15 Amendments of Saïd EL KHADRAOUI related to 2010/2303(INI)
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Notes the failure of some financial institutions and supervisors to appreciate that the nature and scale, scale and complexity of the risk they had incurred contributed to the financial crisis; believes that effective risk governance is a major essential element to preventing future criseis;
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Calls for the establishment in all financial institutions of an effective governance system, with adequate risk management, compliance, internal audit functions (and in case of insurers actuarial functions), strategies and policies, processes and procedures;
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Stresses that the operational risk management should be pre-approved by the supervisor;
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Underlines that the CRO should have direct access to the board of the company. In order to ensure his independence and objectivity is not compromised, his appointment and dismissal will be decided by the whole board. The CRO should be compensated independently of the performance of the company;
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Calls on national supervisors to develop objective criteria for a ‘fit and proper person’ test to assess the suitability of individuals to be added to an ‘approved persons’ list for supervised funcaking into account the nature, complexity and size of the financial institutions; supervisors must perform their assessments and approvals procedure in a timely and efficient manner;
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for regular, formal external assessments to be carried out of the board and its performance, on the basis of objective criteria to be approved by the relevant national supervisor, and for summaries of these assessments to be included in annual reports for the benefit of investors, shareholders and national supervisors with a scope that covers not just the contribution of individual directors and committees but is also broad enough to show how the board as a whole is performing against its objectives and whether it is functioning as a group able to take collective decisions and oversee risk; the annual report should describe the scope of the evaluation for the benefit of investors, shareholders and national regulators and confirm that recommendations have been acted upon;
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Believes that there should be a basic assumption that the roles ofe role of the CEO and cChairman should be separate; notes that there are circumstances in which a combined role could be beneficial;d.
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Believes that all non-executive members of unitary orf supervisory boards should be of high calibre, that every board should have non-executive members who possess recent and relevant financial industry expertise, whose role should be complemented by other non-executives with other areas of experpossess recent and relevant professional qualifications, knowledge and experience, including financial, for jointly piloting the financial undertaking; requires all economically significant financial institutions to have non-executisve and experience rboard members, believant to the work of the board,es however that every financial institution should have a board with a diversity of experience, expertise and character so as to provide sound and prudent management and that appointments should be made on merit;
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. Stresses that non-executive board members' compensation should only consist in fixed pay and should not include performance- or share-based pay;
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 b (new)
Paragraph 23 b (new)
23b. Believes that negative performance by a firm should lead to a considerable reduction of total variable remuneration payouts, in terms both of current compensation and of payouts of amounts previously earned, including through malus or clawback arrangements;
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 c (new)
Paragraph 23 c (new)
23c. Is of the opinion that quality-linked performance criteria should be taken into consideration in order to determine the level of the variable compensation; proposes therefore that the 'social added value of companies' performance' should be taken into consideration as one essential criterion, as well as 'sustainability' criteria when applicable;
Amendment 107 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 d (new)
Paragraph 23 d (new)
23d. Believes supervisors should be responsible for the oversight of the correct application of the corporate governance principles by the financial institutions;
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Believes that an enhanced three-way dialogue between supervisors, auditors (both internal and external) and institutions would make it possible toenable the early detection of substantial or systemic risk at an early stage; encourages supervisors, auditors and institutions to engage in open discussions and to increase the frequency of meetings; believes therefore the frequency of dialogues and meetings between the three parties should be increased in order to facilitateaid prudential supervision;
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Believes that significant transactions above a setdefined size, with the benchmark of which should to be decided by ESMA, should require specific shareholder approval or be subject to a requirement to inform shareholdersbefore the transaction can take effect; below this benchmark, the shareholders should be informed before the transaction can take effect;
Amendment 143 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Calls for mandatory annualevery two years elections of each member of the board at the AGM, with a view to making the board more accountable and encouraging a culture of greater responsibility;