Activities of Nicolaus FEST related to 2021/2180(INI)
Plenary speeches (1)
Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report (debate)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report
Amendments (38)
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 13
Citation 13
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 14
Citation 14
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 16
Citation 16
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 17
Citation 17
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 18
Citation 18
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 19
Citation 19
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 24
Citation 24
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 25
Citation 25
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 28
Citation 28
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the EU conception of the rule of law is based, within EU law, on Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which lists the rule of law as one of the founding principles of the Union, equally ranked with human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, and respect for human rights, but not identical to these other founding principles;
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
Recital A b (new)
Ab. whereas Article 5 TEU states that the EU may only exercise those powers conferred upon it in the Treaties by the Member States and that any powers not so conferred remain with the Member States;
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the annual rule of law review cycle is a welcome addicommon understanding of the EU conception tof the tools available to preserve the Article 2 TEU values by addressing the situation in all EU Member States in a report based on four pillars with a direct bearing on respect for the rule of law; rule of law has evolved into a concept sui generis, which has not much to do with either the principle of ‘state rule through law’ or the traditional principle of the rule of law as found in Common law;
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas the Commission seeks on the one hand to bind the Member States to EU law, as under the ‘state rule through law’, putting the Union hierarchically above the Member States, while on the other hand it seeks to replace the traditional content of the rule of law by constructing an artificial and likewise unhistorical set of values and principles;
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas the Commission uses the EU conception of the rule of law against Member States that do not subscribe to the set of values and principles it has constructed; whereas the Commission is instrumentalising the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism against Poland, Hungary and other states which insist on the supremacy of their traditional values and own, yet equally legitimate, acceptation of the rule of law; whereas this mechanism is a powerful political coercion tool that poses a potential threat to all Member States;
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas it is necessary to strengthethe rise in anti-semitism and any loss of woman’s rights in the Union cand streamline existing mechanisms and to develop an effective EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights to ensure that Article 2 TEU values are be linked to an increase in the Islamisation of some Member States; notes that this is a catastrophic by-product of mass-immigration by third country nationals who have no intention of embracing or upheold throughout the Unioning European values;
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism is applied unequally as there are a number of Member States which have institutional procedures and state action in place that contradict the traditional understanding of the rule of law; whereas the governing coalitions have the power to appoint Supreme Court judges in Germany; whereas a former deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the German Bundestag was elected to the Federal Constitutional Court, over which he is now presiding; whereas home affairs ministers in Germany have the power to order state attorneys to commence and cease criminal proceedings; whereas the German Government removed from his post the former President of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution as he was unwilling to launch a surveillance procedure against Germany’s biggest opposition party; whereas, without delay, his replacement began working towards the launching of such a procedure immediately after taking office; whereas German Courts have already twice deemed such action a violation of the law; whereas the persecution of this opposition party is clearly politically motivated, as shown by the effort to stigmatise it ahead of a series of important regional elections and the Federal elections in the early autumn;
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
Recital D b (new)
Db. whereas it is obvious that the Commission is not addressing violations of the rule of law equally; whereas the delay in the adoption of the Guidelines for the Rule of Law Mechanism demonstrates that the Commission is putting political considerations in the Council above EU law by which the Commission is bound;
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D c (new)
Recital D c (new)
Dc. whereas the Commission is nowadays a politicised Commission; whereas the Treaties designate the Commission as the Guardian of the Treaties; whereas a politicised Commission cannot be trusted to apply the law equally;
Amendment 113 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the Commission’s second annual rule of law report; regrets the fact that the Commission did not address in full the recommendations made by Parliament in its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rrule of the law in the Member States, most of which are deeply rooted in the Western legal tradition in which the rule of law has thrived; respects the national deviations of the general concept of the rule of law as evidenced by the vastly differing legal traditions in the Member States; recalls that the concept of rule of Llaw Report; considers that these recommendatcannot be construed as the Commission’s remain valid and reiterates themsubjective interpretation and application of the law;
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Welcomes the fact that the funcCommission's search for a lean definitioning of justice systems, the anti- corruption framework, media pluralism and certain institutional issues related to checks and balances, including civic space to a certain extthe rule of law by stating the key principles of legality, legal certainty, prohibition of the arbitrary exercise of executive power, effective judicial protection by independent, are all part of the Commission’s annual report; regrets, however, that not all rule of law issues were covered in sufficient detail in the 2021 report; calls for the inclusion in the annual report of other important elements of the Venice Commission’s 2016 Rule of Law Checklist; believes that civic space deserves a separate subheading in the report; nd impartial courts respecting fundamental rights in full, the separation of powers, permanent subjection of public authorities to established laws and procedures, and equality before the law; regrets however that the Commission defines the scope of the 2021 Rule of Law report in a way that does not follow the criteria of its own lean definition, such as anti-corruption, media pluralism and civic space;
Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Welcomes the fact thatNotes that while all Member States are said to be scrutinised according to the same indicators and methodology; emphasises that presenting deficiencies or breaches of a different nature or intensity risks trivialising the most serious breaches of the rule of law; urges the Commission to differentiate its reporting by distinguishing between systemic breaches of the rule of law and isolated breaches, there is an observable gap between the stated goal and the reality;
Amendment 170 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. RegretNotes the fact that the report fails to clearly recognise theany deliberate process of the rule of law backsliding in Poland and Hungary; calls on the Commission to make clear that when the Article 2 TEU values are being deliberately, gravely, permanently and systematically violated over a period of time, Member States could fail to fulfil all the criteria that define a democracy and become authoritarian regimes;
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Regrets the fact that several Member States, in particular Hungary and Poland, had to be mentioned several times by the Commission as points of concern in the synthesis report; recalls that since June 2021 Parliament has also addressed the rule of law situation in Hungary, Poland and Slovenia in its plenary resolutions; further recalls that Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs’ Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group has also addressed similar issues in Bulgaria, Greece, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia, but has ignored far greater breaches in Germany;
Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
Amendment 241 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Underlines its concern at the fact that women and people in vulnerable situations, including persons with disabilities, children, religious minorities, particularly at a time of rising antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred in Europe, Romani people and other persons belonging to ethnic and linguistic minorities, migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, LGBTI+ persons and elderly people, continue to see their rights not being fully respected across the Union; emphasises the obvious link between deteriorating rule of law standards and violations of fundamental rights and minority rightscontinue to see their rights not being fully respected across the Union;
Amendment 266 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Calls on the Commission to strengthen the regular, inclusive and structured dialogue with governments and national parliaments, NGOs, national human rights institutions, ombudspersons, equality bodies, professional associations and other stakeholders; considers that civil society organisations should be closely involved in all phases of the review cycle; highlights that thematically structured consultations would make the process more efficient and increase the amount of valuable feedback; stresses that the consultation questionnaire should allow stakeholders to report aspects beyond the scope envisaged by the Commission;
Amendment 275 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Considers that the time limits for consultation with civil society is often too short and should be suitably adapted and flexible in order to allow for complete and comprehensive input; points out that this has made it more difficult for stakeholders to prepare and plan their contributions and awareness-raising activities, in particular if the consultation coincides with winter holidays; calls on the Commission to allow multilingual submissions; notes that consultation can be improved by ensuring follow-up with civil society actors on the input they provide;
Amendment 289 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Recalls that the Commission must take into account relevant information from pertinent sources and recognised institutions; recalls that the findings of relevant international bodies, such as those under the auspices of the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, are of crucial importance; believes that EFRIS is a useful source of information in this regard;
Amendment 294 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Calls on the Commission to invite the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) to provideensure it has the best methodological advpractices and conduct comparative research to add detail in key areas of the annual report, bearing in mind that the right to a fair trial, freedom of expression and other fundamental rights have intrinsic links with the rule of law;
Amendment 304 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Considers that cooperation with the Council of Europe and other international organisationbetween Member States is of particular relevance for advancing democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the EU; calls on the Commission to analyse systematically data on non-compliance with judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and views of the UN Treaty Bodies concerning individual communications; urges the Commission to uphold its own rules in the area of transparency, anti- corruption and justice;
Amendment 310 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
Amendment 319 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
Amendment 324 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Calls on the Commission to explore the full potential of developingclosing down of the FRA in accordance with principles relating to the status and functioning of national institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights (the Paris Principles) in order for it to become a fully independent body providing impartial and publicly available positions on country- specific situations in the field of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; underlines that such development should go hand in hand with an increase in availableto save €x million in available taxpayer resources;
Amendment 332 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Reiterates that the annual report should serve as a basis for deciding whether to activate one or several relevant tools such as Article 7 TEU,jects the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism; considers Regulation (EU, Euratom)2020/2092 on the Rrule of Llaw Conditionality Regua violation, of the Rule of Law Framework or infringement procedures, including expedited procedures, applications for interim measures before the CJEU and actions regarding non-implementationunanimity principle enshrined in Article 7 TEU and therefore a breach of CJEU judgments; calls on the institutiolaw; expects the lawsuits brought against to activate such tools without delayhe Regulation to be successful;
Amendment 346 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. RecallNotes that infringement procedures are the core instrument to protect and defend EU law the Commission has evolved into a political player rather thand the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; notes with concernGuardian of the Treaties; underlines that the nuMember of infringement procedures launched by the Commission has plummeted since 2004; is surprised byStates are, and should remain, the Masters of the Treaties; considers that the Commission has unhealthily outgrown the role it was assigned by the Treaties; hence notes that the fact that infringement procedures are not triggered systematically as soon as the relevant infringement is documented in the annual report; deplores the Commission’s reluctance to exhaust the possibilities of infringement procedures against Member States as the instrument most tailored to resolve the issues efficiently and without delay; notes that this reluctance resulted in calls on Member States to initiate inter- State cases in accordance with Article 259 TFEU; is concerned that without systematic and tim is due to the politicised and therefore partial Commission; calls on applying the mechanism of the annual rule of law report on the Commission first and to suspend its application on the Member States until this has been done in a proper way; recalls in this context as examples for possible violations of the rule of law at Union level the alleged partiality of the European courts in certain issues, the breach of Union law by setting up the NGEU, as welyl applics the violation of the preventive capacity of infringement procedures declinesohibition of monetary financing according to Article 123 TFEU;
Amendment 359 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Recalls the importance of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation where breaches of the principles of the rule of law affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the Union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the Union; considers that the annual report is the most appropriate place to have a dedicated section and conduct a relevant analysis; urges the Commission to launch the procedure enshrined in Article 6(1) of that regulation at least in the cases of Poland and Hungary; calls on the Commission to explore the full potential of the Common Provisions Regulation and the Financial Regulation to protect the rule law;
Amendment 367 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25