BETA

11 Amendments of Sophia IN 'T VELD related to 2011/2094(INI)

Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the intended simplification of State aid rules for SGEI will not lead to a deterioration in the monitoring of overcompensation;
2011/10/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3b. Takes note of the Commission's intention to introduce a ‘de minimis’ arrangement in respect of State aid for SGEI; underlines that clear and unambiguous criteria are needed to determine what services would be covered by it;
2011/10/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 c (new)
3c. Insists that any proposal to exempt in principle further categories of SGEI from the notification requirement must be based on evidence that such an exemption from the rules is justified and necessary, and does not unduly distort competition;
2011/10/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Believes that the most effective tool for deterrence is still public enforcement by the Commission and by national competition authorities continues to be a highly effective tool for deterrence; recognises, however, that in an increasingly integrated single market, and with rapidly growing online trade, there is a need for an EU-wide approach to consumer rights in the area of collective redress; is also convinced that private enforcement through collective redress could facilitate the competinsation authoritiet EU level of harm caused to consumers and undertakings;
2011/10/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses that forms of private enforcement already exists in most of the Member States; , but that the national systems are widely divergent, and many Member Staktes note ofdo not have explicitly established specific rules on collective redress, including judicial redress; welcomes the Commission’s ideas concerning EU-wide collective redress; calls on the Commission to take careful note of all the potential risks that have been observed in other jurisdictions, including the USA such as abusive litigation and unmeritorious claims;
2011/10/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Believes that the use of ever higher fines as the sole antitrust instrument may be too blunt; therefore favours a ‘carrot- and-stick’ approach with penalties that serve as an effective deterrent, in particular for repeat offenders, while encouraging compliance;
2011/10/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Invites the Commission to set out criteria applicable for launching a sector inquiry; takes the view that the Commission should act not only on complaints from industry or consumers, but also on the recommendation of Parliament;
2011/10/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Reiterates its call on the Commission to conduct a sector inquiry into on-line advertising and search engines;
2011/10/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)
15b. Reiterates its call for an inquiry into the application of public procurement rules, and whether national differences lead to a distortion of competition;
2011/10/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Calls, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Commission's Report on Competition Policy, for the conclusion of an agreement between Parliament and the Commission setting up a comprehensive dialogue on competition policythat should strengthen the role of the European Parliament as the directly elected body representing European citizens; this Agreement should institutionalise regular dialogue between the Commission and the European Parliament by setting out the procedures and commitments regarding the follow up given to European Parliament recommendations;
2011/10/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Highlights that, without prejudice to the Commission’s exclusive powers under the Treaty, this Interinstitutional Agreement should enable the European Parliament to co-shape policies and should lead to de facto accountability of the European Commission in the field of competition policy; the Agreement should set up an Interinstitutional Panel where the Commission reports at least twice a year on the follow up to the European Parliament’s recommendations in the spirit of ‘comply or explain’;
2011/10/03
Committee: ECON