BETA

497 Amendments of Jörg MEUTHEN

Amendment 64 #

2022/2006(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Notes that the European economy is recovering faster than expected from the devastating impact of the global pandemic, although uncertainties remain; underlines the crucial importance that timely policy interventions have played and will continue to play in mitigating the impact of the pandemic on the European economy;
2022/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #

2022/2006(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Is concerned about emerging new variants, the impact on prices of the European Commission’s Green Deal, localised pandemic lockdowns, increased energy prices, inflationary pressure, supply-side disruptions and emerging labour shortages; notes that these risks could hamper economic growth prospects in the coming months and delay the transition to a more sustainable and future-proof economy;
2022/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 134 #

2022/2006(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Is convinced that the coordination of national fiscal policies remains crucial in underpinning the recovery; notes that the overall fiscal stance, taking into account national budgets and the RRF, is projected to remain supportive in 2022 to sustain the recovery; agrees with the Commission that Member States with low or medium levels of debt should pursue or maintain a supportive fiscal stance, and that Member States with high levels of debt should use the RRF to finance additional investment to support the recovery, while pursuing a prudent fiscal policy; agrees with the Commission that all Member States should preserve or broadly preserve their national financed investment;
2022/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 186 #

2022/2006(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Highlights that the RRF presents an unprecedented and uniqueimpact of the RRF on investment will be marginal compared to the contribution of national expenditure, although it presents an opportunity for all Member States to address part of the key structural challenges and investment needs and insists that all recovery and resilience plans address all requirements of the RRF Regulation, in particular the six pillars; highlights the interplay between the European Semester and the RRF; calls on the Member States to make the most of this opportunity and to use it to transform their economies and make them sustainable, more competitive and more resilient to future shocks; highlights the role of the European Parliament in the implementation of the RRF, as enshrined in the RRF Regulation;
2022/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 217 #

2022/2006(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Notes that many Member States are having to contend with old and new structural challenges that are hindering their growth potential; highlights, therefore, that tackling structural challenges is crucial for a sustainable recovery and continued growth; takes the view that implementing reforms economically and socially sustainable to address old and new structural vulnerabilities is key not only to improving the ability to withstand and cope with existing challenges, but also to accomplishing the twin transitions in a sustainable, fair and inclusive manner and to reducing social inequalities; points to the lack of national ownership as one of the main weaknesses in enacting reforms aimed at addressing structural deficiencies;
2022/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 225 #

2022/2006(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Is concerned that the Commission identified macroeconomic vulnerabilities related to imbalances and excessive imbalances in 12 Member States; is worried that the nature and source of Member States’ imbalances remain largely the same as before the pandemic, as many mistakes were made in the management of the severe financial crisis, and that the pandemic could also be exacerbating imbalances and economic divergences; calls on the Member States to preserve national investments, which has been and will be the main tools for recovery, and to take advantage of the unprecedented opportunity provided by the RRF to significantly reduce existing macroeconomic imbalances, in particular by including ambitious reform measures economically and socially sustainable in the national plans of all Member States; stresses that sound execution is essential to make full use of this opportunity;
2022/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 125 #

2021/2199(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
Ja. whereas the tactical moves by the dictatorial regime in Belarus to channel migration flows towards the EU’s external borders, thereby aggravating the situation for neighbouring countries, and in particular Poland, in response to EU sanctions, has triggered a tragic crisis that has aroused great concern;
2022/02/09
Committee: AFET
Amendment 243 #

2021/2199(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital AL a (new)
ALa. whereas it is strategically important to ensure political stability in the area, as this is essential for ensuring a constant and continuous energy supply, including for Europe, so as to avert the risk of dangerous energy shortages and ensuing price rises;
2022/02/09
Committee: AFET
Amendment 428 #

2021/2199(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Expresses deep concern about destabilising and terrorist actions by certain countries, notably Iran, in the South Caucasus, and Turkey, in the Mediterranean; strongly condemns any acts of terrorism; welcomes the security cooperation between the EU, its Member States and EaP countries and fully supports the further deepening of counter-terrorism cooperation;
2022/02/09
Committee: AFET
Amendment 14 #

2021/2071(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
B a. whereas the rule of law is historically a concept that has been instrumentalised for three years now by the European institutions, which want to punish Hungary and Poland for not accepting the distribution of migrants after the 2015 crisis;
2021/06/17
Committee: BUDGCONT
Amendment 17 #

2021/2071(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Takes note of the Commission’s intention to develop guidelines for the application of the Regulation; reiterates once again its view that the text of the Regulation is clear and does not require any additional interpretation in order to be applied;
2021/06/17
Committee: BUDGCONT
Amendment 32 #

2021/2071(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Urges the Commission to avoid any further delay in the application of the Regulation and to investigate swiftly and thoroughly any potential breaches of the principles of the rule of law in the Member States that affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the Union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the Union in a sufficiently direct way; reiterates that the situation in some Member States already warrants immediate investigation under the Regulation;deleted
2021/06/17
Committee: BUDGCONT
Amendment 49 #

2021/2071(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Stresses that the list of indicative violations of the principles of the rule of law is variable and exposed to arbitrariness and emotion;
2021/06/17
Committee: BUDGCONT
Amendment 71 #

2021/2071(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Emphasises the clear link between respect for the rule of law and the efficient implementation of the Union budget in accordance with the principles of sound financial management: economy, efficiency and effectiveness;deleted
2021/06/17
Committee: BUDGCONT
Amendment 77 #

2021/2071(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Recalls that measures under the Regulation are necessary in particular in cases where other procedures set out in sector-specific or financial legislation would not allow the Union budget to be protected more effectively; stresses that this does not mean that the Regulation is to be considered as a ‘last resort’, but rather that the Commission can use a wide range of procedures to protect the Union’s financial interests, to be chosen on a case-by-case basis depending on their efficiency and effectiveness;deleted
2021/06/17
Committee: BUDGCONT
Amendment 85 #

2021/2071(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12 a. Recalls that the conditionality mechanism is at the very least illegitimate since it duplicates the procedures concerning respect for the rule of law, whereas only the procedure under Article 7 TFEU can determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach of the rule of law and the continuation of the procedures under way should therefore henceforth be the sole responsibility of the Council;
2021/06/17
Committee: BUDGCONT
Amendment 102 #

2021/2071(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16 a. Recalls that the appeal lodged with the Court of Justice of the European Union by Poland and Hungary on 11 December 2020 is defacto suspensive;
2021/06/17
Committee: BUDGCONT
Amendment 103 #

2021/2071(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16 b. Welcomes the Commission's respect for the legal situation, as it wishes to wait for the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, whereas Parliament is calling for the immediate activation of the new mechanism;
2021/06/17
Committee: BUDGCONT
Amendment 8 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 43 a (new)
— having regard to the answer by Commissioner Johansson to parliamentary question E-003462/2020,
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 9 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 43 b (new)
— having regard to Article 140(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 10 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 43 c (new)
— having regard to the ECB´s Targeted Review of Internal Models, published April 2021,
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 11 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 43 d (new)
— having regard to the answer of Commission Vice-President Dombrovskis to written question E-003152/2019,
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 13 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas overall, the banking sector has responded to the COVID-19 pandemic with resilience, mostly founded on the regulatory reforms enacted since the global financial crisis and further supported by extraordinary public poliincreased capital requirements, indicating that equity and solvency arelief measures and capital conservation practices key to tackle financial and economic shocks instead of ever- increasing debt financing;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 47 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas climate change, environmental degradation, increased red tape in the context of climate reporting for financial institutions, which could be referred to as "green tape", and the transition to a low-carbon economy bring new risks to banks’ balance sheets;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 50 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
D a. Expresses deep concern about the findings of the ECB´s Targeted Review of Internal Models, published in April 2021, which shows that the biggest euro area banks have repeatedly been too optimistic in their risk-modelling, confirming longstanding suspicions among regulators and analysts that larger banks have often artificially inflated the strength of their balance sheets by underestimating the riskiness of their assets, giving them a short-term advantage over more cautious competitors; is alarmed that the Review resulted in more than 5.800 deficiencies and 253 supervisory corrections of internal models by the ECB, which pushed up the banks’ risk-weighted assets by € 275 billion, a 12 per cent increase in the models examined, which reduced their average common equity tier one ratios by 0.71 percentage points;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas consumer protection varies across the Banking Union; Article 169 of the TFEU states that EU measures shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent consumer protection measures provided that they are compatible with the Treaties; in this way EU law provides a common basic level of protection to all consumers residing in the EU; recalls that there is no consistent and uniform definition of consumer protection in EU law, which justifies divergences amongst the Member States;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 57 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas prudential and anti-money laundering supervision is necessary; there are still important loopholes in the EU AML framework, such as the explicit exemption of the non- profit sector from anti-money laundering reporting requirements, even though certain NGOs and other non-financial entities (NFEs) operate with larger amounts of money than numerous European banks;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 65 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital G
G. whereas the withdrawal of the UK from the EU has resulted in the relocation of certain banking services to the EU;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital J
J. whereas depositors across the Banking Union should enjoy the sameare exposed to varying levels of credit, market and operational risk, which justifies varying levels of protection;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 81 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. WelcomeRegrets the entry of Bulgaria and Croatia into the Banking Union; especially in the light of both countries' sharp drop in the Corruption Perception Index 2020, where Bulgaria now takes last place, and increasing worries about corruption in Croatia, such as the contested government order forcing banks to retroactively convert loans from Swiss francs to euros and pay out over € 1.1 billion in reimbursement to customers it had lent money to, as well as ongoing corruption charges against the HDZ party (EPP), the Agrokor scandal involving finance minister Maric, or the Sanader case; calls on the EU not to expand the euro area with such corrupt regimes;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 85 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Recalls that the Commission assessed in the 2020 Country Specific Recommendations for Croatia that despite several Action Plans, issues of corruption and conflicts of interest remain widespread in Croatia, and that further efforts to strengthen the prevention and sanction of corruption are needed to ensure the transparent and efficient use of public funds; recalls that Article 140(1) TFEU requires the Commission and European Central Bank’s convergence reports to take account of "other factors" relevant to economic integration and convergence, such as corruption; recalls that the Commission criticized Bulgaria in its 2020 Rule of Law report for its disregard for the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary; concludes that Bulgaria and Croatia are not ready for accession to the Banking Union;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 87 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Recalls thatwhereas the Banking Union has delivered the institutional set-up for greater market integration, through the SSM and the SRM, while a European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) is still lackingwill further disintegrate due to moral hazard and lead to a permanent Transfer Union if mechanisms such as the backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) are implemented; regrets that insufficient progress in risk reduction in some member states serves as an argument for mutualisation of deposit insurance schemes, creating incentives for some member states not to reduce risk, or even engage in even more excessive risk-taking; points out that the absence of a proper impact assessment of the EDIS proposal is fundamentally at odds with the principles of sound governance;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 100 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Considers that banks’ response to the current crisis demonstrates that the regulatory reforms in the past decade, as well as the institutional set-up, have resulted in better-capitalised and less- leveraged banks, proving that equity and not debt is the solution to solve crises and build up resilience against economic and financial shocks;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 110 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Considers that while the good relationship between the SSM and the SRB has been fundamental from the inception of the system, a strengthened approach to cooperation between the two pillars is particularly important in the current context;deleted
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 113 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Underlines the vital contribution to addressing the crisis of public guarantee schemes, moratoria on loan repayments for borrowers in financial difficulty, the central banks’ liquidity programmes and the ECB’s targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO) and pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP)Deplores the ECB's role in massively inflating the money supply and expanding its balance sheet up to over 70% of euro area GDP; recalls that banks in the northern euro area hold a disproportionately high amount of deposits with the ECB, and pay disproportionately high penalty interest to the ECB; by contrast, banks in the southern euro area benefit disproportionally from the negative interest rates on TLTRO loans;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 121 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Deplores that PEPP has had an overwhelming influence on the narrowing of yield spreads and has ensured that southern European government bonds from highly indebted Member States were viewed by investors as less risky5a, which shows that PEPP is disproportionately directed towards highly indebted euro area Member States, and that the ECB is thereby guaranteeing the liquidity of highly indebted euro countries; _________________ 5aLeibniz Centre for European Economic Research, https://www.zew.de/presse/pressearchiv/di e-stabilitaet-der-eurozone-haengt-am- tropf-der-ezb
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 122 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5 b. Recalls that The Targeted Long- Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs) further zombify the European economy and deteriorate the real income prospects, especially of young Europeans;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 123 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 c (new)
5 c. Calls on the ECB to end its stimulus package immediately, including phasing out TLTRO;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 127 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. NotesExpresses concern about the the ‘quick fix’ to the Capital Requirements Regulation31 extending transitional arrangements in order to support banks’ lending capacity32 ; seriously doubts whether supporting further debt- financing is a sustainable way to recapitalize the European economy and to fostering economic growth; _________________ 31Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1). 32 Regulation (EU) 2020/873 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 575/2013 and (EU) 2019/876 as regards certain adjustments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (OJ L 204, 26.6.2020, p. 4).
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 160 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Notes the accelerated pace of digitalisation in the banking sector, while pointing to the insufficient level of investment in this arealooks forward to the further development of DORA and its effect on digital operational resilience for the financial sector; calls on the ESAs and ENISA to step up their efforts in monitoring and mitigating the risks concerning third country ICT third- parties, if these third-parties have or are suspected of having ties to foreign governments or foreign militaries;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 167 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. WelcomesExpresses concern about the ECB’s report on the digital euro and the outcome of its public consultation and expects further analysis of the implications for the banking sector, consumer protection and consumer data protection;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 172 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10 a. Recalls that cash is anonymous and it is impossible for banks or central banks to control the direct expenditure of cash holders, which safeguards their privacy; recalls that CBDC is not anonymous, since central banks will be able to trace consumer behaviour and spending patterns of all citizens; recalls that CBDC would give central banks absolute control over the transactions of citizens, meaning that the ECB will have both the power and the technical capacity to control transactions, including disabling certain transactions; expresses deep concern over giving the ECB such far-reaching powers, which are obviously not within its mandate;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 189 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Regrets the failure to ensure full gender balance in EU financial institutions and bodies;deleted
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 214 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Stresses that ensuring proper and timely management of deteriorated exposures will be key to preventing a build-up of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the short term; asks for more efforts to come forward with ambitious solutions to the issue of sovereign exposures and a substantial reductions of the stock of non- performing loans, especially in the lights of the expiring debt-moratoria in the Member States on loans for SMEs that have suffered tremendously under the national and regional lockdown measures;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 238 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Notes that the expected credit losses, together with the current low interest environment, might further negatively affect the already subdued profitability of banks, as confirmed by the Commission in its answer to written question E- 003152/2019; is deeply concerned about the fact that negative interest rates have costed European banks 8.5 billion euros in 2020; recalls that commercial banks are required to place their excess deposits with the ECB, which pays them at a negative interest rate, currently set at - 0.5%, which means that banks have to pay the central bank for their regulatory deposits; calls on the ECB to normalise its interest rate policy without delay;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 246 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Stresses the benefitWarns of banking consolidation inas a supposed solution to addressing the overcapacities and fragmentation of the banking sector; regrets in this respect the calls of Andrea Enria to further latinize the European banking market through consolidation; rejects this pathway to institutionalising the risk of "too big to fail"; proposes rather to break up banks, instead of consolidating them;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 298 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
28. Trusts thatRegrets the introduction of a backstop into the SRF earlier than originally envisaged is positive for the strengthening of the crisis management framework; recalls that the introduction of the backstop was conditional on sufficient risk reduction in the banking sector; highlights that the November 2020 Financial Stability Review clearly indicates increasing credit risk, rising sovereign exposure, elevated negative rating outlooks, the risk of a property market correction, increased risk from a sovereign-corporate-bank nexus, declining bank profitability, lower interest income, rise in banks’ exposure to domestic government debt and an abrupt increase in funding costs from rating downgrades; the report also indicated that lending in 2020 was strongly driven by government loan guarantees;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 347 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
35. Notes the importance of depositors across the Banking Union enjoying the same level of protection of their savings; takes note of the Commission proposal to further strengthen citizens’ confidence in the protection of deposits by introducing an EDISregrets that insufficient progress in risk reduction in some Member States serves as an argument for mutualisation of deposit insurance schemes, creating incentives for some Member States not to reduce risk, or even to engage in even more excessive risk-taking; points out that the absence of a proper impact assessment of the EDIS proposal is fundamentally at odds with principles of sound governance;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 369 #

2020/2122(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
36. Notes the Commission’s launch of the review of the CMDI framework, including the op; asks for more efforts to come forward with ambitious solutions to the issue of sovereign exposures and a substantial reductions of a hybrid EDISthe stock of non-performing loans;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 7 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 20
— having regard to the Commission’s Economic Forecast: Springummer 2020 of 6 Ma7 July 2020 (Institutional Paper 125),
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 14 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas the national and regional lockdown measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic isare causing an unprecedented and symmetric shock both for the EU and globallymost of the developed world, and its duration and its health, social and economic impact are not yet completely foreseeable;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 18 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas the shock is symmetrical but the impact varies considerably among Member States, reflecting the severity of the pandemic and the stringency of their containment measures, but alsoeconomic impact of the lockdown and confinement measures varies considerably among Member States, reflecting their specific economic exposures and initial conditions, including their available scope for discretionary fiscaleconomic policy responses;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 26 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas a determined, coordinated and solidarity-basedn effective and efficient European response ismay be essential to mitigate the negative economic and social consequences of the crisinational and regional lockdown measures and the further deepening of macroeconomic divergence;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 51 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Notes with great concern that, according to the Commission’s Springummer 2020 economic forecast, the EU is expected to suffer the deepest recession in its history in 2020, significantly worse than the projections in the Spring forecast, including a euro area contraction by 8.7%; notes that the recession is more limited in those EU Member States that still retain their monetary sovereignty;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Takes note of the comment of Commission Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis following the publication of the Summer Economic Forecast of 2020, that "the economic impact of the lockdown is more severe than we initially expected", which only further illustrates the cluelessness of the Commission in economic matters, especially crisis management;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 64 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Is concerned about the negative impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the globalEuropean economy, trade, consumer trust, income inequalities and poverty, as well as the risk of regulatory overreach, a more lenient approach to sovereign debt issues and debt-financing of national budgets, and the rise of mass surveillance;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Points out that the Commission’s estimate of the investment needs of the EU for delivering the green transition and digital transformation amounts to at least EUR 595 billion per year8 ; _________________ 8 Commission Staff Working Document - Identifying Europe's recovery needs, p. 16: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/eco nomy- finance/assessment_of_economic_and_inv estment_needs.pdf should shelve its Green Deal in the light of the COVID-19 crisis;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Recognises that the EUMember States faces the unprecedented challenge of mitigating the social and economic consequences of the historic recession and setting the course for a rapidsustainable economic recovery linked to a sustainable and just transition and digital transformation; is convinced that, for this,based on equity and sound budgetary policies; warns that a significant increase in public and private investment compared to the 2010s is indispensable and that the increased level of investmentwill make the already unsustainable debt levels across many Member States even more problematic, and will increase market volatility; believes that an increased level of budgetary discipline must be stabilised for many years to come;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 99 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. WelcomDeplores the swift and strong responabuse tof the crisis in the area ofto further loosen monetary and fiscal policy, at both EU and Member State level, as well as the European Recovery Plan; considers it essential that the recovery package is fully aligned with the EU’s new growth strategy, i.e. in accordance with the principles of the European Green Deal (EGD), the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and with the aim to protect women’s rights and achieve gender equality; demands that funds and resources be directed to projects and beneficiaries that comply with our Treaty-based fundamental values and that recipient firms protect their workers, pay their fair share of taxes, and refrain from paying out dividends or offering share buy-back schemes aimed at remunerating shareholders and its proposed partial debt-financing; recalls that debt-financing is prohibited under article 311 TFEU;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 116 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. WelcomeRegrets the activation of the general escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact, and expects that it will remain activated at least until the end of 2021 in order to support the efforts of the Member States toallow increased public spending and debt financing of the Member States, which will only increase market volatility; urges the Commission and the Member States to focus rather on sustainable recovery from the consequences of the lockdown measures following the pandemic crisis and strengthen their economic and social resilience;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 132 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Recalls the specific need to foster convergence within the euro areaprepare an orderly break-up of the euro area; calls on the Commission to prepare withdrawal scenarios for Member States to leave the euro area, including a proposal for a Treaty change to make it possible to expel Member States from the euro area, if they persistently cause economic problems to the eurozone as a whole;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 141 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Notes with concern that TARGET 2 imbalances are increasing, despite a narrowing in trade imbalances, indicating continued capital outflows from the euro area periphery; is especially worried about Italy´s TARGET 2 liabilities, which hit a new all-time high at € 537 billion;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 150 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. WelcomesTakes note of the conclusion of the European Fiscal Board (EFB)9 that the fiscal framework has to be revised, and is convinced that the deep economic crisis triggered by the lockdown measures following the pandemic further exacerbates this need; believes that the review and reform have to meet the above requirements in terms of increasing investment relating to climate change and digitalisation and stabilising the new level of investment, while ensuring sound budgetary management; _________________ 9EFB Annual report 2019, p. 71 - https:/ec.europa.eu/info/sites/infos/files/20 19-efb-annual-report_en.pdf
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 158 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Is concerned about the significant but uneven negative impact of the lockdown measures following the COVID- 19 crisis on government deficit and private debt, which further aggravates the situation of Member States that are particularly affected by the pandemic and/or pre- existing high levels of government debt; calls for a solution that guarantees the sustainability of public debtmbitious cuts in public debt and for an ambitious overhaul of the debt- financing culture across the EU, if the common currency is to survive the next decade;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 163 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Considers it essential that the revision of the EU’s fiscal and economic policy framework should be completed by the time the escape clause is repealed and should enable fiscal policy to respond with discretion to shocks in the short term, and to reduce high public debt ratios to an agreed reference value in the long term, while allowing a sufficient level of public investment, progressive tax policies and the repayment of loans in a cycle- comfortable manner, andescape clause is repealed as soon as possible, and to reduce high public debt ratios to an absolute minimal value in the long- term modernisation of public commodities;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 183 #

2020/2078(INI)

11. Proposes a combination of expenditure rules for public non- investment expenditure and a golden rule for public investment which is central to both; wishes to see a rapid recovery from the COVID-19 crisis and a transition to a cleaner, socially sustainable and more digital society;deleted
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 204 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. WelcomesTakes note of the refocus of the European Semester Spring Package aimed at providing an immediate economic policy response to tackle and mitigate the health and socio-economic impact of COVID-19 and reboot economic activity; supports the Commission’s announcement of a reform of the European Semester to convert it into a tool to coordinate the recovery measures, framed by the principles of the EGD, the EPSR and the SDGs; is convinced that this has to include the coordination of measures concerning state aid and tax policies; underlines the need for the integration of a new set of binding sustainability and wellbeing indicators and alternative measurements of growth performance;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 229 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Recognises the role that the Commission has allotted to the European Semester in the Recovery Plan; notes, however, that the effectiveness and success of the alignment of Member States’ investment and reform programmes to the Semester process will depend on the progress of the Semester reform and the above-mentioned reform ofrespect for the Stability and Growth Pact;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 235 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Reiterates its call for the strengthening of Parliament’s democratic role in the economic governance framework in any upcoming TreatyWelcomes that the Commission change and, in the meantime, for an Interinstitutional Agreement on Sustainable European Governance granting Parliament a right of consent on the policy recommendations presented in the Annual Sustainable Growth Survey, the euro area fiscal package and thenot force Member States to comply with its Country Specific Recommendations;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 248 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Underlines that public revenues are essential to finance the post-pandemic recovery and the just transition to a sustainable economy; recalls that tax evasion and tax avoidance at EU level amount to up to EUR 160-190 billion each year, constituting missing revenues for the treasuries; underlines that this crisis should not be abused as an argument to increase taxation and public expenditure across Member States; regrets that civil society organisations, such as the Open Society Foundation, with an endowment of almost 20 billion US dollars, are still exempt from the transparency requirements under the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 259 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Invites the Commission to explore new policies suggested by international institutions that support and contribute to financing a just transition and sustainable growth, as well as aiming to restore Member States’ public finances; calls for the new basket of resources to include income stemming from EU policies favouring both the implementation of environmental protection and the preservation of a fair single market;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 267 #

2020/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Recalls the urgent need to complete and reinforce the EMU architecture with a view to protecting citizens and reducing pressure on public finances during external shocks so as to overcome social and economic imbalances, by creating a fiscal capacity for public investment, a macroeconomic stabilisation and cohesion function for the euro area, and a European unemployment benefit reinsurance scheme;deleted
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 3 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 11
— having regard to the final report and recommendations of the High-Level Group on Own Resources,deleted
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 52 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. WelcomeRejects the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan (SEIP) as central in ensuring the success of the Green Deal and the transition towards a more sustainable and resilient economythe financial arm of the European Green Deal scam, created for centrally planning the economies of the Member States and funnelling taxpayers' money and artificially cheap credit to politically desirable sectors and undertakings;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 59 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Stresses the importance to provide for an economically viable transition, in particular for SMEs and micro- enterprises in terms of time and conversion tools;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 62 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 c (new)
1c. Stresses that an equitable transition to a sustainable and resilient economy cannot be separated from an effective digitalization plan. As the facts demonstrated during the Corona virus pandemic, digitization allows doing many remote activities, such as working, attending school or university’s lessons, having a medical consultation; consequently, it could be possible to greatly reduce the pollution from today's very high mobility and would allow repopulating many areas currently depopulated; so stresses that the repopulation of ex populated areas would benefit the environment in terms of ordinary maintenance of the territory, avoiding the hydrogeological risk to which some areas are now more exposed;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 69 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. WelcomeRejects the Commission’s European Recovery Plan with the European Green Deal at its heart; endorsestakes not of the underlying principleassumption that public investments will respect the oath to ‘do no harm’; emphasises that national recovery and resilience plans should put the EU on the path to a 50 % to 55 % reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 and climate neutrality by 2050, since they are the result of central planning by elected and mostly unelected government officials redistributing taxpayers' money and could do more harm to a sustainable economy than informed investment decisions by entrepreneurs dealing with their own capital or capital voluntarily entrusted to them by market investors;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 92 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Stresses that the success of the EU’s aim to achieve climate neutrality will depend on the adequacy of the financingreduce negative externalities detrimental to the environment, will depend on the adequacy of the financing, which has become increasingly difficult under the ultra-accommodative monetary policies of the European Central Bank;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 100 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Stresses that the success of the EU’s aim to achieve climate neutrality will depend on the adequacy of the financingmust be reached with the lowest social and economic impact;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 105 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Recalls that Article 311 TFEU prohibits the EU from contracting debt; underlines that issuing debt is a defining feature of sovereign states;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 111 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Questions whether the SEIP, as currently constituted, will enable the mobilisation of the surprisingly round amount of EUR 1 trillion by 2030, given the negative economic outlook following the COVID-19 crisis and seemingly completely arbitrary nature of that number; requests the Commission to ensure full transparency on equity and debt financing issues, such as the optimistic leverage effect or the lack of clarity over the extrapolations of certain amounts and the no debt clause of Article 311 TFEU; furthermore questions how the new MFF as proposed by the Commission in its revised proposals of 27 and 28 May 2020 would enable the achievement of the SEIP targets;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 136 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Wishes to see it ensured that funding from the SEIP, at EU and national level, goes towards the policies and programmes with the highest potential to contribute to the fight against climate change, and looks forward to the Commission’s upcoming climate tracking methodology using appropriately the criteria established byreturn on investment, without crowding out private investment, and looks forward to the Commission’s follow-up on the statement by Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis of 5 June 2020 on the potential conflict of interest of BlackRock´s involvement in the EU taxonomy regulation;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 157 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Believes that public and private finances should adhere to the EU taxonomyStability and Growth Pact, if it ever is revived, and to the Do Not Significantly Harm (DNSH) principle, in order to ensure that EU policies and financing, including the EU budget, the programmes financed through Next Generation EU, the European Semester and EIB financing do not contribute to objectives, projects and activities that significantly harm social or environmental objectivesthe economy, sovereign debt sustainability and the no debt clause enshrined in Article 311 TFEU;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 167 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Calls for the phasing-out of public and private investments in highly polluting and harmful industries for which economically feasible alternatives are available, while fully respecting the rights of Member States to choose their energy mix;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 195 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Stresses the central role of the EU budget in delivering the SEIP; reiterates its long-standing position that new initiatives should always be financed through additional appropriations and should not negatively affect other policiesown resources, as enshrined in Article 311 TFEU;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 209 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Underlines the fact that, in order to meet its obligations under the Paris Agreement, the EU’s contribution to the climate objectives should be underpinned by sound economics and ambitious minimal share of climate-related expenditure in the EU budget, going beyondpreferable below the levels of targeted spending shares of at least 25 % over the MFF 2021- 2027 period and of 30% as soon as possible and at the latest by 2027, given the severe economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 lockdown measures, and the ongoing economic crisis, which prompts a more moderate and realistic approach by the EU;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 235 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. WelcomeRejects the proposal to top up the Just Transition Fund (JTF), since money does not grow on trees or can be printed without consequences, including with additional funds from Next Generation EU, and the two additional pillars of the Just Transition Mechanism, namely a dedicated scheme under InvestEU and a public sector loan facility, which will contribute to alleviating the economic effects of the transition to climate neutrality on the most vulnerable regioninject even more artificially cheap credit in our already credit-addicted economy, without substantial effects ion the EUreal economy;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 253 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. WelcomeRejects the role of InvestEU in the implementation and functioning of the SEIP and considerdeplores that it should be at the heart of the Union’s green, fair and resilientcentrally-planned and economically unsound recovery; welcomerejects, therefore, the Commission’s proposal to increase the programme’s size and scope; welcomerejects the proposal to create a Strategic Investment Facility within InvestEU to promote sustainable investments in key technologies and value chainsinvestments dubiously labelled as sustainable or green in technologies and value chains which are deemed to be "key", by political decree;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 274 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Notes that the Innovation Fund and the Modernisation Fund should make a significant contribution to the sustainable transition, and welcomes in particular the fact that the Modernisation Fund is designed to support investments to improve energy efficiency in 10 lower- income Member States and is therefore an important tool in ensuring a just transitionModernisation Fund is designed to funnel EU money into Eastern-European Member States, several of which have been downgraded in Transparency´s International Corruption Perceptions Index during recent years;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 285 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. SuppDeplortes the Commission’s innovativesneaky approach in stating that the EU budget will contribute to achieving climate objectives also through its revenue side, which means more and new taxes, and underlines that Article 113 TFEU should be fully respected;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 291 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Reaffirms its previous position regarding candidates for new own resources, and calls on the Commission to proposejects the introduction of new EU own resources, which correspond to essential EU objectives including the fight against climate change and the protection of the environment; asks, therefore, for the introduction of new own resources based on the auction revenues of the Emissions Trading System, a contribution on non-recycled plastic packaging waste, the future Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base or a precursor based on operations of large enterprises, a tax on digital companies, and a financial transaction taxwill ultimately lead to further taxation of businesses and increased tax pressure on citizens;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 293 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Reaffirms its previous position regarding candidates for new own resources, and calls on the Commission to propose new own resources which correspond to essential EU objectives including the fight against climate change and the protection of the environment; asks, therefore, for the introduction of new own resources based on the auction revenues of the Emissions Trading System, a contribution on non-recycled plastic packaging waste, the future Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base or a precursor based on operations of large enterprises, a tax on digital companies, and a financial transaction taxcalls that for a nation to tax itself into prosperity, is like a man standing in a bucket and trying to lift himself up by the handle; rejects the ever more innovate efforts of the Commission in pursuit of own resources;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 318 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Deplores the Commission's approach to creating new European taxes such as the "carbon tax" or the "plastic tax", which would have a very negative impact on consumers and businesses at an already difficult time for the recovery of the economy hit hard by the crisis of the Coronavirus;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 340 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Welcomesarns that the efforts of the European Investment Bank (EIB) to revise its energy lending policy and to devote 50 % of its operations to climate action and environmental sustainability; calls on the EIB to commit to the sustainable transition towards climate neutrality while taking into account the different energy mixes of Member States and devoting particular attention to the sectors and regions most affected by the transitionould lead to asset bubbles in those markets concerned; calls on the EIB to respect the different energy mixes of Member States;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 363 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Recognises the important role of the national promotional banks and institutions and of international financial institutions (IFIs) in the financing of sustainable projects, thereby contributing to the achievement of the goals of the Paris Agreementsound monetary polices, a stable money supply, stable prices and normal interest rates in the financing of sustainable projects, which require longer time horizons and have lower time preference;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 375 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. RecallsTakes note of the statement of the ECB President that the ECB is supporting the development of a taxonomy as a way of facilitating the incorporation of environmental considerations in central bank portfolios; calls on the ECB to evaluate the feasibility of including sustainability criteria in its collateral framework and its annual stress testing exercise, while assessing ways to guide lending towards energy transition investments and to rebuild a sustainable economy in the aftermath of the COVID- 19 crisisquestions whether these operations fall within the scope of the mandate of the ECB, as enshrined in article 127 TFEU;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 395 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Supports a renewed sustainable equity- finance strategy; underlines the need for an EU eco-label for financial products, for an EU Green Bond Standard (EU GBS), and for more reliable, comparable and accessible sustainability data obtained by harmonising sustainability indicators and creating a public sustainability data register based on sound economics; underlines the need for more reliable, comparable and accessible sustainability data obtained by independent market research;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 406 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Insists on the integration of social objectives in the sustainability framework, including through an evaluation of extending the scope of taxonomy and the development of an EU Social Bond Standard;deleted
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 421 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Insists on the integration of governance objectives in the sustainability framework, including withrough additional voting rights for long-term shareholders, reform of remt creating extra red tape and costs for both underation structures and fiduciary duties for top-line management, and mandatory sustainability reporting and due diligence for financial institutions and large corporates; welcomes the preparation of a sustainable corporate governance initiativetakings, shareholders and customers, like we have seen in the aftermath of the chaotic implementation of MiFID II;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 459 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Calls for the introduction of an enabling framework for public sustainable investments to achieve the goals set out in the European Green Deal, but sStresses that whatever financing model is chosen, it must not underminerespect the sustainability of public finance in the EU; supports the commitment by EVP Dombrovskis to explore how taxonomy can be used in the public sector, especially the no debt clause enshrined in Article 311 TFEU; warns that applying taxonomy to the public sector can undermine national sovereignty of Member States and curb their exclusive competences; calls for public support for airlines to be used in a sustainable and efficient manner;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 491 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Recalls that the European Semester is a futile framework for EU Member States to coordinate their budgetary and economic policies; believes that it couldsince it has not been able to keep Member States in line with the Stability and Growth Pact, it could a fortiori not facilitate the implementation of the European Green Deal, the European Pillar of Social Rights and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); believes that the SDGs should be at the heart of EU’s po within the framework of the Stabilicty making processand Growth Pact;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 514 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
25. SupporRejects the Solvency Support Instrument to level the playing field in the single market, and the introduction of centralised ‘transition plans’ for certain politically favoured companies to increase the sustainprofitability of their activities; considers that society can ask for a quid pro quo when providing support to companies; believes that transition plans should be obligatory for companies seeking state aid or EU-level support unless it is clear that they do not engage in environmentally or socially harmful activities; urges the Commission to only approve transition plans that set businesses on the path to the climate- neutral and circular economy without significantly harming any other environmental or social objectivbelieves that taxpayers should ask for a quid pro quo when providing support to companies;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 530 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
26. Invites the Commission to revise the Energy Tax Directive and coordinate a kerosene tax that could also feed into the EU budget;deleted
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 533 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
26. Invites the Commission to revise the Energy Tax Directive and coordinate a kerosenot to coordinate a kerosene tax because it would affect mostly the consumer rather than the airline companies; underlines tax that could also feed into the EU budgehe importance of incentivizing the use of alternative means of transport to the air carriers through facilitations for greener transport;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 554 #

2020/2058(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
27. Wishes it to be ensured that all contribute and profit equitably to the post- corona recovery and the transition to a sustainable economy; seeks an intensified fight against tax fraud, tax evasion and tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning; calls on the Commission to create a blacklist of EU Member States facilitating tax avoidance; calls for EU-level coordination to avoid aggressive tax planning by individuals and corporates; seeks in this context an ambitious strategy for business taxation for the 21st centuryrecalls that only innovation and entrepreneurial spirit, unlike taxation and regulation, can foster economic recovery and innovation;
2020/07/03
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 9 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 d (new)
– having regard to the answer given by Vice-President Dombrovskis on behalf of the Commission E-001130/2017 of 10 April 2017,
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 28 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the financial sector is under extreme pressure by the ultra-low interest rate environment dictated by the ECB to cut costs and find new and innovative ways to work more efficiently, including through digital finance;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 34 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas the ultra-accommodative policies of the ECB cast doubt on a sustainable future for the common currency, which stresses the importance of cryptocurrencies and crypto-assets as reliable stores of value and as a hedge against monetary insecurity;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 43 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) mis based on the concept of a stable asset, is sovereign in nature and therefore distinct to crypto-assetses the point of decentralised and encrypted safe stores of value, unless its issuance algorithm is completely separated from central banking policy, and it is untraceable and anonymous;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 45 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas possible initiatives for implementing CBDCs are under consideration, both within the Union and on at global level; underlines however that the development of CBDCs does not fall within the mandate of the ECB, which is to maintain price stability;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 60 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)
Ia. whereas in its report on decentralised transaction networks (DLT), published in January 2017, ESMA concluded that it was too early for regulatory measures because the technology in the financial markets was still in its early stages;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 65 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital I b (new)
Ib. whereas ESMA expects, according to its report on decentralised transaction networks (DLT), that the new technology will bring various advantages, but also challenges in terms of control, data protection, cross-system interoperability, the application of common standards and access to central bank balances;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 78 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital M
M. whereas operational problems, particularly ICT and security risks, especially hacking by foreign powers, can generate systemic risks for the financial sector;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 79 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital O
O. whereas the ICT and security risks faced by the financial sector, and its level of integration at EU level, warrant specific and more advanced actions that build on but go beyond the NIS Directive;deleted
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 80 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital P
P. whereas cyber resilience is an integral part of the work on the operational resilience of financial institutions carried out by authorities on a globmultilateral level;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 110 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the commitment of the Commission to finalising an Action Plan on FinTech by Q3 of 2020; considers that a Commission proposal on crypto-assets, as well as acould be useful and warranted, and could include rules on cross-sectoral financial services, actnd on operational and cyber resilience, are timely and necessary due to recent developments in the markets; requests that the Commission submit on the basis of Article 114 respective proposal following the recommendations set out in the Annex hereto;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 123 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that FinTech will be integral to the success of the Capital Markets Union (CMU) and encourages the Commission to consider how to harness the benefits of FinTech in driving forwardmaking capital markets integration in the Union the Union more resilient;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 133 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Calls on the Commission to deploy a proportionate, cross-sectorial and holistic approach to its work on FinTech, and focus on not smothering innovation with overregulation and red tape;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 139 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Calls on the Commission to act as first mover in order to create a favourable environment for European FinTech hubs and firms to scale up, for example by exempting such hubs and firms from the increasingly harmonised tax regulation at EU level;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 149 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – introductory part
6. Stresses that law and supervision in the area of FinTech should be based on the following principles:
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 156 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 – point c a (new)
ca. preferential treatment of technologies developed in the EU and financed by EU sources;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 178 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Highlights the importance of the triangle of trust, identity and dataprotection and data security in order to ensure that operators, consumers and supervisors are able to have confidence in digital finance;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 201 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Considers that developing a pan- European taxonomy for crypto-assets is desirable as a step towards fosteringe need for a common understanding, facilitating collaboration across jurisdictions and providing greater regulatorysupervisory and legal certainty for market participants engaged in cross border activity; recommends taking into account the importance of international cooperation and global initiatives as regards frameworks for crypto-assets, bearing in mind in particular their borderless nature; cautions, however, that developing an open-ended taxonomy template may be more appropriate for this evolving market segment, but will ultimately be detrimental to legal certainty, and will be quickly outdated due to technological progress;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 212 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Believes, therefore, that any further categorisation should be cautious, restrained, balanced and flexible in order to give space for innovation in the sector while ensuring that risks can be identified at an early stage;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 222 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Further stresses that clear guidance on the applicable regulatory and prudential processes is needed in order to provide regulatory and prudential certainty regarding crypto- assets;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 232 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Points out that applying existing regulations to previously unregulated crypto-assets will be necessary, as will creating bespoke regulatory regimes for evolving crypto-asset activities, such as initial coin offeringdifficult, since such technological innovations usually innovate by finding ways to circumvent new regulatory initiatives;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 241 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Highlights that a common Union framework on crypto-assets shcould help increase consumer and investor protection, enhance know your customer (KYC) obligations and oversight of the underlying technology;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 268 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Points out that with the increasing digitalisation of financial services, as well as outsourcing to external IT solution or maintenance providers, such as cloud providers, the exposure of financial institutions and markets to disruption caused by internal failures or external attacks by foreign powers is becoming more pronounced;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 276 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Calls on the Commission to propose legislative changerefits in the area of ICT and cyber security requirements for the Union financial sector in order to address any inconsistencies, gaps and loopholes that are found to exist in relevant law;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 289 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Regrets that the supervisory negligence preceeding the downfall of Wirecard suggests that FinTechs profit from preferential treatment by supervisory authorities; regrets that the European institutions, including the European Parliament, has contributed in creating a hype around FinTechs; calls on national and European authorities to curb their enthusiasm when promoting FinTech;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 300 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Points out that the Union is the global standard setter as regards personal data protection; highlights that the transfer and use of personal and non-personal data in the financial services sector should meet all relevant standardadhere to these principles while allowing for the flow of data needed to scale up innovative finance initiatives;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 321 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Points out that customer data or “big data” is being increasingly used by financial institutions; recalls the provisions of Article 71 of the GDPR and calls on all stakeholders to increase efforts to guarantee the enforcement of the rights therein; believes that GDPR requirements should be stricter for non-EU financial institutions and intermediaries buying, selling, compiling and analysing big data;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 326 #

2020/2034(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Believes that both the lack of accessible data and information regarding FinTech activities as well as overburdening enterprises, supervisors and regulators with elaborate reporting requirements, like we have seen following the implementation of MiFID II, can be a detriment to growth; advocates for increased transparency and enhancedquitable reporting of FinTech activity so as to reduce asymmetries and risk, risks and compliance costs;
2020/07/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 161 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) Legislative disparities and unevack of coordination and of interoperability between national regulatory or supervisory approaches on ICT risk trigger obstacles to the single market in financial servicross-border cyber resiliences, impeding the smooth exercise of the freedom of establishment and the provision of services for financial entities with cross- border presence. Competition between the same type of financial entities operating in different Member States may equally be distorted. Notably for areas where Union harmonisation has been very limited - such as the digital operational resilience testing - or absent - such as the monitoring of ICT third-party risk - disparities stemming from envisaged developments at national level could generate further obstacles to the functioning of the single market to the detriment of market participants and financial stability.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 166 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
(14) The use of a regulation helps reducing regulatory complexity, fosters supervisory convergence, increases legal certainty, while also contributing to limiting compliance costs, especially for financial entities operating cross-border, and to reducing competitive distortions. The choice of a Regulation for the establishment of a common framework for the digital operational resilience of financial entities appears therefore the most appropriate way to guarantee a homogenous and coherent application of all components of the ICT risk management by the Union financial sectors.deleted
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 175 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20 a (new)
(20 a) Where financial entities are required to report ICT-related incidents under this Regulation or under other Union or national law, the competent authorities should ensure that the reporting process is streamlined and done in a manner which utilises the model of a ‘one-stop shop’ authority in order to facilitate efficient reporting. Furthermore, given the regulatory framework under the Single Rulebook and cybersecurity legislation, national legislators and competent authorities at both Union and national level should ensure that the principle of proportionality is strictly followed in order to prevent an excessive burden on market participants.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 176 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
(21) ICT-related incident reporting thresholds and taxonomies vary significantly at national level. While common ground may be achieved through relevant work undertaken by tThe European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA)33 and the NIS Cooperation Group for the financial entities under Directive (EU) 2016/1148, divergent approaches on thresholds and taxonomies still exist or can emerge for the remainder of financial entities. This entails multiple requirements that financial entities must abide to, especially when operating across several Union jurisdictions and when part of a financial group. Moreover, these divergences may hinder the creation of further Union uniform or centralisedprovide the necessary coordination between national practices. ENISA and the NIS Cooperation group should improve cross-border mechanisms speeding up the reporting process and supporting a quick and smooth exchange of information between competent authorities, which is crucial for addressing ICT risks in case of large scale attacks with potentially systemic consequences. _________________ 33ENISA Reference Incident Classification Taxonomy, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/r eference-incident-classification-taxonomy.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 179 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22
(22) To enable competent authorities to fulfil their supervisory roles by obtaining a complete overview of the nature, frequency, significance and impact of ICT- related incidents and to enhance the exchange of information between relevant public authorities, including law enforcement authorities and resolution authorities, it is necessary to lay down rules in order to complete the ICT-related incident reporting regime with the requirements that are currently missing in financial subsector legislation and remove any existing overlaps and duplications to alleviate costs. It is therefore essential to harmonisstreamline the ICT-related incident reporting regime by requiring all financial entities to report to their competent authorities only. In addition, the ESAs should be empowered to further specify ICT-related incident reporting elements such as taxonomy, timeframes, data sets, templates and applicable thresholds, after consultation of the national supervisory authorities.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 180 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
(23) Digital operational resilience testing requirements have developed in some financial subsectors within several and unsometimes under-coordinated, national frameworks addressing the same issues in a different way. This leads to duplication of costs for cross-border financial entities and makes difficultcould hamper the mutual recognition of results. Uncoordinated testing can therefore segment the single market.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 181 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24
(24) In addition, where no testing is required, vulnerabilities remain undetected putting the financial entity and ultimately the financial sector’s stability and integrity at higher risk. Without Union intervention, digital operational resilience testing would continue to be patchy and there would be no mutual recognition of testing results across different jurisdictions. Also, as it is unlikely that other financial subsectors would adopt such schemes on a meaningful scale, they would miss out on the potential benefits, such as revealing vulnerabilities and risks, testing defence capabilities and business continuity, and increased trust of customers, suppliers and business partners. To remedy such overlaps, divergences and gaps, it is necessaryTo remedy such overlaps, divergences and gaps, it could be useful to lay down rules aiming at coordinated testing by financial entities and competent authorities, thus facilitating the mutual recognition of advanced testing for significant financial entities.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 199 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 43
(43) Further reflection on the possible centralisation of ICT-related incident reports should be envisaged, by means of a single central EU Hub either directly receiving the relevant reports and automatically notifying national competent authorities, or merely centralising reports forwarded by the national competent authorities and fulfilling a coordination role. The ESAs should be required to prepare, in consultation with ECB and, ENISA and national supervisory authorities, by a certain date a joint report exploring the feasibility of setting up such a central EU Hub.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 203 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 47
(47) The conduct of such monitoring should follow a strategic approach to ICT third-party risk formalised through the adoption by the financial entity’s management body of a dedicated strategy, rooted in a continuous screening of all such ICT third-party dependencies. To enhance supervisory awareness over ICT third-party dependencies, and with a view to further support the Oversight Framework established by this Regulation, financial supervisors should regularly receive essential information from the Registers and should be able to request extracts thereof on an ad-hoc basis. The frequency of such interactions should be proportionate to the risk assessment of the entities, their size, and the reliability and security of the information sharing systems.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 207 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 49
(49) To address the systemic impact of ICT third-party concentration risk, a balanced solution through a flexible and gradual approach should be promoted since rigid caps or strict limitations may hinder business conduct and contractual freedom. Financial entities should thoroughly assess contractual arrangements to identify the likelihood for such risk to emerge, including by means of in-depth analyses of sub-outsourcing arrangements, notably when concluded with ICT third-party service providers established in a third country. This Regulation should forbid outsourcing arrangements with third country ICT third-party service providers if those third parties have, or are suspected of having, ties to foreign governments or to foreign militaries. At this stage, and with a view to strike a fair balance between the imperative of preserving contractual freedom and that of guaranteeing financial stability, it is not considered appropriate to provide for strict caps and limits to ICT third-party exposures. The ESA designated to conduct the oversight for each critical ICT third- party provider (“the Lead Overseer”) should in the exercise of oversight tasks pay particular attention to fully grasp the magnitude of interdependences and discover specific instances where a high degree of concentration of critical ICT third-party service providers in the Union is likely to put a strain on the Union financial system’s stability and integrity and should provide instead for a dialogue with critical ICT third-party service providers where that risk is identified.38 _________________ 38In addition, should the risk of abuse by an ICT third-party service provider considered dominant arise, financial entities should also have the possibility to bring either a formal or an informal complaint with the European Commission or with the national competition law authorities.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 232 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 67
(67) Competent authorities should possess all necessary supervisory, investigative and sanctioning powers to ensure the application of this Regulation. Administrative penalties should, in principle, be published. Since financial entities and ICT third-party service providers can be established in different Member States and supervised by different sectoral competent authorities, close cooperation between the relevant national competent authorities, includingand the ECB with regard to specific tasks conferred on it by Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201339 , and consultation with the ESAs should be ensured by the mutual exchange of information and provision of assistance in the context of supervisory activities. _________________ 39 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 234 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 69 – point 1
Technical standards should ensure the consistent harmonisation of the requirements laid down in this Regulation without hindering innovation and equal treatment of different types of technology. As bodies with highly specialised expertise, the ESAs should be mandated to develop draft regulatory technical standards which do not involve policy choices, for submission to the Commission. Regulatory technical standards should be developed in the areas of ICT risk management, reporting, testing and key requirements for a sound monitoring of ICT third-party risk.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 245 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) crypto-asset service providers, issuers and offerors of crypto-assets, issuers of asset- referenced tokens and issuers of significant asset-referenced tokens,
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 258 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point o
(o) institutions for occupational retirement pensions, unless they are micro, small or medium-sized enterprises,
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 266 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point u a (new)
(u a) central banks, including the ECB.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 269 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 2
2. For the purposes of this Regulation, entities referred to in paragraph (a) to (t) and central banks, including the ECB, shall collectively be referred to as ‘financial entities’.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 323 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 44 a (new)
(44 a) ‘offeror of crypto-assets’ means offeror of ‘crypto-assets’ as defined in point [(h) of Article 3 (1)] of [OJ: insert reference to MICA Regulation];
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 324 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 45 a (new)
(45 a) ‘offeror of asset-referenced tokens’ means an offeror of asset- referenced payment tokens as defined in point [(i) of Article 3 (1]) of [OJ: insert reference to MICA Regulation];
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 325 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 46 a (new)
(46 a) ‘offeror of significant asset- referenced tokens’ means an offeror of significant asset-referenced payment tokens as defined in point ([j) of Article 3 (1)] of [OJ: insert reference to MICA Regulation];
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 326 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 50
(50) 'micro, small and medium-sized enterprise’ means a financial entity as defined in Article 2(3) of the Annex to Recommendation 2003/361/EC.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 365 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 9 – point g
(g) assessing the need for a multi- vendor strategy and, if applicable, and depending on the risk profile of the financial institution, defining a holistic ICT multi- vendor strategy at entitygroup level showing key dependencies on ICT third- party service providers and explaining the rationale behind the procurement mix of third-party and intra-group service providers. Upon the request of the competent authorities, the multi-vendor strategy may be defined at entity level. A multi-vendor strategy shall be defined at entity level for ICT third-party service providers from third countries.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 394 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
3. To achieve the objectives referred to in paragraph 2, financial entities shall use state-of-the-art ICT technology and processes that are proportionate to the risks identified and the size and client base of the relevant financial entity, which:
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 476 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. The ESAs shall, through the Joint Committee of the ESAs (the ‘Joint Committee’) and after consultation with the European Central Bank (ECB) and, ENISA and national supervisory authorities, develop common draft regulatory technical standards further specifying the following:
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 506 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 3 – point a
(a) an initial notification, without delay, but no latin case of a major ICT-related incident, a notification from critical ICT third-party providers thano the end of the business day, or, in casecompetent authority of athe major ICT- related incident that took place later than 2 hours before the end of the business day,, without undue delay and not later than 472 hours from the beginning of the next business day, or, where reporting channels are not available, as soon as they become availableafter becoming aware of it;
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 526 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. The ESAs, through the Joint Committee and after consultation with ENISA and the ECB and national supervisory authorities, shall develop:
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 535 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1
1. The ESAs, through the Joint Committee and in consultation with ECB and, ENISA and national supervisory authorities, shall prepare a joint report assessing the feasibility of further centralisation of incident reporting through the establishment of a single EU Hub for major ICT-related incident reporting by financial entities. The report shall explore ways to facilitate the flow of ICT-related incident reporting, reduce associated costs and underpin thematic analyses with a view to enhancing supervisory convergence.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 550 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 2
2. The digital operational resilience testing programme shall include a range of assessments, tests, methodologies, practices and tools to be applied in accordance with the provisions of Articles 22 and 23. Where Union legislation requires financial entities to carry out any digital operational or resilience testing and monitoring, the financial entities may pool such programmes and activities, provided they meet the requirements of any applicable legislation.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 560 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Where ICT third-party service providers are included in the remit of the threat led penetration testing, the financial entity shall take the necessary measures to ensure the participation of these providers. Participation means that ICT third-party service providers shall conduct separate TLPT or join with the financial entity in the financial entity's TLPT. Those ICT third-party service providers shall not be required to communicate information or provide any details in relation to items which are not relevant to the risk management controls of the relevant critical or important services of the relevant financial entities.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 571 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 4 – introductory part
4. EBA, ESMA and EIOPAThe ESAs shall, after consulting the ECB, ENISA and the national supervisory authorities, and taking into account relevant frameworks in the Union which apply to intelligence-based penetration tests, develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify further:
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 603 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – point 8 – point d a (new)
(d a) ICT third-party service provider becomes or is suspected of becoming at least partially owned or controlled by foreign governments or foreign militaries;
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 610 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – point 11 a (new)
11 a. The rules of this Regulation concerning ICT services shall apply without prejudice to the right of financial entities to use decentralised cryptographic solutions, or to form consortia in order to deploy or use such solutions, in which case such ICT services shall not be subject to this Chapter.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 676 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 9 a (new)
9 a. Financial entities shall not make use of an ICT third-party established in a third country if that third party has, or is suspected of having, ties with foreign governments or foreign militaries.
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 699 #

2020/0266(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 1 – point d – point iv a (new)
(iv a) refraining from entering into a further subcontracting arrangement, when the envisaged sub-contractor is an ICT third-party service provider or an ICT sub-contractor established in a third country, if this third-party has or is suspected of having ties to foreign governments or foreign militaries;
2021/06/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 30 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas the improvement in the economic situation and low interest rates provide an opportunity to implement ambitious reforms, in particular measnegative effects on banks’ net interest income and the increase in banks' lending capacity and lower costs for provisions and losses, which rewards risky behaviour and spures aimed at encouraging public investment to tackle climate change and its socispeculation, poses significant systemic threats in the banking sector and the real econsequences and create full-time jobs; omy, including the possibility of asset bubbles, especially in the green economy;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 58 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. having regard to the need for a European Climate Law with a legally binding goal of reaching net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 at the latest and an intermediate target of at least 65 % for 2030;deleted
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 85 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Notes that, in view of the political prioritization of climate change emergency, the EU’s Annual Growth Survey (AGS) has now been renamed the Annual Sustainable Growth Survey (ASGS), and considers that this implies a change in the positioning of the report and the implementation of ecological indicators;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 98 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Notes the role of the European Green Deal as the EU’s new strategy defining ecological issues and the wellbeing of citizens as principal goals for the Union; notes, with regard to the scope of the European Semester, the inclusion of the SDGs and of the principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR), which will require the adjustment of existing indicators and the creation of new ones to monitor the implementation of EU economic, environmental and social policies, as well as coherence between policy goals and budgetary means; notes the need to implement long-term planning to tackle climate change;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 123 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Considers achieving a fair transition to climate neutrality to be a major responsibility for the EU’s citizens and economy and its role in the worldUrges Member States and citizens to take responsibility for future generations, and to ensure the sustainability of our economies, productivity, innovation and wealth creation; calls for appropriate support and policies, with involvement for and of the public, the various sectors, regions and Member States with a view to benefiting from this transformation and making it a success; calls on the Commission to undertake an annual evaluation of the Union’s ecological debt, carbon budget and imported emissions; calls on the Commission to closely monitor the transitioning costs;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 136 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Notes that the euro area is going through a prolonged period of subdued growth (1.1 % in the euro area and 1.4% in the EU as a whole in 2019), with growth in the euro area in 2020 and 2021 forecast at 1.2 % and for the EU in 2020 and 2021 forecast at 1.4 %; also notes that the inflation rate is forecast to further slow down, to 1.2 % in 2019 and 2020, in a context of high uncertainty due to geopolitical tensions and Brexit; is concerned at the high level of private debt, Brexit and ongoing accommodative interest rate policies pursued by the ECB; is concerned at the high level of public as well as private debt, which has been spurred and exacerbated by the accommodative monetary policy of the ECB;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 146 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Is concerned that post-crisis investment has been on a downward path in the EU in spite of historically low interest rates set by the ECB, currently standing at 3.4 %, with overall infrastructure investment now at about 75 % of its pre-crisis level; whereas 80 % of the shortfall is the result of cutbacks in the public sector, which have occurred particularly in countries subject to adverse macroeconomic conditions and the more severe fiscal constraints imposed on disadvantaged regions already characterised by poor infrastructure quality and weak socio- economic outcomes, but also, and surprisingly, in countries with a large fiscal spaccalls on the ECB to normalise interest rates as soon as possible;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 162 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. EndorsesDisagrees with the conclusion of the European Fiscal Board (EFB) that the fiscal framework has not protected the quality of public expenditure, and welcomes the EFB’s proposal for a ‘golden rule’ to protect public investment; calls, therefore, for the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact and the introduction ofgiven persistently high public deficits in certain member states, and rejects the EFB’s proposal for a golden rule aimed at implementing sound fiscal policy on an equal footing with investment within the EU’s policy objectives; whereas this should cover the investment foreseen for the realisation of the Green Deal, the Digital Revolution, the SDGs and the EPSR Rights, including expenditure aimed at reducing poverty and inequa’ to protect public investment, as long as deficits remain high and the ECB´s monetary politcy related to social protection, health services and long-term care, and education and trainingmains accommodative;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 177 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Highlights the problem of too low a level of public investment; calls on the Commission to assess the cost of not taking action in this area, in particular by evaluating the difference between the need for investment and the actual investments made;deleted
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 191 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Calls for a European Green Industrial Strategy;deleted
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 224 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. NoteRegrets that the debt levels of all the Member States are above the pre-crisis level and are expected to exceed 60 % on average in 2021; further notes that in six Member States the ratio will be higher than 90 %; highlights the fact that the fiscal rules have not contributed to bringing down the debt levels of highly indebted countries but have, rather, increased themregrets that these member states have not made use of the favorable interest rate policy of the ECB to reduce their debt;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 235 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Supportsconsiders that much more flexibility in the implementation of the SGP as proposed by the Commission in 2015; considers that much more flexibility should be introduced in order to boost investment and ecological transition in the EU; calls, therefore, for the reform of the SGP and the introduction of a euro area fiscal capacityin order to boost investment and ecological transition in the EU will worsen the financial situation across all EU member states and will foster green asset bubbles; calls, therefore, for fiscal orthodoxy and strict adherence to the SGP;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 241 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Reiterates its call for a European stabilisation function and a European unemployment benefit reinsurance scheme, with a view to protecting citizens and reducing pressure on public finances during external shocks so as to overcome social and economic imbalances;deleted
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 266 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Is deeply concerned about the accelerating rise in house prices as a result of artificially cheap mortages due to the ultra-accommodative monetary policies of the ECB;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 284 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Recalls the importance of the efficient regulation of the banking and financial sectors in order to prevent a new crisis; believes that such regulation must integrate the ecological situation; emphasises the importance of completing the Banking Union andemphasises the need to reformabolish the European Stability Mechanism in order to avoid moral hazard;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 306 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. CRecalls forthat qualified majority voting in Council on tax matters would lead to a situation of taxation without representation in certain member states, which would only accelerate the disintegration of the European Union;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 315 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. CRecalls for the systematic inclusion of tax matters in the Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs), with the aim of ensuring economic coherence across EU Member States as well as the fairness of EU tax systems; believes that the CSRs could ensure a fair balance between sources of revenue and should also include innovative elements aiming at promoting the Green Deal; further believes that they should also support Member States in tackling tax avoidance and aggressive tax planningthat tax matters are exclusive competences of the member states;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 356 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Takes note of AMR 2020’s finding that wage growth at euro area level remains below what would be expected at the current levels of unemployment on the basis of historical data, and that this affects the inflation rate; highlights that the currently low productivity and inflation together with structural reforms transferring collective bargaining to the enterprise level are detrimental to wage growth and are leading to greater income inequality and an increase in the numbers of working poor, with in-work poverty affecting almost one in ten workers in Europe; accordingly advocates wage growth;deleted
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 367 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Agrees that it is a matter of great concern that income inequality is above pre-crisis levels in some countries, being frequently linked to unequal opportunities in access to education, training and social protection; calls on the Commission and member states to drastically limit the import of cheap labour into the EU, which drives the price of labour downwards;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 379 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Stresses that equality between women and men, gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting must become key elements of the European Semester, leading to action on gender pay, gender career development and the gender pension gap (which currently stands at 40 % in the EU);deleted
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 388 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24 a. Urges Member States to prepare for demographic developments by: 1) building fiscal buffers to arm against rising fiscal costs; 2) implementing structural reforms to reduce these costs; 3) enhancing productivity growth, which is essential to ensuring sustainable economic growth in the future; and 4) reduction of debt and risk;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 405 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
26. Looks forward to the strongbetter involvement of the EP and the national parliaments in the European Semester process and to the creation of an institutionalised dialogue with the Commission, and the social partners, territories and civil society, at both EU and national level, in order to further boost the process’s democratic legitimacy;
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 416 #

2019/2211(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
28. Instructs its President not to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.
2020/01/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 15 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 27 a (new)
- having regard to the ECB's financial stability review of November 2019,
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 17 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 27 b (new)
- having regard to the Bank of International Settlements Annual Economic Report for 2018,
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 20 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas the process of deepening the Economic and Monetary Union requires a solid Banking Union as an indispensable building block to the euro area’s financial stability, as well as the creation of a mechanism of fiscal stabilisation for the euro area as a wholesound monetary policy which adheres strictly to its mandate of price stability as enshrined in article 127 (1) TFEU is an indispensable building block to the euro area’s financial stability;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 27 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas the Banking Union remains incomplete as long as it lacks a backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); will further disintegrate due to moral hazard and lead to a permanent Transfer Union if mechanisms such as the backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) are implemented; regrets that insufficient progress in risk reduction in some member states serves as an argument for mutualisation of deposit insurance schemes, creating incentives for some member states not to reduce risk, or even engage in even more excessive risk-taking; points out that the absence of a proper impact assessment of the EDIS proposal is fundamentally at odds with the principles of sound governance;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 34 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas entrusting the ECB with the supervision of systemically important financial institutions has proven to be unsuccessful, according to the EBA's risk dashboards, which clearly show that the 50% weakest banks in the euro area did not increase their solvency ratios since 2016, and that the biggest banks are substantially worse of than smaller banks;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 37 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
C a. whereas in carrying out its supervisory activities, the European Central Bank has so far failed to sufficiently take into account the proportionality principle;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 38 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C b (new)
C b. emphasises, however, that efficient and effective supervision will not be achieved by making all institutions subject to the same rules because smaller institutions face proportionately higher compliance costs than larger ones; stresses, therefore, the urgent need for further efforts to make banking supervision arrangements more proportionate for small, low-risk institutions; emphasises that improving proportionality means that the administrative burden, in terms of compliance and disclosure requirements, should be considerably lessened;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 39 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas the development of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) whas efficientto be terminated;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 49 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls the progress made regarding the implementation of the Banking Union, namely on risk reduction; stresses, however, that further progressrisk has tonly been made, particularly on risk sharingrginally reduced, despite the favorable interest rate climate;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 65 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. WelcomDeplores the support of the [incoming] President of the European Commission and the President of the ECB for the completransformation of the Banking Union into a Transfer Union and, more globally, the Economic and Monetary Union, through the creation of a fiscal capacity designed to provide the euro area with an adequate stabilisation functionestablish a permanent transfer mechanism from member states with sound economic policies to highly indebted member states with inefficient and outdated governance structures;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 78 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Welcomes the overall increased resilience of the European banking system, as attested by the EBA’s 2018 Risk Assessment of the European Banking System; recalls however the warnings issued by the ECB in its Stability Review of November 2019 regarding lower bank profitability and asset and bond bubbles;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 83 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Notes that bank profitability has increased steadily since 2012, with return on equity surpassing 6 % since 2017; underlines that the low risk and low interest rate environment has resulted in lower costs for provisions and losses; recalls the need to continuously evaluate the levels of financing to the economy and particularly to SMEsUnderlines that the low risk and low interest rate environment has resulted in lower costs for provisions and losses; regrets that the biggest banks and highly indebted Member States have not made use of this favorable environment to reduce debt and increase productivity; recalls the need to continuously evaluate the levels of financing to the economy and particularly to SMEs, taking into account the "zombifications" of at least 10% of European companies due to this accommodative monetary policy, according to the BIS Annual Economic Report 2018;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 94 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Underlines the crucial role of the banking sector in channelling funding into sustainable investments and enabling the transition to a climate-neutral economyWarns the banking sector of green asset bubbles following the mediatic and political hype around sustainable investments and the so-called climate- neutral economy; stresses that fostering such bubbles is detrimental to the financial resilience and stability of the banking sector;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 110 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Restatejects the importestablishment and issuance of a safe asset in the euro area as a way to help stabilise financial markets and allow banks to reduce the exposure of their balance sheets to national sovereign debt; calls on the Commission to submit a legislative proposal for the creation of a true European sa, which remains untested and politically controversial, since it would distract the euro area from the real problem, namely the unsafe nature of certain euro area sovereign bonds, due to a lack of budgetary discipline at national level; recalls therefore the urgent need for ambitious structural reforms; recalls that during the financial panic of 2007, runs out of asset-backed securities were indiscriminate, and depended neither on their complexity nor on their intrinsic performance, which made new issuances impossible even for simple products, while secondary markets froze; warns that the same could happen to the market of the safe asset; recalls the conclusion of the ESRB that the safe asset does not entail any built-in promise to offer asset; stable source of finance for governments during a crisis;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 121 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 125 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6 b. Calls for measures to address concentration risk, including a large- exposure limit, possibly combined with the introduction of non-zero risk weights, to be introduced; debt and sovereign bonds should therefore be covered by equity capital;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 141 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Welcomes theTakes note of the limited progress made in the banking sector in reducing risk and increasing f, but warns about the effects of monetary policy such as lower bank profitability and zombification of banks and corporates, as shown by the ECB´s Financial sStability Review;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 147 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Notes that the ratio of non- performing loans (NPLs) held by significant institutions has fallen by more than half from the start of ECB banking supervision, in November 2014, to June 2019, declining to 3.3% in the third quarter of 2018 and down by 1.1 percentage points year-on-year; is concerned about persistent high ratios of NPLs in some Member States, but remains at unacceptably high level across the Banking Union as a whole; underlines the need to protect customers’ rights in the context of NPL transactions;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 170 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Notes that work on the implementation of the final Basel III standards has already started; recalls its resolution of 23 November 2016 on the finalisation of Basel III and calls on the Commission to act on the recommendations therein when drafting the new legislative proposals; Stresses that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) standards in particular should not be enacted wholesale into European law without taking proper account of the specific characteristics of the European banking system and of the proportionality principle;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 183 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Requests increased transparency in banking supervision and resolution authorities in order to reinforce trust from capital and financial markets, companies and citizens;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 184 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. NotWelcomes that innovative financial technologies, such as cryptocurrencies, which could become a viable alternative to the euro, are profoundly transforming the financial sector, including banking and payment services; highlights the need to address the challenges posed by these new technologies, such as ensuring sustainable business models, a level playing field in terms of regulation and supervision, and cybersecurity;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 196 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Notes that there is considerable interconnectedness between the ‘shadow banking’ sector and the ‘traditional’ banking sector, which raises concerns of systemic risk given the lack of appropriate supervision of the first; calls, in this regard, for the establishment of a macroprudential toolkit to counter threats to financial stability posed by the increasing role of the ‘shadow banking’ system;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 206 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Welcomes the agreement on the exchange of information between the ECB and the AML/CFT supervisors; recalls its serious concern about regulatory and supervisory fragmentation in the AML/CFT area, which is ill-suited to supervise the increasing cross-border activity in the EU; calls on the Commission to start working on the overhaul of the EU AML framework and legislation to effectively address the risks posed by cross-border illegal activity to the integrity of the EU financial system and the security of EU citizens;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 216 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Recalls its resolution of 8 June 2011 on credit rating agencies: future perspectives; notes thatquestions whether the creation of a European credit rating agency would contribute to increasing competition, reducing information asymmetries and increasing transparency for markets; note, since the credit rating market would still remain an oligopoly using dubious methods of assessing creditworthiness; warns that sustainability ratings based on environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria are an importantwould create more layers of complementxity to the credit risk assessments provided by credit ratings in channelling funds towards investments in; warns that such qualitative assessments could lead to channelling funds towards investments in politically mandated activities, rather than economically viable and sustainable activities;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 219 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Notes the need to increase efforts to make financial market activity more consistent with sustainability objectives and ESG criteria, underlining the central role of the ESAs in these objectives;deleted
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 225 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. WelcomNotes the fact that the Single Resolution Board has not been required to take resolution action in 2019; urges the Commission to review whether the legislation is adequate to ensure that all banks could, if needed, be resolved without the need for taxpayers’ money, including resorting to the various taxpayer funded rescue schemes including the Single Resolution Fund; invites the Commission to follow up on the Financial Stability Board review of the ‘too big to fail’ legislation and consider if legislation to separate deposit-taking and investment banking should once again be considered; regrets in this sense the comments made by Pentti Hakkarainen, Member of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, on 15 June 2019, stating that European banking needs to enter a period of consolidation, with less profitable banks exiting the market or being taken over by their more profitable competitors;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 242 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Is concerned by the lack of mechanisms in the Banking Union to ensure that emergency liquidity that can be provided in the event of a resolution and; calls on the Commission to attempt to address this gapmoral hazard without further delay; rejects the idea that the ECB could provide such liquidity;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 250 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Urges the operationalisation of the backstop todissolution of the SRF;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 254 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Stresses that some banks need to be able to operate across borders while managing their capital and liquidity at a consolidated level, in order to diversify their risks and address any lack of profitability; highlights that rules should allow for greater flexibility for the parent company in this regard, while specifying that, in the event of a crisis, the parent company should provide capital and liquidity to the subsidiary located in the host country;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 264 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Urges the compleRejects the transformation of the Banking Union into a Transfer Union through the creation of a fully mutualised EDIS, to protectforce depositors against banking disruptions and to ensure confidence among depositors and investors across the Banking Union; welcomes the support of the [incoming] President of the Commission and the President of the ECBin one Member States to pay for banking disruptions in other Member States and to disrupt confidence among depositors and investors across the Banking Union; recalls that the moral hazard of deposit protection spurs deposit banks to engage in overly risky behaviour; recalls that deposit protection discourages deposit holders to scrutinise their bank and its investment and management decisions; rejects the support of the President of the Commission and the President of the ECB for the establishment of EDIS; points out that the absence of a proper impact assessment of the EDIS proposal is fundamentally at odds with the principles of sound governance; points out that there are still significant doubts regarding the appropriate legal basis for the establishment of EDIS;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 276 #

2019/2130(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22 a. Recalls that gold is money and fiat is debt; welcomes that the German Bundesbank, for the first time since the introduction of the euro, has started to buy gold, thereby taking the necessary precautions for the inevitable; welcomes that the Polish central bank has repatriated its gold reserves; welcomes the recent statement of the Dutch Central Bank that if there were to be a major monetary reset, gold stock can serve as a basis to rebuild the global monetary system; underlines that gold bolsters confidence in the stability of the central bank's balance sheet and creates a sense of security; therefore calls on all national central banks, especially those in the euro area, to hold on to sufficient amounts of physical gold, and repatriate any gold reserves currently kept outside the national borders;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2
– having regard to the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the ECB, in particular Article 15 and Article 21 thereof,
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 3 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 3
– having regard to Article 123, Article 127(1) and (2) and Article 284 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 8 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 7 a (new)
– having regard to the Annual Economic Report 2018 of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS);
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 21 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas according to the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections of September 2019, annual inflation for the euro area in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) looks set to reach 1.2 %, 1.0 % and 1.5 % in 2019, 2020 and 2021, thus still falling short of the medium-term objective of 2 %; recalls however the large variance in inflation rates across the euro area;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas the inflation target set by the ECB has no legal base in the Treaties and, moreover, should be revised by taking into account the development of asset prices;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 23 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas at the end of 2018 the size of the Eurosystem balance sheet had reached an all-time high of EUR 4.7 trillion, over 40% of euro area GDP, an increase of 0.2 trillion compared with the end of 2017; whereas concerns continue to exist that the balance sheet of the ECB contains rising levels of risk;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 26 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas a stronger role of the euro, and its increased use as a reserve currency, would increase the EU’s ability to frame its policy stance independently vis-à-vis the US and the Federal Reserve and would ultimately provide protection from the risk of an uncooperative US approach;deleted
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 39 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H
H. whereas despite this positive trend, green bonds still account for only 1 % of the overall supply of euro-denominated bonds;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Ha. whereas there is still uncertainty and scepticism whether the APP falls within the scope of the mandate of the ECB and constitutes de facto fiscal financing policy1a; _________________ 1aDG IPOL "Policy options and risks of an extension of the ECB’s quantitative easing programme: An analysis", PE 569.994.
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 48 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H b (new)
Hb. whereas the establishment of the SSM within the ECB has created a conflict of interest that endangers the pursuit of an independent monetary policy;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 51 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H c (new)
Hc. whereas the ECB has taken significant risks into its balance sheet through the bond purchase program;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H d (new)
Hd. whereas Article 123 TFEU and Article 21 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank prohibit the monetary financing of governments;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 53 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H e (new)
He. whereas, as part of its supervisory role, the European Central Bank has so far not always sufficiently taken into account the proportionality principle;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the role of the ECB in 1. Stresses that the ECB’s independence is a requisite for fulfilling its mandate; insists that the objective of stability aims at safeguarding europrice stability and stresses that the ECB’s independence isnot the composition of the euro a requisite for fulfilling itsa, for which the ECB has no mandate;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Is concerned that after a short economic recovery, euro area growth momentum has slowed markedly to 1.2 % of GDP in the euro area and to 1.4 % of GDP for the EU-27; underlines, therefore, the need for monetary policy to remain accommodative for the foreseeable future;regrets that the heavy reliance on monetary policy to support the post-crisis recovery has also had unintended negative consequences
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 74 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Stresses that fiscalWarns that the ECB's monetary policy is a necessarcurrently cdomponent for enhancinginated by the implactk of monetary policy and reducing possible side effectsound fiscal policies in some Member States;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Recalls that both monetary and fiscal expansions work to a considerable extent by bringing spending forward in time, thereby disrupting the intertemporal allocation of resources; believes that the structural contribution that monetary policy makes to sustainable growth is limited;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 95 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Underlines that strengthening the role of the euro requires the right structural conditions, among which: - The deepening of the European Monetary Union, including a fiscal capacity for the euro area able to providing a counter-cyclical stabilisation function; - The completion of the banking union, including a fully mutualised European deposit insurance scheme that would reduce risks, promote fair competition, facilitate the expansion of pan-European banking and reinforce the stability of the euro area as a whole; - The completion of the capital markets union; - The creation of a safe asset guaranteed by euro-area Member States to foster the integration of bond markets;deleted
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 107 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 – indent 2
- The completion of the banking union, including a fully mutualised European deposit insurance scheme that would reduce risks, promote fair competition, facilitate the expansion of pan-European banking and reinforce the stability of the euro area as a wholeWarns that there is no legal base for a European deposit insurance scheme. Mutualisation does not create additional security, but rather stimulates risk-taking behaviour of banks;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 133 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. UnderliIs concernesd that the asset purchase programme (APP)certain European countries hasve provided a substantial contribution to economic recovery and the formation of households’ inflation expectations, has lfited in a disproportionate way from the PSPP, since national central banks and the ECB have purchased certain government bonds whose volume exceeds to a substantial improvement in financing conditions via several transmission channels, and has compressed yields across a wide hese Member States’ share in GDP, in two cases even by respectively 43 billion and 51 billion euros, well above the averange of asset classes; stresses, in particular, that the APP has directly improved credit conditions for the private non-financial sector with the asset-backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP) and the third covered bond purchase programm14.4% of GDP for the entire Eurozone; stresses that this strengthens the suspicion that the main goal of the PSPP is fiscal stabilisation of over-indebted Member States of the euro area, which falls outside the scope of the mandate of the (ECBPP3);.
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 139 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Considers that the ECB bond- buying programmes violate Article 123 TFEU; urges the ECB to cease its usurped political role and the monetary financing of government deficits;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 143 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. NotDeplores that on 12 September 2019 the ECB announced a broad stimulus package including an open-ended quantitative easing programme that will run at a monthly pace of EUR 20 billion per month, a cut of 10 basis points in the deposit rate, a two-tier system for reserve remuneration, and easier terms for targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO-III); calls on the ECB to end its stimulus package as soon as possible, including phasing out TLTRO;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 159 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. NoteWarns that the negative effects on banks’ net interest income have been counterbalanced so far by the benefits from moreand the increase in banks' lending capacity and lower costs for provisions and losses, which rewards risky behaviour and spurs speculation, poses significant systemic threats in the banking sector and the real economy;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 165 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Underlines that very low or negative interest rates offer opportunities to consumers, workers and borrowers, who can benefit from stronger economic momentum, lower unemployment and lower borrowing costsEmphasises that low interest rates have made issuing new debt cheaper; reiterates that debt levels in certain member state are still unsustainable; stresses that in 4 euro area Member States debt levels are still well above 100% of GDP; reiterates that low interest rates are instrumental in the emergence of market bubbles, primarily, but certainly not only, in the real estate market;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 174 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Underlines that the ECB’s non- standard monetary policy measures have kept interest rates lower, thereby forestalling Member States and highly indebted private enterprises from defaulting on their unsustainable debts;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 177 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9b. Recognises the existence of distributional consequences of the ECB policies; believes that wealth inequality has been exacerbated by the inflation of financial asset prices as financial assets are primarily held by the very wealthy;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 180 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. SuppDeplortes the intention of the Governing Council of the ECB to continue reinvesting the principal payments from maturing securities for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation, since this policy falls outside the scope of the mandate of the ECB as enshrined in article 127 TFEU;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 188 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Calls for vigilance against the risk of a resurgence in real estate bubbles and excessive household and private sector indebtedness in some Member States due to the accommodative interest policies of the ECB;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 194 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)
10b. Urges the ECB to normalise interest rates as soon as possible; considers that normalising monetary policy includes ending the practice of forward guidance;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 195 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 c (new)
10c. Recalls that ECB measures, in line with its mandate, can have favourable effects on financing conditions and investment, but warns that credit driven expansions can lead to a costly misallocation of real resources (“malinvestments”),
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 197 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 d (new)
10d. Warns that according to the BIS there have been signs of a build-up of financial imbalances, especially in countries largely spared by the global financial crisis because, in contrast to countries at the heart of the turmoil, no private sector deleveraging has taken place there; notes that the imbalances have taken the form of strong increases in private sector credit, often alongside similar increases in property prices;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 198 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 e (new)
10e. Calls for vigilance against a resurgence in real estate bubbles and excessive household and private sector indebtedness in some Member States; warns that the ECB’s continued buying of private sector bonds is a subsidy enabling companies to have exceedingly high levels of debt, thereby contributing to the over- indebtedness of the private sector;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 199 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 f (new)
10f. Reiterates its concern about the increase in TARGET2 balances indicating continued capital outflows from the euro area periphery; calls on the ECB to clarify the underlying factors and the potential risks relating to the imbalances that this could cause;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 201 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Recalls that, as an EU institution, the ECB is bound by the Paris Agreement on climate change and that this should be reflected in its policies, with full respect for its mandate and its independenc the ECB is an independent body with a strict and limited mandate enshrined in article 127 TFEU, namely to ensure price stability, which means the EU´s obligations under the Paris Agreement on climate change fall outside the scope of the ECB's mandate;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 211 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Takes good note ofRegrets Christine Lagarde’s declaration of 4 September, in which she welcomed the ECB’s collaboration in the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) and commitment to contribute to facing the challenges which climate change poses by implementing the NGFS’s recommendations and acting on them substantively wherever possible, withouthich undermininges the ECB’s price stability mandate and otherits subservient objectives;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 232 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Is extremely worried about the risks due toTakes note of the delay in setting up the banking union, and callsoncludes that there is no political will for the swift completion of the banking union with, including a fully mutualised European deposit guarantee scheme, which would only be in the interest of those Member States at the receiving end of the benevolent solidarity of other Member States; underlines that the lack of structural reforms, risk-reduction and debt-levels in aforementioned member states has created substantial distrust within the EU and between Member States;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 245 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Calls for the capital markets union (CMU) project to be accelerated in order to deepen financial integration, with a view to improving resilience to shocks and making the transmission of monetary policy across the monetary union more effective;deleted
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 256 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Calls on the ECB to increase its monitoring ofWelcomes the development of crypto- currencies and the increased risks ins a market-driven emergent alternative to the euro; calls on national central banks and supervisory authorities to monitor its development and risks in the area of cyber-security;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 270 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. ADisagrees with Christine Lagarde that a review of the ECB’s monetary policy framework is timely and warranted in order to ensure that the ECB has the "right tools" to deliver on its price stability mandate in the future; calls on the ECB to organise a public consultation as part of this process in order to ensure that the review is open to input and feedback from a broad rabelieves that the ECB has to radically moderate its ambitions and apply a strict readinge of diverse civil society stakeholdersits own mandate;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 288 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the increase in accountability under the Presidency of Mario Draghi, and looks forward to even greater accountability, dialogue and openness with the incoming PresidentLooks forward to greater accountability, dialogue and openness with the incoming President, and takes note of her promises made regarding accountability and transparency issues during her Hearing before the ECON Committee on the 4th of September 2019;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 295 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Recalls that the nominations of Executive Board members should be prepared carefully, with full transparency and together with Parliament in line with the Treaties; calls on the Council to draw up a gender-balanced shortlist for all current and upcoming vacancies and to share it with Parliament, thus allowing it to play a more meaningful advisory role in the appointment process; regrets that to date no satisfactory progress has been made;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 307 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Calls for a full external audit of the ECB;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 308 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21b. Calls on the European Central Bank to pay particular attention to the principle of proportionality in the context of the tasks assigned to it in the area of banking supervision; points out that communication with directly and indirectly supervised institutions should, in principle, be done in the national language(s) of those institutions;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 309 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 c (new)
21c. Calls on the ECB to terminate the President's membership of the G30 at once, and to carefully review its internal policies in order to protect itself from interference by the global financial sector;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 310 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 d (new)
21d. Urges the ECB, in order to prevent conflicts of interest, to publish declarations of financial interests for its Governing Council members; urges the ECB to ensure that the Ethics Committee is not chaired by a former President or other past members of the Governing Council of the ECB, nor by anyone liable to conflict of interest; calls the ECB Governing Council to follow the EU Staff Regulations and Code of Conduct and require a two-year professional abstention period for its outgoing members after the conclusion of their mandate;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 311 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 e (new)
21e. Stresses the importance of physical money as the only legal tender, and reminds all euro area countries that euro coins and banknotes and other robust stores of value must not be rejected in transactions;
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 312 #

2019/2129(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 f (new)
21f. Deplores the comments made by Christine Lagarde on the budget surpluses in Germany and the Netherlands, only days before taking up her role as president of the ECB; recalls that national investment decisions remains the prerogative of national parliaments and governments; warns that such statements reinforce the threat that the ECB is gradually changing into a political entity, further infringing on the prerogatives of the Member States, and serving the interests of indebted public and private entities; calls on Christine Lagarde to refrain from making such crude comments in the future.
2019/11/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1 #

2019/2126(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
1. Highlights the importance of the activities of the European Investment Bank (EIB) to increase the current levels ofrestoring investment activity in the EU, which areis below historical averages and insufficient to fulfil the EU’s sus; stresses that more risk-takinability, social and innovation ambitions; stresses thg by the EIB should be avoided, giving the fragile nature of the investment climate in order to achieve these ambitions, more risk-taking by the EIB may be necessary in parallel to increasing equity and the development of expertise in innovative funding instruthe EU due to the ultra-accommodative interest policies of the ECB, which may have given rise to asset bubbles throughout European markets, and has contributed to the zombification of up to 10% of European undertakings, according to the 2018 Economic Activity report of the Bank of International Settlements; calls for adequate decapitalisation of the EIB to allow for the use of innovative instruments in the financing of projects with substantial potential sustainability, social and innovation gainsfollowing Brexit, taking into account that the UK accounts for 18% of the banks capital;
2019/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 15 #

2019/2126(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
2. WelcomeRejects the commitment by the Commission President-elect to turn sections of the EIB into a climate bank, and the commitments from the EIB President to increase the share of EIB financing for climate action and environmental sustainability to at least 50 % by 2025 and to align all EIB financing activities with the goals of the Paris Agreement by the end of 2020; calls on the Commission to p, since this will contribute to the emergence of gresent an ambitious new European Sustainable Investment Plan, including additional financial commitments, as soon as possible, and to fully support the EIB in its sustainability ambitionssset bubbles throughout the EU, which threatens the resilience and sustainability of European financial markets; calls on the Commission to refrain from presenting an overly ambitious new European Sustainable Investment Plan;
2019/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 27 #

2019/2126(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
3. Stresses that in order for the EIB to become the EU’s climate bank, it should stop all financial support to fossil fuel projects by the end of 2020, and align all its activities, including EIF operations, with the Paris Agreement’s goals; calls on the EIB to make decarbonisation commitments a condition for companies to receive EIB support; calls on the EIB to apply the EU taxonomy framework, once it has been formally adopted, as a benchmark for its climate and environmental investments; calls on the EIB to develop a credible methodology to measure, disclose and achieve ‘Paris alignment’ of its financing operations;deleted
2019/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 37 #

2019/2126(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
4. Stresses that the key quantitative target of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) of mobilising EUR 500 billion of additional private and public investment should be replaced by measurable targets on sustainability and social impact in future investment strategies; calls on the EIB to increase the share of EFSI and InvestEU financing to projects that substantially contribute to the EU’s sustainability and social objectives; calls on the Commerased; recalls that the EIB is the bank of the Member States, which are its shareholders, and therefore not an EU Institution, which means they should decide on investment decission to ensure that InvestEU’s sustainability- proofing methodologies are fully consistent with s, without any interference by the Commission or other EU’s sustainability objective institutions;
2019/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 69 #

2019/2126(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
5. Calls on the EIB group to be more transparent about its economic operations, its use of the EU budget guarantee, the additionality of EIB operations and on possible future plans for a development subsidiary at the EIB, and for the EIB group to improve its accountability on these issues; calls for a memorandum of understanding between the EIB and Parliament to improve access to EIB documents and data related to strategic orientation and financing policies in the future in order to strengthen the Bank’s accountability.
2019/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 7 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas according to the Commission’s forecasts, the GDP growth rate for 2019 stands at 1.2 % of GDP per capita in the euro area and 1.4 % in the EU28, and is expected to rise to 1.4 % and 1.6 % respectively in 202010; ____________________whose year- ahead projections has proved exceedingly inaccurate and unreliable over the last years, notably the forecasts of GDP, investment, inflation and the government budget balance9a, the GDP growth rate for 2019 stands at 1.2 % of GDP per capita in the euro area and 1.4 % in the EU28, and is expected to rise to 1.4 % and 1.6 % respectively in 202010, which is still far below the projected growth for the rest of the world; whereas private consumption has been the main driver of growth over the past years; whereas this casts doubt on the sustainability of recovery as well as future growth potential; ____________________ 9a Marco Fioramanti et al., European Commission’s Forecast Accuracy Revisited: Statistical Properties and Possible Causes of Forecast Errors, DG ECFIN, Discussion Paper 027, March 2016. 10 Commission’s European Economic Forecast – Summer 2019 (Interim) of 10 July 2019
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 10 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas unemployment rates continue on a steady downward path, with an average rate of 7.5 % in the euro area and 6.3 % in the EU28 in May 2019, the lowest since the start of the EU monthly unemployment series, and a further decrease is expected to 7.3 % and 6.2 % respectively in 2020; whereas unemployment rates have for years been unacceptably high, at levels twice as high as those of the rest of the industrialized world;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 18 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas the general government deficit is expected to rise from 0.5 % to 0.9 % in the euro area and from 0.6 % to 1.0 % in the EU28 in 2019, and to remain at that level in 2020; whereas the debt-to- GDP ratio in 2019 stands at 85.8 % in the euro area and 80.2 % in the EU28 and is forecast to decrease to 84.3 % and 78.8 % respectively in 2020;, taking into account the deteriorating projections for budget balances by the Commission in recent years10a; ____________________ 10aMarco Fioramanti et al., European Commission’s Forecast Accuracy Revisited: Statistical Properties and Possible Causes of Forecast Errors, DG ECFIN, Discussion Paper 027, March 2016.
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 24 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas, in the light of the risks of trade tensions between the US and the China alongside, the persistent uncertainty related to the withdrawal ofconcerning ongoing withdrawal negotiations between the UK fromand the EU, and unsustainable interest rate policies across the developed world, the global outlook risks bending towards the downside;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 41 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)
Fb. whereas the growth rates of the EU's and the euro area's economies have for years been low;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 42 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Notes that while the European economy is growing for the seventh consecutive year, taking into account the detrimental effects of stock market and other asset bubbles in the European market as a result of the ECB’s ultraloose monetary policy, mounting economic risks and uncertainties pose a significant challenge;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 51 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Agrees that effective structural reforms, accompanied by well-targeted investments and, responsible fiscal policies, a sound monetary policy, appropriate budgetary discipline and ambitious reduction of red tape, would provide a successful compass for preparing the EU for its future and present challenges;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 66 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Recognises that the average level of debt-to-GDP is projected to decline; notes, however, that the average level still remains significantly above the level required by the Stability and Growth Pact; points out the possibility of rising debt service costs; underlines, therefore, the importance of bringing down overall debt levels, in line with EU fiscal rules; regrets the ultraloose monetary policy of the ECB, which has made it artificially cheap for already highly indebted economic agents within the euro area to take on more debt.
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 77 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Notes, accordingly, with great concern that the average deficit levels appear to be increasing again and that in some Member States deficits above 3 % are projected; underlines that a significant part of the expected expansion originates in countries with high government debt-to- GDP ratios; calls on the ECB to end its ultraloose monetary policy as soon as possible, which has made it artificially cheap for already highly indebted economic agents within the euro area to take on more debt;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 106 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7b. Rejects legal changes to the Stability and Growth Pact; takes note that the SGP has been violated continuously by almost all Member States, even Germany;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 107 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 c (new)
7c. Calls for a revival of the no- bailout clause which is a safeguard for financial stability of Member States; recalls that the SGP has been designed as a self-enforcing contract and an expression of the principle of national budgetary responsibility, employing the risk of state bankruptcy as a disciplinary tool to limit the volume of debt a Member State will issue;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 108 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 d (new)
7d. Warns that the longer the current spending-oriented policy with deficits in almost all Member continues, the clearer it will become that the euro area's integration and prosperity is at risk from growing imbalances;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 109 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Regrets that some Member States have not made use of unusually low interest rates to structurally reduce their sovereign debt levels;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 113 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Underlines that reforms which increase competition in product markets, promote resource efficiency and improve the business environment, as well as quality of institutions, including an effective justice system, and quality and efficiency of tax collection, are essential for achieving greater economic resilience for the euro area and Member States; emphasises in this context the importareiterates the urgencey of the single market and the need for its further deepeningcarrying on the fight against over indebtedness of banks, states, and private actors that hampers economic growth;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 147 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Calls on Member States to support and implement EU actions to combat Aggressive Tax Planningcombat fiscal fraud and tax evasion; recalls that tax competition between countries is the natural consequence of respecting Member States’ sovereignty; consequently rejects harmonisation of direct taxation at the Union level;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 152 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Calls on Member States to support and implement EU actions to combat Aggressive Tax Planningcombat fiscal fraud and tax evasion; recalls that tax competition between countries is the natural consequence of respecting Member States’ sovereignty; consequently rejects harmonisation of direct taxation at the Union level;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 158 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Recalls that there is a € 1 trillion stock of non-performing loans in the Euro area, which makes it difficult for banks to channel liquidity to households and businesses; supports Member States’ reforms which help facilitate corporate restructuring, and could potentially help to improve capital allocation and push out lower-productivity firms;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 160 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 b (new)
11b. Takes note of the fact that the current high level of NPLs on banks' balance sheets is a bad sign for the state of the Eurozone’s financial stability; considers that a lack of financial stability is endangering the euro area as a whole; calls for a significant reduction of NPLs; calls also for a significant reduction of leverage within banks´ balance sheets; insists that taxpayers will not be made liable to bail out banks during the next crisis;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 164 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 c (new)
11c. Notes with concern that TARGET 2 imbalances are rising in the euro area again, despite a narrowing in trade imbalances, indicating continued capital outflows from the euro area periphery;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 168 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 d (new)
11d. Recalls that the euro area is a club, which Member States are able to leave without leaving the Union; calls on the Commission to come up with a proposal that creates a supporting legal framework; reminds the Commission that having proper procedures in place is preferable to a chaotic exit that may happen any time as soon as there is another financial turmoil;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 170 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 e (new)
11e. Stresses that the persistent current account surpluses are the logical consequence of forcing very different economies into a common currency; suggests that these imbalances would exist, but over time be ameliorated in a system of flexible exchange rates that allows for adjustments by currency devaluations; considers that current account deficits in the euro area demonstrate the need for internal devaluation and reform in Member States with current account deficits; reminds Member States with current account deficits that they would probably already be bankrupt if the ECB would not engage in an accommodating fiscal policy, and reminds the ECB that this is in breach of its mandate; notes that current account surpluses signal that a Member State is consuming less than it could, thereby harming its consumers; rejects any mechanism that foresees transfers from Member States with surpluses to other Member States;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 172 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 f (new)
11f. Rejects employing the ESM as backstop for the SRF; reminds Member States that the ESM is a fiscal institution as it is guaranteed and funded by taxpayers' money via the budget of its Member States; rejects any fiscal backstop in the Banking Union in order to avoid recourse to publicly funded bank bailouts;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 173 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 g (new)
11g. Rejects the Commission’s proposal to transform the European Stability Mechanism into a European Monetary Fund; recalls that there is no suitable legal base to incorporate the ESM into the Union legal framework; recalls that the ESM is based on the unanimity principle, which guarantees a veto right for every member of the ESM; calls, instead, for the ESM to be phased out as soon as possible;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 174 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 h (new)
11h. Points out that there are ongoing discussions regarding the appropriate legal basis for the establishment of EDIS as well as the proposed European Deposit Insurance Fund; notes that Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is not a suitable legal basis for adopting EDIS; reminds that the profitability of banks is dependent on the Member States' economic, tax, and fiscal policy, which are national responsibilities; considers the importance of the profitability of banks for the safety of deposits; rejects EDIS as it would lead to moral hazard;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 175 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 i (new)
11i. Reminds the Member States currently engaged in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) that their economic and monetary well-being is dependent on the fate of the euro area; considers that various imbalances in these Member States, e.g. housing bubbles, have their root causes in the fixed exchange rate against the euro;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 176 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Agrees that the economic upswing needs to be supported by public andfurther private investment, particularly in innovation, and notes that there is still an investment gap in the euro area, even though it has benefitted from exceptionally low interest rates for years and financing conditions remain very favourable and despite EFSI; welcomes the fact that in some Member States investments already exceed the pre- crisis level, and regrets that in others investment is still lagging behind or is not picking up at the necessary speed; underlines that the accommodative interest rate policy of the ECB has failed to stimulate overall investment and therefore calls for a normalisation of interest policies as soon as possible;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 198 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Calls on Member States, while pursuing policies in full respect of the Stability and Growth Pact, to support public and private investment, improve the quality and composition of public finances, and rebuild fiscal buffers, especially in euro area countries with high levels of public debt;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 226 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Suggests that every Member State should bear all the consequences of the economic policy it has chosen; calls therefore for the introduction of national insolvency procedures for Member States of the euro area;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 229 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. NotWelcomes that more than two thirds of the CSRs issued until 2018 have been implemented with at least some progress; regrets, however, that there is evidence of backtracking on elements of major reforms adopted in the past, and is concerned about Member States’ commitment to the CSRs, given that progress on the current recommendations is worse than in previous yearsthe Commission cannot force Member States to comply with its CSR;
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 253 #

2019/2110(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Reminds Member States of the importance of committing to and delivering on the CSRs;deleted
2019/09/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 4 #

2019/2028(BUD)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
1. Calls for the 2020 budget to contribute to the fulfilment of the priorities outlinexpected inby the European Semestercitizens, namely to deliver high-quality investment and reforms that increase productivity growth,facilitate growth in lagging countinuing to ensure macro-financial stability and sound public finries, targeting to reduce asymmetric budget imbalances, and deepening the Single Market, as well as mong Member States; believes that the 2020 budget should be more efficient, transparent, performance- based, withe completion of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)ncrete reductions in administrative expenditures and waste of money;
2047/01/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 17 #

2019/2028(BUD)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
2. Emphasises the importance of ensuring sufficient resources for the coordination and surveillance of macroeconomic policies as well transparent communication to EU citizens;deleted
2047/01/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 35 #

2019/2028(BUD)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
3. Calls for adequate resources for the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) in view of their new tasks; uUnderlines that the ESAs should continue to increase their efficiency without compromising on the quality of their work with a focus on continuous re- assessment of working methods and of effective use of human and financial resources; emphasises that the ESAs must stick to the tasks and to the mandate assigned to them by the European legislator;
2047/01/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 24 #

2019/0161(COD)

Draft legislative resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Rejects the Commission proposal (COM(2019)0354).
2020/05/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 28 #

2019/0161(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
(1) The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States is a matter of common concern, due to the mismatch between the introduction of the euro as a common currency and the economic realities in the different Member States. The Member States whose currency is the euro have a particular interest in and a responsibility to conduct sound economic policies that promote the proper funcavoid costly disintegrationing of the Economic and Monetary Union and to avoid policies that jeopardise it in the context of broad guidelines formulated by the Councilthe interests of other Member States whose currency is the euro.
2020/05/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 38 #

2019/0161(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
(2) In order to ensure the proper functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, Member States whose currency is the euro should take measures to enhance the resilience of their economies through targeted structural reforms and investment. The Euro Summit of December 2018 mandated the Eurogroup to work on the design, modalities of implementation and timing of a budgetary instrument for competitiveness and convergence for the euro area. To ensure that Member States carry out structural reforms and investment in a consistent, coherent and well- coordinated manner, it is necessary to establish a governancesupervisory framework to enable the Council to provide strategic orientations on reform and investment priorities to be undertaken within the euro area by the Member States. Such a framework would enhance convergence and competitiveness ofin the euro area. The Council should also provide country- specific guidance on individual reforms and investment objectives of the Member States whose currency is the euro, which can be supported by the budgetary instrument for convergence and competitiveness. The Council should provide solutions to potential rent-seeking problems such as hold-out effects, in which Member States will block reforms until their demands from the budgetary instrument are met. Since such a framework is specific to the Member States whose currency is the euro, only members of the Council representing those Member States should take part in votes under this Regulation.
2020/05/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 54 #

2019/0161(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
(4) On an annual basis, the Council should set out strategic orientations on the reform and investment priorities for the euro area, as part of the recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area. The strategic orientations should be adopted by the Council acting by qualified majorunanimity on a recommendation from the Commission, and after the Eurogroup has discussed the reforms and investment priorities that it considers relevant and appropriate for inclusion therein. The annual Euro Summit will play its role.
2020/05/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 66 #

2019/0161(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
(5) To ensure that strategic orientations reflect the evolving experience of the implementation of the budgetary instrument for convergence and competitiveness, the Commission should, alongside its recommendation on the strategic orientations, as part of its recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area, inform the Council and the European Parliament of how the strategic orientations have been followed during the preceding years.
2020/05/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 79 #

2019/0161(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
(7) The Council Recommendation providing country-specific guidance on the objectives of reforms and investment in Member States whose currency is the euro, adopted by qualified majorunanimity, should be based on a Commission recommendation. This process should be without prejudice to the voluntary nature of participation of Member States whose currency is the euro in the budgetary instrument for convergence and competitiveness, and without prejudice to the Commission’s prerogatives as regards its implementation.
2020/05/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 87 #

2019/0161(COD)

(9) On the basis of an assessment by the Commission or based on request by a Member State, the Council, shall establish which Member States are experiencing a severe economic downturn for the purpose of a modulation of national co-financing rates provided for in Regulation (EU) XXXX/XX [Reform Support Programme Regulation], and without prejudice to the application of Article 2(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 1467/97 as amended.
2020/05/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 94 #

2019/0161(COD)

(10) In order to enhance the dialogue between the Union institutions, in particular between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability in that economic dialogue, the competent committee of the European Parliament can invite the President of the Council, the Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the Eurogroup to appear before the committee to discuss the measures taken pursuant to this Regulation. The competent committee may draw up a report assessing the effectiveness, efficiency, consistency and relevance of the measures taken.
2020/05/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 143 #

2019/0161(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2
2. In parallel to its recommendation referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission shall inform the Council and the European Parliament on how the strategic orientations of the preceding years have been followed by the Member States.
2020/05/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 160 #

2019/0161(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1
Where relevant, based on an assessment by the Commission or based on request by a Member State, the recommendation referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 5 shall establish whether a Member State is experiencing a severe economic downturn, for the purposes of a modulation of national co-financing rates provided for in Regulation (EU) XXXX/XX [Reform Support Programme Regulation].
2020/05/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 171 #

2019/0161(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1
In order to enhance the dialogue between the Union institutions, in particular the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the European Parliament may invite the President of the Council, the Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the Eurogroup to appear before the committee to discuss the measures taken pursuant to this Regulation. The competent committee may draw up a report assessing the effectiveness, efficiency, consistency and relevance of the measures taken.
2020/05/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 173 #

2019/0161(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1
1. By 31 December 20232 and every fourtwo years thereafter, the Commission shall publish a report on the application of this Regulation. That report shall assess the proportionality and the effectiveness of this Regulation.
2020/05/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 177 #

2019/0161(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2
2. The Commission shall send the report to the European Parliament and to the Council.Council and to the European Parliament, where it shall answer to the scrutiny of the Regulation by the competent committee of the European Parliament ;
2020/05/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 13 #

2018/2271(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital K a (new)
Ka. whereas on the 14th November 2018 the European Parliament rejected a proposal to establish Humanitarian Visas; considers, therefore, that the legislative process has lawfully concluded;
2018/11/30
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 30 #

2018/2271(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Considers that part of the financial implications of the requested proposal should be covered by the gthe Member States that wish to issue humanitarian visas shall be responsible for all of the financial implications that arise from allowing persons to enteral budget of the Union as a practical expression of the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States, in acc the territory of the Member State; insists that Member States shall continue to be responsible for such persons when they leave the Member State that issued the humanitarian visa ford ance with Article 80 TFEUother Member State;
2018/11/30
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 35 #

2018/2271(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – paragraph 1 – indent 27
– provide for significant financial support from the Integrated Border Management Fund to be made available to Member States for its implementation,deleted
2018/11/30
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 36 #

2018/2271(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – paragraph 1 – indent 28
– foresee that a Member State that issues such a humanitarian visa has access to the same compensation from the Asylum and Migration Fund as when a Member State receives a refugee through the European Resettlement Framework,deleted
2018/11/30
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 21 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas Europe’s economy is now entering its sixth year of uninterrupted but modest growth;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas over the past two decades, total factor productivity in the euro area has lagged behind that of major global competitoreconomies;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 57 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas according to the Commission forecast, ten Member States are expected to have debt-to-GDP ratios of more than 60 % in 2019welve Member States of the EU and ten out of nineteen Member States of the euro area are expected to have debt-to-GDP ratios of more than 60 % in 2019; whereas seven of these (Belgium, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, and Portugal) are expected to have debt-to-GDP ratios of close to 100 % or more;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 90 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Considers that pay-as-you-go pension schemes are not suited to generate fiscal buffers; stresses that fiscal subsidies to pay-as-you-go schemes undermine their character and endanger their fairness; underlines that national tax systems are better suited to achieve socially balanced burden sharing than pay-as-you-go systems;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 114 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that a higher proportion of elderly people entails higher healthcare, old-age care and pension spending; notes, moreover, that in an ageing society the proportion of working-age people is falling in relation to the proportion of elderly people, meaning that there are fewer working-age contributors per elderly person; highlights that this places a massive burden on public finances, threatening their sustainability; warns that continued political stalling will, in the near future, render it unavoidable to increase the pension age and cutting pension payout at the same time; suggests to increase flexibility of the pension age quickly;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 164 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Recalls that workforce ageing is likely to be a significant drag on European productivity growth over the next few decades; urges Member States, therefore, to implement productivity-enhancing structural reforms; recalls that productivity growth is brought about by, among others, improving regulatory conditions, easing regulatory burden, and increasing capital investment; recalls that the current political climate tends to be hostile towards capital investors;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 171 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Stresses the importance of reviewing national public pension schemes, largely financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, in order to reduce their budgetary burden; urges to consider replacing pay-as-you-go schemes as they are mostly not sustainable;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 180 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Stresses the importance of increasing the labour force participation rate in order to keep social security systems sustainable, particularly in the context of an increasing dependency ratio; considers that unconditional support may generate disadvantageous incentives;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 190 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Calls for a tax shift away from the high tax burden on labour in Europe;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 198 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Stresses that targeted migration of skilled labour can possibly ease the problems of an ageing society; warns however that immigration of low skilled labour will intensify the problems of an ageing society in capital-based economies; regrets that, in this context, the debate on migration is based on superficialities and emotions; underlines that the categorical differences between migrant labourers, asylum- seekers, refugees, and illegal immigrants need to be re-established;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 201 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Highlights that mobilising a shrinking working-age population will require more versatile employees and more flexible labour markets, combined with active labour market policies, life-long learning and training, and accessible social security systems, as outlined in the European Pillar of Social Rights;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 213 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Highlights that small and medium- sized enterprises (SMEs), which are an important driver of employment, cannot fully harness the potential of the European single market owing to legislative and administrative barriers; urges the Commission to reduce these barriers; urges the CommissionMember States, moreover, to tackle unfair competition and taxation among SMEs and multinational corporations;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 219 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Calls on Member States for taxation reforms with a view to improving tax collection and lowering tax burden; highlights the need for better intergovermental coordination of administrative practices in the field of taxation;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 227 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Recalls the importance of a resilient banking sector that safeguards financial stability; welcomes calls for the step-by- step completion of the banking union, with a credible European deposit insurance scheme and a package to reduce non-performing loans;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 238 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Highlights that a transition to a new risk weight regime for banks’ sovereign exposures will help to weaken the ‘doom loop’ between banks and sovereigns; underlines the need for rules on large exposure to sovereign risks;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 247 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Highlights that to ensure intergenerational fairness, Member States mustcould increase productivity through incentives for productive investments, such as in growth- enhancing infrastructure projects, in order to stimulate much-needed potential economic growth;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 274 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Stresses that increasing productivity growth requires incentives for investment in R&D, innovation, and digitalisation, with an emphasis on increasing both physical and human capital;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 278 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Stresses that intra-European foreign direct investment leads to productivity gains for both the investing firm and local firms in the host regions, and generates economic convergence within Europe; highlights that regulatory and tax competition between the Member States could be a means of attracting such investments;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 307 #

2018/2119(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
26. Recalls that the degree of implementation of the country-specific recommendations is too low; believes that the focus of the European Semester should be on national ownership; urges national and regional parliaments to debate country reports and country-specific recommendations; stresses that the strict employment of the no-bailout clause increases national ownership;
2019/01/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 35 #

2018/2101(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas according to the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections from June 2018, annual inflation in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area looks set to reach 1.7 % in 2018, 2019 and 2020, and thus converge towards the medium-term objective of just shy of 2 %; recalls however the large variance in inflation rates across the Eurozone;
2018/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 36 #

2018/2101(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas the inflation target set by the ECB has no legal base in the Treaties and, moreover, should be revised by taking into account the development of asset prices;
2018/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 40 #

2018/2101(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Ha. whereas NPL ratios in 8 member states are still well above 10%, including two member states with more than 40%1a. _________________ 1a EBA Risk Dashboard.
2018/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 42 #

2018/2101(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)
Ia. Whereas there is still uncertainty and scepticism whether the APP falls within the scope of mandate of the ECB and constitutes de facto fiscal financing policy2a; _________________ 2a DG IPOL "Policy options and risks of an extension of the ECB’s quantitative easing programme: An analysis", PE 569.994.
2018/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 45 #

2018/2101(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
Ja. whereas the establishment of the SSM within the ECB has created a conflict of interest that endangers the pursuit of an independent monetary policy;
2018/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 47 #

2018/2101(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital K
K. whereas at the end of 2017 the size of the Eurosystem balance sheet had reached an all-time high of over EUR 4.5 trillion, growing by 0.8 trillion compared to the end of 2016, constituting 41% of the total GDP of the Euro area;
2018/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 64 #

2018/2101(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Warns that the ECB's monetary policy is currently dominated by the lack of sound fiscal policies of some Member States;
2018/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 88 #

2018/2101(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Emphasises the great importance, at this juncture, of maintaining a favourable environment for public and private investment, which is still lagging behind pre-crisis levels; encourages the ECB to take the necessary measures, in line with its mandate, to help realise this objectiveat low interest rates have made issuing new debt cheaper; reiterates that debt levels in certain member state are still unsustainable; stresses that in 4 euro area member states debt levels are still well above 100% of GDP; reiterates that low interest rates are instrumental in the emergence of market bubbles, primarily in the real estate market;
2018/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 90 #

2018/2101(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Considers that monetary policy alone is not sufficient to achieve a sustainable economic recovery, and that investments should be encouraged, as well as structural reforms in the Member States;
2018/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 110 #

2018/2101(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Recognises the existence of distributional consequences of the ECB policies, e.g. the Cantillon Effect, which can be perceived as increasing inequalities;
2018/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 120 #

2018/2101(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. StressNotes that the ECB’s non- standard monetary policy measures have proven successful in forestalling the risks of deflation that were still present at the beginning of 2016 and in initiating a recovery in credit tokept interest rates low, thereby forestalling member states and highly indebted private enterprises from defaulting on their unsustainable debts; notes that in the private sector, whose annual growth was around 3 % in mid-2018 compared to 0 % in 2015;
2018/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 128 #

2018/2101(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Calls for vigilance against the risk of a resurgence in real estate bubbles and excessive household and private sector indebtedness in some Member States; due to the accommodative ultra-loose interest policies of the ECB;
2018/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 154 #

2018/2101(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Welcomes the transparency provided by the ECB through its forward guidance; deems it appropriate to keep interest rates low, in the light of uncertainties in the global environmenturges the ECB to normalize interest rates as soon ats presentossible;
2018/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 174 #

2018/2101(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Is concerned that certain southern European countries have profited in a disproportionate way from the PSPP, since national central banks and the ECB have purchased Spanish and Italian government bonds whose volume exceeds Spain's and Italy's share in GDP by respectively 43 billion and 51 billion euros, well above the average of 14.4% of GDP for the entire Eurozone; stresses that this strengthens the suspicion that the main goal of the PSPP is fiscal stabilisation of southern Europe, which falls outside the scope of the mandate of the ECB.
2018/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 184 #

2018/2101(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Rejects a so called Eurosystem Resolution Liquidity framework, along the lines of the Bank of England’s Resolution Liquidity Framework, which would aim at using central bank liquidity to prop up failing banks while they are being resolved;
2018/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 229 #

2018/2101(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Stresses the importance of physical money as the only legal tender, and reminds all Eurozone countries that euro coins and banknotes and other robust stores of value must not be rejected in transactions;
2018/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 230 #

2018/2101(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21b. Calls for a full external audit of the ECB;
2018/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 14 #

2018/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas entrusting the ECB with the supervision of financial institutions has proven to be successfulcreated an internal conflict of interest between its supervisory and monetary functions;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #

2018/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas the role of the EBA needs to be significantly strengthened in order to effectively implement anti-money laundering measures;deleted
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 34 #

2018/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
C a. whereas a common DGS or EDIS is inadequate as long as risks differ greatly from one national banking system to another;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 70 #

2018/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Calls on the SSM to regularly update the European Parliament about the information exchange which takes place between staff carrying out monetary policy and supervisory functions in accordance with the European Central Bank decision of 17 September 2014 (ECB/2014/39);
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #

2018/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Highlights that sovereign debt is not risk-free; takes note of the on-going work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on sovereign risk; is concerned by the fact that some financial institutions are heavily invested in their own sovereign debt, constituting excessive "home bias"; calls on the Commission to assess whether to introduce risk weighting on sovereign bonds or exposure limits in the EU; rejects, in this respect, the Commission's ongoing work on the idea of a so-called sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS);
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 106 #

2018/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the NPL package; welcomes the ECB addendum on NPLs and the work of the EBA on guidelines on management of non-performing and forborne exposures; welcomes the reduction in volumof the average rate of NPLs over the past years, from 6.4% in December 2014 to 4.2% at the end of September 2017; stresses that the risk to financial stability posed by NPLs is still significant and that the current NPL level in the EU is still higher than in other major developed countries such as the United States of America and Japan, where NPL ratios are lower than 2%; stresses that in 9 Member States NPL ratios are still well over 10%3a; expresses concern that the coverage ratio differ significantly from one Member State to another, reflecting various levels of collateralisation and heterogeneous accounting practices; agrees with the Commission that the primary responsibility for reducing NPLs lies with the banks themselves and Member States, notably through efficient insolvency laws, and banks themselves; the establishment of asset management companies themselves; _________________ 3a EBA Risk Dashboard.
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 119 #

2018/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 c (new)
13c. Rejects any solution at EU level to the problem of NPLs that would go beyond guidelines for selling NPLs on secondary markets;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 124 #

2018/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS); believes that a single market needs appropriate supervisory powers at EU level;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 135 #

2018/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Recalls the initial debate on the role of the ECB as both monetary and supervisory authority; considers that, overall,believes that the ECB haswill not succeeded in keeping the two roles separate; believes, however, that further debate is necessary to avoid the risk of a conflict of interests between the two tasks, especially once the crisis of the EMU and the European financial system reaches another peak;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 137 #

2018/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Calls on the ECB to conduct annually an external professional audit of its legally required organisational separation of supervisory and monetary policy functions, and immediately to publish the report;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 141 #

2018/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)
17b. Calls on the SSM to periodically report to the European Parliament any exchange of information between policy functions under the Decision of the European Central Bank of 17 September 2014 (ECB/2014/39);
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 150 #

2018/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. WelcomeRejects the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will provide the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and be turned into a true European Monetary Fund (EMF) based on strict conditions ensuring responsibility and the principle of avoiding moral hazard; stresses the need for proper democratic scrutiny; recalls Parliament’s position that the EMF should be fully; warns that there will be no proper democratic scrutiny, if the EMF is incorporated into the Union's institutional framework;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 152 #

2018/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Recalls the constitutional review of the ESM by the German Constitutional Court in 2014, concerning the question of adequate democratic control by national parliaments on ESM decisions; points out that the introduction of a qualified majority rule could potentially substantially reduce such democratic control4a; _________________ 4a BVerfG (2014) Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 18. März 2014. Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 1390/12 - Rn. (1-245).
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 154 #

2018/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Notes that the ‘too-big-to-fail’ issue has still not been properly addressed; considers that market-oriented activity is inconceivable if there are some market actors that are considered to be too significant to fail; urges, therefore, that the banking system must finally be organised in a more market-oriented manner;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 159 #

2018/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Reaffirms its position thatjects the rules for precautionary recapitalisation need to be clarified; notes that precautionary recapitalisation can be an instrument for crisis management but believes that its use needs to be strictly limited to exceptional cases where the bank is solvent and where compliance with EU State aid rules is ensured; recalls that the objective of the EU resolution regime is to make sure that taxpayers are protected, the cost of bank management failures is borne by its shareholders and creditors, and that the stability of the financial system as a whole is preserved; is convinced, however, that the current framework cannot fulfil this objective;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 179 #

2018/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Takes note of the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); underlines the necessity ofrejects EDIS as the third pillar of the Banking Union; believes it should be fully implemented once significant risk reduction has taken place;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 183 #

2018/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. Recalls that the moral hazard of deposit protection spurs deposit banks to engage in overly risky behaviour; recalls that deposit protection disincentivizes deposit holders to scrutinise their bank and its investment and management decisions;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 184 #

2018/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. Considers it an erroneous interpretation of the law to view Article 114 as an appropriate legal basis for the establishment of the EDIS;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 19 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas, according to the Commission’s forecasts, the GDP growth rate for the euro area was 2.4 % in 2017 and will dip slightly to 2.3 % in 2018 and to 2 % in 2019; whereas economic growth is still fragile and is expected to slow down in the face of many challenges such as higher oil prices and unwillingness of Member States to effect the necessary structural reforms;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 51 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Takes note of the Commission’s 2018 country-specific recommendations (CSR); welcomes that the Commission cannot force Member States to comply with its CSR;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Suggests that every Member State should bear all the consequences of the economic policy it has chosen; calls therefore for the introduction of an insolvency procedure for Member States of the euro area;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 60 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Reiterates the urgency of carrying on the fight against the inequalitieover indebtedness of banks, states, and private actors that hampers economic growth;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 63 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Takes note of the fact that the current high level of NPLs on banks' balance sheets is a bad sign for the state of the Eurozone’s financial stability; considers that a lack of financial stability is endangering the Eurozone as a whole; calls for a significant reduction of NPLs; insists that taxpayers will not be made liable to bail out banks during the next crisis;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 71 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Considers that growth-orientatesound fiscal policies are needed at the European level, alongside an appropriat restrictive monetary policy, in order to strengthen the European economy;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 81 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. SupporRejects flexibility in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact as proposed by the Commission in 2015; considers that much more flexibility is required to boost investment and growth in the EU; calls, therefore, for a reform of the Stability and Growth Pact and the introduction of an aggregate euro area fiscal stance;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 93 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Calls for a revival of the no- bailout clause which is a safeguard for financial stability of Member States; recalls that the SGP has been designed as a self-enforcing contract, employing the risk of state bankruptcy as a disciplinary tool to limit the volume of debt a Member State will issue;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 105 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Takes the view that the development of new budgetary tools aimed at stabilisation and convergence in the euro area would be extremely important for the economic governancesuccess of the Eurozone in order to avoid, as far as possible, the re- emergence of events already experienced during the years of the financial crisis;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 113 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Rejects a budget for the Eurozone; rejects the proposed European Investment Stabilisation Function; rejects the European Unemployment Insurance; rejects the Structural Reform Support Program; rejects the EFSI and InvestEU;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 116 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Recalls the Commission’s commitment to integrate the implementation of the SDGs within the European Semester; regrets the fact that this dimension is missing from the 2018 country-specific recommendations;deleted
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 130 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Recalls the importance of access to quality public services endowed with sufficient resources;deleted
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 150 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Calls for the euro area to be transformed into a club, which Member States should be able to leave without leaving the Union; calls on the Commission to come up with a proposal that creates the necessary legal framework; reminds the Commission that having the proper procedures in place is preferable to a chaotic exit that may happen any time when there is financial turmoil;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 157 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Recalls that the fight against aggressive tax planning strategies is essential to ensure the fair treatment of taxpayers, safeguard public finances, preserve social cohesion and fight inequalitiesinternal tax competition is essential for an economically successful euro area;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 167 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Welcomes the Commission recommendation to review the tax systems of a number of Member States which are exploited by multinationals engaged in aggressive tax planning; insists on the need to implement an ambitious pCBCR (public country-by-country reporting) and CCCTB (common consolidated corporate tax base);deleted
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 193 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Encourages strongerless coordination and harmonisation of taxation with the objective of reducing the differences among Member States over a ten-year period, thus making any possible company relocation unattractive, thereby increasing tax competition between Member States;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 203 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Welcomes the Council recommendation and the Commission’s efforts to encourage Members States with large current account surpluses to promote faster wage growth, strengthen investment and thus foster economic expansion; highlights the fact that real wage growth has, in recent times, lagged behind productivity growth, while improvements have occurred in the labour market; stresses, against this background, that there could be room for wage increases in certain sectors and areas to ensure good standards of living, taking into account the need to tackle inequalities and boost growth;deleted
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 213 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Stresses that the persistent current account surpluses are the logical consequence of forcing very different economies into a common currency; suggests that these imbalances would exist, but over time be ameliorated in a system of flexible exchange rates that allows for adjustments by currency devaluations; considers that current account deficits in the euro area demonstrate the need for internal devaluation and reform in Member States with current account deficits; reminds Member States with current account deficits that they would probably already be bankrupt if the ECB would not engage in an accommodating fiscal policy, which is a violation of its mandate; notes that current account surpluses signal that a Member State is consuming less than it could, thereby harming its consumers; rejects any mechanism that foresees transfers from Member States with surpluses to other Member States;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 218 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 b (new)
14b. Notes with concern that TARGET 2 imbalances are rising in the euro area again, despite a narrowing in trade imbalances, indicating continued capital outflows from the euro area periphery; calls for TARGET 2 balances to be safeguarded with appropriate collateral;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 220 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 c (new)
14c. Rejects employing the ESM as backstop for the SRF; reminds that the ESM is a fiscal institution as it is guaranteed and funded by taxpayers' money via the budget of its Member States; rejects any fiscal backstop in the Banking Union in order to avoid recourse to publicly-funded bank bailouts;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 221 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 d (new)
14d. Rejects the Commission’s proposal to transform the European Stability Mechanism into a European Monetary Fund; recalls that there is no suitable legal base to incorporate the ESM into the Union legal framework; recalls that the ESM is based on the unanimity principle, which guarantees a veto right for every member of the ESM; calls, instead, for the ESM to be phased out as soon as possible;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 222 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 e (new)
14e. Points out that there are ongoing discussions regarding the appropriate legal basis for the establishment of EDIS as well as the proposed European Deposit Insurance Fund; notes that Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is not a suitable legal basis for adopting EDIS; reminds that the profitability of banks is dependent on the Member States' economic, tax, and fiscal policy, which is even today mostly determined by national parameters; considers the importance of banks profitability for the safety of deposits; rejects EDIS as it would lead to moral hazard;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 223 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 f (new)
14f. Rejects using ECB profits from seigniorage as one of the possible new own resources for the EU budget; stresses that turning these profits into an EU own resource would require a change to the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB, as well as adjustments to accommodate the specific situation of non-euro area Member States;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 226 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Notes with concern the recent rise in oil prices which generally weakens growth and raises inflation; stresses that, rather than relying on seasonal factors for its recovery, the only way to make the European economy an area of prosperity is to encourage public investment and promote domestic demand;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 240 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Insists on the need for the CSR to take due account of the 20 key principles and rights to support fair and well- functioning labour markets outlined in the European Pillar of Social Rights, which should serve as a compass for a renewed process of upward convergence towards better working and living conditions in the European Union;deleted
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 245 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Recalls the need for stronger surveillance of the employment and social situation in Europe and appropriate and constant follow-up at every step of the European Semester in order to boost quality job creation and thus achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive growth;deleted
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 256 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Shares the Commission’s concerns regarding developments in the housing market in some Member States; stresses that rising interest rates and housing prices are having an impact on household private debt; underlines that this debt plays a role in the stability of the euro area; calls on the Commission to take initiatives in this area in line with recommendation 19 of the social pillarstresses that the ECB's misguided zero-interest rate policies have contributed to the foreseeable trouble in the housing market;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 261 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Reminds the Member States currently engaged in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) that their economic and monetary well-being is dependent on the fate of the euro area; considers that various imbalances in these Member States, e.g. housing bubbles, have their root causes in the fixed exchange rate against the euro;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 266 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3
Investments and cohesion fundStructural reforms
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 273 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Deeply regretWelcomes the proposed cuts in cohesion policy as set out by the Commission in its MFF proposal; insists on the fact that a decrease in structural funding runs counter to the EU’s objective of strengthening economic, social and territorial cohesion, puts at risk the key importance of the ESIF in stimulating public and private investment, and would send a negative signal to citizens; recalls that the EU cohesion policy has a direct impact on citizens’ livesfurther and deeper cuts; recalls that the EU cohesion policy is misguided and in need of great reforms including a reduction of its volume;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 276 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Regrets the fact that the Commission makes part of the allocation of European funds conditional on the European Semester and economic governance;deleted
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 285 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Stresses the key importance of structural funds for the stimulation of public investment, taking into account their strong multiplier effectreforms;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 296 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Warns that the longer the current savpendings-oriented policy – primarily focused on making spending cuts – continues without an effective investment plan to generate revenue through growth, social cohesion and solidaritywith deficits in almost all Member States – primarily focused on avoiding necessary spending cuts and structural reforms – continues, the clearer it will become that Europe’s economicthe euro area's integration and prosperity is at risk from growing social inequalitiimbalances;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 302 #

2018/2033(INI)

24. Takes note of the proposed InvestEU programme which focuses on four key priorities for the EU (sustainable infrastructure; research, innovation and digitisation; small and medium-sized businesses; and social investment); requests that the focus of the InvestEU programme be placed on efficient resources and decarbonisation projects, and stresses the need to guarantee a more balanced budget allocation among Member States and regions;deleted
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 312 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
25. RecallWelcomes that the completion of the EMU requires strong political commitment, efficientwhich is non-existent; warns that ever more regulation and governance based on the Community method andlacks democratic accountability, and better use of the available financial resourcesis ignorant of economics, thereby increasing the likelihood of chaotic dissolution of the euro area;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 323 #

2018/2033(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
26. Underlines the need to strike the right balance betweefor sovereign fiscal responsibility and solidarity; is concerned by the lack of ambition in determining the solidarity instruments needed for the sustainabilityresponsibility shown by the governments of the Member States of the EMU;
2018/07/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 315 #

2018/2007(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Instructs its President not to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.
2018/03/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 138 #

2018/0229(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
The European Parliament rejects [the Commission proposal].
2018/11/07
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 58 #

2018/0171(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
The European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.
2018/11/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 64 #

2018/0171(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 a (new)
(1a) As there are risks in everything, the fiction of regulatory zero risk weight does not conform to reality. At the same time, zero risk weight has created a regulatory privilege for sovereign bonds and is the major reason that there is a nexus between banks and sovereigns in the first place. Artificially creating SBBS as yet another privileged asset will neither weaken nor break the nexus, but enhance it.
2018/11/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 65 #

2018/0171(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 b (new)
(1b) A competitive and sustainable financial industry that aims to serve its customers can only be created by abolishing regulatory privileges, which in fact have the same effect as subsidies. The idea of the rule of law demands equal treatment, a level playing field, and ending regulatory privilege that favours big corporates.
2018/11/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 185 #

2018/0171(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 22
Directive 2009/138/EC
Article 104 – paragraph 8
Article 22 Amendment to Directive 2009/138/EC In Article 104 of Directive 2009/138/EC, the following paragraph 8 is added: (8) For the purposes of the calculation of the Basic Solvency Capital Requirement, exposures to sovereign bond-backed securities as defined in Article 3(3) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted] shall be treated as exposures to Member States' central governments or central banks denominated and funded in their domestic currency. By [6 months from date of entry into force of SBBS Regulation], Member States shall adopt, publish and communicate to the Commission and ESMA measures necessary to comply with the first subparagraph.deleted
2018/11/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 187 #

2018/0171(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Articles 268, 325 and 390
Article 23 Amendments to Regulation EU No 575/2013 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 is amended as follows: 1. in Article 268 , the following paragraph 5 is added: ‘(5) By way of derogation from the first paragraph, sovereign bond-backed securities as defined in Article 3(3) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted] may always be treated in accordance with the first paragraph of this Article.’; ‘(4) For the purpose of this Title, institutions shall treat exposures in the form of sovereign bond-backed securities as defined in Article 3(3) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted] as exposures to the central government of a Member State.’; ‘The first subparagraph shall apply to exposures to sovereign bond-backed securities as defined in Article 3(3) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted].’deleted
2018/11/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 195 #

2018/0171(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a
Article 24 Amendment to Directive (EU) 2016/2341 In Directive (EU) 2016/2341, the following Article 18a is inserted: ‘Article 18a Sovereign-Bond Backed Securities (1) In their national rules regarding the valuation of assets of IORPs, the calculation of own funds of IORPs, and the calculation of a solvency margin for IORPs, Member States shall treat sovereign-bond backed securities, as defined in Article 3(3) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted], in the same way as euro area sovereign debt instruments. (2) By [6 months from date of entry into force of the SBBS Regulation], Member States shall adopt, publish and communicate to the Commission and ESMA measures necessary to comply with paragraph 1.’.deleted
2018/11/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 29 #

2017/2131(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Submits, therefore, in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU, this reasoned proposal to the Council, inviting the Council to determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU and to address appropriate recommendations to Hungary in this regard;deleted
2018/05/17
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 33 #

2017/2131(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Instructs its President not to forward this resolution and the reasoned proposal for a Council decision annexed hereto to the Commission and the Council and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.
2018/05/17
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 5 #

2017/0810(COD)

Draft legislative resolution
Citation 1 a (new)
- having regard to the fourth indent of Article 127(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which confers on the European System of Central Banks the task to "promote the smooth operation of payment systems".
2018/06/12
Committee: ECONAFCO
Amendment 7 #

2017/0810(COD)

Proposal for a decision
Citation 1 a (new)
Bank Having regard to the fourth indent of Article 127(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which confers on the European System of Central Banks the task to "promote the smooth operation of payment systems".
2018/06/12
Committee: ECONAFCO
Amendment 9 #

2017/0810(COD)

Proposal for a decision
Recital 1
Bank (1) The basic tasks to be carried out through the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) include the definition and implementation of the monetary policy of the Union and the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems. Safe and efficient financial market infrastructures, in particular clearing systems, are essential for the fulfilment of these basic tasks.
2018/06/12
Committee: ECONAFCO
Amendment 11 #

2017/0810(COD)

Proposal for a decision
Recital 1 a (new)
Bank (1a) The fourth indent of Article 127(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) must, however, be regarded as limited to payment clearing systems alone. In the absence of an explicit reference to the clearing of securities, the TFEU does not allow assigning the task of clearing securities on the ECB. A mere change of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB cannot create such new power. Moreover, even the Parliament cannot grant such power to the ECB, as this would, in effect, constitute an implicit amendment of the TFEU.
2018/06/12
Committee: ECONAFCO
Amendment 12 #

2017/0810(COD)

Proposal for a decision
Recital 1 b (new)
Bank (1b) In light of the imbalances within the Eurozone there is a need to improve the ESCB's payment system (TARGET2). In recent years, there has been a constant trend towards higher TARGET2 balances. The ECB has confirmed that if a country were to leave the Eurosystem, its national central bank’s claims on the ECB, as well as liabilities to the ECB, would need to be settled in full. Therefore, the ECB is exposed to large financial risks vis-à-vis participants that have liabilities to the ECB. That is why it is necessary that the ECB designs its payment system in a way that mitigates such risks, e.g. by demanding collateral.
2018/06/12
Committee: ECONAFCO
Amendment 37 #

2017/0810(COD)

Proposal for a decision
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank
Article 22
Bank The ECB and national central banks may provide facilities, and the ECB may make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems, and clearing systems for financial instruments, within the Union and with other countries.
2018/06/12
Committee: ECONAFCO
Amendment 46 #

2017/0810(COD)

Proposal for a decision
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank
Article 22 – paragraph 1a (new)
Bank In order to minimise the exposure to risks inherent to the payment system the ECB demands the participants to provide appropriate collateral.
2018/06/12
Committee: ECONAFCO
Amendment 52 #

2017/0334(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point a
Regulation (EU) 2017/825
Article 10 – paragraph 1
1. The financial envelope for the implementation of the Programme is set at EUR 222 800 000 in current prices.;
2018/06/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 2 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
The European Parliament rejects [the Commission proposal].
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 19 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)
- having regard to the German Federal Constitutional Court judgment of 12 September 2012, ref. 2 BvR 1390/12, requiring a reservation to be entered under international law,
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 25 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas the introduction of the euro is erroneously regarded as one of the European project’s most significant political achievements and a cornerstone of EMU construcestablishment of monetary union represents the greatest risk to European unification;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 32 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. B. whereas the financial and economic crisis has revealed the possibility of political manipulation of the rules and the weaknesses of the euro architecture, highlighting the need for the swiftfact that there is no rules- based consensus for completion of the EMU;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 45 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas membership of a common currency area requires common rules and obligations, as well as common tools to respond to symmetric and asymmetric shocks and for the promotion of solidarity and socioeconomic upward convergence; whereas risk reduction and risk sharing should go hand in hand in deepening the EMUbut those conditions are not met in a multilingual, multifaceted and diverse Europe; whereas Member States are sovereign and risk sharing is out of the question;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 58 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and its later transformation into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have represented, despite its intergovernmental nature, an important step towawas a serious mistake and the subsequent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has perpetuated that mistake; whereas it is absurds the creation of a European crisis management mechanism, helping to respond to the weaknesses of the EMU and providing financial assistance to several European countries affected by the crisiso seek to set up a crisis resolution mechanism for a so-called currrency that causes crises in the first place;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 70 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas the intergovernmental nature of the ESM has implications onmakes it possible for its decision-making process, which risks undermining the ESM’s capacity to respond swiftly to economic and financial shocks to be subject to unanimity, which is what enables the ESM Member States to exercise their fiscal sovereignty in the first place;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 73 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas the future incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework should continue to be understood as part of the EMU completion projectproject to deprive Member States of their fiscal sovereignty;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 78 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Recital G
G. whereas the ongoing debate on the future of Europe and the EMU has highlighted differing political views among Member States on the long-term future of the ESM, but also provides a good basis for an important first step towards strengthening its role, developing its financial tools and improving its efficiency and democratic accountability as part of the ESM reform;deleted
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 82 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H
H. whereas, in the short term, the ESM reform should contribute in particular to the banking union, providing a proper common financial backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), without prejudice to the need to establish a European Depokeeping with its purpose, the ESM may provide stability assistance only if that is essential for safeguarding the financial stability of the euro area as a whole, and of its Member States, and whereas the use of ESM funding to assist Insurance Scheme (EDIS)banks must be ruled out for that very reason;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 94 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. WelcomeRejects the Commission’s proposal of 6 December 2017 for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund and considers it a useful contribution to the ongoing debate on the future of Europe, the completion of the EMU and the ESM reform;,
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 100 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Suggests that the ESM be renamed not thenot be expanded to form a European Monetary Fund (EMF), but the European Stability Fund (ESF), making it clear that the eurozone’s monetary policy remains the competence of the ECB, rather, that it be wound up and phased out instead;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 107 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Highlights that the proper functioning of an EMU depends on the existence of an institution serving as a ‘lender of last resort’; acknowledges, in this context, the positive contribution of the ESM, despite its intergovernmental nature, towards addressing its rules being complied with and on the existence of a direct link between action and liability; acknowledges, in this context, that, by establishing the ESM, political leaders have permanently broken that link; stresses that that has further weakenesses ofd the institutional setting of the EMU, namely by providing financial assistance to several Member States affected by the financial crisis and the Great Recession;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 118 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Insists that a European insolvency procedure finally be introduced for euro area Member States;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 120 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls its previous positions in favour of thejects incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework, which would make it a fully-fledged EU body; insists that this incorporation should continue to be understood as part of the EMU completion project; believes that such an integration would allow for management in accordance with the Community method, ensure the full consistency of fiscal rules and obligations, facilitate economic and fiscal policy coordination, and enhance democratic legitimacy and accountability through the European Parliament; points to the sovereignty of national parliaments over their national budgets; points out that fiscal sovereignty is the primary prerogative of each and every parliament; rejects, therefore, the Community method for the ESM, since it weakens the fiscal responsibility of euro area members and jeopardises fiscal sovereignty; points out that the democratic legitimacy of the European Parliament is weaker than that of national parliaments and that democratic legitimacy is lessened when powers are transferred to the Union;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 138 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that the Commission’s proposal has generated a lively discussion on its political, financial and legal implications, and that discussions continue on a number of important issues; stresses, however, that this debate on the long-term vision of the ESM’s institutional setting should not delay the steps urgently required to strengthen the; underscores the fact that there is no legal basis for an EMUF and its capacity to promote financial stability and respond to economic shocks; calls, therefore, for a meaningful ESM reform in the short term by means of a revision of the ESM Treaty, without prejudice to more ambitious developments in the futurethat Article 352 TFEU in particular is not relevant;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 144 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Underlines that the primary mission of the new ESF should continue to be to provide transitional financial assistance to Member States in need, on the basis of the agreed adjustment programmes; stresses that the ESF must have adequate firepower for that purpose; opposes,e fact that the adjustment programmes carried out to date, which have been intended to provide transitional financial assistance, delay the necessary adjustment process and are counterproductive; therefore, rejects any attempt to turn the reformed ESM into an instrument for banks only, or to reduce its financial capacity to support Member States; recalls that financial assistance provided to Member States underthat serves the banks; recalls that, to date, the new ESF has to be complemented by other fiscal capacity tools, including precautionary instruments,not definitively established that it is in a position to promote economic and financial stabilisation, investment and upward socioeconomic convergence in the euro area;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 163 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Believes that the reformed ESM should play a more prominent role in the management of financial assistance programmes, alongside the Commission and in close cooperation with the ECB, ensuring that the EU institutional framework has more autonomy whenever needed, without prejudice to appropriate partnerships with other institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund;deleted
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 186 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Highlights the need for an efficient decision-making procedure in the reformed ESM, particularly ESM, while safeguarding the case ofprinciple of unanimity, including in urgent situations;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 196 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Calls for a swift- in the event of an ESM reform that also redefines its role, functions and financial tools, so that the new ESF can - for no provision to be made for the ESM either to offer liquidity support in case of resolution andor to serve as a financial backstop for the SRF; calls for the SRF to be made operational as soon as possible and, in any case, before 2024;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 216 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Underlines the risks arising from the delay in completingon of the banking union; welcomerejects, in this context, the European Council’s commitment to a common backstop for the SRF and recalls the need also topoints out that the EDIS must not be establish the EDISed either;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 227 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Invites the ESM to establish a protocol for a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) with the European Parliament, with immediate effect, to further promote institutional dialogue and enhance the ESM’s transparency, accountability and democratic legitimacy in line with the further deepening of interinstitutional cooperation on the economic governance of the euro area;deleted
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 316 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25
(25) It is appropriate that financial institutions and financial market participants contribute to the financing of the activities of the ESAs, because the overall objective of the activities of the ESAs is to contribute to financial stability and, through the avoidance of distortions of competition, the proper operation of the single market. The activities of the ESAs benefit all financial institutions and financial market participants, whether or not they operate across borders. The ESAs contribute to them conducting their business in a stable environment and on a level playing field. Financial institutions and financial market participants that are not directly supervised by the ESA’s should therefore also contribute to the funding of those activities of the ESAs from which they benefit. In addition, the ESAs should however also receive fees paid by the financial institutions and financial market participants that are directly supervised by them. The fees paid by financial institutions that are intended as a contribution to the financing of the activities of the ESAs should be collected by competent authorities and redirected to the ESAs. This shall be done in a transparent manner and in accordance with specially developed methodologies which determine the contribution of each financial institution for this purpose.
2018/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 374 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point a – point ii
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point ab
(ab) to develop and maintain up to date, taking into account, inter alia, changing business practices and business models of financial institutions, a Union resolution handbook on the resolution of financial institutions in the Union which sets out supervisory best practices and high quality methodologies and processes;
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 395 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point c – point ii
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point h
(h) collect the necessary information concerning financial institutions as provided for in Article 35 and Article 35b;
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 431 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 16 – paragraph 2
2. The Authority shall, save in exceptional circumstances, conduct open public consultations regarding the guidelines and recommendations which it issues and shall analyse the related potential costs and benefits of issuing such guidelines and recommendations. Those consultations and analyses shall be proportionate in relation to the scope, nature and impact of the guidelines or recommendations. The Authority shall, save in exceptional circumstances, also request the opinions or advice fromf the Technical Committee of the Banking Stakeholder Group referred to in Article 37(4a).;
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 440 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point d
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 16 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
Where two thirds of the members of the Banking Stakeholder GroupTechnical Committee of the Banking are of the opinion that the Authority has exceeded its competence by issuing certain guidelines or recommendations, they may send a reasoned opinion to the Commission.
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 442 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point d
The Commission shall request an explanation justifying the issuance of the guidelines or recommendations concerned from the Authority. The Commission shall, on receipt of the explanation from the Authority, assess the scope of the guidelines or recommendations in view of the Authority's competence. Where the Commission considers that the Authority has exceeded its competence, and after having given the Authority the opportunity to state its views, the Commission may adopt an implementing decision requiring the Authority to withdraw the guidelines or recommendations concerned .The decision of the Commission shall be made public. The obligation to comply with the guidelines or recommendations shall be suspended until the publishing of the Commission´s decision;
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 451 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 16a (new)
(7a) the following Article 16a is inserted: “Article 16a 1. The Authority shall, with a view to establishing consistent and effective application of the regulatory framework, and to ensuring the common, uniform and consistent application of Union law, respond to questions submitted through a specific Q&A process about Directive 2013/36/EU, Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Directive 2014/59/EU, Directive 2014/49/EU, the technical standards developed by the Authority and adopted by the European Commission and the Authority´s guidelines. 2. The Authority shall subject all answers to an expedited public consultation, which shall not take longer than one or in exceptional cases two weeks. 3. The Q&As shall not have a binding force in law, nor shall they be imposed on financial institutions as binding by any supervisor or competent authority. The answers shall also not be subject to the "comply or explain" requirement. 4. All submitted questions and answers shall be published on the Authority´s website no later than one week after the expedited consultation period has passed.
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 458 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 17 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Without prejudice to the powers laid down in Article 35, the Authority may address a duly justified and reasoned request for information directly to other competent authorities or relevant financial institutions, whenever it is deemed necessary for the purpose of investigating an alleged breach or non-application of Union law. Where it is addressed to financial institutions, the reasoned request shall explain why the information is necessary for the purposes of investigating an alleged breach or non- application of Union law.
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 468 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point a
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) on its own initiative where on the basis of objective criteria,reasons disagreement can be determined between competent authorities.
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 477 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 22 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
For those purposes, the Authority may use the powers may use the powers conferred on it under this Regulation, including Article 35 and 35b.;
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 514 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 29a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
The Strategic Supervisory Plan shall identify specific priorities for supervisory activities in order to promote consistent, efficient and effective supervisory practices, taking into account competent authorities’ necessary discretion in addressing national markets specificities, and the common, uniform and consistent application of Union law and to address relevant micro-prudential trends, potential risks and vulnerabilities identified in accordance with Article 32.
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 531 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 – point d – point ii
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 30 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the adequacy of resources, the degree of independence, and governance arrangements of the competent authority, with particular regard to the effective and proportionate application of the Union acts referred to in Article 1(2) and the capacity to respond to market developments;;
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 546 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 31a
(15) the following Article 31a is inserted: [...]deleted
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 593 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 32 – paragraph 3a
3a. The Authority may require competent authorities to conduct specific reviews. It may request competent authorities to carry out on-site inspections, and may participate in such on-site inspections in accordance with Article 21 and subject to the conditions set out therein, in order to ensure comparability and reliability of methods, practices and results.;
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 622 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 34 – paragraph 2
2. With regard to assessments under Article 22 of Directive 2013/36/EC, and which according to that Directive require consultation between competent authorities from two or more Member States, the Authority may, on application of one of the competent authorities concerned, issue and publish an opinion on such an assessment, except in relation to the criteria in Article 23(1)(e) of that Directive. The opinion shall be issued promptly and in any event before the end of the assessment period referred to in that Directive. Articles 35 and 35b shall apply to the areas in respect of which the Authority may issue an opinion.;
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 627 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Articles 35a to 35h
(20) the following Articles 35a to 35h are inserted: [...]deleted
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 630 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 35b – paragraph 1
1. Where information requested under paragraph 1 or paragraph 5 of Article 35 is not available or is not made available within the time limit set by the Authority, it may by simple request or by decision require the following institutions and entities to provide all necessary information to enable the Authority to carry out its duties under this Regulation: (a) (b) a relevant financial institution; (c) within a financial group or conglomerate that are significant to the financial activities of the relevant financial institutions.deleted relevant financial institutions; holding companies or branches of non-regulated operational entities
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 638 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 35b – paragraph 5
5. The authority shall send, without delay, a copy of the simple request or of its decision to the competent authority of the Member State where the relevant entity listed in paragraph 1 concerned by the request for information is domiciled or established.deleted
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 640 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 35c – paragraph 1
1. Where, in carrying out its duties under this Regulation, the authority finds that there are serious indications of the possible existence of facts liable to constitute an infringement as referred to in Article 35d(1), the Authority shall appoint an independent investigation officer within the Authority to investigate the matter. The appointed officer shall not be involved or have been directly or indirectly involved in the direct or indirect supervision of the institutions or entities listed in Article 35b(1) and shall perform his or her functions independently from the Board of Supervisors.deleted
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 641 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 35d – paragraph 1 – title
Finesdeleted
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 642 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 35d – paragraph 1
1. The Authority shall adopt a decision to impose a fine where it finds that an institution or entity listed in Article 35b(1) has, intentionally or negligently, failed to provide information in response to a decision requiring information pursuant to Article 35b(3) or has provided incomplete, incorrect or misleading information in response to a simple request for information or a decision pursuant to Article 35b(2).deleted
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 645 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 35d – paragraph 2
2. The basic amount of the fine referred to in paragraph 1 shall amount to at least EUR 50 000 and shall not exceed EUR 200 000.deleted
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 651 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 35d – paragraph 5
5. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 3, the total fine shall not exceed 20% of the annual turnover of the entity concerned in the preceding business year unless the entity has directly or indirectly benefitted financially from the infringement. In that case, the total fine shall be at least equal to that financial benefit.deleted
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 670 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 37 – paragraph 4a (new)
(a a) the following paragraph 4a is inserted: “4a. The Banking Stakeholder Group shall establish a Technical Committee as a subgroup of the Banking Stakeholder Group, dealing with technical issues. The members of this Committee shall submit opinions and advice and shall have the sole decision making powers on technical issues in the Banking Stakeholder Group. Members of the Technical Committee of the Banking Stakeholder Group shall serve for a period of four years, following which a new selection procedure shall take place.”
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 671 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 37 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1a
Where members of the Banking Stakeholder Group cannot reach a common opinion oragree on advice, theeach members representing one group of stakeholders shall be permitted to issue a separate opinion or separate advice.
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 677 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23
1. The Authority shall act in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 6 when adopting decisions provided for in this Regulation save for those decisions adopted in accordance with Articles 35b, 35d and 35e.
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 777 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 47 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
For the purposes of Articles 17, 19, 22, 29a, 30, 31a, 32 and 35b to 35h, the Executive Board shall be competent to act and to take decisions. The Executive Board shall keep the Board of Supervisors informed of the decisions it takes.
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 843 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 45
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 63 – paragraph 5
5. The Executive Board shall, without delay, notify the budgetary authority of its intention to implement any project which may have significant financial implications for the funding of its budget, in particular any project relating to property, such as the rental or purchase of buildings.; The costs of these projects shall be carried equally by the general budget and financial institutions.
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 857 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 75a – paragraph 2
2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Article 35c and Article 62a shall be conferred for an indeterminate period of time.
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 858 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55
3. The delegation of power referred to in Article 35c and Article 62a may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force.
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 861 #

2017/0230(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 75a – paragraph 6
6. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 35c or Article 62a shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or the Council within a period of three months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by three months at the initiative of the European Parliament or the Council.;
2018/09/14
Committee: ECON
Amendment 107 #

2017/0136(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Citation 1
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 114352 thereof,
2018/04/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 166 #

2017/0136(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
(21) While nNational competent authorities continue to exercise their current supervisory responsibilities under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, the prior consent of ESMA should be required for certain decisions in order to promote consistency in the supervision of CCPs throughout the Union. A specific mechanism is introduced for cases of disagreement between ESMA and the national competent authorities. Similarly, there is a need to better reflect the mandates. National competent authorities inform both ESMA and the relevant central banks of issue about their decisions as appropriate. Since some decisions will require the consent of both ESMA and of the central banks of issue concerning their monetary policy responsibilities, due to the potential risks that the malfunctioning of a CCP could p, disagreements and deadlocks between those two the implementaition of the monetary policy of the Union and the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems. Therefore, the prior consent of the relevantes should be avoided to the greatest extent possible. Therefore, ESMA and the central banks of issue should be required on certaincoordinate their analysis of the draft decisions envisagproposed by national competent authorities, in particular when it relates to a CCP’s payment and settlement arrangements and related liquidity risk management procedures for the transactions denominated in that central bank of issue’s currency and endeavour to reach a common position. They should avoid proposing mutually inconsistent or incompatible amendments to draft decisions. Where inconsistencies or disagreements nevertheless arise, ESMA and the central bank of issue should attempt to reconcile their views and reach a compromise position within the shortest possible timeframe.
2018/04/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 326 #

2017/0136(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 a – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Competent authorities shall prepare and submit draft decisions to ESMA for consentinform ESMA prior to adoption of any of the following decisions:
2018/04/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 337 #

2017/0136(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 a – paragraph 2 –subparagraph 1
Competent authorities shall prepare and submit draft decisions toinform the central banks of issue referred to in Article 18(2)(h) before adopting any decision pursuant to Articles 14, 15, 20, 44, 46, 50 and 54.
2018/04/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 350 #

2017/0136(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 a – paragraph 4
4. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the consent of ESMA shall be deemed to be given unless it proposes amendments or objects to the draft decision within a maximum period of 15 calendar days after having been notified of that decision. Where ESMA proposes amendments or objects to a draft decision, it shall provide full and detailed reasons, in writing.deleted
2018/04/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 354 #

2017/0136(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 a – paragraph 5
5. Where ESMA proposes amendments, the competent authority may only adopt the decision as amended by ESMA. Where ESMA objects to a final draft decision, the competent authority shall not adopt that decision.deleted
2018/04/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 358 #

2017/0136(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 a – paragraph 6
6. Where the competent authority disagrees with the proposed amendment or the objection of ESMA, it may submit within 5 days a reasoned request to the Board of Supervisors referred to in Article 6(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 to assess that objection or amendment. The Board of Supervisors shall either endorse or reject ESMAs objections or amendments within 10 days of that request and paragraph 5 shall apply accordingly.deleted
2018/04/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 361 #

2017/0136(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 a – paragraph 7
7. Without prejudice to the powers of the Commission under Article 258 TFEU, ESMA may adopt a decision addressed to a financial market participant requiring the necessary action to comply with its obligations under Union law, including the cessation of any practice in the following cases: (a) not comply with paragraph 5 in case of ESMAs objection or amendments to a final draft decision; (b) following a request from ESMA in accordance with paragraph 3, fails to take the requested action within a reasonable time where that failure results in a financial market participant breaching the applicable requirements in Titles IV and V of this Regulation. Decisions adopted pursuant to the first subparagraph shall prevail over any previous decision adopted by the competent authorities on the same matter.deleted where a competent authority does where a competent authority,
2018/04/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 374 #

2017/0136(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 b – Title
Consent of the Central Bank of Issuedeleted
2018/04/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 380 #

2017/0136(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 b – paragraph 1
1. The consent referred to in Article 21a(2) shall be deemed to be given unless the central bank of issue proposes amendments or objects to the draft decision within a maximum period of 15 calendar days after its submission. Where the central bank of issue proposes amendments or objects to a draft decision, it shall provide full and detailed reasons, in writing. Where ESMA has proposed amendments pursuant to Article 21a(4) to the draft decisions to be adopted pursuant to Articles 14, 15, 20 and 54, it shall also submit them also to the central bank of issue. In that case, the deadline referred to in the first subparagraph shall be extended by 5 days.deleted
2018/04/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 390 #

2017/0136(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 b – paragraph 2
2. Where the central bank of issue proposes amendments, the competent authority may only adopt the decision as amended by that central bank of issue. Where the central bank of issue objects to a draft decision, the competent authority shall not adopt that decision.deleted
2018/04/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 206 #

2017/0090(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 39 – paragraph 11
11. Where the requirement referred to in paragraph 9 is satisfied, the assets and positions recorded in those accounts shallmay not be considered part of the insolvency estate of the CCP or the clearing member without prejudice to the applicable Member State's insolvency law.;
2018/03/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 226 #

2017/0090(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 65 – paragraph 2
(13) Article 65(2) is amended as follows: (a) in point (a), “EUR 20 000” is replaced by “EUR 200 000”; (b) in point (b), “EUR 10 000” is replaced by “EUR 100 000”; (c) the following point (c) is added: ‘(c) for the infringements referred to in Section IV of Annex I, the amount of the fines shall be at least EUR 5 000 and shall not exceed EUR 10 000.;’deleted
2018/03/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 264 #

2017/0090(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 89 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
1. Until [PO please add date of entry into force + 35 years], the clearing obligation set out in Article 4 shall not apply to OTC derivative contracts that are objectively measurable as reducing investment risks directly relating to the financial solvency of PSAs, and to entities established to provide compensation to members of PSAs in case of a default of a PSA.;
2018/03/05
Committee: ECON