13 Amendments of Marina KALJURAND related to 2023/2501(RSP)
Amendment 11 #
Recital F
F. whereas the ability to transfer personal data across borders has the potential to be a key driver of innovation, productivity and economic competitiveness as long as adequate safeguards are provided; whereas these transfers should be carried out in full respect for the right to the protection of personal data and the right to privacy; whereas one of the fundamental objectives of the EU is the protection of fundamental rights, as enshrined in the Charter;
Amendment 22 #
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that the respect for privacyte and data protectionfamily life and the protection of personal data are legally enforceable fundamental rights enshrined in the Treaties, the Charter and the European Convention of Human Rights, as well as in laws and case-law; emphasises that they must be applied in a manner that does not unnecessarily hamper trade or international relations, but can be balanced only against other fundamental rights and not against commercial or political interests;
Amendment 30 #
Paragraph 2
2. Acknowledges the efforts made in the EO to lay down limits on US Signals Intelligence Activities, by referring to the principles of proportionality and necessity, and providing a list of legitimate objectives for such activities; points out, however, that these principles are long-standing key elements of the EU data protection regime and that their substantive definitions in the EO are not in line with their definition under EU law and their interpretation by the CJEU; points out, furthermore, that for the purposes of the EU-US Data Privacy Framework, these principles will be interpreted solely in the light of US law and legal traditions, not those of the EU, and that the Data Protection Review Court’s interpretations will not be made public; points out that the EO requires that signals intelligence must be conducted in a manner proportionate to the ‘validated intelligence priority’, which appears to be a broad interpretation of proportionality;
Amendment 36 #
Paragraph 3
3. Regrets the fact that the EO does not prohibit the bulk collection of data by signals intelligence, including the content of communications; notes that the list of legitimate national security objectives can be amended and expanded by the US President, who can determine notith no obligation to make the relevant updates public nor to inform EU counterparts; points out that this would undermine the purpose of the objectives as a safeguard to limit US intelligence activities;
Amendment 40 #
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Stresses the EDPB’s concerns over the EO’s failure to provide safeguards in bulk data collection, namely the lack of independent prior authorisation, lack of clear and strict data retention rules and lack of stricter safeguards concerning dissemination of data collected in bulk; points particularly to the specific concern that without further restrictions on dissemination to US authorities, law enforcement authorities will be enabled to access data they would otherwise have been prohibited from collecting;
Amendment 43 #
Paragraph 3 b (new)
Amendment 44 #
Paragraph 3 c (new)
3 c. Reminds that onward transfers effectively multiply the risks to the protection of data and notes that the EDPB has called for the inclusion of a legally binding obligation to analyse and determine whether the third country offers an acceptable minimum level of safeguards while taking into account the effect of any existing international agreements that may provide for the transfer of personal data by intelligence services;
Amendment 45 #
Paragraph 3 d (new)
3 d. Shares the calls from the EDPB that the entry into force and adoption of the adequacy decision be conditional upon, inter alia, the adoption of updated policies and procedures to implement the EO by all US intelligence agencies; calls on the Commission to assess these updated policies and procedures and share its assessment with the European Parliament and the EDPB;
Amendment 55 #
Draft motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Points out that the decisions of the Data Protection Review Court (‘DPRC’) will be classified and not made public or available to the complainant and that they will be final and non-appealable with the DPRC; points out that the DPRC is part of the executive branch and not the judiciary; stresses that it should be prohibited for the US President to remove DPRC judges and calls on the Commission to clarify this matter; points out that a complainant will be represented by a ‘special advocate’ designated by the DPRC, for whom there is no requirement of independence; points out that the redress process provided by the EO is based on secrecy and does not set up an obligation to notify the complainant that their personal data has been processed, thereby undermining their right to access or rectify their data; notes that the proposed redress process does not provide for an avenue for appeal in a federal court and therefore, among other things, does not provide any possibility for the complainant to claim damages; concludes that the DPRC does not meet the standards of independence and impartiality of Article 47 of the Charter and that it is not compatible with the basic principles of justice and due process;
Amendment 63 #
Paragraph 7
7. Notes that European businesses need and deserve legal certainty; stresses that successive data transfer mechanisms, which were subsequently repealed by the CJEU, created additional costs for European businesses; notes that continuing uncertainty and the need to adapt to new legal solutions is particularly burdensome for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises; is concerned that the adequacy decision could (like its predecessors) be invalidated by the Court of Justice, leading to a continuing lack of legal certainty, further costs and disruption for European citizens and businesses;
Amendment 67 #
Paragraph 8
8. Points out that, unlike all other third countries that have received an adequacy decision under the GDPR, the US still does not have a federal data protection law; points out that the EO is not clear, precise or foreseeable in its application, as it can be amended at any time by the US President; is therefore, who is also empowered to issue secret executive orders; is concerned aboutregarding the absence of a sunset clause which could provide that the decision would automatically expire four years after its entry into force; after which the Commission would have to make a new determination; is concerned that the lack of a sunset clause in this adequacy decision represents a more lenient approach to the US, despite the fact that the US privacy framework is based on an Executive Order which allows for secret amendments, and which can be amended without consulting Congress or informing EU counterparts;
Amendment 80 #
Paragraph 10
10. Recalls that, in its resolution of 20 May 2021, Parliament called on the Commission not to adopt any new adequacy decision in relation to the US, unless meaningful reforms were introduced, in particular for national security and intelligence purposes; reiterates that the Commission should not leave proper enforcement of EU data protection law to the Court of Justice of the European Union following complaints by individual citizens;
Amendment 88 #
Paragraph 11
11. Concludes that the EU-US Data Privacy Framework fails to create actuessential equivalence in the level of protection; calls on the Commission to continue negotiations with its US counterparts with the aim of creating a mechanism that would ensure such equivalence and which would provide the adequate level of protection required by Union data protection law and the Charter as interpreted by the CJEU; urgescalls on the Commission not to adopt the adequacy finding;