BETA

63 Amendments of Anna ZÁBORSKÁ related to 2016/0288(COD)

Amendment 156 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 13
(13) The requirements concerning the capabilities of electronic communications networks are constantly increasing. While in the past the focus was mainly on growing bandwidth available overall and to each individual user, other parameters like latency, availability and reliability are becoming increasingly important. The current response towards this demand for unconstrained use is bringing optical fibre closer and closer to the user and future 'very high capacity networks' will require performance parameters which are equivalent to what a network based on optical fibre elements at least up to the distribution point at the sthat are capable of deliverving location can deliver. This corresponds in the fixed-line connection case to network performance equivalent to what is achievable by an optical fibre installation up to a multi-dwelling building, considered as the serving location, and in the mobile connection case to network performance similar to what is achievable based on an optical fibre installation up to the base station, considered as the serving location. Vat least 100 Mbps downlink speed upgradable over time to gigabit speeds and contribute to achieving continuous 5G coverage not taking into account variations in end-users' experience which are due to the different characteristics of the medium by which the network ultimately connects with the network termination point should not be taken into account for the purposes of establishing whether or not a wireless network could be considered as providing similar network performance. In accordance with the principle of technological neutrality, nother technologies andor transmission media should not be excluded, where they compare with this baseline scenario in terms of their capabilities. The roll-out of such 'very high capacity networks' will further increase the capabilities of networks and pave the way for the roll-out of future mobile network generations based on enhanced air interfaces and a more densified network architecture.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 200 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 60
(60) Electronic communications broadband networks are becoming increasingly diverse in terms of technology, topology, medium used and ownership, therefore, regulatory intervention must rely on detailed information and forecasts regarding network roll-out in order to be effective and to target the areas where it is needed. That information should include plans regarding both deployment of very high capacity networks, as well as significant upgrades or extensions of existing copper or other networks which might not match the performance characteristics of very high capacity networks in all respects, such as roll-out of fibre to the cabinet coupled with active technologies like vectoring. The level of detail and territorial granularity of the information that national regulatory authorities should gather should be guided by the specific regulatory objective, and should be adequate for the regulatory purposes that it serves. Therefore, the size of the territorial unit will also vary between Member States, depending on the regulatory needs in the specific national circumstances, and on the availability of local data. Level 3 in the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) is unlikely to be a sufficiently small territorial unit in most circumstances. National regulatory authorities should be guided by BEREC guidelines on best practice to approach such a task, and such guidelines will be able to rely on the existing experience of national regulatory authorities in conducting geographical surveys of networks roll-out. National regulatory authorities should make available tools to end-users as regards quality of service to contribute towards the improvement of their awareness of the available connectivity services.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 202 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 61
(61) In the case of specific and well defined digital exclusion areas, national regulatory authorities should have the possibility to organise a call for declarations of interest with the aim of identifying undertakings that are willing to invest in very high capacity networks. In the interests of predictable investment conditions, national regulatory authorities should be able to share information with undertakings expressing interest in deploying very high-speed networks on whether other types of network upgrades, including those below 100 Mbps download speed, are present or foreseen in the area in question.deleted
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 255 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 172
(172) Civil engineering assets that can host an electronic communications network are crucial for the successful roll-out of new very high capacity networks because of the high cost of duplicating them, and the significant savings that can be made when they can be reused. Therefore, in addition to the rules on physical infrastructure laid down in Directive 2014/61/EU, a specific remedy is necessary in those circumstances where civil engineering assets are owned by an operator designated with significant market power. Where civil engineering assets exist and are reusable, the positive effect of achieving effective access to them on the roll-out of competing infrastructure is very high, and it is therefore necessary to ensure that access to such assets can be used as a self-standing remedy for the improvement of competitive and deployment dynamics in any downstream market, to be considered before assessing the need to impose any other potential remedies, and not just as an ancillary remedy to other wholesale products or services or as a remedy limited to undertakings availing of such other wholesale products or services. National regulatory authorities should value reusable legacy civil engineering assets on the basis of the regulatory accounting value net of the accumulated depreciation at the time of calculation, indexed by an appropriate price index, such as the retail price index, and excluding those assets which are fully depreciated, over a period of not less than 40 years, but still in use.deleted
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 268 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 178
(178) Due to uncertainty regarding the rate of materialisation of demand for the provision of next-generation broadband services it is important in order to promote efficient investment and innovation to allow those operators investing in new or upgraded networks a certain degree of pricing flexibility. To prevent excessive prices in markets where there are operators designated as having significant market power, pricing flexibility should be accompanied by additional safeguards to protect competition and end-user interests, such as stricteffective non-discrimination obligations, measures to ensure technical and economic replicability of downstream products, and a demonstrable retail price constraint resulting from infrastructure competition or a price anchor stemming from other regulated access products, or both. To this end, it is important to ensure that any safeguard limiting pricing flexibility does not negatively impact investments in new or upgraded networks. This includes, inter alia, that price controls based on retail prices must not lead to a level of regulated wholesale prices that does not allow to recover the costs connected to the deployment and operating of new networks and thus to a situation where the investing operator is put in a worse position than non-investing access seekers. Those competitive safeguards do not prejudice the identification by national regulatory authorities of other circumstances under which it would be appropriate not to impose regulated access prices for certain wholesale inputs, such as where high price elasticity of end-user demand makes it unprofitable for the operator with significant market power to charge prices appreciably above the competitive level.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 269 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 180
(180) The charging system in the Union for wholesale voice call termination is based on Calling Party Network Pays. An analysis of demand and supply substitutability shows that currently or in the foreseeable future, there are as yet no substitutes at wholesale level which might constrain the setting of charges for termination in a given network. Taking into account the two-way access nature of termination markets, further potential competition problems include cross- subsidisation between operators. These potential competition problems are common to both fixed and mobile voice call termination markets. Therefore, in the light of the ability and incentives of terminating operators to raise prices substantially above cost, cost orientation is considered the most appropriate intervention to address this concern over the medium term.deleted
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 270 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 181
(181) In order to reduce the regulatory burden in addressing the competition problems relating to wholesale voice call termination coherently across the Union, this Directive should lay down a common approach as a basis for setting price control obligations, to be completed by a binding common methodology to be determined by the Commission and by technical guidance which should be developed by BEREC.deleted
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 271 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 182
(182) In order to simplify their setting and facilitate their imposition where appropriate, wholesale voice call termination rates in fixed and mobile markets in the Union shall be set by means of a delegated act. This Directive should lay down the detailed criteria and parameters on the basis of which the values of voice call termination rates are set. In applying that set of criteria and parameters, the Commission should take into account, inter alia, that only those costs which are incremental to the provision of wholesale call termination service should be covered; that spectrum fees are subscriber- and not traffic-driven and should therefore be excluded and that additional spectrum is mainly allocated for data and therefore not relevant for the call termination increment; that it is recognised that while in mobile networks a minimum efficient scale is estimated at the level of at least 20% market share, in the fixed networks smaller operators can achieve the same efficiencies and produce at the same unit costs as the efficient operator, independently of their size. When setting the exact maximum rate, the Commission should include appropriate weighting to take into account the total number of end-users in each Member State, where this is required on account of remaining cost divergences. When the Commission determines that rate, the experience of BEREC and the national regulatory authorities in building suitable cost models will be invaluable and should be taken into account.deleted
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 272 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 183
(183) This Directive sets maximum wholesale voice call termination rates for fixed and mobile networks below which the initial delegated act will establish the exact rate to be applied by national regulatory authorities. The initial rate will be further updated. Based on the bottom- up pure LRIC models applied by national regulators to date and applying the above criteria the voice termination rates currently vary from 0.4045 €cent per minute to 1.226 €cent per minute in mobile networks and between 0.0430 €cent per minute and 0.1400 €cent per minute in fixed networks in the most local layer of interconnection (calculated as a weighted average between peak and off- peak rates). The variation in rates is due to different local conditions and relative price structures currently existing as well as to the different timing of the model calculations across Member States. In addition, in fixed networks the level of cost efficient termination rates depends also on the network layer where the termination service is provided.deleted
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 277 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 184
(184) Due to current uncertainty regarding the rate of materialisation of demand for very high capacity broadband services as well as general economies of scale and density, co-investment agreements offerthe regulatory framework aims at promoting very high capacity deployment models which (a) provide significant benefits in terms of pooling of costs and risks, enabling smaller-scale operators to invest on economically rational terms and thus promoting sustainable, long-term competition, including in areas where infrastructure- based competition might not be efficient. Where an operator with significant market power makes an open call for co-investment; and (b) take into account the different market characteristics and best practices for deployment of new network elements within Member States. Where an operator with significant market power makes an open call for co-investment or provides a wholesale offer including risk sharing, or establishes a joint venture with one or more undertakings competing on retail or wholesale level on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms in new network elements which significantly contribute to the deployment of very high capacity networks, the national regulatory authority should typically refrain from imposing obligations pursuant to this Directive on the new network elements, subject to further review in subsequent market analyses. Provided due account is taken of the prospective pro-competitive effects of the co-investment at wholesale and retail level, national regulatory authorities can still consider it appropriate, in light of the existing market structure and dynamics developed under regulated wholesale access conditions, and in the absence of a commercial offer to that effect, to safeguard the rights of access seekers who do not participate in a given co-investment through the maintenance of existing access products or – where legacy network elements are dismantled in due course – through imposition of access products with comparable functionality to those previously available on the legacy infrastructure.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 306 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2
(2) 'very high capacity network' means anhigh speed electronic communications network which either consists wholly or partly of optical fibre elements at least up to the distribution point at the serving location or which is capable of delivering under usual peak-time conditions similar network performancewith sufficient capacity to allow unconstrained use of the network in terms of available down- and uplink bandwidth, resilience, error-related parameters, and latency and its variation. Network performance can be considered similar regardless of whether the end-user experience varies due to the inherently different characteristics of the medium by which the network ultimately connects with the network termination point.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 432 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 20 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that undertakings providing electronic communications networks and services associated facilities, or associated services provide all the information, including financial information, necessary for national regulatory authorities, other competent authorities and BEREC to ensure conformity with the provisions of, or decisions made in accordance with, this Directive and the Specific Directives. In particular, national regulatory authorities shall have the power to require those undertakings to submit information concerning future network or service developments that could have an impact on the wholesale services that they make available to competitors. They may also require information on electronic communications networks and associated facilities which is disaggregated at local level and sufficiently detailed for the national regulatory authority to be able to conduct the geographical survey and to designate digital exclusion areas in accordance with Article 22. In accordance with Article 29, national regulatory authorities may sanction undertakings deliberately providing misleading, erroneous or incomplete informationin accordance with Article 22.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 447 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
National regulatory authoritiMember States shall conduct a geographical survey of the reach of electronic communications networks capable of delivering broadband ("broadband networks") within three years from [deadline for transposition of the Directive] and shall update it at least every three years.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 452 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point a
a) a survey of the current geographic reach of broadband networks within their territory, in particular for conducting the tasks required by Articles 62 and 65 and by Article 81, as well as for imposing obligations in accordance with Article 66 and for the surveys required for the application of State aid rules; and
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 453 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point b – paragraph 1
a three-year forecast of the reach of broadband networks within their territory, relying on the information gathered in accordance with point (a), where this is available and relevant.deleted
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 459 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point b – paragraph 2
This forecast shall reflect the economic prospects of the electronic communications networks sector and investment intentions of operators at the time when the data is gathered, in order to allow the identification of available connectivity in different areas. This forecast shall include information on planned deployments by any undertaking or public authority, in particular to include very high capacity networks and significant upgrades or extensions of legacy broadband networks to at least the performance of next-generation access networks. For this purpose, national regulatory authorities shall request undertakings to provide relevant information regarding planned deployments of such networks.deleted
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 465 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
The information collected in the survey shall be at an appropriate level of local detail and shall include sufficient information on the quality of service and parameters thereof.deleted
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 470 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 22 – paragraph 2
2. National regulatory authorities may designate a "digital exclusion area" corresponding to an area with clear territorial boundaries where, on the basis of the information gathered pursuant to paragraph 1, it is determined that for the duration of the relevant forecast period, no undertaking or public authority has deployed or is planning to deploy a very high capacity network or has significantly upgraded or extended its network to a performance of at least 100 Mbps download speeds, or is planning to do so. National regulatory authorities shall publish the designated digital exclusion areas.deleted
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 476 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 22 – paragraph 3
3. Within a designated digital exclusion area, national regulatory authorities may issue a call open to any undertaking to declare their intention to deploy very high capacity networks over the duration of the relevant forecast period. The national regulatory authority shall specify the information to be included in such submissions, in order to ensure at least a similar level of detail as that taken into consideration in the forecast envisaged in paragraph 1(b). It shall also inform any undertaking expressing its interest whether the designated digital exclusion area is covered or likely to be covered by an NGA network offering download speeds below 100 Mbps on the basis of the information gathered pursuant to paragraph 1(b).deleted
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 479 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 22 – paragraph 4
4. When national regulatory authorities take measures pursuant to paragraph 3, they shall do so according to an efficient, objective, transparent and non-discriminatory procedure, whereby no undertaking is a priori excluded. Failure to provide information pursuant to paragraph 1(b) or to respond to the call for interest pursuant to paragraph 3 may be considered as misleading information pursuant to Articles 20 or 21.deleted
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 490 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 22 – paragraph 5
5. Member States shall ensure that local, regional and national authorities with responsibility for the allocation of public funds for the deployment of electronic communications networks, for the design of national broadband plans, for defining coverage obligations attached to rights of use for radio spectrum and for verifying availability of services falling within the universal service obligation in their territory take into account the results of the surveys and of the designated digital exclusion areas conducted in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, and that national regulatory authorities supply such results subject to the receiving authority ensuring the same level of confidentiality and protection of business secrets as the originating authority. These results shall also be made available to BEREC and the Commission upon their request and under the same conditions. [...]
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 494 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 22 – paragraph 7
7. By [date] in order to contribute to the consistent application of geographical surveys and forecasts, BEREC shall, after consulting stakeholders and in close cooperation with the Commission, issue guidelines to assist national regulatory authorities on the consistent implementation of their obligations under this Article.deleted
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 785 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 59 – paragraph 3
3. Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities have the power to impose on undertakings providing or authorised to provide electronic communications networks obligations in relation to the sharing of passive or active infrastructure, obligations to conclude localised roaming access agreements, or the joint roll-out of infrastructures directly necessary for the local provision of services which rely on the use of spectrum, in compliance with Union law, where it is justified on the grounds that, (a) the replication of such infrastructure would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable, and (b) the connectivity in that area, including along its main transport paths, would be severely deficient, or the local population would be subjected to severe restrictions on choice or quality of service, or on both. National regulatory authorities shall have regard to: (a) the need to maximise connectivity throughout the Union and in particular territorial areas; (b) the efficient use of radio spectrum; (c) the technical feasibility of sharing and associated conditions; (d) the state of infrastructure-based as well as service-based competition; (e) the possibility to significantly increase choice and higher quality of service for end-users; (f) technological innovation; (g) the overriding need to support the incentive of the host to roll out the infrastructure in the first place. Such sharing, access or coordination obligations shall be subject to agreements concluded on the basis of fair and reasonable terms and conditions. In the event of dispute resolution, national regulatory authorities may inter alia impose on the beneficiary of the sharing or access obligation, the obligation to share its spectrum with the infrastructure host in the relevant area.deleted
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 789 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 59 – paragraph 4
4. Obligations and conditions imposed in accordance with paragraph 1,2 and 32 shall be objective, transparent, proportionate and non-discriminatory, they shall be implemented in accordance with the procedures referred to in Articles 236, 732 and 33. National regulatory authorities shall assess the results of such obligations and conditions within five years from the adoption of the previous measure adopted in relation to the same operators and whether it would be appropriate to withdraw or amend them in the light of evolving conditions. National regulatory authorities shall notify the outcome of their assessment in accordance with the same procedures.7a33of Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive)
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 816 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 65 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. Where a national regulatory authority conducts the analysis required by paragraph 1, it shall consider developments from a forward-looking perspective in the absence of regulation imposed on the basis of this Article in that relevant market, and taking into accoundetermine that a market is such as to justify the imposition of regulatory obligations pursuant to paragraph 1 when the following criteria are cumulatively met:
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 825 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 65 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the existabsence of market developments which may increaste the likelihood of the relevant market tending towards effective competition, such as those commercial co- investment or access agreements between operators which benefit competitive dynamics sustainably;
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 833 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 65 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) allbsence of significant relevant competitive constraints, including at retail level, irrespective of whether the sources of such constraints are deemed to be electronic communications networks, electronic communications services, or other types of services or applications which are comparable from the perspective of the end-user, and irrespective of whether such constraints are part of the relevant market;
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 836 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 65 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) other types of regulation or measures imposed and affecting the relevant market or related retail market or markets throughout the relevant period, including, without limitation, obligations imposed in accordance with Articles 44, 58 and 59 are insufficient to adequately address the identified market failure(s); and
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 839 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 65 – paragraph 2 – point d
(d) regulation imposed on other relevant markets on the basis of this Article is insufficient to adequately address the identified market failure(s).
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 841 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 65 – paragraph 4
4. Where a national regulatory authority determines that, in a relevant market the imposition of regulatory obligations in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article is justified, it shall identify any undertakings which individually or jointly have a significant market power on that relevant market in accordance with Article 61. The national regulatory authority shall impose on such undertakings appropriate specific regulatory obligations in accordance with Article 66 or maintain or amend such obligations where they already exist if it considers thatthe following criteria are cumulatively met: (a) one or more retail markets would not be effectively competitive in the absence of those obligations; and (b) there are no obligations imposed in other wholesale markets, which address the identified competition problem in the retail market in question.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 849 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 65 – paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. Where, on a forward-looking basis, three access network operators are present or are expected to be present and to sustainably compete in the same retail market, national regulatory authorities shall not identify an operator as having significant market power.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 859 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 66 – paragraph 6
6. National regulatory authorities shall consider the impact of new or planned market developments which are reasonably likely to affect competitive dynamics, such as in relation to commercial agreements, including without limitation co- investment agreements, which have been concluded or unforeseeably breached or terminated affecting competitive dynamics and/or undertakings absent from any retail market for electronic communications services. National regulatory authorities shall do so: (a) on their own initiative, taking account of the need for predictable market conditions, or (b) on a reasoned request. If these developments are not sufficiently important in order to determine the need to undertakrequire a new market analysis in accordance with Article 65, the national regulatory authority shall assess without delay whether it is necessary to review the obligations imposedand amend any previous decision, including by withdrawing obligations or imposing new obligations on operators designated with significant market power in order to ensure that such obligations continue to meet the conditions in paragraph 4. Such amendmentrequirements of this Directive, or whether to decide that no, fewer or less onerous obligations shall be imposed with respect to a planned development. Such decisions shall only be imposedmade following consultation in accordance with Articles 23 and 32.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 872 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 70
Access to civil engineering 1. A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with Article 66, impose obligations on operators to meet reasonable requests for access to, and use of, civil engineering including, without limitation, buildings or entries to buildings, building cables including wiring, antennae, towers and other supporting constructions, poles, masts, ducts, conduits, inspection chambers, manholes, and cabinets, in situations where the market analysis indicates that denial of access or access given under unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level and would not be in the end-user's interest. 2. National regulatory authorities may impose obligations on an operator to provide access in accordance with this Article, irrespective of whether the assets that are affected by the obligation are part of the relevant market in accordance with the market analysis, provided that the obligation is necessary and proportionate to meet the objectives of Article 3.Article 70 deleted
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 901 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 70 a (new)
Article 70 a Access obligations beyond civil engineering In geographic areas where two access networks can be expected on a forward- looking basis and where at least one of the network operators offers wholesale access to any interested undertaking, on reasonable commercial terms permitting sustainable competition on the retail market, national regulatory authorities shall not impose or maintain wholesale access obligations, beyond access to civil infrastructure according to Article 3 of Directive 2014/61/EU.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 906 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Only where a national regulatory authority concludes that the obligations imposed in accordance with Article 703 of Directive 2014/61/EU would not on their own lead to the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 3, it may, in accordance with the provisions of Article 66, impose obligations on operators to meet reasonable requests for access to, and use of, specific network elements and associated facilities, in situations where this is not to the detriment of innovative developments such as very high capacity networks and software emulated networks, and where the national regulatory authority considers that denial of access or unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level, and would not be in the end-user's interest.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 913 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part
Operators may be required inter alia:
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 918 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point a
(a) to give third parties access to specified network elements and/or facilities,at a single network layer that best addresses the problem identified at retail level as appropriate including access to network elements which are either not active (or physical) and/or active (or virtual unbundled) access to the local loop;
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 931 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point d
(d) to grant open access to technical interfaces, protocols or other key technologies that are indispensable for the interoperability of services or virtual network services;
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 934 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point f
(f) to provide specified services needed to ensure interoperability of end-to- end services to users, including facilities for software emulated networks or roaming on mobile networks;
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 960 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 71 – paragraph 2 – point e
(e) the need to safeguard competition in the long term, with particular attention to economically efficient infrastructure- based competition and to sustainable competition such as those based on co- investment in networks and other innovative commercial business models;
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 971 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 71 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. In order to account for the long- term interest of end-users, national regulatory authorities should focus more on facilitating network investments by all operators. Regulation should not be to the detriment of innovative developments, in particular very high capacity networks, software defined networks and network function virtualisation. Only where strictly necessary to safeguard competition and where no alternative access possibilities, including access based on commercial agreements, exist, regulated access should be maintained in an appropriate and balanced manner, i.e. at a single network layer. Regulated access at multiple network layers has led to unnecessarily high complexity with regard to the consistency of regulated wholesale products at different network layers and unduly restricts flexibility and commercial freedom in the dynamic telecoms market environment. Limiting access to a single network layer that best addresses the problem identified at the retail level will significantly reduce regulatory costs and the potential for regulatory gaming by market players, leading to more efficient and appropriate outcomes. In this regard, national regulatory authorities should assess whether active or passive access is more appropriate in consideration of national or local circumstances. As unbundling is detrimental to network investments by allowing 'cream-skimming' of the most profitable customers at average cost, there should no longer be an obligation to provide unbundled access, which undermines investment models based on product and price differentiation.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 973 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 72 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with the provisions of Article 66, impose obligations relating to cost recovery and price controls, including obligations for cost orientation of prices and obligations concerning cost accounting systems, for the provision of specific types of interconnection and/or access, in situations where a market analysis indicates that a lack of effective competition means that the operator concerned may sustain prices at an excessively . A national regulatory authority may only impose price controls that ensure fair and reasonable prices and do not negatively impact investments. When applied, a price control shall meet the following cumulative conditions: (a) the price control ensures recovery of all investments connected to the deployment of new networks and fully incorporates the risks associated with these investments; (b) the price control does not lead to a situation where the investing operator is put at a disadvantage compared to non- investing operators or lead to a situation under whigch level, or may apply a price squeeze, to the detriment of end- usan investment would not have been made in the first place; (c) the price control avoids undue profit margins for access seekers to the detriment of the investing operator and appropriately reflects differences in the risks taken by different access seekers.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 978 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 72 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
In determining whether or not price control obligations would be appropriate, national regulatory authorities shall take into account long-term end-user interests related to investment in, the deployment of and take-up of next-generation networks, and in particular of very high capacity networks. In particular, to encourage investments by the operator, including in next-generation networks, national regulatory authorities shall take into account the investment made by the operator. Where the national regulatory authorities deem price controls appropriate, they shall allow the operator a reasonable rate of return on adequate capital employed, taking into account any risks specific to a particular new investment network project.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 982 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 72 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
National regulatory authorities shall not impose or maintain obligations pursuant to this Article, either for new network elements in case a network roll-out contributes to the availability of very-high capacity networks or where they establish that a demonstrable retail price constraint is present and that any obligations imposed in accordance with Articles 67 to 71, including in particular any economic replicability test imposed in accordance with Article 68 ensures effective and non discriminatoryion of access.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 983 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 72 – paragraph 3
3. Where an operator has an obligation regarding the cost orientation of its prices, the burden of proof that charges are derived from costs including a reasonable rate of return on investment shall lie with the operator concerned. For the purpose of calculating the cost of efficient provision of services, national regulatory authorities may use cost accounting methods independent of those used by the undertaking. National regulatory authorities may require an operator to provide full justification for its prices, and may, where appropriate, require prices to be adjusted.deleted
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 985 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 73
[...]deleted
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 1012 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 74 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point a
(a) the deployment of the new network elements is open to co-investment offers according to a transparent process and on terms which favour sustainable competition in the long term including inter alia fair, reasonable and non- discriminatory terms offered to potential co-investors; flexibility in terms of the value and timing of the commitment provided by each co-investor; possibility to increase such commitment in the future; reciprocal rights awarded by the co- investors after the deployment of the co- invested infrastructure;
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 1020 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 74 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point a – point i (new)
i) is conducted by a joint venture established by two or more undertakings with shared ownership, and one or more undertaking participating in the joint venture provides wholesale access or competes on retail level; or
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 1021 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 74 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point a – point ii (new)
ii) is open to co-investment offers according to a transparent process and on terms which favour sustainable competition in the long term including inter alia fair, reasonable and non- discriminatory terms offered to potential co-investors; flexibility in terms of the value and timing of the commitment provided by each co-investor; possibility to increase such commitment in the future; reciprocal rights awarded by the co- investors after the deployment of the co- invested infrastructure; or
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 1022 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 74 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point a – point iii (new)
iii) is conducted by a single undertaking that provides a wholesale offer on terms which, similar to conditions for co-investment in subparagraph ii), favour competition in the long term by including, inter alia, fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms offered to potential access seekers; flexibility in terms of the value and timing of the commitment provided by each access seeker; possibility to increase such commitment in the future;
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 1028 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 74 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point c
(c) access seekers not participating in the co-investmentone of the deployment models listed in point (a) can benefit from the same quality, speed, conditions and end- user reach as was available before the deployment, either through commercial agreements based on fair and reasonable terms or by means of regulated access maintained or adapted by the national regulatory authority;
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 1035 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 74 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
When assessing co-investment offers and processes referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraphdeployment models listed in subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) of point (a), national regulatory authorities shall ensure that those offers and processes comply with the criteria set out in Annex IV.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 1113 #
Proposal for a directive
Annex IV – paragraph 1 – introductory part
When assessing aoffers for co-investment offerr wholesale access pursuant to Article 74 (1), the national regulatory authority shall verify whether the following criteria have been met:
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 1122 #
Proposal for a directive
Annex IV – paragraph 1 – point b – indent 2
- full detailed terms must be made available without undue delay to any potential bidder that has expressed an interest, including the legal form of the co- investment or wholesale access agreement and - when relevant - the heads of term of the governance rules of the co-investment vehicle; and
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 1124 #
Proposal for a directive
Annex IV – paragraph 1 – point b – indent 3
- The process, like the road map for the establishment and development of the co-investment projectdeployment models pursuant to subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) of Article 74 (1) (a) of the new network elements must be set in advance, it must clearly explained in writing to any potential co-investor and access seeker, and all significant milestones be clearly communicated to all undertakings without any discrimination.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 1126 #
Proposal for a directive
Annex IV – paragraph 1 – point c – introductory part
(c) The co-investment offer shall include terms to potential co-investors and access seekers which favour sustainable competition in the long term, in particular:
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 1129 #
Proposal for a directive
Annex IV – paragraph 1 – point c – indent 1
- All undertakings have to be offered fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions for participation in the co-investment or wholesale access agreement relative to the time they join, including in terms of financial consideration required for the acquisition of specific rights, in terms of the protection awarded to the co-investors and access seekers by those rights both during the building phase and during the exploitation phase, for example by granting indefeasible rights of use (IRUs) for the expected lifetime of the co-investnewly deployed network elements and in terms of the conditions for joining and potentially terminating the co-investment agreementor wholesale access agreement. Fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms shall ensure cost recovery and take into account the risks associated to the investments by the operator. Non-discriminatory terms in this context do not entail that all potential co-investors or access seekers must be offered exactly the same terms, including financial terms, but that all variations of the terms offered must be justified on the basis of the same objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and predictable criteria such as the number of end user lines committed for.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 1132 #
Proposal for a directive
Annex IV – paragraph 1 – point c – indent 2
- The offer must allow flexibility in terms of the value and timing of the commitment provided by each co-investor or wholesale access provider, for example by means of an agreed and potentially increasing percentage of the total end user lines in a given area, to which co-investors or access seekers have the possibility to commit gradually and which shall be set at a unit level enabling smaller co-investors to gradually increase their participation while ensuring adequate levels of initial commitment. The determination of the financial consideration to be provided by each co- investor or access seeker needs to reflect the fact that early investors accept greater risks and engage capital sooner.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 1134 #
Proposal for a directive
Annex IV – paragraph 1 – point c – indent 3
- A premium increasing over time has to be considered as justified for commitments made at later stages and for new co-investors entering the co- investmentor access seekers entering after the commencement of the project, to reflect diminishing risks and to counteract any incentive to withhold capital in the earlier stages.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 1135 #
Proposal for a directive
Annex IV – paragraph 1 – point c – indent 3 a (new)
- Terms and conditions reflecting utilization risks stemming from e.g. low take-up rates compared to overall coverage have to be considered as justified.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 1137 #
Proposal for a directive
Annex IV – paragraph 1 – point c – indent 4
- The co-investment or wholesale access agreements hasve to allow the assignment of acquired rights by co-investors to other co- investors, access seekers or to third parties willing to enter into the co- investment or wholesale access agreement subject to the transferee undertaking being obliged to fulfil all original obligations of the transferor under the co-investment or wholesale access agreement.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 1139 #
Proposal for a directive
Annex IV – paragraph 1 – point c – indent 5
- Co-investors have to grant each other reciprocal rights on fair and reasonable terms and conditions to access the co-invested infrastructure for the purposes of providing services downstream, including to end-users, according to transparent conditions which have to be made transparent in the co- investment offer and subsequent agreement, in particular where co-investors are individually and separately responsible for the deployment of specific parts of the network. If a co-investment vehicle is created, it has to provide access to the network to all co-investors, whether directly or indirectly, on an equivalence of inoutputs basis and according to fair and reasonable terms and conditions, including financial conditions that reflect the different levels of risk accepted by the individual co-investors.
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 1140 #
Proposal for a directive
Annex IV – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) The co-investment offer shall ensure a sustainable investment likely to meet future needs, by deploying new network elements that contribute significantly to the deployment of very high capacity networks.deleted
2017/04/06
Committee: ITRE