BETA

18 Amendments of Markus FERBER related to 2016/0365(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 37

(37) The prime objectives of resolution should be to ensure the continuity of critical functions, to avoid adverse effects on financial stability, and to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support to failing CCPs. To prevent moral hazard and protect taxpayers more effectively, competent authorities should lay down clear and comprehensive measures in advance for recovering those funds from clearing participants.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point d

(d) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support and ensure that the deployed funds can be recouped from clearing participants over time;

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point e – introductory part

(e) none of the CCP'’s creditors, shareholders or clearing participants incur higher losses than ~~they~~ would ~~hav~~be incurred ~~under any of the following circumstances~~by them in accordance with Article 60 et seq.:

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point e – point i

(i) the resolution authority had not taken any resolution action pursuant to Article 21 following the default of one or more clearing members and the creditor was instead subject to possible outstanding obligations pursuant to the CCP's operating rules;deleted

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point e – point ii

~~(ii) the CCP had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, where no clearing member has defaul~~deleted;

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

TWhe resolution authority shall require the CCP to issue instruments of ownership to be subscribed by all non-defaulting clearing members where those non- defaulting clearing members have been subject to loss and position allocation tools in deviation from the CCP's operating rules which have resulted in the non-defaulting clearing member suffering a financial loss. The number of instruments of ownership issued to each affected non-defaulting clearing member shall be proportionate to its loss and shall take account of any outstanding contractual obligations of the clearing members toward the CCP. a CCP has applied recovery tools and subsequently does not have to enter into resolution, the competent supervisory authority, after the matched book has been restored, may require the CCP to compensate some or all clearing members, provided that both of the following conditions are met, namely that: (i) the CCP has deviated both from its rules and from its recovery plan, with the intention of discriminating against individual clearing participants or groups of participants; (ii) the CCP, when applying the tools concerned, has caused operational or technical errors to be made as a result of which unintended or unexpected use has been made thereof. Compensation shall be ordered by the competent supervisory authority. It shall be specified whether compensation is to be provided in cash or by transferring instruments of ownership, held by the CCP, in future gains. The level of compensation for creditors shall be no more than 90% of the CCP’s annual gains, over no more than 15 years, provided it has been established that the loss arose on the basis of the conditions under i) and ii) and there has been complete recovery.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 45 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)

(da) the resolution authority has, in advance, defined clear mechanisms allowing the public funds deployed to be recouped from participants profiting from the support.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 60 – paragraph 1

Where the resolution authority uses one or more resolution tools, it sh~~all~~ould ensure that shareholders, creditors and clearing participants do not incur~~: (a) in the event of the default of a clearing member, greater~~ more losses than ~~they~~ would ~~hav~~be incurred ~~had~~if the resolution authority ~~not taken~~takes no resolution action in relation to the CCP a~~t the time the resolution authority considered that the conditions for resolution pursuant to Article 22(1) were met and had instead been subject to~~nd instead honours all possible outstanding obligations ~~pursuant to~~in accordance with the CCP'’s recovery plan or, together with all other contractual arrangements in its operating rules; (b) in an event other than the default of a clearing member, greater losses than they would have incurred had the CCP been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings including by taking account of its contractual arrangements in its operating rules, and the CCP is wound up under normal insolvency proceedings. In the process, plausible adverse effects as regards systemic instability and market turbulence should be appropriately taken into consideration, with particular account being taken of the following: (a) replacement costs; (b) contract cancellation costs; (ba) less income because of less demand for indirect clearing.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 60 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) in the event of the default of a clearing member, greater losses than they would have incurred had the resolution authority not taken resolution action in relation to the CCP at the time the resolution authority considered that the conditions for resolution pursuant to Article 22(1) were met and had instead been subject to possible outstanding obligations pursuant to the CCP's recovery plan or other contractual arrangements in its operating rules;deleted

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 60 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) in an event other than the default of a clearing member, greater losses than they would have incurred had the CCP been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings including by taking account of its contractual arrangements in its operating rules.deleted

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 61 – paragraph 2 – point a

(a) the treatment that shareholders, creditors and clearing participants would have received had the resolution authority not taken resolution action in relation to the CCP, when the resolution authority considered that the conditions for resolution pursuant to Article 22(1) were met, and they had instead been subject to enforcement of possible outstanding obligations pursuant to the CCP's recovery plan orand other arrangements in its operating rules orand the CCP had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, taking account of possible adverse effects of systemic instability and market turbulence and taking particular account of Article 60(a)-(c);

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 61 – paragraph 3

3. For the purposes of calculating the treatments referred to in paragraph 2(a), the valuation referred to in paragraph 1 shall disregard any provision of extraordinary public financial support to the CCP under resolution.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 80 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 6a – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Where a CCP meets the conditions under Article 22 of Regulation (EU) [on CCP recovery and resolution], the resolution authority of the CCP designated under Article 3(1) of that Regulation ~~or the competent authority of a clearing member of the CCP in resolution~~ may request the Commission to temporarily suspend the clearing obligation laid down in Article 4(1) for specific classes of OTC derivatives where the following conditions are met:

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 80 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 6a – paragraph 1 – point b – indent ii

(ii) the measure is necessary to address the threat and will not have a detrimental effect on financial stability which is disproportionate to its benefits, and it has been established that taking the measure will have no procyclical impact on confidence in financial market stability.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 80 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 6a – paragraph 1 – point b – indent ii a (new)

(iia) it can be established that taking the measure will not have an unequal effect on market participants or put some of them at a competitive disadvantage.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 80 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 6a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3

The resolution authority referred to in the first subparagraph shall notify its reasoned request to ESMA and the ESRB at the same time that the request is notified to the Commission.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 80 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 6a – paragraph 7

7. The suspension of a clearing obligation pursuant to paragraph 4 shall be valid for an initial period ~~not exceeding thre~~of one months from the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 80 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 6a – paragraph 8

8. TWith the agreement of the resolution authority, the Commission may renew the suspension referred to in paragraph 7 for ~~one or more periods not cumulatively exceeding thre~~a further period of no more than one months from the end of the initial suspension period where the grounds for the suspension continue to apply.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON