116 Amendments of Wolf KLINZ related to 2013/0253(COD)
Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) Divergences in national resolution rules between different Member States and corresponding administrative practices and the lack of a unified decision making process at Union level for the resolution of cross-border banks contribute to this lack of confidence and market instability, as they do not ensure certainty and predictability as to the possible outcome of a bank failure. Resolution decisions taken at the national level only may lead to distortions of competition and ultimately to the undermining of the internal market.
Amendment 92 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) Directive [ ] of the European Parliament and of the Council13 has harmonised to a certain extent national bank resolution rules and has provided for cooperation among resolution authorities when dealing with the failure of cross- border banks. However, the harmonisation provided by the Directive [ ] is not complete and the decision making process is not centralised. Directive [ ] essentially provides for common resolution tools and powers available for the national authorities of every Member State but leaves discretion to national authorities in the application of the tools and in the use of national financing arrangements in support of resolution procedures. Directive [ ] does not avoid the taking of separate and potentially inconsistent decisions by Member States regarding the resolution of cross-border groups which may affect the overall costs of resolution. Moreover, as it provides for national financing arrangements, it does not sufficiently reduce the dependence of banks on the support from national budgets and does not prevent different approaches by Member States to the use of the financing arrangements. __________________ 13 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. OJ C, , p. .
Amendment 96 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7 a (new)
Recital 7 a (new)
(7a) Every current and new framework for banking recovery and resolution within the EU should solely be governed by the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (BRRD).
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
Recital 9
(9) Whilst banks in Member States remaining outside the SSM benefit at national level from supervision, resolution and financial backstop arrangements which are aligned, banks in Member States participating in the SSM are subject to Union arrangements for supervision and national arrangements for resolution and financial backstops. This misalignment creates a competitive disadvantage for the banks in the Member States participating in the SSM compared to those in the other Member States. Because supervision and resolution are at two different levels within the SSM, intervention and resolution in banks in the Member States participating in the SSM would not be as rapid, consistent and effective as in banks in the Member States outside of the SSM. This has negative repercussions on the funding costs for these banks and creates a competitive disadvantage with detrimental effects for the Member States in which those banks operate and for the overall functioning of the internal market. Therefore, a centralised resolution mechanism for all banks operating in the Member States participating in the SSM and subject to the direct ECB supervision is essential to guarantee a level playing field.
Amendment 112 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
Recital 13
(13) A centralised application of the bank resolution rules set out in Directive [ ] by a single Union resolution authoritymechanism in the participating Member States can only be ensured where the rules governing the establishment and functioning of a single resolution mechanism are directly applicable in the Member States to avoid divergent interpretations across the Member States. This should bring benefits to the internal market as a whole because it will contribute to ensuring fair competition and to preventing obstacles to the free exercise of fundamental freedoms not only in the participating Member States but in the whole internal market.
Amendment 115 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
Recital 14
(14) Mirroring the scope of the Council Regulation (EU) No …/…, a single resolution mechanism should cover all credit institutions established in the participating Member States. However, within the framework of a single resolution mechanism, it should be possible to resolve directly any credit institution of a participating Member State in order to avoid asymmetries within the internal market in the treatment of failing institutions and creditors during a resolution process. To the extent that parent undertakings, investment firms and financial institutions are included in the consolidated supervision by the ECB, they should be included in the scope of the single resolution mechanism. Although the ECB will not supervise those institutions on a solo basis, it will be the only supervisor that will have a global perception of the risk to which a group, and indirectly the individual members, is exposed to. To exclude entities which form part of the consolidated supervision within the scope of the ECB from the scope of the single resolution mechanism would make it impossible to plan for the resolution of banking groups and to adopt a group resolution strategy, and would make any resolution decisions much less effective.
Amendment 119 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
Recital 16
(16) The ECB, as the supervisor within the SSM, is the best placed to assess whether a credit institution is failing or likely to fail and whether there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector or supervisory action would prevent its failure within a reasonable timeframe. The Board, upon notification of the ECB, should provide a recommendation to the Commission. Given the need to balance the different interests at stake the Commission should decide whether or not to place an institution under resolution and should alsoECB decides whether or not to place an institution under resolution, based on triggers set out in the Directive (BRRD). The Board should decide on a clear and detailed resolution framework establishing the resolution actions to be taken by the Boardhome national resolution authority. Within this framework, the Board should decide on a resolution scheme and instruct the home and where appropriate additionally the host national resolution authorities on the resolution tools and powers to be executed at national level.
Amendment 125 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
Recital 18
(18) It is instrumental for the good functioning of the internal market that the same rules apply to all resolution measures, regardless of whether they are taken by national resolution authorities under Directive [ ] or within the framework of the single resolution mechanism The Commission will assess those measures under Article 107 of the TFEU. Where the use of resolution financing arrangements does not involve State aid pursuant to Article 107 (1) of the TFEU, the Commission should, in order to ensure a level playing field within the internal market, assess those measures by analogy to Art 107 of the TFEU. If a notification under Article 108 of the TFEU is not necessary as no state aid pursuant to Article 107 of the TFEU is entailed in the proposed use of the Fund by the Board, in order to ensure the integrity of the internal market between participating and non- participating Member States, the Commission should apply the relevant State aid rules under Article 107 of the TFEU by way of analogy when assessing the proposed use of the Fund. The Board should not decide on a resolution scheme until the Commission has ensured, by way of analogy with State aid rules, that the use of the Fund follows the same rules as interventions by national financing arrangements and in order to ensure the integrity of the internal market between participating and non- participating Member States, the Commission should apply the relevant State aid rules under Article 107 of the TFEU.
Amendment 128 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
Recital 19
(19) In order to ensure a swift and effective decision making process in resolution, the Board should be a specific Union agency with a specific structure, corresponding to its specific tasks, and which departs from the model of all other agencies of the Union. Its composition should ensure that due account is taken of all relevant interests at stake in resolution procedures. The Board should operate in executive and plenary sessions. In its executiveplenary session, it should be composed of an Executive Director, a Deputy Executive Director, and representatives of the Commission and representative of the ECB and representatives of each national resolution authority from all participating Member States. In its executive session, it should be composed of an Executive Director, a Deputy Executive Director, and a representative of the ECB. Considering the missions of the Board, the Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director should be appointed by the Council on a proposal from the Commission and after hearing the European Parliament. When deliberating on the resolution of a bank or group established within a single participating Member State, the executive session of the Board should also convene and involve in the decision-making process the member appointed by the Member State concerned representing its national resolution authority. When deliberating on a cross- border group, the members appointed by the home and all host Member States concerned representing the relevant national resolution authorities should also be convened and involved in the decision- making process of the executive session of the Board. However, home authorities and host authorities should have a balanced influence on the decision, so host authorities should have jointly one singletwo votes. The home authority should also have two votes. Observers, including a representative of the ESM and of the Euro Group, may also be invited to attend the meetings of the Board.
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
Recital 21
(21) The Board and the Commission, where relevant, should replacshould coordinate the national resolution authorities designated under Directive [ ] in respect of all aspects related to the resolution decision-making process. The national resolution authorities designated under Directive [ ] should continue to carry out activities related to the implementation of resolution schemes adopted by the Board. In order to ensure transparency and democratic control, as well as to safeguard the rights of the Union institutions, the Board should be accountable to the European Parliament and to the Council for any decisions taken on the basis of this proposal. For the same reasons of transparency and democratic control, national parliaments should have certain rights to obtain information about the activities of the Board and to engage in a dialogue with it.
Amendment 142 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
Recital 23
(23) To ensure a uniform approach for institutions and groups the Board should be empowered to coordinate drawing up resolution plans for such institutions and groups. The Board should assess the resolvability of institutions and groups, and take measures aimed at removing impediments to resolvability, if any. The Board should require national resolution authorities to apply such appropriate measures designed to remove impediments to resolvability in order to ensure consistency and the resolvability of the institutions concerned.
Amendment 152 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
Recital 27
(27) In order to minimise disruption to the financial market and to the economy, the resolution process should be accomplished in a short time. The CommissionBoard should, throughout the resolution procedure, have access to any information which it deems necessary to take an informed decision in the resolution process. Where the CommissionECB decides to put an institution under resolution, the Board together with the home national resolution authorities should immediately adopt a resolution scheme establishing the details of the resolution tools and powers to be applied, and the use of any financing arrangements.
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30
Recital 30
(30) When exercising resolution powers, the Commission and the BoardBoard and national authorities should make sure that shareholders and creditors bear an appropriate share of the losses, that the managers are replaced, that the costs of the resolution of the institution are minimised, and that all creditors of an insolvent institution that are of the same class are treated in a similar manner.
Amendment 165 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36
Recital 36
(36) The CommissionBoard together with national resolution authorities should provide the framework for the resolution action to be taken depending on the circumstances of the case and should be able to designate for use all necessary resolution tools. Within that clear and precise framework, the Board should decide on the detailed resolution scheme. The relevant resolution tools should include the sale of business tool, the bridge institution tool, the bail-in tool and the asset separation tool, which are also provided for by Directive [ ]. The framework should also make it possible to assess whether the conditions for the write- down and conversion of capital instruments are met.
Amendment 172 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 39
Recital 39
(39) An effective resolution regime should minimise the costs of the resolution of a failing institution borne by the taxpayers. It should also ensure that even large institutions of systemic importance can be resolved without jeopardising financial stability. The bail-in tool achieves that objective by ensuring that shareholders and creditors of the entity suffer appropriate losses and bear an appropriate part of those costs. To this end, statutory debt write down powers should be included in a framework for resolution as an additional optionthe first choice tool in conjunction with other resolution tools, as recommended by the Financial Stability Board.
Amendment 177 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 42
Recital 42
(42) It is not appropriate to apply the bail- in tool to claims in so far as they are secured, collateralised or otherwise guaranteed. However, in order to ensure that the bail-in tool is effective and achieves its objectives, it should be possible to apply it to as wide a range of the unsecured liabilities of a failing institution as possible. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to exclude certain kinds of unsecured liability from the scope of application of the bail-in tool. For reasons of public policy and effective resolution, the bail-in tool should not apply to those deposits that are protected under Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council15, to liabilities to employees of the failing institution, to covered bonds or to commercial claims that relate to goods and services necessary for the daily functioning of the institution. __________________ 15 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes. OJ L 135, 31.5.1994, p. 5–14.
Amendment 179 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 43
Recital 43
(43) Depositors that hold deposits guaranteed by a deposit guarantee scheme should not be subject to the exercise of the bail-in tool. The deposit guarantee scheme, however, contributes to funding the resolution process to the extent that it would have had to indemnify the depositors. The exercise of the bail-in powers would ensure that depositors continue having access to their deposits which is the main reason why the deposit guarantee schemes have been established. Not providing for the involvement of those schemes in such cases would constitute an unfair advantage with respect to the other creditors which would be subject to the exercise of the powers by the resolution authorityand the deposit guarantee scheme itself should not be subject to the exercise of the bail-in tool. The exercise of the bail-in powers would ensure that depositors continue having access to their deposits.
Amendment 182 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 44
Recital 44
(44) In order to implement the burden- sharing by shareholders and junior creditors, as required under State aid rules, the single resolution mechanism would be able to apply, by way of analogy, as of the entry into application of this Regulatione Directive (BRRD), the bail-in tool.
Amendment 184 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 45
Recital 45
(45) To avoid institutions structuring their liabilities in a manner that impedes the effectiveness of the bail in tool, the Board should be able to establish that the institutions hold an aggregate amount of own funds, subordinated debt and senior liabilities subject to the bail-in tool expressed as a percentage of the total liabilities of the institution, that do not qualify as own funds for the purposes of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council16 and of Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council17 , which institutions should have at all times and which is set out in the resolution plans. __________________ 16 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p.1. 17 Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338.
Amendment 190 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 50
Recital 50
(50) Since the Board replacesupports national resolution authorities of the participating Member States in their resolution decisions, the Board should also replaceco- operate with those authorities for the purposes of the cooperation with non- participating Member States as far as the resolution functions are concerned. In particular, the Board should represent all authorities from the participating Members in the resolution colleges including authorities from non- participating Member States.
Amendment 194 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 52
Recital 52
(52) In order to carry out its tasks effectively, the Board should have appropriate investigatory powers. It should be able to require all necessary information either directly or through national resolution authorities, and to conduct investigations and on-site inspections, where appropriate in cooperation with national competent authorities. In the context of resolution, on-site inspections would be available for the Board to effectively monitor implementation by national authorities and to ensure that the Commission and the Board take their decisions on the basis of fully accurate information.
Amendment 222 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 69
Recital 69
(69) Until the Board is fully operational, the Commissionnational resolution authorities should be responsible for the initial operations including collecting contributions necessary to cover administrative expenses and the designation of an interim executive director to authorise all necessary payments on behalf of the Board.
Amendment 230 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) credit institutions established in participating Member States; and subject to direct supervision carried out by the ECB in accordance with Article 4 of Council Regulation (EU)No[ ] conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions;
Amendment 262 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1
Article 5 – paragraph 1
1. Where, by virtue of this Regulation, the Commission or the Board exercises tasks or powers, which, according to Directive [ ] are to be exercised by the national resolution authority of a participating Member State, the Board shall, for the application of this Regulation and Directive [ ], be considered to be a coordinator for the relevant national resolution authority or, in case of cross-border group resolution, the relevant group national resolution authorityies.
Amendment 271 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2
Article 5 – paragraph 2
2. The Board, when acting as national resolution authority, shall act, where relevant, under authorisation of the Commissionnational resolution authorities.
Amendment 277 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1
Article 6 – paragraph 1
1. No action, proposal or policy of the Board, the Commission or a national resolution authority shall discriminate against entities referred to in Article 2, deposit holders, investors or other creditors established in the Union on grounds of their nationality or place of business.
Amendment 285 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. When making decisions or taking action, which may have an impact in more than one participating Member State, and in particular when taking decisions concerning groups established in two or more participating Member States, the CommissionBoard shall give due consideration to all of the following factors:
Amendment 301 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 3
Article 6 – paragraph 3
3. The CommissionBoard shall balance the factors referred to in paragraph 2 with the resolution objectives referred to in Article 12 as appropriate to the nature and circumstances of each case.
Amendment 310 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 4
Article 6 – paragraph 4
4. No decision of the Board or the Commission shall require Member States to provide extraordinary public financial support.
Amendment 320 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1
Article 7 – paragraph 1
1. The Board shall together with national resolution authorities draw up resolution plans for the entities referred to in Article 2 and for groups.
Amendment 328 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 4
Article 7 – paragraph 4
4. The resolution plan shall provide for the resolution actions which the Commission and the BoardBoard and national resolution authorities may take where an entity referred to in Article 2 or a group meet the conditions for resolution. The resolution plan shall take into consideration a range of scenarios including that the event of failure may be idiosyncratic or may occur at a time of broader financial instability or of system wide events. The resolution plan shall not assume any extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the Fund established in accordance with this Regulation.
Amendment 331 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 4 a (new)
Article 7 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. The resolution plan for each entity shall include all items set out in Chapter 2 of the Directive (BRRD).
Amendment 365 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1
Article 8 – paragraph 1
1. When drafting resolution plans in accordance with Article 7, the Board, after consultation with the competent authority, including the ECB, and the resolution authorities of non-participating Member States in which significant branches are located insofar as is relevant to the significant branch, shall conduct an assessment of the extent to which institutions and groups are resolvable without the assumption of extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the Fund established in accordance with Article 64.
Amendment 382 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1
Article 9 – paragraph 1
1. The Board, on its own initiative or upon proposal by a national resolution authority, may shall apply simplified obligations in relation to the drafting of resolution plans referred to, in Article 7Chapter 1 of the Directive (BRRD) or may waive the obligation of drafting those plans.
Amendment 386 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2
Article 9 – paragraph 2
Amendment 388 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 3
Article 9 – paragraph 3
Amendment 389 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3
Article 9 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3
Amendment 390 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 5
Article 9 – paragraph 5
Amendment 391 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 6
Article 9 – paragraph 6
6. The Board may grant waiver concerning the application of the obligation of drafting resolution plans to institutions that belong to an institutional protection scheme in accordance with Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. When deciding to grant a waiver to an institution that belongs to an institutional protection scheme, the Board shall consider whether the institutional protection scheme is likely to be able to meet simultaneous demands placed on the scheme in relation to its members.
Amendment 392 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 7
Article 9 – paragraph 7
7. The Board shall inform the EBA about its application of paragraphs 1, 4 and 5.
Amendment 395 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2
Article 10 – paragraph 2
2. The minimum requirement shall be calculated as the amount of own funds and eligible liabilities expressed as a percentage of the total liabilities and own funds, excluding liabilities arising from derivatives, of the institutions and parent undertakings referred to in Article 2ccording to the rules set out in the Directive (BRRD).
Amendment 396 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 3
Article 10 – paragraph 3
Amendment 400 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 4
Article 10 – paragraph 4
4. The determination referred to in paragraph 1 mayshall provide that the minimum requirement of own funds and eligible liabilities is partially met on a consolidated orand an individual basis. The minimum requirement may be met through contractual bail-in instrument.
Amendment 405 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
The ECB or competent authorities of participating Member States shall inform the Board of any measure that they require an institution or group to take or that they take themselves pursuant to Article 13b of Council Regulation (EU)No[ ], pursuant to Articles 23(1) or 24 of Directive [ ], or pursuant to Article 104 of Directive 2013/36/EU.
Amendment 406 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Amendment 412 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1
Article 12 – paragraph 1
1. When acting under the resolution procedure referred to in Article 16, the Commission and the Board, in respect of their respective responsibilities, shall have regard to the resolution objectives, and choose the tools and powers that, in its view, best achieve the objectives that are relevant in the circumstances of the case.
Amendment 428 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Article 12 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
When pursuing the above objectives, the Commission and the Board shall seek to avoid the unnecessary destruction of value and to minimise the cost of resolution.
Amendment 430 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 3
Article 12 – paragraph 3
Amendment 435 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. When acting under the resolution procedure referred to in Article 16, the Commission and the Board shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the resolution action is taken in accordance with the following principles:principles set out in the Directive (BRRD).
Amendment 438 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point a
Amendment 440 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 442 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point c
Amendment 444 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point d
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point d
Amendment 446 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point e
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point e
Amendment 448 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point f
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point f
Amendment 454 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2
Article 13 – paragraph 2
Amendment 459 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 3
Article 13 – paragraph 3
Amendment 461 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 1
Article 14 – paragraph 1
1. The CommissionBoard shall take a resolution action in relation to a financial institution, when the conditions specified in Article 16(2et out in the Directive (BRRD) are met with regard to both the financial institution and with regard to the parent undertaking.
Amendment 466 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 2
Article 14 – paragraph 2
2. The CommissionBoard shall take a resolution action in relation to a parent undertaking referred to in point (b) of Article 2, when the conditions specified in Article 16(2et out in the Directive (BRRD) are met with regard to both that parent undertaking and with regard to one or more subsidiaries which are institutions.
Amendment 470 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 3
Article 14 – paragraph 3
Amendment 476 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
When applying the bail-in tool to an institution under resolution, and without prejudice to liabilities excluded from the bail-in tool under Article 24(3), the Commission shall decide on, and the Board and the national resolution authorities of the participating Member States shall exercise the write down and conversion powers to claims following a reverse order of priority to the following order for normal insolvency procedures:the order set out in the Directive (BRRD).
Amendment 484 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point a
Amendment 491 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 496 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point c
Amendment 501 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point d
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point d
Amendment 506 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point e
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point e
Amendment 511 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point f
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point f
Amendment 515 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Amendment 518 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1
Article 16 – paragraph 1
1. Where the ECB or a national resolution authority assesses that the conditions referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 are met in relation to an entity referred to in Article 2, it shall communicate that assessment without delay to the Commission and the Board.
Amendment 524 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. On receiving a communication pursuant to paragraph 1, or on its own initiative, the BoardThe ECB shall conduct an assessment of whether the following conditions are met:
Amendment 533 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 3
Article 16 – paragraph 3
Amendment 537 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 5
Article 16 – paragraph 5
Amendment 549 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 6
Article 16 – paragraph 6
6. HIf all the conditions established in paragraph 2 are met and having regard to the urgency of the circumstances in the case, the CommissionECB shall decide, on its own initiative or taking into account, if any, the communication referred to in paragraph 1 or the recommendation of the Board referred to in paragraph 5recommendation of the Board, whether or not to place the entity under resolution, and. The Board shall decide on the framework of the resolution tools that shall be applied in respect of the entity concerned and of the use of the Fund to support the resolution action. The Commission, on its own initiative, may decide to place an entity under resolution if all the conditions referred to in paragraph 2 are met.
Amendment 560 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 7
Article 16 – paragraph 7
7. The decision of the CommissionECB and the Board shall be addressed to the Board. If the Commissionnational resolution authorities. If the ECB decides not to place the entity under resolution, because the condition laid down in paragraph 2(c) is not met, the entity concerned shall be wound up in accordance with national insolvency law.
Amendment 571 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 8
Article 16 – paragraph 8
8. Within the framework set by the CommissionECB decision, the Board shall decide on the resolution scheme referred to in Article 20 and shall ensure that the necessary resolution action is taken to carry out the resolution scheme by the relevant national resolution authorities. The decision of the Board shall be addressed to the relevant national resolution authorities and shall instruct those authorities, which shall take all necessary measures to implement the decision of the Board in accordance with Article 26, by exercising any of the resolution powers provided for in Directive [ ], in particular those in Articles 56 to 64 of that Directive [ ]. Where State aid is present, the Board may only decide after the Commission has taken a decision on that State aid.
Amendment 574 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 9
Article 16 – paragraph 9
Amendment 576 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 10
Article 16 – paragraph 10
Amendment 578 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 11
Article 16 – paragraph 11
Amendment 581 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 12
Article 16 – paragraph 12
Amendment 588 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17
Article 17
Amendment 609 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 615 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 5
Article 18 – paragraph 5
5. The CommissionBoard, upon a recommendation of the BoardECB or on its own initiative, shall verify that the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 are met. The CommissionBoard shall determine whether the powers to write down or convert capital instruments shall be exercised singly or, following the procedure under Article 16(4) to (7), together with a resolution action.
Amendment 620 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 6
Article 18 – paragraph 6
6. Where the CommissionBoard determines that the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 are met, but the conditions for resolution in accordance with Article 16(2) are not met, the Board, following a decision of the Commission, shall instruct the national resolution authorities to exercise the write down or conversion powers in accordance with Articles 51 and 52 of Directive [ ].
Amendment 633 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 1
Article 20 – paragraph 1
The resolution scheme adopted by the Board under Article 16(8) shall establish, in compliance with the decisions of the Commission on the resolution framework under Article 16(6) and with any decision on State aid where applicable by analogy the details of the resolution tools to be applied to the institution under resolution concerning at least the measures referred to in Articles 21(2), 22(2), 23(2) and 24(1) and determine the specific amounts and purposes for which the Fund shall be used.
Amendment 636 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 2
Article 20 – paragraph 2
Amendment 639 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Within the framework decided by the Commission,Board the sale of business tool shall consist of the transfer to a purchaser that is not a bridge institution of the following:
Amendment 641 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Within the framework decided by the CommissionBoard, the bridge institution tool shall consist of the transfer to a bridge institution of any of the following:
Amendment 645 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Within the framework decided by the CommissionBoard, the asset separation tool shall consist of the transfer of assets, rights or liabilities of an institution under resolution to an asset management vehicle.
Amendment 657 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part
Article 24 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part
Within the framework decided by the CommissionBoard concerning the bail-in tool, the resolution scheme shall follow all relevant provisions set out in the Directive (BRRD) and shall establish in particular:
Amendment 661 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
Article 24 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
3. The following liabilities shallmay not be subject to write down and conversion according to the relevant provisions set out in the Directive (BRRD):
Amendment 702 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 14
Article 24 – paragraph 14
14. Exclusions under paragraph 5 and according to the relevant provisions set out in Directive (BRRD) may be applied either to completely exclude a liability from write down or to limit the extent of the write down applied to that liability.
Amendment 716 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 1
Article 27 – paragraph 1
Amendment 720 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 2
Article 27 – paragraph 2
2. In the exercise of their respective responsibilities under this Regulation, the Board, the Commission, the ECB and the national competent authorities and resolution authorities shall cooperate closely. The ECB and the national competent authorities shall provide the Board and the Commission with all information necessary for the exercise of theirits tasks.
Amendment 722 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 3
Article 27 – paragraph 3
3. In the exercise of their respective responsibilities under this Regulation, the Board, the Commission, the ECB and the national competent authorities and resolution authorities shall cooperate closely in the resolution planning, early intervention and resolution phases pursuant to Articles 7 to 26. The ECB and the national competent authorities shall provide the Board and the Commission with all information necessary for the exercise of their tasks.
Amendment 724 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 6
Article 27 – paragraph 6
Amendment 728 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 2
Article 28 – paragraph 2
2. The Board shall provide the Commission with any information relevant for fulfilling its tasks under this Regulation and, where applicable, Article 107 of the TFEU.
Amendment 730 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 1
Article 30 – paragraph 1
Where a group includes entities established in participating Member States as well as in non-participating Member States, without prejudice to any approval by the CommissionBoard required under this Regulation, the Board shall represent the national resolution authorities of the participating Member States, for the purposes of cooperation with non- participating Member States in accordance with Articles 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 50, and 80 to 83 of Directive [ ].
Amendment 734 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 1
Article 31 – paragraph 1
The Commission and the Board within each of theirBoard within its respective responsibilities shall be exclusively responsible to conclude, on behalf of the national resolution authorities of participating Member States, the non- binding cooperation arrangements referred to in Article 88 (4) of Directive [ ] and shall notify them in accordance with paragraph 6 of that Article.
Amendment 758 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 39 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 39 – paragraph 1 – point c
Amendment 786 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 39 – paragraph 2
Article 39 – paragraph 2
2. The term of office of the Executive Director, the Deputy Executive Director and of the members of the Board appointed by the Commission and the ECB shall be five years. Subject to Article 53(6), that term shall not be renewable.
Amendment 788 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 40 – paragraph 1
Article 40 – paragraph 1
The Board shall act in compliance with Union law, in particular with the Commission decisions pursuant to this Regulation.
Amendment 805 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 44 – paragraph 1
Article 44 – paragraph 1
The Board shall have its seat in Brussels, BelgiumFrankfurt am Main, Germany.
Amendment 812 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 47 – paragraph 2
Article 47 – paragraph 2
2. The Board in its plenary session shall hold at least two ordinary meetings a year. In addition, it shall meet on the initiative of the Executive Director, at the request of the CommissionECB, or at the request of at least one-third of its members.
Amendment 815 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 48 – paragraph 1
Article 48 – paragraph 1
1. The Board, in its plenary session, shall take its decisions by a simple majority of its members. However, decisions referred to in point (c) of Article 47(1) shall be taken by a majority of two-thirdsqualified majority of its members.
Amendment 829 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 50 – paragraph 2 – point b – point i
Article 50 – paragraph 2 – point b – point i
Amendment 855 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 51 – paragraph 2
Article 51 – paragraph 2
2. When deliberating on a cross-border group, the Board shall take its decisions in its executive sessions by a simple majority of its participating members. The members of the Board referred to in Article 40(2) and the member appointed by the Member State in which the group level resolution authority is situated shall each have onetwo votes. The other participating members shall each have a voting right equal to a fraction of onetwo votes and the number of national resolution authorities of the Member States in which a subsidiary or entity covered by consolidated supervision is established. In case of a tie the Executive Director shall have a casting vote.
Amendment 947 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 66 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 66 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Liabilities of a credit institution are excluded from the calculation of contributions where the credit institution has been set up by a Member State's central or regional government or local authority and that government or authority has an obligation to protect the economic basis of the institution and maintain its viability throughout its lifetime or the liabilities are explicitly guaranteed by that government or authority or at least 90% of the loans granted by the institution are directly or indirectly guaranteed by that government or authority and the predominant purpose is to fund promotional loans granted on a non-competitive, not-for-profit basis in order to promote that government's public policy objectives;
Amendment 952 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 66 – paragraph 2
Article 66 – paragraph 2
2. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target funding level specified in Article 65 may include payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the Board for the purposes specified in Article 71(1). The share of these irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 320% of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with paragraph 1.
Amendment 970 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 68
Article 68
Amendment 981 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 70 – paragraph 3
Article 70 – paragraph 3
3. The Board shall invest the amounts held in the Fund only in obligations of the participating Member States or intergovernmental organisations, or in highly liquid assets off the highest credit worthiness. Investments should be sufficiently geographically diversified. The return on those investments shall benefit the Fund.
Amendment 984 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 985 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – point c
Amendment 993 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 71 – paragraph 3
Article 71 – paragraph 3
3. The Fund shall notby no means be used directly or indirectly to absorb the losses of an institution or an entity referred to in Article 2 or to recapitalise an institution or an entity referred to in Article 2. In the event that the use of the resolution financing arrangement for the purposes in paragraph 1 indirectly results in part of the losses of an institution or an entity referred to in Article 2 being passed on to the Fund, the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Article 24 shall apply.
Amendment 997 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 73
Article 73
Amendment 1039 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 85 – paragraph 1
Article 85 – paragraph 1
From the date of application referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 88, the Fund shall be considered a part of the resolution financing arrangement of thefor credit institutions subject to this Regulation of each of participating Member States under Title VII of Directive [ ].
Amendment 1051 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 88 – paragraph 3
Article 88 – paragraph 3
Article 24 shall apply from 1 Januaruly 20186.