BETA

13 Amendments of Anne SANDER related to 2017/2072(INI)

Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Takes note of the ECB’s ‘failing or likely to fail’ assessments in respect of Banco Popular Español S.A., Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca; in that context, notes also that the supervisory and single resolution mechanisms have been working effectively in this context and that the BRRD rules have been properly applied;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Notes the ECB’s determination in the context of the precautionary recapitalisation of Monte dei Paschi di Siena that the bank is solvent and meets the capital requirements; notes, in this regard, that the determination of solvency leaves room for an element of subjectivity as this determination greatly depends on how a bank’s assets are valuedstresses that with decisions of this kind, nothing must be left open to misinterpretation, and that prior asset evaluations must be based on solid evidence, including evidence that shows that the bank is solvent and in compliance with EU state aid rules;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 128 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Reiterates its concerns about the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans’4; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU institutions and bodies on this issue; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly implement the Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on the action plan to tackle non-performing loans in Europe; takes the view that compulsory prudential deduction measures must apply only to banks with high levels of non- performing loans and only to non- performing loans which are no longer generating repayments. Those automatic prudential deductions must be made as part of bilateral exchanges between the bank and its supervisor, given the diversity of the European banking landscape; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU institutions and bodies on this issue; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly implement the Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on the action plan to tackle non-performing loans in Europe; calls on the Commission to take legislative or non-legislative initiatives to encourage transparency and the provision of information to potential investors wishing to invest in NPLs, to further the development of secondary markets for NPLs and to encourage the establishment of national asset management companies, and to request the European Systemic Risk Board to develop, by the end of 2018, macro- prudential approaches to prevent the emergence of systemic NPL problems; _________________ 4 Commission communication on completing the Banking Union, 11 October 2017, p. 15 (COM(2017)0592).
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 167 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’, with a view to limiting financial stability risks, it would be better if banks' sovereign bond portfolios were more diverse; takes note, in this respect, of the Commission’s ongoing work on the idea of so-called sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS);
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 173 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Welcomes the work done by the ECB to assess the adequacy of internal models, including its new guide to the TRIM, with a view to addressing the variability in risk-weights applied to risk- weighted assets of the same class across credit institutions; calls for a rapid conclusion of negotiations on output floors within the BCBS; stresses the importance of the current negotiations at the BCBS, which must not result in a significant increase in capital requirements at Union level, as this would damage economic growth and the Union's financing model; also stresses that, with a view to preventing certain jurisdictions from engaging in any regulatory arbitrage, those negotiations should not be finalised until all the countries concerned have committed to applying the agreements in full;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 195 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Welcomes the banking reform package proposed by the Commission in November 2016; underlines the importance of the fast-track procedure for the phasing- in of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 in order to avoid cliff effects on the regulatory capital of credit institutions; supportappreciates the efforts made to reduce the reporting burden for smaller banks; is concerned, however, about the proposed amendments to the waivers in Articles 7 and 8 of the CRR, and more generally, about the proposed shift in the home-host balancconsiders, however, that there should not be a danger of the measures to reduce this burden (disclosure and reporting) resulting in low-cost supervision or regulation of smaller banks because of lower or more restricted visibility for the supervisor or a reduction in the quality of their supervision (refusal to grant exemptions, the need to take account of improvements gradually introduced in the European context in order to contain risk). It should also be noted that the failure of a smaller bank is not necessarily a systemic risk for a country but that the failure of a number of such banks might become a problem of systemic magnitude. They should therefore not be regarded as posing a lesser risk simply because of their size. The Commission's proposed revision of the regulatory framework for derogations to the application of prudential liquidity and solvency requirements (Articles 7 and 8 of Regulation 575/2013) is a step in the right direction. The opportunity for supervisors to make exemptions from the requirements for credit institutions on an individual basis must be used effectively, as a natural stage in the construction of the Banking Union. Such a development must be accompanied by increased cooperation between supervisors in the home and host Member States. The absence of operational implementation of Articles 7 and 8 and the unwillingness of some supervisors to apply them may give rise to greater fragmentation in Europe;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 210 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Recalls that the options and discretionary powers set out in EU law concerning banking supervision must be harmonised as far as possible. They must as far as possible be transitory, and withdrawn when there is no further need for them, to avoid over-complicating the everyday work of European and national supervisors;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 216 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Recalls its resolution of 17 May 2017 on FinTech; welcomes, in this respect, the work of the Commission, considers that FinTech, which carries out the same kinds of activities as other proposed inclusion of technological innovation in the mandates of the ESAs and the ongoing public consultation on the ECB’s draft guidance to assessments of FinTech blayers in the financial system, should therefore be subject to the same operating rules. The European framework must give the task of supervising the establishments concerned to the national or European supervisors. The European Supervisory Agencies (ESAs) must specify the rules laid down by the Europeank licence applicationegislator for the relevant companies;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 234 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Looksforward to the Commission’s proposal on large investment firms; Warmly welcomes the opinion of the European Banking Authority on the new prudential framework for investment firms and looks forward to the Commission’s proposal on large investment firms; stresses that particular attention must be paid to large investment firms undertaking bank-like activities, particularly regarding supervisory aspects. The proposal must ensure that the principle of fair competition for the activities of investment services carried out in credit establishments or investment firms is adhered to. Also underlines the importance of taking into account 'third- country' aspects in the future proposal, particularly regarding the supervision of these institutions and the equivalence regimes which will need to be reviewed regularly and continuously;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 312 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for progress to be made on the legislative proposals implementing total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) in Union law; supports the inclusion of a pre- resolution moratorium tool in the BRRD;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 321 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Notes the ongoing technical work by the Council on a common fiscal backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF); wishes, however, to see this budgetary support system prevent any kind of contagion of the banking sector as a whole from a crisis initially confined to one establishment in particular;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 341 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Welcomes the EBA’s decision to publish on an annual basis data received by it in accordance with Article 10(10) of the DGSD; regrets that the data do not allow for a direct comparison of the adequacy of funding between deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs); notes, nonetheless, the need for several DGSs to accelerate the build-up of available financial means in order to achieve their target level of 0.8 % of covered deposits by 3 July 2024;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 346 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Asks the Commission to shed light on the applications for a target level lower than 0.8 % of covered deposits as received and approved by it in accordance with Article 10(6) of the DGSD; draws attention to the implications of the availability of such an exception, and on the early intervention measures and alternative measures under Articles 11(3) and 11(6) of the same directive; draws attention to the relevance of such options being available for the potential design of an EDIS;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON