18 Amendments of Jörg MEUTHEN related to 2018/2100(INI)
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas entrusting the ECB with the supervision of financial institutions has proven to be successfulcreated an internal conflict of interest between its supervisory and monetary functions;
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Calls on the SSM to regularly update the European Parliament about the information exchange which takes place between staff carrying out monetary policy and supervisory functions in accordance with the European Central Bank decision of 17 September 2014 (ECB/2014/39);
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Highlights that sovereign debt is not risk-free; takes note of the on-going work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on sovereign risk; is concerned by the fact that some financial institutions are heavily invested in their own sovereign debt, constituting excessive "home bias"; calls on the Commission to assess whether to introduce risk weighting on sovereign bonds or exposure limits in the EU; rejects, in this respect, the Commission's ongoing work on the idea of a so-called sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS);
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the NPL package; welcomes the ECB addendum on NPLs and the work of the EBA on guidelines on management of non-performing and forborne exposures; welcomes the reduction in volumof the average rate of NPLs over the past years, from 6.4% in December 2014 to 4.2% at the end of September 2017; stresses that the risk to financial stability posed by NPLs is still significant and that the current NPL level in the EU is still higher than in other major developed countries such as the United States of America and Japan, where NPL ratios are lower than 2%; stresses that in 9 Member States NPL ratios are still well over 10%3a; expresses concern that the coverage ratio differ significantly from one Member State to another, reflecting various levels of collateralisation and heterogeneous accounting practices; agrees with the Commission that the primary responsibility for reducing NPLs lies with the banks themselves and Member States, notably through efficient insolvency laws, and banks themselves; the establishment of asset management companies themselves; _________________ 3a EBA Risk Dashboard.
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 c (new)
Paragraph 13 c (new)
13c. Rejects any solution at EU level to the problem of NPLs that would go beyond guidelines for selling NPLs on secondary markets;
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS); believes that a single market needs appropriate supervisory powers at EU level;
Amendment 135 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Recalls the initial debate on the role of the ECB as both monetary and supervisory authority; considers that, overall,believes that the ECB haswill not succeeded in keeping the two roles separate; believes, however, that further debate is necessary to avoid the risk of a conflict of interests between the two tasks, especially once the crisis of the EMU and the European financial system reaches another peak;
Amendment 137 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Calls on the ECB to conduct annually an external professional audit of its legally required organisational separation of supervisory and monetary policy functions, and immediately to publish the report;
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)
Paragraph 17 b (new)
17b. Calls on the SSM to periodically report to the European Parliament any exchange of information between policy functions under the Decision of the European Central Bank of 17 September 2014 (ECB/2014/39);
Amendment 150 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. WelcomeRejects the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will provide the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and be turned into a true European Monetary Fund (EMF) based on strict conditions ensuring responsibility and the principle of avoiding moral hazard; stresses the need for proper democratic scrutiny; recalls Parliament’s position that the EMF should be fully; warns that there will be no proper democratic scrutiny, if the EMF is incorporated into the Union's institutional framework;
Amendment 152 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Recalls the constitutional review of the ESM by the German Constitutional Court in 2014, concerning the question of adequate democratic control by national parliaments on ESM decisions; points out that the introduction of a qualified majority rule could potentially substantially reduce such democratic control4a; _________________ 4a BVerfG (2014) Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 18. März 2014. Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 1390/12 - Rn. (1-245).
Amendment 154 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Notes that the ‘too-big-to-fail’ issue has still not been properly addressed; considers that market-oriented activity is inconceivable if there are some market actors that are considered to be too significant to fail; urges, therefore, that the banking system must finally be organised in a more market-oriented manner;
Amendment 159 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Reaffirms its position thatjects the rules for precautionary recapitalisation need to be clarified; notes that precautionary recapitalisation can be an instrument for crisis management but believes that its use needs to be strictly limited to exceptional cases where the bank is solvent and where compliance with EU State aid rules is ensured; recalls that the objective of the EU resolution regime is to make sure that taxpayers are protected, the cost of bank management failures is borne by its shareholders and creditors, and that the stability of the financial system as a whole is preserved; is convinced, however, that the current framework cannot fulfil this objective;
Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Takes note of the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); underlines the necessity ofrejects EDIS as the third pillar of the Banking Union; believes it should be fully implemented once significant risk reduction has taken place;
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. Recalls that the moral hazard of deposit protection spurs deposit banks to engage in overly risky behaviour; recalls that deposit protection disincentivizes deposit holders to scrutinise their bank and its investment and management decisions;
Amendment 184 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. Considers it an erroneous interpretation of the law to view Article 114 as an appropriate legal basis for the establishment of the EDIS;