BETA

16 Amendments of Gianna GANCIA related to 2020/2122(INI)

Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas overall, the banking sector has responded to the COVID-19 pandemic with resilience, mostlyalso founded on the regulatory reforms enacted since the global financial crisis and further supported by extraordinary public policy relief measures and capital conservation practices;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas the lack of a solution to the treatment of sovereign debt exposures andin the banking prudential framework national options and discretions persists, undermining the European dimension of the Banking Union;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas the lack of a solution to the treatment of sovereign debt exposures still to be discussed at international level and national options and discretions persists, undermining the European dimension of the Banking Union;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Underlines the vital contribution to addressing the crisis of public guarantee schemes, moratoria on loan repayments for borrowers in financial difficulty, the central banks’ liquidity programmes and the ECB’s targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO) and pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP); therefore all the above mentioned measures should be kept in place as long as necessary and they should be only gradually relieved;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Notes the ‘quick fix’ to the Capital Requirements Regulation31 extending transitional arrangements in order to support banks’ lending capacity32 ; ; moreover, calls for a 2 years freeze of the calendar of minimum loss coverage requirements set in the “NPL backstop Regulation” and of supervisory expectation; this is key for taking into account that such Regulation could introduce a perverse incentive for banks towards starting judicial procedures for credit recovery and collateral enforcement as soon as possible, rather than granting forbearance measures and supporting business restructuring; in addition, it is worth noting that in many countries civil courts have been closed or their activity significantly reduced and collateral enforcement procedures have been postponed or delayed thus will increasing the length of recovery actions, with negative impacts on the internal workout and/or NPLs values on primary and secondary markets; _________________ 31Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1). 32Regulation (EU) 2020/873 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 575/2013 and (EU) 2019/876 as regards certain adjustments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (OJ L 204, 26.6.2020, p. 4).
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 178 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Notes the postponement of the implementation of the Basel III reforms and awaits the Commission’s upcoming proposal on the implementation of the finalised standards, taking into account the specificities of the EU banking sector and the necessity to introduce measures aimed at increasing banks' lending to the real economy;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 216 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Stresses that ensuring proper and timely management of deteriorated exposures will be key to preventing a build-up of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the short term; calls for the extension until December 2024 of Article 500 CRR on massive disposals of NPLs, in order to avoid disproportionate effects on banks’ capital, affecting negatively banks’ lending to the real economy;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 227 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Stresses that banks should diligently assess the financial soundness and viability of businesses, proactively engage with distressed debtors to manage their exposures, and offer financing and restructuring options to viable companies; in order to give banks enough room to provide forbearance measures, and avoiding counterproductive capital absorptions embedded in the current regulatory framework, it would be important to increase from 1% to 5% the threshold for diminished credit obligation, set by paragraph 51 of EBA Guidelines on the definition of default (EBA/GL/2016/07);
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 231 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Stresses that banks should diligently assess the financial soundness and viability of businesses, proactively engage with distressed debtors to manage their exposures, and offer financing and restructuring options to viable companies; the prudential framework should be consistently amended to allow and encourage such options;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 257 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Is concerned that as Member States sell increasing amountsConsiders that the creation of Next Generation EU will provide high-quality European assets and this will also be beneficial to rebalancing the share of sovereign bonds, their share in banks' balance sheets grows, potentially aggravating the doom loop; considers that the creation of Next Generation EU will provide high-quality European assetwhich is otherwise growing due to increased amount of Member State issuances;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 305 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
29. Welcomes the fact that while the SRB was not required to take resolution action in 2020, it nevertheless collaborated with the SSM regarding close-to-crisis cases; appreciates the advancement of the current resolution planning cycle, and reiterates that MRELproportionate MREL setting represents one of the key elements in enhancing banks’ resolvability, while ensuring broader financial stability;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 315 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
30. Considers it necessary to have in place an EU liquidation regime, based upon an enhanced role of DGS preventive and alternative interventions, for banks for which the SRB assesses that there is no public interest in resolution;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 332 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
33. Considers it necessary to review the public interest assessment in order to allow resolution tools to be applied to a broader group of banksallow national DGSs to carry out preventive and alternative measures (i.e. financing the transfer of assets and liabilities from the LSI bank in crisis to a third party) to ensure an orderly liquidation of small and medium sized banks with negative public interest assessment;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 365 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
36. Notes the Commission’s launch of the review of the CMDI framework, including the option of a hybrid EDIS, built around the idea of an initial liquidity support mechanism among national DGSs, aimed at funding any shortfall of DGS means, regardless of whether the funds have been used in a pay-out intervention or in a preventive/alternative intervention, on the assumption that such a choice is driven by the Least Cost Test (LCT);
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 382 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 a (new)
37 a. Considers it necessary to coherently amend the State Aid rules and the DG COMP 2013 Banking Communication in order to allow DGS preventive and alternative intervention in the crisis management context, taking duly into account the recent CJEU rulings;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 383 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 b (new)
37 b. Considers it necessary to increase transparency and ex-ante predictability on the expected public interest assessment outcomes in order to provide the clarity needed to ensure more coherent and proportionate MREL levels;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON