Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10a – paragraph 2

2. Following the adoption by the Council of a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, the Commission shall carry out a ~~dedicated surveillance~~ mission to the Member State concerned to discuss the measures that the Member State intends to take in response to the measures judged necessary following the notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. Upon invitation by the parliament of the Member State concerned, the Commission may present its assessment of the economic and fiscal situation in the Member State. Enhanced surveillance may be undertaken for Member States which are the subject of recommendations and notices issued following a decision pursuant to Article 126(8) TFEU and decisions under Article 126(11) TFEU for the purposes of on-site monitoring. The Member States concerned shall provide all necessary information for the preparation and the conduct of the ~~surveillance~~ mission.;

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

Margarida MARQUES, Irene TINAGLI, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Costas MAVRIDES, Pedro MARQUES, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ, Joachim SCHUSTER, René REPASI

Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 8 Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 8 – paragraph 4 – point e

~~(e) monitoring compliance with the Union fiscal framework in accordance with Regulations [XXX preventive arm of the SGP] and [XXX corrective arm of the SGP] *;~~deleted

2023/10/24
Committee: ECON

Pedro MARQUES, Aurore LALUCQ, René REPASI, Irene TINAGLI, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13

3. Member States shall ensure that in the event of a capital support measure, the note referred to in paragraph 1 identifies all capital raising measures that can be implemented, including safeguards preventing outflows of funds, a forward- looking capital adequacy assessment, and, a ~~subsequent determination of~~s determined by the competent authority, the capital shortfall that the DGS has to cover.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

2023/0115(COD)

Pedro MARQUES, Aurore LALUCQ, René REPASI, Irene TINAGLI, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 a (new)

Directive 2014/49/EU
Article 12a (new)

(13a) the following Article 12a is added: Support by the Single Resolution Fund to alternative funding arrangements 1. Where the intervention of a DGS within the Banking Union is necessary in the context of a resolution but its available financial means are insufficient to achieve the purposes of its intervention, the DGS may request support, in the form of a guarantee, from the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). 2. The DGS request shall include all relevant information, including: (i) the shortfall of the deposit guarantee scheme for the purposes of the specific intervention in the resolution; (ii) the conditions offered to the deposit guarantee scheme in other alternative funding arrangements; (iii) the expected length of the requested support. 3. The Single Resolution Board shall take a decision, including on the terms applicable to the guarantee provision, according to Article 79a of Regulation 806/2014 (EU). 4. The SRF guarantee provided to the DGS shall be used as collateral for alternative funding arrangements as referred to in Article 10(9) of Directive 2014/49/EU, thus ensuring access to markets in more favourable conditions.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

2023/0115(COD)

Irene TINAGLI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 a (new)

Directive 2014/49/EU
Article 13 – paragraph 1

(13a) Article 13(1) is replaced by the following: “1. The contributions to DGSs referred to in Article 10 shall be based on the amount of covered deposits and the degree of risk incurred by the respective members of any single DGS. Member States may provide for lower contributions for low-risk sectors of credit institutions affiliated to a DGS which are regulated under national law. Member States may decide that members of an IPS pay lower contributions to the DGS to which they are affiliated. Member States may allow the central body and all credit institutions permanently affiliated to the central body as referred to in Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 to be subject as a whole to the risk weight determined for the central body and its affiliated institutions on a consolidated basis. Member States may decide that credit institutions pay a minimum contribution, irrespective of the amount of their covered deposits.”

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

2023/0115(COD)

Pedro MARQUES, Aurore LALUCQ, René REPASI, Irene TINAGLI, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Irene TINAGLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 a (new)

Article 2a Transitional period 1. Institutions or entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU whose preferred resolution strategy will change depending on the entry into force of this Regulation should comply with the requirements referred to in Articles 45e or 45f of Directive 2014/59/EU or with requirements that result from the application of Article 45b(4), (5) or (7) of that Directive, as appropriate, within five years as from the date of the approval of the resolution plan including the new preferred resolution strategy. 2. During the transitional period referred to in paragraph 1, in the cases referred to in point (b), of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 of Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU, where the transfer to the recipient includes deposits that are not covered deposits or other bail-inable liabilities, by way of derogation from the second subparagraph of that paragraph, the deposit guarantee scheme shall contribute to the amount necessary to cover the difference between the value of deposits, including deposits that are not covered, of senior bail-inable liabilities held by retail clients, as defined in point 11 of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU, and of the liabilities with the same or higher priority ranking than deposits and the value of the assets of the institution under resolution which are to be transferred to the recipient.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

2022/2062(INI)

Alfred SANT, Irene TINAGLI, Aurore LALUCQ, Katarína ROTH NEVEĎALOVÁ, Eero HEINÄLUOMA, Costas MAVRIDES, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. Expresses once more its serious concerns about allegations regarding harassment, the working environment and working conditions at the EIB; notes the March 2022 ruling by the General Court on a harassment case in the EIB [KF vs EIB (T-299/20)] in which the decision of the EIB President that no harassment took place was annulled; recognises that efforts have been made by the EIB to address these and other relevant staff issues; urges the EIB to ensure that a policy of zero-tolerance towards all types of harassment is effectively implemented, including preventive and protective measures and proper and reliable complaint and victim support mechanisms; urges the EIB’s management to engage in genuine dialogue with staff representatives in order to address their concerns; deplores the fact that no trade union is recognised at the EIB and that the staff delegation has no power to act in the case of negotiations; calls on the EIB management to observe at the very least core ILO values such as freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining; is concerned that the apparent dysfunctional relationship between the EIB’s management and its staff might have a negative impact on the Bank’s operations;

2023/03/29
Committee: ECON

2021/0376(COD)

Irene TINAGLI

Proposal for a directive
Recital 7 a (new)

(7 a) The marketing of AIFs is not always conducted by the AIFM directly but by one or several distributors either on behalf of the AIFM or on their own behalf. There could also be cases where an independent financial advisor markets a fund without the AIFM’s knowledge. Most fund distributors are subject to regulatory requirements pursuant to Directive 2014/65/EU or Directive 2016/97/EU, which define the scope and extent of their responsibilities towards their own clients. Directive 2011/61/EU should therefore acknowledge the diversity of distribution arrangements and recognise the existing safeguards for the arrangements whereby a distributor acts on its own behalf when it markets the AIF under Directive 2014/65/EU or through life-insurance based investment products in accordance with Directive 2016/97/EU in which case the provisions of this Directive regarding delegation should not apply irrespective of any distribution agreement between the AIFM and the distributor.

2022/07/04
Committee: ECON

Irene TINAGLI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7

(7) In the context of the indirect subscription of internal MREL eligible ~~instrument~~resources by resolution entities pursuant to the revised Union bank resolution framework, intermediate ~~par~~entities should be required to deduct ~~from~~ their ~~own~~full holding of internal MREL eligible resources ~~the full holding of own funds and eligible liabilities issued by their subsidiaries~~issued by entities that are not themselves resolution entities and which belong~~ing~~ to the same resolution group up to an amount equivalent to the internal MREL requirements of such entities. This ensures the proper functioning of the internal loss- absorbing and recapitalisation mechanisms within a group and avoids the double- counting of the internal MREL eligible resources of th~~e subsidiary~~ose entities for the purposes of compliance by the intermediate ~~par~~entity with its own internal MREL. ~~Additionally, w~~Without those deductions, the ~~individual solvency ratios of intermediate parents would not reflect appropriately and prudently their actual loss-absorbing capacity, as t~~proper implementation of the chosen r~~atios would also include the loss-absorbing capacity of their subsidiaries. This~~esolution strategy could be compromise ~~the proper implementation of the chosen resolution strategy~~d, as the intermediate ~~par~~entity could use up not only its own loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity but also that of ~~its subsidiary, before the intermediate parent or the subsidiary are no longer viable. The deductions should first be appli~~other entities that are not themselves resolution entities and which belong to the same resolution group, before the intermediate entity or those other entities are no longer viable. To ensure that the obligation to deduct is aligned with the scope of entities that may be used toby the ~~eligible liabilities items of the intermediate parents. In case the amount to be deducted would exceed the amount of the eligible liabilities items of the intermediate parents, the remaining amount s~~resolution entity for the indirect subscription of internal MREL eligible resources, and to avoid regulatory arbitrage, intermediate entities should deduct their holdings of internal MREL eligible resources issued by all entities belonging to the same resolution group and that may be subject to compliance with internal MREL, and not just the hould ~~be deducted from their Tier 2 items. To ensure that the deduction regime remains proportionate, that regime should not be app~~ings of resources issued by their subsidiaries. The same obligations should apply in the case of indirect issuance of resources eligible for compliance with the requirement for own funds and eligible licab~~le in the exceptional cases where internal MREL is applied on a consolidated basis only.~~ ilities for material subsidiaries of non- EU G-SIIs laid down in Article 92b of Regulation (EU) No575/2013, where relevant.

2022/01/12
Committee: ECON

2021/0343(COD)

Irene TINAGLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 72 e – paragraph 5

5. Institutions and entities required to comply with Article 45c of Directive 2014/59/EU that are not themselves resolution entities shall deduct from eligible liabilities items their holdings of own funds and eligible liabilities that meet the condishall deduct from eligible liabilities items their holdings of own funds instruments and eligible liabilities instruments where all of the following conditions are met: (a) the own funds instruments and eligible liabilities instruments are held by an institution or entity that is not itself a resolution entity but that is a subsidiary of a resolution entity or of a third-country entity that would be a resolution entity if it were established in the Union; (b) the institution or entity referred to in point (a) is required to comply with the requirements laid down in Article 92b of this Regulation or in Article 45f of Directive 2014/59/EU; (c) the own funds instruments and eligible liabilities instruments held by the institution or entity referred to in point (a) were issued by an institutions ofr entity referred to in Article ~~45f(2~~92b(1) of th~~at Directive of their subsidiaries~~is Regulation or in Article 45f(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU that is not itself a resolution entity and that belongs to the same resolution group~~. The deduction shall not appl~~ as the institution or entity referred to in point(a). The deduction established in the first subparagraph shall be equal to the amount of own funds instruments and eligible liabilities instruments held by tohe institution~~s and entities that are not themselves resolution entities where the~~ or entity referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph that have been issued by the institution or entity referred to in point (c) of the first subparagraph to comply with the requirement indicated by Article 45c(7). By way of derogation from the first subparagraph, holdings of own funds instruments and eligible liabilities instruments shall not be deducted where the institution or entity areferred to in point (a) is required to comply with the requirement referred to in ~~Articles 45c and 45d of Directive 2014/59/EU on a consolidated basis~~point (b) on a consolidated basis and the institution or entity referred to in point (c) is included in the consolidation of the institution or entity referred to in point(a) in accordance with Part One, Title II, Chapter 2. For the purposes of this paragraph, the reference to eligible liabilities items shall ~~also~~ be understood as a reference to: (a) eligible liabilities ~~referred to in Article 45f(2), point (a), of Directive~~ items taken into account for the purposes of complying with the requirement in Article 92b; (b) eligible liabilities that meet the conditions of Article 45f(2), point (a), of Directive2014/59/EU. For the purposes of this paragraph, the reference to own funds instruments and eligible liabilities instruments shall be understood as a reference to: (a) own funds instruments and eligible liabilities instruments that meet the conditions of Article 92b, paragraphs 2 and 3; (b) own funds and liabilities that meet the conditions of Article 45f(2) of Directive2014/59/EU.

2022/01/12
Committee: ECON

Alfred SANT, Eero HEINÄLUOMA, Cyrus ENGERER, Josianne CUTAJAR, Alex AGIUS SALIBA, Irene TINAGLI, Margarida MARQUES, Elisabetta GUALMINI, Eva KAILI, Pedro MARQUES, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Costas MAVRIDES, Billy KELLEHER, Frances FITZGERALD

Proposal for a directive
Recital 3 a (new)

(3 a) Insular, peripheral and remote regions had little alternative but to build their economic competitiveness with the support of air transport, enabling and promoting key economic flows and other drivers of economic development enabled by efficient and affordable air services. Improved air connectivity has brought about wider economic benefits, beyond those that benefit the immediate users of air transport networks. Beyond those that could be considered direct economic benefits of aviation, air connectivity between Member States serves as an essential catalyst for economic growth and social welfare. Air linkages that connect central Member States to the insular, peripheral and remote regions continue to make a vital contribution to economic growth.

2022/04/08
Committee: ECON

2021/0213(CNS)

Alfred SANT, Eero HEINÄLUOMA, Cyrus ENGERER, Josianne CUTAJAR, Alex AGIUS SALIBA, Irene TINAGLI, Margarida MARQUES, Elisabetta GUALMINI, Eva KAILI, Pedro MARQUES, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Costas MAVRIDES, Billy KELLEHER, Frances FITZGERALD

Proposal for a directive
Recital 3 b (new)

(3 b) Until cleaner energy is made available through technological advances, taxpayers are encouraged to consume smartly and use transport that consumes less fossil fuels. However, until more environmentally friendly alternatives are available, the insular, peripheral and remote regions will be at an economic disadvantage compared to the central ones. Insular, peripheral and remote regions should not be discriminated against since in the near future they will not have transport alternatives that are more ecological than air transport. Citizens and businesses on islands and at the periphery should continue to benefit from equivalent connectivity opportunities as their counterparts in more central areas of the Union.

2022/04/08
Committee: ECON

2021/0213(CNS)

Irene TINAGLI, Elisabetta GUALMINI

Proposal for a directive
Recital 23 a (new)

(23 a) Before including fisheries in the taxation of energy products, a comprehensive impact assessment should be carried out, including on the socioeconomic impact on fisheries and coastal communities.

2022/04/08
Committee: ECON

2021/0213(CNS)

Joachim SCHUSTER, Alfred SANT, Elisabetta GUALMINI, Irene TINAGLI, René REPASI, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ, Aurore LALUCQ, Margarida MARQUES

Proposal for a directive
Recital 28 a (new)

(28 a) Energy is essential and access to energy services is a basic social right. Households regarded as vulnerable are more often affected by energy poverty as defined in the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on energy efficiency (recast) and need special attention. 'Energy poverty' means a household’s inability, linked to non- affordability, to meet its basic energy supply needs and lack of access to essential energy services such as to guarantee basic levels of comfort and health, a decent standard of living, including adequate heating and cooling, lighting, and energy to power appliances, in the relevant national context, existing social policy and other relevant policies, as a result of insufficient disposable income.

2022/04/08
Committee: ECON