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11 Amendments of Arlene McCARTHY related to 2012/0150(COD)

Amendment 146 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 4
(4) A regime is, therefore, needed to provide authorities with thea credible set of tools to intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing credit institution so as to ensure the continuity of the credit institution’s essential financial and economic functions, while minimizing the impact of an institution’s failure on the financial system and ensuring that shareholders and creditors bear appropriate losseappropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in these institutions. New powers should enable authorities to maintain uninterrupted access to deposits and payment transactions, sell viable portions of the firm where appropriate, and apportion losses in a manner that is fair and predictable. Those objectives should ensure that taxpayers are no longer liable for failing credit institutions, and help avoid destabilizing financial markets and minimize the costs for taxpayers..
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 646 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 14 – paragraph 4 – introductory part
4. For the purposes of paragraph 3, measures identified by a resolution authority may, where necessary and proportionatewhere an institution is required to reduce or remove the impediments to resolvability in question measures identified may, where necessary and proportionate, include the following:
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 807 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Where an institution does not meet or is likely to breach the requirements of Directive 2006/48/EC, Member States shall ensure that competent authorities, , have at their disposal, in addition to the measures referred to in Article 136 of Directive 2006/48/EC where applicable, in particular, the following measures:
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 900 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 27 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities shall take a resolution action in relation to an institution referred to in Article 1(a) only if all of the following conditions are met: (a) the competent authority or resolution authority determines that the institution is failing or likely to fail; (b) having regard to timing and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector or supervisory action, other than a resolution action taken in respect of the institution, would prevent the failure of the institution within reasonable timeframe; (c) a resolution action is necessary in the public interest pursuant to paragraph 3.deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 901 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 27 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the competent authority or resolution authority determines that the institution is failing or likely to fail; . This would include one or more of the following circumstances: (1) the institution is in breach or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will be in breach, in the near future, of the capital requirements for continuing authorisation in a way that would justify the withdrawal of the authorisation by the competent authority because the institution has incurred or is likely to incur in losses that will deplete all or substantially all of its own funds; (2) the assets of the institution are or there are objective elements to support a determination that the assets of the institution will be, in the near future, less than its liabilities; (3) the institution is or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will be, in the near future, unable to pay its obligations as they fall due; (4) the institution requires extraordinary public financial support except when, in order to preserve financial stability, it requires any of the following: (i) a State guarantee to back liquidity facilities provided by central banks according to the banks' standard conditions (the facility is fully secured by collateral to which haircuts are applied, in function of its quality and market value, and the central bank charges a penal interest rate to the beneficiary); or (ii) a State guarantee on newly issued liabilities in order to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In both cases mentioned in points (i) and (ii), the guarantee measures shall be confined to solvent financial institutions, shall not be part of a larger aid package, shall be conditional to approval under State aid rules, and shall be used for a maximum duration of three months.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 914 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 27 – paragraph 2
2. For the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 1, an institution is deemed failing or likely to fail in one or more of the following circumstances: (a) the institution is in breach or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will be in breach, in the near future, of the capital requirements for continuing authorisation in a way that would justify the withdrawal of the authorisation by the competent authority because the institution has incurred or is likely to incur in losses that will deplete all or substantially all of its own funds; (b) the assets of the institution are or there are objective elements to support a determination that the assets of the institution will be, in the near future, less than its liabilities; (c) the institution is or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will be, in the near future, unable to pay its obligations as they fall due; (d) the institution requires extraordinary public financial support except when, in order to preserve financial stability, it requires any of the following: (i) a State guarantee to back liquidity facilities provided by central banks according to the banks' standard conditions (the facility is fully secured by collateral to which haircuts are applied, in function of its quality and market value, and the central bank charges a penal interest rate to the beneficiary); or (ii) a State guarantee on newly issued liabilities in order to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In both cases mentioned in points (i) and (ii), the guarantee measures shall be confined to solvent financial institutions, shall not be part of a larger aid package, shall be conditional to approval under State aid rules, and shall be used for a maximum duration of three months.deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 959 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
(fa) claims of depositors are adequately protected.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 964 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. For the purposes of paragraph 1(fa), Member States shall ensure that the claims of depositors are granted a preferential claim so as to have a higher priority ranking over the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors in the event of insolvency of the credit institution.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 965 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Member States shall ensure that when Deposit Guarantee Schemes are subrogated to the claims of depositors by virtue of payments made to depositors up to the amount of their guaranteed deposits under the scheme, the preferential claim as established in the previous paragraph is also applicable.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1093 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d
(d) liabilities with an original maturity of less than one month;deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1233 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 43 – paragraph 2
2. When applying the write down and conversion powers in compliance with points (c) and (d) of paragraph 1, resolution authorities shall allocate the losses represented by the aggregate amount equally between liabilities of the same rank by reducing the principal amount of, or outstanding amount payable in respect of, those liabilities to the same extent pro rata to their value, unless departure from equal treatment is necessary for financial stability reasons, or to minimise overall losses for the benefit of creditors as a whole.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON