertake an annual evaluation of the Union’s ecological debt, carbon budget and imported emissions; Deplores the Just Transition Fund financial proposal (€7,5 billion) for not being nearly sufficient to ensure that carbon-dependent countries achieve a fair transition to a greener economy; Insists that the criteria underlying the distribution of the fund should take into account the need to promote economic and social upward convergence, countries’ vulnerability to climate change consequences and also the level of fiscal effort that some countries have made in the past to promote energy transition.
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 135 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Notes that the euro area is going through a prolonged period of subdued growth (1.1 % in the euro area and 1.4% in the EU as a whole in 2019), with growth in the euro area in 2020 and 2021 forecast at 1.2 % and for the EU in 2020 and 2021 forecast at 1.4 %; also notes that the core inflation rate is forecast to further slow down, to 1.2 % in 2019 and 2020, which signals an enduring failure of ECB’s monetary policy in boosting price levels in the euro area in a context of high uncertainty due to geopolitical tensions and Brexit; is concerned at the high level of private debt and persistent external surpluses; notes that the current period of sluggish growth and stagnant wages shows the limits of expansionary monetary policy and the need for this approach to be complemented by a fiscal expansion, with coordinated efforts to boost public investment, employment and aggregate demand;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 144 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Is concerned that post-crisis investment has been on a down ward path in the EU in spite of historically low interest rates, currently standing at 3.4 %, with overall infrastructure investment now at about 75 % of its pre-crisis level; whereas 80 % of the shortfall is the result of cutbacks in the public sector, which have occurred particularly in countries subject to adverse macroeconomic conditions and the more severe fiscal constraints imposed on disadvantaged regions already characterised by poor infrastructure quality and weak socio- economic outcomes, but also, and surprisingly, in countries with a large fiscal space; recalls that former ECB president Mario Draghi have asked member states to make use of fiscal policy and apply fiscal stimulus to avoid a deflationary trap; notes that the current period of ultra-low interest rates provides an opportunity to expand public investment, thus addressing crucial challenges such as the energy transition, the fight against poverty and inequality and the promotion of convergence within EU member states; recalls the fact that, without the creation of a serious eurozone budget, with at least the same level of redistribution as cohesion funds, convergence between member states will not be achieved; stresses that this poses risks to the future of the monetary union and undermines its stability.
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 171 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Endorses the conclusion of the European Fiscal Board (EFB) that the fiscal framework has not protected the quality of public expenditure, and welcomes the EFB’s proposal for a ‘golden rule’ to protect public investment; calls, therefore, for the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact and the introduction of a golden rule aimed at implementing sound fiscal policy on an equal footing with investment within the EU’s policy objectives; whereas this should cover the investment foreseen for the realisation of the Green Deal, the Digital Revolution, the SDGs and the EPSR Rights, including expenditure aimed at reducing poverty and inequality related to social protection, health services and long-term care, andchildcare, education and training;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 210 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Shares the concern expressed in others of the EFB’s conclusions regarding the pro-cyclical elements in the EU fiscal rules, which forced Member States to adjust their economies in a poor or difficult economic situation, failing to improvewith counterproductive effects on the quality of public finance and promote investment; welcomes the EFB’s recommendation of a seven-year cycle mirroring the MFF so as to better coordinate Member States’ public accounts, and especially investment; notes that the current revision of the EU fiscal rules provides an opportunity to do away with its pro-cyclical bias.
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 216 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Notes that the debt levels of all the Member States are above the pre-crisis level and are expected to exceed 60 % in 2021; further notes that in six Member States the ratio will be higher than 90 %; highlights the fact that the fiscal rules have not contributed to bringing down the debt levels of highly indebted countries but have, rather, increased them; recalls the need for a process of public debt restructuring in highly indebted economies (such as Greece, Portugal or Italy) in order to reduce the risk of excessive burden of interest expenditure in these countries, while promoting sustainable economic growth and the sustainability of public finances; recalls the need to discuss debt mutualisation within the EU as a way of promoting financial stability.
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 228 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Supports flexibility in the implementation of the SGP as proposed by the Commission in 2015; considers that much more flexibility should be introduced in order to boost investment and ecological transition in the EU; calls, therefore, for the reform of the SGP and the introduction of a euro area fiscal capacity;, as well as the guarantee that cohesion funds will not suffer cuts in the new MFF; stresses that the framework under which the BICC is currently being designed is clearly insufficient to promote sustainable growth and actually harms convergence in the euro area; calls for the BICC to have at least the same level of redistribution as the cohesion funds.
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 245 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Reiterates its call for a European stabilisation function and a European unemployment benefit reinsurance scheme, with a view to protecting citizens and reducing pressure on public finances during external shocks so as to overcome social and economic imbalances; stresses the need for this scheme to be based on budgetary transfers and not on loans granted to the member states.
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 255 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Notes that the Commission 13. warranted in-depth reviews for 13 Member States identified as having imbalances; supports the suggestion made in the Alert Mechanism Report (AMR) 2020 that a rebalancing of current account deficits and surpluses in the euro area is needed urgently and would be beneficial for all Member States; notes that persistent excessive surpluses in core countries such as Germany undermine the macroeconomic stability of the euro area; calls on the Commission to study the possibility of taxing these surpluses, when persistent and above a threshold, by designing a European Convergence Tax, in order to ensure the stability of the monetary union;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 280 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Recalls the importance of the efficient regulation of the banking and financial sectors in order to prevent a new crisis; believes that such regulation must integrate the ecological situation; emphasises the importance of completing the Banking Union and, giving full priority to EDIS and measures to control and revert transnational financial concentration and bank size; Recalls also the need to reform the European Stability Mechanism;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 307 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for qualified majority voting in Council on tax matters; , with the specific aim of reducing incentives for tax dumping and fighting tax evasion and money laundering;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 324 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Calls for the systematic inclusion of tax matters in the Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs), with the aim of ensuring economic coherence across EU Member States as well as the fairness of EU tax systems, inline with the resolution on BEPS 2.0 recently adopted by the European Parliament; believes that the CSRs could ensure a fair balance between sources of revenue and should also include innovative elements aiming at promoting the Green Deal taking into account its social dimension; further believes that they should also support Member States in tackling tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 341 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Notes that the EU-28 employment rate currently stands at 73.1 % - the highest annual average ever recorded - while unemployment stands at 7.6 % in the euro area and 6.3 % in the EU as a whole; however, stresses that unemployment levels are still significantly higher in periphery countries such as Greece (17,3% in 2019) or Spain (13,9% in 2019), while youth unemployment remains at worrying levels in these countries; notes that this trend reflects the dual post-crisis recovery in Europe, thus exacerbating the divergence between surplus and deficit countries within the euro area;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 350 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Stresses that, according to the EU Labour Force Survey, there are 8.3 million involuntary part-time workers in the EU, two thirds of them women; recalls that the rise of precarious work in the EU, such as the emergence of new types of employment created by online platforms, is a direct consequence of labour market deregulation and poses risks to social cohesion(mainly affecting the youth), while damaging aggregate demand; Request the Commission to undertake measures to protect workers in these new forms of work and requests the Commission to undertake a study to analyse the impact of this development on pension systems and public finances;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 359 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Takes note of AMR 2020’s finding that wage growth at euro area level remains below what would be expected at the current levels of unemployment on the basis of historical data, and that this affects the inflation rate; highlights that the currently low productivity and inflation together with structural reforms transferring collective bargaining to the enterprise level are detrimental to wage growth and are leading to greater income inequality and an increase in the numbers of working poor, with in-work poverty affecting almost one in ten workers in Europe; accordingly advocates wage growth;that the necessary wage growth can only be achieved by reversing the process of labour market liberalization and promoting job quality and stability; Calls on the Commission to revert its systematic CSR’s demanding labour market deregulation.
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 366 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Agrees that it is a matter of great concern that income inequality is above pre-crisis levels in some countries, affecting new groups of people and being frequently linked to unequal opportunities in access to education, training and social protection; stresses the importance of redistributive, i.e., progressive income taxes to tackle growing inequality within the EU; Points out that corporate tax dumping promotes inequality, both by depriving Member-States of the necessary resources to fund public services and transferring the tax burden toward labour income.
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 372 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Underlines the fact that the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion stands, on 2017 figures, at 113 million, or 22.5 % of the population; underlines the fact that, in 2017, 9,4% of all employed people in the EU were at risk of poverty; recalls that the objectives laid out in 2010 in the Europe 2020 Strategy (namely, to lift 20million people out of poverty and social exclusion by 2020) haven’t been met yet, as the number of people in this situation has increased significantly.
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 390 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24 a. Calls for the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights as a strategy to promote the fight against poverty and social exclusion namely improving working conditions, job security and stability and wage growth.
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 401 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
26. Looks forward to the stronger involvement of the EP and the national parliaments in the European Semester process and to the creation of an institutionalised dialogue with the Commission, the social partners, territories and civil society, at both EU, local, regional and national level, in order to further boost the process’s democratic legitimacy; Points out that ownership, in order not to be a void concept, implies that democratic institutions at the different levels effectively shape the recommendations.
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 412 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
27. Invites the stakeholders in this necessary next step to create enhanced democratic accountability mechanisms at both EU, local, regional and national levels, while formalising the scrutiny role of the EP in the European Semester; calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance the social and civil dialogue, including over the CSRs, and to engage in dialogue with the social partners;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 19 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas the process of deepening the Economic and Monetary Union requires a solid Banking Union as an indispensable building block to the euro area’s financial stability, as well as the creation of a mechanism of fiscal stabilisation for the euro area as a wholea healthy banking system is a prerequisite for economic growth and financial stability;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 26 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
A a. whereas downside risks to global and euro area economic growth have increased and continue to create financial stability challenges;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 33 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas entrusting the ECB with the supervision of systemically important financial institutions has proven to be successful;deleted
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 41 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas the development of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) was efficienta useful but not yet completed instrument to avoid the socialisation of losses;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 46 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
D a. whereas more than ten years after the financial crisis the ‘too big to fail’ and ‘too interconnected to fail’ problems remain insufficiently addressed;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 80 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. WelcomNotes the overall increased resilience of the European banking system, as attested by the EBA’s 2018 Risk Assessment of the European Banking System; remains concerned about the fragility of the European Banking System and is highly worried that the existing tools as laid out on CRR/CRD and BRRD will be insufficient to avoid major economic shocks in a future banking crisis and that the socialisation of losses will once more be necessary;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 136 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Is concerned about the erosion of the public banking system and the need for competitiveness and profit- maximisation; believes that public ownership of the banking system should be promoted in order to allow for the stable and long-term funding of economic activities;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 142 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Welcomes thNotes some progress made in the banking sector in reducing risk and increasing financial stability; is, however, worried that the sector remains very fragile and the necessary consolidation has not taken place since the last financial crisis;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 167 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Notes that work on the implementation of the final Basel III standards has already started; recalls its resolution of 23 November 2016 on the finalisation of Basel III and calls on the Commission to act on the recommendations therein when drafting the new legislative proposalcalls on the Commission not to deviate from international agreements;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 255 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Stresses that banks need to be able to operate aIs concerned by the latest discussions on the need for cross -borders while managing their capital and liquidity at a consolidated level, in order to diversify their risks and address any lack of profi banking mergers; urges the Commission to undertake a detability; highlights that rules should allow for greater flexibility for the parent company in this regard, while specifying that, in the event of a crisis, the parent company should provide capital and liquidity to the subsidiary located in the host countryed impact assessment on such mergers and their effects on financial stability and too big to fail before advancing any proposals in this regard;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 258 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21 a. Stresses that national banking systems should be maintained and must not be jeopardised by further cross-border harmonisation efforts; sees in this regard different comparisons with the US model of financing the economy with great concern as this model might be able to offer higher short term profits but is at the same time more volatile;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 10 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)
- having regard to P8_TA- PROV(2018)0475, European Parliament resolution of 29 November 2018 on the cum-ex scandal: financial crime and loopholes in the current legal framework (2018/2900(RSP))
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 18 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 18 a (new)
- having regard to P8_TA(2016)0453 European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2016 on towards a definitive VAT system and fighting VAT fraud(2016/2033(INI))
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 29 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 25 a (new)
- having regard to reports on tax avoidance and tax evasion as challenges for governance, social protection and development in developing countries, and gender equality and taxation policies in the EU1a; _________________ 1a Report on tax avoidance and tax evasion as challenges for governance, social protection and development in developing countries (2015/2058(INI)), European Parliament Committee on Development. Report adopted on 09/06/2015; and [add link to FEMM report once published]
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 42 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Stresses that capitalistic globalisation and the free movement of capital created the perfect conditions for the design of base erosion and profit shifting schemes and, at the same time, enshrined a structural bias in policymaking to the benefit of capital owners and multinational enterprises (MNEs), which has served to promote divergences and asymmetries between countries and social classes; emphasises, furthermore, that the free movement of capital, the deregulation and liberalisation of the financial and banking system, and the increasing tax competition among Member States – all promoted by EU institutions and legislation with the support of the European right wing and social democracy –are at the root of the rise of tax evasion and tax avoidance schemes and scandals;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 46 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1 b. Notes that the lowering of wealth taxes, which prioritize the wellbeing of the most privileged casts of the society, can lead to social unrest, as has been the case in the recent episodes in France, as the rest of the society which does not benefit from such tax cuts, but is more and more affected by the reduction of the welfare state, is bound to feel abandoned and neglected by its governing State1a _________________ 1a See comments by Piketty of 9 December 2018; URL: https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2018/ 12/08/thomas-piketty-gilets-jaunes-et- justice-fiscale_5394443_3232.html
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 55 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. WelcomNotes the fact that during its current term the Commission has put forward 22 legislative proposals aimed at closing some of the loopholes, improving theallegedly to fight against financial crimes and aggressive tax planning, and enhancing tax collection efficiency and tax fairness; calls for the swift adoption of initiatives that have not yet been finalised andbut which have had in origin sufficient loopholes, or thresholds so high so as not to affect the current level of tax evasion and continue legalising avoidance; calls for careful monitoring of their implementation to ensure efficiency and proper enforcement, in order to keep pace with the versatility of tax fraud, tax evasion and aggressive tax planning;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 62 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Recalls the observation of the European Parliament in the interim report on MFF noting that effective measures against corruption and tax evasion by multinationals and the wealthiest individuals would make it possible to return to the Member States’ budgets an amount estimated by the Commission at one trillion euros per year, and that in this field there has been a serious lack of action by the European Union1a; _________________ 1a Par. 49 of theInterim report on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021- 2027 adopted inPlenary
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 79 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. Deplores the fact that the Council has not yet made any progress to enter into negotiations with the Parliament on the proposal for CBCR; notes however that Member States have already started implementation of OECD BEPS Action 13 on Country-by-Country Report, and DAC4; calls for the Commission to request information collected from the Member States under CBCR for quantitative impact assessments;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 95 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1.3
Tax fraud, tax evasion and aggressive tax planning (ATP)tax avoidance
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 99 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls that the fight against tax evasion and fraud tackles illegal acts, whereas the fight against tax avoidance addresses situations that are a priori within the limits of the law but against its spirit;– unless deemed illegal by the tax authorities or, ultimately, by the courts1a– but against its spirit. _________________ 1a 1] ‘Member States' capacity to fight tax crimes, Ex-post impact assessment’, Elodie Thirion and Amandine Scherrer, European Parliamentary Research Service, July 2017
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 106 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Recalls that ATP describes the setting of a tax design aimed at reducing tax liability by using the technicalities of a tax system or of mismatchesarbitrating between two or more tax systems that go against the spirit of the law; that such acts, in the same way as tax avoidance, could be deemed illegal by tax authorities or by the courts
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 110 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10 a. Understands then that there is no practical difference between tax avoidance, tax planning and aggressive tax planning; and that tax planning can also be considered systemic tax avoidance3a _________________ 3a Jarass, L. and Obermair, G.M. (2015) What an Individual EU Country Can Do Unilaterally to Counteract BEPS. Reprinted from Tax Notes Int’l, August 24, 2015, p. 697
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 117 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Calls on the Commission and the Council to propose and adopt a comprehensive definition of aggressive tax planning indicators, building on both the hallmarks identified in the fifth review of the Directive on administrative cooperation (DAC6)26 after being strengthened in order to require the mandatory disclosure of dividend arbitrage schemes and all information on capital gains, including the granting of dividend and capital gains tax refunds1a and the Commission’s relevant studies and recommendations27 ; calls on Member States to use those indicators as a basis to repeal all harmful tax practices deriving from existing tax loopholes; _________________ 1a P8_TA-PROV(2018)0475. European Parliament resolution of 29 November 2018 on thecum-ex scandal: financial crime and loopholes in the current legal framework(2018/2900(RSP)) 26 Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements, OJ L 139, 5.6.2018, p. 1. 27 https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/ taxation/files/resources/documents/taxation /gen_info/economic_analysis/tax_papers/ta xation_paper_61.pdfand https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/ taxation/files/tax_policies_survey_2017.pd f
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 124 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Stresses the similarity between corporate tax payers and high-net-worth individuals in the use of corporate structures and similar structures such as trusts and offshore locations for the purpose of ATPtax evasion and tax avoidance; recalls the role of intermediarieenablers and promoters in setting up such schemes;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 132 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13 a. Regrets that 7 EU Member States have been identified for their tax avoidance by the European Commission in the European Semester, namely, Ireland, The Netherlands, Cyprus, Malta, Belgium, Hungary and Luxembourg, and that little measures have been taken by such Member States to modify their legislation in order to make it less attractive for tax evasion and avoidance;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 134 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)
13 b. Notes that company restructures can be observed in the macro-economic data of Ireland from 2014-2017, particularly in the first quarter of 2015; notes that major changes occurred in Ireland’s GNP, GDP, exports, imports, investment, external debt and more; regrets that despite the relocation of sales income and intellectual property to Ireland, there was no observable corresponding increase in corporation tax received by Irish Revenue1a _________________ 1a Brehm Christensen, M.; Clancy, E. (2018) ‘Exposed: Apple’s delicious tax deals, Is Ireland Helping Apple Pay less than 1% in the EU?’; GUE/NGL; June 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 135 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)
13 b. Regrets that even when in Ireland, the capital allowance for depreciation of intangible assets has been lowered from a rate of 100% to 80% from 2017, this reduction was not applied to the intangible assets brought onshore from 2015-2016, which could still benefit from the 100% rate1a _________________ 1a Brehm Christensen, M.; Clancy, E. (2018) ‘Exposed: Apple’s delicious tax deals, Is Ireland Helping Apple Pay less than 1% in the EU?’; GUE/NGL; June 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 136 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)
13 b. Calls on the Commission to list the EU jurisdictions identified for providing opportunities for aggressive tax planning as tax havens and prepare a proposal on deterrent actions to be applied against such Member States;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 137 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 c (new)
13 c. Deplores that the Irish government introduced the 100% rate on capital allowances for intellectual property (IP) following a recommendation made by the American Chamber of Commerce in Ireland in 20141a _________________ 1a Brehm Christensen, M.; Clancy, E. (2018) ‘Exposed: Apple’s delicious tax deals, Is Ireland Helping Apple Pay less than 1% in the EU?’; GUE/NGL; June 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 138 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 c (new)
13 c. Regrets that the Irish government introduced the 100% rate on capital allowances for intellectual property (IP) following a recommendation made by the American Chamber of Commerce in Ireland in 20141a _________________ 1a Brehm Christensen, M.; Clancy, E. (2018) ‘Exposed: Apple’s delicious tax deals, Is Ireland Helping Apple Pay less than 1% in the EU?’; GUE/NGL; June 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 145 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Reiterates its call on companies, as taxpayers, to fully comply with their tax obligations and refrain from aggressive tax planning leading to BEPS, to recognise their business is enabled by tax-funded infrastructure and services, and to consider fair taxation strategy as an important part of their corporate social responsibility;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 146 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14 a. Notes however, that self-regulation cannot be the answer to tackling tax fraud, tax evasion and avoidance; which can only be fought with adequate legislation, transparency, intra and inter institutional cooperation, inter- jurisdictional cooperation,and sufficient personnel and technical equipment employed by tax administrations
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 172 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16 a. Notes however, that any debate concerning minimum taxation should make reference to minimum effective taxation, measured by the total income taxes paid by a corporation over its total profits, including in this measurement tax breaks to the base (that is, the income on which taxes are charged), as effective rates can often be much lower, and in many cases half, of the statutory rate;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 176 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16 b. Notes that the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Tax (ICRICT), observed that setting a minimum effective taxation would put a floor under tax competition1a _________________ 1a ICRICT (2016) FOURWAYS TO TACKLE INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION, November 2016
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 178 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 c (new)
16 c. Notes that a debate that does not consider effective taxation risks ending in lowering statutory rates even more and increasing tax competition;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 184 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17 a. Notes that taxing all earnings without deduction for interest and license fee payments in and by the source country could and should be at the center of any measures against tax avoidance1a _________________ 1a Jarass, L. and Obermair, G.M. (2015) What an Individual EU Country Can Do Unilaterally to Counteract BEPS. Reprinted from Tax Notes Int’l, August 24, 2015, p. 697
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 185 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)
17 b. Notes that any individual EU country can unilaterally enforce both withholding taxes and conditioned limitations on deductions, as comprehensive taxation at the source, including earnings paid for interest, license fees, and the like, is by no means ruled out by the relevant EU directive1a _________________ 1a Jarass, L. and Obermair, G.M. (2015) What an Individual EU Country Can Do Unilaterally to Counteract BEPS. Reprinted from Tax Notes Int’l, August 24, 2015, p. 697
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 186 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 c (new)
17 c. Notes that many countries have introduced withholding taxes, in particular for interest and license fee payments to related parties outside the EU. However, existing tax treaties considerably reduce the withholding tax rate1a _________________ 1a Jarass, L. and Obermair, G.M. (2015) ‘What an Individual EU Country Can Do Unilaterally to Counteract BEPS’, Reprinted from Tax Notes Int’l, August 24, 2015, p. 697; and Hearson M. (2018) ‘The European Union’s Tax Treaties with Developing Countries– Leading By Example?’, September 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 187 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 d (new)
17 d. Regrets, that within the EU, no withholding taxes are levied on payments between related parties even when the other party is not effectively subject to tax on the income deriving from those payments in that other Member State. Notes however, that recital 3 of the interest and royalty directive1a clearly states that “It is necessary to ensure that interest and royalty payments are subject to tax once in a Member State”. Therefore, the EU directive on interest and royalty payments does not forbid source taxation of all earnings produced by an enterprise, whether declared as profit or transferred to another enterprise domestic or abroad as payment for interest or license fees2a _________________ 1a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States 2a Jarass, L. and Obermair, G.M. (2015) What an Individual EU Country Can Do Unilaterally to Counteract BEPS. Reprinted from Tax Notes Int’l, August 24, 2015, p. 697
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 188 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 e (new)
17 e. Encourages EU Member States to apply withholding taxes to payments within and outside the EU in order to ensure that interests and royalty payments are subject to tax once in a Member State; and to make the necessary re-negotiations of their tax treaties in order to allow for withholding taxes to be applied at source1a _________________ 1a Jarass, L. and Obermair, G.M. (2015) What an Individual EU Country Can Do Unilaterally to Counteract BEPS. Reprinted from Tax Notes Int’l, August 24, 2015, p. 697
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 194 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Notes that the G20/OECD 15-point BEPS action plan is being implemented and monitored and further discussions are taking place, in a broader context than just the initial participating countries, through the Inclusive Framework; calls on Member States to support a reform of both the mandate and the functioning of the Inclusive Framework to ensure that remaining tax loopholes and unsolved tax questions such as the allocation of taxing rights among countries are covered by the current international framework to combat BEPS practices;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 217 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22 a. Calls on the Commission to review ATAD I in order to eliminate the 2 alternatives for implementing CFC rules and leave only the stronger, most efficient one in Article 7(2)(a): to tax interest, royalties and other relevant types of income of all low-tax foreign subsidiaries, as the second option (to tax income of low-tax subsidiaries arising from non- genuine arrangements which have been put in place for the essential purpose of obtaining a tax advantage)is very weak and open to abuse, because it only protects against profit-shifting out of the home country and requires the tax authority to analyse many individual transactions of low-tax subsidiaries;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 229 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24 a. Calls for the definition of a permanent establishment to be more in line with the concept of a permanent establishment as defined in the UN model tax convention considering also the definition in the CCTB proposal, in a way that allows for the definition of permanent establishment not only to comprise tax payers with a fixed place of residence in a Member State, but also economic activities performed without the need of physical presence;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 233 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
26. Recalls its concerns relating to the use of transfer prices in ATP and consequently recalls the need for adequate action and improvement of the transfer pricing framework to address the issue; stresses the need to ensure that they reflect the economic reality, provide certainty, clarity and fairness for Member States and for companies operating within the Union, and reduce the risk of misuse of the rules for profit-shifting purposes, taking into account the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administration 2010;to ensure that taxable earnings reflect the economic reality, and reduce the risk of misuse of the rules for profit-shifting purposes.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 235 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)
26 a. Notes that as has been highlighted repeatedly by numerous experts and publications, the use of the ‘independent entity concept’ or ‘arm’s length principle’ recommended by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations of 1979, 1995, 2010 and 2017, is at the core of the problem of tax evasion, tax avoidance and double non-taxation;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 238 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
27. Emphasises that the EU actions aimed at addressing BEPS and ATPtax avoidance have equipped tax authorities with an updatedinsufficient toolbox to ensure fair tax collection; stresses that tax authorities should be responsible for making effective use of the tools without imposing an additional burden on responsible taxpayers, particularly SMEs and to tackle tax avoidance from multinational companies; stresses that tax authorities should be cautious not to end up imposing an additional burden on SMEs, when incapable of taxing multinational companies ;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 246 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 a (new)
28 a. Is concerned by the trend amongst some Member States of facilitating onshoring of IP from low tax third countries to EU Member States, through the provision of amortisation relief on IP acquirement, the proliferation of ‘patent boxes’ providing reduced taxation rates on certain IP profits, high or complete capital allowances for intellectual property and the introduction or extension of research and development credits1a; reiterates concerns expressed by the European Parliament1b and European Commission in relation to revenue losses associated with such measures1c; _________________ 1a Eurodad et. al.,Tax Games: the Race to the Bottom, Europe’s role in supporting an unjust tax system 2017, December 2017, pp. 22 – 24;and IMF, Fiscal Monitor: Acting Now, Acting Together, April 2016, p44. 1b European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2015 on tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect, OJ C 366, 27.10.2017, p. 26, paragraph 117. 1c European Commission, DG TAXUD, Tax Policies in the European Union. 2016 Survey, 26 October 2016, 2.1.3 R&D tax incentives, p2.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 248 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2.2
Strengthening EU actions to fight against corporate aggressive tax planning (ATP)tax avoidance and supplementing BEPS action plan
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 251 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2.2.1
Scrutinising Member States’ tax systems and overall tax environment – ATPtax avoidance within the EU (European Semester)
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 270 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32 a (new)
32 a. Calls on both the EU institutions and Member States to ensure public procurement contracts do not facilitate tax avoidance by suppliers. Member States should monitor and ensure that companies or other legal entities involved in tenders and procurement contracts do not participate in tax evasion and avoidance by interacting with financial intermediaries established in offshore centres and tax havens, or by facilitating illicit capital flows, and to increase their transparency policies by requiring annual public country-by-country reporting, tracing beneficial ownership and controlling the valuation of intragroup transactions in order to ensure the transparency of investments and prevent tax evasion and tax avoidance; Calls on the Commission to clarify existing procurement practice under the EU procurement directive, and if necessary, propose an update to it does not prohibit the application of tax related considerations as criteria for exclusion or even as selection criteria in public procurement1a; _________________ 1a Initiatives such as www.tenderhaven.euhave attempted to introduce more transparency.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 291 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 a (new)
33 a. Notes that CCCTB impact assessments have been carried out on the basis of incomplete data at a time when tax administrations will soon have access to more precise and complete information following the Member States’ implementation of country-by-country reporting, and that going ahead without proper analysis would be deeply irresponsible; calls on the European Commission to conduct a new impact assessment based on high-quality data which would allow for a more informed decision to be made between different possible apportionment formulas;1a _________________ 1a ‘Assessing the impact of the CC(C)TB: European tax base shifts under a range of policy scenarios’; a GUE/NGL Study by Alex Cobham, Petr Janský, Chris Jones and Yama Temouri (Tax Justice Network); November 2017;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 295 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 b (new)
33 b. Believes that, as regards proceeding with the CCTB and CCCTB proposals, if aggregation were to take place without considering the differences between Member States’ accounting rules the inconsistencies in the EU tax base might end up being exploited by those seeking to secure advantage from regulatory arbitrage; calls on the Council to consider that ‘consolidated tax base’ should mean the consolidated net taxable revenue of the corporate group members, as calculated on a consistent accounting basis applicable to all group members;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 297 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 c (new)
33 c. As already stressed by the PANA recommendations, implementing the CCCTB at EU level runs the risk of creating a situation in which current losses from Member States to the rest of world could be locked in, as could the exploitation of the rest of the world by some Member States; notes that an EU- only approach could eliminate the incentives to shift profit within the EU, but open the door to further incentives and opportunities to shift profit out of the EU1a _________________ 1a European Parliament recommendation of 13 December 2017 to the Council and the Commission following the inquiry into money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion (Texts adopted, P8_TA- (2017)0491).
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 298 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 d (new)
33 d. Calls on the Council to take note of PANA recommendations and consider strengthening the anti-tax avoidance provisions of the CCCTB to eliminate transfer pricing to third-country jurisdictions leading to a reduction in the taxable base of companies in the Union1a; in particular this means considering using the stronger, simpler and most efficient approach regarding the implementation of CFC rules in ATAD I Article7(2)(a); _________________ 1a European Parliament recommendation of 13 December 2017 to the Council and the Commission following the inquiry into money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion(Texts adopted, P8_TA- (2017)0491).
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 307 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34 a (new)
34 a. Notes that digitalisation affects the whole economy with many firms using multi-channel models; thus, instead of creating special regimes for digital businesses, international tax rules should be reformed, based on a principle of neutrality between different business models, both digital and non-digital, and regardless of the extent or form of digitalisation, including multi-channel models, recognising the economic reality businesses operate in today;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 319 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 a (new)
35 a. Notes that changing the definition of permanent establishment to make it more aligned with that of the UN model tax convention in a way that also includes digital significant presence, would be the optimal solution to tackle problems not only affecting the digital market but rather the digitalization of the economy and the earnings created in jurisdictions where companies do not have any physical presence;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 336 #

2018/2121(INI)

36a. Notes that the interim solution needs to be swiftly replaced by a change in the definition of permanent establishment; calls for the Council to consider the need for the digital service tax to be set at a level that takes the effective taxation of multinational companies within the scope of this proposal to that of other smaller companies in the same sector and other economic sectors, and that for that reason, the rate should be no lower than 5%;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 369 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44 a (new)
44a. Calls for DAC6 hallmarks to be strengthened in order to require the mandatory disclosure of dividend arbitrage schemes and all information on capital gains, including the granting of dividend and capital gains tax refunds1a _________________ 1a P8_TA-PROV(2018)0475. European Parliament resolution of 29 November 2018 on the cum-ex scandal: financial crime and loopholes in the current legal framework(2018/2900(RSP))
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 402 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45
45. Stresses that the proposal for public CBCR was submitted to the co-legislators just after the Panama papers scandal on 12 April 2016, and that Parliament adopted its position on it on 4 July 2017; recalls that the latter called for an enlargement of the scope of reporting and protection of commercially sensitive information; deplores the lack of progress and cooperation from the Council since 2016; urges for progress to be made in the Council so that it enters into negotiations with Parliament;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 404 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 a (new)
45a. Recalls the position of the European Parliament in the PANA recommendations when it called for ambitious public country-by-country reporting (CbCR) in order to enhance tax transparency and the public scrutiny of multinational enterprises (MNEs) as this would allow the wider public to have access to information about the profits made, subsidies received and the taxes paid by MNEs in the jurisdictions where they operate; urges the Council to reach a common agreement in order to adopt a public CbCR, one of the key measures for achieving greater transparency in relation to companies’ tax information for all citizens; 1a _________________ 1a European Parliament recommendation of 13 December 2017 to the Council and the Commission following the inquiry into money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion(Texts adopted, P8_TA- (2017)0491).
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 411 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 46 a (new)
46a. Notes that tax competition, with its detrimental effects, is not only allowed but encouraged by the European Commission, excluding only ‘special deals’ which are treated as State Aid, in an attempt to attract foreign investment even when the effectiveness of this strategy has been greatly questioned1a; _________________ 1a ICRICT, 'Four ways to tackle international tax competition', December 2016
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 420 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 48 a (new)
48a. Is concerned by the lack of transparency of tax rulings and notes that the tax rulings investigated by the Commission were only available to them because of revelations by investigative journalists, civil society organisations and trade unions;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 426 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 49 a (new)
49a. Is concerned with the fact that the Commission ruled that double-non taxation achieved by McDonald’s stemmed from a mismatch between Luxembourg and US tax laws and the Luxembourg-United States double taxation treaty, a mismatch from which McDonald’s profited by arbitrating between such jurisdictions; and that such tax avoidance is enabled by the current legal framework in the EU to a point that the only means found effective by the European Commission to tackle it is through State Aid rules, something which has proved not to be possible in the case of McDonald’s;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 432 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 51
51. Reiterates its calls for guidelines clarifying what constitutes tax-related State aid and ‘appropriate’ transfer pricing, with a view to removing legal uncertainties for both compliant taxpayers and tax administrations, and providing a framework for Member States’ tax practices accordingly;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 435 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 51 a (new)
51a. Regrets the fact that the current framework for tackling profit shifting between related parties through transfer pricing is based on the ‘arm’s length’ principle, a principle that grants a higher regard to the contractual arrangement among related parties than to the economic reality of the transactions taking place between one party and another one subject to it; deplores that the generalization of the ‘arm’s length principle’ has resulted in the ‘legalization’ of tax avoidance through transfer pricing; notes that in this context, the only effective solution within the European Union to tackle the tax evasion and tax avoidance of multinational companies has been through the identification of abuses to State aid rules;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 438 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 51 b (new)
51b. Deplores that Apple’s new European tax structure remains shrouded in secrecy, partially due to a lack of financial transparency in Ireland and Jersey; and that most of its financial information remains secret globally1a _________________ 1a Brehm Christensen, M.; Clancy, E. (2018) ‘Exposed: Apple’s delicious tax deals, Is Ireland Helping Apple Pay less than 1% in the EU?’; GUE/NGL; June 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 439 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 51 c (new)
51c. Deplores that with the assistance of the Irish government, Apple has successfully created a structure that has allowed it to gain a tax write-off against almost all of its non-US sales profits; calls on the Commission to further investigate Apple’s case in the context of State Aid rules;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 440 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 51 d (new)
51d. Notes that the law governing the use of capital allowances for IP is not subject to Ireland’s transfer pricing legislation, but it includes a prohibition from being used for tax avoidance purposes; deplores that Apple is potentially breaking Irish law by its restructure and it exploitation of the capital allowance regime for tax purposes; notes that if the same legal reasoning used in the European Commission’s state aid ruling on Apple and Ireland is applied, Apple is in breach of Irish tax law, and owes Irish Revenue at least 2.5 billion additional euros in unpaid tax annually from the period 2015-2017;1a _________________ 1a Brehm Christensen, M.; Clancy, E. (2018) ‘Exposed: Apple’s delicious tax deals, Is Ireland Helping Apple Pay less than 1% in the EU?’; GUE/NGL; June 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 453 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 53 a (new)
53a. Regrets however that the banning of letterbox companies in Latvia cannot be used to ban letterbox companies resident in EU Member States, as that would be considered discriminatory in the current EU legislative framework1a;calls for the European Commission to propose changes in the current legislation that would enable to ban letterbox companies even if resident in EU Member States; _________________ 1a TAX3 Delegation to Riga (Latvia), 30- 31 August 2018, MISSION REPORT
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 462 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 54
54. Highlights that the high level of inward and outward foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP in seven Member States (Belgium, Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, and the Netherlands) can only be partially explained by real economic activities taking place in these Member States;40and therefore is a clear indicator of tax avoidance opportunities granted by such Member States; _________________ 40 Kiendl Kristo I. and Thirion E., An overview of shell companies in the European Union, EPRS, European Parliament, October 2018, p.23.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 470 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55 a (new)
55a. Recalls that the European Parliament has called on the Commission to assess the role of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) revealed by the cum-ex papers and, where appropriate, to propose limiting the use of these instruments1a;calls on the European Commission to assess the role of the special purpose entities holding foreign direct investment in Malta, Luxembourg and the Netherlands; _________________ 1a P8_TA- (2018)0475European Parliament resolution of 29 November 2018 on the cum-ex scandal: financial crime and loopholes in the current legal framework (2018/2900(RSP))
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 474 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 56
56. Notes that economic indicators such as an unusually high level of foreign direct investment, as well as foreign direct investment held by special purpose entities are ATPtax avoidance indicators42 ; _________________ 42 IHS, Aggressive tax planning indicators, prepared for the European Commission, DG TAXUD Taxation papers, Working paper No 71, October 2017.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 481 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 57
57. Notes that the ATAD anti-abuse rules (artificial arrangements) cover letterbox companies, and that the CCTB and CCCTB would ensure that the income is attributed to where the real economic activity takes place;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 488 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 58 a (new)
58a. Deplores that shell companies associated with anonymity, circumvention of the Posting of Workers Directive and treaty abuse, can generate serious risks of tax avoidance, tax evasion, money laundering and abuse of social rights; and that such abuses have an impact in the rise of inequalities and decreased trust in public institutions1a _________________ 1a Kiendl Kristo I. and Thirion E., An overview of shell companies in the European Union, EPRS, European Parliament, October 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 491 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59 a (new)
59a. Notes that abusive conversions, mergers or divisions constituting artificial arrangements or social dumping, but also reducing fiscal obligations or undercutting social rights of employees are therefore to be avoided in order to respect Treaty principles;1a _________________ 1a OPINION of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs for the Committee on Legal Affairs on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 as regards cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions (COM(2018)0241 – C8 0167/2018 –2018/0114(COD))
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 493 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59 b (new)
59b. Notes that cross-border conversions should be conditioned to the company moving its registered office together with its head office in order to carry out a substantial part of its economic activity in the Member State of destination1a _________________ 1a OPINION of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs for the Committee on Legal Affairs on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 as regards cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions (COM(2018)0241 – C8 0167/2018 –2018/0114(COD))
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 494 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59 c (new)
59c. Calls for Member States to request that a set of financial information be published ahead of the execution of cross- border conversions, mergers or divisions; and for that financial information to be accompanied by public country by country reporting;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 498 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60 a (new)
60a. Notes that VAT is generally considered a regressive form of taxation, having a disproportionate impact on women and poorer people, who typically spend a higher proportion of their income on consumption1a;Notes that action on VAT should consider in the context of the overall spread of burden across different groups of taxpayers; Is concerned that VAT rates have steadily increased across EU Member States, while corporate income tax rates have decreased1b;Calls on the European Commission to investigate the impact of increasing VAT rates and decreasing CIT rates on the effective tax burden of different taxpayers; _________________ 1a Asa Gunnarsson, Margit Schratzenstaller and Ulrike Spangenberg, Gender equality and taxation in the European Union study, Directorate- General for Internal Policies, European Parliament, 2018; Caren Grown and Imraan Valodia (editors), Taxation and Gender Equity: A Comparative Analysis of Direct and Indirect Taxes in Developing and Developed Countries, Routledge, 2010 pp 32 – 74, pp 309 – 310, and p315; ActionAid, Value-Added Tax (VAT), Progressive tax policy brief, 2018; and Janet G. Stotsky, Gender and Its Relevance to Macroeconomic Policy: A Survey, IMF Working Paper, WP/06/233, p.42 1b Eurodad et. al., Tax Games: the Race to the Bottom, Europe’s role in supporting an unjust tax system 2017, December 2017, pp. 14 - 16;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 569 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 79 a (new)
79a. Recalls that effective cross checks of the data held by tax authorities with data held by customs authorities are crucial to detect and eliminate VAT fraud linked to imports; and recalls on Member States and on the Commission to act in order to facilitate the flow of information between tax and customs authorities regarding imports under Customs Procedure 42, as recommended by the European Court of Auditors1a ;considering that experience has shown that administrative cooperation between tax authorities is suboptimal;1b _________________ 1a P8_TA(2016)0453European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2016 on towards a definitive VAT system and fighting VAT fraud (2016/2033(INI))[ 1b Study entitled ‘VAT fraud: Economic impact, challenges and policy issues’, European Parliament, Directorate- General for Internal Policies, Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, 15 October2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 570 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 79 b (new)
79b. Notes that among the most used crimes in VAT fraud, the one known as "Missing Trader fraud (MTIC fraud) or Carousel fraud" is the most widespread and most used; notes that a particularity of this fraud is that it is carried out, for the most part, by organized crime; notes that in recent years, this fraud has diversified to include online commerce; notes that the extension of this type of fraud to online commerce is partly due to the suboptimal cooperation between tax administrations1a;calls for EU Member States and the European Commission to keep on developing swift cooperation between tax administrations; _________________ 1a Study entitled ‘VAT fraud: Economic impact, challenges and policy issues’, European Parliament, Directorate- General for Internal Policies, Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, 15 October2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 571 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 79 c (new)
79 c. Notes that the extension of e- commerce is posing an important challenge for the economic and fiscal authorities, to whom, this type of economic transactions, poses enormous difficulties, e.g. absence of registration, VAT declarations well below the real value of the declared transactions, ghost transactions for criminal purposes, fraudulent use of customer data; notes that national legislations continue to present enormous deficiencies in the control of e-commerce; notes that the improvement of cooperation between administrations and a more efficient use of the resources available at European level can help to reduce the impact of this type of crime and its consequences, as well as the improvement of European legislation;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 572 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 79 d (new)
79d. Notes that the "reverse charge mechanism" should be used only and exclusively in exceptional cases, and that the Commission and the Council should encourage countries to use existing resources more effectively; notes that at present, a group of bodies and institutions such as Eurofisc, OLAF, Europol or EPPO (European Public Prosecutor Office) provide a panel of options with a very high potential to combat VAT fraud;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 576 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 80 a (new)
80a. Deplores that VAT fraud in the European Union reaches colossal magnitudes: approximately 150 billion euros in 2017; notes that the figure hide, however, huge differences between countries, from percentages of fraud of minor importance (less than 2%); to countries with fraud indicators of around 30%;1a _________________ 1a European Parliament; VAT Fraud, economic impact, challenges and policy issues. October2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 579 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 80 b (new)
80b. Notes that the preservation of VAT fraud has, in addition to the negative economic effects, perverse consequences for inadequate social commitment with the payment of taxes and with a view to improving tax justice;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 580 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 80 c (new)
80c. Regrets that tax fraud has become a crime whose effects are to be managed, rather than a crime to be suppressed; calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to have policy design as a guiding principle, and for such policy design to be driven by efficiency considerations; notes that when efficiency is focused only in the enforcement, but not in the policy design, the credibility of the tax system is undermined, representing a serious risk to the rule of law1a _________________ 1a De la Feria, Rita (2018) ‘Tax Fraud and the Rule of Law’; WP18/02; Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation; January 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 582 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 81
81. Emphasises that natural persons do not generally exercise their freedom of movement for the purposes of tax fraud, tax evasion and aggressive tax planning; underlines, however, that some natural persons have a tax base large enough to span several tax jurisdictionswith high income and/or high wealth use inconsistent definitions of tax residence, special regimes and insufficient enforcement within or beyond the EU to achieve double non-taxation of their income;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 587 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 82
82. Regrets that high net worth individuals (HNWI) and ultra HNWI (UHNWI) continue to have the possibility to shift their earnings and funds or their purchases through different tax jurisdictions to obtain substantially reduced or zero liability by using the services of wealth managers and other intermediaries; Further notes that the threat of evasion and avoidance have created a race to the bottom regarding taxation of wealth, inheritance and capital incomes visible in the fact that –even without all the loopholes and avoidance strategies – the headline rates for labour income are usually higher than for effortless income from wealth and capital throughout the EU;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 604 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 84 a (new)
84a. Notes that corporation and wealth taxes play a crucial role in reducing inequality through redistribution within the tax system and in providing revenues to fund social provisions and social transfers;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 606 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 84 b (new)
84b. Calls on the Member States to eliminate gender gaps in wealth across the EU in terms of financial assets, property ownership, business assets, insurance entitlements, pension savings and stock options1a; notes that the reduction in capital gains and property taxes primarily benefits men, as they are more likely to control such resources1b; _________________ 1a Action Aid. Making tax work for women’s rights 1b Institute of Development Studies (2016). Redistributing Unpaid Care Work – Why Tax Matters for Women’s Rights. Policy Briefing. Issue 109.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 607 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 84 c (new)
84c. Deplores the fact that, overall, the contribution of wealth-based taxes to overall tax revenues has remained rather limited, at 5.8 % of overall tax revenues in the EU-15 and4.3 % in the EU-281a; _________________ 1a European Parliament Policy Department C, Gender equality and taxation in the European Union, 2017.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 608 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 84 d (new)
84d. Deplores the fact that the share of taxes on capital has shown a declining trend since 2002 as a consequence, inter alia, of the general tendency of no longer applying the regular personal income tax schedule to capital incomes, but rather taxing them at relatively moderate flat rates, observable in many Member States1a _________________ 1a European Parliament Policy Department C, Gender equality and taxation in the European Union, 2017.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 609 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 84 e (new)
84e. Recalls the Commission communication of 20011a, which suggested to include special regimes for expatriates in its list of harmful tax practices but has not provided any data on the scope of the problem since; Calls on the Commission to reactivate its work on this issue and to start by collecting information on the users and costs of existing regimes, including the costs of double non-taxation of cross-border capital income that is usually ignored by cost estimates of national tax agencies; _________________ 1a COM (2001) 260:Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee Tax policy in the European Union - Priorities for the years ahead (https://eur- lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/164839)
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 681 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 93
93. Urges the Commission to finalise its study on CBI and RBI schemes in the Union; urges the Commission to examine whether, and, if so, which of these schemes posed a threat to EU legislation; in particular AMLD and ATAD;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 699 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 100 a (new)
100 a. Calls the Commission to assess to what extent free ports and ship licensing may be misused for purposes of tax evasion, and, if appropriate, to come up with a suitable proposal for mitigating such risks1a _________________ 1a European Parliament recommendation of 13 December 2017 to the Council and the Commission following the inquiry into money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion (Texts adopted, P8_TA- (2017)0491).
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 713 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 103
103. RecCalls the need to use amnesties with extreme caution in order not tofor Member States to refrain from using tax amnesties as they encourage tax avoiders to wait for the next amnesty; calls on the Member States which enact tax amnesties to always require the beneficiary to explain the source of funds previously omitted;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 714 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 103 a (new)
103 a. Recalls the European Parliament’s position in the PANA recommendation whereby it called on the Member States to identify and stop all use of any form of tax amnesties that could lead to money laundering and tax evasion or that could prevent national authorities from using the data provided to pursue financial crime investigations1a _________________ 1a European Parliament recommendation of 13 December 2017 to the Council and the Commission following the inquiry into money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion (Texts adopted, P8_TA- (2017)0491).
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 717 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 103 b (new)
103 b. Regrets the fact that EU Member States have prioritized short-term revenue benefits over the elimination of tax fraud by providing tax amnesties;1a _________________ 1a De la Feria, Rita (2018) ‘Tax Fraud and the Rule of Law’; WP18/02; Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation; January 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 718 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 103 c (new)
103 c. Notes that tax amnesties allow tax fraudsters to voluntarily repay all or parts of unpaid taxes without being subject to criminal prosecutions or full penalties; regrets that tax amnesties have become popular in the last few years in the context of the financial crisis1a and the austerity policies; _________________ 1a De la Feria, Rita (2018) ‘Tax Fraud and the Rule of Law’; WP18/02; Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation; January 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 719 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 103 d (new)
103 d. Notes that tax amnesties are very negative they affect the most affluent sectors of society and extend the idea that having many resources guarantees impunity and makes it easy to circumvent legality; calls for Member States to stop tax amnesties and that economic and penal sanctions against the fraudsters be increased;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 731 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 107
107. Stresses that money laundering can assume various forms, and that the money laundered can have its origin in various illicit activities ranging from terrorismdifferent types of crimes such as corruption, weapon and human trafficking and drug dealing to tax evasion and fraud; notes with concern that the proceeds from criminal activity in the EU are estimated to amount to EUR 110 billion per year64 , corresponding to 1 % of the Union’s total GDP; highlights that the Commission estimates that in some Member States up to 70 % of money laundering cases have a cross-border dimension65 ; further notes that the scale of money laundering is estimated by the UN66 to be the equivalent of between 2 to 5 % of global GDP, or around EUR 715 billion and 1.87 trillion a year; _________________ 64 From illegal markets to legitimate businesses: the portfolio of organised crime in Europe, Final report of Project OCP – Organised Crime Portfolio, March 2015. 65 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pre ss-room/20171211IPR90024/new-eu-wide- penalties-for-money-laundering; Commission proposal of 21 December 2016 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on countering money laundering by criminal law (COM(2016)0826. 66 UNODC - https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money- laundering/globalization.html
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 732 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 107 a (new)
107 a. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to report on the effects money laundering on women’s rights, as money laundering impacts on gender inequality by concealing the origin of assets obtained via human trafficking, in which women and girls amount to 70%of the victims, as reported by FATF1a,UNODC2a,among others; _________________ 1a FATF (2011) Money Laundering Risks Arising from Trafficking in Human Beings and Smuggling of Migrants. Seehttp://www.fatf- gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Tra fficking%20in%20Human%20Beings%20 and%20Smuggling%20of%20Migrants.pd f 2a See UNODC’s reports on Trafficking in Persons.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 760 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 112 a (new)
112 a. Is concerned with the reliance of the AMLD on self-regulation by obliged entities; and notes that this is a matter of concern as all leaks so far have exposed the role of banks, lawyers, traders, insurance companies, and other enablers and promoters, as accomplices in money laundering cases;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 779 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 116 a (new)
116 a. Regrets that no action were taken by EU institutions in relation to the ABLV Bank, in advance of those by the US Fin CEN; is concerned by what seems to be acknowledged by experts in this matter which observe that US standards are much stricter than European ones, that even when EU banks manage to apply EU rules, they are not sufficiently capable of applying US rules, and that the EU system seems to be guaranteed by the US one 1a _________________ 1a TAX3 Delegation to Riga (Latvia), 30- 31 August 2018, MISSION REPORT
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 792 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 117 a (new)
117 a. Calls on the Commission to take into consideration the recommendations of the EPRS study on ‘Offshore activities and money laundering: recent findings and challenges’ from 20171a,and consider that in order to reach a harmonized anti- money laundering policy in Europe, it needs to be noted that European countries are too different to all comply in the same way, and therefore different groups of countries within the EU should be targeted differently and some be trained and supported by other Member States; _________________ 1a http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/e tudes/STUD/2017/595371/IPOL_STU(201 7)595371_EN.pdf
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 798 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 117 b (new)
117 b. Calls on the Commission to assess the way in which derivatives can be used for money laundering, as ‘mirror trading’ can allow brokers to create multiple trades where it can conveniently locate washed funds1a; calls on the Commission to investigate whether this has been the case in the exposed cum-ex and cum-cum scandals; _________________ 1a EPRS (2017) ‘Offshore activities and money laundering: recent findings and challenges’. See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/e tudes/STUD/2017/595371/IPOL_STU(201 7)595371_EN.pdf
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 824 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 125 a (new)
125 a. Recalls the request made by the European Parliament resolution of 29 November 2018 on the cum-ex scandal, on ESMA and EBA to assess potential threats to the integrity of financial markets and to national budgets; to establish the nature and magnitude of actors in these schemes; to assess whether there were breaches of either national or Union law; to assess the actions taken by financial supervisors in Member States; and to make appropriate recommendations for reform and for action to the competent authorities concerned;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 861 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 129 a (new)
129 a. Calls for the Commission to report on the status quo and improvements in EU Member States FIUs in relation to dissemination, exchange and processing of information, following the PANA Recommendations and the mapping report carried out by the EU FIUs Platform 1a _________________ 1a European Parliament recommendation of 13 December 2017 to the Council and the Commission following the inquiry into money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion (Texts adopted, P8_TA- (2017)0491).
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 880 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 133 a (new)
133 a. Regrets that even when Parliament1a called for the creation of public Beneficial Ownership registers for trusts and companies, in the end the public access has only been granted to company registries, and trusts registries are only accessible after proof of legitimate interest; reminds Member States that both family and commercial trusts are used for hiding assets from all sorts of creditors, included the tax authorities; and encourages Member States to create public registers both for companies and trusts; _________________ 1a http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getD oc.do?type=REPORT&mode=XML&refer ence=A8-2017-0056 uage=EN
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 923 #

2018/2121(INI)

141. Recalls that EU AML legislation requires Member States to lay down sanctions for breaches of anti-money laundering rules against banks and intermediaries that are knowingly, wilfully and systematically involved in illegal tax or money laundering schemes; stresses that these sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 931 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 143 a (new)
143 a. Recalls the position of the European Parliament in the PANA recommendations regarding the application of sanctions to enablers and promoters involved in illegal, harmful proven to have facilitated illegal, harmful or wrongful corporate tax arrangements; that the sanctions should be targeted towards the companies themselves as well as the management-level employees and board members responsible for the schemes; calling for the stringent application of effective sanctions on banks, providing for the suspension or withdrawal of the banking licence of financial institutions that are proven to be involved in promoting or enabling money laundering, tax evasion or aggressive tax planning; and encouraging Member States to ensure that the fines and pecuniary sanctions imposed on tax evaders and intermediaries are not tax- base deductible; 1a _________________ 1a European Parliament recommendation of 13 December 2017 to the Council and the Commission following the inquiry into money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion (Texts adopted, P8_TA- (2017)0491).
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 934 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5.7 a (new)
An EU anti-money laundering list of high-risk third countries
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 937 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 145 a (new)
145 a. Notes that EU Member States are not treated in the same way as third countries, when they should be according to the Financial Action Task Force, and that this represents a problem when aiming at having common standards in respect of AML; calls for Member States to be peer reviewed in the same way third countries are in FATF; calls the Commission, as a founding member in 1989 of the Financial Action Task Force, to be peer reviewed by FATF as well1a _________________ 1a TAX3 PUBLIC HEARING“RELATIONS WITH SWITZERLAND IN TAX MATTERS AND THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEYLAUNDERING” held on October 1, 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 938 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 145 b (new)
145 b. Is concerned with allegations noting that competent authorities in Switzerland are not functioning and the doubts regarding the reliability of the information shared by the Swiss FIUs; notes that this is a clear violation of FATF’s recommendations 40 and 9; calls for an evaluation to be made of Switzerland’s compliance of FATF regulations; calls for Switzerland to be on the EU list of third country jurisdictions which have strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and in countering terrorist financing1a; _________________ 1a TAX3 PUBLIC HEARING“RELATIONS WITH SWITZERLAND IN TAX MATTERS AND THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEYLAUNDERING” held on October 1, 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 952 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 149 a (new)
149 a. Notes that two FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) were developed to help FATCA fit with international laws: an IGA Model 1 by which foreign financial institutions report relevant information to their home authorities, which then passes this on to the US IRS, and an IGA Model 2 by which foreign financial institutions do not report to their home governments but directly to the IRS; notes that under Model 1 there are 2 versions, one of which is reciprocal and is the most common one; deplores that reciprocity is highly unbalanced with the US getting far more information from overseas than foreign governments; deplores that even in the best scenario of a reciprocal FATCA, the information compiled by the US institutions is full of loopholes, as it allows for senior managers to be registered if there is no person owning more than 25% of the bank's corporate client1a; calls on the EU Member States, to ensure that they are receiving reliable information when they get into a reciprocal FATCA with the US; _________________ 1a https://financialsecrecyindex.com/PDF/U SA.pdf
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 955 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 149 b (new)
149 b. Calls on the Commission and EU Member States to demand that the US enters into the CRS instead of following with the exchange of information under FATCA;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 962 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 150 a (new)
150 a. Considers that tax havens, tax evasion and tax avoidance have been contributing to the rise in inequalities, by depriving countries of the revenue needed to provide public, quality and free education and healthcare services, social security, and affordable housing and transportation, and to build essential infrastructure for achieving social development and economic growth;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 968 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 151
151. WelcomNotes the adoption by the Council of the first EU list on 5 December 2017 and the ongoing monitoring of the commitments made by third countries; notes that the list has been updated several times on the basis of the assessment of those commitments; underlines that this assessment is based on criteria deriving from a technical scoreboard and that Parliament had no legal involvement in this process; calls in this context on the Commission and the Council to inform Parliament in detail ahead of any proposed change to the list; calls on the Council to publish a regular progress report regarding black- and grey-listed jurisdictions as part of the regular update from the CoC Group to the Council;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 969 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 151 a (new)
151 a. Regrets that given that 2 out of the 3 criteria used by the Council refer to the OECD, the blacklist process seems more an extortive means of getting developing countries to implement standards that they have not participated in setting; than a serious effort to tackle tax evasion and tax avoidance;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 973 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 151 b (new)
151 b. Deeply regrets the use of criterion 3 in the EU list, requiring countries to commit to and implement the OECD BEPS actions. Over 100 developing countries were excluded from the negotiations of the OECD BEPS action plan, the outcomes of which reflect the priorities of OECD members and have raised concerns amongst developing countries. The EU listing process has pressured developing countries and heavily-indebted island states to implement rules they were not part of negotiating; Notes that this strongly goes against principles of democratic ownership and policy coherence for development; Deplores the threat of sanctions against Third Countries on the basis of non-transparent criteria that impose endorsement and implementation of the OECD BEPS actions;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 975 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 151 c (new)
151 c. Notes that the exclusion of EU Member States from the EU list is politically driven, may exacerbate tax competition and ATP within the EU and is viewed as political1a; _________________ 1a Eurodad et. al.,Tax Games: the Race to the Bottom, Europe’s role in supporting an unjust tax system 2017, December 2017, p37; and Oxfam, Blacklist or whitewash? What a real EU blacklist of tax havens should look like,2017.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 979 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 152 a (new)
152 a. Calls on the Council to provide clear information on the specific criteria used to clear 20jurisdictions from the 92 that were originally assessed, as at the moment only the names of such jurisdictions1a and the letters of comfort are available, but those do not allow for a clear understanding on why jurisdictions that are such relevant trade partners of the EU, such as the US who was identified to have a lack of transparency and preferential Corporate Income Tax regimes, were so rapidly cleared and not listed; _________________ 1a Council of the EU.2018, June 8. Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation): Report to the Council/Endorsement. 9637/18
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 993 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 154 a (new)
154 a. Is concerned with the fact that even when Switzerland does repeal its non-compliant tax regimes, it may create new ones -as noted by some organizations and experts-, and that in that case the Council would still remove Switzerland from the grey list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions1a;calls for the Council to re- consider their assessment on Switzerland and on any other third country that could be having a similar legislative change; _________________ 1a TAX3 PUBLIC HEARING“RELATIONS WITH SWITZERLAND IN TAX MATTERS AND THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING” held on October 1, 2018; and TAX3 Exchange of views with Fabrizia Lapecorella, Chair of the Code of Conduct Group on Business Taxation, held on October 10,2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 995 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 154 b (new)
154 b. Notes that as of December 2018 there are only 5 countries remaining in the list; is concerned by what seems to soon end up in an empty listing process similar to that of the OECD which resulted in only Trinidad and Tobago remaining in the list; calls for the European Commission and the Council of the European Union to work on a more serious, and objective methodology,which does not rely in commitments but rather on an assessment of the effects of effectively implemented legislation;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 999 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 154 c (new)
154 c. Recalls the European Parliament’s position on the EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions regretting that the EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions approved and published by the Council focuses only on jurisdictions outside the EU, omitting countries within the EU that have played a systematic role in promoting and enabling harmful tax practices and that do not meet the fair taxation criterion1a;and calls for the Commission and the Council to come up with an EU list of EU tax havens; _________________ 1a European Parliament recommendation of 13 December 2017 to the Council and the Commission following the inquiry into money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion (Texts adopted, P8_TA- (2017)0491).
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1003 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 154 d (new)
154 d. Points out that for the EU to hold a leading role in the global fight against tax evasion, aggressive tax planning and money laundering, it would be important for the European Commission to get its own house in order by ensuring that those with a commercial or vested interest in promoting tax avoidance and tax evasion should not have a role in guiding or advising the EU’s policy-making on tax avoidance and tax evasion;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1013 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 156 a (new)
156 a. Recalls the position of the European Parliament in the interim report on MFF, urging for a genuine fight against tax evasion and avoidance, with the introduction of dissuasive sanctions, for offshore territories and for the enablers or promoters of such activities, particularly and as a first step those operating on the European mainland; believes that Member States should cooperate by establishing a coordinated system for monitoring capital movements in order to fight taxevasion, tax avoidance and money laundering; 1a _________________ 1a Par. 48 of the Interim report on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021- 2027 adopted in Plenary
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1024 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 158 a (new)
158 a. Regrets that the current OECD tax committee cannot be nor is sufficiently inclusive, as it is not the United Nations; the OECD is integrated only by 34 countries that tend to be industrialized ones, is not democratically governed and its decisions on recommendations are not guided by democratic rules
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1026 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 158 b (new)
158 b. Regrets that the G20/OECDBEPS Action Plan did not intend nor did it resulted in addressing the problem of source and residence taxation which is at the core of the base erosion problem;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1027 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 158 c (new)
158 c. Underlines that given its lack of representation and of democratic governance, the OECD is not the place to discuss the allocation of taxing rights among industrialized and developing countries;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1028 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 158 d (new)
158 d. Calls on Member States to support the creation of a global body within the UN framework, well-equipped and with sufficient additional resources to ensure that all countries can participate on an equal footing in the formulation and reform of global tax policies1a, and for such body to address unsolved tax questions such as the allocation of taxing rights among countries; _________________ 1a European Parliament resolution of 6 July 2016 on tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect (Texts adopted, P8_TA(2016)0310); and European Parliament recommendation of 13 December 2017 to the Council and the Commission following the inquiry into money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion (Texts adopted,P8_TA- (2017)0491).
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1031 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 159 a (new)
159 a. Acknowledges that the G77and China have also called in 2017 for the UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters to be upgraded to an intergovernmental UN Global Tax Body;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1034 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 159 b (new)
159 b. Calls for Member States to revise their positions regarding the creation of a global tax body within the UN in order to incorporate this global call to their agendas
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1035 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 159 c (new)
159 c. Regrets that the G20/OECD’s inclusive framework is stopping a discussion on international taxation that should take place in the context of the United Nations; calls on Member States to support a reform of the United Nations tax committee to turn it into a UN tax body; and ensure that the such body has sufficient resources to ensure all countries can participate on an equal footing;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1048 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 161 a (new)
161 a. Believes that such support can take different forms, but that care should be taken not to impose models thought for tackling the problems of the North, which are convenient for the economic circumstances of the North, into the South; believes that the best cooperation for the South can most generally come from the South, from developing countries that have similar problems and similar economic circumstances; calls for the EU institutions to respect South-South cooperation;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1058 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 164
164. Welcomes the participation on an equal footing of all countries involved in the Inclusive Framework, which brings together over 115 countries and jurisdictions to collaborate on the implementation of the OECD/G20 BEPS Package; calls on the Member States to support a reform of both the mandate and functioning of the Inclusive Framework to ensure that developing countries’ interests are taken into consideration;deleted
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1061 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 165
165. Recalls that public development aid should be directed to a greater extent towards the implementation of an appropriate regulatory framework and the bolstering of tax administrations and institutions responsible for fighting illicit financial flows; calls for this aid to be provided in the form of technical expertise in relation to resource management, financial information and anti-corruption rules; calls for this aid to also favour regional cooperation against tax fraud, tax evasion, aggressive tax planning and money laundering; stresses that this aid should include support to civil society and media in developing countries to ensure public scrutiny over domestic tax policiesalso favour regional cooperation against tax fraud, tax evasion, aggressive tax planning and money laundering;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1072 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 167 a (new)
167 a. Notes the particular importance of transparency, including through public CBCR and public registers of BO, given the limited capacity of developing countries to meet requirements through existing exchange of information procedures.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1074 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 167 b (new)
167 b. Calls on the EIB and the EBRD, and on Member States’ development finance institutions, to monitor and ensure that companies or other legal entities that receive support do not participate in tax evasion and avoidance by interacting with financial intermediaries established in offshore centres and tax havens, or by facilitating illicit capital flows, and to increase their transparency policies by, for example, making all of their reports and investigations publicly available; calls on the EIB to apply ‘due diligence’, requiring annual public country-by- country reporting, tracing beneficial ownership and controlling the value of intragroup transactions in order to ensure the transparency of investments and prevent tax evasion and tax avoidance1a; _________________ 1a Paragraph 16 from Report on tax avoidance and tax evasion as challenges for governance, social protection and development in developing countries (2015/2058(INI)),European Parliament Committee on Development. Report adopted on 09/06/2015;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1079 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 168 a (new)
168 a. Calls for the Commission to limit the definition and/or scope of financial services to be liberalised in free trade and association agreements where compelling reasons exists, such as for example, if one of the trading partners fails to implement the international AML/CFT standards;1a _________________ 1a Ioannides, I., Douma, W. T., Güven, O., Jancic, D., Pantaleo, L., van der Velde, S., de Vries, F. (2016). The inclusion of financial services in EU free trade and association agreements: Effects on money laundering, tax evasion and avoidance; EPRS.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1080 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 168 b (new)
168 b. Calls for the Commission to strive for a greater degree of specification of the AML/CFT and tax-related requirements in its free trade and association agreements;1a _________________ 1a Ioannides, I., Douma, W. T., Güven, O., Jancic, D., Pantaleo, L., van der Velde, S., de Vries, F. (2016). The inclusion of financial services in EU free trade and association agreements: Effects on money laundering, tax evasion and avoidance; EPRS.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1081 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 168 c (new)
168 c. Calls for the Commission to ensure that all free trade and association agreements contain provisions on tax cooperation and that such provisions guarantee cooperation at the bilateral level in addition to any regional or international instruments or arrangements; 1a _________________ 1a Ioannides, I., Douma, W. T., Güven, O., Jancic, D., Pantaleo, L., van der Velde, S., de Vries, F. (2016). The inclusion of financial services in EU free trade and association agreements: Effects on money laundering, tax evasion and avoidance; EPRS.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1082 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 168 d (new)
168 d. Calls on the Commission to include in its free trade and association agreements provisions aimed at combating mispricing and misinvoicing of internationally traded goods and services;1a _________________ 1a Ioannides, I., Douma, W. T., Güven, O., Jancic, D., Pantaleo, L., van der Velde, S., de Vries, F. (2016). The inclusion of financial services in EU free trade and association agreements: Effects on money laundering, tax evasion and avoidance; EPRS.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1083 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 168 e (new)
168 e. Calls on the Commission to include in its free trade and association agreements provisions on public country by country reporting of corporate tax, the establishment of public registers of beneficial owners, and the establishment of public commercial registers; 1a _________________ 1a Ioannides, I., Douma, W. T., Güven, O., Jancic, D., Pantaleo, L., van der Velde, S., de Vries, F. (2016). The inclusion of financial services in EU free trade and association agreements: Effects on money laundering, tax evasion and avoidance; EPRS.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1084 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 168 f (new)
168 f. Calls on the Commission to include in its free trade and association agreements provisions towards the establishment of well-functioning channels of information exchange between domestic Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), tax authorities, financial supervision authorities and prosecutors; 1a _________________ 1a [1][1] Ioannides, I., Douma, W. T., Güven, O., Jancic, D., Pantaleo, L., van der Velde, S., de Vries, F. (2016). The inclusion of financial services in EU free trade and association agreements: Effects on money laundering, tax evasion and avoidance; EPRS.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1085 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 168 g (new)
168 g. Calls on the Commission to pursue a strategy of imposing a measure of conditionality during trade negotiations, where structural weaknesses in rule of law enforcement – mainly due to corruption, organised crime and shadow economy – undermine the EU’s trade goals and the trading partner’s legislative and administrative endeavours in combating money laundering and tax evasion; 1a _________________ 1a [1][1] Ioannides, I., Douma, W. T., Güven, O., Jancic, D., Pantaleo, L., van der Velde, S., de Vries, F. (2016). The inclusion of financial services in EU free trade and association agreements: Effects on money laundering, tax evasion and avoidance; EPRS.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1101 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 171 a (new)
171 a. Notes that developing countries need tax revenue, not least from the profits of multinational companies, to achieve their development goals; yet the taxation of most of those profits is regulated by a global network of bilateral tax treaties; notes that more than half of these treaties, and 40 percent of those with developing countries, have an EU Member State as signatory;1a _________________ 1a Martin Hearson(2018) ‘The European Union’s tax treaties with developing countries. Leading by example?’; GUE/NGL; September 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1104 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 171 b (new)
171 b. Recalls that the European Parliament has resolved that the “global network of tax treaties…often impedes developing countries from taxing profits generated in their territory”1aand that “when negotiating tax treaties, the European Union and its Member States should comply with the principle of policy coherence for development;2a _________________ 1a Tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect (TAXE 2) 2a European Parliament resolution of 8 July 2015 on tax avoidance and tax evasion as challenges forgovernance, social protection and development in developing countries(2015/2058(INI)). URL:http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides /getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA- 2015-0265 uage=EN˚=A8-2015-0184
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1105 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 171 c (new)
171 c. Notes that the European Economic and Social Committee has recommended that “when negotiating double tax agreements with developing countries, EU Member States take more account of the needs of developing countries”1a _________________ 1a European Economic and Social Committee. EU development partnerships and the challenge posed by international tax agreements. REX/487.https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/o ur-work/opinions-information- reports/opinions/eu-development- partnerships-and-challenge-posed- international-tax-agreements
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1106 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 171 d (new)
171 d. Notes that tax treaties place too much emphasis on the taxing rights of the countries of residence of multinational companies, imposing too many restrictions on the countries that are the source of those companies’ income, often developing countries; 1a _________________ 1a Martin Hearson (2018) ‘The European Union’s tax treaties with developing countries. Leading by example?’; GUE/NGL; September 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1107 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 171 e (new)
171 e. Regrets that on average, the treaties developing countries have concluded with EU Member States impose more restrictions on their source taxing rights than their treaties with other countries, even other OECD members; notes that EU Member States’ treaties with developing countries more closely resemble the OECD model convention, which is not designed with developing countries in mind, than the UN model, which is; notes that a study of 172 treaties signed between EU Member States and developing countries noted that the average EU treaty leaves intact 40% of its developing country signatories’ taxing rights;1a _________________ 1a Martin Hearson(2018) ‘The European Union’s tax treaties with developing countries. Leading by example?’; GUE/NGL; September 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1108 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 171 f (new)
171 f. Calls on EU Member States and the European Commission to conduct spillover analyses incorporating reviews of EU Member States’ double taxation treaties, based on the principle of policy coherence for development and taking into account the recommendations of the European Parliament and the EESC;1a _________________ 1a Martin Hearson(2018) ‘The European Union’s tax treaties with developing countries. Leading by example?’; GUE/NGL; September 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1109 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 171 g (new)
171 g. Calls on EU Member States to undertake a rolling plan of renegotiations with a focus on progressively increasing the source taxation rights permitted by EU Member States’ treaties; calls on such renegotiations to introduce development- friendly measures such as anti-treaty shopping.1a _________________ 1a Martin Hearson (2018) ‘The European Union’s tax treaties with developing countries. Leading by example?’; GUE/NGL; September 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1110 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 171 h (new)
171 h. Calls on EU Member States and the European Commission to formulate and publish an EU Model Tax Convention for Development Policy Coherence, setting out source-based provisions that EU Member States are willing to offer to developing countries as a starting point for negotiations, not in return for sacrifices on their part; 1a _________________ 1a Martin Hearson(2018) ‘The European Union’s tax treaties with developing countries. Leading by example?’; GUE/NGL; September 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1120 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 175 a (new)
175 a. Recalls relevant Member States to make use of the opportunity afforded by their direct relations with the countries concerned to take the necessary steps in order to put pressure on their overseas countries and territories (OCTs) and outermost regions that do not respect international standards pertaining to tax cooperation, transparency and anti- money laundering; takes the view that the EU transparency and due diligence requirements should be effectively enforced in these territories;1a _________________ 1a PANA recommendations adopted on December 13, 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1126 #
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1127 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 177
177. Welcomes the broad definition of both ‘intermediary’ and regrets the incompleteness of the ‘reportable cross- border arrangement’ in the recently adopted DAC683 ; _________________ 83 OJ L 139, 5.6.2018, p. 1. OJ L 139, 5.6.2018, p. 1.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1135 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 177 a (new)
177 a. Urges the Commission, Member States and all EU bodies to refer to “enablers” or “promoters” as opposed to "intermediaries", which disguises the agency of the facilitators and promoters of tax avoidance schemes; notes that Ireland has already classified them as “promoters” in legislation (eg, Mandatory Disclosure of Certain Transactions Regulation 2011);
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1136 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 177 b (new)
177 b. Recalls that the EU’s existing definition of control required to create a group of companies should be applied to accountancy firms that are members of a network of firms associated by legally enforceable contractual arrangements that provide for the sharing of a name or marketing, professional standards, clients, support services, finance or professional indemnity insurance arrangements, as anticipated by Directive2013/34/EU on annual financial statements1a; and calls for the European Commission to present a proposal for professional networks subject to these arrangements to be required to file full country-by-country reports, adapted to meet the particular needs of the sector, on public record;2a _________________ 2a Murphy, R.; Stausholm, S.N. (2017) ‘The Big Four, a study of opacity’; GUE/NGL, July 2017. 1a European Parliament recommendation of 13 December 2017 to the Council and the Commission following the inquiry into money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion (Texts adopted, P8_TA- (2017)0491).
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1137 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 177 c (new)
177 c. Calls for the Commission to present a proposal whereby the networks of professional service firms (e.g. accountancy firms, tax and legal advisors) to be required to apply for a single license to provide audit, taxation services or legal advice of any sort in the Member States, and that all abusive tax schemes promoted by the firm that have an impact on the tax revenue of a Member State be reported, whether sold in or outside the EU by a network member; 1a _________________ 1a Murphy, R.; Stausholm, S.N. (2017) ‘The Big Four, a study of opacity’; GUE/NGL, July 2017.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1138 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 177 d (new)
177 d. Calls on the Commission to present a proposal for all audit firms to be required to be entirely separate from those selling any other service;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1139 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 177 e (new)
177 e. Calls on the European Commission and member states to recognise that there is an inherent conflict of interest between the commercial interests of the tax avoidance industry and the public mandate of the EU to minimise tax avoidance;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1140 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 177 f (new)
177 f. Stresses that this conflict of interest can come in several forms, including via public procurement contracts that require the provision of paid advice on these issues; the provision of informal or unpaid advice via official advisory and expert groups; and via the revolving door;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1141 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 177 g (new)
177 g. Notes that in the same way as has been done by the World Health Organisation (WHO) to reduce the effects of the lobbying powers of the Tabaco industry in health policies, measures can be implemented in national, EU and international institutions to protect fiscal policies from commercial and other vested interests of the accountancy industry;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1142 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 177 h (new)
177 h. Calls on the European Commission and member states to put in place a firewall to ensure that those with a commercial or vested interest in promoting tax avoidance and tax evasion should not have arole in advising the EU and member states on action to tackle tax avoidance and tax evasion. Elements of this firewall should include restrictions on the membership of advisory and expert groups, and on the awarding of public contracts for tax-related studies and impact assessments; restrictions on lobbying on tax avoidance and tax evasion; revolving door regulations; and full lobby transparency;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1177 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 182 a (new)
182 a. Deplores that even when in the area of financial services, the added value of sectorial whistleblower protection was already acknowledged by the Union legislator, and measures for the protection of whistleblowers were introduced in a significant number of legislative instruments in this area1a,a number of high profile cases involving European financial institutions have proven that protection of whistleblowers within such financial institutionsstill remains unsatisfactory and that fears of reprisals from both employers and authorities still prevents whistleblowers from coming forward within formation on breaches of law;2a _________________ 1a Communication of 8.12.2010 "Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial services sector".[ 2a A8-0398/2018. Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliamentand of the Council on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law (COM(2018)0218 – C8 0159/2018 – 2018/0106(COD))
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1181 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 183 a (new)
183 a. Notes that it has been proven that keeping a reporting person’s identity confidential is an essential element in avoiding backsliding and self-censorship. The duty of confidentiality should, therefore, only be waived in exceptional circumstances in which disclosure of information relating to the reporting person’s personal data is a necessary and proportionate obligation required under Union or national law in the context of subsequent investigations or judicial proceedings or to safeguard the freedoms of others including the right of defence of the concerned person, and in each case subject to appropriate safeguards under such laws. Appropriate sanctions should be provided for in the event of breaches of the duty of confidentiality concerning the reporting person’s identity; 1a _________________ 1a A8-0398/2018. Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law (COM(2018)0218 – C8 0159/2018 – 2018/0106(COD))
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1183 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 183 b (new)
183 b. Notes that even when appropriate channels should be allowed for internal reporting, experts have noted that internal reporting should not be mandatory and that ultimately a whistleblower must have the right to be able to report externally1a _________________ 1a TAX3 Public hearing “Combatting money laundering in the EU banking sector”, Panel I: Danske Bank and money laundering allegations.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1184 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 183 c (new)
183 c. Notes that in addition to guarding the confidentiality of the identity of whistleblowers as it is essential for the protection of the reporting person, anonymous reporting should be further protected against the generalised threats and the attacks that aim to discredit the anonymously reporting person, by those offended;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1205 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 188 a (new)
188 a. Deplores that Swiss libel laws are used to silence critics in Switzerland and worldwide because the burden of proof lays on the defendant not the plaintiff; that this not only affects journalists and whistle-blowers, but also reporting entities in the European Union and obliged persons under the beneficial owner register; as in case of having the obligation of reporting a beneficial owner which is Swiss, then the reporting person may end up being sued in Switzerland for libel and slander, being such criminal offences;1a _________________ 1a TAX3 Public hearing “Relations with Switzerland in tax matters and the fight against money laundering”, October 1, 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1209 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 188 b (new)
188 b. Calls on EU Member States and the Commission not to recognise the Swiss and British libel laws because they are used for libel tourism if in an EU Member States it were not possible to sue a journalist or a whistleblower;1a _________________ 1a TAX3 Public hearing “Relations with Switzerland in tax matters and the fight against money laundering”, October 1, 2018.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1211 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 188 c (new)
188 c. Notes that money laundering, tax evasion and avoidance often involve highly complex international corporate and financial arrangements, which are likely to be within the remit of differing jurisdictions; and recalls the need for provisions to be taken for a unified point of contact for whistleblowers1a _________________ 1a A8-0398/2018. Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law (COM(2018)0218 – C8 0159/2018 – 2018/0106(COD))
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1212 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 189
189. Welcomes the work done by the Platform for Tax Good Governance; notes that the mandate of the Platform applies until 16 June 2019; calls for it to be extended or renewed to ensure that civil society concerns and expertise are heard by Member States and the Commission; but considers that intermediaries with a commercial interest in tax avoidance should no longer be members; encourages the Commission to broaden the scope of the experts invited to the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (EGMLTF) to include experts from the private sector (business and NGOs) so long as they do not have a commercial interest in these issues;;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1217 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 192
192. NotDeplores that, despite requests to the Council, no relevant documents have been made available to the TAX3 Committee; calls into question, therefore, the political will of the Council to enhance transparency and cooperation in the fight against money laundering, tax fraud, tax evasion and aggressive tax planning or to comply with the TEU and the principle of sincere cooperation;
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 1242 #

2018/2121(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 9.5 a (new)
Regrets that even when TAXE, TAX2 and PANA committees have managed to make valuable contributions to the legislative discussions, they have not gone in-depth enough to reveal anything new that had not already been said by the media or by the civil society, partly due to the limitations of the powers granted to European Parliament’s special and inquiry committees.
2018/12/20
Committee: TAX3
Amendment 4 #

2018/2093(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
2. Calls for the integraabolition of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) into the EU Treaties by turning it into a full- fledged EU body, on condition that the Commission’s competences on economic policy coordination and multilateral surveillance are fully respected and strengthenedand demands a fundamental review of the current economic governance framework including the Stability and Growth Pact as well as the Fiscal Compact;
2018/10/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 6 #

2018/2093(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Highlights, in this respect, the catastrophic consequences the implementation of austerity policies have had on the economies and societies of member states in EFSF and /or EFSM and / or ESM programmes; points out that these policies have contributed to the divergence of member states’ economies instead of their convergence;
2018/10/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 7 #

2018/2093(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Notes that the divergence in unit labour costs has been one of the main drivers for the macroeconomic imbalances in the Eurozone; regrets that the economic governance framework of the Union does not provide a framework for wage coordination between Eurozone member states which could help alleviate said imbalances;
2018/10/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 9 #

2018/2093(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 c (new)
2c. Regrets, that the Commission has withdrawn the bank structural reform package (COM/2014/043 final) in July 2018; sees the financial stability of the Union jeopardised as long as the banking sector has not undergone fundamental structural changes; views thus the Banking Union as incomplete until measures to change the structure of the banking system have been implemented;
2018/10/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 12 #

2018/2093(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Believes that after the latest tax scandals the ordinary legislative procedure should urgently be introduced for matters related to corporate income taxation as this would reduce member states' incentives to engage in a harmful race to the bottom via taxation policy (tax dumping) and would enhance transparency, fairness and economic convergence;
2018/10/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 17 #

2018/2093(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
6. Stresses the importance for convergence of the Cohesion, Structural and Investment Funds and of the EIB, welcomes programmes such as the Reform Support Programme to help Member States on their way to joining the euro and further conversion within the EU, and requests an increase in the budget allocation for such programmescalls for additional efforts and resources to achieve socio-economic convergence between and within Member States as the gap between rich and poor is widening.
2018/10/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 6 #

2018/2002(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Calls on the Council, with a view to enhancing the uptake of the pan-European P to take no steps in support of the Commission Recommendation on the tax treatment of personal Ppension Pproduct (PEPP), to elaborate proposals regarding incentives for PEPP saverss, including the pan-European Personal Pension Product (C(2017)4393);
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 8 #

2018/2002(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Suggests for the following approaches to be considered: - granting the same tax relief to PEPP as the one granted to national personal pension products, even in cases where PEPP features do not fully match all the national criteria; - granting a specific tax relief to PEPP, harmonised at Union level, to be laid down in a multilateral tax agreement between Member States; - granting a specific subsidy or premium to PEPP savers, in the form of a fixed amount or fixed percentage;deleted
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 26 #

2018/0332(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 4
(4) A lively public debate is taking place on summer-time arrangements and some Member States have already expressed their preference to discontinue the application of such arrangements. In the light of these developments, it is necessary to continue safeguarding the proper functioning of the internal market and to avoid any significant disruptions thereto caused by divergences between Member States in this areaa public consultation conducted by the Commission in summer 2018, 4.6 million citizens, representing 84% of respondents, support the end of the existing summer- time arrangements. Different Member States have previously conducted similar surveys. In the light of these developments, it is necessary to continue safeguarding the proper functioning of the internal market and to avoid any significant disruptions thereto caused by divergences between Member States in this area. Several studies have moreover shown that the bi-annual time change has negative health impacts for example adversely affecting the circadian rythm. Studies and unions also indicate the negative effects on the ability to concentrate which is particularly problematic for workers and pupils. Results supporting the idea of energy savings due to the bi-annual time change are, however, not significant. Therefore, it is appropriate to put an end in a coordinated way to summer-time arrangements.
2018/12/19
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 49 #

2018/0332(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 7
(7) This Directive should apply from 1 April30 March 201920, so that the last summer- time period subject to the rules of Directive 2000/84/EC should start, in every Member State, at 1.00 a.m., Coordinated Universal Time, on 3129 March 201920. Member States that, after that summer-time period, intend to adopt a standard time corresponding to the time applied during the winter season in accordance with Directive 2000/84/EC should change their standard time at 1.00 a.m., Coordinated Universal Time, on 275 October 201920, so that similar and lasting changes occurring in different Member States take place simultaneously. It is desirable that Member States take the decisions on the standard time that each of them will apply as from 201920 in a concerted manner.
2018/12/19
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 58 #

2018/0332(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 2
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, Member States may still apply a seasonal change of their standard time or times in 201920, provided that they do so at 1.00 a.m., Coordinated Universal Time, on 275 October 201920. The Member States shall notify this decision in accordance with Article 2.
2018/12/19
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 71 #

2018/0332(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1
1. The Commission shall report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the implementation of this Directive by 31 December 20245 at the latest.
2018/12/19
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 76 #

2018/0332(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 2
2. Member States shall provide the Commission with the relevant information by 30 April 20245 at the latest.
2018/12/19
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 82 #

2018/0332(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Member States shall adopt and publish, by 1 April30 March 201920 at the latest, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions.
2018/12/19
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 87 #

2018/0332(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
They shall apply those provisions from 1 April30 March 201920.
2018/12/19
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 96 #

2018/0332(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 1
Directive 2000/84/EC is repealed with effect from 1 April30 March 201920.
2018/12/19
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2 #

2018/0291(NLE)

Draft legislative resolution
Paragraph 1
1. GDeclines to gives its consent to Samoa’s accession to the agreement;
2018/11/08
Committee: INTA
Amendment 37 #

2018/0254(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
The Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection calls on the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, as the committee responsible, to reject this proposal.
2018/10/11
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 39 #

2018/0233(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3
(3) In providing a framework for actions which supports the single market, fosters Union competitiveness and protects the financial and economic interests of the Union and its Member States, the Programme should contribute to preventing and fighting tax fraud, tax evasion and tax avoidance; preventing and reducing unnecessary administrative burden for citizens and businesses in cross- border transactions; achieving the full potential of the single market and fostering Union competitiveness; and supporting a joint Union approach in international fora.
2018/10/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 54 #

2018/0233(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) Considering the importance of globalisationglobal scale of tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax fraud, the Programme should continue to provide the possibility of involving external experts within the meaning of Article 238 of the Financial Regulation. Those external experts should mainly be representatives of governmental authorities, including from non-associated third countries, as well as representatives of international organisations, economic operators, taxpayers and civil society.
2018/10/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 70 #

2018/0233(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1
1. The Programme has the general objective to support tax authorities and taxation to enhance the functioning of the single market, foster Union competitiveness and protect the financial and economic interests of the Union and its Member States, in particular by supporting Member States in combatting tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax fraud.
2018/10/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #

2018/0233(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1
1. The financial envelope for the implementation of the Programme for the period 2021 – 2027 shall be EUR 270 000 000 in curreonstant prices.
2018/10/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 83 #

2018/0233(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) IT capacity building actions, in particular the development and operation of European electronic systems, such as open format land and real estate registers;
2018/10/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 93 #

2018/0233(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1
1. Wherever beneficial for the achievement of the actions implementing the objectives referred to in Article 3, representatives of governmental authorities, including those from third countries not associated to the programme pursuant to Article 5, representatives of international and other relevant organisations, of economic operators and organisations representing economic operators and of civil society may take part as external experts to actions organised under the Programme.
2018/10/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 96 #

2018/0233(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 3
3. The external experts shall be selected by the Commission and participating Member States based on their skills, experience and knowledge relevant to the specific action, avoiding any potential conflict of interest. The list of external experts shall be publicly available.
2018/10/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 105 #

2018/0233(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1
1. Evaluations shall be carried out in a timely manner to feed into the decision- making process and shall be made publicly available.
2018/10/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #

2018/0231(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
(1) The internal market is a cornerstone of the Union. Since its inception, it has proved a major contributor to growth, competitiveness and employment. It has generated new opportunities and economies of scale for European businesses, notably micro, small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), and strengthened their industrial competitiveness. The internal market contributed to the creation of jobs and offered greater choice at lower prices for consumers. It continues to be an engine for building a stronger, more balanced and fairer econom economy, even though its benefits should be spread more evenly as not all citizens, especially workers, benefitted similarly. It is one of the Union's major achievements and its best asset in an increasingly global world.
2018/11/13
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 68 #

2018/0231(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) The Programme should support the design, implementation and enforcement of Union legislation underpinning the proper functioning of the internal market. The Programme should support the creation of the right conditions to empower all actors of the internal market: businesses, citizens including consumers and employees, civil society and public authorities. To that end, the Programme should aim to ensure the competitiveness of businesses, notably SMEs, but also supporting the enforcement of consumer protection and safety rules and by raising the awareness of businesses and individuals by providing them with the right tools, knowledge and competence to make informed decisions and strengthen their participation in Union’s policy- making. Furthermore, the Programme should aim to enhance regulatory and administrative cooperation, notably through exchange of best practices, building of knowledge and competence bases, including the use of strategic public procurement. The Programme should also aim to support the development of high- quality international standards that underpin the implementation of Union legislation. This also includes standard setting in the field of financial reporting and audit, thereby contributing to the transparency and well-functioning of the Union’s capital markets and to enhancing investor protection. The Programme should support rulemaking and standard setting also by ensuring the broadest possible stakeholder involvement. The objective of the Programme should also be to support the implementation and enforcement of Union legislation providing for a high level of health for humans, animals and plants along the food chain and the improvement of the welfare of animals.
2018/11/13
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 73 #

2018/0231(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) A modern internal market promotes competition and benefits consumers, businesses and employees. Making better use of the ever evolving internal market in services, while avoiding and combatting abuses, such as the setting up of letterbox companies, should help European businesses create jobs and grow across borders, offer wider choice of services at better prices, and maintain high standards for consumers and workers. To achieve this, the Programme should contribute to the removal of remaining barriers, and to ensure a regulatory framework that can accommodate new innovative business models.
2018/11/13
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 95 #

2018/0231(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
(16) In order to meet the objectives of the Programme and to facilitate the lives of citizens and businesses, high-quality user-centric public services need to be put in place. This implies that public administrations will need to start working in new ways, bring down silos between the different parts of their administrations, and to engage in the co-creation of these public services with citizens and businesses. Moreover, tThe continuous and steady increase of cross-border activities in the internal market requires provision of up-to-date information on the rights of businesses and citizens, but also information explaining the administrative formalities. In addition, provision of legal advice and helping to solve problems which occur at cross national level becomes essential. Furthermore, connecting national administrations in a simple and efficient manner as well as evaluating how the internal market works on the ground is necessary. The Programme should therefore support the following existing internal market governance tools: the Your Europe Portal which should be a backbone of the upcoming Single Digital Gateway, Your Europe Advice, SOLVIT, the Internal Market Information system and the Single Market Scoreboard in order to improve citizens' daily lives and businesses' ability to trade across borders.
2018/11/13
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 113 #

2018/0231(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
(27) The Programme should provide effective support for SMEs throughout their life-cycle and to this effect become better visible to SMEs, inter alia by renewed communication strategies and by reducing red tape. It should build on the unique knowledge and expertise developed with regard to SMEs and industrial sectors and on a long experience in working with European, national and regional stakeholders. This support should build on the successful experience of the Enterprise Europe Network as a one-stop-shop to improve SMEs competitiveness and develop their business in the Single Market and beyond. The Network plans to continue delivering services on behalf of other Union programmes, notably for the Horizon2020 programme, using the financial resources of these programmes. Also the mentoring scheme for new entrepreneurs should remain the tool to enable new or aspiring entrepreneurs to gain business experience by matching with an experienced entrepreneur from another country and thus allow strengthening entrepreneurial talents. The Programme should further strive to grow and extend its geographical coverage and thus offer wider range of matching possibilities to entrepreneurs in complementarity with other Union initiatives where relevant.
2018/11/13
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 153 #

2018/0231(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 79
(79) In accordance with the Financial Regulation, Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council85 , Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2988/9586 ,Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/9687 and Council Regulation (EU) 2017/193988 , the financial interests of the Union are to be protected through proportionate measures, including the prevention, detection, correction and investigation of irregularities and fraud, the recovery of funds lost, wrongly paid or incorrectly used and, where appropriate, the imposition of administrative sanctions. In particular, in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 and Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) may carry out administrative investigations, including on- the-spot checks and inspections, with a view to establishing whether there has been fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union. In accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, for participating Member States the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) may investigate and prosecute fraud and other criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union as provided for in Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council89 . In accordance with the Financial Regulation, any person or entity receiving Union funds is to fully cooperate in the protection of the Union’s financial interests, to grant the necessary rights and access to the Commission, OLAF, whenever applicable, the EPPO and the European Court of Auditors (ECA) and to ensure that any third parties involved in the implementation of Union funds grant equivalent rights.
2018/11/13
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 169 #

2018/0231(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) to improve the functioning of the internal market, and especially to protect and empower citizens, consumers and businesses, in particular micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and their employees, by enforcement of Union law, facilitation of market access, standard setting, and by promoting human, animal and plant health and animal welfare; as well as to enhance cooperation between the competent authorities of Member States and between the competent authorities of Member States and the Commission and the decentralised Union agencies;
2018/11/13
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 173 #

2018/0231(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) making the internal market more effective, facilitating the prevention and removal of obstacles, supporting the development, implementation and enforcement of the Union law in the areas of the internal market for goods and services, public procurement, market surveillance as well as in the areas of company law and contract and extra- contractual law, anti- money laundering, free movement of capital, financial services and competition, including the development of governance tools;
2018/11/13
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 188 #

2018/0231(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point e
(e) contributing to athe highest level of health for humans, animals and plants along the food chain and in related areas, including by preventing and eradicating diseases and pests, and to support the improvement of the welfare of animals as well as a sustainable food production and consumption;
2018/11/13
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 205 #

2018/0231(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) creation of the right conditions to empower all actors of the internal market, including businesses, employees, citizens and consumers, civil society and public authorities through transparent information and awareness raising campaigns, best practice exchange, promotion of good practices, exchange and dissemination of expertise and knowledge and organization of trainings;
2018/11/13
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 209 #

2018/0231(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) provision of mechanisms for citizens, consumers, end-users, civil society, trade unions and businesses representatives, in particular those representing SMEs, from the Union to contribute to political discussions, policies and decision making process, notably by supporting the functioning of representative organisations at national and the Union level;
2018/11/13
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 222 #

2018/0231(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) legal entities established in a third country which is not associated to the Programme are exceptionally eligible to participate, provided that the action pursues Union objectives and the activities outside the Union contribute to the effectiveness of interventions carried out in Member State territories to which the Treaties apply.deleted
2018/11/13
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 223 #

2018/0231(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
LThe Commission may allow legal entities established in a third country which is not associated to the Programme mayto participate in the following actions:
2018/11/13
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 224 #

2018/0231(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
The entities participating in the actions referred to in points a) and b) shall not be entitled to receive Union financial contributions, except where it is essential for the Programme, in particular in terms of competitiveness and access to markets for Union enterprises or in terms of protection of the consumers residing in the Union. That exception shall not apply to profit-making entities.
2018/11/13
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 225 #

2018/0231(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 3
Except in case of animal diseases and plant pests having a substantial impact on the Union, in principle, nNon-associated countries shouldall finance themselves their participation in the actions referred to in points (a) and (b).
2018/11/13
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 90 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
(10) EISF should be a Union instrument which complements national fiscal policies. It should be recalled that Member States should pursue sound fiscal policies and build up fiscal buffers in favourable economic times.
2018/11/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 113 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
(15) Strict eligibility criteria based on compliance with decisions and recommendations under the Union's fiscal and economic surveillance framework over a period of two years before the request for EISF support should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EISF support in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent budgetary policies.deleted
2018/11/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 120 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15 a (new)
(15a) Eligibility for EISF funds should be based on Member States adhering to a development code which sets out socio- economic convergence criteria for the European Union and the respective Member State in matters such as just taxation, social inclusion and social cohesion as well as balanced and participative economic growth.
2018/11/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 122 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
(16) Member States whose currency is the euro which benefit from financial assistance by the ESM, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and which are under a macro-economic adjustment programme within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council12 should not benefit from EISF support since their financing needs including for maintaining public investment are addressed via the financial assistance granted. _________________ 12 Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, (OJ L 140, 27.5.2013, p. 1).deleted
2018/11/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 127 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
(17) Member States with a derogation which benefit from balance of payments support within the meaning of point (a) of Article 3(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 332/200213 should not benefit from EISF support since their financing needs including for maintaining public investment are addressed via the medium- term financial assistance facility granted. _________________ 13Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002 of 18 February 2002 establishing a facility providing medium-term financial assistance for Member States' balance of payments (OJ L 53, 23.2.2002, p.1).deleted
2018/11/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 230 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 a (new)
(6a) ‘Development code’ means the commitment of a Member State regarding socio-economic convergence in matters of balanced and participative economic growth including current account balances, just taxation, labour market participation, investment, productivity, social cohesion and social inclusion and public administrative and good governance capacities within the reformed Treaties.
2018/11/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 237 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. A Member State shall be eligible for EISF support where it is not subject to:compliant with a development code as defined in Article 2.
2018/11/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 239 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) a decision of the Council establishing that no effective action has been taken to correct its excessive deficit under Article 126(8) or Article 126(11) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in the two years prior to requesting support from the EISF;deleted
2018/11/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 245 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) a decision of the Council in accordance with Article 6(2) or Article 10 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1466/9719 establishing that no effective action has been taken to address the observed significant deviation in the two years prior to requesting support from the EISF; _________________ 19Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1deleted
2018/11/08
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 252 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) two successive recommendations of the Council in the same imbalance procedure in accordance with Article 8(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council20 on grounds that the Member State concerned has submitted an insufficient corrective action plan in the two years prior to requesting support from the EISF; _________________ 20Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 25deleted
2018/11/08
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 258 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) two successive decisions of the Council in the same imbalance procedure in accordance with Article 10(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council having established non-compliance by the Member State concerned on grounds that it has not taken the recommended corrective action in the two years prior to requesting support from the EISF;deleted
2018/11/08
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 265 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) a decision of the Council approving a macroeconomic adjustment programme within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013;deleted
2018/11/08
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 267 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point f
(f) a decision of the Council implementing a medium-term financial assistance facility within the meaning of point (a) of Article 3(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 332/200221. _________________ 21 Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002 OJ L 53/1, 23.02.2002, p. 1deleted
2018/11/08
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 315 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) maintain at least the same level of its public investment compared to the average level of its public investment in the five previous years.
2018/11/08
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 318 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
The Commission may nevertheless conclude when adopting the decision in accordance with Article 6(2) that such level of public investment is unsustainable, in which case it shall determine the level of public investment to be maintained.deleted
2018/11/08
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 332 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Where a Member State fulfils the eligibility criteria referred to in Article 3 and is experiencing the large asymmetric shock referred to in Article 4, it may request the Commission once a year to receive EISF support. The Member State shall indicate its needs for support.
2018/11/08
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 343 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2
2. The Commission shall decide the terms of the EISF support. The decision shall contain the amount, the average maturity, the pricing formula, and the availability period of EISF loan and the amount of the interest rate subsidy, and the other detailed rules needed for the implementation of the support. When deciding on the terms of the EISF support, the Commission shall take into account the amount deemed to be sustainable within the meaning of Article [210(3)] of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No XX (the ‘Financial Regulation’) under the own resources ceiling for payment appropriations.
2018/11/08
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 348 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1
The outstanding amount of loans granted to Member States under this Regulation shall be limited toat least EUR 3140 billion in principal.
2018/11/08
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 390 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 3
3. An EISF loan shall not exceed 30 percent of the available amount referred to in Article 7 after deduction of the total amount of outstanding loans awarded under EISF.deleted
2018/11/08
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 439 #

2018/0212(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 2
2. Payment of an interest rate subsidy shall not exceed 30 percent of the available means in the Stabilisation Support Fund at the moment when such payment to the Member State concerned is due. Any further payment shall be deferred. Any new contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund referred to in Article 17(2) shall be firstly used for honouring deferred payments to the Member States concerned. In case of more than one deferred payment, the order in which such payments shall be honoured shall be determined by the length of time of the deferral starting with the longest time.deleted
2018/11/08
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 59 #

2018/0171(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
The European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.
2018/11/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 96 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
(1) The Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of the European Parliament and of the Council41 regulates cross-border mergers of limited liability companies. These rules represent a significant milestone in improving the functioning of the Single Market for companies and firms and to exercise the freedom of establishment and, at the same time, offer appropriate and adequate protection to the parties concerned, such as workers, creditors and minority shareholders. However, evaluation of these rules shows that there is a need for modifications in cross-border merger rules. Furthermore, it is appropriate to provide for rules regulating cross-border conversions and divisions. _________________ 41 Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 relating to certain aspects of company law (codification) (OJ L 169, 30.6.2017, p. 46).
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 103 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 6
(6) It is appropriate therefore to provide procedural and substantive rules on cross-border conversions which would contribute to the abolition of restrictions onsimplify freedom of establishment and provide at the same time adequate and proportionateprovide strong protection for stakeholders such as employees, creditors and minority shareholders.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 108 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 7
(7) The right to convert an existing company formed in a Member State into a company governed by another Member State may in certain circumstances be used for abusive purposes such as for the circumvention of labour standards, social security payments, tax obligations, creditors', minority shareholders' rights or rules on employees participation. In order to combat such possible abuses, a general principle of Union law, Member States are required to ensure that companies do not use the cross-border conversion procedure in order to create purely artificial arrangements aimed at obtaining undue tax advantages or at unduly prejudicing the legal or contractual rights of employees, creditors or members. Member States should be able to block the possibility of conversions and mergers leading to artificial arrangements resorted to by undertakings with the aim of evading future obligations arising from national rules on taxation and employee participation. In so far as it constitutes a derogation from a fundamental freedom, the fight against abuses must be interpreted strictly and be based on an individual assessment of all relevant circumstances. A procedural and substantive framework which describes the margin of discretion and allows for the diversity of approach by Member States whilst at the same time setting out the requirements to streamline the actions to be taken by national authorities to fight abuses in conformity with Union law should be laid down.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 112 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
(10) To allow all stakeholders' legitimate interests to be taken into account in the procedure governing a cross-border conversion, the company should disclose the draft terms of the cross-border conversion containing the most important information about the proposed cross- border conversion, including the envisaged new company form, the instrument of constitution and the proposed timetable for the conversion. Members, creditors, trade unions and employees of the company carrying out the cross-border conversion should be notified in order that they can submit comments with regard to the proposed conversion.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 116 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 13
(13) In order to assess the accuracy of the information contained in the draft terms of conversion and merger and in the reports addressed to the members and employees and to provide factual elements necessary to assess whether the proposed conversion constitutes an artificial arrangement, an independent expert report should be required to be prepared in order to assess the proposed cross-border conversion and merger. In order to securguarantee the independence of the expert, the expert should be appointed jointly by the competent authority, following an application by the companyat the request of the company and, if available, by the competent body of the organisation representing the company’s employees. In this context, the expert report should present all relevant information to enable the competent authority in the departure Member State to take an informed decision as to whether or not to issue the pre- conversion certificate. To this end, the expert should be able to obtain all the relevant company information and documents and carry out all necessary investigations in order to gather all the evidence required. He or she should also be required to receive and consider comments and opinions from financial authorities, social insurance bodies, the representatives of the employees of the company, or, where there are no such representatives, from the employees themselves and also from the creditors and members of the company. The expert should use information, in particular net turnover and profit or loss, number of employees and the composition of balance sheet collected by the company in view of the preparation of financial statements in accordance with Union law and the law of Member States. However, in order to protect any confidential information, including business secrets of the company, the critical parts of such information should not form part of the expert’s final report which itself would bbe redacted before being made publically available. as part of the final report.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 120 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 14
(14) With a view to avoiding disproportionate costs and burdens for smaller companies carrying out the cross- border conversion, micro and small enterprises, as defined in the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC45, should be exempted from the requirement to produce an independent expert report. However, these companies can resort to an independent expert report to prevent litigation costs with creditors. _________________ 45Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36).deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 135 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 22
(22) The issue of the pre-conversion certificate by the departure Member State should be scrutinised to ensure the legality of the cross-border conversion of the company. The competent authority of the departure Member State should decide on the issue of the pre-conversion certificate within onetwo months of the application by the company, unless it has serious concerns as to the existence of an artificial arrangement aimed at obtaining undue tax advantages or unduly prejudicing the legal or contractual rights of employees, creditors or members. In such a case, the competent authority should carry out an in- depth assessment. However, this in-depth assessment should not be carried out systematically, but it should be conducted on a case-by-case basis, where there are serious concerns as to the existence of an artificial arrangement. For their assessment, competent authorities should take into account at least a number of factors laid down in this Directive which however should be only considered as indicative factors in the overall assessment and not be considered in isolation. In order not to burden companies with an overly lengthy procedure, this in-depth assessment should in any event be concluded within twofour months of informing the company that the in-depth assessment will be carried out.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 137 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 23
(23) After having received a pre- conversion certificate, and after verifying that the incorporation requirements in the destination Member State are fulfilled, the competent authorities of the destination Member State should register the company in the business register of that Member State. Only after this registration should the competent authority of the departure Member State strike the company off its own register. It should not be possible for the competent authority of the destination Member State to challenge the accuracy of the information provided by the pre- conversion certificate, particularly in order to avoid artificial arrangements. As a consequence of the cross-border conversion, the converted company should retain its legal personality, its assets and liabilities and all rights and obligations, including rights and obligations arising from contracts, acts or omissions.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 138 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 26
(26) The evaluation of the implementation of the cross-border merger rules in Member States has shown that the number of cross-border mergers in the Union has significantly increased. However, this evaluation has also revealed certain shortcomings in relation specifically to creditor protection, protection of employees and shareholder protection as well as to the lack of simplified procedures which impede the full effectiveness and efficiency of those cross-border merger rules.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 151 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 36
(36) The existing Union law does not provide for a legal framework for cross- border divisions of companies and firms, since Directive (EU) 2017/1132 only provides rules in Chapter III for domestic divisions of public limited companies.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 152 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 37
(37) The European Parliament has called upon the Commission to adopt harmonised rules on cross-border divisions. This harmonised legal framework would further contribute to the removal of restrictions on the freedom of establishment whilst at the same time providing adequate protection for stakeholders such as employees, creditors and members.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 153 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 38
(38) This directive lays down rules on cross-border divisions, both for partial and full divisions, but only through the formation of new companies. However, this directive does not provide a harmonised framework for cross-border divisions in which a company transfers assets and liabilities to more than one existing company as these instances had been viewed as being very complex, requiring the involvement of competent authorities from several Member States and entailing additional risks in terms of fraud and the circumvention of those rules.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 154 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 38
(38) This directive lays down rules on cross-border divisions, both for partial and full divisions, but only through the formation of new companies. However, this directive does not provide a harmonised framework for cross-border divisions in which a company transfers assets and liabilities to more than one existing company as these instances had been viewed as being very complex, requiring the involvement of competent authorities from several Member States and entailing additional risks in terms of fraud and the circumvention of those rules.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 155 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 39
(39) In case of a cross-border division involving newly formed recipient companies, those recipient companies, which are governed by the laws of Member States other than those of the Member State of the company being divided, should be required to comply with the incorporation requirements of those Member States. Such conditions include those related to the disqualification of directors.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 156 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 40
(40) The right of companies to carry out a cross-border division may in certain circumstances be used for abusive purposes such as for the circumvention of labour standards, social security payments, tax obligations, creditors' or members' rights or rules on employees participation. In order to combat such abuses, as a general principle of Union law, Member States are required to ensure that companies do not use the cross- border division procedure in order to create artificial arrangements aimed at obtaining undue tax advantages or at unduly prejudicing the legal or contractual rights of employees, creditors or members. In so far as it constitutes a derogation from a fundamental freedom, the fight against abuses must be interpreted strictly and must be based on an individual assessment of all relevant circumstances. A procedural and substantive framework which describes the margin of discretion and allows for the diversity of approaches by Member States whilst at the same time setting out the requirements to streamline the actions to be taken by national authorities to fight abuses in conformity with Union law should be laid down.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 159 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 41
(41) Given the complexity of cross- border divisions and the multitude of the interests concerned, it is appropriate to provide for an ex-ante control in order to create legal certainty. To that effect, a structured and multi-layered procedure should be set out whereby both the competent authorities of the Member State of the company being divided and of the Member State of the recipient companies ensure that a decision on the approval of a cross-border division is taken in a fair, objective and non- discriminatory manner on the basis of all relevant elements and by taking into account all legitimate public interests, in particular the protection of employees, shareholders and creditors.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 160 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 42
(42) To allow all stakeholders' legitimate interests to be taken into account, the company being divided should disclose the draft terms of the division containing the most important information about the proposed cross- border division, including the envisaged the exchange ratio of securities or shares, the instruments of constitution of the recipient companies and the proposed timetable for the cross-border division. Members, creditors and employees of the company carrying out the cross-border division should be notified that they can submit comments with regard to the division.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 163 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 43
(43) In order to provide information to its members, the company being divided should prepare a report. The report should explain and substantiate the legal and economic aspects of the proposed cross-border division, in particular explaining the implications of the cross- border division for members with regard to the future business of the company and the management organs’ strategic plan. It should also include explanations about the exchange ratio, where applicable, the criteria to determine the allocation of shares and potential remedies available to members, where they do not agree with the decision to carry out a cross-border division.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 164 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 44
(44) In order to provide information its employees, the company being divided should prepare a report explaining the implications of the proposed cross-border division for employees. The report should explain in particular the implications of the proposed cross-border division on the safeguarding of the jobs of the employees, whether there would be any material change in the conditions of employment and the locations of the companies’ places of business, and how each of these factors would relate to any subsidiaries of the company. The provision of the report should be without prejudice to the applicable information and consultation proceedings instituted at national level following the implementation of Directives 2001/23/EC, 2002/14/EC or 2009/38/EC.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 168 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 45
(45) In order to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in the draft terms of division and in the reports addressed to the members and employees and to provide factual elements necessary to assess whether the proposed division constitutes an artificial arrangement which could not be authorised, an independent expert report to assess the division plan should be required to be prepared. In order to secure the independence of the expert, the expert should be appointed by the competent authority, following an application by the company. In this context, the expert report should present all relevant information to enable the competent authority of the Member State of the company being divided to take an informed decision as to whether or not to issue the pre-division certificate To this end, the expert should be able to obtain all the relevant company information and documents and carry out all necessary investigations in order to gather all the evidence required. The expert should use information, in particular net turnover and profit or loss, number of employees and the composition of balance sheet collected by the company in view of the preparation of financial statements in accordance with Union law and the law of Member States. However, in order to protect any confidential information, including business secrets of the company, such information should not form part of the expert’s final report which itself would be publically available.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 171 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 46
(46) With a view to avoiding disproportionate costs and burdens for smaller companies carrying out cross- border division, micro and small enterprises as defined in the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 should be exempted from the requirement to have produce an independent expert.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 172 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 47
(47) On the basis of the draft terms of the cross-border division and the reports, the general meeting of the members of the company being divided, should decide on whether or not to approve those draft terms. It is important that, the majority requirement for such a vote should be sufficiently high in order to ensure that the decision to divide is a collective one.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 174 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 48
(48) It is appropriate that members who held voting rights and who did not vote to approve the draft terms of the cross- border division and those members without voting rights, who could not present their position, should be afforded the right to exit the company. Those members should be able to leave the company and receive cash compensation for their shares equivalent to the value of their shares. Furthermore, they should have a right to challenge the calculation and adequacy of that cash compensation offered and also the share exchange ratio where they wish to remain members of any of the recipient companies before a court. As part of those proceedings, the court should be able to order any company involved in the cross-border division either to pay additional cash compensation or to issue additional shares.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 176 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 49
(49) The company being divided should propose in the draft terms adequate means to protect creditors in view of the cross-border division. In addition, in order to strengthen the protection of creditors in case of insolvency following the cross-border division, Member States should be allowed to require the company to make a declaration stating that it is not aware of any reason why the converted company should not be able to meet its liabilities. Member States should be able to make management organ personally liable for the accuracy of the statement. Since legal traditions vary among Member States with regard to solvency declarations and their possible consequences, it should be up to Member States to draw appropriate consequences of false or misleading declarations, including sanctions and liabilities in compliance with Union law.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 177 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 50
(50) In order to guarantee the appropriate protection of creditors in cases where they are not satisfied with the protection offered by the company in the draft terms of the cross-border division, creditors who are prejudiced by the cross- border division may apply to the competent judicial or administrative authority of the Member State of the company being divided for the safeguards they consider adequate. In order to facilitate the assessment of prejudice, certain presumptions should be laid down whereby creditors would be deemed not to be prejudiced by a cross-border division where the risk of loss to a creditor is remote. A presumption should arise where an independent expert report concludes that there is no reasonable likelihood that the creditors would be prejudiced or where creditors are offered a right to payment against the company resulting from the division or against a third party guarantee of equivalent value to the creditor's original claim and which can be brought in the same jurisdiction jurisdiction as the original claim. The creditor protection provided for in this Directive should be without prejudice to national laws of the Member State of the company being divided concerning payment to public bodies, including taxation or social security contributions.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 179 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 51
(51) To ensure the proper allocation of tasks among Member States and an efficient and effective ex-ante control of cross-border divisions, the competent authority of the Member State of the company being divided should have the power to issue a pre-division certificate without which the authorities of the Member States of the recipient companies should not be able to complete the cross- border-division procedure.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 180 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 52
(52) The issue of the pre-division certificate by the Member State of the company being divided should be scrutinised to ensure the legality of the cross-border division. The competent authority should decide whether to issue a pre-division certificate within one month of the application by the company has been submitted, unless it has serious concerns as to the existence of an artificial arrangement aimed at obtaining undue tax advantages or at unduly prejudicing the legal or contractual rights of employees, creditors or members. In such a case, the competent authority should carry out an in-depth assessment. However, this in-depth assessment should not be carried out systematically but it should be conducted on a case-by-case basis where there are serious concerns as to the existence of an artificial arrangement. For their assessment, competent authorities should take into account at least a number of factors laid down in this Directive which however should be only considered as indicative factors in the overall assessment and not be considered in isolation. In order not to burden companies with an overly lengthy procedure, this in-depth assessment should in any event be concluded within two months informing the company that the in-depth assessment will be carried out.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 183 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 53
(53) After having received a pre- division certificate, and after verifying that the incorporation requirements of the Member State of the recipient company or companies are fulfilled, the authorities of the Member States of the recipient companies should register the companies in the business registers of that Member State. Only after this registration should the competent authority of the Member State of the company being divided strike the company off its own register. The accuracy of the information provided by the pre-division certificate cannot be challenged by the competent authorities of the Member States of the recipient companies.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 185 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 54
(54) As a consequence of the cross- border division, the assets and liabilities of the company being divided shall be transferred to the recipient companies in accordance with the allocation specified in the draft terms of division and the members of the company being divided shall become members of the recipient companies or remain members of the company being divided or shall become members of both.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 186 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 55
(55) In order to ensure that employee participation is not unduly prejudiced as a result of the cross-border division where the company carrying out the cross- border division is operating under an employee participation system, the companies resulting from the division should be obliged to take a legal form allowing for the exercise of participation, including through the presence of representatives of the employees in the appropriate management or supervisory organs of the companies. Moreover, in such a case, a bona fide negotiation between the company and its employees should take place, along the lines of the procedure provided for in Directive 2001/86/EC, with a view to finding an amicable solution reconciling the right of the company to carry out a cross-border division with the employees'' rights of participation. As a result of those negotiations, either a bespoke and agreed solution or, in the absence of an agreement, the application of standard rules as set out in the Annex to Directive 2001/86/EC should apply mutatis mutandis. In order to protect either the agreed solution or the application of those standard rules, the company should not be able to remove the participation rights through carrying out subsequent domestic or cross-border conversions, mergers or divisions within 3 years.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 188 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 56
(56) In order to prevent the circumvention of the employee participation rights by means of a cross- border division, the company carrying out a division which is registered in the Member State which provides for the employee participation rights, should not be able to perform a cross-border division without first entering into negotiations with its employees or their representatives when the average number of employees employed by that company is equivalent to four fifths of the national threshold for triggering such employee participation.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 191 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 58
(58) The provisions of this Directive do not affect the legal or administrative provisions, including the enforcement of tax rules in cross-border conversions, and mergers and divisions, of national law relating to the taxes of Member States, or itstheir territorial andor administrative subdivisions.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 192 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 60
(60) Since the objectives of this Directive, to facilitate and regulate cross- border conversions, and mergers and divisions, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 197 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 b – paragraph 1 – point 6 a (new)
(6a) ‘artificial arrangement’ means a company structure set up for abusive purposes, such as the circumvention of obligations arising from the legal and contractual rights of employees, creditors, or minority shareholders, the avoidance of rules on employee involvement, of social security payments, or of tax obligations due on profits generated, or a company structure which does not carry out a substantive or genuine economic activity supported by staff, equipment, assets and premises, such as, in particular, in the case of a ‘letterbox’ or ‘front’ subsidiary.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 208 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 c – paragraph 2 – point e a (new)
(e a) there is a suspicion of welfare fraud or the infringement of workers’ rights;
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 209 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 c – paragraph 2 – point e b (new)
(eb) the company was involved in tax fraud, tax evasion or the setting up of harmful tax structures;
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 212 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 c – paragraph 3
3. Member States shall ensure that the competent authority of the departure Member State shall not authorise the cross- border conversion where it determines, after an examination of the specific case and having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, that it constitutes an artificial arrangement aimed at obtaining undue tax advantages or at unduly prejudicing the legal or contractual rights of employees, creditors or minority members. The company carrying out the cross-border conversion must demonstrate, on the basis of ascertainable objective factors, that it is actually established and pursues substantive and genuine economic activity in the destination Member State for an indefinite period.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 219 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 d – paragraph 1 – point k a (new)
(ka) detailed information on the transfer of the central administration or principle place of business;
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 231 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 e – paragraph 4
4. However, that report shall not be required where all the members of the company carrying out the cross-border conversion have agreed to waive this requirement.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 240 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 f – paragraph 3
3. The report referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, shall be made available, at least electronically, to the trade unions and the representatives of the employees of the company carrying out the cross-border conversion or, where there are no such representatives, to the employees themselves not less than two months before the date of the general meeting referred to in Article 86i. That report shall also be made similarly available to the members of the company carrying out the cross-border conversion.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 242 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 f – paragraph 5
5. However, where a company carrying out the cross-border conversion and its subsidiaries, if any, have no employees other than those who form part of the management or administrative organ, the report referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be required.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 245 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 g – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Member States shall ensure that the company carrying out the cross-border conversion and, where one exists, the competent organ of the company’s employee representation applies not less than twofour months before the date of the general meeting referred to in Article 86i to the competent authority designated in accordance with Article 86m(1), to appoint an expert to examine and assess the draft terms of the cross-border conversion and the reports referred to in Articles 86e and 86f for both form and content, subject to the proviso set out in paragraph 6 of this Article.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 256 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 g – paragraph 3 – point a
(a) a detailed assessment of the accuracy of the reports and information submitted by the company carrying out the cross-border conversion in terms of both form and content;
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 260 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 g – paragraph 4
4. Member States shall ensure that the independent expert shall be entitled to obtain, from the company carrying out the cross-border conversion, all relevant information and documents and to carry out all necessary investigations to verify all elements of the draft terms or management reports. The expert shall also be entitlobliged to receive and consider comments and opinions from thefinancial authorities, social security programmes, trade unions, representatives of the employees of the company, or, where there are no such representatives, from the employees themselves and also from the creditors and members of the company. These shall be attached to the report as appendices.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 263 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 g – paragraph 5
5. Member States shall ensure that information and opinions submitted to the independent expert can only be used for the purpose of drafting their report and that confidential information, including business secrets, shall not be disclosed. Where appropriate, the expert may submit a separate document containing any such confidential information to the competent authority, designated in accordance with Article 86m(1) and that separate document shall only be made available to the company carrying out the cross- border conversion and not be disclosed to any other paare treated as confidential. Business secrets in particular shall be redacted at key points in the reporty.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 266 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 g – paragraph 6
6. Member States shall exempt micro and small enterprises as defined in Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC (**) from the provisions of this Article.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 268 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 g – paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. For reasons of transparency, the report shall be made available to the public.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 274 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 h – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
However, Member States may, in cases of genuine suspicion of fraud based on reasonable grounds, require a physical presence before a competent authority.(Does not affect the English version.)
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 289 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 l – paragraph 2
2. However, the rules in force concerning employee participation, if any, in the destination Member State shall not apply, where the company carrying out the conversion has, in the six monthsyear prior to the publication of the draft terms of the cross- border conversion as referred to in Article 86d of this Directive, an average number of employees equivalent to four fifths of the applicable threshold, laid down in the law of the departure Member State, which triggers the participation of employees within the meaning of point (k) of Article 2 of Directive 2001/86/EC, or where the same is true of the converted company within one year of the conversion, or where the national law of the destination Member State does not:
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 291 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 l – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) provide for employees of establishments and subsidiaries of the company resulting from the conversion that are situated in other Member States the same entitlement to exercise participation rights as is enjoyed by those employees employed in the destination Member State.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 293 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 l – paragraph 3 – introductory part
3. In the cases referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, the participation of employees in the converted company and their involvement in the definition of such rights shall be regulated by the Member States, mutatis mutandis and subject to paragraphs 4 to 7 of this Article, in accordance with the principles and procedures laid down in Article 12(1), (2), (3) and (4) of Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 and the following provisions of Directive 2001/86/EC:
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 294 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 l – paragraph 4 – point a
(a) shall confer on the special negotiating body the right to decide, by a majority of two thirds of its members representing at least two thirds of the employees, not to open negotiations or to terminate negotiations already opened and to rely on the rules on participation in force in the destination Member State;deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 296 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 l – paragraph 4 – point b
(b) may, in the case where, following prior negotiations, standard rules for participation apply and notwithstanding such rules, decide to limit the proportion of employee representatives in the administrative organ of the converted company. However, if in the company carrying out the conversion employee representatives constituted at least one third of the administrative or supervisory board, the limitation may never result in a lower proportion of employee representatives in the administrative organ than one third;deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 297 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 l – paragraph 7
7. Where the converted company is operating under an employee participation system, that company shall be obliged to take measures to ensure that employees' participation rights are protected in the event of any subsequent cross-border or domestic merger, division or conversion for a period of threfive years after the cross- border conversion has taken effect, by applying mutatis mutandis the rules laid down in paragraphs 1 to 6.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 306 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 m – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
However, in cases of genuine suspicion of fraud based on reasonable grounds, Member States may require a physical presence before a competent authority where relevant information and documents are required to be submitted.(Does not affect the English version.)
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 309 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 m – paragraph 6
6. Member States shall ensure that competent authorities designated in accordance with paragraph 1 may consult other relevant authorities from both the departure Member State and the destination member state with competence in the different fields concerned by the cross-border conversion.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 310 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 m – paragraph 7 – introductory part
7. Member States shall ensure that the assessment by the competent authority is carried out within onetwo months of the date of receipt of the information concerning the approval of the conversion by the general meeting of the company. It shall have one of the following outcomes:
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 313 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 m – paragraph 7 – point c
(c) where the competent authority has serious concernsre is reason to suspect that the cross-border conversion constitutes an artificial arrangement referred to in Article 86c(3), it may, the authority should decide to carry out an in-depth assessment in accordance with Article 86n and shall inform the company about its decision to conduct such an assessment and of the subsequent outcome.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 315 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Member States shall ensure in order to assess whether the cross-border conversion constitutes an artificial arrangement within the meaning of Article 86c(3), that the competent authority of the departure Member State carries out an in-depth assessment of all relevant facts and circumstances and shall take into account at a minimum the following: the characteristics of the establishment in the destination Member State, including the intent, the sector, the investment, the net turnover and profit or loss, number of employees, the composition of the balance sheet, the tax residence, the assets and their location, the habitual place of work of the employees and of specific groups of employees, the place where social contributions are due and the commercial risks assumed by the converted company in the destination Member State and the departure Member State.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 318 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 n – paragraph 2
2. Member States shall ensure that where the competent authority referred to in paragraph 1 decides to carry out an in- depth assessment, it is able to hear the company and all parties that have submitted observations pursuant Article 86h(1)(c) in accordance with national law. The competent authorities referred to in paragraph 1 may also hear any other interested third parties in accordance with national law. The competent authority shall take its final decision regarding the issue of the pre-conversion certificate within twofour months from the start of the in-depth assessment.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 320 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 o – paragraph 2
2. Member States shall ensure that the decision to issue the pre-conversion certificate is sent to the authorities referred to in Article 86m(1) and to all parties that have submitted observations pursuant to Article 86h(1)(c) in accordance with national law and that the decisions to issue or refuse to issue a pre-conversion certificate are available through the system of interconnection of registers set up in accordance with Article 22.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 327 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 86 p – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
However, in cases of genuine suspicion of fraud based on reasonable grounds, Member States may require a physical presence before a competent authority of a Member State where relevant information and documents are required to be submitted.(Does not affect the English version.)
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 339 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b a (new)
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 119 – paragraph 1 – point 2 a (new)
(b a) in Article 119 the following definition is inserted: "(2a) ‘artificial arrangement’ means a company structure set up for abusive purposes, such as the circumvention of obligations arising from the legal and contractual rights of employees, creditors, or minority shareholders, the avoidance of rules on employee involvement, of social security payments, or of tax obligations due on profits generated, or a company structure which does not carry out a substantive or genuine economic activity supported by staff, equipment, assets and premises, such as, in particular, in the case of a ‘letterbox’ or ‘front’ subsidiary."
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 343 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 120 – paragraph 4 – point e a (new)
(e a) there is a suspicion of social fraud or infringements of workers’ rights;
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 352 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 123 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
However, Member States may, in cases of genuine suspicion of fraud based on reasonable grounds, require a physical presence before a competent authority.(Does not affect the English version.)
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 358 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 124 – paragraph 3
3. The report shall be made available, at least electronically, to the members of each of the merging companies not less than one month before the date of the general meeting referred to in Article 126. The report shall also be made similarly available to the trade unions and the representatives of the employees of each of the merging companies, or where there are no such representatives, to the employees themselves. However, where the approval of the merger is not required by general meeting of the acquiring company in accordance with Article 126(3), the report shall be made available, at least one month before the date of the general meeting of the other merging company or companies.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 360 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 124 – paragraph 4
4. However, the report referred to in paragraph 1, shall not be required where all the members of the merging companies have agreed to waive this requirement.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 367 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 124 a – paragraph 4
4. Where the management or administrative organ of one or more of the merging companies receives, in good time, an opinion from the representatives of their employees, or, where there are no such representatives, from the employees themselves, as provided for under national law, the members shall be informed thereof and that opinion shall be appended to the report.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 369 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 – introductory part
(11) in Article 125(1), the following second subparagraph is added is amended as follows:
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 370 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 125 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Member States shall take into account, in assessing the independence of the expert, the framework established in Articles 22 and 22b of Directive 2006/43/EC.deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 372 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 a (new)
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 125
(11 a) Article 125 Independent expert report 1. An independent expert report intended for members and made availableis replaced by the following: "Article 125 Independent expert report 1. Member States shall ensure that the company carrying out the merger and, where one exists, the competent organ of the company’s employee representation applies not less than onefour months before the date of the general meeting referred to in Article 126 shall be drawn up for each merging company. Depending on the law of each Member State, such experts may be natural persons or legal persons. 2. As an alternative to experts operating on behalf of each of the merging companies, one or more independent experts, appointed for that purpose at the joint request of the companies by a judicial or administrative authority in the Member State of one of the merging companies or of the company resulting from the cross-border merger or approved by such an authority, may examine the common draft terms of cross-border merger and draw up a single written report to all the members. 3. The expert report shall include at least the particulars provided for by Article 96(2). The experts shall be entitled to secure from each of the merging companies all information they consider necessary for the discharge of their duties. 4. Neither an examination of the common draft terms of cross-border merger by independent experts nor an expert report shall be required if all the members of each of the companies involved in the cross-border merger have so agreed. (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017L1132&from=EN)to the competent authority designated in accordance with Article 127(1), to appoint an expert to examine and assess the draft terms of the cross- border merger and the reports referred to in Articles 124 and 124a for both form and content, subject to the proviso set out in paragraph 6 of this Article. The application for the appointment of an expert shall be accompanied by the following (a) the draft terms of the cross- border merger referred to in Article 122; the reports referred to in Articles 124 and 124a. 2. The competent authority shall appoint an independent expert within five working days of the application referred to in paragraph 1 and the receipt of the draft terms and reports. The expert shall be independent from the company carrying out the cross-border merger and may be a natural or a legal person depending upon the law of the departure Member State. Member States shall take into account, in assessing the independence of the expert, the framework established in Articles 22 and 22b of Directive 2006/43/EC. 3. The expert shall draw up a written report providing at least: (a) a detailed assessment of the correctness in form and content of the reports and information submitted by the company carrying out the cross-border merger; (b) a description of all factual elements necessary for the competent authority, designated in accordance with Article 127(1), to carry out an in-depth assessment to determine whether the intended cross-border conversion constitutes an artificial arrangement in accordance with Article 128, including at a minimum the following: the characteristics of the establishment in the destination Member State, including the intent, the sector, the investment, the net turnover and profit or loss, number of employees, the composition of the balance sheet, the tax residence, the assets and their location, the habitual place of work of the employees and of specific groups of employees, the place where social contributions are due and the commercial risks assumed by the converted company in the destination Member State and the departure Member State. 4. Member States shall ensure that the independent expert shall be entitled to obtain, from the company carrying out the cross-border merger, all relevant information and documents and to carry out all necessary investigations to verify all elements of the draft terms or management reports. The expert shall also be obliged to receive and consider comments and opinions from financial authorities, social security programmes, trade unions, representatives of the employees of the company, or, where there are no such representatives, from the employees themselves and also from the creditors and members of the company. These shall be attached to the report as appendices. 5. Member States shall ensure that information and opinions submitted to the independent expert are treated as confidential. Business secrets in particular shall be redacted at key points in the report. 6. For reasons of transparency, the report shall be made available to the public." Or. de
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 385 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point a
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 127 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
However, in cases of genuine suspicion of fraud based on reasonable grounds, Member States may require a physical presence before a competent authority where relevant information and documents are required to be submitted.(Does not affect the English version.)
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 388 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 – point b
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 128 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
However, Member States may take measures in cases of genuine suspicion of fraud based on reasonable grounds which could require a physical presence before a competent authority of a Member State in which the relevant information and documents are required to be submitted.(Does not affect the English version.)
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 390 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18 – point -a (new)
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Article 133 – paragraph 2
2.(-a) paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: However, the rules in force concerning employee participation, if any, in the Member State where the company resulting from the cross-border merger has its registered office shall not apply, where at least one of the merging companies has, in the six monthsyear prior to the publication of the draft terms of the cross-border merger as referred to in Article 123, an average number of employees that exceeds 500 and is operating under an employefour fifths of the applicable threshold, laid down in the law of the departure Member State, which triggers the participation systemof employees within the meaning of point (k) of Article 2 of Directive 2001/86/EC, or where the same is true of the company resulting from the merger within one year, or where the national law applicable to the company resulting from the cross- border merger does not: (a) provide for at least the same level of employee participation as operated in the relevant merging companies, measured by reference to the proportion of employee representatives amongst the members of the administrative or supervisory organ or their committees or of the management group which covers the profit units of the company, subject to employee representation; or (b) provide for employees of establishments and subsidiaries of the company resulting from the cross-border merger that are situated in other Member States the same entitlement to exercise participation rights as is enjoyed by those employees employed in the Member State where the company resulting from the cross-border merger has its registered office. (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017L1132&from=EN)Or. de
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 396 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Directive (EU) No 2017/1132
Title II – Chapter IV (new)
[...]deleted
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 493 #

2018/0114(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1
1. The Commission shall, no later than five years after [OP please insert the date of the end of the transposition period of this Directive] and subsequently every five years, carry out an evaluation of this Directive and present a Report on the findings to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee accompanied, where appropriate, by a legislative proposal. The evaluation shall in particular examine whether a positive impact has been achieved regarding eliminating artificial and/or harmful arrangements, and its impact on workers’ rights. The European Commission shall consult the European social partners. Member States shall provide the Commission with the information necessary for the preparation of that report, in particular by providing data on the number of cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions, their duration and related costs.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
(9) To ensure that Member State authorities can impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties in relation to widespread infringements of consumer law and to widespread infringements with a Union dimension that are subject to coordinated investigation and enforcement in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/2394, fines should be introduced as a mandatory element of penalties for such infringements. In order to ensure deterrence of the fines, Member States should set in their national law the maximum fines for such infringements at a level that is at least 4 % of the trader's overall total annual turnover in the Member State concerned.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 104 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 19
(19) Specific transparency requirements for online marketplaces should therefore be provided in Directive 2011/83/EU to inform consumers using online marketplaces about the main parameters and their relative importance vis-à-vis other parameters determining ranking of offers, whether they enter into a contract with a trader or a non-trader (such as another consumer), whether consumer protection law applies and which trader is responsible for the performance of the contract and for ensuring consumer rights when these rights apply. This information should be provided in a clear and comprehensible manner and not only through a reference in the standard Terms and Conditions or similar contractual document. The information requirements for online marketplaces should be proportionate and need to strike a balance between a high level of consumer protection and the competitiveness of online marketplaces. Online marketplaces should not be required to list specific consumer rights when informing consumers about their applicability or non- applicability. The information to be provided about the responsibility for ensuring consumer rights depends on the contractual arrangements between the online marketplace and the relevant third party traders. Online marketplace may refer to the third party trader as being solely responsible for ensuring consumer rights or describe its specific responsibilities where it assumes the responsibility for certain aspects of the contract, for example, delivery or the exercise of the right of withdrawal. The obligation to provide information about the main parameters and their relative importance vis-à-vis other parameters determining ranking of search results is without prejudice to any trade secrets regarding the underlying algorithms. This information should explain the main default parameters used by the marketplace but does not have to be presented in a customized manner for each individual search query.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 116 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 20
(20) In accordance with Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC45, online marketplaces should not be required to verify the legal status of third party suppliers. Instead, tThe online marketplace should require third party suppliers of products on the online marketplace to indicate their status as traders or non- traders for the purposes of consumer law and to provide this information to the online marketplace. __________________ 45 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce') (OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, p. 1)Online marketplaces are responsible for the completeness and detail of the information concerning the status of the entrepreneur.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 120 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 21
(21) Digital content and digital services are often supplied online under contracts where the consumer does not pay a price but provides personal data to the trader. Digital services are characterised by continuous involvement of the trader over the duration of the contract to enable the consumer to make use of the service, for instance, access to, creation, processing, storing or sharing of data in digital form. Examples of digital services are subscription contracts to content platforms, cloud storage, webmail, social media and cloud applications. The continuous involvement of the service provider justifies the application of the rules on the right of withdrawal provided in Directive 2011/83/EU that effectively allow the consumer to test the service and decide, during the 14-day period from the conclusion of the contract, whether to keep it or not. In contrast, contracts for the supply of digital content which is not supplied on a tangible medium are characterised by one-off action by the trader to supply to the consumer a specific piece or pieces of digital content, such as specific music or video files. This one-off nature of the provision of digital content is at the basis of the exception from the right of withdrawal pursuant to Article 16(m) of Directive 2011/83/EU, whereby the consumer loses the right of withdrawal when the performance of the contract is started, such as download or streaming of the specific content.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 121 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 22
(22) Directive 2011/83/EU already applies to contracts for the supply of digital content which is not supplied on a tangible medium (i.e. supply of online digital content) regardless of whether the consumer pays a price in money or provides personal data. In contrast, Directive 2011/83/EU only applies to service contracts, including contracts for digital services, under which the consumer pays or undertakes to pay a price. Consequently, that Directive does not apply to contracts for digital services under which the consumer provides data to the trader without paying a price. Given their similarities and the interchangeability of paid digital services and digital services provided in exchange for personal data, they should be subject to the same rules under Directive 2011/83/EU.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 124 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 23
(23) Consistency should be ensured between the scope of application of Directive 2011/83/EU and the [Digital Content Directive], which applies to contracts for the supply of digital content of digital services under which the consumer provides personal data to the trader.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 126 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 24
(24) Therefore, the scope of Directive 2011/83/EU should be extended to cover also contracts under which the trader supplies or undertakes to supply a digital service to the consumer, and the consumer provides or undertakes to provide personal data. Similar to contracts for the supply of digital content which is not supplied on a tangible medium, the Directive should apply whenever the consumer provides or undertakes to provide personal data to the trader, except where the personal data provided by the consumer is exclusively processed by the trader for supplying the digital content or digital service, and the trader does not process this data for any other purpose. Any processing of personal data should comply with Regulation (EU) 2016/679.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 128 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 25
(25) Where digital content and digital services are not supplied in exchange for a price, Directive 2011/83/EU should also not apply to situations where the trader collects personal data exclusively to maintain in conformity digital content or a digital service or for the sole purpose of meeting legal requirements. Such situations could include cases where the registration of the consumer is required by applicable laws for security and identification purposes, or cases where the developer of open-source software only collects data from users to ensure the compatibility and interoperability of open-source software.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 137 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 33
(33) Directive 2011/83/EU provides fully harmonised rules regarding the right of withdrawal from distance and off- premises contracts. In this context, two concrete obligations have been shown to constitute disproportionate burdens on traders and should be deleted.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 145 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 34
(34) The first relates to the consumer right to withdraw from sales contracts concluded at a distance or off-premises even after using goods more than necessary to establish their nature, characteristics and functioning. According to Article 14(2) of Directive 2011/83/EU, a consumer is still able to withdraw from the online/off-premises purchase even if he or she has used the good more than allowed; however, in such a case, the consumer can be held liable for any diminished value of the good.deleted
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 155 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 35
(35) The obligation to accept the return of such goods creates difficulties for traders who are required to assess the ‘diminished value’ of the returned goods and to resell them as second-hand goods or to discard them. It distorts the balance between a high level of consumer protection and the competitiveness of enterprises pursued by Directive 2011/83/EU. The right for consumers to return goods in such situations should therefore be deleted. Annex I of Directive 2011/83/EU 'Information concerning the exercise of the right of withdrawal' should also be adjusted in accordance with this amendment.deleted
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 161 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 36
(36) The second obligation concerns Article 13 of Directive 2011/83/EU, according to which traders can withhold the reimbursement until they have received the goods back, or until the consumer has supplied evidence of having sent them back, whichever is the earliest. The latter option may, in some circumstances, effectively require traders to reimburse consumers before having received back the returned goods and having had the possibility to inspect them. It distorts the balance between a high level of consumer protection and the competitiveness of enterprises pursued by Directive 2011/83/EU. Therefore, the obligation for traders to reimburse the consumer on the mere basis of the proof that the goods have been sent back to the trader should be deleted. Annex I of Directive 2011/83/EU 'Information concerning the exercise of the right of withdrawal' should also be adjusted in accordance with this amendment.deleted
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 180 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 43
(43) However, the enforcement experience has shown that it may be unclear to consumers, traders and national competent authorities which commercial practices could be contrary to the Directive 2005/29/EC in the absence of an explicit provision. Therefore, Directive 2005/29/EC should be amended to ensure legal certainty both for traders and enforcement authorities by addressing explicitly the marketing of a product as being identical to the same product marketed in several other Member States, where those products have significantly different composition or characteristics. Competent authorities should assess and address on a case by case basis such practices according to the provisions of the Directive. In undertaking its assessment the competent authority should take into account whether such differentiation is easily identifiable by consumers, a trader's right to adapt products of the same brand for different geographical markets due to legitimate factors, such as availability or seasonality of raw materials, defined consumer preferences or voluntary strategies aimed at improving access to healthy and nutritious food as well as the traders' right to offer products of the same brand in packages of different weight or volume in different geographical markets.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 194 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 44
(44) While off-premises sales constitute a legitimate and well-established sales channel, like sales at a trader's business premises and distance–selling, some particularly aggressive or misleading marketing practices in the context of visits to the consumer's home without the consumer's prior agreement or during commercial excursions can put consumers under pressure to make purchases of goods they would not otherwise buy and/or purchases at excessive prices, often involving immediate payment. Such practices often target elderly or other vulnerable consumers. Some Member States consider those practices undesirable and deem it necessary to restrict certain forms and aspects of off-premises sales within the meaning of Directive 2011/83/EU, such as aggressive and misleading marketing or selling of a product in the context of unsolicited visits to a consumer's home or commercial excursions, on grounds of public policy or the respect for consumers’ private life protected by Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and in order to facilitate enforcement, it should therefore be clarified that Directive 2005/29/EC is without prejudice to Member States' freedom to make arrangements without the need for a case-by-case assessment of the specific practice, to protect the legitimate interests of consumers with regard to unsolicited visits at their private home by a trader in order to offer or sell products or in relation to commercial excursions organised by a trader with the aim or effect of promoting or selling products to consumers where such arrangements are justified on grounds of public policy or the protection of private life. Any such provisions should be proportionate and not discriminatory. Member States should be required to notify any national provisions adopted in this regard to the Commission so that the Commission can make this information available to all interested parties and monitor the proportionate nature and legality of those measures.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 205 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point a
Directive 2005/29/EC
Article 3 – paragraph 5
This Directive does not prevent Member States from adopting provisions to protect the legitimate interests of consumers with regard to aggressive or misleading marketing or selling practices in the context of unsolicited visits by a trader to a consumer's home, or with regard to commercial excursions organised by a trader with the aim or effect of promoting or selling products to consumers, provided that such provisions are justified on grounds of public policy or the protection of the respect for private life.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 213 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Directive 2005/29/EC
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) Any marketing of a product as being identical to the same product marketed in several other Member States, while those products have significantly different composition or characteristics;
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 247 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5
Directive 2005/29/EC
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – point d
(d) where appropriate, the intentional or negligent character of the infringement;
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 255 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5
Directive 2005/29/EC
Article 13 – paragraph 3
(3) Where the penalty to be imposed is a fine, the infringing trader’s annual turnover and net profits and profits obtained through the infringement as well as any fines imposed for the same or other infringements of this Directive in other Member States shall also be taken into account in the determination of its amount.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 263 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5
Directive 2005/29/EC
Article 13 – paragraph 4
(4) Member States shall ensure that the penalties for widespread infringements and widespread infringements with a Union dimension within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 2017/2934 include the possibility to impose fines, the maximum amount of which shall be at least 4 % of the trader's worldwide overall annual turnover in the Member State or Member States concerned.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 276 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Directive 2005/29/EC
Annex I – point 11
11. Using editorial content in the media, or providing information to a consumer’s online search query, to promote a product where a trader has paid the trader has paid direct or indirect remuneration for theis promotion, without making that clear in the content or search results or by images or sounds clearly identifiable by the consumer (advertorial; paid placement or paid inclusion). This is without prejudice to Directive 2010/13/EU48. __________________ 48 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, p. 1).
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 280 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 a (new)
Directive 2005/29/EC
Annex I – point 20
6a. In Annex I, point 20 is replaced by the following: “20. Describing a product or service as ‘gratis’, ‘free’, ‘without charge’ or similar if the consumer has to pay anything other than the unavoidable cost of responding to the commercial practice and collecting or paying for delivery of the item. content/DE/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32005L0029&qid=1537794151556&from=EN) or if in return their data may be processed. Or. de (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 286 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 b (new)
Directive 2005/29/EC
Annex I – point 23 a (new)
6b. In Annex I, point 23 a is added as follows: 23a. Any marketing of a product as being identical to the same product marketed in other Member States, while those products have significantly different composition or characteristics;
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 295 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point a
Directive 2011/83/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1, point 4 a
4a. “personal data” means personal data as defined in Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679;deleted
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 300 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point d
Directive 2011/83/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 16
(16) ‘contract for the supply of digital content which is not supplied on tangible medium’ means a contract under which a trader supplies or undertakes to supply specific digital content to the consumer and the consumer pays or undertakes to pay the price thereof. This also includes contracts where the consumer provides or undertakes to provide personal data to the trader, except where the personal data provided by the consumer is exclusively processed by the trader for the purpose of supplying the digital content, or for the trader to comply with legal requirements to which the trader is subject, and the trader does not process this data for any other purpose;
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 304 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point d
Directive 2011/83/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 18
(18) ‘digital service contract’ means a contract under which a trader supplies or undertakes to supply a digital service to the consumer and the consumer pays or undertakes to pay the price thereof. This also includes contracts where the consumer provides or undertakes to provide personal data to the trader, except where the personal data provided by the consumer is exclusively processed by the trader for the purpose of supplying the digital service, or for the trader to comply with legal requirements to which the trader is subject, and the trader does not process this data for any other purpose;
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 307 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point d
Directive 2011/83/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 19
(19) ‘online marketplace’ means a service providernatural or legal person offering, on a professional basis, whether for remuneration or not, an online public communication service which allows consumers to conclude online contracts with traders and consumers on the online marketplace’s online interface the functioning of which is based on the classification or referencing, by means of computer algorithms, of content, goods or services offered or posted by third parties, or the bringing together of several parties for the purpose of selling goods, providing services or the sharing of content, goods or services;
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 326 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)
Directive 2011/83/EU
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point sa (new)
(3a) The following paragraph 1(sa) is inserted in Article 3: ‘(sa) the commercial use of data, even if the consumer does not have to make monetary payment to receive goods or services.’
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 336 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Directive 2011/83/EU
Article 6 a – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the main parameters determining ranking of offers presented to the consumer as result of his search query on the online marketplace and the relative weighting of those parameters compared to other parameters;
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 377 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 4 a (new)
Directive 2011/83/EU
Article 6 b (new)
(4 a) The following paragraph 6b is inserted: ‘Reputation systems (1) If a platform operator offers a reputation system on its online intermediary platform, it must provide information concerning the conditions under which ratings and reviews are collected, processed and published. (2) The reputation system must satisfy the requirements of professional diligence.’
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 381 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point b a (new)
Directive 2011/83/EU
Article 8 – paragraph 11 (new)
(ba) The following paragraph 11 is inserted: 11. Within the withdrawal period, the trader must not use the consumer’s data unless this is necessary for the completion of the contract.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 391 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point a
Directive 2011/83/EU
Article 13 – paragraph 3
(a) Paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: ‘3. collect the goods himself, with regard to sales contracts, the trader may withhold the reimbursement until he has received the goods back.’deleted Unless the trader has offered to
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 394 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point b
Directive 2011/83/EU
Article 13 – paragraph 4
4. In respect of personal data of the consumer, the trader shall comply with the obligations applicable under Regulation (EU) 2016/679.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 396 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point b
Directive 2011/83/EU
Article 13 – paragraph 5
5. In respect of any digital content to the extent that it does not constitute personal data, which was uploaded or created by the consumer when using the digital content or digital service supplied by the trader the trader shall comply with the obligations and can exercise the rights provided under [Digital Content Directive].’
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 409 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point 1
Directive 2011/83/EU
Article 16 – paragraph 1 – point a
(1) point (a) is replaced by the following: (a) service contracts after the service has been fully performed if the performance has begun with the consumer’s prior express consent’;deleted
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 418 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point 3
Directive 2011/83/EU
Article 16 – paragraph 1– point n
(n) the supply of goods that the consumer has handled, during the right of withdrawal period, other than what is necessary to establish the nature, characteristics and functioning of the goods.’deleted
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 425 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2011/83/EU
Article 24 – paragraph 2 – point (d)
(d) where appropriate, the intentional or negligent character of the infringement;
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 434 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Directive 2011/83/EU
Article 24 – paragraph 4
4. Member States shall ensure that the penalties for widespread infringements and widespread infringements with a Union dimension within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 2017/2934 include the possibility to impose fines, the maximum amount of which shall be at least 4 % of the trader’s total global annual turnover in the Member State or Member States concerned.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 446 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 11 – point 1 – point c
Directive 2011/83/EU
Annex I – part A – Instructions for completion – point 4
(c) point 4 under “Instructions for completion” is replaced by the following: “[4.] In the case of sales contracts in which you have not offered to collect the goods in the event of withdrawal insert the following: ‘We may withhold reimbursement until we have received the goods back.’”deleted
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 452 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 11 – point 1 – point d
Directive 2011/83/EU
Annex I – part A – Instructions for completion – point 5 – point c
(d) Subpoint (c) of point 5 under “Instructions for completion” is deleted.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 456 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Directive 1993/13/EEC
Article 8 b – paragraph 2 – point d
(d) where appropriate, the intentional or negligent character of the infringement;
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 465 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Directive 1993/13/EEC
Article 8 b – paragraph 4
4. Member States shall ensure that the penalties for widespread infringements and widespread infringements with a Union dimension within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 2017/2934 include the possibility to impose fines, the maximum amount of which shall be at least 4 % of the trader’s total global annual turnover in the Member State or Member States concerned.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 472 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Directive 1998/06/EC
Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point d
(d) where appropriate, the intentional or negligent character of the infringement;
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 483 #

2018/0090(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Directive 1998/06/EC
Article 8 – paragraph 4
4. Member States shall ensure that the penalties for widespread infringements and widespread infringements with a Union dimension within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 2017/2934 include the possibility to impose fines, the maximum amount of which shall be at least 4 % of the trader’s total global annual turnover in the Member State or Member States concerned.
2018/10/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 47 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 3
(3) That review constitutes an important element of the Digital Single Market24 , given that the Digital Single Market needs a modern and stable tax framework for the digitalised economy to stimulate innovation, tackle market fragmentation and allow all players to tap into the new market dynamics under fair and balanced conditions. _________________ 24 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 'A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe' (COM(2015) 192 final of 6.5.2015).
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 48 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 3 a (new)
(3a) Digitalisation affects the whole economy with many firms using multi- channel models; thus, instead of creating special regimes for digital businesses, international tax rules should be reformed, based on a principle of neutrality between different business models, both digital and non-digital, and regardless of the extent or form of digitalisation, including multi-channel models, recognising the economic reality businesses operate in today.
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 49 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 3 b (new)
(3b) In particular, this means reforming the definition of a permanent establishment to be more in line with the concept of a permanent establishment as defined in the 2010 UN model tax convention.
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 53 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 5 a (new)
(5a) Notwithstanding the difficulties of reaching a global agreement, such an agreement should still be pursued with great effort. Progress on the OECD level has been slow and results have been disappointing. As called for in the European Parliament’s inquiry committee into money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion (PANA) and in its special committee on tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect (TAXE2), an empowered UN tax body should thus be installed to serve as the forum for debates and discussions on said agreement and other matters related to the international tax system.
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 68 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 7
(7) That interim solution should establish the common system of a digital services tax ('DST') on revenues resulting from the supply of certain digital services by certain entities. It should be an easy-to- implement measure targeting the revenues stemming from the supply of digital services, online content and the sale of goods or services which are sold via a digital interface where users contribute significantly to the process of value creation. Such factor (user value creation)s also underpins the action with respect to corporate tax rules, as described in recital (5).
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 73 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
(9) DST should be applied to revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services only. The digital services should be ones that are largely reliant on user value creation where the difference between the place where the profits are taxed and the place where the users are established is typically greatest. It is the revenues obtained from the processing of user input that should be taxed, not the user participation in itself.
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 76 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
(10) In particular, taxable revenues should be those resulting from the provision of the following services: (i) the placing on a digital interface of advertising targeted at users of that interface; (ii) the making available of multi-sided digital interfaces which allow users to find other users and to interact with them, and which may also facilitate the provision of underlying supplies of goods or services directly between users (sometimes referred to as "intermediation" services); and (iii) the transmission of data collected about users and generated from such users' activities on digital interfaces (iv) the supply of digital content such as videos, audio or text; and (v) the sale of goods or services sold via a digital interface. If no revenues are obtained from the supply of listed activities . If no revenues are obtained from the supply of such services, there should be no DST liability. Other revenues obtained by the entity providing such services but not directly stemming from such supplies should also fall outside the scope of the tax.
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 80 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 13
(13) For cases involving multi-sided digital interfaces that facilitate an underlying supply of goods or services directly between users of the interface, the underlying transactions and the revenues obtained by users from those transactions should remain outsidewithin the scope of the tax. The revenues resulting from retail activities consisting in the sale of goods or services which are contracted online via the website of the supplier of such goods or services, and where the supplier does not act as an intermediary, should also be outside the scope of DST because the value creation for the retailer lies with the goods or services provided and the digital interface is only used as a means of communication. Whether a supplier is selling goods or services online on his own account or providing intermediation services would be determined by taking into account the legal and economic substance of a transaction, as reflected in the arrangements between the relevant parties. For instance, a supplier of a digital interface where third-party goods are made available could be said to provide an intermediation service (in other words, the making available of a multi-sided digital interface) where no significant inventory risks are assumed, or where it is the third party effectively setting the price of such goodswithin the scope of DST.
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 83 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 14
(14) Services consisting in the supply of digital content by an entity through a digital interface should be exincluded fromin the scope of the tax, regardless of whether the digital content is owned by that entity or that entity has acquired the rights to distribute it. Even if some sort of interaction between the recipients of such digital content may be allowed and therefore the supplier of such services could be seen as making available a multi-sided digital interface, it is less clear that the user plays a central role in the creation of value for the company supplying the digital content. Instead, the focus from the perspective of value creation is on the digital content itself which is supplied by the entity. Therefore the revenues obtained from such supplies should fall outside the scope of the tax.
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 87 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 15
(15) Digital content should be defined to mean data supplied in digital form, such as computer programmes, applications, games, music, videos or texts, irrespective of whether they are accessed through downloading or streaming, and other than the data represented by a digital interface itself. This is to capture the different forms which digital content can take when acquired by a user, which does not alter the fact that the sole or main purpose from the user's perspective is the acquisition of the digital content.
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 90 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 16
(16) The service described in recital (14) should be distinguished from a service consisting in the making available of a multi-sided digital interface through which users can upload and share digital content with other users, or the making available of an interface that facilitates an underlying supply of digital content directly between users. These latter services constitute a service of intermediation and should therefore fall within the scope of DST, regardless of the nature of the underlying transaction.deleted
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 96 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 22
(22) Only certain entities should qualify as taxable persons for the purposes of DST, regardless of whether they are established in a Member State or in a non-Union jurisdiction. In particular, an entity should qualify as a taxable person only if it meets both of the following conditions: (i) the total amount of worldwide revenues reported by the entity for the latest complete financial year for which a financial statement is available exceeds EUR 750 000 000; and (ii): the total amount of taxable revenues obtained by the entity within the Union during that financial year exceeds EUR 50 000 000.
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 99 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 23
(23) The first threshold (total annual worldwide revenues) should limit the application of DST to the companies of a certain scale, which are the ones mainly able to provide those digital services for which user contribution plays a fundamental role, and which heavily rely on extensive user networks, large user traffic, and the exploitation of a strong market position. Such business models, which depend on user value creation for obtaining revenues and are only viable if carried out by companies with a certain size, are the ones responsible for the higher difference between where their profits are taxed and where value is created. Moreover, the opportunity of engaging in aggressive tax planning lies with larger companies. That is why the same threshold has been proposed in other Union initiatives30 . Such a threshold is also intended to bring legal certainty, given that it would make it easier and less costly for companies and tax authorities to determine whether an entity is liable to DST. It also excludes small enterprises and start-ups for which the compliance burdens of the new tax would be likely to have a disproportionate effect. _________________ 30 See Article 2 of the Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) (COM(2016) 683 final).deleted
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 101 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 24
(24) The secondis threshold (total annual taxable revenues in the Union) should limit the application of the tax to cases where there is a significant digital footprint at Union level in relation to the type of revenues covered by DST. It should be set at Union level in order to disregard differences in market sizes which may exist within the Union.
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 115 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 35
(35) The taxable revenues should be equal to the total gross revenues obtained by a taxable person, net of value added tax and other similar taxes. Taxable revenues should be recognised as obtained by a taxable person at the time when they become due, regardless of whether they have actually been paid by then. DST should be chargeable in a Member State on the proportion of taxable revenues obtained by a taxable person in a tax period that is treated as obtained in that Member State, and should be calculated by applying the DST rate to that proportion. There should be a single DST rate at Union level in order to avoid distortions in the Single Market. The DST rate should be set at 35%, which achieves an appropriate balance between revenues generated by the tax and accounting for the differential DST impact for businesses with different profit margins.
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 122 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 40 a (new)
(40a) Three years after .... [the date of entry into force of this Directive], the Commission should produce an evaluation report of the implementation of this Directive and its effects. In particular, the Commission should assess in this report the amount in tax paid due to the DST in each Member State and who bore the economic incidence of the tax. The Commission should present the report both to Parliament and to Council.
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 129 #

2018/0073(CNS)

(41a) With the view of increasing the resilience of the Union’s tax system further, the application of the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 114 TFEU) for legislation related to corporate income taxation should be considered,
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 133 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
(ca) the making available to users of content on a digital interface such as video, audio or text using a digital interface;
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 135 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point c b (new)
(cb) the sale of goods or services which are contracted online via digital interfaces.
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 139 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – point a
(a) the making available of a digital interface where the sole or main purpose of making the interface available is for the entity making it available to supply digital content to users or to supply communication services to users or to supply payment services to users;
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 143 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. 'Taxable person', with respect to a tax period, shall mean an entity meeting both of the following conditions:
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 144 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the total amount of worldwide revenues reported by the entity for the relevant financial year exceeds EUR 750 000 000;deleted
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 152 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 3 – point c a (new)
(ca) as regards taxable revenues falling under Article 3(1)(ca), in proportion to the time the content made available to users appears on a user’s device while the device is being used in that Member State to access the digital interface in that tax period;
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 153 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 3 – point c b (new)
(cb) as regards taxable revenues falling under Article 3(1)(cb), in proportion to the sales value of the goods and services delivered to a buyer in that Member State in that tax period.
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 161 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 1
The DST rate shall be 35%.
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 175 #

2018/0073(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 23 a (new)
Article 23a Evaluation Report Three years after.... [the date of entry into force of this Directive], the Commission shall produce an evaluation report of the implementation of this Directive and its effects. In particular, the Commission shall assess in this report the amount in tax paid due to the DST in each Member State and who bore the economic incidence of the tax. The Commission shall present the report to both Parliament and Council.
2018/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 21 #

2018/0072(CNS)

(1) Rapid transformation of the global economy as a result of digitalisation is putting new pressures on corporate tax systems both at Union level and internationally, and calling into question the ability to establish where digital companies should pay their taxes and how much they should pay. Although the need to adapt corporate tax rules to the digitalisation of the economy is recognised at international level by bodies such as the G20, reaching an agreement at global level is likely to be challenging.
2018/10/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 23 #

2018/0072(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 a (new)
(1a) Notwithstanding the difficulties of reaching a global agreement, such an agreement should still be pursued with great effort. As called for in the European Parliament’s inquiry committee into money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion (PANA) and in its special committee on tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect (TAXE2), an empowered UN tax body should be installed to serve as the forum for debates and discussions on said agreement and other matters related to the international tax system.
2018/10/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 25 #

2018/0072(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 b (new)
(1b) Digitalisation affects the whole economy with many firms using multi- channel models; thus, instead of creating special regimes for digital businesses, international tax rules should be reformed, based on a principal of neutrality between different business models, both digital and non-digital, and regardless of the extent or form of digitalisation, including multi-channel models, recognising the economic reality businesses operate in today.
2018/10/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 26 #

2018/0072(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 c (new)
(1c) In particular, this means reforming the definition of a permanent establishment to be more in line with the concept of a permanent establishment as defined in the 2011 UN model tax convention.
2018/10/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 32 #

2018/0072(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 2 a (new)
(2a) Progress on the OECD level has been slow and results have been disappointing. Instead of at the OECD, discussions and debates on international tax matters should thus take place at UN level at an empowered UN tax body, ensuring the participation of all countries.
2018/10/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 40 #

2018/0072(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 7
(7) To enable an enterprise's significant digital presence to be taxed in another jurisdiction in accordance with the domestic law of that jurisdiction, it is necessary to establish the principles of attributing profits to that significant digital presence. The rules should be built on the current principles for profit attribution and be based on a functional analysis of the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by a significant digital presence in performing its economically significant activities through a digital interface. Information from the country-by-country reports and master files of companies should be used in addition to the functional analysis. The functional analysis should in any case be based on where economic activity takes place in reality as opposed to where it is contractually located. Particular attention should be paid to the fact that a significant part of the value of a digital business is created where the users are based and where the data related to the users is collected and processed as well as to where the digital services are provided. Since economically significant activities performed by a significant digital presence contribute in a unique manner to value creation in digital business models, the profit split method should normally be used for arriving at a fair allocation of profits to the significant digital presence. However, this should not prevent a taxpayer from using an alternative method in line with internationally accepted principles if the taxpayer can prove that, based on the outcome of the functional analysis, an alternative method in line with internationally accepted principles is more appropriate. It is also essential that the profit splitting factors bear a strong correlation with the creation of value.
2018/10/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 47 #

2018/0072(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 8 a (new)
(8a) With the view of increasing the resilience of the Union’s tax system further, the application of the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 114 TFEU) for legislation related to corporate income taxation should be considered.
2018/10/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 56 #

2018/0072(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
(10) The Commission should evaluate the implementation of this Directive fivthree years after its entry into force and report to the European Parliament and the Council thereon. Member States should communicate to the Commission all information necessary for this evaluation. An advisory DigiTax Committee should be established to examine questions on the application of the Directive.
2018/10/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 66 #

2018/0072(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
(ea) the sale of goods or services which are contracted online via a digital interface;
2018/10/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 67 #

2018/0072(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – paragraph 2
Digital services shall not include the services listed in Annex III or the sale of goods or other services which is facilitated by using the internet or an electronic network.
2018/10/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 87 #

2018/0072(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 2
2. The profits attributable to or in respect of the significant digital presence shall be those that the digital presence would have earned if it had been a separate and independent enterprise performing the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions, in particular in its dealings with other parts of the enterprise, taking into account the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed, through a digital interfacproportionate to the economic reality of the business activity in the corresponding Member State.
2018/10/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #

2018/0072(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 3
3. For the purposes of paragraph 2 the determination of profits attributable to or in respect of the significant digital presence shall be based on a functional analysis. In order to determine the functions of, and attribute the economic ownership of assets and risks to, the significant digital presence, the economically significant activities performed by such presence through a digital interface shall be taken into account. For this purpose, activities undertaken by the enterprise through a digital interface related to data or users shall be considered economically significant activities of the significant digital presence which attribute risks and the economic ownership of assets to such presence. For the purposes of the functional analysis, in determining the location of assets, risks and functions performed, the place of where the economic activity in relation to these factors takes place shall prevail over the location to which they are contractually assigned to.
2018/10/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 92 #

2018/0072(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 6
6. In determining the attributable profits under paragraphs 1 to 4, taxpayers shall use the profit split method unless the taxpayer proves that an alternative method based on internationally accepted principles is more appropriate having regard to the results of the functional analysis. The splitting factors may include expenses incurred for research, development and marketing as well as the number of users and. The splitting factors shall include tangible assets, employee’s payroll, headcount, sales, data collected and users per Member State.
2018/10/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 103 #

2018/0072(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 1
1. The Commission shall evaluate the implementation of this Directive fivthree years after its entry into force and report to the European Parliament and the Council thereon.
2018/10/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 113 #

2018/0072(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 7 – paragraph 2
2. The DigiTax Committee shall consist of representatives of the Member States, Parliament and of the Commission. The chair of the Committee shall be a representative of the Commission. Secretarial services for the Committee shall be provided by the Commission.
2018/10/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 116 #

2018/0072(CNS)

The DigiTax Committee shall draw up an annual report on its activities and findings and shall share this report with Parliament, Council and Commission.
2018/10/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 180 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
(1) EU households are amongst the highest savers in the world, but the bulk of these savings are held in bank accounts with short maturities. More investment into capital markets caWell-designed public pay-as-you- go pension systems are the instruments best equipped to ensure elderly citizens can lead a life of dignity and independence and to safeguard them from old age poverty. Third pillar personal pension products, on thelp meet the challenges posed by population ageing and low interest rates. other hand, are additional saving products for higher income households and are thus not suitable for ensuring widespread pension adequacy.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 185 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 a (new)
(1a) Next to demographic challenges, public pension systems have especially come under heightened pressure due to recent policy trends. Far reaching austerity measures, rising wealth and income inequality, the spread of low paid and unstable jobs and sustained periods of high unemployment are all detrimental to the functioning of public pension systems.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 192 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 b (new)
(1b) To help member states put their public pension systems on a sustainable footing, the economic governance framework of the EU should thus be changed. Instead of emphasising internal devaluation, labour market flexibilisation and budgetary leanness, full employment policies should be promoted.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 209 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
(2) Personal pensions care important in linking long- term savers with long-term investment opportunities. A larger, European market for personal pensions willmight support the supply of funds for institutional investors and investment into the real economy.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 213 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
(4) The Capital Markets Union (CMU) will help mobilise capital in Europe and channel it to all companies, including small and medium enterprises, infrastructure and long term sustainable projects that need it to expand and create jobs. One of the main objectives of the CMU is to increase investment and choices for retail investors by putting European savings to better useaims at promoting market-based finance by deepening capital markets and strengthening market-based banking, even though the academic literature has repeatedly established strong links between the financial instability inherent to market-based banking and the US subprime crisis as well as the EU’s bank and sovereign crisis.1a __________________ 1a Some examples include: Adrian, T. and Shin, H.S. (2010): Liquidity and leverage. Journal of Financial Intermediation 19 (3): 418-437. Brunnermeier, M.K. (2009): Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007-2008. Journal of Economic Perspectives 23 (1): 77-100. Gabor, D. and Ban, C. (2016):Banking and bonds: The new links between states and markets. The Journal of Common Market Studies 54(3): 617-635. Gorton, G. and Metrick, A. (2012): Securitized banking and the run on repo. Journal of Financial Economics 104(3): 425-451.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 218 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4 a (new)
(4a) Further liberalisation of capital markets and reviving securitisation, as envisioned by the Commission’s CMU project, will destabilise the economy of the EU and especially of the euro area even further by fostering the pro-cyclicality of the financial system and by aggravating already existing macroeconomic imbalances between member states.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 223 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) A legislative framework for a PEPP will lay the foundations for a successful market in affordable and voluntary retirement-related investments that can be managed on a pan-European scale. By complementing the existing pension products and schemes, it will contribute to meeting the needs of people wishing to enhance the adequacy of their retirement savings, addressing the demographical challenge and providing a powerful new source of private capital for long-term investment. This framework will not replace or harmonise existing national personal pension schemes.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 226 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) The Regulation harmonises a set of core features for the PEPP, which concern key elements such as distribution, investment policy, provider switching, or cross-border provision and portability. The harmonisation of these core features will improve the level playing field for personal pension providers at large and help boost the completion of the CMU and the integration of the internal market for personal pensions. It will lead to the creation of a largely standardised pan- European product, available in all Member States, empowering consumers to make full use of the internal market by transferring their pension rights abroad and offering a broader choice between different types of providers, including in a cross-border way. As a result of fewer barriers to the provision of pension services across borders, a pan-European Personal Pension Product will increase competition between providers on a pan- European basis and create economies of scale that should benefit savers.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 228 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) Article 114 TFEU allows the adoption of acts both in the shape of Regulations or Directives. The adoption of a Regulation has been preferred as it would become directly applicable in all Member States. Therefore, a Regulation would allow a quicker uptake of the PEPP and contribute more rapidly to address the need for more pension savings and investments in the CMU context. Since this Regulation is harmonising the core features of the PEPPs, they do not have to be subject to specific national rules, so a Regulation appears better suited than a Directive in this case. On the contrary, the features which are out of the scope of the Regulation (e.g. accumulation phase conditions) are subject to national rules.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 238 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
(16) In order to ensure a high quality of service and effective consumer protection, home and host Member States should closely cooperate in the enforcement of the obligations set out in this Regulation. Where PEPP providers and distributors pursue business in different Member States under the freedom to provide services, the competent authority of the home Member State should be responsible for ensuring compliance with the obligations set out in this Regulation, because of its closer links with the PEPP provider. In order to ensure fair sharing of responsibilities between the competent authorities from the home and the host Member States, if the competent authority of a host Member State becomes aware of any breaches of obligations occurring within its territory, it should inform EIOPA and the competent authority of the home Member State which should then be obliged to take the appropriate measures. Moreover, the competent authority of the host Member State should be entitled to intervene if the home Member State fails to take appropriate measures or if the measures taken are insufficient.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 240 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
(17) In the case of the establishment of a branch or a permanent presence in another Member State, it is appropriate to distribute responsibility for enforcement between home and host Member States. While responsibility for compliance with obligations affecting the business as a whole – such as the rules on professional requirements – should remain with the competent authority of the home Member State under the same regime as in the case of provision of services, the competent authority of the host Member State should assume responsibility for enforcing the rules on information requirements and conduct of business with regard to the services provided within its territory. However, where the competent authority of a host Member State becomes aware of any breaches of obligations occurring within its territory with respect to which this Directive does not confer responsibility on the host Member State, a close cooperation demands that that authority informs EIOPA and the competent authority of the home Member State so that the latter takes the appropriate measures. Such is the case in particular as regards breaches of the rules on good repute, professional knowledge and competence requirements. Moreover, in view of protecting consumers, the competent authority of the host Member State should be entitled to intervene if the home Member State fails to take appropriate measures or if the measures taken are insufficient.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 250 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
(21) In order to allow a smooth transition for PEPP providers, the obligation of providing PEPPs comprising compartments for each Member State will apply threfive years after the entry into force of this Regulation. However, uPEPP providers should be allowed to enter into partnership agreements with other PEPP providers for the provision of national compartments. These agreements should be made subject to authorisation by EIOPA. Upon launching a PEPP, the provider should provide information on which national compartments are immediately available, in order to avoid a possible misleading of consumers.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 260 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24
(24) In order to ensure optimal product transparency, PEPP manufacturproviders should draw up the PEPP key information document for the PEPPs that they manufacture before the product can be distributed to PEPP savers. They should also be responsible for the accuracy of the PEPP key information document. The PEPP key information document should replacimprove and adapt the key information document for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products under Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council33 which would not have to be provided for PEPPs. __________________ 33 Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs), OJ L 352, 9.12.2014, p. 1.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 262 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25
(25) In order to ensure widespread dissemination and availability of PEPP key information documents, this Regulation should provide for publication by the PEPP manufacturprovider of PEPP key information documents on its website.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 263 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26
(26) Pension product calculators are already being developed at national level. However, in order for the calculators to be as useful as possible to consumers, they should cover the costs and fees charged by the various PEPP manufacturproviders, together with any further costs or fees charged by intermediaries or other parts of the investment chain not already included by the PEPP manufacturproviders.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 265 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
(27) The details of the information to be included in the PEPP key information document in addition to elements already provided for in the key information document for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products under Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 and the presentation of this information should be further harmonised through regulatory technical standards that complement the regulatory technical standards laid down by Commission delegated Regulation of 8 March 201734 , taking into account existing and ongoing research into consumer behaviour and understanding of financial products, including results from testing the effectiveness of different ways of presenting information with consumers. __________________ 34 Commission Delegated Regulation of 8 March 2017 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) by laying down regulatory technical standards with regard to the presentation, content, review and revision of key information documents and the conditions for fulfilling the requirement to provide such documents.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 270 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31
(31) During the phase when retirement benefits are paid, PEPP beneficiaries should continue to receive information on their benefits and corresponding pay-out options. This is particularly important when a significant level of investment risk is borne by PEPP beneficiaries in the pay- out phase. PEPP beneficiaries should also be informed of any reduction in the level of benefits due, prior to the application of any such reduction, after a decision which will result in a reduction has been taken. As a matter of best practice, PEPP providers are recommended to consult PEPP beneficiaries in advance of any such decision.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 273 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33
(33) By setting the prudent person rule as the underlying principle for capital investment and making it possible for PEPP providers to operate across borders, the redirection of savings into the sector of personal retirement provision is encouraged, thereby contributing to economic and social progress.deleted
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 280 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 35
(35) In the context of deepening the CMU, the understanding of what constitutes instruments with a long-term economic profile is broad. Such instruments are non-transferable securities and therefore do not have access to the liquidity of secondary markets. They often require fixed term commitments which restrict their marketability and should be understood to include participation and debt instruments in, and loans provided to, non-listed undertakings. Non-listed undertakings include infrastructure projects, unlisted companies seeking growth, real estate or other assets that could be suitable for long term investment purposes. Low carbon and climate resilient infrastructure projects are often non-listed assets and rely on long term credits for project financing. Considering the long- term nature of their liabilities, PEPP providers are encouraged toshould allocate a sufficient part of their asset portfolio to sustainable investments in the real economy with long- term economic benefits, in particular to low carbon and climate resilient infrastructure projects and corporates.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 285 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36
(36) Environmental, social and governance factors, as referred to in the United Nations-supported Principles for Responsible Investment, are important for the investment policy and risk management systems of PEPP providers. PEPP providers should be encouraged tosystematically consider such factors in investment decisions and to take into account how they form part of their risk management system.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 291 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 37
(37) In ensuring compliance with their obligation to develop an investment policy in accordance with the prudent person rule, PEPP providers should be prevented to invest in high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions identified by the Financial Action Task Force, nor in a country on the EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions, nor in a country on the EU list of high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies in their regime on anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 293 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 38
(38) In view of the long-term retirement objective of the PEPP, the investment options granted to the PEPP savers should be framed, covering the elements which allow investors to make an investment decision, including the number of investment options they can choose from. After the initial choice made upon the subscription of a PEPP, the PEPP saver should have the possibility to modify this choice at reasonable intervals (every five years), so that sufficient stability is offered to providers for their long-term investment strategy whilst at the same time investor protection is ensuredthree years).
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 300 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 39
(39) The default investment option should allow the PEPP saver to recoup the invested capital. The PEPP providers could in addition include an inflation indexation mechanism to at least partly cover inflation in real terms.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 304 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 41
(41) Where the PEPP provider is an institution for occupational retirement provision or an investment firm, it should appoint a depositary in relation to the safe- keeping of its assets. This is necessary for protecting consumers, since the sectorial legislation applicable to institutions for occupational retirement provision and investment firms does not provide for the appointment of a depositary.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 308 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 47
(47) In order to find better conditions for their investments, thus also stimulating the competition among PEPP providers, PEPP savers should have the right to switch providers during the accumulation and the decumulation phases, through a clear, quick, low cost and safe procedure.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 310 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 53
(53) PEPP savers should be greceiven the freedom to decide upon subscription of a PEPP about their pay-out choicir PEPP benefits in the form of lifetime (annuities, lump sum, or other) in the decumulation phase, but with a possibility to revise their choice once every five years thereafter, in order to be able to best adapt their pay-out choice to their needs when they near retiremen. Only where the capital invested does not allow for the pay out of meaningful lifetime annuities, the PEPP saver should be allowed to choose a lump sum or periodically limited annuity pay- out.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 315 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 54
(54) PEPP providers should be allowed to make available to PEPP savers a wide range of decumulation options. This approach would achieve the goal of enhanced take-up of the PEPP through increased flexibility and choice for PEPP savers. It would allow providers to design their PEPPs in the most cost-effective way. It is coherent with other EU policies and politically feasible, as it preserves enough flexibility for Member States to decide about which decumulation options they wish to encourage.deleted
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 321 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 61
(61) Competent authorities should be empowered to impose pecuniary sanctions which are sufficiently high to offset or go beyond the actual or potential profits, and to be dissuasive even for larger financial undertakings and their managers.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 339 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point d a (new)
(da) in-payments equal at least out- payments in real terms;
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 342 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2
(2) “pan-European Personal Pension Product (PEPP)” means a long-term savings personal pension product, which is provided under an agreed PEPP scheme by a regulated financial undertaking listed in Article 5 (1) authorised under Union law to manage collective or individual investments or savings, and subscribed to voluntarily by an individual PEPP saver or by an independent PEPP savers association on behalf of its members in view of retirement, with no or strictly limited redeemability;
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 350 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point b a (new)
(ba) an independent association subscribing PEPP products for its members
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 355 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9
(9) “PEPP retirement benefits” means benefits paid by reference to reaching, or the expectation of reaching, retirement. These benefits may take the form of payments for life, payments made for a temporary periodlifelong annuities, or, under specified circumstances, a lump sum, or any combination thereofperiodically limited annuities;
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 358 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 11
(11) “decumulation phase” means the period during which assets accumulated in a PEPP account are drawn upon to fund retirement or other income requirementsincome;
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 361 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 13
(13) “drawdownlump sum payments” means the possibility for the PEPP beneficiaries to draw discretionary amounts, up to a certain limit on a periodic basisfull pay out of the accumulated capital at the beginning of the decumulation phase;
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 373 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 21
(21) “capital” means aggregate capital contributions and uncalled committed capital, calculated on the basis of amounts investible afterbefore deduction of all fees, charges and expenses that are directly or indirectly borne by investors;
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 385 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 28 a (new)
(28a) “Biometric risks” mean risks linked to longevity, disability and death.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 406 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) institutions for occupational retirement provision registered or authorised in accordance with Directive 2016/2341/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council45 ; __________________ 45 Directive 2016/2341/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2016 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision (IORPs) (recast) (OJ L 354, 23.12.2016, p. 37).deleted
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 412 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) investment companies or management companies authorised in accordance with Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council46 ; __________________ 46 Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) (recast) (OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 32).deleted
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 414 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point f
(f) alternative investment fund (“AIF”) managers authorised in accordance with Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council47 . __________________ 47 Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010 (OJ L 174, 1.7.2011, p. 1).deleted
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 456 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2
2. Before taking a decision on the application, EIOPA shall consult the competent authority of the applicant. The competent authority may submit an objection to the authorisation process.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 481 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1
EIOPA shall keep a central public register identifying each PEPP authorised under this Regulation, the provider of this PEPP, the available national compartments it offers and the competent authority of the PEPP provider. The register shall be made publicly available and free of charge in electronic format.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 503 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 3
3. Three years at the latest after the entry into application of this Regulation, each PEPP shall offer national compartments for allt least 15 Member States upon request addressed to the PEPP provider. Compartments for all member states shall be offered by no later than five years after the entry into application of this regulation.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 528 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1
1. Without prejudice to the deadline under Article 13(3), immediately after being informed about the PEPP saver’s intention to exercise his right of mobility between Member States, the PEPP provider shall inform the PEPP saver about the possibility to open a new compartment free of charge within the PEPP saver’s individual account and about the deadline within which such compartment could be opened.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 533 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 3
3. Not later than three months following the reception of the request under paragraph 2, the PEPP provider shall provide the PEPP saver with complete information and advice free of charge and advice under Chapter IV, Sections II and III regarding the conditions applicable to the new compartment.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 534 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 a (new)
Article 15a Partnering for the provision of national compartments 1. PEPP providers may enter into partnership agreements with other PEPP providers for the provision of national compartments and to meet the targets set out under Article 13(3). 2. The partnership agreements referred to in paragraph 1 shall be subject to authorisation by EIOPA. 3. As part of the authorisation process, EIOPA shall ensure that all PEPP providers involved in the partnership agreement comply with the prudential regimes set out in Article 5 and that the same prudential regime applies to all national compartments forming part of the same PEPP account. 4. Upon receiving a request for the authorisation of a partnership agreement, EIOPA shall inform the relevant national competent authorities of the request. The relevant national competent authorities may submit an objection to the authorisation of the partnership agreement by EIOPA. 5. EIOPA shall inform the relevant national competent authorities as well as ESMA and EBA of the authorisation of partnership agreements. 6. If applicable, a PEPP provider shall clearly indicate in their PEPP contract with which PEPP provider they are partnering for which compartment.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 542 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1
1. All contractual arrangements for providing the portability service shall be notified by the PEPP provider to the respective national authority exercising prudential supervision over itEIOPA.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 545 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. The information under paragraph 1 shall be filed electronically in a central database held with the national supervisory authority within one month of opening the new compartment andEIOPA within one month of opening the new compartment. National competent authorities shall have access to the database and shall be informed instantaneously of any changes relating to national compartments falling under their remit. The database shall contain at least:
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 553 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
For the distribution of PEPPs, the different types of PEPP providers and distributors shall comply with the following rules:
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 554 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) insurance distributors as defined in point (8) of Article 2(1) of Directive (EU) 2016/97 shall comply with the applicable national laws giving effect to the rules set out in Chapters V and VI of that Directive for the distribution of insurance-based investment products, with any directly applicable Union legislation adopted under those rules with respect to the distribution of such products and with the provisions of Articles 18, 19, 21 to 23, and 27 to 32 of this Chapter;deleted
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 559 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) investment firms as defined in point (1) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU shall comply with the applicable national legislation laws giving effect to the rules on marketing and distribution of financial instruments under Directive 2014/65/EU, set out in the first subparagraph of Article 16(3) of that Directive, in Articles 23, 24 and 25 of that Directive, with any directly applicable Union legislation adopted under those provisions, and with the provisions of Articles 18, 19, 21 to 23, and 27 to 32 of this Chapter;
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 563 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) all other PEPP providers and distributors shall comply with the all the provisions of this Chapter.deleted
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 564 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 1
With regard to the payment or reception of fees or commissions or the provision or reception of non-monetary benefits in connection with the distribution of a PEPP to or by any party except the PEPP saver or a person acting on behalf of the PEPP saver, PEPP providers or distributors referred to in Article 19(c) of this Regulation shall comply with the applicable national laws giving effect to the rules set out for investment firms in Article 24(7)(b) and (9) of Directive 2014/65/EU. For the purposes of this Article, the reference in Article 24(9) of Directive 2014/65/EC to Article 23 of that Directive shall be read as a reference to Article 18 of this Regulationnot receive any inducements.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 565 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1
All documents and information under this Chapter shall be provided to PEPP customers electronically, provided that the PEPP customer is enabled to store such information in a way accessible for future reference and for a period of time adequate for the purposes of the information and that the tool allows the unchanged reproduction of the information stored. Upon request, PEPP providers and distributorPEPP customers shall have the choice to receive all documents and information under this sChall providepter free of charge those documents and information also oeither electronically, in another durable medium or in both forms.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 571 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1
1. Before a PEPP is proposed to PEPP savers, the PEPP provider shall draw up for that product a PEPP key information document in accordance with the requirements of this Chapter and shall publish the document on its website.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 572 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. The key information document shall constitute pre-contractual information. It shall be accurate, fair, clear and not misleading. It shall provide key information and shall be consistent with any binding contractual documents, with the relevant parts of the offer documents and with the terms and conditions of the PEPP.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 573 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. PEPP providers shall make the key information document available free of charge on their websites and in another durable medium.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 588 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 3 – point iv
(iv) general information on the portability service, including information on the compartments and the tax treatments applicable to the compartments;
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 590 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 3 – point v
(v) general information on the switching service, and a reference to the specific information about the switching service available under Article 50;
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 593 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 3 – point vi
(vi) available information related to the performance of the investment policyroduct in terms of environmental, social and governance factors;
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 597 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 3 – point vii a (new)
(viia) information on the implication of early redemption including penalties;
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 599 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 3 – point vii b (new)
(viib) information on structure and amount of costs and fees charged to PEPP customers for the provision of the PEPP;
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 600 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 3 – point vii c (new)
(viic) information on the decumulation phase and the forms of out-payments.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 604 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 4
4. In addition to the PEPP key information document, PEPP providers and PEPP distributors shall provide potential PEPP savers, free of charge, with references to any reports on the solvency and financial condition of the PEPP provider, allowing them easy access to this information.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 609 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 5
5. Potential PEPP savers shall also be provided with information, free of charge, on the past performance of investments related to the PEPP scheme covering a minimum of five years, or, where the scheme has been operating for fewer than five years, covering all the years that the scheme has been operating, as well as with information on the structure of costs borne by PEPP savers and PEPP beneficiaries.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 632 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 2
2. The information referred to in this paragraph 1 shall be provided in a standardised format allowing for comparison and in a comprehensible form in such a manner that PEPP savers are reasonably able to understand the nature and risks concerning the PEPP offered and, consequently, to take investment decisions on an informed basis.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 634 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Chapter 4 – section 3 – title
Advice and standards for sales where no advice is given
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 637 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Prior to the conclusion of a PEPP-related contract, the PEPP provider or distributor referred to in Article 19(c) of this Regulation shall specify, on the basis of information obtained from the PEPP saver, the retirement-related demands and the needs of that PEPP saver and shall provide the PEPP saver with objective information about the PEPP in a comprehensible form to allow that PEPP saver to make an informed decision.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 646 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 2
2. Where advice is provided prior to the conclusion of any specific contract, the PEPP provider or distributor referred to in Article 19(c) of this RegulationThe PEPP provider or distributor shall provide the PEPP saver with a personalised recommendation explaining why a particular PEPP would best meet the PEPP savers’s demands and needs.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 651 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 3
3. When providing advice on PEPPs, the PEPP provider or distributor referred to in Article 19(c) of this RegulationThe PEPP provider or distributor shall comply with the applicable national laws giving effect to the rules set out in Article 25(2) of Directive 2014/65/EU and with any directly applicable Union legislation adopted under Article 25(8) of that Directive relating to those rules.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 654 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 4
4. Where a PEPP providers or distributor referred to in Arts shall give advicle 19(c) of this Regulation informs the PEPP saver that it gives its adviceto PEPP savers on an independent basis, meaning it shall give that advice on the basis of an analysis of a sufficiently large number of personal pension products available on the market to enable it to make a personal recommendation, in accordance with professional criteria, regarding which the PEPP-related contract would be adequate to meet the PEPP saver’s needs. Such advice must not be limited to PEPP-related contracts provided by the PEPP provider or distributor itself, by entities having close links with the PEPP provider or distributor or by other entities with which the PEPP provider or distributor has close legal or economic relationships, including contractual relationships, as to pose a risk of impairing the independent basis of the advice provided.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 657 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 5
5. PEPP providers and distributors referred to in Article 19(c) of this Regulation shall ensure and demonstrate to competent authorities on request that natural persons giving advice on PEPPs possess the necessary knowledge and competence to fulfil their obligations under this Chapter. Member States shall publish the criteria to be used for assessing such knowledge and competence.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 663 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26
[...]deleted
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 672 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 1
1. PEPP providers shall draw up a concise and comprehensible personalised document containing key information for each PEPP saver taking into consideration the specific nature of national pension systems and of relevant national social, labour and tax law (“PEPP Benefit Statement”). The title of the document shall contain the words “PEPP Benefit Statement”.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 673 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. PEPP providers shall make the PEPP Benefit Statement available free of charge to PEPP savers at least once a year either electronically or on paper, whichever the PEPP saver prefers.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 679 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. The PEPP Benefit Statement, which shall be provided at least annually to the PEPP saver, shall include, at least, the following key information for PEPP savers:
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 682 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) personal details of the PEPP saver, name of the PEPP provider, information on pension benefit projections, the expected start of the decumulation phase, information on accrued entitlements or accumulated capital, contributions paid by the PEPP saver or any third party and information on the funding level of the PEPP scheme, for which Article 39, paragraphs 1(a), (b), (d), (e), (f) and (h) of Directive 2016/2341/EU shall be applied, where the “member” means the PEPP saver, the “IORP” means the PEPP provider, the “pension scheme” means the PEPP scheme and “the sponsoring undertaking” means any third party for the purposes of this Regulation;
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 687 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) information on the past performance of the PEPP scheme as a whole or, where relevant, of the PEPP saver’s investment option presented in a chart covering performance for any years available and up to the last ten years;
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 690 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) a breakdown of the costs deducted by the PEPP provider at least over the last 1236 months, indicating the costs of administration, costs of safekeeping of assets, costs related to portfolio transactions and other costs, as well as an estimation of the impact of the costs on the final benefits.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 716 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) the assets shall be predominantly invested on regulated markets. Investment in assets which are not admitted to trading on a regulated financial market must in any event be kept to prudent levels;
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 722 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point f
(f) the assets shall not be invested in a high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdiction identified by the Financial Action Task Force, nor in a country on the EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions, nor in a country on the EU list of high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies in their regime on anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing;
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 727 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
(ga) the PEPP provider shall clearly demonstrate to the competent authority the positive long-term impacts of their investment decisions on environmental, social and governance matters.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 730 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 2
2. The rules set out in points (a) to (ga) of paragraph 1 apply only to the extent that there is no more stringent provision in the relevant sectorial legislation applicable to the PEPP provider.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 741 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 34 – paragraph 2
2. The investment optionPEPP providers shall includeoffer a default investment option and may includeoffer alternative investment options.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 742 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 34 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Any PEPP provider recommending to a PEPP saver an investment option other than the default option, shall provide the PEPP saver with a written explanation as to why the option recommended by the PEPP provider is more suitable for them than the default option.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 754 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 36 – paragraph 1
1. The PEPP saver shall be able to opt for a different investment option once every fivthree years of accumulation in the PEPP.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 771 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 1
1. The default investment option shall ensure capital protectioninclude a capital guarantee for the PEPP saver, on the basis of a risk-mitigation technique that results in a safe investment strategy.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 783 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 2
2. CThe capital protectionguarantee shall allow the PEPP saver to recoup the capital invested in real terms.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 788 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. The default investment option shall be a cost-effective investment option.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 789 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Without prejudice to paragraph 3, overall costs and fees for the default investment option shall not exceed 0.75% of the accumulated capital per annum.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 792 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 38 – paragraph 1
1. If PEPP providers offer alternative investment options, at least onell of them shall offer a cost-effective investment option to PEPP savers.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 807 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 39 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the risk-mitigation technique to ensure a capital protectionguarantee under the default investment option;
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 819 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 40 – paragraph 2
2. Such conditions may include in particular age limits for starting the accumulation phase, minimum duration of the accumulation phase, maximum and minimum amount of in-payments and their continuity, as well as conditions for redemption before retirement age in case of particular hardship. In order to ensure that PEPP savings are first and foremost used for the retirement phase, PEPP savings shall be protected during periods of unemployment. Member States shall ensure that unemployment is not considered particular hardship requiring PEPP savers to terminate their contracts prior to retirement.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 820 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 41 – paragraph 1
1. Where the PEPP provider is an institution for occupational retirement provision or an investment firm as referred to in Article 5(1), it shall appoint one or more depositaries for the safe-keeping of assets and oversight duties.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 823 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 1
PEPP providers may offer PEPPs with an option ensuring the coverage of the risk of biometric risks. For the purpose of this Regulation, “biometric risks” mean risks linked to longevity, disability and death.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 831 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 45 – paragraph 2
2. The PEPP saver may switch PEPP providers no more frequently than once every five years after conclusion of the PEPP contractshall have the right to switch PEPP providers once every twelve months after conclusion of the PEPP contract. The PEPP saver shall be allowed to switch providers at any time when their current PEPP provider has been proven to be negligent or to have breached the law.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 837 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 45 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Without prejudice to paragraph 2, PEPP savers shall be allowed to switch providers when entering into the decumulation phase.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 841 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 48 – paragraph 3
3. The total fees and charges applied by the transferring PEPP provider to the PEPP saver for the closure of the PEPP account held with it shall be limited to no more than 1.0,25 % of the positive balance to be transferred to the receiving PEPP provider and shall in any case not exceed € 150.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 848 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 48 – paragraph 4
4. Fees and charges, if any, applied by the transferring or the receiving PEPP provider to the PEPP saver for any service provided under Article 46, other than those referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article, shall be reasonable and in line withnot exceed the actual costs of that PEPP provider.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 849 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 48 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. PEPP savers shall not be subject to any fees and charges when the switching occurs as a consequence of proven negligence by the PEPP provider or where it has breached Union or national law.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 850 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 49 – paragraph 4
4. The PEPP saver shall bear the costs and any risk of financial loss connected with the redemption in kind of the assets held in the PEPP account for the sake of their transfer from the transferring PEPP provider to the receiving PEPP provider.deleted
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 851 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 49 – paragraph 5
5. The PEPP saver shall bear the costs and any risk of financial loss connected with the capital protection provided by the transferring PEPP provider. This capital protection, allowing the PEPP saver to recoup the capital invested and providing an inflation indexation mechanism, shall be consumed at the moment of switching providers.deleted
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 857 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 51 – paragraph 2
2. Such conditions may include in particular the setting of the retirement age, of a mandatory link between reaching the retirement age and commencing the decumulation phase, of a minimum period of belonging to a PEPP scheme, of a maximum period before reaching the retirement age for joining a PEPP scheme, as well as conditions for redemption in case of particular hardship. In order to ensure that PEPP savings are first and foremost used for the retirement phase PEPP savings should be protected during periods of unemployment. Member States shall ensure that unemployment is not considered particular hardship requiring PEPP savers to terminate their contracts prior to retirement.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 860 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. The PEPP providers may make available to PEPP savers one or more of the following forms of out-payments:shall be paid out in the form of a lifetime annuity.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 861 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) annuities;deleted
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 864 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) lump sum;deleted
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 865 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) drawdown payments;deleted
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 867 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) combinations of the above forms.deleted
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 876 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 2
2. The choice of the form of out- payments for the decumulation phase shall be exercised by PEPP savers upon conclusion of a PEPP contract and can be changed once every five years thereafter during the accumulation phase, if applicable can be changed from a lifetime annuity to a lump sum or a periodically limited annuity if the capital accumulated is not sufficient to provide an annual retirement income of at least 25% of the annual minimum wage of the Member State in which the PEPP saver is resident.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #

2016/0364(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
(9) Own funds add-ons imposed by competent authorities should be set in relation to the specific situation of an institution and should be duly justified. These requirements should not be used to address macroprudential risks and should be positioned, in the stacking order of own funds requirements, above the minimum own funds requirements and below the combined buffer requirement.
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 53 #

2016/0364(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 9 a (new)
(9a) Well-capitalised institutions support economic growth rather than hamper it. Significant risk reduction can only be achieved when institutions are not able to pose systemic threats to the economies of the Union or the Member States and when orderly failure is possible without the socialisation of losses. It is therefore appropriate to increase capital buffers for institutions that are classified as O-SIIs and G-SIIs so that possible losses which may occur can be absorbed by the owners of such institutions.
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 57 #

2016/0364(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 16
(16) In order to guide competent authorities in identifying situations where institution-specific capital add-ons should be imposed, the Commission should be empowered to adopt regulatory technical standards in respect of how risks or elements of risks not covered or not sufficiently covered by the own funds requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 should be measured by means of delegated acts pursuant to Article 290 TFEU and in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.deleted
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 117 #

2016/0364(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 21b – paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Competent authorities may allow the institutions referred to in paragraph 1 to have two intermediate EU parent undertakings where the competent authorities ascertain that a single intermediate EU parent undertaking would be operationally incompatible with a mandatory requirement for separation of activities in accordance with the rules of the third country where the ultimate parent undertaking of the third country group has its head office.
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 150 #

2016/0364(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 21b – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 2
Competent authorities shall ensure that there is a single intermediate EU parent undertaking for all institutions that are part of the same third country group., unless the competent authorities have permitted the institution to have two intermediate EU parent undertakings in order for the institution to be compatible with a mandatory requirement for separation of activities in accordance with the rules of the third country where the ultimate parent undertaking of the third country group has its head office.
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 267 #

2016/0364(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 103
(20) Article 103 is deleted.
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 284 #

2016/0364(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 104a – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Competent authorities shall impose the additional own funds requirement referred to in Article 104(1)(a) only where, on the basis of the reviews carried out in accordance with Articles 97 and 101, they ascertain any of the following situations for an individual institution:
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 285 #

2016/0364(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 104a – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(aa) the institution has reached a size and level of complexity such that its failure would lead to significant disruptions of the economy of the Member State or parts of it;
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 289 #

2016/0364(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 104a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
The competent authorities shall not impose the additional own funds requirement referred to in Article 104(1)(a) to cover macroprudential or systemic risks.deleted
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 307 #

2016/0364(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 104a – paragraph 6
6. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying how the risks and elements of risks referred to in paragraph 2 shall be measured. EBA shall ensure that the draft regulatory technical standards are proportionate in light of: (a) institutions and competent authorities; and (b) higher level of capital requirements that apply where institutions do not use internal models may justifydeleted the implementation burden on the imposition of lower capital requirements when assessing risks and elements of risks in accordance with paragraph 2. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by [one year after entry into force]. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in paragraph 6 in accordance with Articles 10-14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.sibility that the general
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 324 #

2016/0364(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 104b – paragraph 5
5. An institution that fails to meet the expectations set out in paragraph 3 shall notmay be subject to the restrictions referred to in Article 141.
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 354 #

2016/0364(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 30 a (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 131 – paragraph 5
(30 a) In Article 131, paragraph 5 is replaced by the following: "5. The competent authority or designated authority may require each O- SII, on a consolidated or sub-consolidated or individual basis, as applicable, to maintain an O-SII buffer of up to 2 5% of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, taking into account the criteria for the identification of the O-SII. That buffer shall consist of and shall be supplementary to Common Equity Tier 1 capital. "
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 358 #

2016/0364(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 30 b (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 131 – paragraph 9
(30 b) In Article 131, paragraph 9 is replaced by the following: "9. There shall be at least five subcategories of G-SIIs. The lowest boundary and the boundaries between each subcategory shall be determined by the scores under the identification methodology. The cut-off scores between adjacent sub-categories shall be defined clearly and shall adhere to the principle that there is a constant linear increase of systemic significance, between each sub- category resulting in a linear increase in the requirement of additional Common Equity Tier 1 capital, with the exception of the highest sub-category. For the purposes of this paragraph, systemic significance is the expected impact exerted by the G-SII's distress on the global financial market. The lowest sub-category shall be assigned a G- SII buffer of 12 % of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and the buffer assigned to each sub-category shall increase in gradients of 0,51 % of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 up to and including the fourth sub-category. The highest sub-category of the G-SII buffer shall be subject to a buffer of 3,58 % of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. "
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 406 #

2016/0364(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 141a – paragraph 2
2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, an institution shall not be considered as failing todeleted the institution meets the combined buffer requirement for the purposes of Article 141 where all the following conditions are met: (a) buffer requirement defined in Article 128(6) and each of the requirements referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1; (b) requirements referred to in point (d) of paragraph 1 is exclusively due to the inability of the institution to replace liabilities that no longer meet the eligibility or maturity criteria laid down in Articles 72b and 72c of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (c) requirements referred to in point (d) of paragraph 1 does not last longer than 6 months..the failure to meet the the failure to meet the
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 421 #

2016/0364(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32 a (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Chapter 4 a (new)
(32 a) The following Chapter 4a is added: CHAPTER 4 a Too big to fail institutions Section I Treatment of certain activities Article 142a Definitions 1. For the purpose of this Chapter the following definitions shall apply: (1) Too big to fail (TBTF) institutions are domestic or global institutions that have reached a size or level of complexity that a failure would lead to a significant disruption of the economy of the Union, a Member State or parts of it. Systemically important institutions as defined in Article 3 paragraph 1 point 30 shall be deemed as to be too big to fail. (2) "core credit institution" means a credit institution that at the minimum takes deposits eligible under the Deposit Guarantee Scheme in accordance with Directive94/19/EC142a. (3) ‘proprietary trading’ means using own capital or borrowed money to take positions in any type of transaction to purchase, sell or otherwise acquire or dispose of any financial instrument or commodities without any demonstrable connection (a) to actual or reasonably anticipated client activity, (b) to the hedging of the entity's own risks resulting from actual or reasonably anticipated client activity, or (c) to the prudent management of the entity's capital, liquidity and funding; Article 142b Trading activities 1. Competent authorities shall ensure that entities referred to in Article 142a (new) shall not: (a) engage in proprietary trading; (b) with its own capital or borrowed money: (i) acquire or retain units or shares of AIFs as defined by Article 4(1)(a) of Directive2011/61/EU or of any entity that engages in proprietary trading or acquires units or shares in AIFs; (ii) engage in lending to or grant guarantees to AIFs or to any entity that engages in proprietary trading or acquires units or shares in AIFs; (iii) invest in derivatives, certificates, indices or any other financial instrument the performance of which is linked to shares or units of AIFs or which is issued by an AIF; 2. The prohibition in point (a) of paragraph 1 shall not apply to financial instruments issued by Member States central governments or by entities listed in paragraph (2) of Article 117 and in Article 118 of Regulation(EU) No 575/2013. 3. The management body of each entity referred to in Article 142a (new) and each member thereof individually shall permanently ensure that the requirements set out in paragraph 1 are complied with. 4. Each entity referred to in Article 142a (new) shall include in its annual report an explanation of how it complies with the requirements in paragraph 2. 5. The requirements in paragraphs 1 to 5 shall apply as of [OP - please insert exact date, 12 months after publication of the Directive]. 6. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts to exempt from the prohibition referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1: (a) financial instruments other than those referred to in paragraph 2 issued by governments of third countries that apply supervisory and regulatory arrangements at least equivalent to those applied within the Union, exposures to which are assigned a 0 per cent risk weight in accordance with Article 115 of Regulation (EU) No575/2013; (b) financial instruments issued by Member States' regional governments, exposures to which are assigned a 0 per cent risk weight in accordance with Article 115 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. 7. 7. For the purpose of this article, an activity shall be deemed as proprietary trading unless an institution demonstrates to the satisfaction of the competent authority that is not covered by the definition of proprietary trading in Article 142a (new). Section II Core activities Article 142c (new) Core credit activities 1. For the purposes of this Chapter, activities conducted by core credit institutions shall include solely: (a) taking deposits that are eligible under the Deposit Guarantee Scheme in accordance with Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council142b; (b) lending including, consumer credit, credit agreements relating to immovable property, factoring with or without recourse, financing of commercial transactions (including forfeiting); (c) financial leasing; (d) payment services as defined in Article 4(3) of Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council142c; (e) issuing and administering other means of payment such as travelers' cheques and bankers' drafts insofar as such activity is not covered by point (d); money broking, safekeeping and administration of securities; credit reference services; safe custody services; issuing electronic money; advising on and selling products of other regulated financial institutions without acting as a principal, subject to the requirements of (MIFID/MIFIR). 2. In addition to the activities permitted under paragraph 1, core credit institutions may carry out certain trading activities as detailed below provided they can demonstrate to the competent authority that they are solely used for the purpose of prudently managing capital, liquidity and funding: (a) the use of interest rate derivatives, foreign exchange derivatives and credit derivatives eligible for central counter party clearing to hedge its overall balance sheet risk where the hedging activity is designed to reduce, and demonstrably reduces or significantly mitigates, specific, identifiable risks of individual or aggregated positions of the core credit institution; (b) purchasing and disposing of high quality liquid assets that at least meet the standards set out in Article 416 of the Regulation (EU)No 575/2013 for the purpose of managing the cash and liquidity position of the CCI; (c) lending to and borrowing in the interbank markets for the purpose of managing the cash and liquidity position of the CCI subject to the conditions in Article 142d (new) paragraph 1; (d) issuance and repurchase of securities for the purpose of meeting the capital management needs of the CCIs core activities. This may include securitisation not considered to pose a threat to the financial stability of the CCI or to parts of or the whole of the Union financial system. 3. Without prejudice to the remuneration rules laid down in this Directive, the remuneration policy applicable to staff of the core credit institution engaged in hedging activities shall: (a) aim at preventing any residual or hidden proprietary trading activities, whether disguised as risk management or otherwise; (b) reflect the legitimate hedging objectives of the core credit institution as a whole and ensure that remuneration awarded is not directly determined by reference to the profits generated by such activities but takes account of the overall effectiveness of the activities in reducing or mitigating risk. The management body and its individual members shall ensure that the remuneration policy of the core credit institution is in line with the provisions set out in the first subparagraph, acting on the advice of the risk committee, where such a committee is established in accordance with Article 76(3) of this Directive, and include this information in the annual report. 4. The Commission shall [OP insert the correct date by six months of publication of this Directive] adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 145 to specify which type of securitisation is not considered to pose a threat to the financial stability of the core credit institution or to the Union financial system as a whole with regard to each of the following aspects: (a) the structural features, such as the embedded maturity transformation and simplicity of the structure; (b) the quality of the underlying assets and related collateral characteristics; (c) the listing and transparency features of the securitisation and its underlying assets; (d) the robustness and quality of the underwriting processes. The Commission shall, [OP insert the correct date by 6months of publication of this Regulation] adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 145 to specify the criteria for determining that the hedging activity referred to in paragraph 2 is designed to reduce, and demonstrably reduces or significantly mitigates, specific, identifiable risks of individual or aggregated positions of the core credit institution. Article 142d (new) Extra-group large exposure limits 1. In addition to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 395 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 when measures have been imposed in accordance with this Chapter of this Directive the core credit institution shall not incur the following exposures: (a) a large exposure that exceeds 25 per cent of the core credit institution's eligible capital to a financial entity. That exposure limit shall apply on an individual and on a sub-consolidated basis, and after taking into account the effect of the credit risk mitigation and exemptions in accordance with Articles 399 to 403 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and paragraph 2 of this Article; (b) large exposures that in total exceed 200 per cent of the core credit institution's eligible capital to financial entities. That exposure limit shall apply on an individual and on a sub- consolidated basis, and after taking into account the effect of the credit risk mitigation and exemptions in accordance with Articles 399 to 403 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and paragraph 2 of this Article. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 145 to adjust the level of the extra-group aggregate large exposure limit as set out in point (b) of paragraph 1, in line with the extent to which the credit risk mitigation has been recognised. 2. In addition to the provisions of Articles 399 to 403 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, when measures have been imposed in accordance with this Chapter of this Directive, restrictions with respect to the recognition of credit mitigation techniques shall apply to the computation of exposure values for the purposes of compliance with the large exposure limits as referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 145 to specify the extent to which credit risk mitigation techniques including types of and limits to eligible credit protection shall be recognised for the purposes of the first sub-paragraph of paragraph 2 with the purpose of ensuring that credit risk mitigation techniques do not fail when risks materialise so that there can be effective recovery of credit protection. Article 142e (new) Disclosure requirements 1. A core credit institution shall publish, at least semi-annually, a separate balance sheet detailing the use of its own capital or borrowed money to take positions in any type of transaction to purchase, sell or otherwise acquire or dispose of any financial instrument or commodities with a demonstrable connection to each of the following: (a) actual or reasonably anticipated client activity (b) the hedging of the entity's own risks resulting from actual or reasonably anticipated client activity, (c) the prudent management of the entity's capital, liquidity and funding; or (d) other activities. Section III Powers of competent authorities Article 142f (new) Requirement for a core credit institutions not to carry out certain activities 1. The competent authority shall assess trading activities to determine the extent to which they are permissible activities under Article 142c (new) for the following entities: (a) a core credit institution established in the Union, which is neither a parent undertaking nor a subsidiary, including all its branches irrespective of where they are located; (b) an EU parent, including all branches and subsidiaries irrespective of where they are located, where one of the group entities is a core credit institution established in the Union; (c) EU branches of credit institutions established in third countries. 2. Where the competent authority concludes that, following the assessment referred to in paragraph 1, the core credit institution carries out trading activities that are not permitted it shall, no later than two months after the finalisation of that assessment, start the procedure leading to a decision to fully separate the core credit entity from the trading entity. Article 142g (new) Separation of trading activities not permitted for a Core Credit Institution 1. All trading activities not prohibited by Article 142b (new) and not permitted for a core credit institution in Article 142c (new) paragraph 1 and 2 shall, following the decision of a competent authority referred to in Article 142f (new), be transferred to an economically, legally and operationally separate institution ("trading entity"). 2. Trading entities shall not belong to the same group as core credit institutions. All contracts and other transactions entered into between core credit institutions and trading entities shall be done at arm's length. 3. Core credit institutions shall not hold capital instruments or voting rights in trading entities and vice versa. Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, the competent authority may decide to allow core credit institutions that meet the requirements set out in Article 49(3)(a) or (b) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 to hold capital instruments or voting rights in a trading entity where the competent authority considers that holding such capital instruments or voting rights is indispensable for the functioning of the group and that the core credit institution has taken sufficient measures in order to appropriately mitigate the relevant risks. A core credit institution, which is neither a central nor a regional credit institution, shall not, in any case, be allowed to directly hold capital instruments or voting rights in any trading entity. Prior to adopting a decision in accordance with this paragraph, the competent authority shall consult EBA. The competent authority shall notify its decision to EBA. EBA shall publish a list of those institutions to which this paragraph has been applied. 4. In accordance with the applicable national law, the name or the designation of trading entities and core credit institutions shall be such that the public can easily identify which entity is a trading entity and which entity is a core credit institution. 5. After separation, trading entities shall comply with the obligations laid down in Parts Two, Three and Four and Parts Six, Seven and Eight of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Title VII of this Directive. 6. Notwithstanding the criteria laid out in Article 142a (new), trading entities shall in any case comply with the provisions of Article 142b (new) of this Directive. __________________ 142a Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes, OJ L 135, 31.05.1994 pages 0005 to 0014. 142b Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes (OJ L 135, 31/05/1994, pages 0005 to 0014). 142c Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market (OJ L 319 of 5.12.2007, pages 1 to 36).
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 35 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 5
(5) Member States should ensure that institutions have sufficient loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity to ensure smooth and fast absorption of losses and recapitalisation in resolution with a minimum impact on financial stability and taxpayerwithout taxpayer bail-outs. That should be achieved through compliance by institutions with an institution-specific minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities ('MREL') as provided in Directive 2014/59/EU.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 37 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 7
(7) Eligibility criteria for bail-inable liabilities for the MREL should be closely aligned with those laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 for the TLAC minimum requirement, in line with the complementary adjustments and requirements introduced in this Directive. In particular, certain debt instruments with an embedded derivative component, such as certain structured notes, should be eligible to meet the MREL to the extent that they have a fixed principal amount repayable at maturity while only an additional return is linked to a derivative and depends on the performance of a reference asset. In view of their fixed principal amount, those instruments should be highly loss-absorbing and easily bail-inable in resolution. Eligible liabilities should be clearly subordinated to other liabilities in order to avoid any ‘no creditor worse off’ issues.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 38 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 7 a (new)
(7 a) Recent cases of bank bail-outs with public money have highlighted fundamental shortcomings of the current recovery and resolution framework, which was drafted with the intention that no socialisation of losses should take place. It is therefore appropriate to close existing loopholes, namely precautionary recapitalisation, which enable authorities to inject public money into failing banks.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 39 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 8
(8) The scope of liabilities to meet the MREL includes, in principle, all liabilities resulting from claims arising from unsecured non-preferred creditors (non- subordinated liabilities) unless they do not meet specific eligibility criteria provided in this Directive. To enhance the resolvability of institutions through an effective use of the bail-in tool, resolution authorities should be able to require that the MREL is met with subordinated liabilities, in particular when there are clear indications that bailed-in creditors are likely to bear losses in resolution that would exceed their potential losses in insolvency. The requirement to meet MREL with subordinated liabilities should be requested only for a level necessary to prevent that losses of creditors in resolution are above losses that they would otherwise incur under insolvency. Any subordination of debt instruments requested by resolution authorities for the MREL should be without prejudice to the possibility to partly meet the TLAC minimum requirement with non-subordinated debt instruments in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as permitted by the TLAC standard.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 43 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
(9) The MREL should allow institutions to absorb losses expected in resolution and recapitalise the institution post-resolution. The resolution authorities should, on the basis of the resolution strategy chosen by them, duly justify the imposed level of the MREL in particular as regards the need and the level of the requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU in the recapitalisation amount. As such, that level should be composed of the sum of the amount of losses expected in resolution that correspond to the institution's own funds requirements and the recapitalisation amount that allows the institution post- resolution to meet its own funds requirements necessary for being authorised to pursue its activities under the chosen resolution strategy. The MREL should be expressed as a percentage of the total risk exposure and leverage ratio measures, and institutions should meet simultaneously the levels resulting from the two measurements. The resolution authority should be able to adjust the recapitalisation amounts in cases duly justified to adequately reflect also increased risks that affect resolvability arising from the resolution group’s business model, funding profile and overall risk profile and therefore in such limitednecessary circumstances require that the recapitalisation amounts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 45c(3) and (4) are exceeded.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 46 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
(10) To enhance their resolvability, resolution authorities should be able to impose an institution-specific MREL on G- SIIs in addition to the TLAC minimum requirement laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. That institution-specific MREL may only be imposed where the TLAC minimum requirement is not sufficient to absorb losses and recapitalise a G-SII under the chosen when deemed necessary by the resolution strategauthority.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 51 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
(11) When setting the level of MREL, resolution authorities should consider the degree of systemic relevance of an institution and the potential adverse impact of its failure on the financial stability. They should take into account the need for a level playing field between G-SIIs and other comparable institutions with systemic relevance within the Union. Thus MREL of institutions that are not identified as G-SIIs but the systemic relevance within the Union of which is comparable to the systemic relevance of G-SIIs should not diverge disproportionately from the level and composition of MREL generally set for G-SIIs and may also exceed that level.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 53 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 12
(12) Similarly to powers conferred to competent authorities by Directive 2013/36/EU, this Directive should allow resolution authorities to require institutions to meet higher levels of MREL while addressing in a more flexible manner any breaches of those levels, in particular by alleviating the automatic effects of those breaches in the form of limitations to the Maximum Distributable Amounts (MDAs). Resolution authorities should be able to give guidance to institutions to meet additional amounts to cover losses in resolution that are above the level of the own funds requirements as laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU, and/or to ensure sufficient market confidence in the institution post-resolution. To ensure consistency with Directive 2013/36/EU, guidance to cover additional losses may only be given where the 'capital guidance' has been requested by the competent supervisory authorities in accordance with Directive 2013/36/EU and should not exceed the level requested in that guidance. For the recapitalisation amount, the level requested in the guidance to ensure market confidence should enable the institution to continue to meet the conditions for authorisation for an appropriate period of time, including by allowing the institution to cover the costs related to the restructuring of its activities following resolution. The market confidence buffer should not exceed the combined capital buffer requirement under Directive 2013/36/EU unless a higher level is necessary to ensure that, following the event of resolution, the entity continues to meet the conditions for its authorisation for an appropriate period of time. Where an entity consistently fails to have additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance, the resolution authority should be able to require that the amount of the MREL be increased to cover the amount of the guidance. For the purposes of considering whether there is a consistent failure, the resolution authority should take into account the entity's reporting on the MREL as required by this Directiveen deemed necessary for resolution.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 14
(14) Institutions that are not resolution entities should comply with the MREL at individual level. Loss absorption and recapitalisation needs of those institutions should be generally provided by their respective resolution entities through the acquisition by resolution entities of eligible liabilities issued by those institutions and their write-down or conversion into instruments of ownership at the point where those institutions are no longer viable. As such, the MREL applicable to institutions that are not resolution entities should be applied together and consistently with the requirements applicable to resolution entities. That should allow resolution authorities to resolve a resolution group without placing certain of its subsidiary entities in resolution, thus avoiding potentially disruptive effects on the market. Subject to the agreement of the resolution authorities of the resolution entity and of its subsidiary, it should be possible to replace the issuance of eligible liabilities to resolution entities with collateralised guarantees between the resolution entity and its subsidiaries, that can be triggered when the timing conditions equivalent to those allowing the write down or conversion of eligible liabilities are met. The resolution authorities of subsidiaries of a resolution entity should also be able to fully waive the application of the MREL applicable to institutions that are not resolution entities if both the resolution entity and its subsidiaries are established in the same Member State. The application of the MREL to institutions that are not resolution entities should comply with the chosen resolution strategy, in particular it should not change the ownership relationship between institutions and their resolution group after those institutions have been recapitalised.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 169 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 20 a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – point d
(d) extraordinary public financial support is required except when, in order to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State and preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms: (i) facilities provided by central banks according to the central banks’ conditions; (ii) liabilities; or (iii) an injection of own funds or purchase of capital instruments at prices and on terms that do not confer an advantage upon the institution, where neither the circumstances referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph nor the circumstances referred to in Article 59(3) are present at the time the public support is granted. 20 a. In Article 32(4), point (d) is replaced by the following: (d) public financial support would be required to continue the operation of the institution. a State guarantee to back liquidity a State guarantee of newly issued Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 202 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
1. Eligible liabilities shall be included in the amount of own funds and eligible liabilities of resolution entities only where they satisfy the conditions referred to in Article 72a, except for point (d) of Article 72b(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 206 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45b – paragraph 2
By way of derogation from point (l) of Article 72a(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, liabilities that arise from debt instruments with derivative features, such as structured notes, shall be included in the amount of own funds and eligible liabilities only where all of the following conditions are met: (a) a given amount of the liability arising from the debt instrument is known in advance at the time of issuance, is fixed and not affected by a derivative feature; (b) derivative feature, is not subject to any netting agreement and its valuation is not subject to Article 49(3);deleted the debt instrument, including its
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 216 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45b – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
The liabilities referred to in the first subparagraph shall only be included in the amount of own funds and eligible liabilities for the part that corresponds with the amount referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph.deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 223 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45b – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
Resolution authorities may decidshall ensure that the requirement referred to in Article 45f is met by resolution entities with instruments that meet all conditions referred to in Article 72a of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 with a view to ensure that the resolution entity can be resolved in a manner suitable to meet the resolution objectives.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 225 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45b – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
The resolution authority's decision under this paragraph shall contain the reasons for that decision on the basis of the following elements: (a) non-subordinated liabilities referred to in the first and second paragraphs have the same priority ranking in the national insolvency hierarchy as certain liabilities that are excluded from the application of the write-down or conversion powers in accordance with Article 44(2) or Article 44(3); (b) planned application of write-down and conversion powers to non-subordinated liabilities that are not excluded from the application of the write-down or conversion powers in accordance with Article 44(2) or Article 44(3), creditors of claims arising from those liabilities incur greater losses than they would incur in a winding up under normal insolvency proceedings; (c) liabilities shall not exceed the amount necessary to ensure that creditors referred to in point (b) shall not incur losses above the level of losses that they would otherwise have incurred in a winding up under normal insolvency proceedings.deleted the risk that as a result of a the amount of subordinated
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 262 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Without prejudice to the last subparagraph, for resolution entities, the amount referred to in paragraph 2 shall not exceedThe resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amounts referred to in the previous paragraphs in accordance with the resolution actions foreseen in the resolution plan and may adjust those recapitalisation amounts to adequately reflect risks that affect resolvability arising from the greater of the following:solution group’s business model, funding profile and overall risk profile.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 271 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point a
(a) the sum of: (i) absorbed in resolution that corresponds to the requirements referred to in Article 92(1)(a),(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU of the resolution entity at sub-consolidated resolution group level, (ii) allows the resolution group resulting from resolution to restore its total capital ratio referred in Article 92(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and its requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU at resolution group sub- consolidated level;deleted the amount of losses to be a recapitalisation amount that
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 272 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
(i) the amount of losses to be absorbed in resolution that corresponds to the requirements referred to in Article 92(1)(a),(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU of the resolution entity at sub-consolidated resolution group level,deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 276 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
(ii) a recapitalisation amount that allows the resolution group resulting from resolution to restore its total capital ratio referred in Article 92(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and its requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU at resolution group sub- consolidated level;deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 283 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) the sum of: (i) the amount of losses to be absorbed in resolution that corresponds to the resolution entity's leverage ratio requirement referred to in the Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 at resolution group sub-consolidated level; and (ii) allows the resolution group resulting from resolution to restore the leverage ratio referred to in Article 92(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 at resolution group sub-consolidated level.deleted a recapitalisation amount that
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 292 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
For the purposes of point (a) of Article 45(2), the requirement referred to in Article 45(1) shall be expressed in percentage terms as the amount calculated in accordance with point (a) of this paragraph divided by the total risk exposure amount.deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 294 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3
For the purposes of point (b) of Article 45(2), the requirement referred to in Article 45(1) shall be expressed in percentage terms as the amount calculated in accordance with point (b) of this paragraph divided by the leverage ratio exposure measure.deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 297 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 –subparagraph 4
The resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amounts referred to in the previous subparagraphs in accordance with the resolution actions foreseen in the resolution plan and may adjust those recapitalisation amounts to adequately reflect risks that affect resolvability arising from the resolution group’s business model, funding profile and overall risk profile.deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 308 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 4
4. Without prejudice to the last subparagraph, for entities that are not themselves resolution entities, the amount referred to in paragraph 2 shall not exceed the greater of any of the following: (a) (i) absorbed in resolution that corresponds to the requirements referred to in Article 92(1)(a),(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU of the entity, and (ii) allows the entity to restore its total capital ratio referred in Article 92(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and its requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU; (b) (i) absorbed in resolution that corresponds to the entity's leverage ratio requirement referred to in the Article 92(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, and (ii) allows the entity to restore its leverage ratio referred to in the Article 92(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 ; For the purposes of point (a) of Article 45(2)(a), the requirement referred to in Article 45(1) shall be expressed in percentage terms as the amount calculated in accordance with point (a) divided by the total risk exposure amount. For the purposes of point (b) of Article 45(2)(b), the requirement referred to in Article 45(1) shall be expressed in percentage terms as the amount calculated in accordance with point (b) divided by the leverage ratio exposure measure. The resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amounts referred to the previous subparagraphs in accordance with the resolution actions foreseen in the resolution plan and may adjust those recapitalisation amounts to adequately reflect risks that affect the recapitalisation needs arising from the entity's business model, funding profile and overall risk profile.deleted the sum of: the amount of losses to be a recapitalisation amount that the sum of: the amount of losses to be a recapitalisation amount that
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 358 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
8. EBA shall draft regulatory technical standards which shall further specify the criteria referred to in paragraph 1 on the basis of which the requirement for own funds and permissible liabilities is to be determined in accordance with this Article. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory standards to the Commission by [1 month after the entry into force]. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1090/2010.deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 368 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45d – paragraph 2
2. The resolution authority may impose an additional requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1 only: (a) in point (a) of paragraph 1 is not sufficient to fulfil the conditions set out in Article 45c; and (b) required own funds and eligible liabilities does not exceed a level that is necessary to fulfil the conditions of Article 45c.deleted where the requirement referred to to an extent that the amount of
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 384 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45e
[...]deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 439 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45g – paragraph 4
4. Subject to the agreement of the resolution authorities of the subsidiary and the resolution entity, the requirement may be met with a guarantee of the resolution entity granted to its subsidiary, which fulfils the following conditions: (a) least the equivalent amount as the amount of the requirement for which it substitutes; (b) the subsidiary is unable to pay its debts or other liabilities as they fall due or a determination has been made in accordance with Article 59(3) in respect of the subsidiary, whichever is the earliest; (c) through a financial collateral arrangement as defined in point (a) of Article 2(1) of Directive 2002/47/EC for at least 50 per cent of its amount; (d) collateral arrangement are governed by the laws of the Member State where the subsidiary is established unless specified otherwise by the resolution authority of the subsidiary; (e) guarantee fulfils the requirements of Article 197 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, which, following appropriately conservative haircuts, is sufficient to fully cover the amount guaranteed; (f) the collateral backing the guarantee is unencumbered and in particular is not used as collateral to back any other guarantee; (g) the collateral has an effective maturity that fulfils the same maturity condition as that for referred to in Article 72c(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 , and (h) operational barriers to the transfer of the collateral from the resolution entity to the relevant subsidiary, including when resolution action is taken in respect of the resolution entity.deleted the guarantee is provided for at the guarantee is triggered when the guarantee is collateralised the guarantee and financial the collateral backing the there are no legal, regulatory or
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 470 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45g – paragraph 5 – point f
(f) the resolution entity holds more than 50 % of the voting rights attached to shares in the capital of the subsidiary orand has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the management body of the subsidiary;
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 487 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45i – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Entities referred to in Article 1(1) shall report to their competent and resolution authorities on the following upon request and at least on a yearly basis:
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 499 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45k – paragraph -1 (new)
-1. An institution that meets the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities shall not make a distribution in connection with Common Equity Tier 1 capital or make payments on Additional Tier 1 instruments to an extent that would decrease its Common Equity Tier 1capital to a level where the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities is no longer met.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 519 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 24
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 55 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
TExcept for G-SIIs the requirement referred to in paragraph 1 may not apply where the resolution authority of a Member State determines all of the following conditions are met:
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 537 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 24
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 55 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 a (new)
The liabilities for which a waiver from the contractual recognition of bail-in has been granted by the resolution authority in accordance with this paragraph shall not exceed 10 per cent of all liabilities of an institution or entity referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1).
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 19 #

2016/0361(COD)

(7) Eligibility criteria for liabilities for the MREL should be closely aligned with those laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 for the TLAC minimum requirement, in line with the complementary adjustments and requirements introduced in this Regulation. In particular, certain debt instruments with an embedded derivative component, such as certain structured notes, should be eligible to meet the MREL to the extent that they have a fixed principal amount repayable at maturity while only an additional return is linked to a derivative and depends on the performance of a reference asset. In view of their fixed principal amount, those instruments should be highly loss- absorbing and easily bail-inable in resolution. Eligible liabilities should be clearly subordinated to other liabilities in order to avoid any "no creditor worse off" issues.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 20 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) The scope of liabilities to meet the MREL includes, in principle, all liabilities resulting from claims arising from unsecured non-preferred creditors (non- subordinated liabilities) unless they do not meet specific eligibility criteria provided in this Regulation. To enhance the resolvability of institutions through an effective use of the bail-in tool, the Board should be able to require that the firm- specific requirement is met with subordinated liabilities, in particular when there are clear indications that bailed-in creditors are likely to bear losses in resolution that would exceed their potential losses in insolvency. The requirement to meet MREL with subordinated liabilities should be requested only for a level necessary to prevent that losses of creditors in resolution are above losses that they would otherwise incur under insolvency. Any subordination of debt instruments requested by the Board for the MREL should be without prejudice to the possibility to partly meet the TLAC minimum requirement with non- subordinated debt instruments in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as permitted by the TLAC standard.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 23 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
(10) To enhance their resolvability, the Board should be able to impose an institution-specific MREL on G-SIIs in addition to the TLAC minimum requirement provided in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. That institution-specific MREL may only be imposed where the TLAC minimum requirement is not sufficient to absorb losses and recapitalise a G-SII under the chosen resolution strateg when deemed necessary.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 25 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) When setting the level of MREL, the Board should consider the degree of systemic relevance of an institution and the potential adverse impact of its failure on the financial stability. The Board should take into account the need for a level playing field between G-SIIs and other comparable institutions with systemic relevance within the participating Member States. Thus MREL of institutions that are not identified as G-SIIs but the systemic relevance within participating Member States of which is comparable to the systemic relevance of G-SIIs should not diverge disproportionately from the level and composition of MREL generally set for G-SIIs. and may also exceed that level.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 26 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) Similarly to powers conferred to competent authorities by Directive 2013/36/EU, the Board should be allowed to impose higher levels of MREL while addressing in a more flexible manner any breaches of those levels, in particular by alleviating the automatic effects of those breaches in the form of limitations to the Maximum Distributable Amounts ('MDAs'). The Board should be able to give guidance to institutions to meet additional amounts to cover losses in resolution that are above the level of the own funds requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU, and/or to ensure sufficient market confidence in the institution post-resolution. To ensure consistency Directive 2013/36/EU, guidance to cover additional losses may only be given where the 'capital guidance' has been requested by the competent supervisory authorities in accordance with Directive 2013/36/EU and should not exceed the level requested in that guidance. For the recapitalisation amount, the level requested in the guidance to ensure market confidence should enable the institution to continue to meet the conditions for authorisation for an appropriate period of time including by allowing the institution to cover the costs related to the restructuring of its activities following resolution. The market confidence buffer should not exceed the combined capital buffer requirement under Directive 2013/36/EU unless a higher level is necessary to ensure that, following the event of resolution, the entity continues to meet the conditions for its authorisation for an appropriate period. Where an entity consistently fails to have additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance, the Board should be able to require that the amount of the MREL be increased to cover the amount of the guidance. For the purposes of considering whether there is a consistent failure, the Board should take into account the entity's reporting on the MREL as required by Directive 2014/59/EUen deemed necessary for resolution.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 28 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
(14) Institutions that are not resolution entities should comply with the firm- specific requirement at individual level. Loss absorption and recapitalisation needs of those institutions should be generally provided by their respective resolution entities through the acquisition by resolution entities of eligible liabilities issued by those institutions and their write- down or conversion into instruments of ownership when those institutions are no longer viable. As such, the MREL applicable to institutions that are not resolution entities should be applied together and consistently with the requirements applicable to resolution entities. That should allow the Board to resolve a resolution group without placing certain of its subsidiary entities in resolution, thus avoiding potentially disruptive effects on the market. Subject to the agreement of the Board, it should be possible to replace the issuance of eligible liabilities to resolution entities with collateralised guarantees between the resolution entity and its subsidiaries, that can be triggered when the timing conditions equivalent to those allowing the write down or conversion of eligible liabilities are met. The collateral backing the guarantee should be highly liquid and have minimal market and credit risk. The Board should also be able to fully waive the application of the MREL applicable to institutions that are not resolution entities if both the resolution entity and its subsidiaries are established in the same participating Member State.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 49 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 c – paragraph 1
1. Eligible liabilities shall be included in the amount of own funds and eligible liabilities of resolution entities only where they satisfy the conditions referred to in 72a(2), except for point (d) of Article 72b(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 51 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 c – paragraph 2
2. By way of derogation from point (l) of Article 72a(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, liabilities that arise from debt instruments with derivative features, such as structured notes, shall be included in the amount of own funds and eligible liabilities only where all of the following conditions are met: (a) arising from the debt instrument is known in advance at the time of issuance, is fixed and not affected by a derivative feature; (b) derivative feature, is not subject to any netting agreement and its valuation is not subject to Article 49(3); (c) subparagraph shall only be included in the amount of own funds and eligible liabilities for the part that corresponds with the amount referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph.deleted a given amount of the liability the debt instrument, including its The liability referred to in the first
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 54 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
The Board, on its own initiative after consulting the national resolution authority or upon proposal by a national resolution authority, may decidshall ensure that the requirement referred to in Article 12g is met by resolution entities with instruments that meet all conditions referred to in Article 72a of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 with a view to ensure that the resolution entity can be resolved in a manner suitable to meet the resolution objectives.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
The Board's decision under this paragraph shall contain the reasons for that decision on the basis of the following elements: (a) referred to in the paragraph (1) and (2) have the same priority ranking in the national insolvency hierarchy as certain liabilities excluded from the application of the write-down or conversion powers in accordance with Article 44(2) or Article 44(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU ; (b) application of write-down and conversion powers to non-subordinated liabilities that are not excluded from the application of the write-down or conversion powers in accordance with Article 44(2) or Article 44(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU, creditors of claims arising from those liabilities incur greater losses than they would incur in a winding up under normal insolvency proceedings; (c) liabilities shall not exceed the amount necessary to ensure that creditors referred to in point (b) shall not incur losses above the level of losses that they would otherwise have incurred in a winding up under normal insolvency proceedings.deleted non-subordinated liabilities as a result of a planned the amount of subordinated
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 72 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Without prejudiceThe resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amounts referred to in the lastprevious subparagraph, for resolution entities, the amount referred to in paragraph 2 shall not exceeds in accordance with the resolution actions foreseen in the resolution plan and may adjust those recapitalisation amounts to adequately reflect risks that affect resolvability arising from the greater of the following:solution group’s business model, funding profile and overall risk profile.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point a
(a) the sum of: (i) to be absorbed in resolution that corresponds to the requirements referred to in Article 92(1)(a),(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU of the resolution entity at sub-consolidated resolution group level, (ii) allows the resolution group resulting from resolution to restore its total capital ratio referred in Article 92(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and its requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU at resolution group sub- consolidated level in accordance with the resolution actions foreseen in the resolution plan;deleted the amount of losses that may need a recapitalisation amount that
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 80 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) the sum of: (i) absorbed in resolution that corresponds to the resolution entity's leverage ratio requirement referred to in Article 92(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 at resolution group sub-consolidated level; and (ii) allows the resolution group resulting from resolution to restore the leverage ratio referred to in Article 92(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 at resolution group sub-consolidated level in accordance with the resolution actions foreseen in the resolution plan;deleted the amount of losses to be a recapitalisation amount that
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 83 #

2016/0361(COD)

The Board shall set the recapitalisation amounts referred to in the previous subparagraphs in accordance with the resolution actions foreseen in the resolution plan and may adjust those recapitalisation amounts to adequately reflect risks that affect resolvability arising from the resolution group’s business model, funding profile and overall risk profile.deleted
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 88 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
Without prejudice to the last subparagraph, for entities that are not themselves resolution entities, the amount referred to in paragraph 2 shall not exceed any of the following: (a) (i) absorbed in resolution that corresponds to the requirements referred to in Article 92(1)(a),(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU of the entity, and (ii) allows the entity to restore its total capital ratio referred in Article 92(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and its requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU in accordance with the resolution plan; or (b) (i) absorbed in resolution that corresponds to the entity's leverage ratio requirement referred to in Article 92(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; and (ii) allows the entity to restore its leverage ratio referred to in Article 92(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 in accordance with the resolution plan.deleted the sum of: the amount of losses to be a recapitalisation amount that the sum of: the amount of losses to be a recapitalisation amount that
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 113 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
2. The Board may impose an additional requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1 only : (a) in point (a) of paragraph 1 is not sufficient to fulfil the conditions set out in Article 12d; and (b) required own funds and eligible liabilities does not exceed a level that is necessary to fulfil the conditions of Article 12d.deleted where the requirement referred to to an extent that the amount of
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 116 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 f
Article 12f Guidance for the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities 1. an entity to have own funds and eligible liabilities that fulfil the conditions of Article 12c and Article 12h(3) in excess of the levels set out in Article 12d and Article 12e for amounts for the following purposes: (a) of the entity to those covered in Article 12d, and/or (b) resolution, a sufficient market confidence in the entity is sustained through capital instruments in addition to the requirement in point (b) of Article 12d(2) ('market confidence buffer'). The guidance shall be only provided and calculated with respect to the requirement referred to in Article 12a(1) calculated in accordance with point (a) of Article 12a(2). 2. The amount of the guidance given in accordance with point (a) of paragraph 1 may be set only where the competent authority has already set its own guidance in accordance with Article 104b of Directive 2013/36/EU and shall not exceed the level of that guidance. The amount of guidance given in accordance with point (b) of paragraph 1 shall not exceed the amount of the combined buffer requirement referred to in point (6) of Article 128 of Directive 2013/36/EU, except for the requirement referred to in point (a) of that provision unless a higher level is necessarydeleted The Board may give guidance to to cover potential additional losses to ensure that, following the event of resolution, the entity continues to meet the conditions for its authorisation for an appropriate period of time that is not longer than one year. The resolution authority shall provide to the entity the reasons and a full assessment for the need and the level of the guidance given in accordance with this Article. 3. to have additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance referred to in the first paragraph, the Board may require that the amount of the requirement referred to in Article 12d(2) be increased to cover the guidance given pursuant to this Article. 4. additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance referred to in the first paragraph shall not be subject to the restrictions referred to in Article 141 of Directive 2013/36/EU.Where an entity consistently fails An entity that fails to have
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 119 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 f – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
The Board may give guidance to an entity to have own funds and eligible liabilities that fulfil the conditions of Article 12c and Article 12h(3) in excess of the levels set out in Article 12d and Article 12e for amounts for the following purposes: (a) of the entity to those covered in Article 12d, and/or (b) resolution, a sufficient market confidence in the entity is sustained through capital instruments in addition to the requirement in point (b) of Article 12d(2) ('market confidence buffer').deleted to cover potential additional losses to ensure that, in the event of
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 123 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
The guidance shall be only provided and calculated with respect to the requirement referred to in Article 12a(1) calculated in accordance with point (a) of Article 12a(2).deleted
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 125 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 f – paragraph 2
2. The amount of the guidance given in accordance with point (a) of paragraph 1 may be set only where the competent authority has already set its own guidance in accordance with Article 104b of Directive 2013/36/EU and shall not exceed the level of that guidance. The amount of guidance given in accordance with point (b) of paragraph 1 shall not exceed the amount of the combined buffer requirement referred to in point (6) of Article 128 of Directive 2013/36/EU, except for the requirement referred to in point (a) of that provision unless a higher level is necessary to ensure that, following the event of resolution, the entity continues to meet the conditions for its authorisation for an appropriate period of time that is not longer than one year. The resolution authority shall provide to the entity the reasons and a full assessment for the need and the level of the guidance given in accordance with this Article.deleted
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 131 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 f – paragraph 3
3. Where an entity consistently fails to have additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance referred to in the first paragraph, the Board may require that the amount of the requirement referred to in Article 12d(2) be increased to cover the guidance given pursuant to this Article.deleted
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 135 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 f – paragraph 4
4. An entity that fails to have additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance referred to in the first paragraph shall not be subject to the restrictions referred to in Article 141 of Directive 2013/36/EU.deleted
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 145 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 h – paragraph 4
4. Subject to the agreement of the Board, the requirement referred to in Article 12a(1) may be met with a guarantee of the resolution entity granted to its subsidiary, which fulfils the following conditions: (a) least the equivalent amount as the amount of the requirement for which it substitutes; (b) the subsidiary is unable to pay its debts or other liabilities as they fall due or a determination has been made in accordance with Article 21(3) in respect of the subsidiary, whichever is the earliest; (c) through a financial collateral arrangement as defined in point (a) of Article 2(1) of Directive 2002/47/EC for at least 50 per cent of its amount; (d) collateral arrangement are governed by the laws of the Member State where the subsidiary is established unless otherwise specified by the Board; (e) guarantee fulfils the requirements of Article 197 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, which, following appropriately conservative haircuts, is sufficient to fully cover the amount guaranteed; (f) guarantee is unencumbered and in particular is not used asdeleted the guarantee is provided for at the guarantee is triggered when the guarantee is collateralised the guarantee and financial the collateral to back any other guarantee; (g) maturity that fulfils the same maturity condition as that referred to in Article 72c(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; and (h) operational barriers to the transfer of the collateral from the resolution entity to the relevant subsidiary, including when resolution action is taken in respect of the resolution entity.ing the the collateral backing the the collateral has an effective there are no legal, regulatory or
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 183 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) In order not to unnecessarily constrain lending by institutions to corporates and private households and to prevent unwarranted adverse impacts on market liquidity, tThe leverage ratio requirement should be set at a level where it acts as a credible backstop to the risk of excessive leverage without hampering economic growthand it should be aligned with the institution's risk profile.
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 187 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) TWhile the European Banking Authority (EBA) concluded in its report to the Commission19 that a Tier 1 capital leverage ratio calibrated at 3% for any type of credit institution would constitute a credible backstop function. A 3% leverage ratio requirement was also agreed upon at international level by, the OECD9a and US FDIC recommend a leverage ratio of at least 5% for institutions that are systemically important. It is therefore justified to deviate from the Basel Committee. T and to set higher leverage ratio requirement should therefore be calibrated at 3%s of 4%, and 6% for systemically important financial institutions. __________________ 19 Report on the leverage ratio requirement of 3 August 2016 https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/101 80/1360107/EBA-Op-2016- 13+(Leverage+ratio+report).pdf 9a Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Paul Atkinson, 2012. ‘Deleveraging, Traditional versus Capital Markets Banking and the Urgent Need to Separate and Recapitalise G-SIFI Banks’, OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 03 Oct 2012, No 1, Volume: 2012, Issue: 1. pp 7–44.
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 190 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) The Basel Committee is currently considering the introduction of a leverage ratio surcharge for globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs). The final outcome of the Basel Committee's calibration work should give rise to a discussion on the appropriate calibration of the leverage ratio for systemically important EU institutions.deleted
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 197 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
(19) To ensure the effectiveness of the requirement on own funds and eligible liabilities, it is essential that the instruments held for meeting that requirement have a high capacity of loss absorption. Liabilities that are excluded from the bail-in tool referred to in Directive 2014/59/EU do not have that capacity, and neither do other liabilities that, although bail-in-able in principle might raise difficulties for being bailed in in practice. Those liabilities should therefore not be considered eligible for the requirement on own funds and eligible liabilities. On the other hand, capital instruments, as well as subordinated liabilities have a high loss absorption capacity. Also, the loss absorption potential of liabilities that rank pari passu with certain excluded liabilities should be recognised up to a certain extent, in line with the TLAC standard.
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 198 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33
(33) The implementation of the FRTB standards in the Union needs to preserve the good functioning of financial markets in the Union. Recent impact studies about the FRTB standards show that the implementation of the FRTB standards is expected to lead to a steep increase in the overall own fund requirement for market risks. To avoid a sudden contraction of trading businessesnegative effects for the real economy in the Union, a phase-in period should therefore be introduced so that institutions can recognise the overall level of own fund requirements for market risks generated by the transposition of the FRTB standards in the Union. Particular attention should also be paid to European trading specificities and adjustments to the own funds requirements for sovereign and covered bonds, and simple, transparent and standardised securitisations.
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 200 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 38
(38) The NSFR should be expressed as a percentage and set at a minimum level of 100%, and 120% for G-SIIs, which indicates that an institution holds sufficient stable funding to meet its funding needs during a one-year period under both normal and stressed conditions. Should its NSFR falls below the 100% levels, the institution should comply with the specific requirements laid down in Article 414 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 for a timely restoration of its NSFR to the minimum level. The supervisory measures in case of non- compliance should not be automatic, competent authorities should instead assess the reasons for non-compliance with the NSFR requirement before defining potential supervisory measures.
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 201 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 39
(39) In accordance with the recommendations made by EBA in its report of 15 December 2015 prepared pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 510 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the rules for calculating the NSFR should be closely aligned with the Basel Committee's standards, including developments in those standards regarding the treatment of derivatives transactions. The necessity to take into account some European specificities to ensure that the NSFR does not hinder the financing of the European real economy however justifies adopting some limited adjustments to the Basel NSFR for the definition of the European NSFR. Those adjustments due to the European context are recommended by the NSFR report prepared by EBA and relate mainly to specific treatments for i) pass- through models in general and covered bonds issuance in particular; ii) trade finance activities; iii) centralised regulated savings; iv) residential guaranteed loans; and v) credit unions. These proposed specific treatments broadly reflect the preferential treatment granted to these activities in the European LCR compared to the Basel LCR. Because the NSFR complements the LCR, those two ratios should indeed be consistent in their definition and calibration. This is in particular the case for required stable funding factors applied to LCR high quality liquid assets for the calculation of the NSFR that shall reflect the definitions and haircuts of the European LCR, regardless of compliance with the general and operational requirements set out for the LCR calculation that are not appropriate in the one-year frame of the NSFR calculation.
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 208 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 53
(53) IPublic investments in infrastructure are essential to strengthen Europe's competitiveness and to stimulate job creation. The recovery and future growth of the Union economy depends largely on the availability of capital for strategic investments of European significance in infrastructure, notably broadband and energy networks, as well as transport infrastructure, particularly in industrial centres; education, research and innovation; and renewable energy and energy efficiency. The Investment Plan for Europe aims at promoting additional funding to viable infrastructure projects through, inter alia, the mobilization of additional private source of finance. For a number of potential investors the main concern is the perceived absence of viable projects and the limited capacity to properly evaluate risk given their intrinsically complex nature.
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 210 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 54
(54) In order to encourage public and private investments in infrastructure projects it is therefore essential to lay down athe prudential regulatory environment that is abcan play a role toin promoteing high quality infrastructure projects and reduce risks for investors. In particular capital charges for exposures to infrastructure projects should be reduced provided they comply with a set of strict criteria able to reduce their risk profile and enhance predictability of cash flows. The Commission should review the provision by [three years after the entry into force] in order to assess a) its impact on the volume of infrastructure investments by institutions and the quality of investments having regard to EU's objectives to move towards a low-carbon, climate-resilient and circular economy; and b) its adequacy from a prudential standpoint. The Commission should also consider whether the scope should be extended to infrastructure investments by corporates.
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 355 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 72a – paragraph 2 – point j – point ii
(ii) a commercial or trade creditor, where the liability arises from the provision to the institution or the parent undertaking of goods or services that are critical to the daily functioning of the institution's or parent undertaking's operations, including IT services, utilities and the rental, servicing and upkeep of premises; and the creditor is not itself an institution as defined by Art. 4(1) of this Regulation;
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 360 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 72b – paragraph 2 – point b – point ii a (new)
(iia) retail clients as defined by Art 4 (1) (11) of Directive 2014/65/EU.
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 389 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 72b – paragraph 3
3. In addition to the liabilities referred to in paragraph 2, liabilities shall qualify as eligible liabilities instruments up to an aggregate amount that does not exceed 3.5% of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 92, provided that: (a) paragraph 2 except for the condition in point (d) are met; (b) the liabilities rank pari passu with the lowest ranking excluded liabilities referred to in Article 72a(2); and (c) eligible liabilities items does not have a material adverse impact on the resolvability of the institution, as confirmed by the resolution authority after having assessed the elements referred to in points (b) and (c) of Article 45b(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU. An institution may decide not to include in eligible liabilities items the liabilities referred to in the first subparagraph.deleted all the conditions laid down in the inclusion of these liabilities in
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 395 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 72b – paragraph 4
4. Where an institution takes a decision as referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 3, liabilities shall qualify as eligible liabilities instruments in addition to the liabilities referred to in paragraph 2, provided that: (a) to include in eligible liabilities items liabilities referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 3 is effective, in accordance with paragraph 5; (b) paragraph 2, except for the condition in point (d) of that paragraph, are met; (c) are senior to the lowest ranking excluded liabilities referred to in Article 72a(2); (d) institution, the amount of the excluded liabilities referred to in Article 72a(2) which rank pari passu or below those liabilities in insolvency does not exceed 5% of the amount of the own funds and eligible liabilities of the institution; (e) eligible liabilities items does not have a material adverse impact on the resolvability of the institution, as confirmed by the resolution authority after having assessed the elements referred to in points (b) and (c) of Article 45b(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU.deleted the decision by the institution not all the conditions laid down in the liabilities rank pari passu or on the balance sheet of the the inclusion of those liabilities in
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 399 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 72b – paragraph 5
5. The decision referred to in the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 3 shall specify whether the institution intends either to include the liabilities referred to in paragraph 4 in eligible liabilities items or not to include any of the liabilities referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4. An institution may not decide to include liabilities referred to in both paragraphs 3 and 4 in eligible liabilities items. The decision shall be published in the annual report and shall take effect 6 months after the publication of that report. The decision shall be effective for at least one year.deleted
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 402 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27
6. The competent authority shall consult the resolution authority when examining whether the conditions of this Article are fulfilled.deleted
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 477 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 39 – point a
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 92 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) a leverage ratio of 3%.6% for G-SIIs.
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 484 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 39 – point a a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 92 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)
(aa) in paragraph 1, the following point (da) is added: "(da) a leverage ratio of 4%. for O- SIIs."
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 485 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 39 – point a b (new)
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 92 – paragraph 1 – point d b (new)
(ab) in paragraph 1, the following point (db) is added: "(db) a leverage ratio of 3% for all other institutions."
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 488 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 92 a – title
Article 92a G-SII and O-SII Requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 492 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 92 a – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Subject to Articles 93 and 94 and to the exceptions set out in paragraph 2 of this Article, institutions identified as resolution entities and that are a G-SII or an O-SII or part of a G- SII or O-SII shall at all times satisfy the following requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities:
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 500 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 92 a – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) within the threone years following the date on which the institution or the group of which the institution is part has been identified as a G-SII or O-SII;
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 504 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 92 a – paragraph 3
3. Where the aggregate resulting from the application of the requirements laid down in point (a) of paragraph 1 to each resolution entity of the same G-SII or O- SII exceeds the requirement of own funds and eligible liabilities calculated in accordance with Article 12, the resolution authority of the EU parent institution may, after having consulted the other relevant resolution authorities, act in accordance with Articles 45d(3) or 45h(1)of Directive 2014/59/EU.
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 505 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 92 a – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. The requirements for G-SII as laid down in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be multiplied with the following factors: (a) 1,2 in the period from [date of application of this Article + 1 year] to [date of application of this Article + 2 years - 1 day] (b) 1,4 in the period from [date of application of this Article +2 years] to [date of application of this Article +3 years - 1 day]; (c) 1,6 in the period from [date of application of this Article +3 years] to [date of application of this Article +4 years - 1 day]; (d) 1,8 in the period from [date of application of this Article +4 years] to [date of application of this Article +5 years - 1 day].
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 507 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 92 b – title
Article 92b Non-EU G-SII and O-SII Requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 511 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 92 b – subparagraph 1
Institutions that are material subsidiaries of non-EU G-SIIs and that are not resolution entities shall at all times satisfy a requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities equal to 9100% of the requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities laid down in Article 92a.
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 532 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 42
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 99 – paragraph 11
11. Competent authorities may waive the requirements to report data items specified in the implementing technical standards referred to in this Article and Articles 100, 101, 394, 415 and 430 where, or allow the institution to report in another reporting format, if: (a) those data items are already available to the competent authorities by means other than those specified under the above mentioned implementing technical standards, including where that information is available to the competent authorities in a different formats or levels of granularity.; the competent authority may then only grant the waiver or exception stated in this paragraph if data received or collated through such alternative methods are identical to those data points which otherwise ought to be reported in accordance with the respective implementing standards; (b) the data points or formats have not been updated in accordance with the amendments to this Regulation within an appropriate time period before the deadline for the data to be reported.
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 539 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 48
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 104 – paragraph 2 – point e
(e) financial assets or liabilities measured at fair valuestruments held as accounting trading assets or liabilities;
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 629 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 a i – table 4 – column Sector – row Bucket 4
Table 4 Financial sector entities including credit institutions incorporated or established by a central government, a regional government or a local authority and promotional lenders , excluding public sector entities as defined in Art 4 (8) of Regulation EU 575/2013
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 731 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 b – paragraph 2
2. Institutions other than G-SIIs shall maintain a net stable funding ratio of at least 100%.
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 732 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 b – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. G-SIIs shall maintain a net stable funding ratio of at least 120%.
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 733 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 b – paragraph 3
3. Where at any time the net stable funding ratio of an institution has fallen or can be reasonably expected to fall below 100%the thresholds specified in paragraph 2 and 2a (new) of this Article, the requirement laid down in Article 414 shall apply. The institution shall aim at restoring its net stable funding ratio to the levels referred to in paragraph 2 and 2a (new). Competent authorities shall assess the reasons for non- compliance with the level referred to in paragraph 2 and 2a (new) before taking, where appropriate, any supervisory measures.
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 794 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 s – point b
(b) assets that have a residual maturity of less than six months resulting from secured lending transactions and capital market-driven transactions as defined in Article 192(2) and (3) with financial customers, where those assets are collateralised by assets that qualify as Level 1 assets under Title II of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61, excluding extremely high quality covered bonds referred to in point (f) of Article 10(1) of that Delegated Regulation , and where the institution would be legally entitled and operationally able to reuse those assets for the life of the transaction, regardless of whether the collateral has already been reused. Institutions shall take those assets into account on a net basis where Article 428e(1) of this Regulation applies;deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 811 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 u – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) assets that have a residual maturity of less than six months resulting from secured lending transactions and capital market-driven transactions as defined in Article 192(2) and (3) with financial customers, other than thosewhere those assets are collateralised by assets that qualify as Level 1 assets under Title II of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61, excluding extremely high quality covered bonds referred to in point (bf) of Article 428s. Those assets shall be taken10(1) of that Delegated Regulation , and where the institution would be legally entitled and operationally able to reuse those assets for the life of the transaction, regardless of whether the collateral has already been reused. Institutions shall take those assets into account on a net basis where Article 428e(1) of this Regulation applies;
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 812 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 u – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) assets that have a residual maturity of less than six months resulting from transactions with financial customers other than those referred to in point (b) of Article 428s and in point (a) of this Article;deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 816 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
2. For all netting sets of derivative contracts that are not subject to margin agreements under which institutions post variation margins to their counterparties, institutions shall apply a 10% required stable funding factor to the absolute market value of those netting sets of derivative contracts, gross of any collateral posted, where those netting sets have a negative market value.deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 820 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 w – point a a (new)
(aa) assets that have a residual maturity of less than six months resulting from secured lending transactions and capital market-driven transactions as defined in Article 192(2) and (3) with financial customers, other than those referred to in point (a) of Article 428u. Those assets shall be taken into account on a net basis where Article 428e(1) applies
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 826 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 w – point b a (new)
(ba) assets that have a residual maturity of less than six months resulting from transactions with financial customers other than those referred to in point (a) of Article 428u and in point (a) of this Article.
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 830 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 x – paragraph 2
2. For all netting sets of derivative contracts subject to margin agreements under which institutions post variation margins to their counterparties, institutions shall apply a 20% required stable funding factor to the absolute market value of those netting sets of derivative contracts, gross of any collateral posted, where those netting sets have a negative market value.
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 904 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 115
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 429 a – paragraph 2 – point e
(e) it is precluded from accepting covered deposits as defined in point (5) of Article 2(1) of Directive 2014/49/EU or in the national law of Member States implementing that Directive.deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 930 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 115
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 429 c – paragraph 4
4. For the purposes of paragraph 1 of this Article, institutions shall not include collateral received in the calculation of NICA as defined in point 12a of Article 272, except in the case of derivatives contracts with clients where those contracts are cleared by a QCCP.
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1041 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 127
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 501 a – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. For the purpose of paragraph 1(b) essential public services have to deliver a positive social impact and have to meet core values of the European Union notably human rights, inclusion, respect and justice, preferably but not exclusively aimed at: (i) health and safety, human rights and labour rights; (ii) organic farming, circular economy, biodiversity, renewable energy, water preservation, preservation of natural resources;
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1049 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 127
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 501 b – paragraph 1
1. Until [date of application + 3 years], institutions that use the approaches set out in Chapters 1a and 1b, Title IV, Part Three to calculate the own funds requirement for market risks shall multiply their own funds requirements for market risks calculated under these approaches by a factor of 65%80% for institutions that use the IRB approach and 40% for institutions that use the standardised approach.
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON