Activities of Włodzimierz CIMOSZEWICZ related to 2018/0902R(NLE)
Opinions (1)
OPINION on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded
Amendments (9)
Amendment 3 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Expresses deep concern about the deliberate and systematic efforts of the Hungarian Government to undermine the founding values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU, in particular through the removal of the constitutional checks and balances, by the limitation of the independence of the judiciary, by intentional alterations of the national electoral system and by hampering freedom of expression, academic freedoms, media pluralism and media Independence, and by challenging the right to equal treatment as well as rights of migrants and asylum seekers; highlights that these trends have substantially worsened since the triggering of Article 7(1) TEU and have been severely amplified by the COVID-19 crisis;
Amendment 8 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Recalls that the rule of law does not mean rule by law, but is underlined by the principle of legality, implying a transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic process of enacting laws; Deplores the fact that the constitutional balance in Hungary has continued to be significantly altered by a deliberately broad and instrumental use of cardinal laws and constitutional amendments aiming to entrench the issues which are to be regulated by ordinary legislation, through amendments of constitutional level, with no or limited public consultation, in a very expedient manner, without any effective involvement of the opposition or civil society; highlights that such a trend of locking in issues at the constitutional level is problematic with regard to both the Constitution and ordinary laws, is contrary to the rule of law, to constitutional traditions and to principles common to Member States and has been a source of open and consistent criticism by the EU and by the Council of Europe institutions; denounces the excessive use of extraordinary powers with the declaration of the state of danger at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic without limitation and with full discretionary powers granted to the government to extend or terminate it and with including a capacity for the government to set aside any law by a simple executive decree and insists that any such measures should remain necessary and proportionate and with relevant constitutional guarantees for their legislative oversight;
Amendment 13 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Underlines that several recently adopted provisions in fundamental law or in cardinal acts aimed to curb the operational functioning of civil law institutions such as universities or to introduce unnecessary hurdles for making changes needed for an effective administration election, in particular by increasing obstacles for the parties to be able to run in a national list of candidates; insist that also practice adopting such laws shortly before the election is contrary to established practice and the recommendations of Venice Commission in its Rule of Law checklist; insist that on the other hand, the Hungarian government has pushed for expedient amendments without any consultation to several ordinary laws which had far-reaching negative impact on fundamental rights and right of equal treatment to increase obstacles for political parties to be able to run a national list of candidates in the parliamentary elections; recalls that the OSCE decided to send a full-scale election observation mission to the 2022 Hungarian parliamentary elections because campaign finance legislation has remained largely unchanged and the latest amendments thereto have not addressed the recommendations of the ODIHR and GRECO;
Amendment 18 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Expresses concern about the steps the Hungarian Government has taken to further limit the independence of the judiciary, in particular by weakening the powers of the National Judicial Council, which damages by modifying appointment procedure, and increasing administrative powers of president of the Supreme Court which takes place entirely without judicial involvement; recalls that the integrity and independence of judicial system is essential source and lack of it will damage mutual trust in the EU, as national judges are judges of first instance of EU law and guarantee equality between EU citizens through its uniform application; highlights, furthermore, that the Hungarian Government increasingly relies on the Hungarian Constitutional Court to avoid compliance with the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), thereby undermining the primacy of EU law;
Amendment 23 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Insists that the Council’s constitutional obligation to organise hearings, enshrined in Article 7(1) TEU, should be implemented in an open, regular and structured manner; insists that in all proceedings related to Article 7 TEU, Parliament and the Commission should be treated equally; points in that regard that the institutional responsibility of the Parliament in triggering Article 7 procedure and principle of mutual sincere cooperation between the EU institutions enshrined in Article 13(2) TEU which should ensure its participation rights in all aspects of the Article 7 procedures; calls on the Council to systematically provide the Member State concerned with recommendations, and to oversee the implementation thereof on a regular basis, following the hearings under Article 7 TEU; recalls that the Council has the obligation to regularly reassess the situation in the Member State concerned and may lift a determination if it finds that the grounds do not longer apply;
Amendment 30 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Underlines that the implementation of Article 7(1) TEU does not require unanimity and acknowledges Council´s refusal to vote following this provision to determine that there is a "clear risk of a serious violation" to the founding values of the Union;
Amendment 32 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Welcomes the judgment of the CJEU in cases C-156/21 and C-157/21 of 16 February 2022, which confirms the validity of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, as it is based on an appropriate legal basis and is compatible with the procedure laid down in Article 7 TEU; insist that application of the conditionality Regulation is a tool complementary to Article 7 procedure, is directly applicable in all Member States and enforceable since January 2021 and calls on the Commission to undertake all the necessary actions for its effective enforcement; points with concern with regard to the protection of the EU budget to the recent amendments to laws narrowing the scope of application of public procurement rules in Hungary leading to reduced scrutiny and increased risk of corruption; points furthermore to a clear lack of cooperation with OLAF, as well as failures to recover of amounts due from economic operators which committed irregularity or fraud;
Amendment 41 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Takes note of the recommendations adopted by the Citizens Panel 2 on “European democracy, values and rights and security” in the Conference on the Future of Europe and in particular the number 10 and 11, including the extension of the conditionality mechanism to cover “all violations of the rule of law;
Amendment 42 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 b (new)
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7 b. Calls to reform the Treaty to remove the unanimity decision-making in the implementation of Article 7(2) in favour of majority in Council to “determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values referred in Article 2" TEU;