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Activities of Corien WORTMANN-KOOL related to 2010/0280(COD)

Plenary speeches (1)

Prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances (A7-0183/2011 - Elisa Ferreira)
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0280(COD)

Reports (1)

REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies PDF (523 KB) DOC (469 KB)
2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2010/0280(COD)
Documents: PDF(523 KB) DOC(469 KB)

Amendments (36)

Amendment 71 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation
Citation 2 a (new)
- having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank,
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 88 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 a (new)
(3a) Treaty-based instruments for economic coordination and surveillance should be strengthened by establishing a common framework for the submission, monitoring and implementation of national reform programmes that enhance competitiveness and are conducive to sustainable growth and employment as an integral part of a European growth strategy.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 137 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
(7) The obligation to achieve and maintain the medium-term budgetary objective needs to be put into operation, through the specification of principles of prudent fiscal policy-makingfor the adjustment path towards the medium-term objective.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 150 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) Prudent fiscal policy-making implies thatSufficient progress towards the MTO shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures. In this regard, and as long as the MTO is not achieved, the growth rate of government expenditure doesshall normally not exceed a prudentreference medium-term growth rate of GDP,potential GDP growth, with increases in excess of that norm arebeing matched by discretionary increases in government revenues and discretionary revenue reductions arebeing compensated by reductions in expenditure. The reference medium-term rate of potential GDP growth shall be calculated according to a commonly agreed methodology validated by the Member States.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 162 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
(10) A temporary departure from prudent fiscal policy-makingthe adjustment path towards the medium-term objective should be allowed in case of severe economic downturn of a general nature in order to facilitate economic recovery.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 170 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) In the event of a significant deviation from prudent fiscal-policythe adjustment path towards the medium-term objective a warning shouldall be addressed by the Commission to the Member State concerned and in case the significant deviation persists or is particularly serious, a recommendation should be addressed to the Member State concerned to take the necessary corrective measuresto be followed within one month by a Council recommendation, setting a deadline to take the necessary corrective measures. The Member State concerned should report to the Council on the action taken. If the Member State concerned fails to take appropriate action in the deadline set by the Council, the Council should adopt a recommendation stating so and report to the European Council. The Commission, in liaison with the ECB for euro area Member States and for ERM2 Member States, may carry out a monitoring mission. The Commission will report to the Council on the outcome of the mission and will make its findings public within one month.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 187 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) In order to ensure compliance with the fiscal surveillance framework of the Union for participating Member States, a specific enforcement mechanism should be established on the basis of Article 136 of the Treaty for cases where aof persistent and significant deviation from prudent fiscal policy making prevailsthe adjustment path towards the medium-term objective.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 193 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point -1 (new)
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 1
[Current text of Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97:-1. Article 1 is replaced by the following: "Article 1 "Article 1 This Rregulation sets out the rules covering the content, the submission, the examination and the monitoring of stability programmes and, convergence programmes and national reform programmes as part of multilateral surveillance by the Council and the Commission so as to prevent, at an early stage, the occurrence of excessive general government deficits and debt and to promote growth through the surveillance and coordination of economic policies."]
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 225 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 1 d (new)
Regulation (EC) no 1466/97
Section 1A a (new)
1d. The following section is inserted: "Section 1Aa NATIONAL REFORM PROGRAMMES Article 2aa 1. In order for Member States to conduct their economic policies with the view to contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Union, in particular the obligation to regard their economic policy as a matter of common concern, and in the context of the broad guidelines referred to in Article 121.2 TFEU, Member States shall establish national reform programmes, which shall enhance competitiveness and be conducive to sustainable growth and employment. 2. Each Member State shall submit annually between 1 and 30 April to the Council and Commission the national reform programme for the purpose of multilateral surveillance under Article 121.3 TFEU. 3. Member States shall make public their national reform programmes after due involvement of the national parliament and consultation of national stakeholders, including social partners. 4. The national reform programme shall include detailed information about the planned actions and decision taken by the government in accordance with: (a) the broad economic policy guidelines and the employment guidelines; (b) the annual policy guidelines agreed upon by the European Council; (c) the Council recommendations and the policy warnings by the Commission. 5. The Council shall, based on an assessments by the Commission and, as part of multilateral surveillance in accordance with Article 121 TFEU, monitor the implementation of the national reform programmes with a view to reaching the objectives set out in paragraph 1. This assessments should take into account the information provided by Member States, particularly those in the euro area, to each other and the Commission on potential economic policy decisions with expected significant spill-over effects, which may jeopardise the smooth functioning of the internal market and of the Economic and Monetary Union. 6. The Council shall monitor whether the planned policy actions and the economic assumptions on which the programme is based are plausible, and whether more policy actions would be required in order to reach the objectives as set out in paragraph 1. 7. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall deliver an opinion on the programme. Where the Council considers that the objectives and contents of a programme should be strengthened, the Council shall, in its opinion, invite the Member State concerned to adjust its programme and submit a updated programme within 2 months. The updated programmes shall be examined by the Council and the Commission in accordance with the procedure set out in this Article. 8. In the event that the Council identifies significant divergence from the policy objectives agreed upon in the opinion referred to in Article 7, it shall, with a view to giving an early warning in accordance with Article 121.4 TFEU, give a recommendation to the Member State concerned to take the necessary adjustment measures. 9. In the event referred to in paragraph 8 the Commission may address a warning to the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 121.3 TFEU. The warning shall be made public. 10. In the event referred to in paragraph 8 and 9 the European Parliament may invite the Member State concerned to explain its policies before its competent committee. 11. The President of the Council and the Commission shall report annually to the European Council and the European Parliament on the results of the multilateral surveillance in accordance with 121.5 TFEU. In the case of serious concerns as regards to the progress made by a specific Member State the Council may, on a proposal by the Commission, submit a specific report to the European Council and the European Parliament."
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 232 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 1 e (new)
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Section 1A b (new)
1e. The following section is inserted: "Section 1Ab HEARING OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE EURO GROUP Article 2ab The President of the Euro Group may, at the request of the European Parliament or on his own initiative, be heard by the competent committees of the European Parliament, in particular in regard to the work programme of the Euro group, the economic situation in the euro area, the evolution of the competitiveness in the Member States and the real convergence of the economies, the sustainability of the budgetary positions of the Member States, the achievement of the national reform plans and the evolution of macro- economic imbalances within the EU."
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 238 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – subpoint b – subpoint i
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the medium-term budgetary objective and the adjustment path towards this objective for the general government balance as a percentage of GDP, the expected path of the general government debt ratio, the planned growth path of government expenditure, in particular bearing in mind the conditions and criteria to establish the expenditure growth under Article 5(1), the planned growth path of government revenue at unchanged policy and a quantification of the planned discretionary revenue measures;
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 266 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – subpoint c
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 3 – paragraph 3
3. The information about the paths for the general government balance and debt ratio, the growth of government expenditure, the planned growth path of government revenue at unchanged policy, the planned discretionary revenue measures, appropriately quantified, and the main economic assumptions referred to in paragraph 2(a) and (b) shall be on an annual basis and shall cover, the preceding year, the current year and at least the following three years.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 276 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
The Council and the Commission, when assessing the adjustment path toward the medium-term budgetary objective, shall examine if the Member State concerned pursues an appropriate annual improvement of its cyclically-adjusted budget balance, net of one-off and other temporary measures, required to meet its medium-term budgetary objective, with 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark. For Member States faced with a highdebt level of debt or excessive macroeconomic imbalances or both, the Councilexceeding 60% of GDP or with pronounced risks of overall debt sustainability, the Council and the Commission shall examine whether the annual improvement of the cyclically-adjusted budget balance, net of one-off and other temporary measures is significantly higher than 0.5% of GDP. The Council and the Commission shall take into account whether a higher adjustment effort is made in economic good times, whereas the effort may be more limited in economic bad times.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 289 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
With a view to ensuring that the medium- term budgetary objective is effectively achieved and maintained, the Council shall verify thatSufficient progress towards the MTO shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as the reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures. To this effect, the Council and the Commission shall assess whether the growth path of government expenditure, taken in conjunction with the effect of measures being taken or planned on the revenue side, is consistent with prudent fiscal policy- making.in line with the following conditions:
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 302 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4 – point a
(a) for Member States that have achieved the medium-term budgetary objective, annual expenditure growth does not exceed a prudentreference medium-term rate of potential GDP growth, unless the excess is matched by discretionary revenue measures;
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 310 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4 – point b
(b) for Member States that have not yet reached their medium-term budgetary objective, annual expenditure growth does not exceed a rate below a prudentreference medium- term rate of potential GDP growth, unless the excess is matched by discretionary revenue measures. The size of the shortfall of the growth rate of government expenditure compared to a prudentreference medium-term rate of potential GDP growth is set in such a way as to ensure an appropriate adjustment towards the medium-term budgetary objective;
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 316 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4 – point c
(c) for Member States that have not yet reached their medium-term budgetary objective, discretionary reductions of government revenue items are matched either by expenditure reductions or by discretionary increases in other government revenue items or both. The expenditure aggregate should exclude interest expenditure, expenditure on EU programmes fully matched by EU funds revenue and non-discretionary changes in unemployment benefit expenditure. The excess of expenditure growth over the medium-term reference should not be counted as a breach of the benchmark to the extent that it is fully offset by revenue increases mandated by law.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 322 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 5
The prudentreference medium-term ofrate of potential GDP growth shouldall be assessed on the basis of forward looking projections, over a ten-year horizonr on backward looking projections if the latter do not lead to a slower adjustment path towards the medium-term objective. Projections shall be updated at regular intervals.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 340 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 7
SWithin these reforms, special attention shall be paid to pension reformsthat of pensions, when introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar. Member States implementing such reforms shall be allowed to deviate from the adjustment path to their medium-term budgetary objective or from the objective itself, with the deviation reflecting the net cost of the reform to the publicly managed pillar, under the condition that the deviation remains temporary and that an appropriate safety margin with respect to the deficit reference value is preserved.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 356 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 9
In periods of severe economic downturn of a general nature Member States may be allowed to temporarily depart from the adjustment path implied by prudent fiscal- policy makingtowards the medium-term objective referred to in the fourth subparagraph.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 368 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 6 – paragraph 1
1. As part of multilateral surveillance in accordance with Article 121(3) of the Treaty, the Council shall monitor the implementation of stability programmes, on the basis of information provided by participating Member States and of assessments by the Commission and the Economic and Financial Committee, in particular with a view to identifying actual or expected significant divergences of the budgetary position from the medium-term budgetary objective, or from the appropriate adjustment path towards it ensuing from deviations from prudent fiscal-policy making.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 375 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – first subparagraph
In the event of a significant deviation from prudent fiscal-policy makingthe adjustment path towards the medium- term objective referred in the fourth subparagraph of Article 5(1) of this regulation, and in order to prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit, the Commission, in accordance with Article 121(4) of the Treaty may address a warning to the Member State concerned. shall address a warning to the Member State concerned. Such a warning shall be made public and the European Parliament may invite the Member State concerned to explain its policies before its competent committee. The Council shall, within one month of any significant deviation as referred to in the first subparagraph, adopt a recommendation for policy measures setting a deadline of no more than five months, for addressing the deviation, on the basis of a Commission recommendation, based on Article 121(4) TFEU. In the event of a particularly significant deviation or in a particularly serious situation, the deadline shall be no more than three months. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall make the recommendation public. The Commission shall monitor the measures contained in the recommendation on the basis of surveillance visits in accordance with Article 6a and prepare a report to the Council. That report shall be made public within one month. If the Member State concerned fails to take appropriate action within the deadline specified in a Council recommendation under the second subparagraph, the Council shall immediately adopt a final recommendation setting out the non- compliance of the Member State on the basis of a further Commission recommendation in accordance with Article 121(4) TFEU. At the same time, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall address a formal report to the European Council. The process from the Council recommendation referred to in the second subparagraph to the final Council recommendation and report to the European Council referred to in the fourth subparagraph shall be no longer than six months. A deviation from the medium-term budgetary objective or the appropriate adjustment path towards it shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as the reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, as defined in Article 5, paragraph 1.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 386 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
A deviation from prudent fiscal policy making shall be considered significant if the following conditions occur: an excess over the expenditure growThe assessment of whether the deviation is significant shall notably include the following criteria: For a Member State that has not reached the medium-term budgetary objective, when assessing the consistent with prudent fiscal policy-making, not offset by discretionary revenue-increasing measures;hange in the structural balance, the deviation shall be considered significant if it is at least 0.5% of GDP in one single year or at least 0.25% of GDP on average per year in two consecutive years; when assessing expenditure developments net orf discretionary revenue- decreasing measures not offset by reductions in expenditure; and the deviation measures, the deviation shall be considered significant if it has a total impact on the government balance of at least 0.5 % of GDP in one single year or of at least 0.25 % of GDP on average per yearcumulatively in two consecutive years.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 417 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 6 – subpoint b – subpoint i
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the medium-term budgetary objective and the adjustment path towards this objective for the general government balance as a percentage of GDP, the expected path of the general government debt ratio, the planned growth path of government expenditure, in particular bearing in mind the conditions and criteria to establish the expenditure growth under Article 9(1), the planned growth path of government revenue at unchanged policy and a quantification of the planned discretionary revenue measures, the medium-term monetary policy objectives, the relationship of those objectives to price and exchange rate stability and to the achievement of sustained convergence;
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 432 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 6 – subpoint c
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 7 – paragraph 3
3. The information about the paths for the general government balance and debt ratio, the growth of government expenditure, the planned growth path of government revenue at unchanged policy, the planned discretionary revenue measures, appropriately quantified, and the main economic assumptions referred to in paragraph 2(a) and (b) shall be on an annual basis and shall cover the preceding year, the current year and at least the following three years.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 444 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
The Council and the Commission, when assessing the adjustment path toward the medium-term budgetary objective, shall take into account whether a higher adjustment effort is made in economic good times, whereas the effort may be more limited in economic bad times. For Member States faced with a highdebt level of debt or excessive macroeconomic imbalances or both, the Councilexceeding 60% of GDP or with pronounced risks of overall debt sustainability, the Council and the Commission shall examine whether the annual improvement of the cyclically- adjusted budget balance, net of one-off and other temporary measures is higher than 0.5% of GDP. For ERM2 Member States, the Council and the Commission shall examine if the Member State concerned pursues an appropriate annual improvement of its cyclically adjusted balance, net of one-off and other temporary measures, required to meet its medium- term budgetary objective, with 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 455 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
With a view to ensuring that the medium- term budgetary objectivSufficient progress towards the MTO shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance ias effectively achieved and maintained, the Council shall verify thatthe reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures. To this effect, the Council and the Commission shall assess whether the growth path of government expenditure, taken in conjunction with the effect of the measures being taken or proposlanned on the revenue side, is consistent with prudent fiscal- policy making.in line with the following conditions:
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 467 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4 – point a
(a) for Member States that have achieved the medium-term budgetary objective, annual expenditure growth does not exceed a prudentreference medium-term rate of potential GDP growth, unless the excess is matched by discretionary revenue measures;
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 474 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4 – point b
(b) for Member States that have not yet reached their medium-term budgetary objective, annual expenditure growth does not exceed a rate below a prudentreference medium- term rate of potential GDP growth, unless the excess is matched by discretionary revenue measures. The size of the shortfall of the growth rate of government expenditure compared to a prudentreference medium-term rate of potential GDP growth is set in such a way as to ensure an appropriate adjustment towards the medium-term budgetary objective;
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 478 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4 – point c
(c) for Member States that have not yet reached their medium-term budgetary objective, discretionary reductions of government revenue items are matched either by expenditure cutreductions or by discretionary increases in other government revenue items or both. The expenditure aggregate should exclude interest expenditure, expenditure on EU programmes fully matched by EU funds revenue and non-discretionary changes in unemployment benefit expenditure. The excess of expenditure growth over the medium-term references should not be counted as a breach of the benchmark to the extent that it is fully offset by revenue increases mandated by law.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 484 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 5
The prudentreference medium-term ofrate of potential GDP growth, shouldall be assessed on the basis of projections over a ten-year horizonforward looking projections or on backward looking projections if the latter do not lead to a slower adjustment path towards the medium-term objective. Projections shall be updated at regular intervals.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 498 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 7
SWithin these reforms, special attention shall be paid to pension reformsthat of pensions, when introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar. Member States implementing such reforms shall be allowed to deviate from the adjustment path to their medium-term budgetary objective or from the objective itself, with the deviation reflecting the net cost of the reform to the publicly managed pillar, under the condition that the deviation remains temporary and that an appropriate safety margin with respect to the deficit reference value is preserved.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 510 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 9
In periods of severe economic downturn of a general nature Member States may be allowed to temporarily depart from the adjustment path implied by prudent fiscal- policy makingtowards the medium-term objective referred to in the fourth subparagraph.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 519 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 9
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – first subparagraph
As part of multilateral surveillance in accordance with Article 121(3) of the Treaty, the Council shall monitor the implementation of convergence programmes, on the basis of information provided by Member States with a derogation and of assessments by the Commission and the Economic and Financial Committee, in particular with a view to identifying actual or expected significant divergences of the budgetary position from the medium-term budgetary objective, or from the appropriate adjustment path towards it, ensuing from deviations from prudent fiscal-policy making.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 528 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 9
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 10 – paragraph 2 – first subparagraph
In the event of a significant deviation from prudent fiscal-policy makingthe adjustment path towards the medium- term objective referred to in the fourth subparagraph of Article 9(1) of this Regulation, and in order to prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit, the Commission, in accordance with Article 121(4) of the Treaty may address a warning to the Member State concerned. TFEU, shall address a warning to the Member State concerned. Such a warning shall be made public and the European Parliament may invite the Member State concerned to explain its policies before its competent committee. In the event of such a significant deviation, the Commission may require additional reporting from the Member State concerned. The Council shall, within one month of any significant deviation as referred to in the first subparagraph,, adopt a recommendation for policy measures setting a deadline of no more than five months for addressing the deviation, on the basis of a Commission recommendation, based on Article 121(4) TFEU. In the event of a particularly significant deviation or in a particularly serious situation, the deadline shall be no more than three months. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall make the recommendation public. The Commission shall monitor the measures contained in the recommendation on the basis of surveillance visits and prepare a report to the Council. That report shall be made public within one month. If the Member State concerned fails to take appropriate action within the deadline specified in a Council recommendation under the second subparagraph, the Council shall immediately adopt a final recommendation setting out the non- compliance of the Member State, on the basis of a further Commission recommendation in accordance with Article 121(4) TFEU. At the same time, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall address a formal report to the European Council. The process from the first Council recommendation referred to in the second subparagraph to the final Council recommendation and report to the European Council referred to in the fourth subparagraph shall be no longer than six months. A deviation from the appropriate adjustment path towards the medium-term objective shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as the reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures as defined in Article 9, paragraph 1.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 530 #
Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 9
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 10 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
A deviation from prudent fiscal policy making shall be considered significant if the following conditions occur: an excess over the expenditure growth consistent with prudent fiscal policy-making, not offset by discretionary revenue-increasing measures;The assessment of whether the deviation is significant shall notably include the following criteria: For a Member State that has not reached the medium-term budgetary objective, when assessing the change in the structural balance, the deviation shall be considered significant it is at least 0.5% of GDP in one single year or at least 0.25% of GDP on average per year in two consecutive years; when assessing expenditure developments net orf discretionary revenue- decreasing measures not offset by reductions in expenditure; and the deviation measures, the deviation shall be considered significant if it has a total impact on the government balance of at least 0.5% of GDP in one single year or of at least 0.25% of GDP on average per yearcumulatively in two consecutive years.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
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