8 Amendments of Thomas MANN related to 2017/0136(COD)
Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) Since the adoption of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, the volume of CCP activity in the Union and globally has grown rapidly in scale and in scope. The expansion in CCP activity, especially in the context of OTC equity derivatives and currency derivatives as asset classes in the original scope, is set to continue in the coming years with the introduction of additional clearing obligations and the rise in voluntary clearing by counterparties not subject to a clearing obligation. The Commission’s proposal of 4 May 201747 to amend Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 in a targeted manner, to improve its effectiveness and proportionality, will create further incentives for CCPs to offer central clearing of derivatives to counterparties and facilitate access to clearing to small financial and non- financial counterparties. These are the main elements that will ensure the G20 objectives are implemented in full for the sake of greater financial stability in the long term. Deeper and more integrated capital markets resulting from the Capital Markets Union (CMU) will further increase the need for cross-border clearing in the Union, thus further increasing the importance and the interconnectedness of CCPs within the financial system. __________________ 47 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 as regards the clearing obligation, the suspension of the clearing obligation, the reporting requirements, the risk-mitigation techniques for OTC derivatives contracts not cleared by a central counterparty, the registration and supervision of trade repositories and the requirements for trade repositories, COM/2017/0208 final.
Amendment 152 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
Recital 16
(16) To provide for an appropriate level of expertise and accountability, the Head and the two Directors of the CCP Executive SessionChair of the CCP Supervisory Committee should be appointed on the basis of merit, skills, knowledge of clearing, post-trading and financial matters, as well as experience relevant to the supervision and regulation of CCPs. They Chair of the CCP Supervisory Committee should be chosen on the basis of an open selection procedure. The Commission supervisory colleges should submit a proposal for the appointment of candidates to the European Parliament for approval. Following the European Parliament’s approval of that proposal, the Council should adopt an implementing decision.
Amendment 165 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
Recital 21
(21) While national competent authorities continue to exercise their current supervisory responsibilities under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, the prior consent of ESMA should be required for certain decisions in order to promote consistency in the supervision of CCPs throughout the Union. A specific mechanism is introduced for cases of disagreement between ESMA and the national competent authorities. Similarly, in order to ensure the stability of the currency in question and of the financial sector, there is a need to betterclearly reflect the mandates of the central banks of issue concerning their monetary policy responsibilities, due to the potential risks that the malfunctioning of a CCP could pose to the implementation of the monetary policy of the Union and the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems. Therefore, the prior consent of the relevant central banks of issue should be required on certain decisions, especially those of systemic importance that are critical to the market, envisaged by national competent authorities, in particular when it relates to a CCP’s payment and settlement arrangements and related liquidity risk management procedures for the transactions denominated in that central bank of issue’s currency. Since some decisions will require both the consent of ESMA and of the central bank of issue, disagreements and deadlocks between those two entities should be avoided to the greatest extent possible. Therefore, ESMA and the central bank of issue should coordinate their analysis of the draft decisions proposed by national competent authorities and endeavour to reach a common position. They should avoid proposing mutually inconsistent or incompatible amendments to draft decisions. Where inconsistencies or disagreements nevertheless arise, ESMA and the central bank of issue should attempt to reconcile their views and reach a compromise position within the shortest possible timeframe.
Amendment 172 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22 a (new)
Recital 22 a (new)
(22a) The Chair of the CCP Supervisory Committee shall be a full-time, independent professional. The Chair shall be appointed on the basis of merit, skills, knowledge of clearing, post-trading and financial matters, and of experience relevant to CCP supervision and regulation. The Chair shall be chosen on the basis of an open selection procedure organised by the supervisory colleges, which shall respect the principles of gender balance, experience and qualification. The Chair shall not hold any other office at national, Union, or international level. The supervisory colleges shall provide to the European Parliament a shortlist of candidates for the position of Chair of the CCP Supervisory Committee and shall inform the Council and the Commission of the shortlist. The supervisory colleges shall submit a proposal for the appointment of the Chair of the CCP Supervisory Committee to the European Parliament for approval. Following the approval of that proposal, the Council shall adopt an implementing decision to appoint the Chair of the Supervisory Committee. The Council shall act by qualified majority. Where the Chair of the CCP Supervisory Committee no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his or her duties or has been found guilty of serious misconduct, the Council, having received the consent of the supervisory colleges, may, on a proposal from the Commission which has been approved by the European Parliament, adopt an implementing decision to remove him or her from office. The Council shall act by qualified majority. The European Parliament or the Council may inform the supervisory colleges that they consider the conditions for the removal of the Chair of the CCP Supervisory Committee to be fulfilled, to which the Commission shall respond.
Amendment 339 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Competent authorities shall prepare and submit draft decisions to the central banks of issue referred to in Article 18(2)(h) before adopting any decision pursuant to Articles 14, 15, 20, 42, 44, 46, 47, 48, 50 and 54.
Amendment 443 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 25 – paragraph 2 a – subparagraph 1 – point c
Article 25 – paragraph 2 a – subparagraph 1 – point c
(c) the CCP's clearing membership structure as well as the structure of its network of clients and indirect clients;
Amendment 447 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 25 – paragraph 2 a – subparagraph 1 – point c a (new)
Article 25 – paragraph 2 a – subparagraph 1 – point c a (new)
(ca) the availability of clearing services in the relevant currencies to clearing members, their clients and indirect clients;
Amendment 479 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 25 – paragraph 2 c – subparagraph 1
Article 25 – paragraph 2 c – subparagraph 1
ESMA, in agreement withafter obtaining the consent of the relevant central banks of issue and commensurate with the degree of systemic importance of the CCP in accordance with paragraph 2aafter consulting the ESRB, may conclude that a CCP is of such substantial systemic importance that compliance with the conditions set out in paragraph 2b does not sufficiently ensure the financial stability of the Union or of one or more of its Member States and should not therefore be recognised. In such a case, ESMA shall recommend that the Commission adopt an implementing act confirming that thate CCP should not be recognised in accordance with paragraph 2b. and requiring the CCP to apply for authorisation pursuant to Article 14 to provide the clearing services in question within the Union. ESMA may, in its analysis, identify specific clearing services or activities for which it considers that recognition shall not be granted or extended. The recommendation shall be accompanied by an analysis of all of the following elements: (a) the elements referred to in points (a) to (d) of Article 25; (b) The features of the clearing services provided by the CCP, especially those in the currencies of the Union; (c) the potential consequences of including the outstanding cleared contracts within the scope of the implementing act; (d) the potential consequences, in terms of costs and benefits, of the requirement for the CCP to apply for authorisation in the Union on the Union clearing members, their clients, linked and operable FMIs and Union markets as a whole, in particular as regards the impact of the decision on their competitiveness; (e) the potential impact of a CCP not being required to apply for authorisation in the Union and the impact on the financial stability of the Union or of one or more of its Member States; (f) the existence and nature of liquidity support mechanisms available to the CCP in its home country and the existence of any market mechanisms allowing to spread the risk caused by the CCP.