BETA

33 Amendments of Miguel PORTAS related to 2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 1

(1) The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States~~, as provid~~ within the Union is geared byto the ~~Treaty, should entail compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices,~~objectives of sustainable growth, job creation and a high level of protection and social rights. These objectives mean that economic coordination should take account of controlling inflation and ensuring sound public finances and monetary conditions, a~~nd a sustainable~~s well as a sound balance of payments.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

(3) ~~The Stability and Growth Pact is based on the objective of sound government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for pric~~In the name of sound public finances and controlling inflation, the sStability and ~~for strong sustainable growth underpinned by financial stability and conducive to employment creation~~Growth Pact condemned the EU to years of mediocre growth, high levels of unemployment and a worsening of its main internal imbalances.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 3 a (new)

(3a) Until such time as the EU has a Sustainable Growth and Employment Pact, a framework for enhanced economic governance will be created that is geared to achieving these objectives and to preventing and correcting the appearance of excessive macroeconomic, macrofinancial and social imbalances within the Union. This framework will be based on the presupposition that the Member States regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and that they coordinate them among themselves. Given that this is a framework for shared governance, decisions will be adopted by the Council on a proposal from the Commission.Those institutions undertake to respect the principle of transparency, which means that their decisions must be reasoned and made public.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 3 b (new)

(3b) The framework for enhanced economic governance will be created as part of the 'European semester' and should: a) define annual guidelines for a job- creating sustainable growth strategy across the Union, by formulating Broad Economic Policy Guidelines in accordance with Article 121(2) TFEU; b) establish concerted action to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances under the amended Regulation (EU) No .../2011; c) carry out the effective prevention and correction of excessive imbalances in public finances under this Regulation (EC) No 1467/97; d) organise enhanced financial market regulation and supervision, including macroprudential supervision by the European Systemic Risk Board; e) establish a permanent and credible financial crisis resolution mechanism that enables Member States to protect the revival of their respective economies, as well as social cohesion and convergence policies, against speculative attacks on their sovereign debts.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 3 c (new)

(3c) In the 'European semester', documents prepared by the Commission relating to the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the respective assessment should be debated by Parliament before being adopted by the Council. Likewise, the main documents originating from the Member States and containing national economic and budgetary policy commitments should be voted on by the respective parliaments before being submitted to the Council, in order to guarantee democratic legitimacy and the subsidiarity principle in a context of enhanced economic governance. By 31 December 2011 Parliament, the Council and the Commission will conclude a procedural agreement on parliamentary involvement, which will be revised by 2014 in line with the experience gained.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 4

(4) The common framework for enhanced economic governance requires ~~to be enhanced, including with regard to budgetary surveillance, in line with~~improvement in its budgetary aspect, in order to reflect both the lessons of the latest financial, economic and social crisis and the high degree of integration achieved by Member States economies within the European Union, and particularly in the euro area.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 5

~~(5) The rules on budgetary discipline should be strengthened in particular by giving a more prominent role to the level and evolution of debt and overall sustainability.~~deleted

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 6

(6) Implementing the existing excessive deficit procedure on the basis of both the deficit criterion and the debt criterion requires defining a numerical benchmark against which to assess whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pacehas been based on a numerical benchmark ratio for the deficit and debt aligned with gross domestic product; this criterion, applied mechanically, has proved to be counterproductive or simply unusable, especially in times of crisis and recession.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 7

(7) The establishment of the existence of an excessive deficit based on the debt criterion and the steps leading to it should not be based solely on non-compliance with the numerical benchmark, but always take into account the whole range of relevant factors covered by the Commission report under Article 126(3) of the Treaty.deleted

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 8

(8) In the establishment of the existence of an excessive deficit ~~based on~~, the defi~~cit~~ning criterion ~~and the steps leading to it there is a need to take i~~will in future be the ratio between the primary currento account ~~the whole range of relevant factors covered by the report under Article 126(3) of the Treaty if the government debt to gross domestic product does not exceed the reference value~~balance and GDP, with a view to preserving the necessary safety margins for public investment policy, especially in those Member States having to deal with major economic difficulties and/or tending to diverge from the majority of the macroeconomic thresholds included in the reference indicators scoreboard for economic governance in the EU.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 8 a (new)

(8a) In the establishment of the existence of an excessive deficit based on the criterion of the ratio of the primary balance to GDP and in the steps leading to such a decision, there is a need to take into account the whole range of relevant factors examined by the Commission under Article 126(3) of the Treaty.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 8 b (new)

(8b) The framework for monitoring public and private debt should, for its part, support long-term growth and, in periods of crisis, serve to stimulate the economy on a basis of respect for Member States' specific needs and priorities.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 13

(13) ~~It is appropriate to step up the application of the financial sanctions envisaged by Article 126(11) of~~The excessive debt procedure shall be based on a multilateral dialogue process in which the surveillance and monitoring functions fall to the Commission, which makes recommendations to the Council. Member States shall comply with the multilateral agreements concerning the numerical objectives which they have accepted, as well as new targets in case of non-compliance. However, the choice of policies and actions for the Trea~~ty so that they constitute a real incentive for compliance with the notices under Article 126(9).~~ lisation of those objectives shall be entirely their responsibility. In the excessive debt procedure, the Council and Commission shall make their decisions public in order to ensure effective peer pressure; similarly, Parliament may invite the Member State concerned to explain its decisions to the relevant committee. The current excessive debt procedure will not involve applying the financial sanctions permitted under Article 126(11) of the Treaty, since this would worsen the problems it purported to resolve.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 14

(14) In order to ensure compliance with the fiscal surveillance framework of the Union for participating Member States, rules-based sanctions should be designed on the basis of Article 136 of the Treaty, ensuring fair, timely and effective mechanisms for compliance with the Stability and Growth pact rules.deleted

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 14 a (new)

(14a) The more economically and politically sensitive recommendations shall take due account of the structure of the deficit and the national debt, the economic cycle (with the objective of avoiding procyclical fiscal policies), and the structural composition of public revenue, while safeguarding expenditure which is essential for policies fostering sustainable growth.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1– paragraph 1

1. This Regulation sets out the provisions to speed up and clarify the excessive deficit procedure, having as its objective to ~~deter~~correct excessive ~~government~~ deficits ~~and, if~~where they occur~~, to furt~~. Ther pr~~ompt their correction, where compliance with the~~esent budgetary discipline is examined on the basis of the ~~government deficit and government debt criteria~~primary current account balance and the reference values for government debt arising from an economic policy that is coordinated at European level.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

1. The excess ~~of a government deficit~~ive character of the primary balance/GDP ratio over the reference value shall be considered exceptional~~, in accordance with the second indent of Article 126 (2) (a) of the Treaty,~~ when resulting from an unusual event outside the control of the Member State concerned and which has a major impact on the financial position of general government, or when resulting from a severe economic downturn.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1a

1-A. When it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) is to be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with Article 126 (2) (b) of the Treaty if the differential with respect to the reference value has reduced over the previous three years at an average rate of the order of one-twentieth per year. For a period of 3 years from [the date of entering into force of this Regulation ~~- to be inserted],~~ account shall be taken of the backward-looking nature of this indicator in its application.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point c

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3

3. The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) of the Treaty shall take into account all relevant factors as indicated in that Article. The report shall appropriately reflect developments in the medium-term economic position (in particular potential growth, prevailing cyclical conditions, inflation, excessive macroeconomic imbalances) and developments in the medium-term budgetary position (in particular, fiscal consolidation efforts in ‘good times’, public investment, the implementation of policies in the context of the common growth strategy for the Union and the overall quality of public finances, in particular, compliance with ~~Council~~the Directive ~~[…]~~ on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States). The report shall also analyse developments in the medium- term debt position ~~as relevant~~ (in particular, it ~~appropriately~~ reflects risk factors including the maturity structure and currency denomination of the debt, stock-flow operations, accumulated reserves and other government assets; guarantees, notably linked to the financial sector; liabilities both explicit and implicit related to ageing and private debt to the extent that it ~~may~~ represents a contingent implicit liability for the government). Furthermore, the Commission shall give ~~due~~ consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to ~~comprehensively~~ assess in qualitative terms the excess over the reference value ~~and which the Member State has put forward to the Commission and to the Council~~. In that context, special consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity ~~and to achieving Union policy goals, including financial stability~~.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point d

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2– paragraph 4

4. The Commission and the Council shall make a balanced overall assessment of all the relevant factors, specifically, the extent to which they affect the assessment of compliance with the ~~deficit~~primary balance and/or the debt criteria as aggravating or mitigating factors. When assessing compliance on the basis of the ~~deficit~~balance criterion, if the ratio of ~~the government debt~~balance to GDP exceeds the reference value, these factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit provided for in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of Article 126 of the Treaty only if the double condition of the overarching principle — that, before these relevant factors are taken into account, the general government deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary — is fully met.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point e

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2– paragraph 7

7. 'In the case of Member States where the excess of the deficit or the breach of the requirements of the debt criterion according to Article 126 (2) (b) of the Treaty reflects the implementation of a pension reform introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar, the Commission and the Council shall also consider the cost of the reform to the publicly managed pillar when assessing developments in EDP deficit and debt figures. In cases where the debt ratio exceeds the reference value, the cost of the reform shall be considered only if the deficit remains close to the reference value. For that purpose, for a period of five years starting from the date of entry into force of such a reform, consideration shall be given to its net cost as reflected in deficit and debt developments on the basis of a linear degressive scale. Additionally, irrespective of the date of entry into force of the reform, its net cost as reflected in debt developments shall be given consideration for a transitional period of five years from [date of entry into force of this Regulation, to be inserted] on the basis of the same linear degressive scale. The net cost as thus calculated shall be taken into account also for the decision of the Council under Article 126(12) of the Treaty on the abrogation of some or all of its decisions under paragraphs 6 to 9 and 11 of Article 126 of the Treaty, if the deficit has declined substantially and continuously and has reached a level that comes close to the reference value and, in case of non-fulfilment of the requirements of the debt criterion, the debt has been put on a declining path. Moreover, equal consideration shall be given to the reduction in this net cost resulting from the partial or total reversal of an above mentioned pension reform.'deleted

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 3 – point c

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 4

4. The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) of the Treaty shall establish a deadline of six months at most for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit, which should be completed in the year following its identification unless there are special circumstances. In the recommendation, the Council shall request that the Member State achieves annual budgetary targets which~~, on the basis of the forecast underpinning the recommendation, are consistent with a minimum annual improvement of at least 0,5 % of GDP as a benchmark, in its cyclically adjusted balanc~~ are compatible with a strategy for sustained GDP growth. These objectives shall be adjusted for cyclical variations and shall be net of one-off and temporary measures, in order to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit within the deadline set in the recommendation.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 3 – point e

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 5

5. If effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) of the Treaty and unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances occur after the adoption of that recommendation, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) of the Treaty. The revised recommendation~~, taking into account the relevant factors mentioned in Article 2(3) of this Regulation, may notabl~~ may extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. The Council shall assess the existence of unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances against the economic forecasts in its recommendation. The Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) of the Treaty in case of a severe economic downturn ~~of a general nature~~.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1

1. Any Council decision to give notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures for thexcessive deficit reduction ~~in accordance with Article 126(9) of the Treaty~~ shall be taken within two months of the Council decision establishing that no effective action has been taken in accordance with Article 126(8). In the notice, the Council shall request that the Member State achieve annual budgetary targets which~~, on the basis of the forecast underpinning the notice, are consistent with a minimum annual improvement of at least 0,5 % of GDP as a benchmark, in its cyclically adjusted balanc~~ ensure the preservation of a strategy for sustained GDP growth. The value proposed for the primary balance must be adjusted for cyclical variations and must be net of one- off and temporary measures, in order to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit within the deadline set in the notice. The Council shall also ~~indicate~~recommend measures conducive to the achievement of these targets, which the Member State may or may not follow, with its options being evaluated in the light of results.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1a

1-A. Following the Council notice given in accordance with Article 126(9) of the Treaty, the Member State concerned shall report to the Commission and the Council on action taken in response to the Council notice. The report shall include the targets for the government expenditure and for the discretionary measures on the revenue side as well as information on the actions being taken in response to the specific Council recommendations ~~so as to allow the Council to take, if necessary, the decision in accordance with Article 6 (2) of this Regulation. The report shall be made public~~. The report shall be made public, and Parliament may invite the Member State to present it to the competent committee.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 6

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 6 – paragraph 2

2. Where the conditions to apply Article 126(11) of the Treaty are met, the Council shall impose sanctions in accordance with Article 126 (11). Any such decision shall be taken no later than four months after the Council decision giving notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures in accordance with Article 126 (9).'deleted

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 7

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 7

~~7. in Article 7, the reference to 'Article 4(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 3605/93' is replaced by the reference to 'Article 3(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 479/2009'.~~deleted

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 8

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 8

Any Council decision to intensify sanctions, in accordance with Article 126(11) of the Treaty, shall be taken no later than two months after the reporting dates pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009. Any Council decision to abrogate some or all of its decisions in accordance with Article 126(12) of the Treaty shall be taken as soon as possible and in any case no later than two months after the reporting dates pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009.'deleted

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 11

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 11

Whenever the Council decides to apply sanctions to a participating Member State in accordance with Article 126(11) of the Treaty, a fine shall, as a rule, be required. The Council may decide to supplement this fine by the other measures provided for in Article 126(11) of the Treaty.'deleted

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 12

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 1

1. The amount of the fine shall comprise a fixed component equal to 0,2 % of GDP, and a variable component. The variable component shall amount to one tenth of the difference between the deficit as a percentage of GDP in the preceding year and either the reference value for government deficit or, if non compliance with budgetary discipline includes the debt criterion, the general government balance as a percentage of GDP that should have been achieved in the same year according to the notice issued under Article 126(9) of the Treaty.deleted

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 12

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 2

2. Each following year, until the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit is abrogated, the Council shall assess whether the participating Member State concerned has taken effective action in response to the Council notice ~~in accordance with Article 126(9) of the Treaty~~. In this annual assessment the Council shall decide, in accordance with Article 126(11) of the Treaty, to intensify the ~~sanc~~recommendations, unless the participating Member State concerned has ~~complied with the Council notice. If an additional fine is decided, it shall be calculated in the same way as for the variable component of the fine in paragraph 1~~achieved the reference values proposed in the Council notice.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 12

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 3

~~3. Any single fine referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exceed the upper limit of 0,5 % of GDP.'~~deleted

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 14

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 16

Fines referred to in Article 12 of this Regulation shall constitute other revenue referred to in Article 311 of the Treaty and shall be distributed among participating Member States which do not have excessive deficit as determined in accordance with Article 126(6) of the Treaty and which are not the subject of an excessive imbalance procedure within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No […/…], in proportion to their share in the total gross national income (GNI) of the eligible Member States.'deleted

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON