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23 Amendments of Miguel PORTAS related to 2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2

(2) The Treaty ~~allows the adoption of specific measures in the euro area which go beyond the provisions applicable to all Member States,~~ on the Functioning of the European Union and the Regulations relating to the Stability and Growth Pact established an excessive deficit procedure which is founded on a process of multilateral dialogue, in which supervision and surveillance are carried out by the Commission, which proposes recommendations to the Council. The experience acquired from the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure indicates that the Council and Commission should make their decisions public, in such a way as to ensure effective peer pressure, and likewise that there is a need for the European Parliament to invite Member States with budgetary difficulties to appear before the ~~purpose of ensuring the proper functioning of economic and monetary union~~relevant committee and explain the decisions they have adopted Under the excessive deficit procedure, the Member States undertake to abide by their multilateral commitments with regard to the budgetary targets they undertook to meet, as well as the new targets in case of non-compliance. However, it is also understood that the commitment to the sustainable public finances objective does not prejudice the principle of subsidiarity, which means that the choice of policies and actions to achieve these objectives are the strict responsibility of the Member States.

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3

(3) Additional sanctions are necessary to make the enforcement of budgetary surveillance more effective in the euro area. Those sanctions should enhance the credibility of the fiscal surveillance framework of the UnionThe European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

(4) The rules laid down by this Regulation should ensure fair, timely, graduated and effective mechanisms for compliance with the preventive and the corrective parts of the Stability and Growth Pact, in particular Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies and Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure.deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5

(5) Sanctions for Member States whose currency is the euro in the preventive part of the Stability and Growth Pact should provide incentives for prudent fiscal policy-making. Such policy-making should ensure that the growth rate of government expenditure does not normally exceed a prudent medium-term growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP), unless the excess is matched by increases in government revenues or discretionary revenue reductions are compensated by reductions in expenditure.deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6

(6) Prudent fiscal policy-making should effectively achieve and maintain the medium-term budgetary objective. Adherence to the medium-term objective for budgetary positions should allow Member States to have a safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP reference value for the government deficit, to ensure rapid progress towards sustainability, and at the same time to have room for budgetary manoeuvre, in particular taking into account the needs for public investment.deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7

(7) In the preventive part of the Stability and Growth Pact, the incentive for prudent fiscal policy-making should consist of an obligation to lodge an interest-bearing deposit temporarily imposed on a Member State whose currency is the euro that is making insufficient progress with budgetary consolidation. This should be the case when, following an initial warning from the Commission, a Member State persists in conduct which, while not amounting to a violation of the ban on excessive deficits, is imprudent and potentially detrimental to the smooth functioning of economic and monetary union, and the Council therefore issues a recommendation in accordance with Article 121(4) of the Treaty.deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8

(8) The interest-bearing deposit imposed should be released to the Member State concerned with the interest accrued on it once the Council has been satisfied that the situation giving rise to the obligation to lodge that deposit has come to an end.deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9

(9) In the corrective part of the Stability and Growth Pact, sanctions for Member States whose currency is the euro should take the form of an obligation to lodge a non-interest-bearing deposit linked to a Council decision establishing the existence of an excessive deficit and the obligation to pay a fine in the event of non-compliance with a Council recommendation to correct an excessive government deficit. These sanctions should be imposed irrespective of whether or not an interest-bearing deposit has previously been imposed on the Member State concerned.deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

(10) The size of the interest-bearing deposit, of the non-interest-bearing deposit and of the fine provided for in this Regulation should be set in such a way as to ensure a graduation of sanctions in the preventive and corrective parts of the Stability and Growth Pact and to provide sufficient incentives for the Member States whose currency is the euro to comply with the fiscal framework of the Union. The fine linked to Article 126(11) of the Treaty as specified in Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is composed of a fixed component that equals 0.2% of GDP and of a variable component. Thus, graduation and equal treatment between Member States are ensured if the interest- bearing deposit, the non-interest-bearing deposit and the fine specified in this Regulation are equal to 0.2% of GDP, the size of the fixed component of the fine linked to Article 126(11) of the Treaty.deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11

(11) A possibility should be provided for the Council to reduce or to cancel the sanctions imposed on Member States whose currency is the euro on the basis of a Commission proposal following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned. In the corrective part of the Stability and Growth Pact, the Commission should also be able to propose to reduce the size of a sanction or to cancel it on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances.deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

(12) The non-interest-bearing deposit should be released upon correction of the excessive deficit while the interest on such deposits and the fines collected should be distributed among Member States whose currency is the euro which do not have an excessive deficit and which are not the subject of an excessive imbalance procedure either.deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

(13) The power to adopt individual decisions implementing the sanction mechanisms set out in this Regulation should be conferred on the Council. As part of the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States conducted within the Council as specified in Article 121(1) of the Treaty, these individual decisions are an integral follow-up to the measures adopted by the Council in accordance with Articles 121 and 126 of the Treaty and Regulations (EC) No 1466/97 and (EC) No 1467/97.deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

(14) Since this Regulation contains general rules for the effective enforcement of Regulations (EC) No 1466/97 and (EC) No 1467/97, it should be adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure referred to in Article 121(6).deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

(15) Since the objective to create a uniform sanction mechanism cannot be sufficiently achieved at the level of the Member States, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective,deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1

Subject matter and scope 1. This Regulation sets out a system of sanctions for enhancing the enforcement of the preventive and corrective parts of the Stability and Growth Pact in the euro area. 2. This Regulation shall apply to Member States whose currency is the euro.deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2

Definitions For the purpose of this Regulation: (1) 'the preventive part of the Stability and Growth Pact' means the multilateral surveillance system as organised by Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of July 1997; (2) 'the corrective part of the Stability and Growth Pact' means the procedure for the control of Member States’ excessive deficit as regulated by Article 126 of the Treaty and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997; (3) 'exceptional economic circumstances' means circumstances where an excess of a government deficit over the reference value is considered exceptional within the meaning of the second indent of Article 126(2)(a) of the Treaty and as specified in Regulation (EC) No 1467/97.deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3

Interest-bearing deposit 1. If the Council addresses to a Member State a recommendation in accordance with Article 121(4) of the Treaty to take the necessary adjustment measures in the event of persisting or particularly serious and significant deviations from prudent fiscal policy-making as laid down in Article 6(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, the lodging of an interest bearing deposit shall be imposed by the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission. The decision shall be deemed to be adopted by the Council unless it decides by qualified majority to reject the proposal within ten days of the Commission adopting it. The Council may amend the proposal in accordance with Article 293(1) of the Treaty. 2. The interest-bearing deposit to be proposed by the Commission shall amount to 0.2% of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the Member State concerned in the preceding year. 3. The deposit shall bear the interest rate reflecting the Commission credit risk and the relevant investment period. 4. By derogation from paragraph 2, the Commission, following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned addressed to the Commission within ten days of adoption of the Council recommendation referred to on paragraph 1, may propose to reduce the amount of the interest- bearing deposit or to cancel it. 5. If the situation giving rise to the recommendation referred to in paragraph 1 no longer subsists, the Council, on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, shall decide that the deposit and the interest accrued thereon are returned to the Member State concerned. The Council may amend the Commission proposal in accordance with Article 293(1) of the Treaty.deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4

Non-interest-bearing deposit 1. If the Council decides in accordance with Article 126(6) of the Treaty that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the lodging of a non-interest-bearing deposit shall be imposed by the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission. The decision shall be deemed to be adopted by the Council unless it decides by qualified majority to reject the proposal within ten days of the Commission adopting it. The Council may amend the proposal in accordance with Article 293(1) of the Treaty. 2. The non-interest-bearing deposit to be proposed by the Commission shall amount to 0.2% of the GDP of the Member State concerned in the preceding year. 3. If the Member State has an interest- bearing deposit lodged with the Commission in accordance with Article 3, the interest-bearing deposit shall be converted into a non-interest-bearing deposit. If the size of the previously lodged interest-bearing deposit and of the interest accrued exceeds the size of the required non-interest-bearing deposit, the outstanding amount shall be returned to the Member State. If the size of the required non-interest- bearing deposit exceeds the size of the previously lodged interest-bearing deposit and the interest accrued thereon, the Member State shall make up the outstanding amount when it lodges the non-interest-bearing deposit. 4. By derogation from paragraph 2 of this Article, the Commission may, on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned addressed to the Commission within ten days of adoption of the Council decision in accordance with Article 126(6) of the Treaty, propose to reduce the amount of the non-interest- bearing deposit or to cancel it.deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5

1. If the Council decides in accordance with Article 126(8) of the Treaty that the Member State has not taken effective action in response to a Council recommendation within the period laid down, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, shall decide that the Member State shall pay a fine. The decision shall be deemed adopted by the Council unless it decides by qualified majority to reject the proposal within ten days of the Commission adopting it. The Council may amend the proposal in accordance with Article 293(1) of the Treaty. 2. The fine to be proposed by the Commission shall amount to 0.2% of the GDP of the Member State concerned in the preceding year. 3. If the Member State has a non-interest- bearing deposit lodged with the Commission in accordance with Article 4, the non-interest-bearing deposit shall be converted into the fine. If the size of the previously lodged non- interest-bearing deposit exceeds the size of the required fine, the outstanding amount shall be returned to the Member State. If the size of the required fine exceeds the size of the previously lodged non-interest- bearing deposit, or if no non-interest- bearing deposit has been previously lodged, the Member State shall make up the outstanding amount when it pays the fine. 4. By derogation from paragraph 2 of this Article, the Commission may, on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned addressed to the Commission within ten days of adoption of the Council decision in accordance with Article 126(8) of the Treaty, propose to cancel or to reduce the amount of the fine.Fine deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6

Return of the non-interest-bearing deposit If the Council decides in accordance with Article 126(12) of the Treaty to abrogate some or all of its decisions, any non- interest-bearing deposit lodged by the Member State with the Commission shall be returned to the Member State concerned.deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7

Distribution of the interest and fines The interest earned by the Commission on deposits lodged in accordance with Article 4 and the fines collected in accordance with Article 5 shall constitute other revenue referred to in Article 311 of the Treaty, and shall be distributed, in proportion to their share in the gross national income of the eligible Member States, among Member States whose currency is the euro which do not have an excessive deficit as determined in accordance with Article 126(6) of the Treaty and which are not the subject of an excessive imbalance procedure within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No […/…].deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8

Voting within the Council For the measures referred to in Articles 3, 4 and 5, only members of the Council representing Member States whose currency is the euro shall vote and the Council shall act without taking into account the vote of the member of the Council representing the Member State concerned. A qualified majority of the members of the Council mentioned in the previous paragraph shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty.deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9

Entry into force This Regulation shall enter into force on the [xx] day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the Member States in accordance with the Treaties.deleted

2011/02/16
Committee: ECON