Activities of Emmanouil FRAGKOS related to 2021/0297(COD)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on applying a generalised scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council
Amendments (38)
Amendment 118 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
Recital 5
(5) The general objectives of the GSP are to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 17.12 and to promote the sustainable development agenda, while averting harm to EU industry’'s interestsand member states national interests, sourcing from international law. The 2018 GSP Mid- term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 has delivered on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/200815 . _________________ 15 Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences from 1 January 2009 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007 (OJ L 211, 6.8.2008, p. 1).
Amendment 128 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
Recital 7
(7) By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to wealth creation and reduceing poverty and achieve and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be re- invested for the benefit of their own development and, in addition, to diversify their production and exports and thus upgrading their economies. The scheme's tariff preferences should focus on those developing countries that have greatercountries most in development, trade and financial needs.
Amendment 129 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
Recital 7
(7) By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to wealth creation and reduceing poverty and achieve and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be re- invested for the benefit of their own development and, in addition, to diversify their production and exports and thus ugrading their economies. The scheme's tariff preferences should focus on those developing countries that have greatercountries most in development, trade and financial needs.;
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7 a (new)
Recital 7 a (new)
(7 a) The GSP scheme should be based on engaging with partner countries in a continuous and cooperative manner to help them develop and enforce international social, human and environmental standards.
Amendment 138 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7 a (new)
Recital 7 a (new)
(7 a) The GSP scheme should be based on engaging with partner countries in a continous and cooperative manner to help them develop and enforce international, social, human and environmental standards.
Amendment 139 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7 b (new)
Recital 7 b (new)
(7 b) The GSP scheme brings also important benefits to Union businesses importing from GSP countries, particularly those with GSP+ and EBA status, as reduction of duties leads to a reduction of costs.
Amendment 140 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7 b (new)
Recital 7 b (new)
(7 b) The GSP scheme benefits Union business trading with GSP countries, particularly those with GSP+ and EBA status, as reduction of duties leads to a reduction of costs.
Amendment 141 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7 c (new)
Recital 7 c (new)
(7 c) GSP beneficiary countries that take decisions that violate directly or indirectly the United Nations Security Council Resolutions should lose their status.
Amendment 149 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
Recital 12
(12) Countries graduating from the Least-Developed Countries (LDC) category established by the UN should be incentivised to continue on the path of sustainable development. For this purpose, the economic vulnerability criteria to qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be eased compared to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, to facilitate access by a larger number of countries graduating from the least developed country categoryevaluating, however, capacity of these countries to fulfill necessary conditions i.e. ratify and implement relevant international conventions.
Amendment 151 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
Recital 12
(12) Countries graduating from the Least-Developed Countries (LDC) category established by the UN should be incentivised to continue on the path of sustainable development. For this purpose, the economic vulnerability criteria to qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be eased compared to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, evaluating, however, the capacity of these countries to fulfil necessary conditions i.e. respect international law and ratify and implement relevant international conventions; to facilitate access by a larger number of countries graduating from the least developed country category.
Amendment 163 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
Recital 21
(21) Common Customs Tariff duties on non-sensitive products should continue to be suspended, while duties on sensitive products should enjoy a tariff reduction, in order to ensure a satisfactory utilisation rate and maximize the development effect of the mechanism while at the same time taking account of the situation of the corresponding Union industries.
Amendment 164 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
Recital 21
(21) Common Customs Tariff duties on non-sensitive products should continue to be suspended, while duties on sensitive products should enjoy a tariff reduction, in order to ensure a satisfactory utilisation rate and maximize the development effect of the mechanism while at the same time taking account of the situation of the corresponding Union industries.
Amendment 167 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22
Recital 22
(22) Such a tTariff reductions should be sufficiently attractive, in order to motivate traders to make use of the opportunities offered by the scheme. Therefore, the ad valorem duties should generally be reduced by a flat rate of 3,5 percentage points from the 'most favoured nation' duty rate, while such duties for textiles and textile goods should be reduced by 20 %. Specific duties should be reduced by 30 %. Where a minimum duty is specified, that minimum duty should not apply.
Amendment 176 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25
Recital 25
(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance,so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. The temporary withdrawal could have long term consequences for GSP economies as well as Union businesses investing in these countries. It could have severe impacts on workers and the most vulnerable and those suffering of violations. The temporary withdrawal should be used as a last resort provided all other avenues have been explored; it should follow alerts, cooperation and assistance to allow for engagement to effectively address these failings. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union’s zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.
Amendment 177 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25
Recital 25
(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance,so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. The temporary withdrawal could have long term consequences for GSP economies as well as Union businesses investing in these countries. It could have severe impacts on workers and the most vulnerable and those suffering of violations. The temporary withdrawal should be used as a last resort provided all other avenues have been explored; it should follow alerts, cooperation and assistance to allow for engagement to effectively address these failings. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union’s zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.
Amendment 179 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25
Recital 25
(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance,so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union’s zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the 'relevant conventions') and the United Nations Security Council Decisions.
Amendment 181 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25
Recital 25
(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include violation of the UN Security Council Resolutions, serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union’s zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.
Amendment 182 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25
Recital 25
(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection and maritime legislation, and good governance,so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union’s zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.
Amendment 183 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25
Recital 25
(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrine, women and min those conventionorities' rights), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance,so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union’s zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.
Amendment 191 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26
Recital 26
(26) Orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development needs. Increasing coherence between trade, development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to both the origin and destination countries. In this respect, it is essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long- term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be reviewed if the country of origin does not cooperate in a satisfactory manner on the readmission of its own nationals. If the review deems it necessary, these tariff preferences could be temporarily withdrawn until the country of origin cooperates in a satisfactory manner on the readmission of its own nationals.
Amendment 208 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 11
(11) ‘effective implementation’ means the integral implementation of the undertakings and obligations undertaken under the international conventions listed in Annex VI, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the 'relevant conventions') and the United Nations Security Council Decisions, thus ensuring fulfilment of the principles, objectives and rights guaranteed in these conventions in the beneficiary country’s entire territory;
Amendment 243 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the 'relevant conventions'), in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the 'relevant conventions') and the United Nations Security Council Decisions, and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions;
Amendment 248 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point d
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) it cooperates in a satisfactory manner with the Union and its Member States on the readmission of its own nationals and gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action for the effective implementation of the relevant conventions;
Amendment 257 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1
Article 13 – paragraph 1
1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under constant review and monitor in an open and transparent manner the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall examine all relevant information, in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies.
Amendment 258 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1
Article 13 – paragraph 1
1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under constant review and monitor in an open and transparent way the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall examine all relevant information, in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies.
Amendment 263 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. The Commission shall support the necessary capacity-building measures and provide specific technical assistance, expertise and advice in order to help beneficiary countries to comply with international commitments.
Amendment 264 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. The Commission shall support the necessary capacity-building measures and provide specific technical assistance, expertise and advice in order to help beneficiary countries to comply with international commitments.
Amendment 294 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 9
Article 15 – paragraph 9
9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission mayshall, when appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.
Amendment 310 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the conventions listed in Annex VI, as long as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the United Nations Security Council Decisions;
Amendment 324 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
(e a) the temporary withdrawal shall be used as a last resort option when all other means to remedy serious violations fail;
Amendment 328 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 19 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. The temporary withdrawal shall be used as a last resort option when all other means to remedy serious violations fail;
Amendment 336 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3
Article 19 – paragraph 3
3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, and after duly taking into account the socio-economic effect for a beneficiary country, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.
Amendment 337 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3
Article 19 – paragraph 3
3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative and after duly taking into account the socio-economic effect for a beneficiary country, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.
Amendment 354 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 10
Article 19 – paragraph 10
10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). In adopting the delegated act the Commission mayshall, where appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.
Amendment 361 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 16
Article 19 – paragraph 16
16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b) is reduced to 2 months and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to 5 months.
Amendment 362 #
16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b) is reduced to 2 months and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to 5 months.
Amendment 391 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from GSP sections S-11a and S-11b or to products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 001701, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value:
Amendment 411 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 2
Article 29 – paragraph 2
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to EBA beneficiary countries, nor shall it apply to countries with a share for the relevant products referred to in paragraph 1 not exceeding 6 % of total Union imports of the same products.