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14 Amendments of Arlene McCARTHY related to 2010/2303(INI)

Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)
- having regard to Directive 2010/76/EU amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the trading book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies,
2011/01/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Notes the diversity of corporate governance structures throughout the European Union and the diversity of approaches that Member States take in regulating these structures; recognises that a ‘one size fits all’ approach would be inappropriate and damaging to the competitiveness of financial institutions, nonetheless stresses that strong minimum standards are required to ensure good governance across the financial sector in Europe;
2011/01/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Recognises that the area of corporate governance is constantly evolving and isthat therefore ill-suited to a prescriptive approach and that a flexible ‘comply or explain’ approach in the form of codes of best practice is more appropriate; believes that ‘comply or explain’ is proportionatea flexible approach which guarantees high standards is appropriate; believes that ‘comply or explain’ can be a useful tool in improving corporate governance in appropriate circumstances and can be applied across a wide range of financial institutions operating in various sectors and markets, but that it must be complemented by regular external evaluation and appropriate regulatory oversight; notes in particular the crucial role of legally enforceable rights for shareholders;
2011/01/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Calls on the Commission to submit every proposal it considers to improve corporate governance to a cost-benefit impact assessment which focuses on the need to keep financial institutions strong, stable and competitive so that they can help deliver economic growth;
2011/01/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 35 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9
9. Draws attention, with reference to remuneration and remuneration policies in financial institutions, to the legislative action which has already been taken, in particular the EU Capital Requirement Directive (CRD III), which came into force on 1 January 2011, and recomcalls on all Member States to implemendst that the next step should be to assess its effectivenis legislation with oversight from the Commission and the European Supervisory Authoritiess;;
2011/02/07
Committee: JURI
Amendment 36 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Notes that during discussions on CRD III the Commission and Council agreed that further proposals raised by the European Parliament should be addressed as part of the corporate governance package and highlights in particular the Parliament's concern that shareholders currently cannot and do not exercise due control over remuneration policies in financial institutions;
2011/02/07
Committee: JURI
Amendment 37 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9b. Insists that full transparency is necessary for shareholders to be able to conduct proper oversight of remuneration policies, including the publication of the number of staff receiving more than 500,000 Euros, in bands of at least 500,000 Euros; calls for a requirement for shareholder approval of remuneration policies and overall payments by a financial institution each year;
2011/02/07
Committee: JURI
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Believes that remuneration policies should encourage long-term thinking and the sustainable performance of the institution and should avoid a short-term focus, as this may contribute to excessive risk-takingmust be based on the long-term performance of the individual and their firm, to ensure remuneration policies do not contribute to excessive risk-taking. Remuneration policies or payments should never undermine the stability of a firm;
2011/01/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Stresses that properly disclosed share options with vestingretention periods of at least three years for directors are a useful tool to bring the interests of directors into line with those of the shareholders;
2011/01/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Notes that the issue of remuneration in financial institutions has been dealt with in CRD IIICRD III and AIFMD address essential aspects concerning payment structures for remuneration and aspects of corporate governance including the importance of a remuneration committee and transparent annual reporting on remuneration policies; calls on all Member States to implement this legislation with oversight from the Commission and the European Supervisory Authorities;
2011/01/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. Notes however that during discussions on CRD III the Commission and Council agreed that further proposals raised by the European Parliament should be addressed as part of the corporate governance package;
2011/01/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 b (new)
23b. Highlights in particular concern that shareholders currently cannot and do not exercise due control over remuneration policies in financial institutions;
2011/01/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 c (new)
23c. Insists that full transparency is necessary for shareholders to be able to conduct proper oversight of remuneration policies, and calls in particular for the publication of the number of staff in each institution receiving total remuneration greater than 500,000 Euros, in bands of at least 500,000 Euros;
2011/01/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 d (new)
23d. Calls for a requirement for shareholder approval of remuneration policies and overall payments by a financial institution each year, insists in particular that the in the case of credit institutions where the costs attributable to staff remuneration represent more than 25 % of total revenue, shareholders have a vote on the allocation of surplus revenues;
2011/01/18
Committee: ECON