4 Amendments of György SCHÖPFLIN related to 2012/2130(INI)
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AG a (new)
Recital AG a (new)
AGa. whereas, under the Fundamental Law, the powers of the Constitutional Court to review budget-related laws are temporary in nature and limited in scope; and whereas the constitutional rules on the powers of the Constitutional Court regarding budget-related laws do not affect the right of the Constitutional Court regarding the unlimited ex ante review of all budget-related legislative acts, regarding the unlimited ex post review of all legal acts other than acts of Parliament (e.g. government decrees), regarding the full ex ante and ex post review of all budget-related legislative acts from a procedural point of view and regarding full ex ante and ex post review of all budget-related legislative acts with regard to their compliance with international treaty obligations;
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AI
Recital AI
AI. whereas the Constitutional Court, in its above-mentioned Decision 4561/2012,1 held that ‘Constitutional legality has not only procedural, formal and public law validity requirements, but also substantial ones. T"one of the most important arguments against the extension of the powers of the cConstitutional criteria of a democratic State under the rule of law are at the same timCourt to the review of the Constitution is that the cConstitutional values, principles and fundamental democratic freedoms enshrined in international treaties and accepted and acknowledged by communities of democratic States under the rule of law, as well as the ius cogens, which is partly the same as the foregoing. As appropriate, the Constitutional Court may even examine the free enforcement andCourt cannot create and cannot alter the Constitution which it is designed to protect and which it must apply as a yardstick in the course of the constitutional review of legislation. This is confirmed by the fact that, throughout its operation, the Constitutional Court has consistently refused to review the Constitution or its provisions. (...) Within the system of the division of powers, the power of the cConstitutionalisation of the substantial requirements, guarantees and values of democratic States under the rule of law.’ (Point IV.7 of the Decis Court, too, is a limited power. Following from this, the Constitutional Court will not draw the review the Constitution and new amendments to the Constitution within its competence without express authorisation in the Constitution);."
Amendment 234 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Recalls that as declared by the Constitutional Court in its Decision No 45/2012, 'Constitutional legality has not only procedural, formal and public law validity requirements, but also substantial ones [...]. As appropriate, the Constitutional Court may even examine the free enforcement and the constitutionalisation of the substantial requirements, guarantees and values of democratic States under the rule of law‘;'; also recalls the Constitutional Court's Decision 61/2011 stating "one of the most important arguments against the extension of the powers of the Constitutional Court to the review of the Constitution is that the Constitutional Court cannot create and cannot alter the Constitution which it is designed to protect and which it must apply as a yardstick in the course of the constitutional review of legislation. This is confirmed by the fact that, throughout its operation, the Constitutional Court has consistently refused to review the Constitution or its provisions. (...) Within the system of the division of powers, the power of the Constitutional Court, too, is a limited power. Following from this, the Constitutional Court will not draw the review the Constitution and new amendments to the Constitution within its competence without express authorisation in the Constitution."
Amendment 238 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14