BETA

Activities of Irene TINAGLI

Plenary speeches (2)

Ensuring sustainable, decent and affordable housing in Europe - encouraging investment, private property and public housing programmes (debate)
2024/10/09
The Autumn 2024 Economic Forecast: a gradual rebound in an adverse environment (debate)
2024/11/26

Written questions (12)

Further delays to the reopening of the Fréjus Rail Tunnel
2024/08/29
Documents: PDF(57 KB) DOC(10 KB)
Police searches of media outlets: the case of Il Corriere Fiorentino
2024/09/04
Documents: PDF(67 KB) DOC(10 KB)
LGBTQIA+ rights in Italy – Sasso motion
2024/09/12
Documents: PDF(56 KB) DOC(10 KB)
Recent massacre in the Al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’ in the Gaza Strip
2024/09/14
Documents: PDF(61 KB) DOC(11 KB)
Approval of the draft law on security and breach of EU principles
2024/09/25
Documents: PDF(58 KB) DOC(10 KB)
Debt sustainability analysis framework
2024/10/04
Documents: PDF(58 KB) DOC(10 KB)
Compliance of the Italy-Albania protocol with EU law
2024/10/22
Documents: PDF(58 KB) DOC(11 KB)
The crisis surrounding Beko Europe and worker protection
2024/11/08
Documents: PDF(64 KB) DOC(10 KB)
Change of algorithm on X before US election
2024/11/21
Documents: PDF(68 KB) DOC(12 KB)
Conflicts of interest and political interference by Elon Musk
2024/11/26
Documents: PDF(63 KB) DOC(10 KB)
Incompatibility between the list of safe countries of origin made by the Italian Government and the criteria laid down in EU law
2024/11/29
Documents: PDF(61 KB) DOC(11 KB)
Conditions for workers in the automotive industry
2024/12/05
Documents: PDF(56 KB) DOC(10 KB)

Amendments (291)

Amendment 1 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 11 a (new)
– having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights,
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 4 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 14 a (new)
– having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 19 May 2022 on the social and economic consequences for the EU of the Russian war in Ukraine - reinforcing the EU´s capacity to act (2022/2653(RSP)),
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 10 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas HICP inflation is projected to increase somewhat in the last quarter of 2024, before declining to 2.2 % inreaching the 2% inflation target in the fourth quarter of 2025 and 1.9 % in 20264 ; _________________ 4 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/projection s/html/ecb.projections202409_ecbstaff~9c 88364c57.en.html#toc6.
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 13 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas the ECB’s primary objective is to maintain price stability, which it has defined as a level of inflation of 2 % over the medium term; whereas the ECB´s secondary mandate requires it, without prejudice to its primary mandate, to support the general economic objectives in the EU;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 15 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas political independence requires the ECB to refrain from taking political decisions;deleted
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 18 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas Article 123 TFEU and Article 21 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB prohibit the direct monetary financing of governments; whereas the ECB may purchase debt securities on the secondary market if this is necessary to pursue its objectives;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 21 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
F a. whereas the ECB shall promote the general economic policies in the EU, thereby contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the EU as laid down in Article 3 TFEU;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 28 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H
H. whereas the euro is the second most important currency globally, lagging behind the US dollar by a significant margin, despite the euro area’s economic size in global trade;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 34 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)
I a. whereas the Governing Council of the ECB reflects a gender imbalance; calls on Member States to promote gender balance through equal representation of the respective governors;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 35 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the role of the ECB in safeguarding monetary stability; underlines that the ECB is the institution responsible for maintaining price stability in the euro areaEuro area; emphasizes the importance of the ECB´s secondary mandate to promote the EU´s general economic objectives as set out in Article 3 TFEU, which include full employment, social progress, and environmental protection; whereas the ECB´s mandate, as defined by its objectives, is laid down in Article 127 TFEU and thus legally binding;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 51 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Highlights the importance of the ECB’s political independence, which should remain untouched; stresses that this independence requires the ECB to in turn refrain from taking political decisions; welcomes the institutional cooperation, thereby stressing the importance of the corresponding level of accountability towards the European Parliament;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 66 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. RegretNotes that inflation levels remain above the ECB’s target of 2 % in some Member States%; emphasises that inflation diminishes the purchasing power of fixed incomes, savings and pensions and that it distorts the signalling function of prices that ensures an efficient allocation of resources;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 67 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Stresses that both monetary and fiscal policies should work in tandem to help European citizens and households, as well as small businesses most adversely affected by the ongoing geopolitical crisis;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 69 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5 b. Stresses that inflation triggered a "cost of living crisis" for EU citizens, emphasizes therefore the imperativeness of curbing inflation to its desired core inflation rate of 2%;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 70 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Regrets that core inflation remains high, with only two euro area Member States reporting core inflation rates below 2 % in September 2024;deleted
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 80 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Warns the ECB against the temptation to lower interest rates too quickly, given the risk that inflation levels could start increasing again; stressNotes that the ECB itself expects a temporary increase in inflation levels in the last quarter of 2024 as previous sharp falls in energy prices drop out of the annual rates, before dropping again in 2025;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 88 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Emphasizes the importance of lower interest rates that encourages higher investments, which is needed to finance the green and digital transitions, recalling the Draghi report´s demand for investment quantified at 800 billion Euro;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 107 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls that prudent fiscal policies by the Member States can complement the ECB’s efforts to keep inflation low; hHighlights that addressing excessive public deficit and debt levels is crucial to maintaining a stable economy; highlights the importance of investments in and sustainable growthfuture;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 117 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Expresses concern about the high levels of government debt and deficits within the Member States and the risks of fiscal dominance that this entailof new austerity measures being imposed, further exacerbating the "cost of living" crisis;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 127 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Welcomes the decrease in core inflation from its peak of 7.6 % in March 2023 to 2.7 % in September 2024, but expresses its unease at its historically and persistently high level;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 128 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12 a. Highlights that the supply- side shock - triggered by the rapid decline in fossil fuel energy imports - is the key driver for the record high inflation; emphasizes that geopolitical tensions have not been resolved which subsequently could cause another supply-side shock; notes, that the new trans-atlantic dynamic might also be a factor for a possible supply-side shock;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 154 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15 a. Welcomes the operational structure of the ECB, including the decision to incorporate secondary objectives and climate change concerns into the planning of its structural refinancing operations and structural portfolios;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 172 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Stresses that the ECB’s purchase programmes are unconventional policies that amount, in economic terms, to monetary financing, which is prohibited under Article 123(1) TFEU, if the ECB does not shrink back its balance sheet; calls on the ECB to therefore to continue gradually reduceing the size of its balance sheet;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 178 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. RegretWelcomes the establishment of the transmission protection instrument (TPI) in July 2022; calls on the ECB to respect not just the legal prohibition of monetary financing but also its economic meaning; stresses in this regard that selectively purchasing government debt amounts to monetarily financing an EU Member State;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 190 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Stresses that diverging interest rates in the euro area are generally the result of different risk premia on government bonds; stresses that purchases under the TPI wshould merely cobe used to address financeial the symptoms of loose fiscal policy; calls on Member Stmarket stress and panics unrelatesd to econduct responsible fiscal policies and ensure sustainable debt leveomic fundamentals;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 195 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19 a. Stresses that the inclusion of owner-occupied housing (OOH) in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) is desirable for reasons of both representativeness and comparability across countries in the euro area; underlines that according to the ECB, since 2011 the estimated impact of including OOH in HICP annual inflation would have been between -1.2 and +0.4 percentage points; notes, however, that the period of observation is short relative to the length of housing market cycles, and the deviations observed are larger if one looks at the country inflation indices; express concerns that in future housing market cycles the differences between the HICP including and excluding the OOH might be larger;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 198 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 b (new)
19 b. Welcome that the Governing Council of the ECB, in its review of the monetary strategy, recognised the appropriateness of including the costs related to owner-occupied housing (OOH) in the HICP as part of a multi-year project and that, in the meantime, it committed to consider both in its monetary policy assessments and decisions also the available inflation measures regarding the quarterly standalone OOH index among the wider set of supplementary inflation indicators that the ECB ordinarily looks at; calls for an acceleration of the roadmap in order to get a rapid inclusion of OOH in the HICP.
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 219 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Reiterates that the digital euro should serves as a complement to physical cash, that it should not replace cash entirely and that cash should remains available at all times;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 223 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Stresses the need for a compensation model for the banking sector, which is tasked with the practical implementation of the digital euro project;deleted
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 237 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23 a. Invites the ECB, together with the Parliament, to launch a broad information campaign on the digital euro in order to allay citizens´concerns;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 242 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Calls on the ECB to refrain from taking politically motivated decisions and to stick to its mandate of maintaining price stability; stresses that overstepping this mandate touches on the central bank’s political independencestick to its mandate of maintaining price stability, while having recourse to its secondary mandate in accorance wth Article 3 TFEU;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 248 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24 a. Emphasizes that, while price stability is the ECB´s primary target, the ECB must take account of environmental, social and economic sustainability goals in line with its secondary mandate;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 254 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
25. Stresses that the ECB’s secondary objectives are best achieved when the free market operates in a stable macroeconomic environment, based on predictable price levels, that encourages investment;deleted
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 258 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)
25 a. Calls on the ECB to include a specific chapter in its annual report explaining how it has interpreted and implemented its secondary objectives;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 264 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)
26 a. Stresses the significance of the European Pillar of Social Rights for socio-economic alignment;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 266 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
27. Insists that the ECB respect the market neutrality principle in all of its monetary operations; regrets that the ECB’s actions to decarbonise its corporate bond holdings have not followed a market neutral approach by its very definition;deleted
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 278 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
28. CWelcomes the Climate and nature plan 2024-2025; calls on the ECB to use all its available tools to ensure that banks take climate risk seriously in order to mitigate the financial risks resulting from climate change;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 288 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
30. Calls on the ECB to look into strengthening the international role of the euro with a view to enhancing its attractiveness as a reserve currency and support market-driven shifts in this direction; stresses the need to deepen and complete the Economic and Monetary Union as a prerequisite for a strong international euro; underlines the importance that co- legislators remain in charge throughout the design of the digital euro;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 289 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 a (new)
30 a. Recalls President Lagarde´s past statement that the current and persisting geopolitical crisis requires us to progress on EU fiscal integration; welcomes the ECB´s long- standing support for a well- thought out completion of the Economic and Monetary Union, the Banking Union, namely with the establishment of a fully- fledged European Deposit Insurance Scheme, and the Capital Markets Union; recalls that this would contribute to a larger spread of risks within and the enhanched financial stability of the Momentary Union, as well as it would further strengthen the international role of the euro and amplify its attractiveness as a reserve currency;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 293 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 b (new)
30 b. Emphasizes the creation of a well- designed European safe asset could facilitate integration and help mitigate negative feedback loops between the sovereign and domestic banking sectors;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 311 #

2024/2054(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 a (new)
33 a. Regrets that the Governing Council of the ECB Governing Council consist currently of only 2 female member; urges the euro area Member States to fulfil their obligations and apply the principals of gender equality in their appointment procedures, so that both genders have equal opportunities to serve as governors of their respective national central bank;
2024/11/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 130 #

2023/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Notes that the NPL ratio decreased further; calls for the adoption of the proposal for a AECE Directive to develop NPL secondary markethighlights that the directive on credit servicers and credit purchasers has made the secondary market for non- performing loans more efficient, while establishing high safeguards for debtors; underlines that the sale of a non- performing loan represents a second best solution compared to returning the credit to performing status; stresses that if the debtor is a household, banks are required to exercise, where appropriate, reasonable forbearance before the sale of impaired loans and before enforcement proceedings are initiated; calls for the extension of this practice to small and medium-sized enterprises;
2023/10/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 135 #

2023/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10 a. Underlines that credit institutions should be encouraged to engage in proactive, preventive and meaningful debt restructuring to support debtors, when deemed appropriate, without necessarily entailing that a default shall be considered to have occurred; stresses that the current specification of what constitutes a material diminished financial obligation in case of distressed restructuring does not provide adequate flexibility to credit institution; calls for a more granular classification that takes in due consideration, among other things, the kind of concession granted, the residual maturity of the exposure and the length of the postponement; recalls that the political agreement on the revision of the CRR invites the EBA to review its guidelines on the matter by 1 January 2026; expresses the hope that the EBA will be able to review the guidelines before that final date;
2023/10/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 159 #

2023/2078(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Welcomes the agreement reached at interinstitutional level to implement Basel III standards in the EU; highlights that the framework will not increase prudential requirements for banks or damage their competitiveness; notes that the implementation of the Basel standards to crypto-assets is still pending; highlights that the new rules have strengthened and better specified proportionality in banking supervision; calls on the national and European supervisors to effectively apply this principle;
2023/10/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 66 #

2023/2064(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Fears that, without properly delivering on its mandate of maintaining price stability, the ECB risks losing its legitimaccredibility;
2023/10/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 107 #

2023/2064(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Notes that according to the most recent economic forecast, the Euro Area economy is expected to growth much less than what was predicted last spring, while there is a certain inertia in the price level; emphasizes that, as a consequence, the so- called “sacrifice ratio” to bring inflation back to 2% is becoming higher than the it was expected some time ago; recognizes that inflation is a painful and harmful phenomenon, and that ECB is using every tools at its disposal to cope with that; underlines, however, that social tensions, economic crisis and political instability are also equally dangerous for the future of the Union; warns that inflation, social, economic and political tensions might feed each other and could create a dangerous spiral; calls for a proper assessment on how to make the fight against inflation economically, socially and politically sustainable, and therefore possible.
2023/10/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 192 #

2023/2064(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Underlines that climate change and extreme weather phenomena could lead to greater variability in prices, especially in the agri-food sector; notes that sudden tightening conditions on the supply side might become very frequent, leading to new inflationary episodes in the coming years; emphasizes that this is an issue that evidently poses serious difficulties for the ECB, which have adequate tools to stabilize demand-driven inflation, but can do little when price instability is mainly due to variations in supply conditions; expresses concern that the Union do not have a proper toolkit to deal with such episodes.
2023/10/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 122 #

2023/0379(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point c – introductory part
Regulation (EU) 2016/1011
Article 29 – paragraph 1a
(c) a new paragraph 1ab is inserted:
2024/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 122 #

2023/0379(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point c – introductory part
Regulation (EU) 2016/1011
Article 29 – paragraph 1a
(c) a new paragraph 1ab is inserted:
2024/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 125 #

2023/0379(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point c
Regulation (EU) 2016/1011
Article 29 – paragraph 1a
1ab. A supervised entity that uses a benchmark in existing financial contracts or financial instruments or to measure the performance of investment funds that is subject to a public notice under Article 24a(5) shall replace that benchmark with an appropriate alternative within 6 months following the publication of that notice, or issue and publish a statement on its website informing clients of the absence of an appropriate alternative.;
2024/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 125 #

2023/0379(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point c
Regulation (EU) 2016/1011
Article 29 – paragraph 1a
1ab. A supervised entity that uses a benchmark in existing financial contracts or financial instruments or to measure the performance of investment funds that is subject to a public notice under Article 24a(5) shall replace that benchmark with an appropriate alternative within 6 months following the publication of that notice, or issue and publish a statement on its website informing clients of the absence of an appropriate alternative.;
2024/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 129 #

2023/0379(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point c a (new)
Regulation (EU) 2016/1011
Article 29 – paragraph 2
(ca) paragraph 2 is amended as follows: 2. Where the object of a prospectus to be published under Directive 2003/71/EC or Directive 2009/65/EC is transferable securities or other investment products that reference a benchmark, the issuer, offeror, or person asking for admission to trade on a regulated market shall ensure that the prospectus also includes clear and prominent information stating whether the benchmark is provided by an administratora public notice on the benchmark used is included in the register referred to in Article 36 of this Regulation, within 6 months following the publication of the public notice.
2024/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 129 #

2023/0379(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point c a (new)
Regulation (EU) 2016/1011
Article 29 – paragraph 2
(ca) paragraph 2 is amended as follows: 2. Where the object of a prospectus to be published under Directive 2003/71/EC or Directive 2009/65/EC is transferable securities or other investment products that reference a benchmark, the issuer, offeror, or person asking for admission to trade on a regulated market shall ensure that the prospectus also includes clear and prominent information stating whether the benchmark is provided by an administratora public notice on the benchmark used is included in the register referred to in Article 36 of this Regulation, within 6 months following the publication of the public notice.
2024/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 23 #

2023/0288(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
(2) The prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances according to Regulation (EU) 1176/201115 and the monitoring of adequate minimum wages according to Directive (EU) 2022/2041 of the European Parliament and of the Council16 require accurate information on the evolution of hourly labour costs and wage levels as well as collective bargaining coverage across Member States. _________________ 15 Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances (OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 25) 16 Directive (EU) 2022/2041 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on adequate minimum wages in the European Union (OJ L 275 of 25.10.2022, p. 33).
2024/01/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 42 #

2023/0288(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2 a (new)
(2 a) ‘social enterprise’ means a private law entity that provides goods and services for the market in an entrepreneurial way and in accordance with the principles and features of the social economy, having social or environmental objectives as the reason for its commercial activity. Social enterprises can be set up in a variety of legal forms1a; _________________ 1a Council Recommendation of 27 November 2023 on developing social economy framework conditions (C/2023/1344).
2024/01/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 48 #

2023/0288(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point (a) – indent 2 a (new)
– (iii) collective bargaining coverage;
2024/01/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 63 #

2023/0288(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. For all the topics in the Annex, the Member States shall collect and provide separate data on social enterprises.
2024/01/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 153 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
(4) The involvement ofIn order to increase the democratic accountability of the fiscal governance framework, the effective involvement of the European Parliament is key as well as the structured involvement of national parliaments, local and regional authorities, social partners, civil society organisations and other relevant stakeholders in the European Semester is keyand in the economic governance process as a whole to ensure ownership and transparent and inclusive policy-making.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 158 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
(5) The economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to better take into account the growing heterogeneity and challenges of fiscal positions, and public debt challenges and other vulnerabilities acrossacross the Member States, national public investment gaps and needs to achieve the priorities of the Union, together with other vulnerabilities. The framework should also provide enough flexibility and be capable of quickly adapt to unexpected and structural shocks with asymmetric impact on Member States. The strong and coordinated policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic, supported by bold, innovative and common instruments at EU level, proved highly effective in mitigating the economic and social damage of the crisis, but tturning the EU economy more resilient and credible to financial markets. The crisis resulted in a significant increase in public- and private-sector debt ratios, underscoring the importance of reducing debt ratios to prudent levels in a gradual, sustained, and growth-friendly and inclusive manner and addressing macroeconomic imbalances, while paying due attention to employment and social objectives and upward social convergence. At the same time, the economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted, to helpprovide, with a level playing field, the necessary fiscal space - at EU and Member State level to address the medium- and long-term challenges facing the Union including achieving a fair digital and green transition, including the Climate Law22 , ensuring energy security, open strategic autonomy, addressing demographic change, strengthening social and economic resilience and implementing the strategic compass for security and defence, all of which requires reforms and sustained high levels of investment in the years to come. _________________ 22 The European Climate Law sets a Union-wide climate neutrality objective by 2050 and requires Union institutions and Member States to progress in enhancing adaptive capacity, requiring significant public investment to reduce the negative socio-economic impacts of climate change on the EU and its Member States, including negative impacts on growth and fiscal sustainabilitystrengthening social and economic resilience, including the implementation of the Pillar of Social Rights, ensuring energy security, open strategic autonomy, addressing demographic.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 171 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
(6) The economic governance framework of the Union should put debt sustainability, investment and reforms, the common priorities of the Union and sustainable and inclusive growth at its core on equal footing and therefore differentiate between Member States by taking into account their public debt challenges and allowing country-specific fiscal trajectories, and ensure consistency among the Union as a whole, including the euro area.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 180 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6 a (new)
(6 a) To achieve the central objective of the reform of this framework - to strengthen public debt sustainability while promoting sustainable and inclusive growth in all Member States and respond fully to the sustained high levels of investment needed to finance EU public goods to address the current and future strategic priorities of the EU - , this framework would be better equipped, if supported by a central and permanent investment instrument. The lessons learned from the implementation of EU instruments, such as SURE or NextGenerationEU, could serve as constructive models for forthcoming investment and macroeconomic stabilisation mechanisms aimed at strengthening the fiscal governance framework.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 181 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6 b (new)
(6 b) In order to increase the legitimacy of the European semester, in order to account for the far-reaching consequences of measures adopted in the context of the European semester on the economic and fiscal course of action and the social fabric of the Member States and in order to ensure appropriate public scrutiny, the European semester should only be launched by a legislative act in the form of a decision on a proposal made by the Commission, based on Article 121(6) TFEU, and promptly adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council. In this decision, the European Parliament and the Council define, in the recitals, their benchmarks for the outcome of the European semester that is to be launched. The European Commission has to take due account of this decision and its recitals when adopting its communication on the Annual Sustainability Growth Survey. By the same token, the Commission takes due account of the Annual Sustainability Growth Survey, the Council’s conclusions and the European Parliament’s resolutions thereon when drafting the recommendations for the draft broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and the Union pursuant to Article 121(2) TFEU and the proposal for the guidelines for employment pursuant to Article 148(2) TFEU. The European Parliament evaluates the Commission's role in the previous European semester against the benchmark of launching decision, the Annual Sustainability Growth Survey and the Parliament’s resolution thereon when adopting the decision to launch the subsequent European semester.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 182 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6 c (new)
(6 c) In order to set out the detailed arrangements of the interinstitutional relationship between the European Parliament and the European Commission in the context of the European semester, both institutions should conclude an interninstitutional agreement between each other on the involvement of the European Parliament in the drafting and approval of the Annual Sustainability Growth Survey, of the broad economic policy and employment guidelines, of the reference trajectory, of the medium-term fiscal- structural plans, of the country-specific recommendations. In order to increase the personal accountability of the Commissioner responsible for the implementation of the European semester, the President of the Commission should commit itself, as a rule, to request that Commissioner to resign, in accordance with Article 17(6) TEU and Point 5 of the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the Commission, if Parliament asks the President of the Commission to withdraw confidence in that Commissioner on the basis of a negative assessment of the outcome of the European semester. If the President refuses exceptionally to require resignation, she/he explains his/her refusal to do so before Parliament in the following part-session.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 183 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6 d (new)
(6 d) In order to promote upward social convergence, the multilateral surveillance procedure set out in Article 148(4) TFEU is complemented with an early warning system within the European Semester (Social Convergence Framework). Within the Social Convergence Framework, the Commission - pursuant to Article 148 TFEU - first identifies risks to upward convergence for Member States in the Joint Employment Report based on the Social Scoreboard headline indicators. In the second stage, the Commission identifies Member States requiring further examination and publishes the ‘Social Convergence Reports’ for those Member States identified as facing risks to upward social convergence. The country-specific conclusions of the multilateral surveillance activities under the new framework should provide input to the Commission’s reflection on CSR proposals.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 190 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) Detailed rules should therefore be laid down regarding the content, submission, assessment and monitoring of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans, in order to promote debt sustainability and sustainable and inclusive growth in the Member States, ensure an appopriate fiscal stance, and prevent the occurrence of excessive government deficits through medium-term planning.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 199 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
(10) Cohesion policy funds are also synchronised with the European Semester process. As the long-term investment policy of the EU budget, strengthening economic, social and territorial cohesion, cohesion policy investments and reforms should also be duly taken into account in the drawing of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. Each Member State should also explain how its national medium-term fiscal-structural plan will ensure consistency with the expenditure on EU programmes fully matched by EU funds revenue and the relevant national co- financing.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 210 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) In order to simplify the Union fiscal framework and increase transparency, a single operational indicator anchored in debt sustainability should serve as a basis for setting the fiscal path and carrying out annual fiscal surveillance for each Member State. That single operational indicator should be based on nationally financed net primary expenditure, that is to say government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures and excluding interest expenditure as well as cyclical, expenditure on programmes of the Union fully matched by Union funds revenue, national expenditure on investment co-financing of programmes funded by the Union, or aimed at addressing country-specific recommendations, including, where applicable, recommendations issued under the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, cyclical elements of unemployment benefit expenditure and expenditure on Union programmes fully matched by revenue from Union funds, costs related to the borrowing of funds for the loans related to the national plans in accordance with the Recovery and Resilience Facility in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/241, and national expenditure incurred in projects related to the loans Recovery and Resilience Facility loans under Regulation (EU) 2021/241. This indicator allows for macro-economic stabilisation as it is not affected by the operation of automatic stabilisers, including revenue and expenditure fluctuations outside the direct control of the government.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 216 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) To provide guidance to the Member States ininitiate the drafting of theirits national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, the Commission should put forward a technicaleach Member State having a public debt above the 60% of GDP reference value or a government deficit above the 3% of GDP reference value, should put forward a proposal for a reference trajectory to the Commission. The trajectory should be based on the minimum fiscal adjustment that brings the debt trajectory of the Member State on a plausibly downward path or maintains debt at a prudent level. It should also ensure that the public debt ratio at the end of the planning horizon declines below its level in the year before the start of the technical trajectoryleading to sustainable debt reduction or maintains debt at a prudent level. The public debt ratio should be reduced in proportion of the real economic growth. Public debt issued in the form of European Green Bonds according to [the Green Bonds Regulation] should not be counted in the calculation of the public debt ratio. The sustainability of that debt reduction should result from appropriate fiscal policies.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 222 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 a (new)
(13 a) Following the submission of Members States' reference trajectory, a dialogue with the Commission should take place to assess compliance of its reference trajectory with the provisions of this Regulation. If as a result of the dialogue, the Commission and the Member State disagree, the reference trajectory put forward by the Commission should apply. The reference trajectory should be made public only after the the submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 271 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26
(26) To inform enforcement actions, in particular a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission should set up a control account for each Member State to keep track of annual deviations of the net expenditure observed in the Member State from the net expenditure path set by the Council, summing those deviations over time. A Member state will be deemed not to be in compliance of its net expenditure path where the cumulated balance of the control account during the adjustment period is higher than [X% of GDP] in the years of positive GDP growth. Deviations from the net expenditure determined by justifiable and strategically significant investments addressing common priorities of the Union, or by exceptional circumstances outside the control of the Member States that lead to a major impact on the public finances should not be included in the control account. If in the reference period the Member State achieves an average primary balance that is lower than expected but still satisfactory, the deviations should not be considered in the control account.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 276 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
(27) Independent fiscal institutions have proven their capacity to foster fiscal discipline and strengthen the credibility of Member States’ public finances. In order to enhance national ownership, the role of independent fiscal institutions, traditionally mandated to monitor compliance with the national framework, should be expanded to the economic governance framework of the Union with an appropriate balance with the role of the European Parliament in order to increase the overall democratic accountability of the framework.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 282 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28 a (new)
(28 a) Unlike in other major advanced economies, the euro-area aggregate fiscal stance is not based on a single budget voted for by a single parliament, but on the aggregation of twenty national budgets and the EU budget. It is therefore accidental if the sum of country-specific fiscal stances corresponds with the optimal aggregate fiscal stance as recommended by the Council. In the absence of a euro-area instrument for stabilising economic cycles, stronger coordination among the different national fiscal stances is needed. In order to achieve a European fiscal stance consistent with the optimal fiscal stance as recommended by the Council, national medium-term fiscal-structural plans should internalise the effects of national fiscal policies on the euro-area as a whole. Moreover, the European Fiscal Board should be entrusted with the definition of an unconstrained optimal aggregate fiscal stance and its constrained version according to the rules laid down in this Regulation. This exercise should be done for the euro area as a whole and for each euro-area Member State. The Commission should amend its Decision (EU) 2015/1937 accordingly.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 296 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33 a (new)
(33 a) A methodology for debt sustainability analysis should be adopted by means of a delegated act no later than 12 months after the entry into force of this Regulation. For the first year in which the Member States have to submit their medium-term fiscal-structural plans, the 2022 Debt Sustainability Monitor should be the basis for the underlying medium- term public debt projection framework.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 312 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2
It lays down detailed rules concerning the content, submission, assessment and monitoring of national medium-term fiscal- structural plans as part of multilateral budgetary surveillance by the Council and the Commission so as to promote debt sustainability, with involvement of the European Parliament, so as to promote debt sustainability, investments and reforms, common priorities of the Union, and sustainable and inclusive growth and upward social convergence in the Member States and prevent the occurrence of excessive government deficits, by medium- term planning ensuring consistency among the Union, including the euro area.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 321 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2
(2) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of : (a) interest expenditure, (b) discretionary revenue measures and other budgetary variables outsi, (c) expenditure on programmes of the Union fully matched by Union funds revenue, national expenditure on investment co-financing of programmes funded by the Union, or aimed at addressing country-specific recommendations, including, where applicable, recommendations issued under the control of the government as set out in Annex II, point (a); Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, up to 2% of GDP over the lifetime of their national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, or up to 0.5% of GDP per year; (d) cyclical elements of unemployment benefit expenditure; (e) cost related to the borrowing of funds for the loans related to the national plans in accordance with the Recovery and Resilience Facility under Regulation (EU) 2021/241. (f) national expenditure incurred in projects related to the loans Recovery and Resilience Facility loans under Regulation (EU) 2021/241.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 403 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 a (new)
Article3a Launching the European Semester 1. The European Semester is launched by a decision of the European Parliament and Council, on a proposal by the Commission, based on Article 121(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. 2. Following the adoption of the decision pursuant to paragraph 1, the European Commission shall adopt a communication on the Annual Sustainability Growth Survey taking due account of the decision referred to in paragraph 1. 3. When drafting the recommendations for the draft broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and the Union pursuant to Article 121(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and when drafting the proposal for the guidelines for employment pursuant to Article 148(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union the European Commission shall take due account of Annual Sustainability Growth Survey referred to in paragraph 2.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 452 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) the government deficit is brought and maintained below, on average, the 3% of GDP reference value;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 460 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) the fiscal adjustment effort over the period of the national medium-term fiscal- structural plan is at least proportional to the total effort over the entire adjustment period; If a Member State plans to implement, within a defined timeframe, justifiable and strategically significant investments addressing the common priorities of the Union as outlined in Article 12, that year will be exempted from this rule, meaning that the year will be taken out of the proportionality calculations;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 472 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) the public debt ratio at the end of the planning horizon is below the public debt ratio in the year before the start of the technical trajectory; andis reduced by at least 20% of GDP real growth over the adjustment period plus 10 years.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 503 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 a (new)
By way of derogation, point (d) of paragraph 1 shall not apply in the first two years after the entry into force of this Regulation, and in the two years following the expiry of the Council recommendation referred to in Articles 24 and 25.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 504 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 a (new)
If a Member States deficit is above 3% while the public debt is below the 60% of GDP reference value, the rules in Article 6(1), points (c) and (d), shall not apply.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 509 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Public debt issued in the form of European Green Bonds according to [the Green Bonds Regulation] shall not be counted in the calculation of the public debt ratio for the purpose of paragraph 1, point (d).
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 513 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. By [1 MarchFebruary] of the year [xxxx] in which the Member States have to submit for the first time their medium-term fiscal- structural plans or, as appropriate, within 3 weeks from the request of the Member State to submit a new plan, the Commission shall publishthe Commission shall provide the following information to each Member State:
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 521 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the country-specific underlying medium-term public debt projection framework and results;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 525 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) its country-specific macroeconomic forecast and assumptions;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 528 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) the technical trajectory, if required under Article 5, and the corresponding structural primary balance.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 533 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. The Commission shall provide the reference trajectories and the information referred to in paragraph 1 to the Council and the European Parliament, after the submission of the national plans, including the proposed trajectories put forward by the Member States, data, assumptions and calculations underlying the trajectories in a way that allows for replication.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 534 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 b (new)
1 b. Following the negotiations, in case of no agreement between the Member State and the Commission on the reference trajectory, the Council may recommend the Member State concerned that the technical trajectory proposed by the Commission be the net expenditure path of the Member State or request a new proposal.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 535 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 c (new)
1 c. In case a Member State does not submit its proposal for a reference trajectory by [1 March] of the same year referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission shall put forward a reference trajectory meeting the requirements set out in Article 6 in its own motion.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 552 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – title
Assessment of plausibility and debt sustainability
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 555 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1
To assess plausibility and sustainability that the projected public debt ratio of the Member State concerned is on a downward path or remains at a prudent level, the Commission shall use thea methodology referred to in Annex V. The Commission shall make public its analysis of plausibility and the underlying data. based on the following conditions: (a) public debt ratio should be declining, or stay at prudent levels, under the deterministic scenarios of the Commission’s medium-term public debt projection framework based on the debt sustainability analysis methodology; (b) the risk of the public debt ratio not decreasing in the 5 years following the adjustment period of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan is sufficiently low, according to the Commission's analysis.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 556 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1
To assess plausibility that the projected public debt ratio of the Member State concerned is on a downward path or remains at a prudent level, the Commission shall use thea methodology referred to in Annex V. The Commission shall make public its analysis of plausibility and the underlying databased on the following conditions: (a) public debt ratio should be declining, or stay at prudent levels, under the deterministic scenarios of the Commission’s medium-term public debt projection framework based on the debt sustainability analysis methodology; (b) the risk of the public debt ratio not decreasing in the 5 years following the adjustment period of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan is sufficiently low, according to the Commission's analysis.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 557 #

2023/0138(COD)

To assess plausibility that the projected public debt ratio of the Member State concerned is on a downward path or remains at a prudent level, and consistent, in the case of the Member States in the monetary union, with the achievement of a fiscal stance in line with the cyclical situation of the economy, the Commission shall use the methodology referred to in Annex V. The Commission shall make public its analysis of plausibility and the underlying data.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 564 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 a (new)
The Commission shall inform the Council and the European Parliament of its analysis of plausibility and the underlying data, subject to confidentiality arrangements if necessary.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 567 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 b (new)
By 12 months after the entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 33 to supplement this Regulation by defining a commonly agreed methodology for the assessment of plausibility as referred to in paragraph 1.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 568 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 c (new)
For the first year in which the Member States have to submit their medium-term fiscal-structural plans, and as long as the delegated act referred to in paragraph 3 is not adopted, the 2022 Debt Sustainability Monitor should be the basis for the underlying medium-term public debt projection framework.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 569 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 d (new)
For the purpose of the delegated act on debt sustainability analysis, the Commission shall take into account the future evolution of sustainable growth, interest rates, the level of inflation, liquidity risks, the structure of the debt, contingent liabilities, the potential growth impact of the reforms and investments underpinning the implemented national medium-term fiscal-structural plans, as well as climate challenges.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 584 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Prior to submission, Member States shall discuss its draft national medium-term fiscal-structural plan with its respective parliaments. The Member State shall make its national medium-term fiscal- structural plan public, including all the data and documents related to the negotiations and assumptions used for the reference trajectory.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 644 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) explain how it will eEnsure the delivery of investment and reforms responding to the main challenges identified within the European Semester, in the country-specific recommendations, correct the identified macroeconomic imbalances under the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure if applicable, and address the common priorities of the Union referred to in Annex VI of this Regulation, including the European Green Deal, European Pillar of Social Rights and the Digital Decade while being consistent with the updated National Energy and Climate Plans and the National Digital Decade Roadmaps;the social convergence reports under the Social Convergence Framework and correct, if applicable, the identified macroeconomic imbalances under the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, the warnings by the Commission, or the recommendations by the Council, made pursuant to Article 121(4) TFEU.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 660 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
(b a) address the following common priorities of the Union: (a) The European Green Deal, including the transition to climate neutrality by 2050 and the translation at national level through the National Energy and Climate Plans; (b) The European Pillar of Social Rights, including the related targets on employment, skills and poverty reduction by 2030; (c) The Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030, and reflected at national level through the National Digital Decade Strategic Roadmaps; (d) A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence - For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 671 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) explain how it will ensure consistencEnsure consistency and where appropriate complementarity with the Recovery and Resilience Plan of the Member State concerned during the period of availability of the Recovery and Resilience Facility in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/241 and with any EU investment instruments that address the EU common priorities or serve the same purpose as the Recovery and Resilience Facility.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 680 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point d b (new)
(d b) ensure progress in addressing national public investment gaps in alignment with each of the priorities of the Union as stated in Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, recognising that these investments play a pivotal role in supporting the fulfilment of Union objectives and ensuring sustainable and inclusive growth, upward social convergence and fiscal stability;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 685 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point d c (new)
(d c) ensure consistency and, where appropriate, complementarity with the EU funds, namely cohesion policy funds the Member State concerned benefits from;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 686 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point d d (new)
(d d) ensure consistency with the broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and with the employment guidelines in accordance with Article 121(2) and Article 148(2) TFEU;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 689 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1
1. WThe adjustment period may be extended by three years at most, when at least one of following conditions applies: a) where the expected economic growth rate at the time of requesting the extension of the adjustment period is lower than the expected growth rate at the beginning of the adjustment period; b) where a Member State commits to 1. a relevant set of reforms and investments in accordance with the criteria set out in paragraph 2, the adjustment period may be extended by 3 years at most. .
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 695 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
The set of reform and investment commitments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period, shall be commensurate with the degree of public debt challenges and challenges to medium-term growth in the Member State concerned.deleted
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 707 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point i
(i) be growth enhancing and boost resilience and upward social convergence;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 730 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point iv
(iv) address relevant country-specific recommendations addressed to the Member State concerned, under Article 121(4) and Article 148(4) TFEU including, where applicable, recommendations issued under the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure as well as under the Social Convergence Framework;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 751 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 4
4. DCommitments included in the approved Recovery and Resilience Plan during the lifetime of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/241, commitments included in the approved Recovery and Resilience Plan and the Partnership Agreement in Multiannual Financial Framework of the Member State concerned canshould be taken into account and be consistent with the overall set of reforms an d investments for an extension of the adjustment period.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 817 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) whether the government deficit is maintained below, on average, the 3% of GDP reference value throughout the duration of the plan or whether the government deficit returns swiftly below the 3% of GDP reference value at the latest by the end of the adjustment period when the deficit is above this reference value at the time of submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 848 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – point f
(f) whether the public debt ratio at the end of the planning horizon is below the public debt ratio in the year before the start of the technical trajectoryis reduced by at least 20% of GDP real growth over the adjustment period plus 10 years.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 916 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 a (new)
Article19a Medium-term scoreboard 1. The Commission shall establish a medium-term fiscal-structural plans' scoreboard (the "Scoreboard"), which shall display the contribution of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans of the Member States in the achievement of the common priorities of the Union as defined in Article 12. 2. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 33 to supplement this Regulation by defining the detailed elements of the Scoreboard. 3. The Scoreboard shall be operational by [June] 2024 and shall be updated by the Commission twice a year. The Scoreboard shall be made publicly available on a website or internet portal.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 941 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Deviations of actual net expenditures from the net expenditure path shall not be included in the control account in the following cases: (a) where the Member State implements justifiable and strategically significant investments addressing the common priorities of the Union as outlined in Article 12; (b) where the Member State experiences exceptional circumstances outside its control that lead to a major impact on the public finances; (c) where the Member State’s average primary balance in the reference period is lower than expected but still satisfactory.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 952 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1
Each national independent fiscal institution referred to in Article 8 of Council Directive […]32 [on the national budgetary frameworks] shall provide an assessment of compliance of the budgetary outturns data reported in the progress report referred to in Article 20 with the net expenditure path, including of non quantifiable targets and an assessment of the social impact of fiscal adjustment policy choices involving social experts in the process. Where applicable, each national independent fiscal institution shall also analyse the factors underlying a deviation from the net expenditure path. _________________ 32 Council Directive […] of […] [amending Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States] (OJ …., …, p,…)
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 955 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1 a (new)
The Commission shall establish the European Advisory Fiscal Board (EFB), an independent expert group, which shall have an advisory role in respect of the Union’s economic policy coordination. The Commission shall have no voting rights. European social partners should be invited as observer members.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 973 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. The Commission shall orally inform the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the competent committee of the European Parliament of the progress made in the preparation of the draft Commission recommendation referred to in paragraph 2. That information shall be treated as confidential.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1008 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Where Member States face a negative GDP growth or must implement, within a defined timeframe, justifiable and strategically significant investments addressing the common priorities of the Union as outlined in Article 12, with a combined size of at least (X)% of GDP, shall be considered as exceptional circumstances and shall allow Member States to deviate from its net expenditure path.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1023 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 a (new)
Article28a European Parliament and the European Semester An agreement shall be concluded between the European Parliament and Commission on the detailed arrangements for organising the Parliamentary scrutiny of the European Semester and the involvement of the European Parliament in the drafting and approval of the Annual Sustainability Growth Survey, of the broad economic policy and employment guidelines, of the reference trajectory, of the medium-term fiscal- structural plans, of the country-specific recommendations, and for organising the accountability of the Commission and the responsible Commissioner for their activities in implementing this Regulation.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1055 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 35 – paragraph 1
1. The Commission may undertake in- depth surveillancemonitoring missions in Member States which are the subject of recommendations issued pursuant to Article 23 for the purposes of on-site monitoring.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1057 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 35 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. European Commission may invite social partners or other relevant stakeholders to offer their views on the socio-economic situation in the Member State and the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1062 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 36 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. The report referred to in paragraph 1 shall assess and review:
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1070 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 36 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. The Commission shall submit the report to the European Parliament and to the Council, together with, where appropriate, a legislative proposal for an EU investment instrument to ensure that the central objective of the reform of this framework - to strengthen public debt sustainability while promoting sustainable and inclusive growth and upward social convergence in all Member States and respond fully to the sustained high levels of investment needed to address the current and future strategic priorities of the EU - can be met, or if the framework needs to be complemented by the establishment of a central and permanent investment instrument
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1107 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex II – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
(c a) Progress in addressing national public investment gaps in alignment with each of the priorities of the Union as stated in Article 12;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1135 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex II – paragraph 1 – point q
(q) Information on the public consultations of social partners, civil society organisations and other relevant stakeholders in view of the preparation of the plan and a summary of their contributions to the plan.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1136 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex II – paragraph 1 – point q a (new)
(q a) Challenges identified in the social convergence reports under the Social Convergence Framework and the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1137 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex II – paragraph 1 – point q b (new)
(q b) A quantification, as much as possible, of the expected impacts of reforms and investment referred to under point (k) on fiscal sustainability, sustainable and inclusive growth and quality employment as well as upward social convergence, where applicable in line with commonly agreed methodologies;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1151 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – paragraph 1 – point m a (new)
(m a) Progress in addressing national public investment gaps in alignment with each of the priorities of the Union as stated in Article 12;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1153 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – paragraph 1 – point n
(n) Information on labour market, skills and social policy developments, and on the implementation of policy measures taken that foster upward social convergence among Member States towards better working and living conditions, in line with the principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights and the Employment Guidelines under Article 148 TFEU. That includes the expected impact of measures, in relation to progress on the national targets on employment, skills and poverty reduction by 2030 and if applicable the expected impact of measures to address the challenges identified under the Social Convergence Framework.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1154 #

2023/0138(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – paragraph 1 – point n a (new)
(n a) A quantification, as much as possible, of the expected impacts of reforms and investment referred to under point (k) on fiscal sustainability, sustainable and inclusive growth and quality employment as well as upward social convergence, where applicable in line with commonly agreed methodologies
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 15 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
(6) The economic governance framework of the Union should put debt sustainability and sustainable and inclusive growth at its core and therefore differentiate between Member States by taking into account their public debt challenges and allowing country-specific fiscal trajectories.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 24 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) In order to simplify the Union fiscal framework and increase transparency, a single operational indicator anchored in debt sustainability should serve as a basis for setting the fiscal path and carrying out annual fiscal surveillance for each Member State. That single indicator should be based on nationally financed net primary expenditure, that is to say expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures and excluding interest expenditure as well as cyclical unemployment expenditure and expenditure on Union programmes fully matched by revenue from Union funds as defined in Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. This indicator allows for macro-economic stabilisation as it is not affected by the operation of automatic stabilisers, including revenue and expenditure fluctuations outside the direct control of the government.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 35 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) In accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council, following a recommendation from the Commission, can allow Member States to deviate from the net expenditure path set by the Council under that Regulation in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole, or in the event of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, provided that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term or where Member States implement, within a defined timeframe, justifiable and strategically significant investments addressing the common priorities of the Union as outlined in Article 12 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], and adhering to the reforms and investments outlined in national plans, including those of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Cohesion Funds, and future EU investment instruments designed to serve similar purposes. As a consequence, such a deviation should not lead to the opening of a debt-based EDP.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 57 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21 a (new)
(21a) A strong track record of commitments and implementation rate of reforms and investments approved under the Recovery and Resilience Plan of the Member State, as well on its Partnership Agreement for the Cohesion Funds, should be taken into account for the Commission to halt its proposal to the Council to suspend all or part of the commitments or payments of these two instruments as stated in Article 10(1) and Article 19(7) of the Recovery and Resilience Facility Regulation , respectively.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 73 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures and other budgetary variables outside the control of the government, as defined in Annex II, point (a)as defined in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council [on the preventive arm]*;
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 76 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) ‘technical'reference trajectory’ means the net expenditure trajectory put forward by the Commission in accordance with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]each Member State and negotiated after with the Commission to provide guidance to Member States with public debt above the 60% of gross domestic product (GDP) reference value or government deficit above the 3% of GDP reference value when drawing up their national medium- term fiscal-structural plans;
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 83 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1
The excess of a government deficit over the reference value shall be considered exceptional, in accordance with Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), where the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] or of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, or where Member States implement, within a defined timeframe, justifiable and strategically significant investments addressing the common priorities of the Union as outlined in Article 12 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], and adhering to the reforms and investments outlined in national plans, including those of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Cohesion Funds, and future EU investment instruments designed to serve similar purposes in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 85 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
In addition, the excess over the reference value shall be considered temporary where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commission and the Member State indicates that the deficit will fall belowis on a downward path towards the reference value following the end of the severe economic downturn or the exceptional circumstances referred to in the first subparagraph.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 90 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1a
1a. When it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) shall be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with Article 126(2), point (b), TFEU if the Member State concerned respectsfollows within a sustainable range its net expenditure path.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 105 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of debt challenges in the Member State concerned. In particular, where the Member State faces substantial public debt challenges according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor, it shall be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an excessive deficit procedure as a rule, national public investment gaps and needs to achieve the common priorities of the Union as stated in the Article 12 of Regulation (EU) on the preventive arm], in the Member State concerned.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 121 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 a (new)
The Commission shall take into account as a key relevant factor to prevent the opening of a EDP the delivery and commitment by the Member State on the implementation of the investments and reforms to address the common priorities of the Union as stated in the Article 12 of the Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], but also the reforms and investments committed in the national plans of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Cohesion Funds and future EU investments instruments that serve the same purpose.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 129 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b
(b) the developments in the medium- term budgetary positions, including, in particular, the size of the actual deviation from the net expenditure path, in annual and cumulative terms as measured by the control account, and the extent to which the deviation is due to a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole or to exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned in accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. Where relevant, the deviation compared to the technical trajectory shall also be taken into account when considering the size of the deviation;
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 134 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point c a (new)
(ca) the progress in addressing national public investment gaps in alignment with the priorities of the Union as stated in Article 12 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], recognising that these investments play a pivotal role in supporting the fulfilment of Union objectives and ensuring sustainable and inclusive growth and fiscal stability;
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 139 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
(d) the implementation of reforms and investments including, in particular policies to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances and policies to implement the common growth and employment strategy of the Union and the European Pillar of Social Rights, including those supported by NextGenerationEU, Cohesion Funds and EU investments instruments that serve the same purpose, and the overall quality of public finances, in particular the effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 147 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4
The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and, achieving the policy goals of the Union. The opinion submitted to the Commission by the Member State concEU common priorities of the Union, the size of the public investment committed to address the priorities refernred shall include the opinion of its national independent fiscal institution on relevant factorsin Article 12ba) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 and any other relevant factors outside of the control of the Member State.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 156 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
The Council and the Commission shall make a balanced overall assessment of all the relevant factors, specifically, the extent to which they affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and/or the debt criteria as aggravating or mitigating factors.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 161 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
When assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit criterion, if the ratio of the government debt to GDP exceeds the reference value, those factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit provided for in Article 126(4), (5) and (6) TFEU only if the double condition of the overarching principle — that, before these relevant factors are taken into account, the general government deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary — is fully met.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 165 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3
However, tThose factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit when assessing compliance on the basis of the debt criterion.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 170 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 5
5. Where Member States are allowed to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole pursuant to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment, mayshall decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 173 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 6
If the Council, acting under Article 126(6) TFEU, decides that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the Council and the Commission shall, in the subsequent procedural steps of that Article of the TFEU, take into account the relevant factors referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, as they affect the situation of the Member State concerned, including as specified in Article 5(2) of this Regulation, in particular in establishing a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit and eventually extending that deadline. However, those relevant factors shall not be taken into account for the decision of the Council under Article 126(12) TFEU on the abrogation of some or all of its decisions under Article 126(6) to (9) and (11) TFEU.’;
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 183 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of sixtwelve months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. WThen warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the deadline for effective action may be three months. The Council recommenda Council recommendation may also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit ensuring a sustainable and balanced correction sthall also establish a deadlint does not endanger sustainable and inclusive growth, social convergence for the correction of the excessive defimplementation of significant investments and social policites. In its recommendation, the Council shallmay also request that the Member State implements a correctivenew net expenditure path, which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value within the deadline set in the recommendation. For the years when the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective net expenditure path shall be consistent with a minimum annual adjustment of at least 0,5% of GDP as a benchmark.is declining towards a reference value
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 193 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly and sustainable downward path or keep it at a prudent level having regard to the criteria established in Annex I of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. The corrective net expenditure path shall ensure that the average annual fiscal adjustment eff and prevent the occurrence ort in the first three years is at least as high as the average annual fiscal effort of the total adjustment periodcentives to pro-cyclical policies.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 198 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 5
5. Within the deadline provided for in paragraph 4 of this Article, the Member State concerned shall report to the Council and the Commission on action taken in response to the Council’s recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The report shall include the targets for government expenditure and revenue and for the discretionary measures on both the expenditure and the revenue side consistent with the Council’s recommendation, as well as information on the measures taken and the nature of those envisaged to achieve the targets. The report shall also include the opinion of the independent fiscal institution of the Member State concerned on the adequacy of the measures taken and envisaged with respect to the targets. The Member State shall make the report public.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 205 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 6
6. Where effective action has been 6. taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path recommended by the Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, , or where Member States implement, within a defined timeframe, justifiable and strategically significant investments addressing the common priorities of the Union as outlined in Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, and adhering to the reforms and investments outlined in national plans, including those of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Cohesion Funds, and future EU investment instruments designed to serve similar purposes, occur after the adoption of that recommendation, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The revised recommendation, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU provided that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised recommendation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.;
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 214 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Any Council decision to give notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures for the deficit reduction in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU shall be taken within two months of the Council decision under Article 126(8) TFEU establishing that no effective action has been taken. In the notice, the Council shall request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained belowclose to the reference value within the deadline set in the notice. For the years where the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective net expenditure path shall be consistent with a minimum annual adjustment of at least 0,5% of GDP as a benchmark.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 224 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly and sustainable downward path or keep it at a prudent level having regard to the criteria established in Annex I of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. The corrective net expenditure path shall ensure that the average annual fiscal adjustment effort in the first three years is at least as high as the average annual fiscal effort of the total adjustment period. The Council shall also indicate measures conducive to the achievement of the corrective net expenditure path.;
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 230 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 5 – paragraph 2
2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, or where Member States implement, within a defined timeframe, justifiable and strategically significant investments addressing the common priorities of the Union as outlined in Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, and adhering to the reforms and investments outlined in national plans, including those of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Cohesion Funds, and future EU investment instruments designed to serve similar purposes, occur after the adoption of that notice, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. The revised notice, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, on condition that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised notice may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.;
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 241 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 8 – paragraph 3
3. A Council decision shall only be taken pursuant to Article 126(12) TFEU where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commission and the Member State indicate that the deficit has been brought durably belowclose to the reference value and, where the excessive deficit procedure was opened on the basis of the debt criterion, the Member State concerned respectfollowed the corrective net expenditure path set by the Council in accordance with Article 3(4) or Article 5(1) of this Regulation over the previous 2 years and is projected to continue to do so in the current year on the basis of the Commission forecast.;
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 245 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point ba (new)
(ba) where the participating Member State returns to its original net expenditure path as assessed in accordance with Article 8 of Regulation EU [on the preventive arm];
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 255 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10a – paragraph 2
2. Following the adoption by the Council of a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, the Commission shall carry out a dedicated surveillance mission to the Member State concerned to discuss the measures that the Member State intends to take in response to the measures judged necessary following the notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. Upon invitation by the parliament of the Member State concerned, the Commission may present its assessment of the economic and fiscal situation in the Member State. Enhanced surveillance may be undertaken for Member States which are the subject of recommendations and notices issued following a decision pursuant to Article 126(8) TFEU and decisions under Article 126(11) TFEU for the purposes of on-site monitoring. The Member States concerned shall provide all necessary information for the preparation and the conduct of the surveillance mission.;
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 260 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new)
(9a) Article 11 is replaced by the following: "Article 11 "Whenever the Council decides under Article 126(11) TFEU to impose sanctions on a participating Member State, a fine shall, as a rule, be required. The Council may decide to supplement such a fine by the other measures provided for in Article 126(11) TFEU. A strong track record of commitments and implementation rate of reforms and investments approved under the Recovery and Resilience Plan of the Member State, as well on its Partnership Agreement for the Cohesion Funds, should be taken into account for the Commission to halt its proposal to the Council to suspend all or part of the commitments or payments of these two instruments as stated in Article 10(1) of the RRF regulation and Article 19(7), respectively. "
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 264 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 1
1. The amount of the fine shall amount to up to 0,051% of GDP for a 6- month period and be paid every 6 months until the Council assesses that the Member State concerned has taken effective action in response to the notice issued under Article 126(9) TFEU.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 269 #

2023/0137(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 3
3. The cumulated amount of the fines referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exceed 0,52 % of GDP.;
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 16 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
(11) Biased and unrealistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts for the annual and multiannual budget legislations can considerably hamper the effectiveness of fiscal planning and consequently impair commitment to budgetary discipline. To improve baseline assumptions and provide unbiased assessments of the fiscal impact of various policy measures, the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts of the Member States should be endorsed or producproduced or supported by an independent fiscal institution.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 20 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 13
(13) Independent bodies charged with monitoring public finances in the Member States are an essential building block ofcan be a support to develop effective budgetary frameworks. Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council28 requires Member States whose currency is the euro to have independent fiscal institutions tasked with the endorsement or productionproduction or support of macroeconomic forecasts and establishes specific safeguards regarding their independence and technical capacity. Given the positive contribution to public finance of independent bodies, those requirements should be extended to all Member States. In order to foster fiscal discipline and strengthen the credibility of fiscal policy, such bodies should also contribute to budgetary planning by either producing or endsupporsting the forecasts and debt analyses used by the government, and by carrying out independent assessments of fiscal policies and monitoring compliance with the fiscal framework. __________________ 28 Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area (OJ L 140, 27.5.2013, p. 11).
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 43 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 3 – point a Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 4 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that annual and multiannual fiscal planning is based on realistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts using the most up-to- date information. Budgetary planning shall be based on the most likely macrofiscal scenario or on a more prudent scenario. The macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts shall be either produced or endorsed by independent fiscal institutions established in accordance with Article 8. They shall be compared with the most updated forecasts of the Commission. Significant differences between the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts of the Member State and the Commission’s forecasts shall be explained, including where the level or growth of variables in external assumptions departs significantly from the values contained in the Commission’s forecasts.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 47 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 3 – point c Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 4 – paragraph 5
5. Member States shall specify which institution is responsible for producing macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts. At least annually, the Member States and the Commission shall engage in a technical dialogue concerning the assumptions underpinning the preparation of macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 51 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 3 – point c Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 4 – paragraph 6
6. The macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts for annual and multiannual fiscal planning produced by the national institutions shall be subject to regular, objective and comprehensive evaluation by an independent body, including ex post evaluation. The result of that evaluation shall be made public and taken into account appropriately in future macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts. If the evaluation detects a significant bias affecting macroeconomic forecasts over a period of at least 4 consecutive years, the Member State concerned shall take the necessary action and make it public.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 54 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 5 – point a Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) The effective and timely monitoring of compliance with the rules, based on reliable and independent analysis carried out by independent fiscal institutions established in accordance with Article 8.;deleted
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 56 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 5 – point b Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 6 – paragraph 2
If numerical fiscal rules contain escape clauses, such clauses shall set out a limited number of specific circumstances, consistent with the Member States’ obligations deriving from the TFEU and Regulation [XXX preventive arm of the SGP], and stringent procedures in which temporary non-compliance with the rules is permitted. Escape clauses shall have clear time limits.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 65 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 8 Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 8 – paragraph 4
4. Member States shall ensure that the iInstitutions referred to in paragraph 1 have the following tasks:
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 66 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 8 Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 8 – paragraph 4 – point a
(a) producing or supporting the annual and multiannual macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts underlying the government’s medium-term planning or endorsing those used by the budgetary authorities;
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 73 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 8 Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 8 – paragraph 4 – point b
(b) producing or supporting debt sustainability assessments underlying the government’s medium-term planning or endorsing those provided by the budgetary authorities;.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 77 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 8 Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 8 – paragraph 4 – point c
(c) producing or supporting assessments on the impacts of policies on fiscal sustainability and sustainable and inclusive growth or endorsing those provided by the budgetary authorities;
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 79 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 8 Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 8 – paragraph 4 – point d
(d) monitoring compliance with country-specific numerical fiscal rules in accordance with Article 6;deleted
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 80 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 8 Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 8 – paragraph 4 – point e
(e) monitoring compliance with the Union fiscal framework in accordance with Regulations [XXX preventive arm of the SGP] and [XXX corrective arm of the SGP] *;deleted
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #

2023/0136(NLE)

(f) conducting, on a regular basis, reviews of the national budgetary framework, in order to assess the consistency, coherence and effectiveness of the framework, including mechanisms and rules that regulate fiscal relationships between public authorities across sub- sectors of general government;.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 90 #

2023/0136(NLE)

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b – point ii Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) a description of medium-term policies, including investment and reforms, and if applicable, specifying the investments and reforms in EU common priorities, envisaged with an impact on general government finances and sustainable and inclusive growth, broken down by major revenue and expenditure item, showing how the adjustment towards the national budgetary objectives over the medium term as referred to in Article 2, point (e), is achieved compared to projections under unchanged policies.;
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 111 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 22 a (new)
(22a) To avoid a DGS becoming insufficiently funded and unable to support a new intervention, robust and favourable alternative funding arrangements are required. Therefore, to prevent temporary financing by the Member States, and to ensure that it remains a last resort, the Single Resolution Board should be able to provide a guarantee based on the Single Resolution Fund to a DGS in order to facilitate its access to markets at favourable financing conditions. The Single Resolution Fund's guarantee should be provided when the DGS is required to intervene in resolution, yet available financial means are insufficient to satisfy the needs of such action.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 112 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 22 b (new)
(22b) The provision of Single Resolution Fund guarantees to DGSs pursuing alternative funding arrangements must not preclude, nor delay, any progress in the establishment of a fully-fledged European deposit insurance scheme, which remains the optimal solution.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 119 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 26
(26) To ensure that preventive measures achieve their objective, credit institutions should be required to prepare a note outlining the measures that they commit to undertake. The preparation of such note should not be too burdensome and time- consuming for the credit institution to ensure the possibility for the DGS to intervene early enough. Therefore, the note accompanying preventive measures should take the form of a sufficiently short explanatory document. Such note should contain all elements which aim at preventing the outflow of funds and strengthening the capital and liquidity position of the credit institution, enabling the credit institution to comply with all the relevant prudential and other regulatory requirements on a forward-looking basis. Such note should therefore contain capital raising measures, including rules on the issuance of rights, the voluntary conversion of subordinated debt instruments, liability management exercises, capital generating sales of assets, the securitisation of portfolios, and earnings retention, including dividend bans and bans on the acquisition of stakes in undertakings. For the same reason, during the implementation of the measures envisaged in the note, credit institutions should also strengthen their liquidity positions and refrain from aggressive commercial practices, and from the repurchasing of own shares or call hybrid capital instruments. Such note should also contain an exit strategy for any support measures received. Competent authorities are best positioned to be consulted onassess the relevance and credibility of the measures envisaged in the note. To ensure that the designated authorities of the DGS that is requested to finance a preventive measure by the credit institution can assess that all the conditions for preventive measures are fulfilled, the competent authorities should cooperate with the designated authorities. To ensure a consistent approach to the application of preventive measures across the Union, the EBA should issue guidelines to assist credit institutions to draft such a note.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 120 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 27
(27) To ensure that credit institutions receiving support from DGSs in the form of preventive measures deliver on their commitments, competent authorities should request a remediation plan from credit institutions that failed to fulfil their commitments or to repay the amount contributed under the preventive measures. Where a competent authority is of the opinion that the measures in the remediation plan are not capable of achieving the credit institution’s long-term viability, the DGS should not provide any further preventive support to the credit institution and the relevant authorities should carry out an assessment on whether the institution is failing or is likely to fail, in accordance with Article 32 of Directive 2014/59/EU. The same consequences should apply in cases where the credit institution fails to comply with the remediation plan or fails to repay the preventive measures. To ensure a consistent approach to the application of preventive measures across the Union, the EBA should issue guidelines to assist credit institutions to draft such a remediation plan.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 135 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 45
(45) Directive 2014/49/EU allows Member States to recognise an IPS as a DGS if it fulfils the criteria laid down in Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and complies with Directive 2014/49/EU. To take into account the specific business model of those IPSs, in particular the relevance of preventive measures at the core of their mandate, it is appropriate to provide for the possibility of Member States to allow IPSs to adapt to the new safeguards for the application of preventive measures within a 63-year period. This possibly longer compliance period takes into account the timeline for the build-up of a segregated fund for IPS purposes other than deposit insurance as agreed between the European Central Bank, the national competent authority and the relevant IPSs.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 159 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point -a (new)
Directive 2014/49/EU
Article 6 – paragraph 1
(-a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: "Member States shall ensure that the coverage level for the aggregate deposits of each depositor is EUR 1200 000 in the event of deposits being unavailable. "
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 180 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 – point c a (new)Directive 2014/49/EU

Article 10 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 – points a and b
(a) the reductionca) paragraph 6, points a and b are replaced by the following: “(a) the reduction is applicable at the single DGS level and is based on the assumption that it is unlikely that a significant share of available financial means will be used for measures to protect covered depositors, other than as provided for in Article 11(2) and (6); and (b) the banking sector in which theis composed of credit institutions affiliated to the DGS operate is highly concentrated with a large quantity of assets held by a small number of credit institutions or banking groups, subject to supervision on a consolidated basis which, given their size, are likely in case of failure to be subject to resolution proceedings.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 198 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Directive 2014/49/EU
Article 11 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
3. Member States may allow DGSs toshall ensure that a DGS may use the available financial means for preventive measures as referred to in Article 11a for the benefit of a credit institution where all of the following applies:
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 201 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Directive 2014/49/EU
Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point a
(a) the competent authority has confirmed that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) of Directive 2014/59/EU are present;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 206 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Directive 2014/49/EU
Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point a a (new)
(aa) the DGS has confirmed that the intervention is necessary to preserve financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Directive 2014/49/EU
Article 11 – paragraph 5
5. Where a credit institution is wound up in accordance with Article 32b of Directive 2014/59/EU in order to exit the market or terminate its banking activity, Member States may allow DGSsshall ensure that a DGS may to use the available financial means for alternative measures to preserve the access of depositors to their deposits, including the transfer of assets and liabilities and a deposit book transfer, provided that the DGS confirms that the cost of the measure does not exceed the cost of repaying depositors as calculated in accordance with Article 11e of this Directive and that all the conditions laid down in Article 11d of this Directive are met.’;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 220 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13
Directive 2014/49/EU
Article 11a – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Where Member States allow the use of DGS funds for preventive measures as referred to in Article 11(3), Member States shall ensure that DGSs use the available financial means for the preventive measures referred to in Article 11(3), provided that all of the following conditions are met:
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 226 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13
Directive 2014/49/EU
Article 11a – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) the credit institution has consulted the competent authority onhas assessed the measures envisaged in the note referred to in Article 11b and confirmed that the measures are necessary to secure the financial soundness and the long-term viability of the credit institution;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 259 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13
3. Member States shall ensure that in the event of a capital support measure, the note referred to in paragraph 1 identifies all capital raising measures that can be implemented, including safeguards preventing outflows of funds, a forward- looking capital adequacy assessment, and, a subsequent determination ofs determined by the competent authority, the capital shortfall that the DGS has to cover.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 309 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 a (new)
Directive 2014/49/EU
Article 12a (new)
(13a) the following Article 12a is added: Support by the Single Resolution Fund to alternative funding arrangements 1. Where the intervention of a DGS within the Banking Union is necessary in the context of a resolution but its available financial means are insufficient to achieve the purposes of its intervention, the DGS may request support, in the form of a guarantee, from the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). 2. The DGS request shall include all relevant information, including: (i) the shortfall of the deposit guarantee scheme for the purposes of the specific intervention in the resolution; (ii) the conditions offered to the deposit guarantee scheme in other alternative funding arrangements; (iii) the expected length of the requested support. 3. The Single Resolution Board shall take a decision, including on the terms applicable to the guarantee provision, according to Article 79a of Regulation 806/2014 (EU). 4. The SRF guarantee provided to the DGS shall be used as collateral for alternative funding arrangements as referred to in Article 10(9) of Directive 2014/49/EU, thus ensuring access to markets in more favourable conditions.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 310 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 a (new)
Directive 2014/49/EU
Article 13 – paragraph 1
(13a) Article 13(1) is replaced by the following: “1. The contributions to DGSs referred to in Article 10 shall be based on the amount of covered deposits and the degree of risk incurred by the respective members of any single DGS. Member States may provide for lower contributions for low-risk sectors of credit institutions affiliated to a DGS which are regulated under national law. Member States may decide that members of an IPS pay lower contributions to the DGS to which they are affiliated. Member States may allow the central body and all credit institutions permanently affiliated to the central body as referred to in Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 to be subject as a whole to the risk weight determined for the central body and its affiliated institutions on a consolidated basis. Member States may decide that credit institutions pay a minimum contribution, irrespective of the amount of their covered deposits.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 313 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point d
Directive 2014/49/EU
Article 14 – paragraph 3
3. Member States shall ensure that where a credit institution ceases to be member of a DGS and joins a DGS of another Member State, or if some of the credit institution’s activities are transferred to a DGS of another Member State, the DGS of origin shall transfer to the receiving DGS the contributions due for the last 12 monthan amount that reflects the additional potential liabilities borne by the receiving DGS as a result of the transfer, taking into account the impact of the transfer on the financial situation of both DGSs preceding the change of DGS membership, with the exception of the extraordinary contributions referred to inlative to the risks they cover. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the methodology for the calculation of the amount to be transferred. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by ... [12 months after the date of entry into force of this amending Directive]. Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Directive by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the second subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10(8).; to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 330 #

2023/0115(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 2
2. By way of derogation from Article 11(3) of Directive 2014/49/EU, as amended by this Directive, and Articles 11a, 11b, 11c and 11e in relation to preventive measures, until [OP – please insert the date = 7236 months after the date of entry into force of this Directive], Member States may allow IPS referred to in Article 1(1), point (c), to comply with the national provisions implementing Article 11(3) of Directive 2014/49/EU as applicable on [OP – please insert the date of entry into force of this Directive].
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
(10) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme (‘DGS’) funds are used more efficiently and the losses for those funds are minimised. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, the resolution objective of protecting depositors should be considered better achieved in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more costly for the DGS.deleted
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 63 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
(11) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through the prioritisation of using industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or DGSs) and, on the other hand,deposit guarantee schemes) instead of funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline. Therefore, when assessing the objective of minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, the Single Resolution Board or the resolution authorities should find funding through the resolution financing arrangements or the DGSdeposit guarantee scheme, preferable to funding through an equal amount of resources from the budget of Member States. For these purposes, funds provided by industry-funded safety nets shall not be considered as funds provided from the budget of a Member State.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 67 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 12
(12) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the outcome of the public interest assessment should be negative only where the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives more effectively and not only to the same extent as resolution.deleted
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 79 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 17
(17) In light of the experience acquired in the implementation of Directive 2014/59/EU, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council31 , it is necessary to specify further the conditions under which measures of a preventive precautionary nature that qualify as extraordinary public financial support may exceptionally be granted. To minimise distortions of competition arising from differences in nature of DGSs in the Union, interventions of DGSs in the context of preventive measures complying with Directive 2014/49/EU that qualify as extraordinary public financial support should exceptionally be allowed where the beneficiary institution or entity does not meet any of the conditions for being deemed ashas been not declared failing or likely to fail. It should be ensured that precautionary measures are taken sufficiently early. The European Central Bank (ECB) currently bases its consideration that an institution or entity is solvent, for the purposes of precautionary recapitalisation, on a forward-looking assessment for following 12 months of whether the institution or entity can comply with the own funds requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council32 or in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council33 , and the additional own funds requirement laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive (EU) 2019/2034. That practice should be laid downrevised in Directive 2014/59/EU. Moreover, measures to provide relief for impaired assets, including asset management vehicles or asset guarantee schemes, can prove effective and efficient in addressing causes of possible financial distresses faced by institutions and entities and preventing their failure and could therefore constitute relevant precautionary measures. It should be therefore specified that such precautionary measures can take the form of impaired asset measures. __________________ 31 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149). 32 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1). 33 Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on the prudential requirements of investment firms and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 575/2013, (EU) No 600/2014 and (EU) No 806/2014 (OJ L 314, 5.12.2019, p. 1).
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 81 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 18
(18) To preserve market discipline, protect public funds and avoid distortions of competition, precautionary measures should remain the exception and only be applied to address situations of serious disturbance in the market or to preserve financial stability. Moreover, precautionary measures should not be used to address incurred or likely losses unless the Union State aid framework allows for an exception to the burden-sharing requirement. The most reliable instrument to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses is an asset quality review by the ECB, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council34 or national competent authorities. Competent authorities should use such a review to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses where such review can be carried out within a reasonable timeframe. Where that is not possible, competent authorities should identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses in the most reliable way possible under the prevailing circumstances, based on on-site inspections where appropriate. __________________ 34 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12).
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 18
(18) To preserve market discipline, protect public funds and avoid distortions of competition, precautionary measures should remain the exception and only be applied to address situations of serious disturbance in the market or to preserve financial stability, in particular in the event of a systemic crisis. Moreover, precautionary measures should not be used to address incurred or likely losses. The most reliable instrument to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses is an asset quality review by the ECB, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council34 or national competent authorities. Competent authorities should use such a review to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses where such review can be carried out within a reasonable timeframe. Where that is not possible, competent authorities should identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses in the most reliable way possible under the prevailing circumstances, based on on-site inspections where appropriate. __________________ 34 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12).
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 84 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 19
(19) Precautionary recapitalisation is aimed at supporting viable institutions and entities identified as likely to encounter temporary difficulties in the near future and to prevent their situation from deteriorating further. To avoid that public subsidies are granted to businesses that are already unprofitable when the support is granted, precautionary measures granted in the form of acquisition of own funds instruments or other capital instruments or through impaired asset measures should not exceed the amount necessary to cover capital shortfalls as identified in the adverse scenario of a stress test or equivalent exercise. To ensure that public financing is ultimately discontinued, those precautionary measures should also be limited in time and contain a clear timeline for their termination (exit strategy). Perpetual instruments, including Common Equity Tier 1 capital, should only be used in exceptional circumstances and be subject to certain quantitative limits because by their nature they are not well suited for compliance with the condition of temporarinesswhen strictly necessary.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 86 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 20
(20) Precautionary measures should be limited to the amount that the institution or entity would need to maintain its solvency in the case of an adverse scenario event as determined in a stress test or equivalent exercise. In the case of precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures, the receiving institution or entity should be able to use that amount to cover losses on the transferred assets or in combination with an acquisition of capital instruments, provided that the overall amount of the shortfall identified is not exceeded. It is also necessary to ensure that such precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures comply with existing State aid rules and best practices, that they restore the institution or entity's long-term viability, that State aid is limited to the minimum necessary and that distortions of competition are avoided. For those reasons, the authorities concerned should in case of precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures take into account the specific guidance, including the AMC Blueprint35 and the Communication on Tackling Non- Performing Loans36 . Those precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures should always be subject to the overriding condition of temporariness. Public guarantees granted for a specified period in relation to the impaired assets of the institution or entity concerned are expected to ensure better compliance with the temporariness condition than transfers of such assets to a publicly supported entity. To ensure the market exit of institutions and entities that prove not to be viable, despite the support received, it is necessary to lay down that non- comat institutions receiving support comply with terms of the support measure, competent authorities should request a remediation pliance by the from institution or entity concerned with the terms of the support measures specified at the time such measures were granted is to result in the institution or entity concerned being considereds that failed to fulfil their commitments. Where a competent authority is of the opinion that the measures in the remediation plan are not capable of achieving the institution’s long-term viability or where the institution failed to comply with the remediation plan, relevant authorities shall carry out an assessment of whether the institution is failing or is likely to fail, in accordance with Article 32 of Directive 2014/59/EU. __________________ 35 COM(2018) 133 final. 36 COM(2020) 822 final.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 95 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 31
(31) It is necessary to ensure equal incentives to build sufficient amounts of MREL for institutions and entities that would be subject to transfer strategies both in and outside resolution. The setting of level of the MREL for institutions or entities that may be subject to of measures in the context of national insolvency proceedings pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU should therefore follow the same rules as those applicable to the setting of the MREL for resolution entities whose preferred resolution strategy provides for the sale of business or transfer to a bridge institution leading to its exit from the market.deleted
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1 a – point f a (new)
(fa) the requirement for the management body of the entity to draw up a plan that the entity can implement in case the relevant corporate body decides to initiate the voluntary wind-down of the entity; the plan shall include at least analyses of the necessary capital and liquidity support for winding down and of the concrete relevant strategic options for a possible market exit.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 243 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31 –paragraph 2 – point d
(d) to protect depositors, while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 266 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where, pursuant to Article 31(3), that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives more effectivelyto the same extent.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 274 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and inpursuant to Article 10(1) and 45c(2), the resolution authority, in order to assess the appropriateness of the resolution for the institution, consider the following elements: (a) the prevalence of deposits and the absence of debt instruments in the funding model; (b) the access to the capital markets for eligible liabilities; (c) the evxtent of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;to which the institution relies on Common Equity Tier 1 capital to meet its capital requirements.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 300 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point a – point iii
(iii) an acquisition of own funds instruments other than Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, or of other capital instruments or a use of impaired assets measures, at prices, duration and other terms that do not confer an undue advantage upon the institution or entity concerned, where neitherr a use of impaired assets measures provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4), points (a), (b) or (c), nor the circumstances referred to in Article 59(3) are present at the time the public support is granted;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 305 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme to preserve the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 317 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) the measures are of a precautionary and temporary nature and are based on a pre-defined exit strategy approved by the competent authority, including a clearly specified termination date, sale date or repayment schedule for any of the measures provided;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 321 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), an institution or entity shall be deemed to be solvent where the competent authority has concluded that no breach has occurred, or is likely to occur in the 12 following months, of any of the requirements referred to in Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, Article 40 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 or the relevant applicable requirements under Union or national law.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 322 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2a (new)
The competent authority may deem an institution or entity to be solvent where it determines that a breach of these requirements is temporary in nature, taking into account the specific circumstances of each case, and provided that the institution or entity can demonstrate a reasonable plan to remedy the breach within an appropriate timeframe as determined by the competent authority.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 327 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5
By way of derogation from paragraph 1, point (a)(iii), aAcquisition of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall be exceptionally permitted where the nature of the shortfall identified is such that the acquisition of any other own funds instruments or other capital instruments would not make it possible for the institution or entity concerned to address its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario in the relevant stress test or equivalent exercise. The amount of acquired Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall not exceed 2% of the total risk exposure amount of the institution or entity concerned calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 331 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6
In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 32(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures, and shall communicate that assessment to the resolution authority concernedrequest the institution or entity to submit a remediation plan describing the steps to be taken in order to ensure or restore compliance with supervisory requirements, its long-term viability and to repay the amount provided, as well as the associated timeframe.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 334 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6a (new)
Where the relevant national competent authority does not recognise the remediation plan as credible or feasible, or where the institution or entity fails to comply with the remediation plan, an assessment of whether the institution or entity is failing or likely to fail shall be conducted in accordance with Article 32.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 366 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, and where its size and its ability to access the capital markets where it operates so justify in light of the princple of proportionality, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 395 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 2
2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the resolution authority shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out the assessment referred to in Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph, of this Directive.deleted
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 423 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 103 – paragraph 3
3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 102 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in Article 101(1). The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 530 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. Within that limit, the resolution authority shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 433 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the claims arising from the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors:
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 441 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) all deposits;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 449 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) deposits that were made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 455 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) deposit guarantee schemes when subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 489 #

2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 a (new)
Article2a Transitional period 1. Institutions or entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU whose preferred resolution strategy will change depending on the entry into force of this amending Directive shall comply with the requirements referred to in Articles 45e or 45f of Directive 2014/59/EU or with requirements that result from the application of Article 45b(4), (5) or (7) of Directive 2014/59/EU, as appropriate, within five years as from the date of the approval of the resolution plan including the new preferred resolution strategy. 2. During the transitional period referred to in the first paragraph, in the cases referred to in point (b), of the first subparagraph of Article 109(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU, as amended by this amending Directive, where the transfer to the recipient includes deposits that are not covered deposits or other bail-inable liabilities, by way of derogation from the second subparagraph of that paragraph, the deposit guarantee scheme shall contribute to the amount necessary to cover the difference between the value of deposits, including deposits that are not covered, of senior bail-inable liabilities held by retail clients, as defined in point (11) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU, and of the liabilities with the same or higher priority ranking than deposits and the value of the assets of the institution under resolution which are to be transferred to the recipient.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 70 #

2023/0111(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) Where the resolution strategy envisages the use of resolution tools other than bail-in, the recapitalisation needs of the entity concerned will generally be smaller after resolution than in case of open bank bail-in. The calibration of the MREL in such a case should take that aspect into account when estimating the recapitalisation requirement. Therefore, when adjusting the level of the MREL for resolution entities the resolution plan of which envisages the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the Board should take into account the features of those tools, including the expected perimeter of the transfer to the private purchaser or to the bridge institution, the types of instruments to be transferred, the expected value and marketability of those instruments, and the design of the preferred resolution strategy, including the complementary use of the asset separation tool. Since the resolution authority has to decide on a case by case basis on any possible use in resolution of funds from the deposit guarantee scheme and since such decision cannot be assumed with certainty ex ante, the Board should not consider the potential contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme (in resolution when calibrating the level of the MREL.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #

2023/0111(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) It is necessary to ensure equal incentives to build sufficient amounts of MREL for institutions and entities that would be subject to transfer strategies both in and outside resolution. The setting of the level of the MREL for institutions and entities that may be subject to measures in the context of national insolvency proceedings pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council32 should therefore follow the same rules as those applicable to the setting of the MREL for resolution entities whose preferred resolution strategy provides for the sale of business or transfer to a bridge institution leading to its exit from the market. __________________ 32 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149).deleted
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #

2023/0111(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
(18) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme funds are used more efficiently and the losses for those funds are minimised. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, the resolution objective of protecting depositors should be considered better achieved in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more costly for the deposit guarantee scheme.deleted
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 93 #

2023/0111(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20
(20) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the outcome of the public interest assessment should be negative only where the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives more effectively and not only to the same extent as resolution.deleted
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 100 #

2023/0111(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
(21) In light of the experience acquired in the implementation of Directive 2014/59/EU, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and Directive 2014/49/EU, it is necessary to specify further the conditions under which measures of a precautionary nature that qualify as extraordinary public financial support may exceptionally be granted. To minimise distortions of competition arising from differences in nature of deposit guarantee schemes in the Union, interventions of such schemes in the context of preventive measures complying with the requirements laid down in Directive 2014/49/EU that qualify as extraordinary public financial support should exceptionally be allowed where the beneficiary institution or entity does not meet any of the conditions for being deemed ashas been not declared failing or likely to fail. It should be ensured that precautionary measures are taken sufficiently early. The ECB currently bases its consideration that an institution or entity is solvent, for the purposes of precautionary recapitalisation, on a forward-looking assessment for the following 12 months of whether the institution or entity can comply with the own funds requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, and the additional own funds requirement laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive (EU) 2019/2034. That practice should be laid downrevised in Regulation (EU) No 806/2014. Moreover, measures to provide relief for impaired assets, including asset management vehicles or asset guarantee schemes, can prove effective and efficient in addressing causes of possible financial distress faced by institutions and entities and preventing their failure and could therefore constitute relevant precautionary measures. It should therefore be specified that such precautionary measures can take the form of impaired asset measures.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 147 #

2023/0111(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operatability to access the capital markets for eligible liabilities;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 156 #

2023/0111(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
(ea) whether any contribution by a deposit guarantee scheme is expected to be made pursuant to Article 79.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 162 #

2023/0111(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12da – paragraph 2
2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the Board shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out the assessment referred to in Article 12d(2a), second subparagraph, of this Regulation.deleted
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 211 #

2023/0111(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 14(3), that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in that Article 1431, and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives more effectivelyto the same extent.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 223 #

2023/0111(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
When carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board, based on thepursuant to Articles 8(2), 9(2) and 12d(2), the Board, inf ormation available to it at the time of that assessment, shall consider and compare all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the entity, both in the event of resolution and inder to assess the appropriateness of the resolution for the institution, shall consider the following elements: (a) the prevalence of deposits and the absence of debt instruments in the funding model; (b) the access to the capital markets for eligible liabilities; (c) the evxtent of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;to which the institution relies on Common Equity Tier 1 capital to meet its capital requirements.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 323 #

2023/0111(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 43 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 94 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(43a) in Article 94(1), the following point is added: (aa) the interplay between the existing framework and the establishment of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 326 #

2023/0111(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 a (new)
Article 2a Transitional period 1. Institutions or entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU whose preferred resolution strategy will change depending on the entry into force of this Regulation should comply with the requirements referred to in Articles 45e or 45f of Directive 2014/59/EU or with requirements that result from the application of Article 45b(4), (5) or (7) of that Directive, as appropriate, within five years as from the date of the approval of the resolution plan including the new preferred resolution strategy. 2. During the transitional period referred to in paragraph 1, in the cases referred to in point (b), of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 of Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU, where the transfer to the recipient includes deposits that are not covered deposits or other bail-inable liabilities, by way of derogation from the second subparagraph of that paragraph, the deposit guarantee scheme shall contribute to the amount necessary to cover the difference between the value of deposits, including deposits that are not covered, of senior bail-inable liabilities held by retail clients, as defined in point 11 of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU, and of the liabilities with the same or higher priority ranking than deposits and the value of the assets of the institution under resolution which are to be transferred to the recipient.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 141 #

2022/2062(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
32. Expresses once more its serious concerns about allegations regarding harassment, the working environment and working conditions at the EIB; notes the March 2022 ruling by the General Court on a harassment case in the EIB [KF vs EIB (T-299/20)] in which the decision of the EIB President that no harassment took place was annulled; recognises that efforts have been made by the EIB to address these and other relevant staff issues; urges the EIB to ensure that a policy of zero-tolerance towards all types of harassment is effectively implemented, including preventive and protective measures and proper and reliable complaint and victim support mechanisms; urges the EIB’s management to engage in genuine dialogue with staff representatives in order to address their concerns; deplores the fact that no trade union is recognised at the EIB and that the staff delegation has no power to act in the case of negotiations; calls on the EIB management to observe at the very least core ILO values such as freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining; is concerned that the apparent dysfunctional relationship between the EIB’s management and its staff might have a negative impact on the Bank’s operations;
2023/03/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 136 #

2021/0376(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 7 a (new)
(7 a) The marketing of AIFs is not always conducted by the AIFM directly but by one or several distributors either on behalf of the AIFM or on their own behalf. There could also be cases where an independent financial advisor markets a fund without the AIFM’s knowledge. Most fund distributors are subject to regulatory requirements pursuant to Directive 2014/65/EU or Directive 2016/97/EU, which define the scope and extent of their responsibilities towards their own clients. Directive 2011/61/EU should therefore acknowledge the diversity of distribution arrangements and recognise the existing safeguards for the arrangements whereby a distributor acts on its own behalf when it markets the AIF under Directive 2014/65/EU or through life-insurance based investment products in accordance with Directive 2016/97/EU in which case the provisions of this Directive regarding delegation should not apply irrespective of any distribution agreement between the AIFM and the distributor.
2022/07/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 168 #

2021/0376(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 28 a (new)
(28 a) The marketing of UCITS is not always conducted by the management company directly but by one or several distributors either on behalf of the management company or on their own behalf. There could also be cases where an independent financial advisor markets a fund without the management company’s knowledge. Most fund distributors are subject to regulatory requirements pursuant to Directive 2014/65/EU or Directive2016/97/EU, which define the scope and extent of their responsibilities towards their own clients. Directive 2009/65/EC should therefore acknowledge the diversity of distribution arrangements and recognise the existing safeguards for the arrangements whereby a distributor acts on its own behalf when it markets the UCITS under Directive 2014/65/EU or through life-insurance based investment products in accordance with Directive 2016/97/EU in which case the provisions of this Directive regarding delegation should not apply irrespective of any distribution agreement between the management company and the distributor.
2022/07/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 311 #

2021/0376(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point c a (new)
Directive 2011/61/EU
Article 20 – paragraph 6 a (new)
(c a) the following paragraph 6a is inserted: ‘(6a) By way of derogation from the paragraphs 1 to 6 of this Article, where the marketing function as referred in Annex I, paragraph 2(b), is performed by one or several distributors which are acting on their own behalf and which market the AIF under Directive 2014/65/EU or through insurance-based investment products in accordance with Directive2016/97/EU, such function shall not be considered a delegation subject to the requirements laid down in paragraphs 1 to 6 of this Article irrespective of any distribution agreement between the AIFM and the distributor.’
2022/07/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 439 #

2021/0376(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point b a (new)
Directive 2009/65/EU
Article 13 – paragraph 2a (new)
(b a) the following paragraph 2a is inserted: ‘2a. By way of derogation from the paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, where the marketing function, as referred in Annex II, is performed by one or several distributors which are acting on their own behalf and which market the UCITS under Directive 2014/65/EU or through insurance-based investment products in accordance with Directive 2016/97/EU, such function shall not be considered a delegation subject to the requirements laid down in the abovementioned paragraphs irrespective of any distribution agreement between the management company and the distributor.’
2022/07/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 28 #

2021/0343(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
(7) In the context of the indirect subscription of internal MREL eligible instrumentresources by resolution entities pursuant to the revised Union bank resolution framework, intermediate parentities should be required to deduct from their ownfull holding of internal MREL eligible resources the full holding of own funds and eligible liabilities issued by their subsidiariesissued by entities that are not themselves resolution entities and which belonging to the same resolution group up to an amount equivalent to the internal MREL requirements of such entities. This ensures the proper functioning of the internal loss- absorbing and recapitalisation mechanisms within a group and avoids the double- counting of the internal MREL eligible resources of the subsidiaryose entities for the purposes of compliance by the intermediate parentity with its own internal MREL. Additionally, wWithout those deductions, the individual solvency ratios of intermediate parents would not reflect appropriately and prudently their actual loss-absorbing capacity, as tproper implementation of the chosen ratios would also include the loss-absorbing capacity of their subsidiaries. Thisesolution strategy could be compromise the proper implementation of the chosen resolution strategyd, as the intermediate parentity could use up not only its own loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity but also that of its subsidiary, before the intermediate parent or the subsidiary are no longer viable. The deductions should first be appliother entities that are not themselves resolution entities and which belong to the same resolution group, before the intermediate entity or those other entities are no longer viable. To ensure that the obligation to deduct is aligned with the scope of entities that may be used toby the eligible liabilities items of the intermediate parents. In case the amount to be deducted would exceed the amount of the eligible liabilities items of the intermediate parents, the remaining amount sresolution entity for the indirect subscription of internal MREL eligible resources, and to avoid regulatory arbitrage, intermediate entities should deduct their holdings of internal MREL eligible resources issued by all entities belonging to the same resolution group and that may be subject to compliance with internal MREL, and not just the hould be deducted from their Tier 2 items. To ensure that the deduction regime remains proportionate, that regime should not be appings of resources issued by their subsidiaries. The same obligations should apply in the case of indirect issuance of resources eligible for compliance with the requirement for own funds and eligible licable in the exceptional cases where internal MREL is applied on a consolidated basis only. ilities for material subsidiaries of non- EU G-SIIs laid down in Article 92b of Regulation (EU) No575/2013, where relevant.
2022/01/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 49 #

2021/0343(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 72 e – paragraph 5
5. Institutions and entities required to comply with Article 45c of Directive 2014/59/EU that are not themselves resolution entities shall deduct from eligible liabilities items their holdings of own funds and eligible liabilities that meet the condishall deduct from eligible liabilities items their holdings of own funds instruments and eligible liabilities instruments where all of the following conditions are met: (a) the own funds instruments and eligible liabilities instruments are held by an institution or entity that is not itself a resolution entity but that is a subsidiary of a resolution entity or of a third-country entity that would be a resolution entity if it were established in the Union; (b) the institution or entity referred to in point (a) is required to comply with the requirements laid down in Article 92b of this Regulation or in Article 45f of Directive 2014/59/EU; (c) the own funds instruments and eligible liabilities instruments held by the institution or entity referred to in point (a) were issued by an institutions ofr entity referred to in Article 45f(292b(1) of that Directive of their subsidiariesis Regulation or in Article 45f(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU that is not itself a resolution entity and that belongs to the same resolution group. The deduction shall not appl as the institution or entity referred to in point(a). The deduction established in the first subparagraph shall be equal to the amount of own funds instruments and eligible liabilities instruments held by tohe institutions and entities that are not themselves resolution entities where the or entity referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph that have been issued by the institution or entity referred to in point (c) of the first subparagraph to comply with the requirement indicated by Article 45c(7). By way of derogation from the first subparagraph, holdings of own funds instruments and eligible liabilities instruments shall not be deducted where the institution or entity areferred to in point (a) is required to comply with the requirement referred to in Articles 45c and 45d of Directive 2014/59/EU on a consolidated basispoint (b) on a consolidated basis and the institution or entity referred to in point (c) is included in the consolidation of the institution or entity referred to in point(a) in accordance with Part One, Title II, Chapter 2. For the purposes of this paragraph, the reference to eligible liabilities items shall also be understood as a reference to: (a) eligible liabilities referred to in Article 45f(2), point (a), of Directive items taken into account for the purposes of complying with the requirement in Article 92b; (b) eligible liabilities that meet the conditions of Article 45f(2), point (a), of Directive2014/59/EU. For the purposes of this paragraph, the reference to own funds instruments and eligible liabilities instruments shall be understood as a reference to: (a) own funds instruments and eligible liabilities instruments that meet the conditions of Article 92b, paragraphs 2 and 3; (b) own funds and liabilities that meet the conditions of Article 45f(2) of Directive2014/59/EU.
2022/01/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 348 #

2021/0342(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36 a (new)
(36 a) When measuring capital requirements for operational risk, insurance policies should be allowed to be used as effective risk mitigation techniques. To that end, within 6 months after the entry into force of the Regulation EBA shall report to the Commission on a standardized formula, based on specific criteria, to be used for the calculation of operational risk capital requirements. The Commission should be empowered to submit a legislative proposal within the following 12 months, to the European Parliament and Council of the EU taking into account insurance policies for the calculation of capital requirements on operational risk. EBA should identify eligible insurance contracts.
2022/08/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 483 #

2021/0342(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point b a (new)
Regulation (EU) 575/2013
Article 36 – paragraph 1 – point m
(b a) in paragraph 1, point (m) is replaced by the following: '(m) the applicable amount of insufficient coverage for non-performing exposures other than exposures purchased by a specilised debt restructurer which were non-performing at the time of purchase.;'
2022/08/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 486 #

2021/0342(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 47a – paragraph 7 a (new)
(11 a) in Article 47a, the following paragraphs are added: '7a. For the purpose of Article 36(m) "specialised debt restructurer" means an institution that, during the preceding financial year, complies with the all following conditions : (i) the main activity of the institution is the purchase of exposures of other institutions and its management body has implemented a clear and effective internal decision process to this end; (ii) the book value of its own originated loans does not exceed 15% of the aggregate book value, including purchased performing and non- performing exposures, of its loans; and (iii) its total assets do not exceed EUR 30,000,000,000. 7b. EBA shall, taking into account the criteria set out in points (i) to (iii) of paragraph 7a, develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the conditions under which an institution may be considered a specialised debt restructurer. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by [12 months after the date of entry into force of this amending Regulation]. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.'
2022/08/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 487 #

2021/0342(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 b (new)
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 47a – paragraph 7 b (new)
(11 b) in Article 47b(1), the introductory part is replaced by the following: '1. Forbearance measure is a concession by an institution towards an obligor that is experiencing or is likely to experience difficulties in meeting its financial commitments. Forbearance measures should aim to return the borrower to a sustainable performing repayment status, having regard to her fair treatment, and to all relevant national and EU consumer protection requirements that may be applicable. Credit institutions shall make best efforts to exercise, where appropriate, reasonable forbearance before enforcement proceedings are initiated. When deciding which forbearance measures to take, creditors should take into account the individual circumstances of the consumer, the consumer’s interests and rights and the consumer’s ability to repay the credit, including in particular if the credit agreement is secured by residential immovable property that is the consumer’s primary residence. A concession may entail a loss for the lender and shall refer to either of the following actions: '
2022/08/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 492 #

2021/0342(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 c (new)
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 47b – paragraph 1 – introductory part
(11 c) in Article 47b(1), the introductory part is replaced by the following: '1. Forbearance measure is a concession by an institution towards an obligor that is experiencing or is likely to experience difficulties in meeting its financial commitments. Forbearance measures should aim to return the borrower to a sustainable performing repayment status, having regard to her fair treatment, and to all relevant national and EU consumer protection requirements that may be applicable. Credit institutions shall make best efforts to exercise, where appropriate, reasonable forbearance before enforcement proceedings are initiated. When deciding which forbearance measures to take, creditors should take into account the individual circumstances of the consumer, the consumer’s interests and rights and the consumer’s ability to repay the credit, including in particular if the credit agreement is secured by residential immovable property that is the consumer’s primary residence. A concession may entail a loss for the lender and shall refer to either of the following actions: '
2022/08/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 503 #

2021/0342(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 -a (new)Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

Article 49 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
(13 -a) in Article 49(1), the introductory part is replaced by the following: '1. For the purposes of calculating own funds on an individual basis, a sub- consolidated basis and a consolidated basis, where the competent authorities require or permit institutions to apply method 1, 2 or 3 of Annex I to Directive 2002/87/EC, the competent authorities may permit institutions not to deduct the holdings of own fundsequity instruments of a financial sector entity in which the parent institution, parent financial holding company or parent mixed financial holding company or institution has a significant investment, provided that the conditions laid down in points (a) to (e) of this paragraph are met:'
2022/08/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 872 #

2021/0342(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52
Regulation 575/2013
Article 133 – paragraph 6
6. Equity exposures to central banks shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 %.
2022/08/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1196 #

2021/0342(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 195 – point a
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 462 – paragraph 2
2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Article 47a, Articles 244(6) and 245(6), in Articles 456 to 460 and, in Articles 461a and 461b, and in Article 500 shall be conferred on the Commission for an indeterminate period of time from 28 June 2013.
2022/08/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1197 #

2021/0342(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 195 – point a
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 462 – paragraph 3
3. The delegation of power referred to in Article 47a, Articles 244(6) and 245(6), in Articles 456 to 460 and, in Article 461a and 461b, and in Article 500 may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of the delegated acts already in force.;
2022/08/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1402 #

2021/0342(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 199
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 495a – paragraph 3
3. By way of derogation from Article 133, institutions may continue to assign the same risk weight that was applicable as of [OP please insert the date = one day before the date of entry into force of this amending Regulation] to equity exposures, including the part of the exposures not deducted from own funds in accordance with Article 471, to entities of which they have been a shareholder at [adoption date] for six consecutive years and over which they exercise, at least, control or significant influence in the meaning of Directive 2013/34/EU, or the accounting standards to which an institution is subject under Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002, or a similar relationship between any natural or legal person and an undertaking.
2022/08/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1463 #

2021/0342(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 199 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 500
(199 a) Article 500 is amended as follows: a) paragraph 1, point b) is replaced by the following: '(b) the dates of the disposals of defaulted exposures are after 23 November 2016 but not later than 28 June 2022; 31 December 2026' (b) paragraph 1, subparagraph 2, is replaced by the following: 'The adjustment referred to in the first subparagraph may only be carried out until 28 June31 December 20226 and its effects may last for as long as the corresponding exposures are included in the institution's own LGD estimates.' c) a new paragraph 2a is introduced as follows: '2a. The Commission shall, by 31 December 2026, and every two years thereafter, assess if the level of defaulted exposures in the balance sheets of the institutions has increased significantly, or it expects a significant deterioration in the institutions’ asset quality, or if the degree of development of secondary markets for defaulted exposures is not adequate to ensure efficient disposals of defaulted exposures by institutions, also taking into consideration the regulatory developments on securitisation. The Commission shall review the appropriateness of the derogation set out in paragraph 1 and it shall, where appropriate, adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 462 to extend, reintroduce, or amend, as needed, the adjustment provided in this Article.'
2022/08/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1525 #

2021/0342(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 205
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 519d – paragraph 1 – introductory part
By [OP please insert the date = 60 months after date of application of Part Three, Title III], the EBA shall report to the Commission on all of the following:
2022/08/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1535 #

2021/0342(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 205
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 519d – paragraph 2
On the basis of that report, the Commission shall, where appropriate, submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a legislative proposal by [OP please insert the date = 712 months after date of application of Part Three, Title III].;
2022/08/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 506 #

2021/0341(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 a (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 97 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
(22a) in Article 97(4),subparagraph 2 is replaced by the following: 'When conducting the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, competent authorities shall apply the principle of proportionality in accordance with the criteria disclosed pursuant to point (c) of Article 143(1). In particular, competent authorities shall take into account the following elements: (a) whether the entity is not a G-SII; (b) whether the entity and its subsidiaries are linked according to Article 22, paragraph 7, of Directive 2013/34/EU and applicable national laws; (c) whether the subsidiaries are small and non-complex entities according to point 145 of this article or less significant institutions according to Article 6, paragraph 4, of Regulation (EU) 1024/2013.'
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 98 #

2021/0213(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 3 a (new)
(3 a) Insular, peripheral and remote regions had little alternative but to build their economic competitiveness with the support of air transport, enabling and promoting key economic flows and other drivers of economic development enabled by efficient and affordable air services. Improved air connectivity has brought about wider economic benefits, beyond those that benefit the immediate users of air transport networks. Beyond those that could be considered direct economic benefits of aviation, air connectivity between Member States serves as an essential catalyst for economic growth and social welfare. Air linkages that connect central Member States to the insular, peripheral and remote regions continue to make a vital contribution to economic growth.
2022/04/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 100 #

2021/0213(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 3 b (new)
(3 b) Until cleaner energy is made available through technological advances, taxpayers are encouraged to consume smartly and use transport that consumes less fossil fuels. However, until more environmentally friendly alternatives are available, the insular, peripheral and remote regions will be at an economic disadvantage compared to the central ones. Insular, peripheral and remote regions should not be discriminated against since in the near future they will not have transport alternatives that are more ecological than air transport. Citizens and businesses on islands and at the periphery should continue to benefit from equivalent connectivity opportunities as their counterparts in more central areas of the Union.
2022/04/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 159 #

2021/0213(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 23 a (new)
(23 a) Before including fisheries in the taxation of energy products, a comprehensive impact assessment should be carried out, including on the socioeconomic impact on fisheries and coastal communities.
2022/04/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 184 #

2021/0213(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 28 a (new)
(28 a) Energy is essential and access to energy services is a basic social right. Households regarded as vulnerable are more often affected by energy poverty as defined in the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on energy efficiency (recast) and need special attention. 'Energy poverty' means a household’s inability, linked to non- affordability, to meet its basic energy supply needs and lack of access to essential energy services such as to guarantee basic levels of comfort and health, a decent standard of living, including adequate heating and cooling, lighting, and energy to power appliances, in the relevant national context, existing social policy and other relevant policies, as a result of insufficient disposable income.
2022/04/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 191 #

2021/0213(CNS)

(29 a) The implementation of the Directive could have socio-economic consequences as well as a diverse impact on income classes and Member States. In that regard, a Social Monitor is established by this Directive to assess the implementation of the Directive and its impact in different Member States, regions and income classes. The Social Monitor should distribute reporting obligations to both the Commission and Member States. While the Commission should provide a holistic overview, also with regard to the evolution of energy prices, Member States should describe the social measures taken to ease the potential socio-economic consequences of the implementation of this Directive. If according to the assessments of the Social Monitor no significant progress is made to ease the potential socio-economic consequences on households recognised as vulnerable, Member States should have the possibility to prolong the transition period for those households.
2022/04/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 196 #

2021/0213(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 36
(36) Every fivthree years and for the first time fivthree years after the entry into force of this Directive, the Commission should report to the Council on the application of this Directive, examining in particular the minimum levels of taxation, the impact of innovation and technological developments, especially as regards energy efficiency, the use of electricity in transport and the justification for the exemptions, reductions and differentiations laid down in this Directive. The report should take into account the proper functioning of the internal market, environmental and social considerations, the real value of the minimum levels of taxation and, the impact of this Directive on air connectivity and the economic and social welfare of insular, peripheral and remote regions as well as the wider relevant objectives of the Treaties.
2022/04/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 198 #

2021/0213(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 36
(36) Every five years and for the first time five years after the entry into force of this Directive, the Commission should report to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of this Directive, examining in particular the minimum levels of taxation, the impact of innovation and technological developments, especially as regards energy efficiency, the use of electricity in transport and the justification for the exemptions, reductions and differentiations laid down in this Directive. The report should take into account the proper functioning of the internal market, environmental and social considerations, the real value of the minimum levels of taxation and the wider relevant objectives of the Treaties.
2022/04/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 216 #

2021/0213(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b – indent 2 – paragraph 1
An energy product has a dual use when it is used both as heating fuel and for purposes other than as motor fuel and heating fuel. The use of energy products for chemical reduction and in electrolytic and metallurgical processes,and mineralogical processes, including also various hydrogen production methods, such as methane pyrolysis or carbon capture, storage and utilisation when energy products are used directly in or to provide a direct energy input to the process, or their consumption is connected to the process, shall be regarded as dual use,
2022/04/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 259 #

2021/0213(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 13 a (new)
Article 13 a In addition to the general provisions setout in Directive 92/12/EEC on exempt uses of taxable products, and without prejudice to other Union provisions, Member States shall exempt energy products supplied for use as fuel for a fishing vessel within Union waters and electricity produced on board a fishing vessel, from taxation under conditions which they shall lay down for the purpose of ensuring the correct and straightforward application of such exemptions and of preventing any evasion, avoidance or abuse. For the purposes of this Article, ‘fishing vessel’ shall mean any vessel as defined in point (4) of Article 4 of Regulation (EU)1380/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council
2022/04/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 367 #

2021/0213(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 26 a (new)
Article 26 a Reporting obligations of the European Commission - Social monitor Within two years after the adoption of this Directive and every two years thereafter, the Commission shall adopt and make public available a report providing detailed assessments of the situation of energy prices in Member States and on the EU market and of the effects of this Directive therein. The Report shall include all relevant facts and figures covering energy price developments, as well as an assessment of the effects of the implementation of the revised Directive on those prices, with special emphasis on households recognised as vulnerable as defined in this Directive. The Commission shall in this respect take into consideration the different starting positions of Member States and assess possible extensions of the transitional period, targeted reductions and exemptions. This shall specifically apply to justified cases related to households recognised as vulnerable to prevent severe price jumps that may occur after the end of the transitional period. The Commission in cooperation with Member States shall identify and report on the number of households recognised as vulnerable as well as those suffering from energy poverty as defined in the directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on energy efficiency (recast).
2022/04/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 378 #

2021/0213(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 31 – paragraph 1
Every fivthree years and for the first time fivthree years after 1 January 2023, the Commission shall submit to the Council a report on the application of this Directive.
2022/04/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 384 #

2021/0213(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 31 – paragraph 2
The report by the Commission shall, inter alia, examine the minimum levels of taxation, the impact of innovation and technological developments, in particular as regards energy efficiency, the use of electricity in transport and the justification for the exemptions, reductions and differentiations laid down in this Directive. The report shall take into account the proper functioning of the internal market, environmental and social considerations, the real value of the minimum levels of taxation and, the impact of this directive on air connectivity and the economic and social welfare of insular, peripheral and remote regions as well as the relevant wider objectives of the Treaties.
2022/04/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 230 #

2020/0104(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 a (new)
(10a) The Facility should support projects that respect the principle of additionality of Union funding and that generate a genuine European added value. The Facility should not be a substitute for recurring national expenditures and should not run counter to the strategic and economic interests of the Union, and should therefore not finance investment plans of third countries. However, recurrent costs from investments and reforms should be considered in the costing of the Recovery and Resilience Plan if they have direct positive structural benefits and if the negative effect on the government balance is only temporary.
2020/09/22
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 380 #

2020/0104(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
(19) In order to ensure a meaningful financial contribution commensurate to the actual needs of Member States to undertake and complete the reforms and investments included in the recovery and resilience plan, it is appropriate to establish a maximum financial contribution available to them under the Facility as far as the financial support (i.e. the non- repayable financial support) is concerned. TDuring 2021 and 2022, that maximum contribution should be calculated on the basis of the population, the inverse of the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the relative unemployment rate of each Member State for the years 2015-2019. During 2023 and 2024 that maximum financial contribution should be calculated on the basis of the population, the inverse GDP, the relative unemployment rate of each Member State for the years 2015-2019 and the cumulative loss in real GDP observed over the period 2020-2021 compared to 2019.
2020/09/22
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 417 #

2020/0104(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21 a (new)
(21a) To ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the Facility, all procedures foreseen under the present Regulation shall enable a streamlined and coherent governance system and avoid any duplication or overlap of duties and competences among all institutions and entities involved. In light of the urgency of action due to the present crisis, decisions pertaining to the assessment of the recovery and resilience plans and the disbursement of the allocated resources shall be adopted in a timely manner. In any case, said procedures shall not prevent the Commission from exercising its competences in the execution of the European budget as set out in Art. 17 TEU and 317 TFEU.
2020/09/22
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 470 #

2020/0104(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28 a (new)
(28a) Loans agreed under the Facility and requested by Member States, and the related expenditure, will not be taken into account when assessing compliance within the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact.
2020/09/22
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 547 #

2020/0104(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 39
(39) The recovery and resilience plans to be implemented by the Member States and the corresponding financial contribution allocated to them should be established by the Commission by way of implementing act. In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. The implementing powers relating to the adoption of the recovery and resilience plans and to the payment of the financial support upon fulfilment of the relevant milestones and targets should be exercised by the Commission in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council, under the examination procedure thereof13 . After the adoption of an implementing delegated act, it should be possible for the Member State concerned and the Commission to agree on certain operational arrangements of a technical nature, detailing aspects of the implementation with respect to timelines, indicators for the milestones and targets, and access to underlying data. To allow the continuous relevance of the operational arrangements in respect of the prevailing circumstances during the implementation of the recovery and resilience plan, it should be possible that the elements of such technical arrangements may be modified by mutual consent. Horizontal financial rules adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on the basis of Article 322 ofSuch arrangements, as well as the choice of the relevant milestones and targets, shall allow the inclusion in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union apply to this Regulation. These rules are laid down in the Financial Regulation and determine in particular the procedure for establishing and implementing the budget through grants, procurement, prizes,covery and resilience plans of infrastructural investments which, due to their indiherecnt implementation, and provide for checks on the responsibility of financial actors. Rules adopted on the basis of Article 322 TFEU also csize and complexity, may require loncgern the prot execution of the Union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States, as the respect for the rule of law is an essential precondition for sound financial management and effective EU fundingperiods going beyond the time horizon of the regulation. __________________ 13 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13).
2020/09/22
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 158 #

2019/0161(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1
Where relevant,The Council shall establish, on the basedis onf an assessment by the Commission, the recommendation referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 5 shall establish recommendation of the Commission and taking into account any recommendations of the European Parliament adopted pursuant to such Commission’s assessment, whether a Member State is experiencing a severe economic downturn, as referred to in Article 2(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 1467/97 for the purposes of a modulation of national co-financing rates provided for in Regulation (EU) XXXX/XX. [Reform Support Programme Regulation].
2020/05/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 99 #

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) credit institutions established in a participating Member State, including those affiliated to an institutional protection scheme as referred to in Article 113(7) of Regulation No 575/2013;
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 117 #

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point9
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 19 – paragraphs 3 5 7 and 10
9. Article 19 is amended as follows: (a) in paragraph 3, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following: ‘ To the extent that the resolution action as proposed by the Board involves the use of the Funds (SRF or DIF), the Board shall notify the Commission of the proposed use of the Funds. The Board's notification shall include all of the information necessary to enable the Commission to make its assessments pursuant to this paragraph.; ’ (b) in paragraph 3, in the third, the fifth and the seventh subparagraphs the word "Fund" is replaced by "Funds", making such grammar changes as necessary; (c) in paragraph 5, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following: ‘ The Board shall pay any amounts received under the first subparagraph into the respective Fund (SRF or DIF) and take such amounts into consideration when determining contributions in accordance with Articles 70 and 71, and 74c and 74d.; ’ (d) in paragraphs 7 and 10, the word "Fund" is replaced by the word "Funds", making such grammar changes as necessary;deleted
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 208 #

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o –title
Article 41o Repayment of funding and determination of excess loss and lossliquidity
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 211 #

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 1
1. The participating DGS shall repay the fundingliquidity support provided by the Board under Article 41n, less the amount of any excess loss cover in case of coverage under Article 41a in accor dany loss cover in case of coverage under Article 41d orce with a repayment plan as referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article 41h.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 213 #

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 2
2. UntilWithin 3 monthsof the determinationof the insolvency or resolution procedure, the Board shall determine, on an annual basis, the amount the participating DGS has already recovered from the insolvency procedure or has already be referred to in Article 41m, the Board, after consulting the relevant designated authority, shall establish a repayment paid in accordance with Article 75 of Directive 2014/59/EU. The participating DGS shalllan that ensures that the funding provide tod by the Board all information necessary to make this determination. The participating DGS shall pay to the Board a share of that amount which corresponds to the share that is covered by EDIS in accordance with Article 41a, Article 41d or Article 41hunder Article 41n will be repaid in full within six years by the participating DGS.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 3
3. In case of coverage under Article 41a, the participating DGSshall also pay to the Board, by the end of the first calendar year after the funding was provided, an amount equal to the ex-post contributions that the participatingDGS may raise within one calendar year in accordance with the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 10(8) of Directive 2014/49/EU, less the amount of ex-post contributions it raised in accordance with point (b) of Article 41b(1) of this RegulationThe repayment plan initially shall, to the largest extent possible, be based on the expected funding from the sources referred to in paragraph 5.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 221 #

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 4
4. After the termination of the insolvency procedure or resolution procedure of the credit institution concerned, the Board shall without delay determine the excess loss in accordance with Article 41d or the loss in accordance with Article 41h. Where this determination results in arepayment obligation ofthe participating DGS that differs from the amounts repaid in accordance with the second and third paragraph, the difference shall be settled between the Board and the participating DGS without deThe following conditions for the repayment planshallapply: (a) the minimum annualrepayment bythe participating DGS shall be on average 10% of the funding provided by the Board under article 41n; and b) each year, the Board shall reassess the level of expected recoveries and recalibrate the repayment plan for the remaining years in accordance with that assessment, and assess any need to extend the repayment playn.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 223 #

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 4a (new)
4a. As long as a participating DGS has liquidity support outstanding with the DIF, at least 50% of any extraordinary contributions raised in accordance with Article 10(8) of Directive 2014/49/EU, at least 50% of any recoveries on the DGS’s claims pursuant to Article 9(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU and Article 75 of Directive 2014/59/EU, and at least 50% of any repayment of or income derived from measures taken in accordance with Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU or Article 11(3) and 11(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU shall be repaid to the DIF. This shall be reflected in the repayment plan.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 232 #

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 q a (new)
Article 41qa Terms of loans provided by the DIF 1. The Board shall determine the key financial terms and conditions of the liquidity facility in a standardised agreement. 2. The Board and the participating DGS that has requested liquidity support in accordance with Article 41a shall enter into an agreement based on the standardized agreement as referred to in paragraph 1. 3. In case the participating DGS requests an extension of the maturity of the loan in accordance with Article 41o(7), an interest rate not higher than the ECB marginal facility rate may be charged until the remaining time to maturity of the loan.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 269 #

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 –subparagraph 1
The Commission shall be empowered to adopt adelegated acts in accordance with Article 93 in order to specify a risk-based method for the calculation of contributions in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 270 #

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 –subparagraph 2
It shall adopt one delegated act specifying the method for the calculation of contributions payable to participating DGSs and, for the reinsurance period only, to the DIF. In this delegated act the calculation shall be based on the amount of covered deposits and the degree of risk incurred by each credit institution relative to all other credit institutions affiliated to the same participating DGS.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 273 #

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 –subparagraph 3
It shall adopt a second delegated act specifying the method for the calculation of the contributions payable to the DIF as from the co-insurance period. In this second delegated act the calculation shall be based on the amount of covered deposits and the degree of risk incurred by each credit institution relative to all other credit institutions referred to in point (b) of Article 2(2).
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 278 #

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 –subparagraph 4 – introductory part
BothThe delegated acts shall include a calculation formula, specific indicators, risk classes for members, thresholds for risk weights assigned to specific risk classes, and other necessary elements. It shall not consider as a risk to be factored in, the exposures of the credit institutions to the sovereign debt in the EU. The degree of risk shall be assessed on the basis of the following criteria:
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 280 #

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 –subparagraph 4 – point d
(d) the quality of the institution’s assets, including its level II and III assets;
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 309 #

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 39 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 94 – paragraph 3 a (new)
39a. in Article 94, the following paragraph is added: 3a. By [insert one year after entry into force of this amending Regulation] the Commission shall review and assess the functioning of EDIS I and the transition to a fully mutualised insurance scheme that provides funding to and covers the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes. It shall review the functioning of EDIS I in order to create a single European deposit insurance scheme, possibly backed by a publicly funded liquidity mechanism. The review shall assess in particular the following: (a) the adequacy of the funding mechanism and the target level of EDIS I, and the cases of use of the liquidity mechanism; (b) the scope of the measures financed by EDIS I under article 41a and by the entities referred to in Article 2(2), point (b); (c) the conditions for an extension of EDIS I from providing liquidity support to a loss coverage mechanism and its features; (d) the appropriateness of introducing a publicly funded backstop mechanism to support the DIF. By [insert one year after the date referred to in the first paragraph] the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the basis of this assessment. The report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal, where appropriate.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 321 #

2015/0270(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 99 – paragraph 5 a
5a. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, Article 1(2), Part IIa and Part III, Title V Chapter 2 Section 1a shall apply without undue delay and from [OP insert date of entry into force of this Regulation];
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON