BETA

36 Amendments of Isabel BENJUMEA BENJUMEA related to 2024/2055(INI)

Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas a completed BU would be a positive development for EU citizens and businesses, improveing the competitiveness and stability of the banking sector and consumer choice, and facilitate access to financing, reducing systemic risk, improving supply and consumer choice, and offering increased opportunities for cross-border banking that enhance access to financing for households and businesses, thereby reducing costs for banks' customers;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas the BU must ensure that the banking sector in the euro area and the wider EU is stable, safe and reliable, thus contributing to financial stability;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
Bb. whereas the BU aims to ensure that: (i) banks are robust and able to withstand any future financial crises; (ii) non-viable banks are resolved without recourse to taxpayers' money and with minimal impact on the real economy; (iii) market fragmentation is reduced by harmonised financial sector rules;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B c (new)
Bc. whereas banks are a cornerstone of our economy and one of our most important strategic sectors; whereas it is vital to ensure that they operate in an environment that fosters stability, resilience, dynamism and competitiveness; whereas those principles are essential not just for sustainable economic growth, but also to ensure that the financial system can adapt to global challenges, facilitate innovation and respond effectively to the needs of businesses and citizens; whereas a vibrant economy requires a banking sector that is both robust and flexible, and that fosters investment and channels capital efficiently, thereby increasing our capacity to compete in an ever-changing global market;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas the BU should help to address the bank-sovereign nexus or 'doom loop' that exists in the European Union;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
Db. whereas, according to the European Central Bank, around 80 % of external financing for EU companies comes from banks, while just 20 % comes from the capital markets;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D c (new)
Dc. whereas the EIB noted in 2022 that between 75 % and 85 % of EU SMEs use bank loans as their primary source of funding; whereas just 3–5 % of SMEs access financing from bonds or capital in the financial markets;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D d (new)
Dd. whereas just 30 % of credit for US firms comes from banks, while 70 % is funded via capital markets, including corporate bond holdings and shares;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
F a. whereas deposit insured by national deposit guarantee schemes account for 37% of total deposits1a; _________________ 1a https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ etudes/BRIE/2024/764175/IPOL_BRI(20 24)764175_EN.pdf
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Asks the Commission to ensure that the completion of BUthe BU and the Capital Markets Union remains a key priority; highlights that thisese projects offers households and SMEs access to broader funding, reduce the high reliance on bank credit to foster investments and job creation, increases financial stability, reduces the impact of economic downturns, funds the transition to a green and digital economy and unlocks the EU’s growth potential;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Notes the necessity to be prepared for episodes of banking stress that could potentially lead to bankruns as those witnessed in March 2023 in some jurisdictions outside the EU and the need to ensure the stability of deposits;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Notes that a more integrated BU would help to make the EU banking sector more resilient; notes that better cross- border integration of banking business would increase the potential for private risk sharing and ensure diversification in the EU banking market; stresses that a fully developed BU would allow EU banks to grow and put them in a better position to compete in the international arena;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Deplores the fact that banks' exposure to domestic sovereign debt has shot up by EUR 200 billion according to the latest IMF report in October, exceeding USD 100 trillion and accounting for 93% of combined gross domestic product at market prices; notes that, according to the same forecasts, public debt will be higher than global GDP by 2030; points out that this increase in debt has taken place against a backdrop of the loosening of fiscal rules in some geographical areas; recalls that one of the main objectives of the banking union is to break the link between bank and sovereign risks;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Regrets that EU banks’ ability to finance major investments is constrained by higher costs, smaller scale and lower profitability that is not sufficient to ensure their competitiveness; calls on the Commission to assess the effects of national tax levies on credit institutions on the competitiveness of the EU banking sector and the prospects for the completion of the BU;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Regrets that EU banks’ ability to finance major investments is constrained by higher costs, smaller scale and lower profitability that is not sufficient to ensure their competitiveness; calls on the Commission to cut red tape for the banking sector so that it is not hampering its competitiveness;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. NotAgrees that the creation of a separate jurisdiction for EU banks with substantial cross-border operations13 would help to complete the BU; _________________ 13 Draghi report, p. 61.
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Welcomes the adoption by co- legislators of the new banking package implementing Basel III standards in the EU; stresses that the Commission should evaluate thoroughly whether a delay in implementation is necessary to maintain the competitiveness of EU banks; welcomes, in this regard, the delegated act postponing the date of application of the new market risk framework by one year to 1 January 2026; urges the Commission to carry out a thorough check on whether other jurisdictions, mainly our competitors, are implementing the agreement and, if they are not, to consider not proceeding with its implementation in the EU so that the competitiveness of European banks is not hampered;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Notes that the current levels of banking sector profitability may provide an opportunity for some Member States to implement additional targeted increases in macroprudential buffers and help to preserve banking sector resilience;deleted
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Welcomes the objective of the proposal on crisis management and deposit insurance of ensuring a more consistent approach across all Member States to the application of resolution tools and deposit protection to enhance financial stability, taxpayer protection and depositor confidence; notes that small banks do not pose any risks to financial stabilitypotential risks to financial stability should be assessed not only based on the size of the institution but due to contagion effects among other relevant factors;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 184 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Welcomes the objective of the proposal on crisis management and deposit insurance of ensuring a more consistent approach across all Member States to the application of resolution tools and deposit protection to enhance financial stability, taxpayer protection and depositor confidence; notstresses that small banks do not pose any risks tobanks need an effective regulatory environment that fosters their development and thus underpins financial stability;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 188 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Highlights the importance of preserving shareholders’ and creditors’ primary responsibility for bearing losses in the event of a bank’s failure, which is still a key lesson learned from the global financial crisis; stresses that the bail-in of shareholders and creditors must remain the main source for resolution financing before any recourse is made to; stresses that, whenever possible to preserve financial stability, resorting to taxpayers money must be avoided - which is still a key lesson learned from the global financial crisis; stresses that all resolution tools should be considered for resolving a bank; welcomes the Commission proposal on CMDI to increase to availability of industry- fundeding sources for the resolvability of banks;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Recalls that a sufficient minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities is crucial for a credible resolution framework and for ensuring that resolution authorities have sufficient flexibility to effectively apply the resolution strategies needed in a specific crisis situation; warns that reductions in this minimum requirement, resulting from specific resolution strategies inelcomes SRB recommendations of MREL requirements taking into account the specificities of each resolution tool; encourages the SRB to increase the presolution planning phase, could hamper the resolvability of banksparedness to operationalise the sale of business resolution strategy;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 201 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Highlights that liquidity support in resolution should not be based on any additional public funds; notes that any reliance on taxpayer money for the resolution of banks should be avoiddeleted;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 206 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Highlights that liquidity support in resolution should not be based on any additional public funds; notes that any reliance on taxpayer money for the resolution of banks should be avoided, in keeping with the principles of fiscal responsibility and market discipline;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 211 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16 a. Stresses the importance of tackling at EU level the issue of liquidity in resolution on the basis of the role of the ECB as liquidity provider, fully respecting its need for guarantees to perform its mandate;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 213 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16 b. Notes that the role of ESM supporting liquidity during resolution processes could be further expanded;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 219 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the fact that the Single Resolution Fund has now been built up; calls for the full ratification of the Amending Agreement to the ESM Treaty by all Member States, including the establishment of a common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund;(Does not affect the English version.)
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 224 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Highlights the need for additional efforts to ensure full resolvability for all banks falling under the scope of resolution; recalls that achieving resolvability cannot be considered a ‘moving target’ and therefore calls for mwelcomes the SRB flexibility to address bank-specific, market ore standardisation and harmonisation of the resolvability assessystemic risk developments;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 232 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Underlines the fact that the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme was published back in 2015, and that the landscape has changed significantly since then; stresses that any European mechanism must bolster financial stability, boost depositor confidence and preserve incentives for prudent risk management by banks;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 233 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Underlines the fact that the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme was published back in 2015, and that the landscape has changed significantly since then; welcomes the fact that its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted its position in favour of a creation of a European deposit insurance scheme in April 2024; calls on the European Parliament to adopt its mandate to enter into interinstitutional negotiations; urges the Council to agree on its position on EDIS without any further delay;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 241 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Notes that national deposit guarantee schemes have been introduced successfully and have proved their functionality in a number of cases; underlines the need to take specific national characteristics into account and to preserve the well-functioning systems for smaller banks that are already in place in some Member Stateregrets that their fragmentation accross national lines limits their effectiveness to tackle systemic crises and adds barriers to expand cross border activity to pan- European banks; welcomes a common deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) to further diversify risks in a larger pool of resources, to reduce market fragmentation while increasing competitiveness of the European banking system thus providing more stable deposits;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 244 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Notes that national deposit guarantee schemes have been introduced successfully and have proved their functionality in a number of cases; underlines the need to take specific national characteristics into account and to preserve the well-functioning systems for smaller banks that are already in place in some Member States, thus upholding the principle of subsidiarity with regard to the Member States;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 253 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Underlines the necessity to take the specifics of institutional protection schemes into account and preserve their functioning while ensuring a level playing field across the Banking Union;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 257 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Takes note of the Eurogroup statement of 16 June 2022 on the future of the BU; laments no further developments at Eurogroup level to push the completion of the BU, most notably the third pillar;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 263 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
25. Recalls that breaking the link between bank and sovereign risk remains a challenge for the BU; emphasises that the risk on banks’ balance sheets can be reduced further through the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 267 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
25. Recalls that breaking the link between bank and sovereign risk remains a challenge for the BU; emphasises that the risk on banks’ balance sheets can be reduced further through the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures; stresses that further decoupling of bank and sovereign risk will help to bolster financial stability, protect taxpayers and move towards a more integrated and competitive European financial market;
2024/12/16
Committee: ECON