BETA

11 Amendments of Benoît HAMON related to 2007/0195(COD)

Amendment 19 #
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 1 a (new)
Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 3 – paragraph 2
(1a) In Article 3, paragraph 2 is replaced as follows: "2. Having full regard to the relevant provisions of the Treaty, in particular Article 86 thereof, Member States may impose on undertakings operating in the electricity sector, in the general economic interest, public service obligations which may relate to security, including security of supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies and environmental protection, including energy efficiency and climate protection. Such obligations shall be clearly defined, transparent, non discriminatory, verifiable and shall guarantee equality of access for EU electricity companies to national consumers. These obligations may take the form of supply price regulation, including the fixing of a maximum price for the supply of electricity to final clients. In relation to security of supply, energy efficiency/demand-side management and for the fulfilment of environmental goals, as referred to in this paragraph, Member States may introduce the implementation of long term planning, taking into account the possibility of third parties seeking access to the system."
2008/03/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 31 #
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 1 a (new)
Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 3 – paragraph 2
(1a) Article 3(2) is amended as follows: '2. Having full regard to the relevant provisions of the Treaty, in particular Article 86 thereof, Member States may impose on undertakings operating in the electricity sector, in the general economic interest, public service obligations which may relate to security, including security of supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies and environmental protection, including energy efficiency and climate protection. Such obligations shall be clearly defined, transparent, non discriminatory, verifiable and shall guarantee equality of access for EU electricity companies to national consumers. These obligations may, for example, take the form of price regulation, including the fixing of a ceiling price for electricity supplies to final users. In relation to security of supply, energy efficiency/demand-side management and for the fulfilment of environmental goals, as referred to in this paragraph, Member States may introduce the implementation of long term planning, taking into account the possibility of third parties seeking access to the system.
2008/03/28
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 32 #
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. In order to ensure the independence of transmission system operators, Member States shall ensure that as from [date of transposition plus one year]:
2008/03/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 33 #
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point -a (new)
-a) integrated undertakings have to comply either with the provisions of Articles 8, 8a and 8b or with the provisions of Articles 8a, 8b and 8c;
2008/03/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 47 #
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 5 – introductory part
(5) The following Articles 8a, 8b and 8bc are inserted:
2008/03/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 51 #
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 5
Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 8c (new)
Article 8c Effective and efficient unbundling of transmission systems 1. Transmission system operators shall be equipped with all human, physical and financial resources of the vertically integrated undertaking which are required for the regular business of electricity transmission, in particular: (i) assets that are necessary for the regular business of electricity transmission shall be owned by the transmission system operator; (ii) personnel required for the regular business of electricity transmission shall be employed by the transmission system operator; (iii) the leasing of personnel and provision of services to and from any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of generation or supply shall be limited to cases with no discriminatory potential and be subject to approval by national regulatory authorities in order to exclude competition concerns and conflicts of interest; (iv) appropriate financial resources for future investment projects shall be made available in due time. 2. The activities deemed necessary for the regular business of electricity transmission referred to in paragraph 1 shall include at least: - representation of the transmission system operator, contacts to third parties and to the regulatory authorities; - granting and managing third party access; - collection of access charges; - congestion rents and payments under the inter transmission system operator compensation mechanism in compliance with Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003; - operation, maintenance and development of the transmission system; - investment planning ensuring the long- term ability of the system to meet reasonable demand and guaranteeing security of supply; - legal services; - accountancy and IT services. 3. The transmission system operator shall have its own corporate identity, significantly different from the vertically integrated undertaking with separate branding, communication and premises. 4. The accounts of transmission system operators shall be audited by a different auditor than the one auditing the vertically integrated undertaking and all its affiliated companies. Independence of the transmission system operator management, chief executive officer/executive board. 5. Decisions on the appointment and on any premature termination of the employment of the chief executive officer and other members of the executive board of the transmission system operator and the respective contractual agreements of the employment and its termination shall be notified to the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority. These decisions and agreements may become binding unless the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority uses its right of veto within a period of 3 weeks following notification. A veto may be issued in cases of appointment and mutually contractual agreements if serious doubts arise as to the professional independence of the nominated chief executive officer or member of the executive board, or in the case of early termination of employment and mutual contractual agreements, if serious doubts exist as regards the basis for this measure. 6. An effective right of appeal to the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority or court shall be guaranteed for any complaint by the management of the transmission system operator regarding the early termination of their own employment contracts. 7. After termination of employment by the transmission system operator, former chief executive officers and members of the executive board of that transmission system operator shall not work in any capacity in any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of generation or supply for a period of not less than 3 years. 8. The chief executive officer and members of the executive board of the transmission system operator shall not hold any interest in, or receive any compensation from, any undertaking of the vertically integrated company other than the transmission system operator. His/their remuneration shall in no part depend on activities of the vertically integrated undertaking other than those of the transmission system operator. 9. The chief executive officer or the members of the executive board of the transmission system operator may not bear responsibility, directly or indirectly, for the day-to-day operation of any other branch of the vertically integrated undertaking. 10. Without prejudice to the provisions of this Article, the transmission system operator shall have effective decision- making powers independent from the integrated electricity undertaking, with respect to assets necessary to operate, maintain or develop the network. This should not prevent the existence of appropriate coordination mechanisms to ensure that the economic and management supervision rights of the parent company are protected in respect of a return on assets in a subsidiary, as indirectly regulated in accordance with Article 22c. In particular, this shall enable the parent company to approve the annual financial plan or any equivalent instrument of the transmission system operator and to set overall limits on the level of indebtedness of its subsidiary. If the annual financial plan, or any equivalent financial plan, is not approved or changed by the parent company, the case shall be referred to the regulatory authority for a decision. The parent company shall not be permitted to give instructions in day-to-day operations, nor with respect to individual decisions concerning the construction or upgrading of transmission lines that do not exceed the terms of the approved financial plan or any equivalent instrument. 11. Chairmen of the supervisory board or the board of directors of the transmission system operator shall not work in any capacity in any part of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of generation or supply. 12. The supervisory boards or boards of directors of transmission system operators shall include independent members, appointed for a term of at least 5 years. Their appointment shall be notified to the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority and become binding under the conditions described in paragraph 5. 13. For the purposes of paragraph 12, a member of the supervisory board or board of directors of a transmission system operator shall be deemed independent if he is free of any business or other relationship within the vertically integrated undertaking, its controlling shareholders or the management of either that creates a conflict of interest such as to impair his judgement, in particular: (a) has not been an employee of any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of generation and supply in five years prior to his appointment to the supervisory board or board of directors; (b) does not hold any interest in and does not receive any compensation from the vertically integrated undertaking or any of its affiliates except the transmission system operator; (c) does not hold any relevant business relationship with any branch of the vertically integrated company performing functions of electricity supply during his appointment to the supervisory board or board of directors; 14. Member States shall ensure that transmission system operators establish and implement a compliance programme which sets out measures taken to ensure that discriminatory conduct does not occur. The programme shall set out the specific obligations of employees to meet this objective. It shall be subject to the approval of the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority. Compliance with the program shall be independently monitored by the compliance officer. The regulatory authority shall have the power to impose sanctions in case of inappropriate implementation of the compliance program. 15. The chief executive officer or executive board of the transmission system operator shall appoint a person or a body as a compliance officer in charge of: (i) monitoring the implementation of the compliance programme; (ii) producing an annual report which sets out the measures taken in order to implement the compliance programme and submitting it to the regulatory authority; (iii) issuing recommendations on the compliance programme and its implementation. 16. The independence of the compliance officer shall be guaranteed in particular by the terms of his employment contract. 17. The compliance officer shall have the opportunity to regularly address the supervisory board or board of directors of the transmission system operator of the vertically integrated undertaking and the regulatory authorities. 18. The compliance officer shall assist in all sessions of the supervisory board or board of directors of the transmission system operator that address the following issues: (i) conditions for access and connection to the grid, including the collection of access charges, congestion rents, and payments under the inter transmission system operator compensation mechanism in compliance with Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003; (ii) projects undertaken in order to operate, maintain and develop the transmission grid system, including interconnection and connection investments; (iii) balancing rules, including reserve power rules; (iv) energy purchases in order to cover energy losses. 19. During these sessions, the compliance officer shall prevent information about generator or supplier activities which may be commercially sensitive from being disclosed in a discriminatory manner to the supervisory board or board of directors. 20. The compliance officer shall have access to all relevant books, records and offices of the transmission system operator, as well as to all the information required in the proper performance of his duties. 21. The compliance officer shall be nominated and removed by the chief executive officer or executive board only after prior approval by the regulatory authority. 22. Transmission system operators shall elaborate a 10-year network development plan at least every two years. They shall provide efficient measures in order to guarantee system adequacy and security of supply. 23. The 10-year network development plan shall in particular: (i) indicate to market participants the main transmission infrastructures that should preferably be built over the next ten years; (ii) contain all the investments already decided on and identify new investments for which an implementation decision has to be taken in the next three years. 24. In order to elaborate this 10-year network development plan, each transmission system operator shall make a reasonable hypothesis as to the evolution of generation, consumption and exchanges with other countries, and shall take into account regional and European- wide existing network investment plans. The transmission system operator shall submit in due time the draft to the competent national body. 25. The competent national body shall consult all relevant network users on the basis of a draft for the 10-year network development plan in an open and transparent manner and may publish the result of the consultation process, in particular the possible investment needs. 26. The competent national body shall examine whether the 10-year network development plan covers all investment needs identified in the consultation. The authority may oblige the transmission system operator to amend its plan. 27. A competent national body for the purposes of paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 may be the national regulatory authority, any other competent national public authority or a network development trustee established by transmission system operators. In the latter case, transmission system operators shall submit the drafts of the statutes, of the list of members and of the rules of procedure to the approval of the competent national public authority. 28. If the transmission system operator rejects the implementation of a specific investment listed in the 10-year network development plan to be undertaken in the next three years, Members States shall ensure that the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority have the necessary powers to implement one of the two following measures: (i) request the transmission system operator to undertake, by all legal means , its investment obligations using its own financial means, (ii) invite independent investors to tender for the necessary investment in a transmission system and, in so doing, may oblige the transmission system operator: - to agree to financing by any third party, - to agree to the provision of construction works by any third party and to the construction of the new assets; - to agree to operate the new assets. The relevant financial arrangements shall be subject to the approval of the regulatory authority or any other competent national authority. In both cases, tariff regulation shall allow for revenues that cover the costs of such investments. 29. The competent national public authority shall monitor and evaluate the implementation of the investment plan. 30. Transmission system operators shall be obliged to establish and publish transparent and efficient procedures for the non-discriminatory connection of new power plants to the grid. Those procedures shall be subject to the approval of national regulatory authorities or any other competent national public authority. 31. Transmission system operators shall not be entitled to refuse the connection of a new power plant on the grounds of possible future limitations to available network capacities, e.g. congestion in remote parts of the transmission grid. The transmission system operator shall be obliged to supply the necessary information. 32. Transmission system operators shall not be entitled to refuse a new connection point on the sole basis that this new connection would lead to additional costs because of the required capacity increase of grid elements within close range of that new connection point.
2008/03/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 10
Independent system operators 1. Where the transmission system belongs to a vertically integrated undertaking on entry into force of this Directive, Member States may grant derogations from Article 8(1), provided that an independent system operator is designated by the Member State upon a proposal from the transmission system owner and subject to approval of such designation by the Commission. Vertically integrated undertakings which own a transmission system may not in any event be prevented from taking steps to comply with Article 8(1). 2. The Member State may approve and designate an independent system operator only where: (a) the candidate operator has demonstrated that it complies with the requirements of Article 8(1)(b) to (d); (b) the candidate operator has demonstrated that it has at its disposal the required financial, technical and human resources to carry out its tasks under Article 9; (c) the candidate operator has committed to complying with a ten year network development plan proposed by the regulatory authority; (d) the transmission system owner has demonstrated its ability to comply with its obligations under paragraph 6. To this effect, it shall provide all the draft contractual arrangements with the candidate undertaking and any other relevant entity; (e) the candidate operator has demonstrated its ability to comply with its obligations under Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity* including the cooperation of transmission system operators at European and regional level. 3. Undertakings which have been certified by the regulatory authority as having complied with the requirements of Articles 8a and 10(2) shall be approved and designated as independent system operators by Member States. The certification procedure in Article 8b shall be applicable. 4. Where the Commission has taken a decision in accordance with the procedure in Article 8b and finds that the regulatory authority has not complied with its decision within two months, it shall, within a period of six months, designate, on a proposal from the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators and after having heard the views of the transmission system owner and the transmission system operator, an independent system operator for a period of 5 years. At any time, the transmission system owner may propose to the regulatory authority the designation of a new independent system operator pursuant to the procedure in Article 10(1). 5. Each independent system operator shall be responsible for granting and managing third party access, including the collection of access charges, congestion rents, and payments under the inter transmission system operator compensation mechanism in compliance with Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, as well as for operating, maintaining and developing the transmission system, and for ensuring the long term ability of the system to meet reasonable demand through investment planning. When developing the network the independent system operator is responsible for planning (including authorisation procedure), construction and commissioning of the new infrastructure. For this purpose, it shall act as a transmission system operator in accordance with this Chapter. Transmission system owners may not be responsible for granting and managing third party access, nor for investment planning. 6. Where an independent system operator has been designated, the transmission system owner shall: (a) provide all the relevant cooperation and support to the independent system operator for the fulfilment of its tasks, including in particular all relevant information; (b) finance the investments decided by the independent system operator and approved by the regulatory authority, or give its agreement to financing by any interested party including the independent system operator. The relevant financing arrangements shall be subject to approval by the regulatory authority. Prior to this approval, the Regulatory Authority shall consult the asset owner together with other interested parties; (c) provide for the coverage of liability relating to the network assets, excluding the liability relating to the tasks of the independent system operator; (d) provide guarantees to facilitate financing any network expansions with the exception of those investments where, pursuant to paragraph b, it has given its agreement to financing by any interested party including the independent system operator. 7. In close cooperation with the regulatory authority, the relevant national competition authority shall be granted all relevant powers to effectively monitor compliance of the transmission system owner with its obligations under paragraph 6.Article 10 deleted
2008/03/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 56 #
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. In order to ensure the independence of transmission system operators, Member States shall ensure that as from [date of transposition plus one year]:, vertically integrated undertakings have to comply: – either with the provisions of Articles 8 and 8a – or with the provisions of Articles 8a, 8b and 8c.
2008/03/28
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 57 #
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 5 – introductory part
The following Articles 8a, 8b and 8bc are inserted:
2008/03/28
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 58 #
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 5
Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 8 (ba) (new)
Article 8 c Effective and efficient unbundling of transmission systems 1. Transmission systems operators shall be equipped with all human, physical and financial resources of the vertically integrated undertakings necessary for the regular business of electricity transmission, in particular: (i) assets that are necessary for the regular business of electricity transmission shall be owned by the transmission system operator; (ii) personnel necessary for the regular business of electricity transmission shall be employed by the transmission system operator; (iii) leasing of personnel and rendering of services from and to any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of production or supply shall be limited to cases with no discriminatory potential and be subject to approval by national regulatory authorities in order to exclude competition concerns and conflicts of interest; (iv) appropriate financial resources for future investment projects shall be made available in due time. 2. The activities deemed necessary for the regular business of electricity transmission referred to in paragraph 1 shall include at least: - the representation of the transport systems operator and contacts with third parties and the regulatory authorities; - granting and managing third party access; - the collection of access charges; - revenue from congestion management and payments under the compensation mechanism applicable between transmission systems operators under Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003; - operation, maintenance and development of the transmission system; - investment planning ensuring the long- term ability of the system to meet reasonable demand and guaranteeing security of supply; - legal services; - accountancy and information technology services. 3. The transmission system operator shall have its own corporate identity significantly different from the vertically integrated undertaking, with separate branding, communication tools and premises. 4. Transport system operators' accounts shall be audited by another auditor than the one auditing the vertically integrated undertaking and all its affiliated companies. Independence of the TSO management, chief executive officer/executive board 5. Decisions on the appointment and on any premature termination of the employment of the chief executive officer/members of the executive board of the TSO and the respective contractual agreements of the employment and its termination shall be notified to the regulatory authority or any other competent national authority. These decisions and agreements may become binding unless, within a period of three weeks after notification, the regulatory authority has used its right of veto. A veto may be issued in cases of appointment and respective contractual agreements if serous doubts arise as to the professional independence of the nominated chief executive officer/member of the executive board or in the case of premature terminations of employment and respective contractual agreements if serious doubts exist regarding the reasoning for this measure. 6. Effective rights to appeal to the regulatory authority or other competent national public authority or to a court shall be guaranteed for any complaints by the management of the TSO against premature terminations of their employment. 7. After termination of employment by the TSO, former chief executive officer/members of the executive board shall not participate in any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of production or supply for a period of not less than three years. 8. The chief executive officer/members of the executive board shall not hold any interest in or receive any compensation from any undertaking of the vertically integrated company other than the TSO. His/their remuneration shall in no part depend on activities of the vertically integrated undertaking other than those of the TSO. 9. The chief executive officer or the members of the executive board of the TSO may not bear responsibility directly or indirectly for the day to day operation of any other branch of the vertically integrated undertaking. 10. Without prejudice to the provisions of this article, the TSO shall have effective decision-making rights independent from the integrated electricity undertaking with respect to assets necessary to maintain or develop the network. This shall not prevent the existence of appropriate coordination mechanisms to ensure that the economic and management supervision rights of the parent company in respect of return on assets regulated indirectly in accordance with Article 22c in a subsidiary are protected. In particular, this shall enable the parent company to approve the annual financial plan or any equivalent instrument of the transmission system operator and to set global limits on the level of indebtedness of its subsidiary. It shall not, however, permit the parent company to give instructions for the day to day operations nor with respect to individual decisions concerning the construction or upgrading of transmission lines complying with the terms of the approved financial plan and any other equivalent instrument. 11. The chairmen of the supervisory board/board of directors of the TSO shall not participate in any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of production or supply. 12. The supervisory boards and the boards of directors of TSOs will include independent members appointed for a term of at least five years. Their appointment shall be notified to the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority and become binding under the conditions described in paragraph 5. 13. For the purposes of paragraph 12, a member of the supervisory board / board of directors of a TSO shall be deemed independent if he is free of any business, or other relationship with the vertically integrated undertaking, its controlling shareholders or the management of either, that creates a conflict of interest such as to impair his judgement, in particular: (a) has not been an employee of any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of production and supply in the five years prior to his appointment as supervisory board / board of directors member; (b) does not hold any interest in and does not receive any compensation from the vertically integrated undertaking or any of its affiliates except the TSO (c) does not hold any relevant business relationship with any branch of the vertically integrated company performing functions of energy supply during his appointment as supervisory board / board of directors member ; (d) is not a member of the executive board of a company in which the vertically integrated undertaking appoints members of the supervisory board / board of directors. 14. Member States shall ensure that TSOs establish and implement a compliance programme which sets out measures taken to ensure that discriminatory conduct is excluded. The programme shall set out the specific obligations of employees to meet this objective. It shall be subject to approval of the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority. Compliance with the program shall be independently monitored by the compliance officer referred to in paragraph 15. The regulatory authority shall have the power to impose sanctions in case of inappropriate implementation of the compliance program. 15. The chief executive officer / executive board of the TSO shall appoint a person or a body as a compliance officer in charge of : (i) monitoring the implementation of the compliance programme; (ii) elaborating an annual report, setting out the measures taken in order to implement the compliance programme and submitting it to the regulatory authority ; (iii) issuing recommendations on the compliance programme and its implementation. 16. The independence of the compliance officer shall be guaranteed in particular by the terms of his employment contract 17. The compliance officer shall have the opportunity to regularly address the supervisory board/board of directors of the TSO, of the vertically integrated undertaking and the regulatory authorities. 18. The compliance officer shall assist to all sessions of the supervisory board / board of directors of the transmission system operator that address the following areas : (i) conditions for access and connection to the grid, including the collection of access charges and congestion rents and payments made under the inter transmission operator compensation mechanism referred to in Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003; (ii) projects undertaken in order to operate, maintain and develop the transmission grid system, including interconnection and connection investments ; (iii) balancing rules, including rules governing reserve capacity; (iv) energy purchases in order to cover energy losses. 19. During these sessions, he shall prevent information about producers’ or suppliers’ activities which may be commercially advantageous from being disclosed in a discriminatory manner to the supervisory board/board of directors. 20. The compliance officer shall have access to all relevant books, records and offices of the TSO and to all the necessary information for the fulfilment of his task for the proper performance of his duties. 21. The compliance officer shall be appointed and removed by the chief executive officer / executive board only after prior approval by the regulatory authority. 22. TSOs shall elaborate a ten-year network development plan at least every two years. They shall provide efficient measures in order to guarantee system adequacy and security of supply. 23. The 10-year network development plan shall in particular : (i) indicate to market participants the main transmission infrastructures that ought to be built over the next ten years. (ii) contain all the investments already decided and identify new investments for which an implementation decision has to be taken in the next three years. 24. In order to elaborate this ten-year network development plan, each TSO shall make a reasonable hypothesis about the evolution of supply, consumption and exchanges with other countries, and takes into account regional and European-wide existing network investment plans. The TSO shall submit in due time the draft to the competent national body. 25. The competent national body shall consult all relevant network users on the basis of a draft for the ten-year network development plan in an open and transparent manner and may publish the result of the consultation process, in particular possible needs for investments. 26. The competent national body shall examine whether the ten-year network development plan covers all investment needs identified in the consultation. The authority may oblige the TSO to amend his plan. 27. A competent national body for the purposes of paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 may be the national regulatory authority, any other competent national public authority or a network development trustee constituted by TSOs. In the latter case, TSOs shall submit the drafts of the statutes, of the list of members and of the rules of procedure to the approval of the competent national public authority. 28. If the TSO rejects to implement a specific investment listed in the ten-year network development plan to be executed in the next three years, Members States shall ensure that the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority is competent to take one or other of the following measures: (i) to request the TSO to execute, by all legal means, his investment obligations using his financial capacities; or (ii) to invite independent investors to tender for a necessary investment in a transmission system and, in so doing, may oblige the TSO: - to agree to financing by any third party, - to agree to building by any third party or to build the new assets, and - to operate the new asset. The relevant financial arrangements shall be subject to the approval of the regulatory authority or any other competent national authority. In both cases, tariff regulation shall allow for revenues that cover the costs of such investments. 29. The competent national public authority shall monitor and evaluate the implementation of the investment plan. 30. The TSOs shall be required to define and publish transparent and efficient procedures for a non-discriminatory connection of new power stations to the grid. These procedures shall be subject to the approval of the national regulatory authorities or any other competent national public authority. 31. The TSOs shall not be entitled to refuse to connect a new power station by invoking the possible introductions of future ceilings on available grid capacity, for example because of the congestion of remote grid segments. The TSO shall be required to supply the necessary information. 32. The TSO shall not be entitled to refuse a new connection on the sole grounds that it will involve additional costs requiring a capacity increase of network elements situated in the immediate proximity of the connection point.
2008/03/28
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 60 #
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 10
Independent systems operators 1. Where the transmission system belongs to a vertically integrated undertaking on entry into force of this Directive, Member States may grant derogations from Article 8(1), provided that an independent system operator is designated by the Member State upon a proposal from the transmission system owner and subject to approval of such designation by the Commission. Vertically integrated undertakings which own a transmission system may not in any event be prevented from taking steps to comply with Article 8(1). 2. The Member State may approve and designate an independent system operator only where: (a) the candidate operator has demonstrated that it complies with the requirements of Article 8(1)(b) to (d); (b) the candidate operator has demonstrated that it has at its disposal the required financial, technical and human resources to carry out its tasks under Article 9; (c) the candidate operator has committed to complying with a ten year network development plan proposed by the regulatory authority; (d) the transmission system owner has demonstrated its ability to comply with its obligations under paragraph 6. To this effect, it shall provide all the draft contractual arrangements with the candidate undertaking and any other relevant entity; (e) the candidate operator has demonstrated its ability to comply with its obligations under Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity* including the cooperation of transmission system operators at European and regional level. 3. Undertakings which have been certified by the regulatory authority as having complied with the requirements of Articles 8a and 10(2) shall be approved and designated as independent system operators by Member States. The certification procedure in Article 8b shall be applicable. 4. Where the Commission has taken a decision in accordance with the procedure in Article 8b and finds that the regulatory authority has not complied with its decision within two months, it shall, within a period of six months, designate, on a proposal from the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators and after having heard the views of the transmission system owner and the transmission system operator, an independent system operator for a period of 5 years. At any time, the transmission system owner may propose to the regulatory authority the designation of a new independent system operator pursuant to the procedure in Article 10(1). 5. Each independent system operator shall be responsible for granting and managing third party access, including the collection of access charges, congestion rents, and payments under the inter transmission system operator compensation mechanism in compliance with Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, as well as for operating, maintaining and developing the transmission system, and for ensuring the long term ability of the system to meet reasonable demand through investment planning. When developing the network the independent system operator is responsible for planning (including authorisation procedure), construction and commissioning of the new infrastructure. For this purpose, it shall act as a transmission system operator in accordance with this Chapter. Transmission system owners may not be responsible for granting and managing third party access, nor for investment planning. 6. Where an independent system operator has been designated, the transmission system owner shall: (a) provide all the relevant cooperation and support to the independent system operator for the fulfilment of its tasks, including in particular all relevant information; (b) finance the investments decided by the independent system operator and approved by the regulatory authority, or give its agreement to financing by any interested party including the independent system operator. The relevant financing arrangements shall be subject to approval by the regulatory authority. Prior to this approval, the Regulatory Authority shall consult the asset owner together with other interested parties; (c) provide for the coverage of liability relating to the network assets, excluding the liability relating to the tasks of the independent system operator; (d) provide guarantees to facilitate financing any network expansions with the exception of those investments where, pursuant to paragraph b, it has given its agreement to financing by any interested party including the independent system operator. 7. In close cooperation with the regulatory authority, the relevant national competition authority shall be granted all relevant powers to effectively monitor compliance of the transmission system owner with its obligations under paragraph 6.Article 10 deleted
2008/03/28
Committee: IMCO