BETA

8 Amendments of Sophia IN 'T VELD related to 2020/2023(INI)

Amendment 8 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 11
11. Takes the position that if the UK does not explicitly commit to enforce the European Convention of Human Rights and will not accept the jurisdiction of the CJEU, there will be no agreement possible on judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters. Is concerned about the fact that, during the first round of negotiations (2-5 March 2020) for the future partnership agreement, the UK stated that, as regards judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters, it will not commit to enforcing the European Convention of Human Rights, nor will it accept the jurisdiction of the CJEU; deplores the fact that the latter position has been maintained during the second round of negotiations; fully endorses the declaration made by the EU negotiator Mr Barnier that, if this position is maintained by the UK, this will have immediate and practical consequences for the cooperation between the EU and the UK, which will remain possible on the basis of international agreements but will not be very ambitious8 ; takes note also of the declarations made by the EU negotiator Mr Barnier further to the second negotiation round, stating that, during this second round, the UK refused to provide firm guarantees on fundamental rights and individual freedoms and insisted on lowering current standards and deviating from agreed mechanisms of data protection, thus creating serious limitations for our future security partnership9 ; _________________ 8 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorn er/detail/en/INF_19_5950 9 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorn er/detail/en/statement_20_739
2020/05/14
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 10 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13 a. Underlines that the UK as an EU Member in 2014 by way of opt out decided to participate no longer in EU instruments in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, but then opted back into legislative measures on a case-by-case basis;
2020/05/14
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 12 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 16
16. Is deeply concerned aboutStrongly objects to the UK’s request to receive direct access to the EU data information systems in the field of Justice and Home Affairs and to retain a status in the Justice and Home Affairs agencies close to that enjoyed by the Member States; stresses once more in this regard that the UK, as a non-Schengen third country, cannot have direct access to EU information systems data or participate in the management structures of the EU agencies in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice; cautions that any sharing of information, including personal data, with the UK should be subject to strict safeguards, audit and oversight conditions, including an equivalent level of protection of personal data to that provided by Union law;
2020/05/14
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 13 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16 a. Recalls the UK authorities’ hack of Belgian telecommunications provider Belgacom, which came to light in 2013, and which was attributed to the GCHQ as concluded by the Belgian Federal Prosecutor in 2018;
2020/05/14
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 14 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16 b. Recalls that UK authorities failed to forward details of 75 000 convictions against EU citizens to their home country in accordance with Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA and concealed this failure from other Member States, for fear of damaging the UK’s reputation as regards law enforcement cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters; deplores that the UK have still not forwarded details of these 75 000 cases to law enforcement authorities in the EU-27;
2020/05/14
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 16 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 17
17. Recalls that the Schengen Information System (SIS) was created as a compensatory tool to remedy the lifting of border controls in the Schengen area; points out that the SIS legislation explicitly forbids the access of third countries to the system; underlines that, as a third country, the UK cannot have access to the SIS; recalls that, in 2015, the UK started applying certain provisions of Schengen acquis related to the SIS in the area of police cooperation10 and that serious deficiencieviolations in its application by the UK were identified and have still not been remedied; considers that future cooperation between the EU and the UK in the area of law enforcement and judicial cooperation should be based on mutual trust; considers, therefore, that the arrangements for the future cooperation between the EU and the UK in the area of law enforcement and judicial cooperation should be dependent on those deficiencies being remedied; underlines, in this regard, the importance of robust rules on data protection in both negotiatmade conditional upon the full remedy of the violations of the SIS and the failed transfer of details of 75,000 convictions prior to any agreement; underlines that such cooperation can only be considered if robust rules on data protection are established and if strong enforcement mechanisms are ing partieslace; _________________ 10Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), OJ L 205, 7.8.2007, p. 63.
2020/05/14
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 18 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 18
18. Points out that the automated exchange of DNA data with UK under the Prüm Framework was launched only in 2019 and that the Council is about to adopt an implementing decision which would allow the UK to take part in automated exchanges of dactyloscopic data; reminds the negotiators that the Council decisions authorising these automated data exchanges will expire at the end of the transition period; stresses the need for a timely agreement on new arrangements for the future relationship, given the importance of information exchange in the fight against serious and organised cross- border crime and terrorism; considers that the future relationship should not be predetermined by the rules applied during the transition period; believes that the agreement should be based on the principle of full reciprocity; strongly urges the UK, therefore, to reconsider its position not to disclose data of suspected persons, failing which, exchanges under Prüm between the EU and the UK will have to remain limited;
2020/05/14
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 19 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 19
19. Is concerned that the UK negotiating mandate lacks ambition in important areas of judicial cooperation in criminal matters such as anti-money- laundering and counter terrorism financing provisions; insists that a level playing field on anti-money laundering is essential for a final agreement; believes that a solution allowing for a more ambitious cooperation than the one under the Council of Europe convention on extradition could be found by the negotiating parties;
2020/05/14
Committee: LIBE