BETA

10 Amendments of Miguel PORTAS related to 2010/0277(NLE)

Amendment 52 #

Recital 1 a (new)
1a. Experience gained during the first decade of functioning of the economic and monetary union shows a need for an improved economic governance framework in the Union, which should be built on a stronger national ownership of commonly agreed rules and policies and on a more robust governance at the Union level of national economic policies.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 85 #

Recital 12
12. Considering the documented effectiveness of rules-based budgetary frameworks of the Member States in promoting budgetary discipline, strong national fiscal rules that are consistent with the budgetary objectives at the level of the Union must be a cornerstone of the strengthened budgetary surveillance framework of the Union. Fiscal rules are more likely to be effective if set at a national level, so as to take account of national considerations and ensure ownership. Best practices suggest that fiscal rules should avoid a backwards- looking perspective, which may not properly account for 'one-off' payments, or receipts, and therefore may not necessarily give an accurate indication of future behaviour. Strong fiscal rules should be equipped with well-specified target definitions together with mechanisms for effective and timely monitoring. In addition, policy experience has shown that for numerical rules to work effectively, consequences must be attached to non-compliance, where the costs involved may be simply reputational.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 119 #

Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) numericational fiscal rules, which establish a permanent constraint on the conduct of fiscal policy expressed in terms of a summary indicator of budgetary performance, such as the government budget deficit, borrowing, debt, or a major component thereof;
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 145 #

Chapter 4 – title
Numericational fiscal rules
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 146 #

Article 5 – paragraph 1
Member States shall have in place numerical fiscal rules that effectively promote compliance with their respective obligations deriving from the Treaty in the area of budgetary policy. Such rules shall include in particular: (a) compliance with the reference values on deficit and debt set in accordance with the Treaty; (b) the adoption of a multi-annual fiscal planning horizon, including respect of the medium-term budgetary objectives.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 151 #

Article 6 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Without prejudice to the Treaty provisions of the budgetary surveillance framework of the Union, numericational fiscal rules shall contain specifications on the following elements:
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 159 #

Article 6 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Without prejudice to the provisions of the TFEU on the budgetary surveillance framework of the Union, national fiscal rules for participating Member States shall contain specifications that address the following elements: (a) the target definition and scope of the rules; (b) effective and timely monitoring of compliance with the rules, by independent national budget offices or institutions acting in the field of budgetary policy; (c) consequences in the event of non- compliance, including stricter public disclosure and public justifications; (d) escape clauses, setting out a limited number of specific and exceptional circumstances in which temporary non- compliance with the rule is permitted. The activation of escape clauses referred to in point (d) is to be disclosed and justified in a transparent and timely manner.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 161 #

Article 7 – paragraph 1
The annual budget legislation of the Member States shall reflect the constraints imposed by their numericational fiscal rules in force.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 176 #

Article 12 – paragraph 1
1. All sub-sectors of general government shall be covered by numericational fiscal rules.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 184 #

Article 14 a (new)
Article 14a Three years after the transposition date referred to in Article 14 the Commission shall publish a general report assessing the implementation of provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. The report shall evaluate, inter alia, the effectiveness of: (a) the requirement for cash-based fiscal data to all sub-sectors of government; (b) the accuracy of macro-economic forecasts following ex-post evaluation; (c) the design and effectiveness of fiscal rules; (d) the design and effectiveness of fiscal institutes; (e) the general level of transparency of government finances.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON