74 Amendments of Ivo STREJČEK related to 2012/2151(INI)
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)
Citation 1 a (new)
- having regard to Articles 5, 6 and 7 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas a closer European integration should necessarily involve efficient institutional checks and balances to ensure greater democratic legitimacy, accountability, transparency and citizen's endorsement;
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C b (new)
Recital C b (new)
Cb. whereas a closer European integration should provide for a greater parliamentary involvement at both the national and Union level;
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas legislation underpinning the 'banking union' should respect the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality as defined in the Treaty of Lisbon, and in particular Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
Recital D b (new)
Db. whereas there is need to enhance democratic legitimacy with regards to the 'proposed banking union' by closely involving through the appropriate legal procedure both the national parliaments, especially those of the euro area, and the European Parliament, in the ongoing legislative process well as in the drafting of any future amendment to the Treaties;
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the economic, and financial and banking crisiscrisis, especially the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, has repeatedly demonstrated that excessive public debt and deficit at national level and financing problems as well as the disturbance of macroeconomic equilibriums quickly, directly and negatively affect the socio-economic development of the euro area and ofindirectly impact the Union as a whole;
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas due consideration should be given to the potential mutual spill-over effects of the 'banking union' in the euro area for non-euro area members;
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital K a (new)
Recital K a (new)
K a. whereas progress towards a genuine EMU should respect the will of the Member States that have an opt-out from having to introduce the euro to retain their respective national currencies;
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital N
Recital N
N. whereas Union and national policy makers and parliamentarians should continuously explain to their citizens the benefits and possible downsides of a single currency, including the costs and risks linked to a break up of the euro area;
Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital P
Recital P
P. whereas any doubt about the future of EMU in general and the Union's single currency in particular must be ruled outsubject to a thorough public debate at national and Union level;
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital P a (new)
Recital P a (new)
Pa. whereas economic and monetary policy making in the Union cannot be based on political ideology, but rather based on thorough economic and financial analysis, rational choices with respect to the introduction of the euro in the yet non-euro area Member States, viable exit strategies from the euro area for defaulting euro area members, and enhanced democratic scrutiny by the European citizens via their national and Union elected representatives;
Amendment 125 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital R
Recital R
R. whereas the answer to the euro crisis is complex and demands sustained, multifaceted efforts at all institutional and policy levels without a priori ruling out any options;
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital S
Recital S
S. whereas the Union institutions and the Heads of State and Government of the Member States in general and of the euro area Member States in particular hold the key to working in a credible way on the much-needed restoration of confidence by ensuring greater transparency and democratic legitimacy of, and parliamentary involvement in, the policy decisions proposed;
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital T
Recital T
T. whereas restoring confidence also requires those Heads of State and Government and their Ministers to defend loyallyexplain in a detailed manner in their Member States the policy decisions theyat have been agreed upon at Union level and to explain that they subscribed to those policies in the belief that they will safeguard the future of their own citizens; whereas by unfairly imputing unpopular decisions to the Union in some instances, a particularly dangerous game of perception is being played which risks eroding the Union from below, undermining solidarity and ultimately damaging the credibility of the national leaders themselves and potentially the European project as a whole;
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital V
Recital V
V. whereas the growing divide between core and peripheral countriesMember States with a budgetary surplus and those with an excessive deficit in the Union should not become chronic in nature; whereas a permanent framework mustcould be created in which Member States in difficulty should beto the extent possible be also able to rely on solidarity-based support from other Member States in addition to implementing measures to return as soon as possible to balanced public accounts; whereas those Member States which desire solidarity should be able to take up their responsibility for implementing the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union as well as their country-specific recommendations and their engagements under the European Semester, in particular those related to the stability and growth pact (SGP), the Euro- plus pact and the macro-economic imbalances procedure;
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital W
Recital W
W. whereas it is beyond doubt that thethe European integration is a progressive process in which Member States should pay attention to meticulously honouring their national, European and integrnation is an irreversible and progressive process if Member States meticulously honour their European engagemental engagements, and whereas particular attention should be given to close transatlantic, and where possible G20, cooperation in view of implementing as part of the 'exit strategy' from the crisis compatible regulatory and supervisory regimes, especially for global and systemically important credit institutions and other financial actors;
Amendment 161 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital X
Recital X
X. whereas from a democratic point of view it is incomprehensible that the President of the European Parliament, whoich is composed of elected parliamentarians representsing more than 502 million European citizens, has not been involved in the drafting of the report of 26 June 2012 of the President of the European Council, in collaboration with the Presidents of the European Commission, the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank, entitled ‘'Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’';
Amendment 164 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Y
Recital Y
Y. whereas the time has come for the political leaders of and within the European Union to demonstrate their determination, creativity, courage, resilience and leadership to remove the remaining deficiencies that continue to hamper the proper functioning of EMU, while respecting the rule of law of the Union as enshrined in the Lisbon Treaties;
Amendment 174 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AA
Recital AA
AA. whereas the European Council of 28 and 29 June 2012 requested its President to develop a specific and time-bound roadmap for the achievement of a genuine EMU; whereas developing a global long- term vision via a road map is an important signal forthat could contribute to restoring confidence that willwhich could grow as the road map is carried out step by step;
Amendment 177 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AB
Recital AB
AB. whereas steady progress in the implementation of the long-term road map should not delay the needed short-term measures, while fully respecting the prerogatives of each institution involved in this latest reform of the EMU;
Amendment 182 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AC
Recital AC
AC. whereas it cannot be excluded that new Treaty changes might be needed for increasing the governance of a fully operational EMU; whereas any needed changes of the Treaties or of existing national legislations should be conducted in full compliance with national constitutional provisions; whereas the Commission should list without delay the necessary institutional developments in the long term and inform the co-legislators about them;
Amendment 190 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AE
Recital AE
AE. whereas the ambition should be that all Member States of the euro area jointly take steps forward towards greater European integration; whereas decisions that only apply to the euro area might be needed where required or justified on the basis of the specificity of the euro area, not excluding opt-ins for other Member States;
Amendment 195 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AE a (new)
Recital AE a (new)
AEa. whereas to overcome the structural deficiencies inherent in the EMU and effectively curb the pervasive moral hazard, the proposed 'banking union' should draw on the earlier reform of the Union financial services sector, including the creation of EBA, ESMA, EIOPA and the ESRB, as well as the strengthened economic governance, especially in the euro area, and the new budgetary framework of the European Semester, to ensure greater resilience and competitiveness of the Union banking sector, increased confidence in it, and enhanced capital reserves to prevent Member States' public budgets having to bear the costs of banks' bail-outs in the future;
Amendment 201 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AF
Recital AF
AF. whereas the operations within the Union to stabilise the financial system to date, can be called successful but insufficient to fully have partially contributed to restoreing confidence; whereas the European Central Bank (ECB) with its series of exceptional temporary assistance measures for both Member States and banks has played a pivotal role in these 'rescue operations' without losing sight of its core objective, namely guaranteeing price stability;
Amendment 208 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AG a (new)
Recital AG a (new)
AG a. whereas Union and national policy makers and parliamentarians should foster public debate on the new role foreseen for the ECB as single banking supervisor of credit institutions in the euro area, especially with respect to the bank's ability to remain independent from political pressure, the scope of its new and overall tasks and the competences left to the national central banks;
Amendment 230 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AL
Recital AL
AL. whereas all public and private stakeholders of the Union banking sector, including financial institutions and their representatives, should act responsibly and according to high moral standards, serving the real economy;
Amendment 234 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AM
Recital AM
AM. whereas the Union would benefit fromCommission has already or will soon present the European Parliament with proposals that introduce a single Eeurop arean supervisory mechanism for financial institutions, amend Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and establish a single Eeurop arean deposit guarantee scheme and a single Eeurop arean recovery and resolution scheme;
Amendment 245 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AN
Recital AN
AN. whereas the scope of the deposit guarantee and crisis management framework should mirror that of the single supervisory mechanism in terms of the Member States and banks covered (symmetry);
Amendment 258 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AP a (new)
Recital AP a (new)
APa. whereas the role of EBA in defining, enforcing and controlling the single rulebook for Union banks is gradually proving useful in sharing of best supervisory practices across the Union;
Amendment 259 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AQ
Recital AQ
AQ. whereas creating a high-quality and uniform Eeurop arean supervisory mechanism is indispensablcould contribute to avoiding competitive distortions, to guarantee a level playing field between all financial institutions and to in the supervision of systemically important cross-border financial institutions operating in the euro area and gradually restoreing cross-border confidence;
Amendment 263 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AR
Recital AR
AR. whereas in line with the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality a clear division of operational responsibilities should be agreed between a Eeurop arean supervisory mechanism involving the ECB and the national supervisory authorities, depending on the size and nature of bankECB's assessment of the risks posed by the supervised institutions and the nature of the supervisory tasks; to be performed;
Amendment 269 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AS
Recital AS
AS. whereas the European level of supervision should have ultimate responsibility for all financial institutions within the euro area countries included in the system, for the guidance of national supervisory authorities and for determining the overall strategic supervisory framework;
Amendment 272 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AT
Recital AT
AT. whereas European supervision of financial institutions within the euro area is an absolutpresented to the European Parliament as one of the priority to take measures to tackle the crisis;
Amendment 282 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AU
Recital AU
AU. whereas, for reasons of efficiency and quick action, it isthe Commission's proposal recommendeds to confer European supervision to the ECB, given its widely recognised expertise, access to information resources and significant credibility;
Amendment 287 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AV
Recital AV
AV. whereas the Commission recommends that supervision by the ECB should already from the very start cover the financial institutions requiring direct support from the Union as well as European systemically important financial institutions (E-SIFIs) and domestic systemically important financial institutions (D-SIFIs));
Amendment 290 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AW
Recital AW
AW. whereas it is of paramount importance that efficient safeguards are introduced to avoid conflicts of interest between the ECB's monetary policy and its supervisory powers; whereas any possible erosion of the ECB's authority for monetary policy needs to be excluded by the setting up within the ECB of a legally independent supervisory board;
Amendment 293 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AW a (new)
Recital AW a (new)
AWa. whereas the proposed ECB's single supervisory role over E-SIFIs and D- SIFIs should be carefully assessed against the backdrop of the ESRB's role in identifying and preventing systemic risks susceptible to impact on the Union as a whole;
Amendment 304 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AY
Recital AY
AY. whereas the independence of the Eeurop arean single supervisory mechanism from political and industry influence does not exempt it from explaining, justifying and being accountable to the European Parliament, on a regular basis and whenever the situation requires, for the actions and decisions taken in the field of European supervision in the euro area, given the impact that supervisory measures may have on public finances, banks, employees and customers;
Amendment 307 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AZ
Recital AZ
AZ. whereas the head of the Eeurop arean single supervisory mechanism should be different from the head of the ECB and the ESRB and he/she should be appointed after a hearing in, and confirmation by, the European Parliament based on a shortlist of both male and female candidates selected from across the Union banking sector and not the central banks exclusively;
Amendment 310 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BA
Recital BA
BA. whereas it is a major achievement that in the future the European Stabilitthe head of the euro area single supervisory Mmechanism (ESM) will, under certain conditions, be able to fund banks in difficulties directly; whereas for this reason making the single supervisory mechanism operational is the first and most urgent task in the realisation of the banking unionshould be different from the head of the ECB and ESRB and he/she should be appointed after a hearing in, and confirmation by, the European Parliament based on a shortlist of both male and female candidates selected from across the Union banking sector and not the central banks exclusively;
Amendment 311 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BA
Recital BA
BA. whereas it is a major achievement that in the future the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will, under certain conditions, ,be able to fund banks in difficulties directly; whereas for this reason making the single supervisory mechanism operational is the first and most urgent task initiated by the Commission in the realisation of the banking union;
Amendment 314 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BB
Recital BB
BB. whereas athe single set of rules (single rule book), to being developed by EBA, should ensure fully harmonised rules and their uniform application across the Union; whereas the completion of the single rule book on banking supervision and prudential requirements is a precondition for the effective functioning of the single supervisory mechanism, since the European supervisor cannot work with different national prudential rules;
Amendment 331 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BE
Recital BE
BE. whereas a balance should be struck between, on the one hand, an excessive protection of risks taken by financial institutions, which increases the risk of moral hazard and, and on the other, insufficient protection which undermines confidence in and the credibility of the financial system;
Amendment 336 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BF
Recital BF
BF. whereas after the increase of the deposit protection to a uniform Union level of EUR 100 000 per depositor and per credit institution, the current Commission proposal for a Eeurop arean system of deposit guarantees is another step in the right dircould further enhance deposit protection; whereas the Commission proposal mainly aims at the harmonisation of national systems in the area of the offered guarantees as well as their financing; whereas there is risk that for some credit institutions the ex-ante funding of the single system of deposit guarantees will imply excessive financial burden;
Amendment 344 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BG
Recital BG
BG. whereas the introduction of a single Eeurop arean deposit guarantee fund should be the ultimate goal,conditional on an independent impact assessment clearly proving its relevance and not an a priori defined ultimate goal, that may or not further increasinge the credibility of the scheme; the development of a similar scheme is justifiedwhile being justified by the Commission considering the introduction of a Eeurop arean structure for prudential supervision and a Eeurop arean recovery and resolution framework should not be prejudged;
Amendment 353 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BH
Recital BH
BH. whereas a single deposit guarantee scheme should cover all banks within the countriesMember States whose currency is the euro included in the system in order to guarantee a level playing field and avoid deposit flight from uncovered to covered financial institutions and provide for other Member States whose currency is not the euro to voluntarily opt-in to these arrangements;
Amendment 359 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5
Subheading 5
Single euro area recovery and resolution scheme
Amendment 369 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BJ
Recital BJ
BJ. whereas a single Eeurop arean recovery and resolution authority (ERRA) should be established for the euro area, preferably in parallel with the single supervisory mechanism, for restoring the viability of banks in difficulties and resolving non- viable financial institutions;
Amendment 375 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BK
Recital BK
BK. whereas the ERRA willshould be able to work more efficiently, more promptly and more consistently than a network of national recovery and resolution authorities, avoiding the negative consequences of purely national decisions, breaking the negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns and eliminating the need for ad hoc intergovernmental crisis solutiobreaking the negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns;
Amendment 381 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BL
Recital BL
BL. whereas the ERRA, whenever the situation requires, needs to explain and justify and should be accountable to the European Parliament and the Council for the actions and decisions taken in the field of Eeurop arean recovery and resolution of financial institutions;
Amendment 385 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BM
Recital BM
BM. whereas the head of the ERRA should be appointed after a hearing in and confirmation by the European Parliament based on a shortlist of both male and female candidates selected from across the Union banking sector and not the central banks exclusively;
Amendment 387 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BN
Recital BN
BN. whereas the Commission proposal on recovery and resolution tools for euro area banks in crisis iscould be a step in the right direction;
Amendment 391 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BO
Recital BO
BO. whereas progress also must be made tothe possibility of createing a single Eeurop arean recovery and resolution fund which is essential to guarantee at all times the stability of the financial system and to manage the resolution of financial institutions, whatever their size or nature, while safeguarding public financesshould be conditional on an independent impact assessment;
Amendment 397 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BP
Recital BP
BP. whereas it is necessary for the protection of private savings to keep separate Eeurop arean funds for deposit guarantee and recovery and resolution;
Amendment 402 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BQ
Recital BQ
BQ. whereas Eeurop arean resolution and deposit guarantee mechanisms should have a strong financial structure built, amongst other sources, on contributions from the industry, with European public money only serving as an ultimate backstop;
Amendment 426 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BU
Recital BU
BU. whereas the crisis has made clear the need forotivated Union-level political decisions on a qualitative step towards a more robust fiscal union with more effective mechanisms to correct unsustainable fiscal trajectories, debt levels and set the upper limits of budget balance of Member States;
Amendment 433 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BV
Recital BV
BV. whereas supplementary mechanisms arproposed by the Commission are said to be needed to ensure that all Member States respect their engagements in their individual budgetary procedures, where it cannot be excluded that the role of the European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs needs to be reinforced;
Amendment 441 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BW
Recital BW
BW. whereas the trilogue negotiations on the so-called ‘'two-pack’' regulations should soon lead to concrete political results; the Council should abandon its reluctance on the dossier;
Amendment 448 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BX a (new)
Recital BX a (new)
BXa. whereas common debt issuance of the euro area Member States, if backed by joint or several guarantees, risks triggering contagion, including rating downgrades for all participants, in the case of severe macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, and whereas a downgrading of ratings of the euro area may also negatively impact on the creditworthiness and ratings of non-euro area Member States, thus ultimately leaving the whole EU-27 short of sustainable credit;
Amendment 457 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BZ
Recital BZ
BZ. whereas the common issuance of debt is in the longer run a corollary of EMUeuro area would require changes to the Treaties;
Amendment 491 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital CC
Recital CC
CC. whereas the European Semester offers a good framework to coordinate economic policies and budgetary choices implemented at national level in line with the country-specific recommendations adopted by the Council;
Amendment 500 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital CD
Recital CD
CD. whereas fiscal discipline is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to get out of the crisis, in-depth structural reforms and initiatives are also needed to ensure a qualitative and sustainable growth and employment in a socially justknowledge-driven society;
Amendment 512 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital CF
Recital CF
CF. whereas the Pact for Growth and Jobs, which was approved at the European Summit of 28 and 29 June 2012, canould bring an important contribution to growth, employment and improved European competition capacities, the Union and the Member States mustshould therefore take on their responsibility and act quickly;
Amendment 523 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital CH
Recital CH
Amendment 542 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital CI
Recital CI
CI. whereas it is important that the recovery of the economy goes along with a labour market policy that stimulates job search and entrepreneurial spirit, reduces structural unemployment, especially for youth, old persons and women,
Amendment 548 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital CJ
Recital CJ
CJ. whereas binding coordination at Union level might be considered for certain key economic policy issues particularly relevant for growth and employment;
Amendment 553 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital CK
Recital CK
CK. whereas sustainable lasting public finance is not only a matter of an economic use of the scarce government resources, but also of a fair taxation, of a well- organised collection of taxes, of a better fight against all forms of tax fraud and evasion, and of a well- designed tax system that avoids the combination of high marginal rates with low tax basespromotes business development and jobs creation;
Amendment 561 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital CL
Recital CL
CL. whereas the Union owes its legitimacy to its democratic values, the objectives it pursues and itsproper checks and balances putting in place a viable equilibrium between the powers, competences, and instruments andof Union institutions on the one hand, and the Member States, on the other,
Amendment 572 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital CN
Recital CN
CN. whereas the European Council has acted responsibly for the past years in the management of the crisis, formulating numerous proposals to find a way out of the crisis for which in the Treaties not always a clear competence to the Union has been assigned;
Amendment 598 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital CS
Recital CS
CS. whereas it is no longer acceptable that a solution could be envisaged for the President of the European Parliament cannoto be present for the whole duration of the meetings of the European Council and the Euro area Summit; whereas a solution for this lack of democratic legitimacy shn inter-institutional solution could be found urgently through a political agreement between the two institutions;
Amendment 602 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital CT
Recital CT
CT. whereas wherever new competences are transferred to or created at Union level or new Union institutions established, corresponding democratic control by, and accountability to, the European Parliament and the Council as well as any other relevant Union institution should be ensured;
Amendment 607 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Requests the Commission to submit to Parliament as soon as possible after consultation of all interested parties, with the European Parliament being a co- legislator, proposals for acts on following the detailed recommendations set out in the Annex heretoinvolved under consultation or ordinary legislative procedure where appropriate;
Amendment 610 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Confirms thatInvites the Commission and the Member States to assess whether the recommendations herein respect the principle of subsidiarity and the fundamental rights of citizens of the European Union;
Amendment 614 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Calls on the Commission, in addition to the measures which can and must be taken swiftly under the existing Treaties, to list the institutional developments which may prove necessary in order to establish a stronger EMU architecture, based on the need for a banking union, a fiscal union and an economic union and to inform the European Parliament and the Council about any of these without delay;