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63 Amendments of Benoît HAMON

Amendment 1 #

2008/2330(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Criticises the fact that, although the financial crisis is demonstrating the importance of State action in maintaining economic activity and strengthening social cohesion, the Commission has thus far failed to secure the future of and the crucial role played by public services in Europe by putting forward a proposal for a framework directive on services of general interest;
2009/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 2 #

2008/2330(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Will pay particular attention to the report on the impact of demographic ageing on public spending and to the communication on the long-term sustainability of public finances, to be submitted in 2009; in that context, will take steps to ensure that the proposals for the modernisation of pension schemes do not lead to a lengthening of people's working lives or a decrease in the resources available to retired people; will also pay particular attention to the pension status of atypical workers;
2009/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 3 #

2008/2330(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 c (new)
1c. Welcomes the attention paid to the conventions adopted by the International Labour Organisation, which must be regarded as minimum standards with regard to decent work, and emphasises the importance of restoring the remunerative value of work, both within the Union and in relations with third countries;
2009/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 4 #

2008/2330(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 d (new)
1d. Deplores the fact that the Commission has failed to take the opportunity presented by the renewed social agenda to consider a revision of Directive 96/71/EC1 on the posting of workers; ______________ 1 OJ L 18, 21.1.1997, p. 1.
2009/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 5 #

2008/2330(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 e (new)
1e. Deplores the fact that the Commission has not honoured its undertaking to set up a forum with the task of assessing the repercussions of the Court of Justice judgments in the Laval1, Viking2and Ruffer3cases; ______________________ 1 Judgment of18 December 2007 in Case C- 341/05, ECR 2007, p. I-11767. 2 Judgment of11 December 2007 in Case C- 438/05, ECR 2007, p. I-10779. 3 Judgment of3 April 2008 in Case C-346/06.
2009/02/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 5 #

2008/2199(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
2. Supports removing barriers that hinder investment and transatlantic financial services, and is in favour of gradually integrating the two markets to allow t, subject to a satisfactory framework for prudential rules being establishemd to compete with emerging marketsprevent a crisis on one side of the Atlantic affecting the other side;
2009/01/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 9 #

2008/2199(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
services without a parallel review of the regulatory framework and supervisory standards would make it harder for the authorities to exercise effective control due to the financial institutions and supervisory authorities acting in different spheres;
2009/01/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 11 #

2008/2199(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
4. Calls, consequently, for a greater convergence between the regulatory frameworks in order to strengthen the transparency and control of products, financial institutions and markets and guarantee competition;
2009/01/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 13 #

2008/2199(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Calls for tax havens to be abolished;
2009/01/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 16 #

2008/2199(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
7. Considers that a Code of Conduct should be agreed upon for sovereign wealth funds operating on the transatlantic market;
2009/01/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 18 #

2008/2199(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Stresses the need, as regards the suggestions for transatlantic convergence in the issues raised in paragraphs 2 to 8, for a framework for negotiations to be established under which the reoccurrence of situations similar to those that have led to the present situation, where an American crisis is dragging down Europe's economy, would be avoided;
2009/01/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 5 #

2008/2085(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Draft opinion
Recital B
B. whereas the principle of the free movement of services, as other freedoms of the internal market, are at the core of European integration and therefore those freedoms should not be regarded in any case as limitations to theunder no circumstances limit the exercise of the right to collective bargaining and collective action,
2008/06/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 7 #

2008/2085(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
1. Underlines the need to maintain the balance betweenprevent the misuse of the freedom in the provision of services and the freedom of establishment on one side and securito call into question workers' rights and downg radequate employees’ their working conditions on the other;
2008/06/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 12 #

2008/2085(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
2. Points out, taking into account ECJ rulings, that services providers from other Member States who are forced into negotiations on posted workers' working conditions other than required by the Directive 96/71/EC may lead to the restriction on the freedom to provide services; therefore collective actions aimed at service providers from other Member States should be undertaken in foreseeable wahat recent ECJ rulings have introduced legal uncertainty as regards the lawfulness of the exercise of the right to take collective action and strike action, and have called into question the balances in the social models of several Member States; considers that the European legislative authorities should therefore take appropriate action to remove such legal uncertainty;
2008/06/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 17 #

2008/2085(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Considers that the fact that posted workers may receive less pay than non- posted workers performing the same tasks is an attack on their dignity and their interests; stresses that this is tantamount to discrimination, in the same way as wage disparities between workers for the same work depending on their gender, nationality or any other arbitrary criterion;
2008/06/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 22 #

2008/2085(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
3. Stresses that there is no need to revise the provisions of the Directive on the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services need to be revised;
2008/06/09
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 3 #

2008/2035(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1. Notes that the stagnation or fall in purchasing power of numerous households in the Union, together with the joint impact of wage restraint and rising prices, is prompting a number of European workers to seek additional income through undeclared work;
2008/07/01
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 4 #

2008/2033(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas fiscal fraud imperils equity and fiscal justice, the loss of income to public finance often being compensated by a tax increase hitting the least affluent and most honest taxpayers, who do not have the option or the intention of evading or infringing their tax obligations,
2008/05/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 9 #

2008/2033(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas when examining options, the Commission and the Member States should not contemplateas far as possible avoid measures that could lead to a disproportionate administrative burden on businesses and tax administrations or that could discriminate among traders,
2008/05/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 12 #

2008/2033(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Notes that the purpose of the EU fiscal fraud strategy must be to tackle tax losses due to fiscal fraud by identifying the areas where improvements both to EU legislation and to the administrative cooperation between Member States can be made, that effectively promote the reduction of tax fraud, as far as possible without creating unnecessary burdens both for tax administrations and tax payers;
2008/05/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #

2008/2033(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Calls on the Commission to consider a harmonised European system for collecting data and producing statistics on fiscal fraud, so as to obtain an assessment of the full extent of the phenomenon that is as accurate as possible;
2008/05/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 26 #

2008/2033(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Recognises that with variationthe differences in VAT rates, the taxation of intra- Community supplies would require rebalancing payments between Member States; considers that such rebalancing should be made through a clearing house that would facilitate the passing of revenue between Member States; stresses that the operation of a clearing house is technically feasible;
2008/05/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 34 #

2008/2033(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Points out that reform of the tax savings directive must deal with its various loopholes and deficiencies as they facilitate tax evasion and fiscal fraud operations;
2008/05/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 35 #

2008/2033(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21b. Calls on the Commission, in this connection, to include all legal entities in the directive’s scope, in particular foundations, ‘fiducies’, trusts and other forms of ‘Anstalt’;
2008/05/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 36 #

2008/2033(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 c (new)
21c. Calls on the Commission to extend the financial revenue covered by the directive, so as to include in particular capital gains, dividends and payments made by insurance schemes and pension funds;
2008/05/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 37 #

2008/2033(INI)

Benoît HAMON
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 d (new)
21d. Calls for an end to the transitional system of withholding tax at source, in favour of a general removal of banking secrecy throughout the European Union;
2008/05/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 42 #

2008/0215(CNS)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 5 a (new)
Directive 2003/48/EC
Article 10 – paragraph 2
(5a) Article 10(2) is replaced by the following: "The transitional period shall end a) either at the end of the first full tax year after 1 July 2014; b) or at the end of the first full tax year following the later of the dates given below, provided that this is earlier than the date mentioned in point a): — the date of entry into force of the latest agreement between the European Community, following a unanimous decision of the Council, and the Swiss Confederation, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the Republic of San Marino, the Principality of Monaco and the Principality of Andorra, providing for the exchange of information upon request as defined in the OECD Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters released on 18 April 2002 (hereinafter the "OECD Model Agreement") with respect to interest payments, as defined in this Directive, made by paying agents established within their respective territories to beneficial owners resident in the territory to which the Directive applies, in addition to the simultaneous application by those same countries of a withholding tax on such payments at the rate defined for the corresponding periods referred to in Article 11(1), — the date on which the Council agrees by unanimity that the United States of America is committed to exchange of information upon request as defined in the OECD Model Agreement with respect to interest payments, as defined in this directive, made by paying agents established within its territory to beneficial owners resident in the territory to which the Directive applies.
2009/02/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 56 #

2008/0215(CNS)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 11
Directive 2003/48/EC
Article 18 b – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. The Commission, assisted by the Committee, shall assess, every two year from 1 January 2010 onwards, the performance of the procedures, documents and formats referred to in Article 18a and, acting in accordance with the procedure in Article 18b(2), shall adopt the measures required to improve these.
2009/02/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 57 #

2008/0215(CNS)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Annex – point 2
Directive 2003/48/EC
Annex I
ANNEX I List of legal forms of entities and legal arrangements to which Article 2(3) applies because of the presence within the territory of specific countries or jurisdictions of their place of effective management 1. Entities and legal arrangements whose place of effective management is in a country or jurisdiction outside the territorial scope of the Directive as defined in Article 7 and which is different from those listed in Article 17(2): Antigua and Barbuda International business company Bahamas Trust Foundation International business company Bahrain Financial trust Barbados Trust Belize Trust International business company Bermuda Trust Brunei Trust International business company International trust International Limited Partnership Cook Islands Trust International trust International company International partnership Costa Rica Trust Djibouti Exempt company (Foreign) trust Dominica Trust International business company Fiji Trust French Polynesia Société (Company) Société de personnes (Partnership) Société en participation (Joint venture) (Foreign) trust Guam Company Sole proprietorship Partnership (Foreign) trust Guatemala Trust Fundación (Foundation) Hong Kong Trust Kiribati Trust Labuan (Malaysia) Offshore company Malaysian offshore bank, Offshore limited partnership Offshore trust Lebanon Companies benefiting from the Offshore company regime Macao Trust Fundação (Foundation) Maldives All the companies, partnership and Foreign trust Northern Marianas Islands Foreign sales corporation Offshore banking corporation (Foreign) trust Marshall Islands Trust Mauritius Trust Global business company cat. 1 and 2 Micronesia Company Partnership (Foreign) trust Nauru Trusts/nominee company Company Partnership Sole proprietorship Foreign will Foreign estate Other form of business negotiated with the Government New Caledonia Société (Company) Société civile (Civil company) Société de personnes (Partnership) Joint venture Estate of deceased person (Foreign) trust Niue Trust International business company Panama Fideicomiso (Trust) Fundación de interés privado (Foundation) Palau Company Partnership Sole proprietorship Representative office Credit union (financial cooperative) Cooperative (Foreign) trust Philippines Trust Puerto Rico Estate Trust International banking entity Saint Kitts and Nevis Trust Foundation Exempt company Saint Lucia Trust Saint Vincent and the Grenadine Trust Samoa Trust International trust International company Offshore bank Offshore insurance company International partnership Limited partnership Seychelles Trust International business company Singapore Trust Solomon Islands Company Partnership Trust South Africa Trust Tonga Trust Tuvalu Trust Provident fund United Arab Emirates Trust US Virgin Islands Trust Exempt company Uruguay Trust Vanuatu Trust Exempt company International company 2. Entities and legal arrangements whose place of effective management is in a country or jurisdiction listed in Article 17(2), to which Article 2(3) applies pending the adoption by the country or jurisdiction concerned of provisions equivalent to those of Article 4(2): Andorra Trust Anguilla Trust Aruba Stichting (Foundation) Companies benefiting from the offshore company regime British Virgin Islands Trust International business company Cayman Islands Trust Exempt company Guernsey Trust Zero tax company Isle of Man Trust Jersey Trust Liechtenstein Anstalt (Trust) Stiftung (Foundation) Monaco Trust Fondation (Foundation) Montserrat Trust Netherlands Antilles Trust Stichting (Foundation) San Marino Trust Fondazione (Foundation) Switzerland Trust Foundation Turks and Caicos Exempted company Limited partnership Trust "ANNEX I 1. The legal forms of entities and legal arrangements to which Article 2(3) applies shall include the following: − Limited liability companies whether limited by shares, guarantee or some other mechanism; − Limited liability corporations whether limited by shares, guarantee or some other mechanism; − International companies or corporations; − International business companies or corporations; − Exempt companies or corporations; − Protected cell companies or corporations; − Incorporated cell companies or corporations; − International banks, including corporations of similar name; − Offshore banks, including corporations of similar name; − Insurance companies or corporations; − Reinsurance companies or corporations; − Co-operatives; − Credit unions; − Partnerships of all forms including (without limitation) general partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability partnerships, international partnerships and international business partnerships; − Joint ventures; − Trusts; − Settlements; − Foundations; − Estates of deceased persons; − Funds of all forms; − Branches of any of the entities and arrangements listed here; − Representative offices of any of the entities and arrangements listed here; − Permanent establishments of any of the entities and arrangements listed here; − Multiform Foundation, however described. 2. The specific countries or jurisdictions outside the territorial scope of the Directive as defined in Article 7 and which is different from those listed in Article 17(2) in which Article 2(3) shall apply with regard to the legal forms of entities and legal arrangements referred to in Part 1 of this Annex if their place of effective management is located therein includes: − Anjouan − Antigua and Barbuda − The Bahamas − Bahrain − Barbados − Belize − Bermuda − Brunei − Cook Islands − Costa Rica − Djibouti − Dominica − Dubai − Fiji − French Polynesia − Ghana − Grenada − Guam − Guatemala − Hong Kong − Kiribati − Labuan (Malaysia) − Lebanon − Liberia − Macao − Macedonia − Maldives − Montenegro − Northern Marianas Islands − Marshall Islands − Mauritius − Micronesia − Nauru − New Caledonia − Niue − Panama − Palau − Philippines − Puerto Rico − Saint Kitts and Nevis − Saint Lucia − Saint Vincent and the Grenadines − Samoa − Sao Tome e Principe − Seychelles − Singapore − Solomon Islands − Somalia − South Africa − Tonga − Tuvalu − United Arab Emirates − US Virgin Islands − Uruguay − Vanuatu 3. The specific countries or jurisdictions listed in Article 17(2) in which Article 2(3) shall apply pending the adoption by the country or jurisdiction concerned of provisions equivalent to those of Article 4(2) with regard to the legal forms of entities and legal arrangements referred to in Part 1 of this Annex if their place of effective management is located therein includes: − Andorra − Anguilla − Aruba − British Virgin Islands − Cayman Islands − Guernsey, Alderney or Sark − Isle of Man − Jersey − Liechtenstein − Monaco − Montserrat − Netherlands Antilles − San Marino − Switzerland − Turks and Caicos 4. Any of the legal forms of entities and legal arrangements referred to in Part 1 of this Annex shall be covered by Article 2(3) if their place of effective management is located in any of the specific countries or jurisdictions referred to in Parts 2 and 3 of this Annex subject to the following: a) a country or jurisdiction referred to in Parts 2 and 3 can make an application to the Committee referred to in Article 18b to have any of the legal forms of entities and legal arrangements referred to in Part 1 removed from consideration for their country or jurisdiction on the grounds that the legal forms of entities and legal arrangements referred to could not have their place of effective management located therein or on the ground that appropriate taxation of interest income paid to these legal persons or arrangements is in fact ensured; b) The Committee shall publish its decision with reasons stated within 3 months of such application being made and the legal forms of entities and legal arrangements noted as being removed from the scope of Part 1 for the country or jurisdiction that has made such application for a notified period, not to exceed two years, which period may be extended on application from the country or jurisdiction submitted not more than six months prior to its date of expiry.
2009/02/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 60 #

2008/0215(CNS)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Annex – point 2
Directive 2003/48/EC
Annex III
ANNEX III List of ‘paying agents on receipt’ under Article 4(2) INTRODUCTORY NOTE Trusts and similar legal arrangements are listed for those Member States that do not have a domestic fiscal regime for the taxation of income received on behalf of such legal arrangements by the person who primarily holds legal title and primarily manages its property and income, and is resident on their territory. This list refers to trusts and similar legal arrangements whose place of effective management of their movable assets is in these countries (residence of the main trustee or other administrator responsible for movable assets), irrespective of the laws under which these trusts and similar legal arrangements have been set up. List of entities and Countries Comments arrangements Belgium - Société de droit commun / See Articles 46, 47 and 48 of maatschap (Civil law or the Belgian Company Code. commercial company without any legal status) These ‘companies’ (the - Société momentanée / name of which is given in tijdelijke French and Dutch) do not handelsvennootschap have legal status, and from (Company without any the point of view of taxation, legal status whose purpose a look-through approach is is to deal with one or applicable. several specific commercial operations) - Société interne / stille handelsvennootschap (Company without any legal status through which one or more persons has (have) an interest in operations that one or more other persons manage(s) on their behalf) - ‘Trust’ or other similar legal arrangement Bulgaria - Drujestvo sys specialna Entity exempt from investicionna cel (Special- corporate income tax . purpose investment company) -Investicionno drujestvo (Investment company, not Trusts are allowed for public covered by Article 6) offering in Bulgaria and are exempt from corporate - ‘Trust’ or other similar income tax. legal arrangement Czech Republic - Veřejná obchodní společnost (ver. obch. spol. or V.O.S.) (Partnership) - Sdruženi (Association) - Družstvo (Cooperative) - Evropské hospodářské zájmové sdružení (EHZS) (European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG )) - ‘Trust’ or other similar legal arrangement Denmark - Interessentskaber (General partnership) - Kommanditselskaber (Limited partnership) - Partnerselskaber (Partner company) - Europæisk økonomisk firmagrupper (EØFG) (European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)) - ‘Trust’ or other similar legal arrangement Germany - Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts (Civil law company) - Kommanditgesellschaft — KG, offene Handelsgesellschaft — OHG (Commercial partnership) - Europäische Wirtschaftliche Interessenvereinigung (European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)) Estonia - Täisühing- TÜ (General General and limited partnership) partnerships are taxed as - Usaldusühing-UÜ (Limited separate taxable entities, any partnership) distributions by which are deemed to be dividends - ‘Trust’ or other similar (subject to distribution tax) legal arrangement Ireland - Partnership and investment Irish resident trustee taxable club on income arising to the trust. - European economic interest grouping (EEIG) Greece - Omorrythmos Eteria (OE) Partnerships are subject to (General partnership) corporate income tax. However, up to 50% of the profits of partnerships is - Eterorythmos Eteria (EE) taxed in the hands of the (Limited partnership) individual partners at their personal tax rate - ‘Trust’ or other similar legal arrangement Spain Entities subject to the system for taxing attribution of profits: - Sociedad civil con o sin personalidad jurídica (Civil law partnership with or without legal personality), - Agrupación europea de interés económico (AEIE) (European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)), - Herencias yacentes (Estate of a deceased person), - Comunidad de bienes (Joint ownership). - Other entities without legal personality that constitute a separate economic unit or a separate group of assets (Article 35(4) of the Ley General Tributaria). - ‘Trust’ or other similar legal arrangement France - Société en participation (Joint venture company) - Société ou association de fait (De facto company) - Indivision (Joint ownership) - ‘Trust’ or other similar legal arrangement Italy - Società semplice (Civil law The category of entities partnership and assimilated treated as ‘società semplici’ entity) includes: ‘società di fatto’ (irregular or ‘de facto’ partnerships), which do not have commercial activities as their purpose, and ‘associazioni’ (associations) - Non-commercial entity organised by artists or without legal personality professional persons for the practice of their art or profession in associative - ‘Trust’ or other similar forms with no legal legal arrangement personality The category of non- commercial entities without legal personality is wide, and may include various types of organisations: associations, syndicates, committees, non-profit organisations and others Cyprus - Syneterismos (Partnership) - syndesmos or somatio (Association) - Synergatikes (Cooperative) Trusts created under Cypriot - ‘Trust’ or other similar jurisdiction are considered legal arrangement transparent entities under national law. - Ekswxwria Eteria (Offshore company) Latvia - Pilnsabiedrība (General partnership) - Komandītsabiedrība (Limited partnership) - Eiropas Ekonomisko interešu grupām (EEIG) (European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) - Biedrības un nodibinājumi (Association and foundation); - Lauksaimniecības kooperatīvi (Agriculture cooperative) - ‘Trust’ or other similar legal arrangement Lithuania - Europos ekonominių Interests and capital gains on interesų grup÷s (European shares or bonds derived by Economic Interest associations are exempt from corporate income tax. Grouping (EEIG)) - Asociacija (Association) - ‘Trust’ or other similar legal arrangement Luxembourg - Société en nom collectif (General partnership) - Société en commandite simple (Limited partnership) - ‘Trust’ or other similar legal arrangement Hungary - ‘Trust’ or other similar Hungary recognises trusts as legal arrangement ‘entities’ under national rules Malta - Soëjetà in akomonditia Partnerships ‘en (Partnership ‘en commandite’ the capital of commandite’), the capital of which is divided into shares which is not divided into are subject to general CIT. shares - Arrangement in participation (Association ‘en participation’) - Investment club - Soëjetà Kooperattiva (Cooperative society) The Netherlands - Vennootschap onder firma General partnerships, closed (General partnership) partnerships and EEIGs are transparent for tax purposes. - Commanditaire vennootschap (Closed limited partnership) - Europese economische samenwerkingsverbanden (EESV) (European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)) - Vereniging (Association) Verenigingen (associations) - Stichting (Foundation) and stichtingen - ‘Trust’ or other similar (foundations) are tax exempt legal arrangement unless they carry on a trade or business. Austria - Personengesellschaft Partnership is considered (Partnership) transparent, even if viewed as an entity for the purpose - Offene of profit computation. Personengesellschaft (General commercial partnership) - Kommanditgesellschaft, KG (Limited partnership) - Gesellschaft nach bürgerlichem Recht, GesBR (Civil law partnership) - Offene Erwerbsgeselllschaft (OEG) (Professional general partnership) - Kommandit- Erwerbsgesellschaft Treated like a normal (Professional limited ‘partnership’. partnership) - Stille Gesellschaft (Silent Taxed as a company, interest partnership) income taxed at a reduced - Einzelfirma (Sole rate of 12.5% partnership) - Wirtschaftliche Interessenvereinigung (European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)) - Privatstiftung (Private foundation) - ‘Trust’ or other similar legal arrangement Poland - Spólka jawna (Sp. j.) (General partnership) - Spólka komandytowa (Sp. k.) (Limited partnership) - Spólka komandytowo- akcyjna (S.K.A.) (Limited joint-stock partnership) - Spólka partnerska (Sp. p.) (Professional partnership) - Europejskie ugrupowanie interesów gospodarczych (EUIG) (European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)) - ‘Trust’ or other similar legal arrangement Portugal - Sociedade civil (Civil law Civil law partnerships not partnership) which is not incorporated in a incorporated in a commercial form, commercial form incorporated firms engaged in listed professional activities, ACE (type of incorporated joint venture), EEIGs and companies holding assets which are either controlled by a family group or fully owned by five members or less are fiscally transparent. Other incorporated - Incorporated firms engaged partnerships are treated as in listed professional companies and taxed under activities in which all the general IRC rules. partners are individuals qualified in the same profession - Agrupamento de Interesse Económico (AIE) (domestic economic interest grouping ) - Agrupamento Europeu de Interesse Económico (AEIE) (European Economic Interest Offshore companies Grouping (EEIG)) operating in free-trade zones in Madeira or in Azores - Sociedada gestora de island of Santa Maria are participacoes sociais exempted from CIT and (SGPS) (Holding WHT on dividends, interest, companies which are either royalties and similar controlled by a family payments made to the group or fully owned by foreign parent. five members or less) The only trusts admitted - Herança jacente (namely under Portuguese law are estate of a deceased those set up under foreign person) law by legal persons in the International Business - Unincorporated association Centre of Madeira and trust assets constitute an - Offshore company autonomous part of the operating in free-trade patrimony of the legal zones in Madeira or in person acting as trustee. Azores island of Santa Maria - ‘Trust’ or other similar legal arrangement Romania - Association (partnership) - Cooperative (Cooperative) - ‘Trust’ or other similar legal arrangement Slovenia - Samostojni podjetnik (Proprietorship) - ‘Trust’ or other similar legal arrangement Slovak Republic - Verejná obchodná spoločnosť (General partnership) - Európske združenie The taxable base is first hospodárskych záujmov computed for the limited (European Economic partnership as a whole and interest grouping (EEIG)) then allocated to the general partners and limited - Komanditná spoločnosť partners. The profit shares (Limited partnership) re received by the general income attributed to a partners of a limited general partner partnership are taxed at the level of general partners. The remainder income of the limited partners is taxed initially at partnership level according to the rules for companies. - Združenie (Association) - Entities that are not set up for the purpose of conducting business: chambers of professionals, voluntary civic associations, Nadácia (foundations) Tax-exempt income includes income derived from - ‘Trust’ or other similar activities that are the legal arrangement purpose of the establishment of the organisation, except income subject to the WHT regime. Finland - yksityisliike (Unregistered firm) - avoin yhtiö / öppet bolag (Partnership) - kommandiittiyhtiö / kommanditbolag (Limited partnership) - kuolinpesä / dödsbo (Estate of a deceased person) - eurooppalaisesta taloudellisesta etuyhtymästä (ETEY) / europeiska ekonomiska intressegrupperingar (European Economic interest grouping (EEIG)) - ‘Trust’ or other similar legal arrangement Sweden - handelsbolag (General partnership) - kommanditbolag (Limited partnership) - enkelt bolag (Simple partnership) - ‘Trust’ or other similar legal arrangement United Kingdom - General partnership General partnerships, limited partnerships; limited liability - Limited partnership partnerships and EEIGs are transparent for tax purposes. - Limited liability partnership - EEIG - Investment club (where members are entitled to a specific share of assets) ANNEX III List of ‘paying agents on receipt’ under Article 4(2) INTRODUCTORY NOTE Trusts and similar legal arrangements are listed for those Member States that do not have a domestic fiscal regime for the taxation of income received on behalf of such legal arrangements by the person who primarily holds legal title and primarily manages its property and income, and is resident on their territory. This list refers to trusts and similar legal arrangements whose place of effective management of their movable assets is in these countries (residence of the main trustee or other administrator responsible for movable assets), irrespective of the laws under which these trusts and similar legal arrangements have been set up. List of entities and Countries Comments arrangements Belgium - Société de droit commun / See Articles 46, 47 and 48 of maatschap (Civil law or the Belgian Company Code. commercial company without any legal status) These ‘companies’ (the - Société momentanée / name of which is given in tijdelijke French and Dutch) do not handelsvennootschap have legal status, and from (Company without any the point of view of taxation, legal status whose purpose a look-through approach is is to deal with one or applicable. several specific commercial operations) - Société interne / stille handelsvennootschap (Company without any legal status through which one or more persons has (have) an interest in operations that one or more other persons manage(s) on their behalf) ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement Bulgaria - Drujestvo sys specialna Entity exempt from investicionna cel (Special- corporate income tax purpose investment company) -Investicionno drujestvo (Investment company, not Trusts are allowed for public covered by Article 6) offering in Bulgaria and are exempt from corporate ‘Trust’, foundation or other income tax similar legal arrangement Czech Republic - Veřejná obchodní společnost (ver. obch. spol. or V.O.S.) (Partnership) - Sdruženi (Association) - Družstvo (Cooperative) - Evropské hospodářské zájmové sdružení (EHZS) (European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG )) - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement Denmark - Interessentskaber (General partnership) - Kommanditselskaber (Limited partnership) - Partnerselskaber (Partner company) - Europæisk økonomisk firmagrupper (EØFG) (European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)) - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement Germany - Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts (Civil law company) - Kommanditgesellschaft — KG, offene Handelsgesellschaft — OHG (Commercial partnership) - Europäische Wirtschaftliche Interessenvereinigung (European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)) - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement Estonia - Täisühing- TÜ (General General and limited partnership) partnerships are taxed as - Usaldusühing-UÜ (Limited separate taxable entities, any partnership) distributions by which are deemed to be dividends - ‘Trust’, foundation or (subject to distribution tax). other similar legal arrangement Ireland - Partnership and investment Irish resident trustee taxable club on income arising to the trust. European economic interest grouping (EEIG) - ‘General partnership’ - ‘Limited partnership’ - ‘Investment partnership’ - ‘Non-resident limited liability company’ - ‘Irish common contractual fund’ - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement Greece Partnerships are subject to - Omorrythmos Eteria (OE) corporate income tax. (General partnership) However, up to 50% of the profits of partnerships is taxed in the hands of the - Eterorythmos Eteria (EE) individual partners at their (Limited partnership) personal tax rate. - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement Spain Entities subject to the system for taxing attribution of profits: - Sociedad civil con o sin personalidad jurídica (Civil law partnership with or without legal personality), - Agrupación europea de interés económico (AEIE) (European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)), - Herencias yacentes (Estate of a deceased person), - Comunidad de bienes (Joint ownership). - Other entities without legal personality that constitute a separate economic unit or a separate group of assets (Article 35(4) of the Ley General Tributaria). - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement France - Société en participation (Joint venture company) - Société ou association de fait (De facto company) - Indivision (Joint ownership) - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement Italy - Società semplice (Civil law The category of entities partnership and assimilated treated as ‘società semplici’ entity) includes: ‘società di fatto’ (irregular or ‘de facto’ partnerships), which do not have commercial activities as their purpose, and ‘associazioni’ (associations) - Non-commercial entity organised by artists or without legal personality professional persons for the practice of their art or profession in associative - ‘Trust’, foundation or forms with no legal other similar legal personality. arrangement The category of non- commercial entities without legal personality is wide, and may include various types of organisations: associations, syndicates, committees, non-profit organisations and others. Cyprus - Syneterismos (Partnership) - syndesmos or somatio (Association) - Synergatikes (Cooperative) - ‘Trust’, foundation or Trusts created under Cypriot other similar legal jurisdiction are considered arrangement transparent entities under national law. - Ekswxwria Eteria (Offshore company) Latvia - Pilnsabiedrība (General partnership) - Komandītsabiedrība (Limited partnership) - Eiropas Ekonomisko interešu grupām (EEIG) (European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) - Biedrības un nodibinājumi (Association and foundation); - Lauksaimniecības kooperatīvi (Agriculture cooperative) - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement Lithuania - Europos ekonominių Interests and capital gains on interesų grup÷s (European shares or bonds derived by Economic Interest associations are exempt from corporate income tax. Grouping (EEIG)) - Asociacija (Association) - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement Luxembourg - Société en nom collectif (General partnership) - Société en commandite simple (Limited partnership) - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement Hungary - ‘Trust’, foundation or Hungary recognises trusts as other similar legal ‘entities’ under national arrangement rules Malta - Soëjetà in akomonditia Partnerships ‘en (Partnership ‘en commandite’ the capital of commandite’), the capital of which is divided into shares which is not divided into are subject to general CIT. shares - Arrangement in participation (Association ‘en participation’) - Investment club - Soëjetà Kooperattiva (Cooperative society) - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement Netherlands - Vennootschap onder firma General partnerships, closed (General partnership) partnerships and EEIGs are transparent for tax purposes. - Commanditaire vennootschap (Closed limited partnership) - Europese economische samenwerkingsverbanden (EESV) (European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)) - Vereniging (Association) Verenigingen (Associations) - Stichting (Foundation) and stichtingen - ‘Trust’, foundation or (foundations) are tax exempt other similar legal unless they carry on a trade arrangement or business. Austria - Personengesellschaft Partnership is considered (Partnership) transparent, even if viewed as an entity for the purpose - Offene of profit computation. Personengesellschaft (General commercial partnership) - Kommanditgesellschaft, KG (Limited partnership) - Gesellschaft nach bürgerlichem Recht, GesBR (Civil law partnership) - Offene Erwerbsgeselllschaft (OEG) (Professional general partnership) - Kommandit- Erwerbsgesellschaft Treated like a normal (Professional limited ‘partnership’. partnership) - Stille Gesellschaft (Silent Taxed as a company, interest partnership) income taxed at a reduced - Einzelfirma (Sole rate of 12.5% partnership) - Europäische Wirtschaftliche Interessenvereinigung (European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)) - Privatstiftung (Private foundation) - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement Poland - Spólka jawna (Sp. j.) (General partnership) - Spólka komandytowa (Sp. k.) (Limited partnership) - Spólka komandytowo- akcyjna (S.K.A.) (Limited joint-stock partnership) - Spólka partnerska (Sp. p.) (Professional partnership) - Europejskie ugrupowanie interesów gospodarczych (EUIG) (European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)) - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement Portugal - Sociedade civil (Civil law Civil law partnerships not partnership) which is not incorporated in a incorporated in a commercial form, commercial form incorporated firms engaged in listed professional activities, ACE (type of incorporated joint venture), EEIGs and companies holding assets which are either controlled by a family group or fully owned by five members or less are fiscally transparent. Other incorporated partnerships are treated as - Incorporated firms engaged companies and taxed under in listed professional the general IRC rules. activities in which all partners are individuals qualified in the same profession - Agrupamento de Interesse Económico (AIE) (domestic economic interest grouping ) - Agrupamento Europeu de Interesse Económico (AEIE) (European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)) - Sociedada gestora de Offshore companies participacoes sociais operating in free-trade zones (SGPS) (Holding in Madeira or in Azores companies which are either island of Santa Maria are controlled by a family exempted from CIT and group or fully owned by WHT on dividends, interest, five members or less) royalties and similar payments made to the - Herança jacente (namely foreign parent. estate of a deceased person) The only trusts admitted under Portuguese law are - Unincorporated association those set up under foreign law by legal persons in the - Offshore company International Business operating in free-trade Centre of Madeira and trust zones in Madeira or in assets constitute an Azores island of Santa autonomous part of the Maria patrimony of the legal person acting as trustee. - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement Romania - Association (partnership) - Cooperative (Cooperative) - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement Slovenia Samostojni podjetnik (Proprietorship) - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement Slovakia - Verejná obchodná spoločnosť (General partnership) - Európske združenie The taxable base is first hospodárskych záujmov computed for the limited (European Economic partnership as a whole and interest grouping (EEIG)) then allocated to the general partners and limited - Komanditná spoločnosť partners. The profit shares (Limited partnership) re received by the general income attributed to a partners of a limited general partner partnership are taxed at the level of general partners. The remainder income of the limited partners is taxed initially at partnership level according to the rules for companies. - Združenie (association) - Entities that are not set up for the purpose of conducting business: chambers of professionals, voluntary civic Tax-exempt income includes associations, Nadácia income derived from (foundations) activities that are the purpose of the establishment - ‘Trust’, foundation or of the organisation, except other similar legal income subject to the WHT arrangement regime. Finland - yksityisliike (Unregistered firm) - avoin yhtiö / öppet bolag (Partnership) - kommandiittiyhtiö / kommanditbolag (Limited partnership) - kuolinpesä / dödsbo (Estate of a deceased person) - eurooppalaisesta taloudellisesta etuyhtymästä (ETEY) / europeiska ekonomiska intressegrupperingar (European Economic interest grouping (EEIG)) - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement Sweden - handelsbolag (General partnership) - kommanditbolag (Limited partnership) - enkelt bolag (Simple partnership) - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement United Kingdom - General partnership General partnerships, limited partnerships; limited liability - Limited partnership partnerships and EEIGs are transparent for tax purposes. - Limited liability partnership - EEIG - Investment club (where members are entitled to a specific share of assets) - ‘Trust’, foundation or other similar legal arrangement - Entities and legal arrangements whose place of effective management is in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar, including: − Limited liability companies whether limited by shares, guarantee or some other mechanism; − Limited liability corporations whether limited by shares, guarantee or some other mechanism; − International companies or corporations; − International business companies or corporations; − Exempt companies or corporations; − Protected cell companies or corporations; − Incorporated cell companies or corporations; − International banks, including corporations of similar name; − Offshore banks, including corporations of similar name; − Insurance companies or corporations; − Reinsurance companies or corporations; − Co-operatives; − Credit unions; − Partnerships of all forms including (without limitation) general partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability partnerships, international partnerships and international business partnerships; − Joint ventures; − Trusts; − Settlements; − Foundations; − Estates of deceased persons; − Funds of all forms; − Branches of any of the entities and arrangements listed here; − Representative offices of any of the entities and arrangements listed here; − Permanent establishments of any of the entities and arrangements listed here; − Multiform Foundation, however described.
2009/02/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 25 #

2008/0150(CNS)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 1
Directive 92/79/CEE
Article 2 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that excise duty (specific duty and, ad valorem duty) on cigarettes represents at least 57 % of the weighted average retail selling price of cigarettes sold. That excise duty shall not be less than EUR 64 per 1 000 cigarettes irrespective of the weighted average retail selling price. However, Member States which levy an excise duty of at least EUR 101 per 1 000 cigarettes on the basis of the weighted average retail selling price need not comply with the 57% requirement set out in the first subparagraph and minimum duty) on cigarettes shall not be less than EUR 64 per 1 000 cigarettes.
2008/12/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 29 #

2008/0150(CNS)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 1
Directive 92/79/EEC
Article 2 – paragraph 2
2. As from 1 January 2014, Member States shall ensure that excise duty (specific duty and, ad valorem duty) on cigarettes represents at least 63 % of the weighted average retail selling price and minimum duty) ofn cigarettes sold. That excise duty shall not be less than EUR 90 per 1 000 cigarettes irrespective of the weighted average retail selling price. However, Member States which levy an excise duty of at least EUR 122 per 1 000 cigarettes on the basis of the weighted average retail selling price need not comply with the 63% requirement set out in the first subparagraph.
2008/12/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 36 #

2008/0150(CNS)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 1
Directive 92/79/EEC
Article 2 – paragraph 4
4. By way of derogation from paragraph 2 the second and third subparagraphs of this paragraph shall apply. Poland, HungaryHungary, Poland and Slovakia shall be authorised to bring into force the provisions necessary to comply with paragraph 2 by 31 December 20149 at the latest; they shall apply those provisions from 1 January 2015. Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Estonia and Latv20. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania shall be authorised to bring into force the provisions necessary to comply with paragraph 2 by 31 December 201520 at the latest; they shall apply those provisions from 1 January 20216.
2008/12/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 39 #

2008/0150(CNS)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 1
Directive 92/79/EEC
Article 2 – paragraph 6 − subparagraph 1 a (new)
The Commission shall calculate and publish, on the same occasion and for purposes of information, the European floor price for cigarettes, expressed in euros and in national currencies, adding the excise duty and VAT levied on a nominal packet of cigarettes of a value of EUR 0 pre-tax.
2008/12/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 43 #

2008/0150(CNS)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 2 – point 1
Directive 92/80/EEC
Article 3 − paragraph 1 − subparagraphs 8 and 9
As from 1 January 2010, Member States shall apply an excise duty on fine-cut smoking tobacco intended for the rolling of cigarettes of at least 38% of the retail selling price inclusive of all taxes, and at least EUR 43 per kilogram. As from 1 January 2014, Member States shall apply an excise duty on fine-cut smoking tobacco intended for the rolling of cigarettes of at least 42% of the retail selling price inclusive of all taxes, and at least EUR 60 per kilogram.
2008/12/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #

2008/0150(CNS)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 3 – point -1 (new)
Directive 95/59/EEC
Article 2 – paragraph 2 − subparagraph 1a (new)
-1) Add the following subparagraph to Article 2(2): "Pursuant to Article 24(4) of Council Directive 92/12/EEC of 25 February1992 on the general arrangements for products subject to excise duty and on the holding, movement and monitoring of such products1, the Committee on Excise Duties may adopt opinions on the application to particular products or classes of product of the classification rules of Articles 3 to 7." 1 OJ L 76, 23.3.1992, p. 1.
2008/12/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 48 #

2008/0150(CNS)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 3 – paragraph 4 a (new)
Directive 95/59/EC
Article 9 – paragraph 1 − subparagraph 3
(4a) In Article 9(1), the third subparagraph is replaced by the following: "The second paragraph may not, however, hinder implementation of national systems [...] regarding the control of price levels, the observance of imposed prices or the setting by a Member State of a minimum retail price for one or more of the products defined in Article 2, in the context of that Member State's public health policy".
2008/12/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #

2008/0051(CNS)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive
Recital 27
(27) By virtue of the principle governing the single market, excise duty is to be charged in the Member State in which excise goods are acquired when they are acquired by private individuals for their own use and transported by them. That principle, should also apply in relation to excise goods for the personal use of a private individual transported by a third party on behalf of the private individual, since such transactions are purely private. For health protection reasons this principle should not, however, be extended to cover manufactured tobacco transported on behalf of a private individual.deleted
2008/09/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 28 #

2008/0051(CNS)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – introductory section
1. The competent authorities of the Member State of dispatch, under the conditions fixed by them, shall require that the risks inherent in the movement under suspension of excise duty are covered by a guarantee, which may be provided by one or more of the following persons or on their behalf:
2008/09/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 40 #

2008/0051(CNS)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
As regards excise goods other than manufactured tobacco acquired by private individuals, the first subparagraph shall also apply in cases where the goods are transported on their behalf.deleted
2008/09/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 43 #

2008/0051(CNS)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive
Article 30 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. For the purposes of applying paragraph 2(e), Member States may lay down guide levels, solely as a form of evidence. Those guide levels shall be no less than: a) Tobacco products - 800 cigarettes, - 400 cigarillos (cigarillos are cigars of a maximum weight of 3 grams each), - 200 cigars, - 1 kilogramme of smoking tobacco; b) Alcoholic beverages - 10 litres of spirit drinks, - 20 litres of intermediate products, - 90 litres of wines (including a maximum of 60 l of sparkling wines), - 110 litres of beers.
2008/09/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 47 #

2008/0051(CNS)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive
Article 30 – paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Member States may also provide for excise duty to become chargeable in the Member State of consumption in respect of the acquisition of mineral oils already released for consumption in another Member State if those goods have been moved atypically by or for private individuals. Atypical movement may be considered to denote the movement of fuel in containers other than the vehicle tank or a suitable spare fuel container or the movement of liquid heating fuels by means other than tankers being used for a commercial entrepreneur.
2008/09/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 49 #

2008/0051(CNS)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive
Article 34 – paragraph 4 – point a
(a) register his identity with the tax authorities of the Member State of dispatch of the excise goods and obtain an identification document from these authorities;
2008/09/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 51 #

2008/0051(CNS)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive
Article 37
1. Without prejudice to Article 7(1), Member States may require that excise goods carry tax markings or, national identification marks or any other form of serial or authentication mark used for fiscal purposes at the time when they are released for consumption in their territory, or, in the cases provided for in Article 31(1), first subparagraph, and Article 34(1), when they enter their territory. 2. Any Member State which requires the use of tax marking or, national identification marks or any other form of serial or authentication mark as set out in paragraph 1 shall be required to make them available to authorised warehousekeepers of the other Member States. 3. Without prejudice to any provisions they may lay down in order to ensure that this Article is implemented properly and to prevent any fraud, evasion or abuse, Member States shall ensure that these markings or marks do not create obstacles to the free movement of excise goods. When such markings or marks are affixed to excise goods, any amount paid or guaranteed to obtain such markings or marks shall be reimbursed, remitted or released by the Member State which issued them if excise duty has become chargeable and has been collected in another Member State. 4. Tax markings or, national identification marks or any other form of serial or authentication mark within the meaning of paragraph 1 shall be valid in the Member State which issued them. However, there may be mutual recognition of these markings between Member States.
2008/09/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 124 #

2007/0280(COD)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive
Article 37 - paragraph 1 - point a
a) when the award is made to the most economically advantageous tender from the point of view of the contracting authority, various criteria linked to the subject matter of the public contract in question: for example, quality, price, technical merit, functional characteristics, environmental characteristics, running costs, lifecycle costs, cost-effectiveness, after-sales service and technical assistance, delivery date and delivery period or period of completion, security of supply, and interoperability, ; orthe need for autonomy and operational sovereignty from a European perspective, and the need to shore up the supremacy or industrial and technological independence of the European Union insofar as an economic or strategic advantage is to be gained therefrom.
2008/08/29
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 16 #

2007/0196(COD)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 1 a (new)
Directive 2003/55/EC
Article 3 – paragraph 2
(1a) Article 3(2) shall be replaced by the following: "2. Having full regard to the relevant provisions of the Treaty, in particular Article 86 thereof, Member States may impose on undertakings operating in the gas sector, in the general economic interest, public service obligations which may relate to security, including security of supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies, and environmental protection, including energy efficiency and climate protection. Such obligations shall be clearly defined, transparent, non- discriminatory, verifiable and shall guarantee equality of access for EU gas companies to national consumers. These obligations may in particular take the form of price regulation, including setting a maximum price for the supply of gas to end-users. In relation to security of supply, energy efficiency/demand-side management and for the fulfilment of environmental goals, as referred to in this paragraph, Member States may introduce the implementation of long term planning, taking into account the possibility of third parties seeking access to the system."
2008/03/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #

2007/0196(COD)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 3 a (new)
Directive 2003/55/EC
Article 6a (new)
(3a) The following article shall be inserted: "Article 6a Alternative unbundling requirements In order to ensure the independence of transmission system operators, Member States shall ensure that as from ... * vertically integrated undertakings shall comply with Article 7(1)(a) to (d) on ownership unbundling (OU), Article 9 on independent system operators (ISO), or Article 9b on effective and efficient unbundling (EEU). __________ * One year after the date for transposition."
2008/03/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 38 #

2007/0196(COD)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Directive 2003/55/EC
Article 9 b (new)
Article 9b Effective and efficient unbundling of transmission systems Assets, equipment, staff and identity 1. Transmission system operators shall be equipped with all human, physical and financial resources of the vertically integrated undertaking necessary for the regular business of gas transmission. In particular the transmission system operator shall: (a) own assets that are necessary for the regular business of gas transmission; (b) employ personnel necessary for the regular business of gas transmission; (c) lease personnel and render services, from and to any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of production or supply, on a non-discriminatory basis only and subject to the approval of the competent national public authority in order to exclude competition concerns and conflicts of interest; and (d) keep available appropriate financial resources for future investment projects. 2. The activities deemed necessary for the regular business of gas transmission referred to in paragraph 1 shall include at least: (a) making representations on behalf of the transmission system operator and contacts to third parties and the regulatory authorities; (b) granting and managing third-party access; (c) collecting of access charges and congestion rents; (d) operating, maintain and developing the transmission system; (e) investment planning ensuring the long-term ability of the system to meet reasonable demand and guaranteeing security of supply; (f) legal services; and (g) accountancy and IT services. 3. Transmission system operators shall take the legal form of a joint-stock company. 4. Transmission system operators shall have their own corporate identity, significantly distinct from the vertically integrated undertaking, with separate branding, communication and premises. 5. Transmission system operators' accounts shall be audited by an auditor other than the auditor of the vertically integrated undertaking and all its affiliated companies. Independence of the transmission system operator's management, chief executive officer and executive board 6. Decisions regarding the appointment or premature termination of employment of the transmission system operator's chief executive officer or a member of its executive board and the agreement or termination of employment contracts relating thereto shall be notified to the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority. Those decisions and agreements may become binding only if the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority has not used its right of veto within 3 weeks of notification. A veto may be used in the event that serious doubts arise in regard to the professional independence of a nominee for appointment on the one hand or the justification for the premature termination of employment on the other. 7. Effective rights of appeal to the regulatory authority or another competent national public authority or to a court shall be guaranteed for any complaints by transmission system operator's management against a premature termination of employment. 8. After termination of employment by the transmission system operator, a former chief executive officer or members of the executive board shall be prohibited from participating in any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of production or supply for a period of no less than 3 years. 9. A chief executive officer or member of the executive board shall hold no interest in or receive any compensation from any undertaking of the vertically integrated company other than the transmission system operator. His, her or their remuneration shall in no part depend on activities of the vertically integrated undertaking other than those of the transmission system operator. 10. A transmission system operator's chief executive officer or member of the executive board shall bear no responsibility, directly or indirectly, in the day-to-day operation of any other branch of the vertically integrated undertaking. 11. Without prejudice to the provisions set out in this Article, a transmission system operator shall have effective decision- making rights, independent from the integrated gas undertaking, with respect to assets necessary to operate, maintain or develop the network. This shall not prevent the existence of appropriate coordination mechanisms to ensure that the economic and management supervision rights of the parent company in respect of return on assets, regulated indirectly in accordance with Article 24c, in a subsidiary are protected. In particular, a parent company may approve the transmission system operator's annual financial plan, or any equivalent instrument, and set global limits on the levels of indebtedness of its subsidiary. The parent company shall give no instructions regarding day-to-day operations or with respect to individual decisions concerning the construction or upgrading of transmission gas pipelines that do not exceed the terms of the approved financial plan, or any equivalent instrument. Supervisory board and Board of directors 12. A chairperson of the transmission system operator's supervisory board or board of directors shall not participate in any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of production or supply. 13. The transmission system operator's supervisory board or board of directors shall include independent members, appointed for a term of at least 5 years. Their appointment shall be notified to the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority and shall become binding subject to the conditions set out in paragraph 5. 14. For the purpose of paragraph 12, a member of a transmission system operator's supervisory board or board of directors shall be deemed independent if he or she is free of any business or other relationship with the vertically integrated undertaking or its controlling shareholders or the management of either, which creates a conflict of interest such as to impair his or her judgement, and, in particular, he or she: (a) has not been an employee of any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of production and supply in five years prior to his or her appointment to the supervisory board or board of directors; (b) does not hold any interest in or receive any compensation from the vertically integrated undertaking or any of its affiliates except the transmission system operator; (c) does not have any relevant business relationship with any branch of the vertically integrated company performing functions of energy supply during his appointment to the supervisory board or board of directors; (d) is not a member of the executive board of a company in which the vertically integrated undertaking appoints members of the supervisory board or board of directors. Compliance officer 15. Member States shall ensure that transmission system operators establish and implement a compliance programme which sets out measures taken to ensure that discriminatory conduct is excluded. The programme shall set out the specific obligations of employees to meet that objective and shall be subject to approval of the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority. Compliance with the programme shall be independently monitored by the compliance officer. The regulatory authority shall have the power to impose sanctions in the event of inappropriate implementation of the compliance programme. 16. The transmission system operator' chief executive officer or executive board shall appoint a person or body as a compliance officer in order to: (a) monitor the implementation of the compliance programme ; (b) elaborate an annual report, setting out the measures taken in order to implement the compliance programme and submitting it to the regulatory authority; and (c) issue recommendations on the compliance programme and its implementation. 17. The independence of the compliance officer shall be guaranteed in particular by the terms of his or her employment contract 18. The compliance officer shall have the opportunity regularly to address the supervisory board or board of directors of the transmission system operator, the vertically integrated undertaking, and the regulatory authorities. 19. The compliance officer shall attend all sessions of the supervisory board or board of directors of the transmission system operator that address the following areas: (a) conditions for access and connection to the grid, including the collection of access charges and congestion rents; (b) projects undertaken in order to operate, maintain and develop the transmission grid system, including interconnection and connection investments; (c) balancing rules, including the transmission system operator's flexibility needs; and (d) energy purchases in order to cover the transmission system operator's needs. 20. During the meetings referred to in paragraph 19, the compliance officer shall prevent information about customers or suppliers activities, which may be commercially advantageous from being disclosed in a discriminatory manner to the supervisory board or board of directors. 21. The compliance officer shall have access to all the transmission system operator's relevant books, records and offices and to all the necessary information for the proper performance of his or her duties. 22. The compliance officer shall be appointed and removed from office by the chief executive officer or executive board subject to the prior approval of the regulatory authority. Grid development and powers to make investment decisions 23. A transmission system operator shall elaborate a 10-year network development plan at least every two years. It shall provide efficient measures in order to guarantee system adequacy and security of supply. That development plan shall, in particular: (a) indicate to market participants the main transmission infrastructures that ought to be built over the next ten years. (b) include all the investments already decided upon and identify new investments for which an implementation decision has to be taken during the following three years. 24. In order to elaborate its 10-year network development plan, each transmission system operator shall make reasonable estimates about the evolution of supply, consumption and exchanges with other countries, taking into account regional and European-wide existing network investment plans. A transmission system operator shall submit its estimates to the competent national body within a reasonable time period. 25. The competent national body shall consult all relevant network users on the basis of the draft 10-year network development plan in an open and transparent manner and may publish the result of the consultation process, in particular as regards possible investment needs. 26. The competent national body shall examine whether the 10-year network development plan covers all investment needs identified in the consultation. That body may require a transmission system operator to amend its plan 27. A competent national body in the context of paragraphs 24, 25 and 26, shall include the national regulatory authority, any other competent national public authority, or a network development trustee comprised of transmission system operators. In the latter case, a transmission system operator shall submit its draft statutes, list of members and rules of procedure for approval to the competent national public authority. 28. If a transmission system operator refuses to make a specific investment that is listed in the 10-year network development plan for execution during the following three years, Members States shall ensure that the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority have the competence to: (a) request the transmission system operator to execute its investment obligations using its financial capacities; (b) invite independent investors to tender for the necessary investment in a transmission system, possibly requiring the transmission system operator to agree to: (i) third-party financing; (ii) a third party building a new asset; and/or (iii) a third party operating a new asset. The relevant financial arrangements shall be subject to the approval of the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority. Whether the transmission system operator or a third party make a specific investment, tariff regulation shall allow for revenue that cover the costs of such investment. 29. The competent national public authority shall monitor and evaluate the implementation of the investment plan.
2008/03/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #

2007/0196(COD)

Benoît HAMON, Bernadette VERGNAUD, Catherine NERIS
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 1 a (new)
Directive 2003/55/EC
Article 3 – paragraph 2
1a) Article 3(2) is amended as follows: "2. Having full regard to the relevant provisions of the Treaty, in particular Article 86 thereof, Member States may impose on undertakings operating in the gas sector, in the general economic interest, public service obligations which may relate to security, including security of supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies and environmental protection, including energy efficiency and climate protection. Such obligations shall be clearly defined, transparent, non-discriminatory, verifiable and shall guarantee equality of access for EU gas companies to national consumers. These obligations may, for example, take the form of price regulation, including the fixing of a ceiling price for gas supplies to final users. In relation to security of supply, energy efficiency/demand-side management and for the fulfilment of environmental goals, as referred to in this paragraph, Member States may introduce the implementation of long- term planning, taking into account the possibility of third parties seeking access to the system."
2008/03/12
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 59 #

2007/0196(COD)

Bernadette VERGNAUD, Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 3 a (new)
Directive 2003/55/EC
Article 6 a (new)
(3a) The following article shall be inserted after Article 6: "6a. In order to ensure the independence of transmission system operators Member States shall ensure that as from [date of transposition plus one year] vertically integrated undertakings have to comply either with the provisions of points (a) – (d) of Article 7 on ownership unbundling or with the following provisions of Article 9a on effective and efficient unbundling (“EEU”)."
2008/03/12
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 63 #

2007/0196(COD)

Bernadette VERGNAUD, Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Directive 2003/55/EC
Article 9
Independent system operators 1. Where the transmission system belongs to a vertically integrated undertaking on entry into force of this Directive, Member States may grant derogations from Article 7(1), provided that an independent system operator is designated by the Member State upon a proposal from the transmission system owner and subject to approval of such designation by the Commission. Vertically integrated undertakings which own a transmission system may not in any event be prevented from taking steps to comply with Article 7(1). 2. The Member State may approve and designate an independent system operator only where:: a) the candidate operator has demonstrated that it complies with the requirements of Article 7(1)(b) to (d); ; b) the candidate operator has demonstrated that it has at its disposal the required financial, technical and human resources to carry out its tasks under Article 8;; c) the candidate operator has committed to complying with a ten year network development plan proposed by the regulatory authority; the transmission system owner has demonstrated its ability to comply with its obligations under paragraph 6. To this effect, it shall provide all the draft contractual arrangements with the candidate undertaking and any other relevant entity; e) the candidate operator has demonstrated its ability to comply with its obligations under Regulation (EC) No 1775/05 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 September 2005 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission network* including the cooperation of transmission system operators at European and regional level. 3.Undertakings which have been certified by the regulatory authority as having complied with the requirements of Articles 7a and 9(2) shall be approved and designated as independent system operators by Member States. The certification procedure in Article 7b shall be applicable. 4. Where the Commission has taken a decision in accordance with the procedure in Article 7b and finds that the regulatory authority has not complied with its decision within two months, it shall, within a period of six months, designate, on a proposal from the Agency and after having heard the views of the transmission system owner and the transmission system operator, an independent system operator for a period of 5 years. At any time, the transmission system owner may propose to the regulatory authority the designation of a new independent system operator pursuant to the procedure in Article 9(1). 5. Each independent system operator shall be responsible for granting and managing third party access, including the collection of access charges and congestion rents, for operating, maintaining and developing the transmission system, as well as for ensuring the long term ability of the system to meet reasonable demand through investment planning. When developing the network the independent system operator is responsible for planning (including authorisation procedure), construction and commissioning of the new infrastructure. For this purpose, it shall act as a transmission system operator in accordance with this Chapter. Transmission system owners may not be responsible for granting and managing third party access, nor for investment planning. 6. Where an independent system operator has been designated, the transmission system owner shall: a)provide all the relevant cooperation and support to the independent system operator for the fulfilment of its tasks, including in particular all relevant information; b)finance the investments decided by the independent system operator and approved by the regulatory authority, or give its agreement to financing by any interested party including the independent system operator. The relevant financing arrangements shall be subject to approval by the regulatory authority Prior to this approval, the Regulatory Authority shall consult the asset owner together with other interested parties; c) provide for the coverage of liability relating to the network assets that it owns and are managed by the independent system operator, excluding the liability relating to the tasks of the independent system operator; d) provide guarantees to facilitate financing any network expansions with the exception of those investments where, pursuant to paragraph b, it has given its agreement to financing by any interested party including the independent system operator. 7. In close cooperation with the regulatory authority, the relevant national competition authority shall be granted all relevant powers to effectively monitor compliance of the transmission system owner with its obligations under paragraph 6.Article 9 Deleted
2008/03/12
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 64 #

2007/0196(COD)

Bernadette VERGNAUD, Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 8 a (new)
Directive 2003/55/EC
Article 9 (aa) (new)
(8a) A new article 9(aa) is inserted: "Article 9(aa) Effective and efficient unbundling of transmission systems 1. TSOs shall be equipped with all human, physical and financial resources of the vertically integrated undertaking necessary for the regular business of gas transmission, in particular: (i) Assets that are necessary for the regular business of gas transmission shall be owned by the TSO. (ii) Personnel necessary for the regular business of gas transmission shall be employed by the TSO. (iii) Leasing of personnel and rendering of services, from and to any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of production or supply, shall be limited to cases with no discriminatory potential and be subject to approval by national regulatory authorities in order to exclude competition concerns and conflicts of interest. (iv) Appropriate financial resources for future investment projects shall be kept available in due time. 1b. The activities deemed necessary for the regular business of gas transmission referred to in paragraph 1 shall include at least: • representation of the TSO and contacts to third parties and the regulatory authorities • granting and managing third party access • collection of access charges and congestion rents • operation, maintenance and development of the transmission system • investment planning ensuring the long-term ability of the system to meet reasonable demand and guaranteeing security of supply • legal services • accountancy and IT services 2. TSOs shall be organised in the legal form of a joint-stock company. 3. The TSO shall have its own corporate identity, significantly different from the vertically integrated undertaking with separate branding, communication and premises. 4. TSOs accounts shall be audited by another auditor than the one auditing the vertically integrated undertaking and all its affiliated companies. Independence of the TSO management, chief executive officer / executive board 5. Decisions on the appointment and on any premature termination of the employment of the chief executive officer / members of the executive board of the TSO and the respective contractual agreements of the employment and its termination shall be notified to the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority. These decisions and agreements may become binding only if, within a period of 3 weeks time after notification, to the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority has not used it’s right of veto. A veto may be issued in cases of appointment and respective contractual agreements if serious doubts arise as to the professional independence of the nominated chief executive officer / member of the executive board, or in the case of premature terminations of employment and respective contractual agreements, if serious doubts, exist regarding the reasoning for this measure. 6. Effective rights of appeal to the regulatory authority or another competent national public authority or to a court shall be guaranteed for any complaints by the management of the TSO against premature terminations of their employment. 7. After termination of employment by the TSO, chief executive officers / members of the executive board shall not participate in any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of production or supply for a period of not less than 3 years. 8. The chief executive officer / members of the executive board shall not hold any interest in or receive any compensation from any undertaking of the vertically integrated company other than the TSO. His/their remuneration shall in no part depend on activities of the vertically integrated undertaking other than those of the TSO. 9. The chief executive officer or the members of the executive board of the TSO may not bear responsibility, directly or indirectly, for the day-to-day operation of any other branch of the vertically integrated undertaking. 10. Without prejudice to the provisions of this Article, the TSO shall have effective decision-making rights, independent from the integrated gas undertaking, with respect to assets necessary to operate, maintain or develop the network. This shall not prevent the existence of appropriate coordination mechanisms to ensure that the economic and management supervision rights of the parent company in respect of return on assets, regulated indirectly in accordance with Article 24 c, in a subsidiary are protected. In particular, this shall enable the parent company to approve the annual financial plan, or any equivalent instrument, of the transmission system operator and to set global limits on the levels of indebtedness of its subsidiary. It shall not permit the parent company to give instructions regarding day-to-day operations, nor with respect to individual decisions concerning the construction or upgrading of transmission gas pipelines, that do not exceed the terms of the approved financial plan, or any equivalent instrument. 11. Chairmen of the supervisory board/board of directors of the TSO shall not participate in any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of production or supply. 12. The supervisory boards / boards of directors of TSOs shall include independent members, appointed for a term of at least 5 years. Their appointment shall be notified to the regulatory authority/ or any other competent national public authority and become binding under the conditions described in paragraph 5. 13. For the purposes of paragraph 12, a member of the supervisory board / board of directors of a TSO shall be deemed independent if he is free of any business, or other relationship with the vertically integrated undertaking, its controlling shareholders or the management of either, that creates a conflict of interest such as to impair his judgement, in particular: (a) has not been an employee of any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of production and supply in five years prior to his appointment as supervisory board / board of directors member; (b) does not hold any interest in and does not receive any compensation from the vertically integrated undertaking or any of its affiliates except the TSO (c) does not hold any relevant business relationship with any branch of the vertically integrated company performing functions of energy supply during his appointment as supervisory board / board of directors member ; (d) is not a member of the executive board of a company in which the vertically integrated undertaking appoints members of the supervisory board / board of directors. 14. Member States shall ensure that TSOs establish and implement a compliance programme which sets out measures taken to ensure that discriminatory conduct is excluded. The programme shall set out the specific obligations of employees to meet this objective. It shall be subject to approval of the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority. Compliance with the program shall be independently monitored by the compliance officer. The regulatory authority shall have the power to impose sanctions in case of inappropriate implementation of the compliance program. 15. The chief executive officer / executive board of the TSO shall appoint a person or a body as a compliance officer in charge of : (i) monitoring the implementation of the compliance programme; (ii) elaborating an annual report, setting out the measures taken in order to implement the compliance programme and submitting it to the regulatory authority ; (iii) issuing recommendations on the compliance programme and its implementation. 16. The independence of the compliance officer shall be guaranteed in particular by the terms of his employment contract 17. The compliance officer shall have the opportunity to regularly address the supervisory board/board of directors of the TSO, of the vertically integrated undertaking and the regulatory authorities. 18. The compliance officer shall assist to all sessions of the supervisory board / board of directors of the transmission system operator that address the following areas : (i) conditions for access and connection to the grid, including the collection of access charges and congestion rents; (ii) projects undertaken in order to operate, maintain and develop the transmission grid system, including interconnection and connection investments ; (iii) balancing rules, including TSOs’ flexibility needs ; (iv) energy purchases in order to cover TSOs’ needs. 19. During these sessions, he shall prevent information about customers or suppliers activities which may be commercially advantageous from being disclosed in a discriminatory manner to the supervisory board/board of directors. 20. The compliance officer shall have access to all relevant books, records and offices of the TSO and to all the necessary information for the fulfilment of his task for the proper performance of his duties. 21. The compliance officer shall be nominated and removed by the chief executive officer / executive board only after prior approval by the regulatory authority. Grid development and powers to make investment decisions 22. TSOs shall elaborate a 10-year network development plan at least every two years. They shall provide efficient measures in order to guarantee system adequacy and security of supply. 23. The 10-year network development plan shall in particular : a) indicate to market participants the main transmission infrastructures that ought to be built over the next ten years. b) contain all the investments already decided and identify new investments for which an implementation decision has to be taken in the next three years. 24. In order to elaborate this 10-year network development plan, each TSO shall make a reasonable hypothesis about the evolution of supply, consumption and exchanges with other countries, and takes into account regional and European-wide existing network investment plans. The TSO shall submit in due time the draft to the competent national body. 25. The competent national body shall consult all relevant network users on the basis of a draft for the 10-year network development plan in an open and transparent manner and may publish the result of the consultation process, in particular possible needs for investments. 26. The competent national body shall examine whether the 10-year network development plan covers all investment needs identified in the consultation. The authority may oblige the TSO to amend his plan. 27. A competent national body for the purposes of paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 may be the national regulatory authority, any other competent national public authority or a network development trustee constituted by TSOs. In the latter case, TSOs shall submit the drafts of the statutes, of the list of members and of the rules of procedure to the approval of the competent national public authority. 28. If the TSO rejects to implement a specific investment listed in the 10-year network development plan to be executed in the next three years, Members States shall ensure that the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority is competent to take one or other of the following measures: (a) to request the TSO to execute, by all legal means, his investment obligations using his financial capacities; or (b) to invite independent investors to tender for a necessary investment in a transmission system and, in so doing, may oblige the TSO: - to agree to financing by any third party, - to agree to building by any third party or to build the new assets, and - to operate the new asset. The relevant financial arrangements shall be subject to the approval of the regulatory authority or any other competent national authority. In both cases, tariff regulation shall allow for revenues that cover the costs of such investments. 29. The competent national public authority shall monitor and evaluate the implementation of the investment plan."
2008/03/12
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 19 #

2007/0195(COD)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 1 a (new)
Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 3 – paragraph 2
(1a) In Article 3, paragraph 2 is replaced as follows: "2. Having full regard to the relevant provisions of the Treaty, in particular Article 86 thereof, Member States may impose on undertakings operating in the electricity sector, in the general economic interest, public service obligations which may relate to security, including security of supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies and environmental protection, including energy efficiency and climate protection. Such obligations shall be clearly defined, transparent, non discriminatory, verifiable and shall guarantee equality of access for EU electricity companies to national consumers. These obligations may take the form of supply price regulation, including the fixing of a maximum price for the supply of electricity to final clients. In relation to security of supply, energy efficiency/demand-side management and for the fulfilment of environmental goals, as referred to in this paragraph, Member States may introduce the implementation of long term planning, taking into account the possibility of third parties seeking access to the system."
2008/03/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 31 #

2007/0195(COD)

Benoît HAMON, Bernadette VERGNAUD
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 1 a (new)
Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 3 – paragraph 2
(1a) Article 3(2) is amended as follows: '2. Having full regard to the relevant provisions of the Treaty, in particular Article 86 thereof, Member States may impose on undertakings operating in the electricity sector, in the general economic interest, public service obligations which may relate to security, including security of supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies and environmental protection, including energy efficiency and climate protection. Such obligations shall be clearly defined, transparent, non discriminatory, verifiable and shall guarantee equality of access for EU electricity companies to national consumers. These obligations may, for example, take the form of price regulation, including the fixing of a ceiling price for electricity supplies to final users. In relation to security of supply, energy efficiency/demand-side management and for the fulfilment of environmental goals, as referred to in this paragraph, Member States may introduce the implementation of long term planning, taking into account the possibility of third parties seeking access to the system.
2008/03/28
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 32 #

2007/0195(COD)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. In order to ensure the independence of transmission system operators, Member States shall ensure that as from [date of transposition plus one year]:
2008/03/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 33 #

2007/0195(COD)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point -a (new)
-a) integrated undertakings have to comply either with the provisions of Articles 8, 8a and 8b or with the provisions of Articles 8a, 8b and 8c;
2008/03/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 47 #

2007/0195(COD)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 5 – introductory part
(5) The following Articles 8a, 8b and 8bc are inserted:
2008/03/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 51 #

2007/0195(COD)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 5
Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 8c (new)
Article 8c Effective and efficient unbundling of transmission systems 1. Transmission system operators shall be equipped with all human, physical and financial resources of the vertically integrated undertaking which are required for the regular business of electricity transmission, in particular: (i) assets that are necessary for the regular business of electricity transmission shall be owned by the transmission system operator; (ii) personnel required for the regular business of electricity transmission shall be employed by the transmission system operator; (iii) the leasing of personnel and provision of services to and from any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of generation or supply shall be limited to cases with no discriminatory potential and be subject to approval by national regulatory authorities in order to exclude competition concerns and conflicts of interest; (iv) appropriate financial resources for future investment projects shall be made available in due time. 2. The activities deemed necessary for the regular business of electricity transmission referred to in paragraph 1 shall include at least: - representation of the transmission system operator, contacts to third parties and to the regulatory authorities; - granting and managing third party access; - collection of access charges; - congestion rents and payments under the inter transmission system operator compensation mechanism in compliance with Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003; - operation, maintenance and development of the transmission system; - investment planning ensuring the long- term ability of the system to meet reasonable demand and guaranteeing security of supply; - legal services; - accountancy and IT services. 3. The transmission system operator shall have its own corporate identity, significantly different from the vertically integrated undertaking with separate branding, communication and premises. 4. The accounts of transmission system operators shall be audited by a different auditor than the one auditing the vertically integrated undertaking and all its affiliated companies. Independence of the transmission system operator management, chief executive officer/executive board. 5. Decisions on the appointment and on any premature termination of the employment of the chief executive officer and other members of the executive board of the transmission system operator and the respective contractual agreements of the employment and its termination shall be notified to the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority. These decisions and agreements may become binding unless the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority uses its right of veto within a period of 3 weeks following notification. A veto may be issued in cases of appointment and mutually contractual agreements if serious doubts arise as to the professional independence of the nominated chief executive officer or member of the executive board, or in the case of early termination of employment and mutual contractual agreements, if serious doubts exist as regards the basis for this measure. 6. An effective right of appeal to the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority or court shall be guaranteed for any complaint by the management of the transmission system operator regarding the early termination of their own employment contracts. 7. After termination of employment by the transmission system operator, former chief executive officers and members of the executive board of that transmission system operator shall not work in any capacity in any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of generation or supply for a period of not less than 3 years. 8. The chief executive officer and members of the executive board of the transmission system operator shall not hold any interest in, or receive any compensation from, any undertaking of the vertically integrated company other than the transmission system operator. His/their remuneration shall in no part depend on activities of the vertically integrated undertaking other than those of the transmission system operator. 9. The chief executive officer or the members of the executive board of the transmission system operator may not bear responsibility, directly or indirectly, for the day-to-day operation of any other branch of the vertically integrated undertaking. 10. Without prejudice to the provisions of this Article, the transmission system operator shall have effective decision- making powers independent from the integrated electricity undertaking, with respect to assets necessary to operate, maintain or develop the network. This should not prevent the existence of appropriate coordination mechanisms to ensure that the economic and management supervision rights of the parent company are protected in respect of a return on assets in a subsidiary, as indirectly regulated in accordance with Article 22c. In particular, this shall enable the parent company to approve the annual financial plan or any equivalent instrument of the transmission system operator and to set overall limits on the level of indebtedness of its subsidiary. If the annual financial plan, or any equivalent financial plan, is not approved or changed by the parent company, the case shall be referred to the regulatory authority for a decision. The parent company shall not be permitted to give instructions in day-to-day operations, nor with respect to individual decisions concerning the construction or upgrading of transmission lines that do not exceed the terms of the approved financial plan or any equivalent instrument. 11. Chairmen of the supervisory board or the board of directors of the transmission system operator shall not work in any capacity in any part of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of generation or supply. 12. The supervisory boards or boards of directors of transmission system operators shall include independent members, appointed for a term of at least 5 years. Their appointment shall be notified to the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority and become binding under the conditions described in paragraph 5. 13. For the purposes of paragraph 12, a member of the supervisory board or board of directors of a transmission system operator shall be deemed independent if he is free of any business or other relationship within the vertically integrated undertaking, its controlling shareholders or the management of either that creates a conflict of interest such as to impair his judgement, in particular: (a) has not been an employee of any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of generation and supply in five years prior to his appointment to the supervisory board or board of directors; (b) does not hold any interest in and does not receive any compensation from the vertically integrated undertaking or any of its affiliates except the transmission system operator; (c) does not hold any relevant business relationship with any branch of the vertically integrated company performing functions of electricity supply during his appointment to the supervisory board or board of directors; 14. Member States shall ensure that transmission system operators establish and implement a compliance programme which sets out measures taken to ensure that discriminatory conduct does not occur. The programme shall set out the specific obligations of employees to meet this objective. It shall be subject to the approval of the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority. Compliance with the program shall be independently monitored by the compliance officer. The regulatory authority shall have the power to impose sanctions in case of inappropriate implementation of the compliance program. 15. The chief executive officer or executive board of the transmission system operator shall appoint a person or a body as a compliance officer in charge of: (i) monitoring the implementation of the compliance programme; (ii) producing an annual report which sets out the measures taken in order to implement the compliance programme and submitting it to the regulatory authority; (iii) issuing recommendations on the compliance programme and its implementation. 16. The independence of the compliance officer shall be guaranteed in particular by the terms of his employment contract. 17. The compliance officer shall have the opportunity to regularly address the supervisory board or board of directors of the transmission system operator of the vertically integrated undertaking and the regulatory authorities. 18. The compliance officer shall assist in all sessions of the supervisory board or board of directors of the transmission system operator that address the following issues: (i) conditions for access and connection to the grid, including the collection of access charges, congestion rents, and payments under the inter transmission system operator compensation mechanism in compliance with Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003; (ii) projects undertaken in order to operate, maintain and develop the transmission grid system, including interconnection and connection investments; (iii) balancing rules, including reserve power rules; (iv) energy purchases in order to cover energy losses. 19. During these sessions, the compliance officer shall prevent information about generator or supplier activities which may be commercially sensitive from being disclosed in a discriminatory manner to the supervisory board or board of directors. 20. The compliance officer shall have access to all relevant books, records and offices of the transmission system operator, as well as to all the information required in the proper performance of his duties. 21. The compliance officer shall be nominated and removed by the chief executive officer or executive board only after prior approval by the regulatory authority. 22. Transmission system operators shall elaborate a 10-year network development plan at least every two years. They shall provide efficient measures in order to guarantee system adequacy and security of supply. 23. The 10-year network development plan shall in particular: (i) indicate to market participants the main transmission infrastructures that should preferably be built over the next ten years; (ii) contain all the investments already decided on and identify new investments for which an implementation decision has to be taken in the next three years. 24. In order to elaborate this 10-year network development plan, each transmission system operator shall make a reasonable hypothesis as to the evolution of generation, consumption and exchanges with other countries, and shall take into account regional and European- wide existing network investment plans. The transmission system operator shall submit in due time the draft to the competent national body. 25. The competent national body shall consult all relevant network users on the basis of a draft for the 10-year network development plan in an open and transparent manner and may publish the result of the consultation process, in particular the possible investment needs. 26. The competent national body shall examine whether the 10-year network development plan covers all investment needs identified in the consultation. The authority may oblige the transmission system operator to amend its plan. 27. A competent national body for the purposes of paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 may be the national regulatory authority, any other competent national public authority or a network development trustee established by transmission system operators. In the latter case, transmission system operators shall submit the drafts of the statutes, of the list of members and of the rules of procedure to the approval of the competent national public authority. 28. If the transmission system operator rejects the implementation of a specific investment listed in the 10-year network development plan to be undertaken in the next three years, Members States shall ensure that the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority have the necessary powers to implement one of the two following measures: (i) request the transmission system operator to undertake, by all legal means , its investment obligations using its own financial means, (ii) invite independent investors to tender for the necessary investment in a transmission system and, in so doing, may oblige the transmission system operator: - to agree to financing by any third party, - to agree to the provision of construction works by any third party and to the construction of the new assets; - to agree to operate the new assets. The relevant financial arrangements shall be subject to the approval of the regulatory authority or any other competent national authority. In both cases, tariff regulation shall allow for revenues that cover the costs of such investments. 29. The competent national public authority shall monitor and evaluate the implementation of the investment plan. 30. Transmission system operators shall be obliged to establish and publish transparent and efficient procedures for the non-discriminatory connection of new power plants to the grid. Those procedures shall be subject to the approval of national regulatory authorities or any other competent national public authority. 31. Transmission system operators shall not be entitled to refuse the connection of a new power plant on the grounds of possible future limitations to available network capacities, e.g. congestion in remote parts of the transmission grid. The transmission system operator shall be obliged to supply the necessary information. 32. Transmission system operators shall not be entitled to refuse a new connection point on the sole basis that this new connection would lead to additional costs because of the required capacity increase of grid elements within close range of that new connection point.
2008/03/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #

2007/0195(COD)

Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 10
Independent system operators 1. Where the transmission system belongs to a vertically integrated undertaking on entry into force of this Directive, Member States may grant derogations from Article 8(1), provided that an independent system operator is designated by the Member State upon a proposal from the transmission system owner and subject to approval of such designation by the Commission. Vertically integrated undertakings which own a transmission system may not in any event be prevented from taking steps to comply with Article 8(1). 2. The Member State may approve and designate an independent system operator only where: (a) the candidate operator has demonstrated that it complies with the requirements of Article 8(1)(b) to (d); (b) the candidate operator has demonstrated that it has at its disposal the required financial, technical and human resources to carry out its tasks under Article 9; (c) the candidate operator has committed to complying with a ten year network development plan proposed by the regulatory authority; (d) the transmission system owner has demonstrated its ability to comply with its obligations under paragraph 6. To this effect, it shall provide all the draft contractual arrangements with the candidate undertaking and any other relevant entity; (e) the candidate operator has demonstrated its ability to comply with its obligations under Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity* including the cooperation of transmission system operators at European and regional level. 3. Undertakings which have been certified by the regulatory authority as having complied with the requirements of Articles 8a and 10(2) shall be approved and designated as independent system operators by Member States. The certification procedure in Article 8b shall be applicable. 4. Where the Commission has taken a decision in accordance with the procedure in Article 8b and finds that the regulatory authority has not complied with its decision within two months, it shall, within a period of six months, designate, on a proposal from the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators and after having heard the views of the transmission system owner and the transmission system operator, an independent system operator for a period of 5 years. At any time, the transmission system owner may propose to the regulatory authority the designation of a new independent system operator pursuant to the procedure in Article 10(1). 5. Each independent system operator shall be responsible for granting and managing third party access, including the collection of access charges, congestion rents, and payments under the inter transmission system operator compensation mechanism in compliance with Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, as well as for operating, maintaining and developing the transmission system, and for ensuring the long term ability of the system to meet reasonable demand through investment planning. When developing the network the independent system operator is responsible for planning (including authorisation procedure), construction and commissioning of the new infrastructure. For this purpose, it shall act as a transmission system operator in accordance with this Chapter. Transmission system owners may not be responsible for granting and managing third party access, nor for investment planning. 6. Where an independent system operator has been designated, the transmission system owner shall: (a) provide all the relevant cooperation and support to the independent system operator for the fulfilment of its tasks, including in particular all relevant information; (b) finance the investments decided by the independent system operator and approved by the regulatory authority, or give its agreement to financing by any interested party including the independent system operator. The relevant financing arrangements shall be subject to approval by the regulatory authority. Prior to this approval, the Regulatory Authority shall consult the asset owner together with other interested parties; (c) provide for the coverage of liability relating to the network assets, excluding the liability relating to the tasks of the independent system operator; (d) provide guarantees to facilitate financing any network expansions with the exception of those investments where, pursuant to paragraph b, it has given its agreement to financing by any interested party including the independent system operator. 7. In close cooperation with the regulatory authority, the relevant national competition authority shall be granted all relevant powers to effectively monitor compliance of the transmission system owner with its obligations under paragraph 6.Article 10 deleted
2008/03/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 56 #

2007/0195(COD)

Bernadette VERGNAUD, Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. In order to ensure the independence of transmission system operators, Member States shall ensure that as from [date of transposition plus one year]:, vertically integrated undertakings have to comply: – either with the provisions of Articles 8 and 8a – or with the provisions of Articles 8a, 8b and 8c.
2008/03/28
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 57 #

2007/0195(COD)

Bernadette VERGNAUD, Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 5 – introductory part
The following Articles 8a, 8b and 8bc are inserted:
2008/03/28
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 58 #

2007/0195(COD)

Bernadette VERGNAUD, Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 5
Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 8 (ba) (new)
Article 8 c Effective and efficient unbundling of transmission systems 1. Transmission systems operators shall be equipped with all human, physical and financial resources of the vertically integrated undertakings necessary for the regular business of electricity transmission, in particular: (i) assets that are necessary for the regular business of electricity transmission shall be owned by the transmission system operator; (ii) personnel necessary for the regular business of electricity transmission shall be employed by the transmission system operator; (iii) leasing of personnel and rendering of services from and to any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of production or supply shall be limited to cases with no discriminatory potential and be subject to approval by national regulatory authorities in order to exclude competition concerns and conflicts of interest; (iv) appropriate financial resources for future investment projects shall be made available in due time. 2. The activities deemed necessary for the regular business of electricity transmission referred to in paragraph 1 shall include at least: - the representation of the transport systems operator and contacts with third parties and the regulatory authorities; - granting and managing third party access; - the collection of access charges; - revenue from congestion management and payments under the compensation mechanism applicable between transmission systems operators under Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003; - operation, maintenance and development of the transmission system; - investment planning ensuring the long- term ability of the system to meet reasonable demand and guaranteeing security of supply; - legal services; - accountancy and information technology services. 3. The transmission system operator shall have its own corporate identity significantly different from the vertically integrated undertaking, with separate branding, communication tools and premises. 4. Transport system operators' accounts shall be audited by another auditor than the one auditing the vertically integrated undertaking and all its affiliated companies. Independence of the TSO management, chief executive officer/executive board 5. Decisions on the appointment and on any premature termination of the employment of the chief executive officer/members of the executive board of the TSO and the respective contractual agreements of the employment and its termination shall be notified to the regulatory authority or any other competent national authority. These decisions and agreements may become binding unless, within a period of three weeks after notification, the regulatory authority has used its right of veto. A veto may be issued in cases of appointment and respective contractual agreements if serous doubts arise as to the professional independence of the nominated chief executive officer/member of the executive board or in the case of premature terminations of employment and respective contractual agreements if serious doubts exist regarding the reasoning for this measure. 6. Effective rights to appeal to the regulatory authority or other competent national public authority or to a court shall be guaranteed for any complaints by the management of the TSO against premature terminations of their employment. 7. After termination of employment by the TSO, former chief executive officer/members of the executive board shall not participate in any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of production or supply for a period of not less than three years. 8. The chief executive officer/members of the executive board shall not hold any interest in or receive any compensation from any undertaking of the vertically integrated company other than the TSO. His/their remuneration shall in no part depend on activities of the vertically integrated undertaking other than those of the TSO. 9. The chief executive officer or the members of the executive board of the TSO may not bear responsibility directly or indirectly for the day to day operation of any other branch of the vertically integrated undertaking. 10. Without prejudice to the provisions of this article, the TSO shall have effective decision-making rights independent from the integrated electricity undertaking with respect to assets necessary to maintain or develop the network. This shall not prevent the existence of appropriate coordination mechanisms to ensure that the economic and management supervision rights of the parent company in respect of return on assets regulated indirectly in accordance with Article 22c in a subsidiary are protected. In particular, this shall enable the parent company to approve the annual financial plan or any equivalent instrument of the transmission system operator and to set global limits on the level of indebtedness of its subsidiary. It shall not, however, permit the parent company to give instructions for the day to day operations nor with respect to individual decisions concerning the construction or upgrading of transmission lines complying with the terms of the approved financial plan and any other equivalent instrument. 11. The chairmen of the supervisory board/board of directors of the TSO shall not participate in any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of production or supply. 12. The supervisory boards and the boards of directors of TSOs will include independent members appointed for a term of at least five years. Their appointment shall be notified to the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority and become binding under the conditions described in paragraph 5. 13. For the purposes of paragraph 12, a member of the supervisory board / board of directors of a TSO shall be deemed independent if he is free of any business, or other relationship with the vertically integrated undertaking, its controlling shareholders or the management of either, that creates a conflict of interest such as to impair his judgement, in particular: (a) has not been an employee of any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of production and supply in the five years prior to his appointment as supervisory board / board of directors member; (b) does not hold any interest in and does not receive any compensation from the vertically integrated undertaking or any of its affiliates except the TSO (c) does not hold any relevant business relationship with any branch of the vertically integrated company performing functions of energy supply during his appointment as supervisory board / board of directors member ; (d) is not a member of the executive board of a company in which the vertically integrated undertaking appoints members of the supervisory board / board of directors. 14. Member States shall ensure that TSOs establish and implement a compliance programme which sets out measures taken to ensure that discriminatory conduct is excluded. The programme shall set out the specific obligations of employees to meet this objective. It shall be subject to approval of the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority. Compliance with the program shall be independently monitored by the compliance officer referred to in paragraph 15. The regulatory authority shall have the power to impose sanctions in case of inappropriate implementation of the compliance program. 15. The chief executive officer / executive board of the TSO shall appoint a person or a body as a compliance officer in charge of : (i) monitoring the implementation of the compliance programme; (ii) elaborating an annual report, setting out the measures taken in order to implement the compliance programme and submitting it to the regulatory authority ; (iii) issuing recommendations on the compliance programme and its implementation. 16. The independence of the compliance officer shall be guaranteed in particular by the terms of his employment contract 17. The compliance officer shall have the opportunity to regularly address the supervisory board/board of directors of the TSO, of the vertically integrated undertaking and the regulatory authorities. 18. The compliance officer shall assist to all sessions of the supervisory board / board of directors of the transmission system operator that address the following areas : (i) conditions for access and connection to the grid, including the collection of access charges and congestion rents and payments made under the inter transmission operator compensation mechanism referred to in Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003; (ii) projects undertaken in order to operate, maintain and develop the transmission grid system, including interconnection and connection investments ; (iii) balancing rules, including rules governing reserve capacity; (iv) energy purchases in order to cover energy losses. 19. During these sessions, he shall prevent information about producers’ or suppliers’ activities which may be commercially advantageous from being disclosed in a discriminatory manner to the supervisory board/board of directors. 20. The compliance officer shall have access to all relevant books, records and offices of the TSO and to all the necessary information for the fulfilment of his task for the proper performance of his duties. 21. The compliance officer shall be appointed and removed by the chief executive officer / executive board only after prior approval by the regulatory authority. 22. TSOs shall elaborate a ten-year network development plan at least every two years. They shall provide efficient measures in order to guarantee system adequacy and security of supply. 23. The 10-year network development plan shall in particular : (i) indicate to market participants the main transmission infrastructures that ought to be built over the next ten years. (ii) contain all the investments already decided and identify new investments for which an implementation decision has to be taken in the next three years. 24. In order to elaborate this ten-year network development plan, each TSO shall make a reasonable hypothesis about the evolution of supply, consumption and exchanges with other countries, and takes into account regional and European-wide existing network investment plans. The TSO shall submit in due time the draft to the competent national body. 25. The competent national body shall consult all relevant network users on the basis of a draft for the ten-year network development plan in an open and transparent manner and may publish the result of the consultation process, in particular possible needs for investments. 26. The competent national body shall examine whether the ten-year network development plan covers all investment needs identified in the consultation. The authority may oblige the TSO to amend his plan. 27. A competent national body for the purposes of paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 may be the national regulatory authority, any other competent national public authority or a network development trustee constituted by TSOs. In the latter case, TSOs shall submit the drafts of the statutes, of the list of members and of the rules of procedure to the approval of the competent national public authority. 28. If the TSO rejects to implement a specific investment listed in the ten-year network development plan to be executed in the next three years, Members States shall ensure that the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority is competent to take one or other of the following measures: (i) to request the TSO to execute, by all legal means, his investment obligations using his financial capacities; or (ii) to invite independent investors to tender for a necessary investment in a transmission system and, in so doing, may oblige the TSO: - to agree to financing by any third party, - to agree to building by any third party or to build the new assets, and - to operate the new asset. The relevant financial arrangements shall be subject to the approval of the regulatory authority or any other competent national authority. In both cases, tariff regulation shall allow for revenues that cover the costs of such investments. 29. The competent national public authority shall monitor and evaluate the implementation of the investment plan. 30. The TSOs shall be required to define and publish transparent and efficient procedures for a non-discriminatory connection of new power stations to the grid. These procedures shall be subject to the approval of the national regulatory authorities or any other competent national public authority. 31. The TSOs shall not be entitled to refuse to connect a new power station by invoking the possible introductions of future ceilings on available grid capacity, for example because of the congestion of remote grid segments. The TSO shall be required to supply the necessary information. 32. The TSO shall not be entitled to refuse a new connection on the sole grounds that it will involve additional costs requiring a capacity increase of network elements situated in the immediate proximity of the connection point.
2008/03/28
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 60 #

2007/0195(COD)

Bernadette VERGNAUD, Benoît HAMON
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 10
Independent systems operators 1. Where the transmission system belongs to a vertically integrated undertaking on entry into force of this Directive, Member States may grant derogations from Article 8(1), provided that an independent system operator is designated by the Member State upon a proposal from the transmission system owner and subject to approval of such designation by the Commission. Vertically integrated undertakings which own a transmission system may not in any event be prevented from taking steps to comply with Article 8(1). 2. The Member State may approve and designate an independent system operator only where: (a) the candidate operator has demonstrated that it complies with the requirements of Article 8(1)(b) to (d); (b) the candidate operator has demonstrated that it has at its disposal the required financial, technical and human resources to carry out its tasks under Article 9; (c) the candidate operator has committed to complying with a ten year network development plan proposed by the regulatory authority; (d) the transmission system owner has demonstrated its ability to comply with its obligations under paragraph 6. To this effect, it shall provide all the draft contractual arrangements with the candidate undertaking and any other relevant entity; (e) the candidate operator has demonstrated its ability to comply with its obligations under Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity* including the cooperation of transmission system operators at European and regional level. 3. Undertakings which have been certified by the regulatory authority as having complied with the requirements of Articles 8a and 10(2) shall be approved and designated as independent system operators by Member States. The certification procedure in Article 8b shall be applicable. 4. Where the Commission has taken a decision in accordance with the procedure in Article 8b and finds that the regulatory authority has not complied with its decision within two months, it shall, within a period of six months, designate, on a proposal from the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators and after having heard the views of the transmission system owner and the transmission system operator, an independent system operator for a period of 5 years. At any time, the transmission system owner may propose to the regulatory authority the designation of a new independent system operator pursuant to the procedure in Article 10(1). 5. Each independent system operator shall be responsible for granting and managing third party access, including the collection of access charges, congestion rents, and payments under the inter transmission system operator compensation mechanism in compliance with Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, as well as for operating, maintaining and developing the transmission system, and for ensuring the long term ability of the system to meet reasonable demand through investment planning. When developing the network the independent system operator is responsible for planning (including authorisation procedure), construction and commissioning of the new infrastructure. For this purpose, it shall act as a transmission system operator in accordance with this Chapter. Transmission system owners may not be responsible for granting and managing third party access, nor for investment planning. 6. Where an independent system operator has been designated, the transmission system owner shall: (a) provide all the relevant cooperation and support to the independent system operator for the fulfilment of its tasks, including in particular all relevant information; (b) finance the investments decided by the independent system operator and approved by the regulatory authority, or give its agreement to financing by any interested party including the independent system operator. The relevant financing arrangements shall be subject to approval by the regulatory authority. Prior to this approval, the Regulatory Authority shall consult the asset owner together with other interested parties; (c) provide for the coverage of liability relating to the network assets, excluding the liability relating to the tasks of the independent system operator; (d) provide guarantees to facilitate financing any network expansions with the exception of those investments where, pursuant to paragraph b, it has given its agreement to financing by any interested party including the independent system operator. 7. In close cooperation with the regulatory authority, the relevant national competition authority shall be granted all relevant powers to effectively monitor compliance of the transmission system owner with its obligations under paragraph 6.Article 10 deleted
2008/03/28
Committee: IMCO
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