23 Amendments of Antolín SÁNCHEZ PRESEDO related to 2010/0276(CNS)
Amendment 53 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 1
Recital 1
(1) The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union, as provided by the Treaty, should be developed in the context of the broad economic and employment guidelines with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union defined in Article 3 of the TUE and the fulfilment of the requirements provided in Article 9 of the TFEU, and should entail compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices, sound and sustainable public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments.
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 4 a (new)
Recital 4 a (new)
(4a) The improved economic governance framework should rely on several inter- linked and coherent policies, namely a Union strategy for jobs and smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, a European Semester for strengthened coordination of economic and budgetary policies, an effective framework for preventing and correcting excessive budgetary positions (the Stability and Growth Pact), a robust framework for preventing and correcting macro- economic imbalances, enhanced financial market regulation and supervision (including macro-prudential supervision by the European Systemic Risk Board), a credible permanent financial stability mechanism, a multiannual financial framework and a increased Union budget with new financial and own resources, which should be aimed to improve economic coordination and achieve the objectives of the Union
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 4 b (new)
Recital 4 b (new)
(4b) The Stability and Growth Pact and the Union's economic governance framework as a whole should complement and be compatible with a Union strategy for jobs and smart, sustainable and inclusive growth which aims at boosting the Union's competitiveness, environmental responsibility and social progress.
Amendment 96 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 4 c (new)
Recital 4 c (new)
(4c) Strengthening economic governance should go hand in hand with reinforcing the democratic legitimacy of European governance, which should be achieved through the closer and timelier involvement of the European Parliament and national parliaments throughout economic policy coordination.
Amendment 97 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 4 d (new)
Recital 4 d (new)
(4d) The European semester for economic and budgetary policies coordination should play a vital role in implementing the requirement under Article 121(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) that Member States regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and coordinate them accordingly. Transparency, independent oversight and multilateral coordinated surveillance are an integral part of enhanced economic governance. The Council and the Commission should make public and set out the reasons for their positions and decisions at appropriate stages of the economic policy coordination procedures.
Amendment 99 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 4 e (new)
Recital 4 e (new)
(4e) Member States should provide for binding fiscal arrangements such as national fiscal rules, respecting the principles laid down in Council Directive (...) on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, and provide for fully independent public institutions to be involved in the budgetary process and medium-term budgetary framework. National budgetary rules should implement and complement the Member States' commitments under the Stability and Growth Pact. National institutions should play a more prominent role in budgetary surveillance to strengthen national ownership, enhance enforcement through national public opinion and enrich the economic and policy analysis that exists at EU level.
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 4 f (new)
Recital 4 f (new)
(4f) Without prejudice to their rights and obligations under the TFEU, the Member States whose currency is not the euro should have the right to opt-out from certain provisions of EU legislation in the field of economic governance according to the conditions provided for in each piece of EU legislation.
Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 4 g (new)
Recital 4 g (new)
(4g) Experience gained during the first decade of functioning of the economic and monetary union shows a need for improved economic governance in the Union, which should be built on a stronger national ownership of commonly agreed rules and policies and on a more robust framework at the Union level for national economic policies.
Amendment 122 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) Implementing the existing excessive deficit procedure on the basis of both the deficit criterion and the debt criterion requires defining a sustainable numerical benchmark (structurally, cyclically and long-term adjusted) against which to assess whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.
Amendment 127 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 7
Recital 7
(7) The establishment of the existence of an excessive deficit based on the debt criterion and the steps leading to it should not be based solely on non-compliance with the sustainable numerical benchmark, but alwaysand should take into account the whole range of relevant factors covered by the Commission report under Article 126(3) of the Treaty.
Amendment 136 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 8
Recital 8
(8) In the establishment of the existence of an excessive deficit based on the deficit criterion and the steps leading to it there is a need to take into account the whole range of relevant factors covered by the report under Article 126(3) of the Treaty if the government debt to gross domestic product does not exceed the reference valuenature, composition and quality of expenditure, including government investment expenditure, and other relevant factors covered by the report under Article 126(3) TFEU.
Amendment 153 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 14
Recital 14
(14) In order to ensure compliance with the fiscal surveillance framework of the Union for participating Member States, rules- based incentives and sanctions should be designed on the basis of Article 136 of the Treaty, ensuring fair, timely and effective mechanisms for compliance with the Stability and Growth pact rules.
Amendment 156 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 14 a (new)
Recital 14 a (new)
(14a) The incentives and sanctions should take due account of the structure of the national deficit and debt, the economic cycle in order to avoid pro-cyclical fiscal policy and the characteristics and evolution of public revenues and expenditures needed for growth- enhancing structural reforms notably in the framework of the Union's jobs and smart, sustainable and inclusive growth objectives.
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 14 b (new)
Recital 14 b (new)
(14b) The Council and the Commission should make their positions and decisions public at appropriate stages of the economic policy coordination procedures, while fully respecting Treaty provisions, in order to ensure effective peer pressure. The European Parliament may invite the Council, the Commission and the Member State concerned to explain before its competent committee its decisions and policies; the Council, the Commission and the Member State concerned may equally ask to be invited to the European Parliament for the same purposes.
Amendment 166 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 1
Article 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 2
Article 1 – paragraph 2
2. For the purpose of this Regulation “: – 'participating Member States” shall mean those Member States' means those Member States whose currency is the euro, including Member States whose currency is not the euro but have been admitted to ERM II under the conditions of their accession treaty to the Union, and – 'Member States with a derogation' means Member States other than those whose currency is the euro.
Amendment 168 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 1
Article 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Amendment 179 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point b
Article 1 – point 2 – point b
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1a
Article 2 – paragraph 1a
1a. When it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) is to be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with Article 126 (2) (b) of the Treaty if the differential with respect to the reference value has reduced over the previous three years at an average rate of the order of one-twentieth per year. , as a benchmark, following an assessment made over a three-year period. A reduction of the differential with respect to the reference value of less that one-twentieth per year over a three year period may, nevertheless, be considered to be satisfactory if this lesser reduction is due to new government debt for public investment. The definition of what shall constitute public investment conductive to achieving the Union's sustainable growth and employment objectives within the scope of this regulation shall be laid down by the Commission through a delegated act, respecting the principles laid down in Council Directive (...) on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. In order to take due account of the economic cycle, in the case of a sharp decrease of annual GDP volume growth rate followed by growth rates below 1,5%, the Commission may define the conditions for a proportionate, lower and temporary benchmark that is balanced with the efforts made to match the objectives and requirements of the Union; the conditions for a proportionate, higher and temporary benchmark may be defined by the Commission in the case of an average annual GDP volume growth rate above 3% over a period of three years. For a period of 3 years from [date of entering into force of this Regulation - to be inserted], account shall be taken of the backward-looking nature of this indicator in its application.' For a period of 3 years from [date of entering into force of this Regulation - to be inserted], account shall be taken of the backward-looking nature of this indicator in its application.
Amendment 191 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point c
Article 1 – point 2 – point c
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3
Article 2 – paragraph 3
3. The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) of the Treaty shall take into account all relevant factors as indicated in that Article. The report shall appropriately reflect developments in the medium-term economic position (i. In particular, potential growth, prevailing cyclical conditions, inflation, excessive macroeconomic imb (including price evolution of main financial assets), employment and unemployment in accordance with Article 9 of the Treaty, savings and external ancd internal national indebtednes)s and developments in the medium-term budgetary position, (in particular, fiscal consolidation efforts in “‘good times”’, public investment, the implementation of policies in the context of the common growth strategy for the Union and the overall quality of public finances, in particular, compliance with Council Directive […] on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States). The report shall also analyse developments in the medium-term debt position as relevant (i. In particular, it appropriately shall reflects risk factors including the maturity structure and dynamics of debt, and the currency denomination of the debt, stock-flow operations, accumulated reserves and other government assets; public guarantees, notably linked to the financial sector; liabilities both explicit and implicit related to ageing and private debt to the extent that it may repexplicit, implicit and contingent liabilities notably linked to the financial sector and private debt. The exact nature of the information mentioned above should be in full compliance with in Council Directive (...) on requiresment a contingent implicit liability for the government)s for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. Furthermore, the Commission shall give due consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess in qualitative terms the excess over the reference value and which the Member State has put forward to the Commission and to the Council. In that context, special consideration shall be given to strategic public investment made to support structural reforms for the implementation of the Union's growth and employment objectives, and financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and to achieving Union policy goals, including financial stability. and social and regional cohesion.
Amendment 226 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 a (new)
Article 1 – point 2 a (new)
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 a (new)
Article 2 a (new)
2a. The following article is inserted: Article 2a In order to enhance the dialogue between the institutions of the Union, in particular the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, and the Member States' parliaments and governments, or any other relevant body, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the European Parliament may conduct hearings and public debates on the macro-economic and budgetary surveillance undertaken by the Council and the Commission.
Amendment 235 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 3 – point c
Article 1 – point 3 – point c
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 4
Article 3 – paragraph 4
4. The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) of the Treaty shall establish a deadline of six months at most for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit, which should be completed in the year following its identification unless there are special circumstances. In the recommendation, the Council shall request that the Member State achieves annual budgetary targets which, on the basis of the forecast underpinning the recommendation, are consistent with a minimum annual improvement of at least 0,5 % of GDP as a benchmark, in its cyclically adjusted balance net of fiscal one-offs and other temporary measures, in order to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit within the deadline set in the recommendation . (Cross reference to amendment tabled by MEP Sánchez Presedo toThe Council may decide to set a lower or higher temporary benchmark according to the criteria defined Commission under the cases foreseen in the Article 2.1a. Or. en point 2 – subpoint b (Regulation EC 1467/97, Article 1 2– paragraph 1 –a))
Amendment 244 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 3 – point d a (new)
Article 1 – point 3 – point d a (new)
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 4a a (new)
Article 3 – paragraph 4a a (new)
Amendment 265 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5 – point b a (new)
Article 1 – point 5 – point b a (new)
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1a a(new)
Article 5 – paragraph 1a a(new)
Amendment 286 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 11 a (new)
Article 1 – point 11 a (new)
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 11 – Paragraph 1a (new)
Article 11 – Paragraph 1a (new)
(11a) the following paragraph has been inserted: "The European Parliament may invite the Member State concerned, within three months of the date of the announcement of the sanctions referred to in paragraph 1, to explain before its competent committee the reasons why, despite the warnings received, it has not corrected the excessive deficit. The Member State may also ask to be invited to the European Parliament for the same purposes."