BETA

536 Amendments of Miguel PORTAS

Amendment 15 #

2012/2006(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. WelcomesTakes note of the suggested savings in connection with staff travel and redeployments in the establishment plan.
2012/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 18 #

2012/2006(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Supports an effective information campaign for the 2014 electionsUnderlines the democratic importance of the 2014 elections; underlines that an effective information campaign must take into account the current context of budgetary constraints and that the allocations made available to the European parties and European political foundations must not go above the foreseen inflation rate;
2012/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 25 #

2012/2006(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. WelcomesTakes note of the Secretary General's initiative taken in 2011 proposing the reorganisation of translation and interpretation activities; believes that such an initiative wills should lead to significant savings in the 2012 budget and calls for this initiative to be continued in 2013; defends, however,insists on the full commitment to the principles of multilingualism, and transparency; insists on all Members being guaranteed the necessary working conditions regarding interpretation and translation services, at their request, in plenary, all committee and coordinators meetings, delegations and whenever necessary; highlights the unique nature of the European Parliament with regard to interpretation and translation needs;
2012/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 3 #

2012/2001(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
C a. whereas in a context of the ongoing economic crisis, and taking into account pro-cyclical performance of public authorities, expenditure cuts should be considered as risk to increase the economic crisis in the European Union;
2012/01/31
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 30 #

2012/2001(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Calls for a freeze on budget lines related to all travel in 2013 andon the condition that the 15% reserve thereon, introduced in the 2012 Budget, becomes a budgetary decrease of equal percentage, and that there is no indexation of any of the Members' individual allowances until the end of the legislature;
2012/01/31
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 1 #

2012/2000(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. AcknowledgesRegrets that the fiscal consolidation efforts undertaken by Member States with the aim of addressing the crisis; underlines the fact that the EU will never be able to respond properly to the crisis without common instruhave driven the EU to a second wave of crisis; the austerity policies resulted in a severe slowdown of public and private consumption and led to the decrease of public and private investment, leaving the economic recovery solely dependent on exports; calls for this trend to be reversed and underlines that investments need to be made both at EU and national level to fight unemployments and the presources to make them workcariousness of labour; underlines the fact that the EU urgently needs common instruments, such as eurobonds, to enhance solidarity;
2012/02/16
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 6 #

2012/2000(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Continues to beIs deeply concerned at the unprecedented global crisis that has seriously damaged economic growth and financial stability and provoked a strong deterioration in the; insists that 2013 will only be a key year for economic recovery if priority is goivernment deficit and debt position of the Member States; shares the Council’s concern regarding economic and budgetary constraints at national level and insistn to policies, which trigger and support investment and the recovery of the citizens consumption; stresses that without this thate 2013 will be a key year for economic recoveryEU Budget will not help to overcome the effects of the recessive policies;
2012/02/16
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 14 #

2012/2000(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Stresses that, in times of crisis more than ever, the collective efforts of solidarity, integration and territorial cohesion taken at EU level must be strengthened in order to ensure that our actions deliver results; underlines the fact that the annual budget, as well as all other European instruments, needs to be aligned with the Europe 2020 Strategy for Growth and Jobs and that this is essential for themust be a leverage tool for Member Strategy’s credibility and in order to preserve confidence in EU policies, especially amongst its citizens; stresses that, given its role as a catalyst for s' recovery policies by supporting national investment to reinforce growth and the creation of employment, namely the youth; underlinvestment, that lowering the level of the EU budget would have an adverse impact on the creation of growth and jobs of the Union;
2012/02/16
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 22 #

2012/2000(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Proposes that any eventual appropriations' decrease should be made on the appropriations of the Risk-Sharing Finance Facility since it supports mainly large dimension enterprises, which have the capacity of alternative financing on the market; the savings made should reinforce the policies and programmes targeting SMEs and the development of the regions to foster growth and employment;
2012/02/16
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 31 #

2012/2000(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Points out that in time of austerity, a budgetary shift from military action to civil conflict prevention and peace- building is a necessary alternative to regulate migratory flows into the EU and reduce expenses;
2012/02/16
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 36 #

2012/2000(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Underlines the fact that all the measures taken so far to combat the crisis should assist a return to the path of growth; stresses, in this regard, that the tailor-made austerity measures already taken neled to be accompanied by targeted investmenta drastic drop in public and private investment and a dramatic aggravation of unemployment, poverty and precariousness rates in several Member States; points out that the EU budget has a determining role to play in this context as a tool to ensure prompt and well coordinated action in all fields to mitigate the effects of the crisis on the real economy and to act as a catalyst to boost investment, growth and jobs in Europe;
2012/02/16
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 42 #

2012/2000(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Stresses that well coordinated, coherent and timely implementation of political commitments and priorities shared at national and EU levelthe budgetary policy requires national and European institutions to work together toin prioritiseary public spending on growth areas, assess ex ante the effects of planned actionsinvestment, increaseing synergies between them and ensureing that they have a positive impact by removing obstacles and tapping into under-utilised potential; in the European Semester, underlines its commitment to continuing to organise interparliamentary debates on the common budgetary orientations of the Member States and the Union in order to ensure that there is coordination between the national and EU budgets in the general framework of Parliament’s activities in the European Semester;
2012/02/16
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 44 #

2012/2000(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Calls for the adoption of a responsible and result-oriented budget, based on good-quality spending and optimal and timely use of existing EU financing; in this spirit, welcomes the statement of 30 January 2012 by the Members of the European Council outlining the need to invest in growth and jobs, especially in terms of SMEs and young peopleTakes note of the statement of 30 January 2012 by the Members of the European Council outlining the need to invest in growth and jobs, especially in terms of SMEs and young people; regrets, that these objectives were not supported with any additional financial resources, and underlines that they are solely sustained by new guidelines on non- implemented resources of the structural funds; underlines its intention of engaging, together with the specialised parliamentary committees, not only in the identification of concrete areas where actions need to be strengthened, but also in identifying possible negative priorities;
2012/02/16
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 48 #

2012/2000(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Stresses that the EU budget represents an investment solely directed towards policies and actions demonstrating EU added value; draws attention to the factRecalls that the EU budget – which cannot run into deficit – has a leverage effect on growth and employment much higher thand that of national spending, as does its capacity to gear up investment, deliver stability in Europe anould help the EU out of the current economic, social and financial crisis if it would have more resources; underlines the fact, moreover, that new financial instruments should further enhance the leverage effect of EU spending’s contribution to growth and boost the creation of employment, however the current context of stagnation and recession of the EU constraints its effect;
2012/02/16
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 53 #

2012/2000(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Will pay specific attention, in the context of the 2013 budgetary procedure, to the implementation of the EP’s previous years’ budgetary priorities and will, in particular, follow closely the funding and implementation of the Europe 2020 Strategy, which is fully endorsed by Member States, in terms of promoting competitiveness and employment, as well as of its other sectoral priorities;
2012/02/16
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 73 #

2012/2000(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Proposes that, in this context, any eventual proposal for an appropriations' decrease should be made on security research; the EU, following the new challenges and modifications in the international context, should assume a new and daring approach to security matters with the aim to concentrate on cooperation for development and on conflict prevention by pacific means;
2012/02/16
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 76 #

2012/2000(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Highlights the importance of funding the European authorities of financial market supervision to enable their entire and necessary commitment to prevent crisis;
2012/02/16
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 83 #

2012/2000(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Takes note of the letter dated 23 January 2012 from the Commissioner for Budgets and Financial Programming expressing the Commission’s willingness to reduce the number of posts in its establishment plans by 1 % as early as 2013; recalldeeply regrets the Commission’s intention of reducing the staffing in EU institutions and bodies by 5 % as compared to 2013 by 2018, and recalls that this is to be seen as an overall goal; considers that any short- term or long-term reduction of staff shouldmust take full account of, inter alia, the Union’s legal obligations and the institutions’ new competences arising from the treaties; reiterates that the principle of multilinguism should not be jeopardised and recalls that all EU citizens should have access to all the EU documents in all the official languages;
2012/02/16
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 13 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas the current economic and financial crisis with its origin in market deregulation has led to a significant rise in public debt in Europe; whereas speculation on public debt has further aggravated the crisis in Europe;
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 15 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas effective taxation is of fundamental importance for public authorities, especially in Europe, to fulfil their tasks and obligations as well as citizens' expectations; whereas it is also an instrument for wealth distribution and the eradication of poverty;
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 17 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas comprehensive and sustainesound fiscal consolidation is necessary to restore fiscal credibility, and the reduction of debt requires both expenditure restraint and tax increases, while growth-oriented tax changes must be given priorityeach time, social impact must be duly considered and consumers must be protected from further decreases of purchasing power, also with a view to protect demand and employment;
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 20 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas off-shore centres and tax havens facilitate an annual illicit capital flight of US$1 trillion; whereas these illicit monetary outflows are roughly ten times the amount of aid money going into developing countries for poverty alleviation and economic development; Whereas tax havens that offer secrecy rules and fictional domiciles combined with ‘zero tax’ regimes in order to attract capital and revenues that should have been taxed in other countries generate harmful tax competition;
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 25 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
Db. whereas globalization has led to increasing difficulties in combating fiscal fraud at an international level;
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 26 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1 a (new)
Fight against tax havens
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 40 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Recalls that direct taxation is better adapted to mitigate negative social impact and contribute instead to a fairer and more equitable society via a progressive redistribution of wealth; underlines that progressive and fair taxation can be an effective tool to increase citizens' trust in public authorities and democracy as such; notes that it is not tolerable for a modern and developed society that the strongest and most wealthiest are not forced to contribute to the funding of the State's tasks in a way that corresponds to their capacities;
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 46 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Reminds that sufficiently high taxation of assets can contribute to bridging the rising gap between rich and poor in our societies as well as encourage real economy investment, employment creation and contribute to more stability in the financial sector;
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Notes that MS with high deficits will have to explore carefully and the roots of their deficits and increase tax revenues through higher taxes, pursue expenditure reductions and increase public savings taking due consideration to social and economic effects of any such measures; notes that solidarity among EU MS can also be necessary in order to overcome serious budgetary and interlinked economic problems;
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 62 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Introducing the FTT, the Commission should find still more precise measures to prevent tax evasion, for example by expanding the residence principle as already used as a basis for the application of the FTT in COM 2011/594. The transaction should not only be taxable in the EU in the case that one of the counterparties is settled in the EU, but also in the case that the orderer is settled in the EU, whereas double taxation has to be prevented;
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 67 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3b. Ask the Commission and Member States to move forward the introduction of a FTT at worldwide level whereas income should be used to reach the Millennium Development Goals;
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 81 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Emphasizes that the Directive on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation recognizes that the mandatory automatic exchange of information without preconditions is the most effective means of enhancing the correct assessment of taxes in cross-border situations and of fighting fraud. Urges the EU to defend within the G20 and OECD a system of information by automatic exchange on tax matters to ensure aspects of transparency and to fight against fiscal fraud;
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 83 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5b. The European Parliament defines a Tax Haven as any place which fulfils the following criteria: (a) a country or jurisdiction imposes no or only nominal taxes (generally or in special circumstances) and offers itself, or is perceived to offer itself, as a place to be used by non-residents to escape tax in their country of residence; (b) a country lacks transparency in tax matters; (c) a country's legislation or administrative practices prevent the effective exchange of information for tax purposes with other governments on taxpayers benefiting from the no or nominal taxation; (d) a country or jurisdiction does not require substantial activity for corporations registered on its territory;
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 85 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 c (new)
5c. Asks the Commission to elaborate an inclusive strategy on the fight against international tax evasion and tax heavens; considers that the elaboration of an annual list of tax heavens and effective prosecution of European companies and citizens making use of tax heavens must be core elements of such a strategy;
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 87 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 d (new)
5d. Welcomes the Commission's proposal for the introduction of an EU Financial Transaction Tax. Asks the Commission to carry on its efforts for establishing the Financial Transaction Tax as proposed in COM 2011/594. Asks the Council to make quick and constructive negotiations on the implementation of a European FTT possible. Calls for the introduction of a European FTT until 2013 whereas may Euro area countries be required to go ahead. Considers though that the implementation of an EU 27 FTT must remain a core objective of European taxation policies. Underlines that the FTT must be an instrument to replace the current trend to austerity policies in the EU and serve the fight against poverty and the preservation of high quality public services;
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 e (new)
5e. Asks the Commission to consider rising the tax rate from 0.01 % on financial products as defined in article 6 of COM 2011/594 to 0.05 % and from 0.1 to 0.3 % on financial products as defined in article 5 of COM 2011/594, whereby a considerable part of the additional revenue should be used to reach the Millennium Development Goals. The Member States on the other hand should not reduce their own effort in reaching the MDG;
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 135 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)
26a. Notes that the lack of coordination of tax policies for businesses in the EU is leading to a bottom race in tax rates eroding tax revenues;
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 140 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 – point 1 a (new)
introduce wealth taxes or levies in order to make society as a whole contribute to the damages caused by the financial crisis in Europe;
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 158 #

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 a (new)
29a. Ask the Commission to promote minimum rates for the taxation of corporations;
2011/11/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 2 #

2011/2157(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that a constructive long-term neighbourhood policy is of vital importance for the partnership countries in order to promote progress towards peace, democracy, stability and prosperity, but also strategically important for the European Union considering the importance of the partner countries in the East as well as the South for our common security, environment and economic development;
2011/10/26
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 8 #

2011/2157(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
3. Calls, in the light of the Arab Spring, for a specific self-critical evaluation of the financial instruments used in the past within the ENPI, with regard to their functioning in the fields of peace, democracy, governance, institution- building and support to civil society; the EU must assume a newer and more daring approach enhancing cooperation for development and on conflict prevention by pacific means;
2011/10/26
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 9 #

2011/2157(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Considers that the financial assistance in the field of cooperation with third countries in the area of immigration and asylum should must focus on supporting actions in order to mitigate brain drain, promote information campaigns on the possibilities for legal migration, give structural help for reception of asylum seekers and refugees, promote training of third countries officials in the field of asylum and human rights and facilitate re-integration of returnees;
2011/10/26
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 21 #

2011/2157(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
8. WelcomesTakes note of the Commission's commitment to reinvigorate the participation of neighbouring countries in the work of some EU agencies and the EU programmes opened to third countries; calls on the Commission to present a clear and comprehensive list of relevant agencies and programmes in which neighbouring countries could participate, together with an overview of the form and method of such differentiated participation;
2011/10/26
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 2 #

2011/2043(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
3. While fully respecting the rights of the budgetary and discharge authorities, welcomes the RSFF and other innovative financial instruments which strengthen the leverage of the EU budget; emphasises the need for working delivery mechanisms for these; underlines that public investments have to be considered as well; asks the Commission to improve access for primary target groups such as SMEs, especially in the new Member States;
2011/03/16
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 7 #

2011/2043(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
4. Stresses the need for further efforts in the field of research infrastructure, benefitting also SMEs and industry, especially in the new Member States;
2011/03/16
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 13 #

2011/2043(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
6. Welcomes the simplifications concerning the acceptability of personnel costs and asks the Commission to explore further simplification measures; reaffirms its commitment to further simplifying the rules applicable to the implementation of the EU budget and to research spending in particular; asks the Commission to put exchange and cooperation between the different programmes and member states as well as transparency on top of its agenda;
2011/03/16
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 16 #

2011/2043(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
7. Urges the Commission to further align FP7 with the Europe 2020 targets especially with specific targets such as combating poverty, improve health, fight climate change and protect the environment, while maintaining the overall level of funding for FP7;
2011/03/16
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 2 #

2011/2042(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Title before paragraph 1
A 2012 budget under the auspices of enhanced European economic governance, the European Semester mechanism and the Europe 2020an objectives to boost employment, peace- building, sustainable development and ecological conversion
2011/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 5 #

2011/2042(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Takes the view that the Europe 2020 strategy strategy should help European Union should help its countries recover from the crisis and come out stronger, through smart, sustainable and inclusive growth based on the five EU headline targets, namely promoting employment, improving the conditions for innovation, research and development, meeting our climate change and energy objectives, improvmoting education to high standard levels and promoting social inclusionpolicies, in particular through thesocial inclusion and reduction of poverty; recalls that the Member States themselves have fully endorsed these five targets;
2011/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 14 #

2011/2042(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Is of the opinion that the EU budget brings added value to national public expenditure by initiating, supporting and complementing investments in those policies which are at the core of Europe 2020; believes, moreover, that the EU budget has an instrumental role to play in helping the EU to exit the current economic and financial crisis through its capacity as a catalyst to boost investment, growth and jobs in Europe; takes the view that the EU budget could at least mitigate the effects of current restrictive national budgetary policies; stresses also that, given its redistributive nature, any attempt to limit the level of the EU budget will be detrimental to European solidarity and to the pace of economic development in most Member States; takes the view that the ‘ net contributor’ /’ net beneficiary’ approach has no economic rationale, since it disregards spill-over effects between EU countries and therefore undermines common EU policy goals;
2011/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 17 #

2011/2042(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Recalls that delivering on the Europe 2020 strategy’ s seven flagshipnew emerging European initiatives will require a huge amount of future- oriented investment in the short, medium and longer term; stresses that the main objective of the new Europe 2020an strategy – namely, to promote jobs and high-quality employment for all Europeans – will be achieved only if the necessary investments in education, promotion of a knowledge society, research and development, innovation, SMEs and green technologies are made now and not delayed any longer; calls for a renewed political compromise combining the reduction of public deficits and debt with the promotion of such investments; expresses its willingness to improve and widen existing instruments enhancing the synergy between the EU budget and EIB actions, in order to support long- term investments;
2011/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 23 #

2011/2042(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Strongly opposes, therefore, any attempt to limit budget appropriations in those sectors linked to the delivery of the Europe 2020 strategy’ s headline targets and seven flagship initiativetargets where the EU wants to put emphasis; notes that such an attempt would be counter-productive, most likely resulting in thea failure ofor Europe 2020, as was the case for the Lisbon Strategy; takes the view that the Europe 2020 strategyan project project can be credible only if adequately funded, and recalls that the EP has on numerous occasions raised this serious political concern;
2011/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 27 #

2011/2042(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Takes the view that the budget 2012 should be able to react on unexpected incidents, such as the current incidents in the South Mediterranean and in the Arab world; a broader strategic approach of development aid is needed as well as the regulation of migratory flows;
2011/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 30 #

2011/2042(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Takes the view, moreover, that 2012 budget appropriations, including in those areas not directly linked to the achievement of the Europe 2020 strategy, need to be kept at an appropriate level to ensure the continuation of EU policies and the achievement of EU objectives well beyond the duration of the current economic crisis;
2011/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 36 #

2011/2042(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Commits to peace-building; points out that a budgetary shift from military action to conflict prevention is a useful alternative to reduce military expenses in time of austerity;
2011/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 37 #

2011/2042(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)
8b. Underlines the necessity to enhance sustainability and the urgency of promoting an ecological conversion to create new jobs;
2011/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 45 #

2011/2042(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Underlines that these figures constitute a yearly breakdown of multiannual global amounts agreed upon by both Parliament and the Council when these programmes and actions were adopted; stresses that the annual amounts programmed represent appropriations to be budgeted as a matter of political consistency and with a view to achieving EU objectives and priorities, notably in the context of Europe 2020; acknowledges, however, that some room for manoeuvre may appear under certain headings of the MFF, given the very provisional indicative figures (in particular under Heading 2) put forward by the Commission at that point in the year;
2011/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 46 #

2011/2042(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Points out that, in times of economic difficulties, mediocre growth rate and divergences between the EU countries, the ceilings laid down by the MFF have to be reached in order to maximize the effects of the European public investment;
2011/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 61 #

2011/2042(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Stresses, in this connection, that keeping commitment appropriations under strict control would require not only significant redeployments and reprioritisation, but also the joint identification of possible negative priorities by the institutions; highlights, however, the fact that, to this end, greater budgetary flexibility (mainly between the headings of the current MFF) would be needed in order to align budgetary resources with evolving circumstances and priorities; underlines that full transparency must be guaranteed;
2011/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 77 #

2011/2042(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Is aware that the level of payments finally implemented every year sometimes entails a significant so-called ‘surplus’ compared to the level of payments originally agreed by the budget authority, meaning that Member States’ national contributions to the EU budget are therefore decreased accordingly and their fiscal positions improved; does not consider the Council’s concerns as to the level and timing of this ‘return’ relevant in addressing the sensitive underlying political issue of the financing of the EU budget; strongly urges the Commission, therefore, to make proposals for the establishment of new and genuine own resources so as to provide the EU with real and autonomous financial resources; asks the Council to cooperate constructively to implement fair new own resources for the EU;
2011/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 1 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that the promotion of a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy, which creates jobs and high-quality employment by deliveringimplementation onf the Europe 2020 strategy's seven flagship initiatives is a jointly endorsed goal of the 27 Member States and the EU institutions; recalls that the implementation of this strategy will requirean strategy demands a huge amount of future- oriented investment up to 2020, estimated at no less thain EUR 1 800 billion, by the Commission, in its communication entitled 'The EU Budget Review’1 ; underlines, therefore, that necessary investments - at both EU and Member State level - must be made now and delayed no longer;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 3 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Is deeply concerned, against this background, that the current crisis has been aggravated by the austerity policies, resulteding in a drastic drop in public investment in some of these areasand private investment, because of the adjustments that Member States have made to their national budgets, especially those under bailout; calls for this trend to be reversed and firmly believes that investments need to be guaranteedmade at EU and national level if the EU as a whole is to deliver on the EU 2020 strategy; is of the opinion that the EU budget has a role to play as; considers that the EU budget must be a leverage tool for Member States' recovery policies by triggering and supporting national investment to reinforce growth and employment; emphasises that this is fully in line with the dynamics of the European Semester, which, as a new mechanism for enhanced European economic governance, aims at increasing consistency, synergies and complementarities between the EU and the national budgets in delivering on the jointly agreed Europe 2020 goalsthe creation of employment for economic recovery;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 5 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Recalls, once more, that the EU budget should in no way be perceived and evaluated as a simple financial item added as a burden to national budgets but, on the contrary, is to be understood as an opportunity to gear up thoseimplement programs, initiatives and investments that are of interest and of added value to the EU as a whole, most of themof common interest, most of them proposed by Member States and co-decided by Parliament and the Council and thus legitimised also at national level;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 8 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Points out that the margins stemming from the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) do not allow real room for manoeuvre, especially in subheading 1a and heading 4, andseverely reduce the capacity of the EU to react to policy changes and unforeseen needs while maintaining its priorities; points out that the scope of the challenges the EU faces, would require means well beyond the current ceilings of the MFF; recalls, in that respect, that the mobilisation of the instruments foreseen in the Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) of 17 May 2006 on budgetary discipline and sound financial management has been rendered unavoidable by the various challenges and new priorities that havrecalls the the new European priorities and events such as the Arab Spring required the mobilisation of the instruments foreseen in the Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) of 17 May 2006; sustains that the challenges which Europe is facing would require an EU Budget much more robust than the marisen, such as the Arab Spring this yeargins allowed by the current MFF;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 13 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Deplores, against this background and despite previous calls from Parliament, that Council mad the horizontal cuts in the budget made by the Council, deciding on the overall level of appropriations a priori, without duly taking into account an accurate assessment of the actual needs for the achievement of the Union's agreed objectives and, political commitments, nor and the priorities byof the Parliament, as presented in its mandate for its abovementionedthe resolution of 23 June 2011 on the mandate for the trilogue;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 14 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Underlines that the sole consideration of past implementation rates, together with the rates of increase as compared to previous year's budget, as a basis for selecting lines and amounts to be cut is a backward-looking approach which does not allow, in the context of multiannual programming, to properly reflect the speeding up of the budget implementation along the year, namely in the multiannual programs;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 16 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Recalls that EU-2020 policies have been identified by Parliament as one of its most important priorities1 for the 2012 budget since they are essential and necessary parts of the EU strategy for the economic recovery; emphasis; underlines that the proposed increase in appropriations for a selected number of budget items serves both short- and long-term strategies for the future of the EU;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 18 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Keeps on consideringReiterates that the level of payments proposed by the Commission is a bare minimum for payments, as also mentioned in several statements by President Barroso and Commissioner Lewandowski; is not confident that Draft Council's statement No 1 on payment appropriations aiming at addressing the issue of possible additional payment needs may be of any help in this respect, notably in light of early 2011 experience, when Council happened to be reluctant to honour the similar statement it initiated for 2011 Budget; therefore also, decides to restore most payment appropriations to DB levels all the more that Council cuts in payments also affect areas and budget lines falling under EU 2020 objecessential prioritives, particularly in Heading 1a;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 20 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Recalls that Heading 1a is the key heading of the MFF 2007-2013 in terms of reaching the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy, thanks to its direct or indirect contribution to the financing of all its five headline targets and the seven flagship initiatives;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 22 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Regrets that the Commission and the Council do not generally do not propose to boost – beyond what was originally planned – the support for investments urgently needed to implement the seven flagshipEU programs and initiatives, and notes that they are regrettably inclined to postpone the necessary big leap in terms of common financial effort to the post- 2013 MFF; is convinced that this attitude will seriously endanger the achievement of the headline goals by 2020;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 27 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Reaffirms its strong opposition to any form of redeployment from FP7 like proposed by the Commission as part of the ITER financing package since this would endanger the successful implementation of FP 7 and significantly reduce its contributions to the achievement of the headline goals and the implementation of the flagship initiatives of the Europe 2020 strategy; therefore restores FP7 to financial programming figures by adding the EUR 100 million to the budget lines cut by the Commission; also restores the bulk of payments cuts brought on FP7 lines by the Council (EUR XXX million or X %), as a matter of avoiding any risk of non implementation of existing legal obligations, which could lead to additional costs due to late interests to pay;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 29 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Further increases the overall level of commitment appropriations for the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework programme (CIP - Intelligent energy and CIP - Entrepreneurship and Innovation) compared to what was initially foreseen, as a matter of delivering on the flagship initiatives of the Europe 2020 strategy; hopes that this increase will contribute to improving the access of SMEs to this programme and to developing specific programmes and innovative financial mechanisms; recalls, in this context, the key role played by SMEs in; hopes that this decision will improve access of SMEs to these lines of credit and boosting the EU economy and supports, in particular, the CIP-EIP programme as an indispensable tool of recovery from the crisidevelopment of innovative projects;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 32 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Also iIncreases support for the Lifelong Learning programme, given its high European added value and also because of its strong contribution to the flagship initiatives ‘Youth on the Move’ and ‘Innovation Union’; calls on the Commission to deliver a proposal improving the management of all programmes and potential initiatives for youth mobility within the Union, so that financial support is given in accordance to living conditions in destination countries to avoid social discrimination in the access to these programmes;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 38 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Decides to restore DB payments for the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) line; underlines the fact that the insertion of payment appropriations not only gives higher visibility tospeeds up the implementation of the fund but also avoids transfers from other budget lines pursuing different aims and covering different needs;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 39 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Proposes that, within the 2012 budgetary negotiation procedure, any eventual appropriations' decrease, under subheading 1a, should be made on the line for security research; considers that the EU, following the new challenges and modifications in the international context, should assume a new and daring approach to security matters with the aim to concentrate on cooperation for development and on conflict prevention by pacific means;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 40 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 b (new)
20b. Also proposes that, within the 2012 budgetary negotiation procedure, any eventual appropriations' decrease, under subheading 1a, should be made on the lines for Innovative medicines Initiative Joint undertaking and on the Risk- Sharing Finance Facility; these lines support mainly large dimension enterprises, which have a better capacity of alternative financing, instead of targeting SMEs, which can promote a higher degree of convergence between the regions on research;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 44 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Recalls the important role regional and cohesion policies play towards the achievement of the goals of the EU 2020 strategy and economic recovery of European regions; deplores Council's restrictive approach on payments, which were cut by some EUR 1 300 million as compared to Commission's forecasts of payment needs for 2012; notes that only the convergence objective and the technical assistance lines remained untouched by the cuts of Council; reminds that these cuts apply to budget allocations that were already far below Member States' own estimates (EUR 61 billion for 2012 or some 50% above DB) and widely considered as being the bare minimum for honouring upcoming payment claims and be consistent with the speeding up of implementation at the end of the programming period; also recalls the recent Commission Communication on the new rates of co-financing to countries with structural adjustment programmes;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 46 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
25. Generally restores Council's cuts under this Headings to a level EUR xxxx million, which is XX% above 2011 Budget; considers that the Commission’s estimates of budgetary needs are more realistic than the Council’s proposals, in particular against the current background of great economic uncertainty and of instability in the markets and in terms of farmers’ incomes, which calls for a very careful approach to any important changes;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 51 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
29. Maintains the budget allocation dedicated to the EU Food Distribution Programme for the Most Deprived Persons of the Community (MDP); strongly calls for a political and legal solution to be found promptly to avoid any drastic cuts to the respective programmes, especially in view of the difficult social situation in many Member States followis programme that supports 18 million people with problems of malnutrition withing the financial and economic crisisUnion;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 53 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
32. Recalls its strong call for an appropriate and balanced answer to the current challenges in the area of migration and solidarity, with a view to the management ofArgues that the current challenges in the area of migration should be managed in a perspective of solidarity mechanisms to promote legal migration and to slowing down of illegal migration; acknowledging the obligation of EU Member States to conform to established EU law, emphasises the need for sufficient funding and support tools to handle emergency situations in a spirit of full respect of internal protection rules and human rights and solidarity amongst allemphasises the need to deal with emergency situations in a spirit of full respect for human rights and mutual support among Member States;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 59 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
33. Intends to restore the Draft budget appropriations for the prevention of crime and the prevention of terrorism in line with financial programming, as cooperation is increasingly needed, in areas such as cyber-security strategy, or confiscation of assets of criminal organisations;deleted
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 62 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
35. ReiteratesAdvocates strengthening thate funding for education- oriented programmes, initiatives and bodies should be increased in view terms of their contribution to the completion of EU 2020 strategy's flagship initiatives "Youth on the Move" and '"Innovation Union'; intends in particular to further increase funding for the "Youth in action" programme";
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 64 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
38. In relation to European public spaces, considers that an assessment report and work programme shouldmust be presented to the budgetary authority in time to be taken into account in the budgetary procedure; decides to hold in reserve part of Communication appropriations until Commission demonstrates its willingness to improve interinstitutional collaboration in this respect;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 67 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
41. WelcomNotes the reinforcement of appropriations for the Neighbourhood Instrument, as proposed in Amending Letter n°1/2012, as in line with its support to a clear and consistent EU response tosupporting the recent political and social developments in Southern Mediterranean; reiterates nevertheless very clearly that such a financial assistance can in no way be detrimental to existing priorities;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 71 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52
52. Considers indeed that any cut brought to agencies' budget during the budgetary procedure should be more closely related to the process of agencies' work planning and tasks, unless some precise sources of efficiency gains can be identified; In this respect considers the cuts brought to Frontex, the mandate of which has just been revised, as one typical example of the complete disconnection operated by Council between the tasks and activities of agencies - as enshrined by legal texts and requirements - and the budgetary resources allocated to them;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 74 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 53
53. Further decides to increase the 2012 budget allocation to the three new financial supervision agencies as a matter of utmost importance in the current economic and financial situation anccording to the needs requested by them; considers that indeed, full compliance with their mandates cannot be affected, disminished for their build-up procedexcused by the scarcity of resources;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 76 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55
55. Recalls its position adopted in its abovementioned resolution of 6 April 2011, asking that all institutions should draw up their budgets on the basis of sound and efficient management and looking for savings where possible, in line with Commissioners Lewandowski letter of 3 February 2011 calling on every institution to make all possible efforts towards limiting expenditure increase below 1 % compared to 2011;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 78 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 56
56. Considers that the agreement made in the context of the estimates (its resolution of 6 April 2011 adopted in plenary by 479 votes in favour) should not be put in question and none of the elements of that agreement should be reopened if no new circumstances have occurred since then;deleted
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 81 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 58
58. Recognises the efforts that were made by all institutions which resulted in real cuts on their own budgets; in real terms, the budget growth in all institutions is negative, despite their new competences, new jobs, actions and activities created as a consequence of the entry in force of the Lisbon Treaty;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 83 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59
59. NotStresses that the administrative and operating expenditure budget from all institutions represents XX% of the global EU budget, of which heading V having a margin of EUR XXX million and that Council has cut appropriations in the sections concerned by EUR 40 millionX% less than budgeted for 2011;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 84 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60
60. Reaffirms that savings measures cannot jeopardize payment of salaries and pensions, maintenance of buildings and security as institutions must have the minimum and the necessary to operate and that cuts shall be appropriate to the extent of not penalizing institutions which achieved the maximum limit of savings and furthermore that savings shall be legal and retain their effectiveness in 2012;deleted
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 85 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60 a (new)
60a. Expresses the willingness of the European Parliament to reach an agreement with the Council and the Commission for the freezing of salaries for the highest category of employees of the Union during the years 2012 and 2013; considers that this commitment must be obtained rapidly and should also freeze the salaries of MEPs in the values of 2011;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 87 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61
61. Points out that also theStresses the willingness of the Bureau of Parliament isto ready, in view of the general difficult economic context to make savings onlize significant savings in the administrative budget within this institution; however, regrets that this action has not been extended to various items own administrative budget, where possible, as reflected in the amendments tabled by its major political groupsf expenditure that finance the activities of MEPs, with emphasis on the general expenditure allowance in the amount of EUR 51588 per year, which are out of any tax incidence;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 90 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62
62. Notes that the Amending Letter adopted by the Bureau in September 2011 does imply major changes to the estimates, pushing the volume of the budget voted up by EUR 10 605 078 and EUR 49 350 728 over the Parliament's 2011 budget;deleted
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 92 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62 a (new)
62a. Reiterates that the savings expected from the budget lines for translation and interpretation can not harm the principle of multilingualism in the European Parliament and during the dialogues between other institutions; savings will be implemented without jeopardizing the right of any Member to speak during plenary, committees, coordinators meetings and trilogues in his/her own language; Members should also keep their right to write and read in his/her own language;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 93 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62 b (new)
62b. Records the agreement for the reduction of travel costs in 5% and for the placing under reserve of 15% of the foreseen appropriation; invites the Bureau to present proposals until 31st March in a way that reserves should be used; recommends the Bureau to study the possibility of strablishing rules that: a) promote flexible economic flights inside the EU, respecting duly fundamented exceptions; b)prevent the accumulation of time and distance allowances with daily allowances; suggests that these values for these appropriations should be freezed from 2012 until the end of the mandate; d) suggests that savings in the institutional visits have into account the primacy of pluralism over the proportionality when defining the delegations composition;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 95 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 63
63. Points out that his amount includes expenditurethe overall for the European Parliament Budget for 2012 includes the preparatory expenses resulting from the future enlargement to Croatia ( EUR 7,8 million), and additional 18s well as the 18 new Members following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (EUR 10,6 million); without taking into account this new expenses, the Budget for 2012, when compared with Budget 2011, presents an increase of X%, below the foressen inflation;
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 97 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 64
64. Votes therefore the overall level of its 2012 Budget at EUR xxx.xxxx, which means an increase of xx % compared to 2011, not considering in the 2012 budget the new 18 Members of the Parliament and the Croatia accession;deleted
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 100 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 65
65. Notes that the final amount decided by the budgetary authority represents a net reduction of EUR xxx.xxxx compared to the DB and EUR xxx.xxx to the initial budget proposals before conciliation with the Bureau;deleted
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 101 #

2011/2020(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 66
66. Maintains its position that, in any event, a policy of identifying savings wherever possible and the continued pursuit of reorganisation and redeployment of existing resources are crucial elements of its budgetary policy, especially in this time of economic crisis; considers therefore that such savings for 2012 Budget should be made in the wider context of structural charges having longer term effects;deleted
2011/10/06
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 9 #

2011/2019(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that in its resolution of 24 March 2011 the EP put the Europe 2020 strategy for a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth at the centre of the 2012 EU budgetary strategy in order to move the Union out of the current economic and social crisis;deleted
2011/05/24
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 14 #

2011/2019(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Recalls that the promotion of jobs and high-quality employment by delivering on the Europe 2020 strategy’s seven flagship initiatives is a jointly endorsed goal of the 27 EU Member States; recalls that the implementation of this strategy will require a huge amount of future-oriented investment up to 2020, estimated at no less than EUR 1 800 billion by the Commission in its communication entitled ‘The EU Budget Review’3 ; underlines, therefore, that necessary investment in education at all levels, fostering a knowledge society, research and grounded on the overall EU scientific and technological capacity, the budget devoted to research, development, innovation, and support to SMEs, and green and new technologiess well as the reinforcement of the funding in domains fostering a sustainable and inclusive growth model must be made now and delayed no longer;
2011/05/24
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 90 #

2011/2019(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Stresses the European added value of investments in cross-border transport, particularly the TEN-T programme, which improve trans-border and intermodal connections, thus promoting economic development and employment; recalling the traditional under-funding of TEN-T, urges that increased resources be made available for this purpose, including through recourse to alternative sources of financing such as Public Private Partnerships (PPP) and other forms of financial instrument;
2011/05/24
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 119 #

2011/2019(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
32. Asks the Commission to keep on working closely with those Member States with a low absorption rate in order to further improve absorption on the ground; calls, therefore, for the further promotion of mutual learning, exchange of best practices and reinforcimprovement of administrative capacities in certain Member States;
2011/05/24
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 150 #

2011/2019(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
43. Notes that these increases are mostly linked to three of the four Solidarity and Management of Immigration programmes: External Borders Fund (+38%), European Return Fund (+43%) and European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (+24%); emphasises, however,underlines that the increases foreseen under this heading for 2012 are simply the result of the yearly breakdown of multiannual global amounts agreed upon by both Parliament and Council when these programmes and actions were adopted; are much more remarkable in those programmes oriented to prevent the arrival and to repatriate immigrants than other programmes which aim is their integration; highlights that this fact is paradoxical confronted with the challenges arisen by the processes of transition to democracy in the Southern Mediterranean;
2011/05/24
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 156 #

2011/2019(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45
45. Takes note of the repeated calls by the European Council to strengthen the operational capacity and role of FRONTEX; aAsks the Commission to present the full budgetary implications for 2012 of the ongoing revision of FRONTEX and to provide a clearer picture of the Member States’ financial participation in its functioning;
2011/05/24
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 162 #

2011/2019(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 49
49. Takes the view that programmes and actions under this heading play an important role in achieving headline targets and flagships initiatives of the Europe 2020an strategy; reiterates that education, training and culture carry economic value since they contribute notably to economic growth and quality job creation and support the development of active citizenship;
2011/05/24
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 163 #

2011/2019(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 50
50. Underlines the fact thatDisagrees with the very small margin available that will allow limited room for manoeuvre when proposing new actions or taking decisions on stepping up the funding of priorities directly relevant to citizens;
2011/05/24
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 173 #

2011/2019(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 53
53. Is astonished that the Commission has not proposed in its Draft Budget 2012 any specific programme in favour of sport, although this is now a fully-fledged competence of the Union deriving from the Treaty of Lisbon; finds this attitude all the more surprisingdeplorable since some funding – though of limited magnitude – was available in Budgets 2009, 2010 and 2011;
2011/05/24
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 3 #

2011/2018(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas the current financial, economic and social situation of the EU obliges the institutions to respond with the quality and efficiency that is required and to employ strict management procedures so that savings may be achieved; considers that such savings should involve budget lines related with the Members of the European Parliament;
2011/03/17
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 6 #

2011/2018(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the so far good cooperation between the Bureau of the European Parliament and the Committee on Budgets during the current budget procedure;deleted
2011/03/17
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 11 #

2011/2018(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. While fully aware of the challenges ahead, takes the view that the growth rate and final level of the budget need to be adjusted in these Draft Estimates; decides that at this stage, the overall level of the budget is EUR X, which represents a rate of increase of X % and is around the inflation ratesignificantly below the inflation rate forecasted for 2012; this represents a percentage share of X of heading 5;
2011/03/17
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 15 #

2011/2018(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Reaffirms that the Parliament should show budgetary responsibility and self- restraint by staying around the inflation rate and finding additional savings; following the interinstitutional line, enlargement-related needs are to be integrated either by a letter of amendment or an amending budget; the needs for the 18 new MEPs following the Lisbon Treaty will be also integrated by a letter of amendment or an amending budget;
2011/03/17
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 24 #

2011/2018(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Is of the opinion that the European Parliament and the other institutions should show budgetary responsibility and self- restraint in the context of economic crisis and the heavy burden of public debt and restraint in times of ongoing national budgetary consolidation efforts without undermining the goal of legislative excellence; is therefore ready to accept a revision of the ceiling of heading 5 of the MFF according to point 23 of the Inter- Institutional Agreement (IIA); this revision should be an offsetting with a reduction of the ceiling of heading 5 (administration) by EUR 100 million and a corresponding increase of other headings, "in favour of youth"which should be object of a later decision;
2011/03/17
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 28 #

2011/2018(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Considers that the ongoing efforts to modernise and rationalise the administration and the proposals for 2012 should contribute to a reduction in the external provision of services and expects significant savings to be made here so as to achieve a level of expenditure comparable at least to that of 2010;
2011/03/17
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 29 #

2011/2018(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Decides that the item on the General Expenditure Allowance (article 1006), which covers expenses incurred for parliamentary work of members, should not be updated in 2012;
2011/03/17
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 34 #

2011/2018(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. CutKeeps the contingency reserve by X million EUR.at the level for 2011;
2011/03/17
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 35 #

2011/2018(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Keeps the funding for European political parties at the level of 2011 while allowing for an adjustment according to the inflation rate;
2011/03/17
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 36 #

2011/2018(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Keeps the funding for European Political Foundations at the level of 2011, while allowing for an adjustment according to the inflation rate;
2011/03/17
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 42 #

2011/2018(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Notes that Members' travel costs could be significantly reduced if MEPs and staff were obliged, for flights within the Union, to travel economy class;
2011/03/17
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 43 #

2011/2018(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Considers that all expenses related to publications, information and participation, organization of seminars and symposiums as well as cultural activities (articles 3141, 3242, 3243 and 3245) should not be updated in 2012;
2011/03/17
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 45 #

2011/2018(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 b (new)
12b. Considers that expenditure on Acquisition of expertise (article 320) can be reduced up to 2010 levels, streamlining the criteria for conducting studies and consultations, without prejudice to the transparency and openness in procurement;
2011/03/17
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 47 #

2011/2018(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a
13a. Decides that the budget line on salaries and allowances of MEPs (article 100) should not be updated in 2012; considers that savings in the European Parliament should start by their own members;
2011/03/17
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 48 #

2011/2018(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Considers that the above-mentioned ICT modernisation should engender significant savings with regard to the provision of external ICT services, allowing for the spending level of 2011 to be maintained; considers further that more competitive conditions might be negotiated with regard to the cleaning and maintenance costs of the Parliament in order to keep them at the level of 2011, which may further contribute to reducing the EP's environmental footprint; considers that in this context, EP's paper - related costs can be reduced by at least 10%;
2011/03/17
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 50 #

2011/2018(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)
13b. Decides that the Bureau of Parliament should amend its rules relating to travel expenses (article 1400) included in its own decision PE 422.536/BUR in order to establish as a rule the purchase of airplane tickets in economy class for flights of less than 4 hours and this new way of applying the Statute for Members can make exceptions with regard to the age of the MEP and his health conditions state;
2011/03/17
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 34 #

2011/2017(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Considers that for 2012, and taking into account the current budgetary constraints, no assistants allowance increase should be considered, besides that due to inflation indexation;
2011/02/18
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 35 #

2011/2017(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21b. Stresses that the current Members allowances’ system should be revised in order to avoid, on travelling days, the combination of the daily allowance with the time allowance; furthermore, considers that the revision of the Members allowances’ system is essential in order to duly adjust the daily allowance to the days in which effectively the Members are carrying out their parliamentarian activity;
2011/02/18
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 27 #

2011/2011(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas the much mentioned current- account imbalances are a result of underlying structural imbalances in the domestic economiesthe differences in competitive capacity between domestic economies and of the commercial and exchange rate policies adopted,
2011/05/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 60 #

2011/2011(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Is aware that, ultimately, confidence in the strength of the underlying economy and the depth and sophistication of its financial markets are the main determinants for which currencies are kept as reserves by central banks;deleted
2011/05/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 67 #

2011/2011(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. States that currencies should reflect underlying market fundamentals in order to enhance openness and flexibility and to facilitate economic adjust, while remaining a powerful economic policy instrument;
2011/05/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 76 #

2011/2011(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Supports the work and commitments of G20 States to implement medium-term fiscal consolidation, pursuing appropriate monetary policies, enhancing exchange rate flexibility to better reflect underlying economic fundamentals, and structural reforms to foster job creation and contribute to global rebalancing;deleted
2011/05/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #

2011/2011(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Supports the establishment of a timetable for an action plan that will implement the G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth;deleted
2011/05/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 86 #

2011/2011(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Takes the view that the commitments given in the G20 need to be more concrete and that progress needs to be monitored by an independent body, such as the IMF;deleted
2011/05/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 93 #

2011/2011(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. . Stresses the need to agree a set of macroeconomic, macrofinancial and social indicators that will allow this monitoring to take place at a global level; underlines that these indicators should cover internal imbalances, such as public debt and deficits andficits, public and private indebtedness levels, employment and skills, private savings and debt, and employment rates, as well as external imbalances from trade and investment flows and transfers;
2011/05/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 114 #

2011/2011(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Underlines the need for a global understanding and a common approach regarding monetary policy, sustainable public finances and flexible currencies based on economic fundamentals; considerstresses that the global economyis process should be chaoperacterised by free trade in all sectors; stresses that the IMF and WTO should be the c within the institutional frameworek of such a process, with input from the G20the UN, with active input from the G20, the IMF, the WTO and other relevant bodies;
2011/05/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 129 #

2011/2011(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Considers the G20UN to be a key forum for global cooperation, but also underlines a lack of representativeness; stresses that actions for global institutional coordination should be carried out through the IMF;
2011/05/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 142 #

2011/2011(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Stresses that the lack of coopertransparent relations among financial supervisors and financial system operators facilitated the spreademergence of the financial crisis and worsened its effects;
2011/05/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 163 #

2011/2011(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Stresses the positive effects of a stronger economic governance framework in the EU and the euro area for global cooperation and coordination;deleted
2011/05/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 186 #

2011/2011(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Underlines that fullEurope's participation in the global economy is crucial for Europe in order to take advantage of all its opportunitiesneeds to be carefully regulated in order to neutralise the adverse effects of globalisation in terms of employment, unequal distribution of income and the stability of the financial system;
2011/05/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 10 #

2011/0455(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
(6) The potential advantages for officials and other servants of the European Union of the application of the method should be balanced by the continuation of the system of special levy, to be renamed as 'solidarity levy'. This levy should therefore be collected and assigned in accordance with real solidarity principles. While the rate of the special levy in force during the period from 2004 to 2012 increased gradually over time and averaged at 4.23 %, it seems appropriate in the present circumstances to increase the solidarity levy at the uniform rate of 6%to an overall equivalent rate of 6%, to be applied progressively according to the position of the official concerned in the salary scale, so as to take account of a difficult social and economic context and its ramifications for public finances throughout the European Unionthroughout the European Union. The amounts levied should be applied to increase the appropriations allocated to Progress 1. Such a solidarity levy should apply to all officials and other servants of the European Union for the same period as the 'method' itself. ------------------------------- 1 See Decision No. 1672/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 establishing a Community Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity – Progress (OJ L 315, 15.11.2006, p. 1).
2012/03/01
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 15 #

2011/0455(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
(14) Working hours applied in the institutions should be aligned to those in force in certain of the Member States of the European Union to compensate for the reduction of staff in the institutions. The introduction of a minimum number of weekly working hours will ensure that the staff employed by the institutions is able to carry out the work- load resulting from the European Union's policy objectives while, at the same time, harmonising working conditions in the institutions, in the interest of solidarity throughout the European Union's civil service.
2012/03/01
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 24 #

2011/0455(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 21 – point d
Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities
Article 55 – paragraph 4
4. The appointing authority of each institution mayshall introduce flexible working- time arrangements. Officials to whom the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 44 apply shall manage their working-time without resorting to such arrangements.
2012/03/01
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 27 #

2011/0455(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 32 – point a
Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities
Article 66a
'1. By way of derogation from Article 3(1) of Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 260/68 and in order to take account of the application of the method for updating the remuneration and pensions of officials and the difficult social and economic context throughout the Union, a temporary measure regarding remuneration paid by the Union to staff in active employment, to be known as the ‘solidarity levy’, shall be applied from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2022. 2. The rate of this solidarity levy, which shall apply to the base defined in paragraph 3, shall be 6 %.';applied in a progressive manner according to the position of the official concerned in the salary scale, with an aggregate total effect equivalent to 6 %. 2a. The amounts levied shall be applied to increase the appropriations allocated to Progress 1.' -------------------------------------------- 1 See Decision No. 1672/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 establishing a Community Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity – Progress (OJ L 315, 15.11.2006, p. 1).
2012/03/01
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 48 #

2011/0386(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
The European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.
2012/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 47 #

2011/0385(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
The European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.
2012/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 104 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11 a (new)
(11a) Above and beyond the principle of rotation, and to enable credit rating agencies to perform services to issuers as independently as possible, contracts between a given credit rating agency and a given issuer should not be renewable, even when the contractual relationship has not run to its maximum duration. In addition, clauses should be prohibited if they serve in any way to link the ratings issued to the remuneration of the credit rating agency or the possibility of terminating the contract. The object is, as far as possible, to curtail attempts to make the work of credit rating agencies subject to conditions, whether under contractual provisions or by means an implicit threat not to renew a contract.
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 111 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) One of the specificities of sovereign ratings is that the issuer-pays model generally does not apply. Instead, the majority of ratings are produced as unsolicited ratings, providing the basis for both solicited and unsolicited ratings of the financial institutions of the country concerned. It is therefore not necessary to require the rotation of credit rating agencies issuing sovereign ratingsGiven the role played by the issue of sovereign ratings in triggering and exacerbating the current sovereign debt crisis, measures should be taken to safeguard the stability and integrity of the euro area and its member countries. Furthermore, as far as sovereign debt is concerned, investors have reliable background documents enabling them to assess the debt, not least the reports produced by the Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Credit rating agencies should therefore be prohibited from carrying out analyses or issuing ratings or rating outlooks on any sovereign debt securities, whether concerning a single Member State or a group of Member States. If a credit rating agency fails to comply with that ban, its registration should be suspended. This measure is intended to allow for the present circumstances of the euro area and should be reviewed at the end of 2015.
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 133 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17 a (new)
(17a) To support the rotation mechanism and reduce rating market concentration, every issuer should be subject to a limit of 50% of the notional sum rated by each credit rating agency. The aim is to encourage issuers to work with several credit rating agencies. So as not to penalise those issuers which voluntarily, or are legally obliged to, obtain more than one rating for a given security, or which have issued only one security, the notional sums corresponding to securities rated by more than one credit rating agency should, for the purposes of this limit, be apportioned among the credit rating agencies issuing the ratings.
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 149 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20 a (new)
(20a) The ratings issued by credit rating agencies should be directly related to credit risk. This is the only way to ensure comparability, whether in terms of the systems used by individual credit rating agencies or in terms of the types of financial instruments rated. It is unacceptable that investors and regulators should have no specific, objective criterion, verifiable at least a posteriori, enabling them to compare the different agency ratings and the agencies’ risk assessment performance. Furthermore, no credit rating system can be credible if financial instruments are rated equally when the probability of default is not the same. That being the case, ESMA should draw up a harmonised rating scale making the probability of default the decisive criterion for ratings issued.
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 207 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 1 a (new)
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 1 – paragraph 2 a (new)
(1a) In Article 1 the following paragraph is inserted: “Lastly, this Regulation applies to ratings concerning Member States and their sovereign debt.”
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 208 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 3 – point -a (new)
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point (a)
(-a) Point (a) is amended as follows: (a) “credit rating” means a service provided to investors and consumers in the form of an opinion regarding the creditworthiness of an entity, a debt or financial obligation, debt security, preferred share or other financial instrument, or of an issuer of such a debt or financial obligation, debt security, preferred share or other financial instrument, issued using an established and defined ranking system of rating categories and subject to liability arrangements;
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 221 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 6
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 5 b – paragraph 2
The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) established by Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (***) shall not refer to credit ratings in its warnings and recommendations where such references have the potential to trigger mechanistic reliance on credit ratings.
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 234 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 6 a – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. A shareholder or a member of a credit rating agency holding at least 5% of stake in the capital or the voting rights in that agency shall not
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 237 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 6 a – paragraph1 – point a
(a) hold 5% or more of the capital ofin any other credit rating agency. This prohibition does not apply to holdings in diversified collective investment schemes, including managed funds such as pension funds or life insurance, provided that the holdings in diversified collective investment schemes do not put him or her in a position to exercise significant influence on the business activities of those schemes;
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 240 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 6 a – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) have the right or the power to exercise 5% or more of the voting rights in any other credit rating agency;
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 259 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 6 b – paragraph 2 – point c a (new)
(ca) irrespective of its duration, a contract may not be renewed, nor may it contain clauses linking the remuneration of the credit rating agency to the ratings issued.
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 267 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 6 b a (new)
Article 6ba Rating concentration limit for issuers 1. No issuer may have more than 50% of the notional amount of its securities rated by any one credit rating agency. 2. For the purposes of the calculation referred to in the preceding paragraph, the notional amount of a security rated by more than one credit rating agency shall be apportioned equally among the agencies issuing the ratings. 3. Where they exceed the limit laid down in paragraphs 1 and 2 in respect of a given credit rating agency, issuers may not have new assets rated, or ratings renewed, by that agency.
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 273 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 10 – point b
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 8 – paragraph 5
(b) in paragraph 5, a second subparagraph is added: ‘Sovereign ratings shall be reviewed at least every six months.’deleted
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 317 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 12 e (new)
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 10 a (new)
(12e) The following article is inserted after Article 10: ‘Article 10a Issue of sovereign ratings 1. Credit rating agencies shall be expressly prohibited from carrying out any assessment, whether solicited or unsolicited, or issuing ratings or rating outlooks on sovereign debt instruments. 2. Paragraph 1 shall apply both to the sovereign debt of single Member States and to assessments concerning groups of Member States.’
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 332 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 18 – point b
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 21 – paragraph 4 a – point a
(a) a harmonised standard rating scale to be used, in accordance with Article 11a, by registered and certified credit rating agencies, which will be based upon the metric to measure credit risk and the number of rating categories and cut off values for each rating category, determined according to the likelihood of default;
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 367 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 21 – point b a (new)
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 36 a – paragraph 2 – point i a (new)
(ba) In Article 36a(2) the following point is added: (ia) Where a credit rating agency fails to comply with Article 10a, its registration shall be suspended for five years.
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 371 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 24 – point a
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 39 – paragraph 1
1. By 7 December 20123, the Commission shall make an assessment of the application of this Regulation, including an assessment of the reliance on credit ratings in the Union, the impact on the level of concentration in the credit rating market, the cost and benefits of impacts of the Regulation and of the appropriateness of the remuneration of the credit rating agency by the rated entity (issuer-pays model), and submit a report thereon to the European Parliament and the Council’;
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 378 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 24 – point b
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 39 – paragraph 4
4. By 1 July 2015, the Commission shall assess the situation in the credit rating market, in particular the availability of sufficient choice in order to comply with the requirements set out in Articles 6b and 8b. The review shall also assess the need to extend the scope of the obligations in Article 8a to include other financial products, including covered bonds. Finally, it shall assess the continuing relevance or otherwise of the provisions of Article 10a prohibiting credit rating agencies from issuing sovereign ratings or sovereign rating outlooks.’;
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 389 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – point 1 – point b – point ii
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Annex I – Section B – point 3 – paragraph 1 – point a a
‘(aa) a shareholder or member of a credit rating agency holding, directly or indirectly, 10% or more of either the capital or the voting rights ofin that credit rating agency or being otherwise in a position to exercise significant influence on the business activities of the credit rating agency, directly or indirectly owns financial instruments of the rated entity or a related third party or has any other direct or indirect ownership interest in that entity or party, other than holdings in diversified collective investment schemes, including managed funds such as pension funds or life insurance, which do not put him in a position to exercise significant influence on the business activities of the scheme;’;
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 394 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – point 1 – point b – point iii
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Annex I – Section B – point 3 – paragraph 1 – point b a
‘(ba) the credit rating is issued with respect to a rated entity or a related third party which, either directly or indirectly holds 10% or more of either the, is a holder of capital or the voting rights ofin that credit rating agency;’;
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 397 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – point 1 – point b – point iv
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Annex I – Section B – point 3 – paragraph 1 – point c a
‘(ca) a shareholder or member of a credit rating agency holding, directly or indirectly, 10% or more of either the capital or the voting rights ofin that credit rating agency or being otherwise in a position to exercise significant influence on the business activities of the credit rating agency, is a member of the administrative or supervisory board of the rated entity or a related third party;’;
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 399 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – point 1 – point b – point v
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Annex I – Section B – point 3 – second paragraph
‘A credit rating agency shall also immediately assess, taking into account the limits laid down in the first subparagraph, whether there are grounds for re-rating or withdrawing the existing credit rating or credit outlook.’;
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 404 #

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – point 1 – point d
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Annex I – Section B – point 4 – subparagraph 1
‘4. Neither a credit rating agency nor any person holding, directly or indirectly, at least 5% of the capital or voting rights of the credit rating agency or otherwise in a position to significantly influence the business activities of the credit rating agency shall provide consultancy or advisory services to the rated entity or a related third party regarding the corporate or legal structure, assets, liabilities or activities of that rated entity or related third party.’;
2012/04/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 4 #

2011/0261(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
(1) The recent financial crisis has led to debates at all levels about a possible additional tax on the financial sector and in particular a financial transactions tax (FTT). This debate stems from the desire to ensure the financial sector contribute to covering the costs of the crisis and that it is taxed in a fair way vis-à-vis other sectors for the future; to dis-incentivise excessively risky activities by financial institutions; to complement regulatory measures aimed at avoiding future crises and to generate additional revenue for general budgets or specific policy purposthe European Union budget, above all in order to promote employment, social and environment policies.
2012/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 7 #

2011/0261(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 13
(13) Because of the high mobility of financial transactions and in order to help mitigating potential tax avoidance, the FTT should be applied on the basis of thein accordance with an issuance principle, supplemented by a residence principle.
2012/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 8 #

2011/0261(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 16 a (new)
(16a) Bearing in mind the Commission proposal on the multiannual financial framework for the period 2014-2020 and, in particular, the provisions on the own- resources of the Union laid down in the Treaties, the revenue accruing from the FTT should be administered at Union level, as an own resource, and should be linked to specific Union policies or public goods, in particular action to combat poverty at world and European level, action to combat unemployment and the fight against climate change.
2012/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 9 #

2011/0261(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. The FTT shall constitute a financial resource of the Union, and the revenue accruing from its application shall be added to the Union budget.
2012/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 11 #

2011/0261(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2 a (new)
(2a) Issuance 1. For the purposes of this Directive a financial instrument is deemed to be issued within the territory of a Member State or the Union where it is issued by a legal entity that is registered in a Member State. 2. In the case of a derivative, the condition of issuance within the territory of a Member State or the Union is fulfilled where the reference or underlying instrument is issued by a legal entity that is registered in a Member State. 3. In the case of a structured instrument, the condition of issuance within the territory of a Member State or the Union is fulfilled when the structured instrument is based on or backed by a greater than 20% proportion of assets or financial instruments and derivatives with reference to financial instruments issued by a legal entity that is registered in a Member State.
2012/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 12 #

2011/0261(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
The minimum rates shall be fixed by each Member State as a percentage of the taxable amount not lower than 0.1%.
2012/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 13 #

2011/0261(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part
Those rates shall not be lower than: (a) 0.1% in respect of the financial transactions referred to in Article 5; (b) 0.01% in respect of financial transactions referred to in Article 6.deleted
2012/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 14 #

2011/0261(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 3
3. Member States shall apply the same rate to all financial transactions that fall under the same category pursuThe Commission shall define an increment system relating to the minimum rate, whereby categories of instruments shall be defined by level of complexity and maturity intervals. These increments shall increase the tax on the most complex instruments antd to paragraph 2 (a) and (b)hose with the shortest maturities.
2012/03/09
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 19 #

2011/0261(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
(1) The recent financial crisis has led to debates at all levels about a possible additional tax on the financial sector and in particular a financial transactions tax (FTT). This debate stems from the desire to ensure the financial sector contribute to covering the costs of the crisis and that it is taxed in a fair way vis-à-vis other sectors for the future; to dis-incentivise excessively risky activities by financial institutions; to complement regulatory measures aimed at avoiding future crises and to generate additional revenue for general budgets or specific policy purposthe European Union budget, above all in order to promote employment, social and environment policies.
2012/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 37 #

2011/0261(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 3
(3) For the internal market to function properly, FTT should apply to trade in a wide range of financial instruments, including structured products, both in the organised markets and "over-the-counter", as well as to the conclusion and modification of all derivative contracts, penalising the most complex and least transparent instruments and those based on short-term financing considerations. For the same reason, it should apply to a broadly determined range of financial institutions.
2012/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #

2011/0261(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 13
(13) Because of the high mobility of financial transactions and in order to help mitigating potential tax avoidance, the FTT should be applied on the basis of thein accordance with an issuance principle, supplemented by a residence principle.
2012/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 60 #

2011/0261(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 17 a (new)
(17a) Bearing in mind the Commission proposal on the multiannual financial framework for the period 2014-2020 and, in particular, the provisions on the own- resources of the Union laid down in the Treaties, the revenue accruing from the FTT should be administered at Union level, as an own resource, and should be linked to specific Union policies or public goods, in particular action to combat poverty at world and European level, action to combat unemployment and the fight against climate change.
2012/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 74 #

2011/0261(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. The FTT shall constitute a financial resource of the Union, and the revenue accruing from its application shall be added to the Union budget.
2012/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 119 #

2011/0261(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 a (new)
Article 3a Issuance 1. For the purposes of this Directive a financial instrument is deemed to be issued within the territory of a Member State or the Union where it is issued by a legal entity that is registered in a Member State. 2. In the case of a derivative, the condition of issuance within the territory of a Member State or the Union is fulfilled where the reference or underlying instrument is issued by a legal entity that is registered in a Member State. 3. In the case of a structured instrument, the condition of issuance within the territory of a Member State or the Union is fulfilled when the structured instrument is based on or backed by a greater than 20% proportion of assets or financial instruments and derivatives with reference to financial instruments issued by a legal entity that is registered in a Member State.
2012/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 127 #

2011/0261(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
The minimum rates shall be fixed by each Member State as a percentage of the taxable amount not lower than 0.1%.
2012/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 128 #

2011/0261(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Those rates shall not be lower than: (a) 0.1% in respect of the financial transactions referred to in Article 5; (b) 0.01% in respect of financial transactions referred to in Article 6.deleted
2012/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 136 #

2011/0261(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 3
3. Member States shall apply the same rate to all financial transactions that fall under the same category pursuThe Commission shall define an increment system relating to the minimum rate, whereby categories of instruments shall be defined by level of complexity and maturity intervals. These increments shall increase the tax on the most complex instruments antd to paragraph 2 (a) and (b)hose with the shortest maturities.
2012/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 77 #

2011/0203(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 63 a (new)
(63a) When drafting technical standards according to this Directive EBA and the Commission have to ensure that those standards and their requirements can be applied by all different institutions concerned in a way that is proportionate to the scale and complexity of the institutions and their activities.
2012/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 154 #

2011/0203(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 64 – point j a (new)
(ja) to remove one or more members of the management body, where they do not fulfil the requirements imposed under Article 87.
2012/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 209 #

2011/0203(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 75 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
The risk management function shall be responsible for identifying, measuring, and reporting on risk exposures. The risk management function shall be actively involved in elaborating institution's risk strategy and in all material risk management decisions. The riskable to report directly to the management body in its supervisory function when necessary, independent from senior management and to raise concerns and warn this body, where appropriate, in case of specific risk developments that affect or may affect the institution, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the management body in both its supervisory and/or managementrial function shall be able to dels pursuant to this Directiver a complete view on the whole range of risks of the institutionnd Regulation (EU) No .../2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of ... [on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms].
2012/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 303 #

2011/0203(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 87 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) The management body shall possess adequate collectivindividually and collectively adequate knowledge, skills and experience to be able to understand the institution's activities, including the main risks.
2012/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 323 #

2011/0203(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 87 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) the notion of adequate individual and collective knowledge, skills and experience of the management body as referred to in paragraph 1(b);
2012/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 522 #

2011/0203(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 132 – paragraph 1
1. Where an institution fails to meet its Combined Buffer Requirement, it shall prepare a capital conservation plan and submit it to the competent authority no later than 5 working days after it identified that it was failing to meet that requirement, unless the competent authority authorises a longer delay. Competent authorities shall only grant such authorisations based on the individual situation of a credit institution and taking into account the scale and complexity of the institution's activities.
2012/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 185 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 68
(68) A leverage ratio is a new regulatory and supervisory tool for the Union. In line with international agreements, it should be introduced first as an additional feature that can be applied on individual institutions at the discretion of supervisory authorities. Reporting obligations for institutions would allow appropriate review and calibration, with a view to migrating to a binding measure inin order to ensure the compulsory application of the leverage ratio from 20186.
2012/03/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 583 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 87 a (new)
Article 87a Own funds requirements for systemically important institutions 1. By way of derogation of Article 87 (1) competent authorities shall be empowered to apply (a) a Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of 10 %; (b) a Tier 1 capital ratio of 12 %; (c) a total capital ratio of 18 %; for systemically important institutions. 2. EBA shall define in close cooperation with national supervisors until 31.12.2013 what constitutes a systemically important institution, taking into account the following elements: a) exposure classes; b) complexity of business activities; c) deposit to loan ratio; d) share of KMU funding; e) trading on own account; f) share of public customers; g) funding of services of general interest; h) social and environmental impact of the project portfolio; i) respect of ethical and social standards; j) internal incentive structures; k) on and off balance sheet items; l) interconnectedness and systemic relevance leading to the too-big-to-fail problem.
2012/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 794 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 238 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. The originator institution of a traditional securitisation may exclude 75% of the securitised exposures from the calculation of risk- weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts if either of the following conditions is fulfilled:
2012/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 797 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 240 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) in the case of a traditional securitisation, exclude from its calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts, and, as relevant, expected loss amounts, 75% of the exposures which it has securitised;
2012/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 799 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 244 – paragraph 1
In calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts for the securitised exposures, where the conditions in Article 239 are met, the originator institution of a synthetic securitisation shall, subject to Article 245, use the relevant calculation methodologies set out in this Section and not those set out in Chapter 2. For institutions calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts under Chapter 3, the expected loss amount in respect of such exposures shall be zero25% of the expected loss amount if the exposure has not been transferred.
2012/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 893 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 394 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
An institution, other than when acting as an originator, a sponsor or original lender, shall be exposed to the credit risk of a securitisation position in its trading book or non-trading book only if the originator, sponsor or original lender has explicitly disclosed to the institution that it will retain, on an ongoing basis, a material net economic interest which, in any event, shall not be less than 25 %.
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 894 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 394 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part
Only any of the following qualifies as retention of a material net economic interest of not less than 25%:
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 895 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 394 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point a
(a) retention of no less than 25 % of the nominal value of each of the tranches sold or transferred to the investors;
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 896 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 394 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point b
(b) in the case of securitisations of revolving exposures, retention of the originator's interest of no less than 25 % of the nominal value of the securitised exposures;
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 897 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 394 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point c
(c) retention of randomly selected exposures, equivalent to no less than 25 % of the nominal amount of the securitised exposures, where such exposures would otherwise have been securitised in the securitisation, provided that the number of potentially securitised exposures is no less than 100 at origination;
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 898 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 394 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point d
(d) retention of the first loss tranche and, if necessary, other tranches having the same or a more severe risk profile than those transferred or sold to investors and not maturing any earlier than those transferred or sold to investors, so that the retention equals in total no less than 25 % of the nominal value of the securitised exposures.
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 900 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 394 – paragraph 4 – point b a (new)
(ba) German covered bonds
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 915 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 400 – paragraph 1 – point 2
(2) ‘Retail deposit’ means a liability to a natural person or to a small and medium sized enterprise where the aggregate liability to such clients or group of connected clients is less than 1 million EUR. Deposits of corporates' can be considered as retail deposits when their annual turnover is less than 50 Mio. Euro.
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 930 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 402 – paragraph 1
Where a credit institution does not meet, or is expected not to meet the requirement set out in Article 401(1), it shall immediately notify the competent authorities and shall submit without undue delay to the competent authority a plan for the timely restoration of compliance with Article 401. Until such compliance has been restored, the credit institution shall report the items daily by the end of each business day unless the competent authority authorises a lower frequency and a longer delay. Competent authorities shall only grant such authorisations based on the individual situation of a credit institution and taking into account the scale and complexity of the institution's activities. They shall monitor the implementation of the restoration plan and shall require a more timely restoration if appropriate.
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1011 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 404 – paragraph 2 – point a – point iii a (new)
(iii a) the issuer of transferable assets and the investing institution are both part of the same institutional protection scheme referred to in 108(7)(b), provided that they meet all the conditions laid down in Article 108(7).
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1280 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 416 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1
Institutions shall determine the exposure value of items listed in Annex II and of credit derivatives in accordance with either the Mark-to-Market Method set out in Article 269 or the Original Exposure Method set out in Article 270 without taking into account derivatives netting agreements. Institutions may use the Original Exposure Method to determine the exposure value of items listed in Annex II and of credit derivatives only if they also use this method for determining the exposure value of these items for the purposes of meeting the own funds requirements set out in Article 87.
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1281 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 416 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 2
In determining the exposure value of items listed in Annex II and of credit derivatives, institutions shall take into account the effects of contracts for novation and other netting agreements, except contractual cross-product netting agreements, in accordance with Article 289.deleted
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1294 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 417 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
Competent authorities shall publicly disclose the leverage ratio of supervised institutions on a quarterly basis as of 1 January 2014.
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1383 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 443 a (new)
Article 443a Application of stricter prudential requirements by national authorities 1. National authorities, either on their own initiative or based on an ESRB recommendation pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, may impose stricter prudential requirements on institutions where macro-prudential risks are identified as posing a threat to financial stability at national level in the following areas: (a) the level of own funds laid, down in Article 87(1) and Article 87a (new); (b) the requirements for large exposures, laid down in Article 381 and Articles 384 to 392; (c) the liquidity requirements and the leverage ratio. 2. At least five working days before the introduction of stricter prudential requirements national authorities shall notify the ESRB in accordance with paragraph 1(a) to (c) in view of the identified macroprudential risks to financial stability. In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 and taking into account confidentiality requirements, the ESRB shall play a coordination role by assessing, upon request of the Commission or of at least three Member States, the financial stability concerns and possible unintended consequences and spill over effects on other Member States that could result from the imposition of the stricter requirements. 3. The ESRB shall inform the national authorities of other Member States about the initiative of the Member State that is planning to introduce stricter prudential requirements. 4. Where the ESRB determines that the identified macro-prudential risks to financial stability, as assessed in accordance with paragraph 2, that led to stricter prudential requirements cease to exist, the national authorities may repeal the stricter requirements and the original provisions of this Regulation shall apply. 4. The ESRB may, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, recommend the extension of the list of prudential requirements specified in paragraph 1.'
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1423 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 448 a (new)
Article 448 a Own funds requirements for systemically important institutions 1. By way of derogation from points (a) and (b) of Article 87a (1) (new), systemically important institutions shall satisfy the following own funds requirements: (a) at all times during the period from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2013: (i) a Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of a level that falls within a range with a lowest value of 3.5% and a highest value of 10%; (ii) a Tier 1 capital ratio of a level that falls within a range with a lowest value of 4.5% and a highest value of 12%; (b) at all times during the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2014: (i) a Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of a level that falls within a range of 6 % to 10 %; (ii) a Tier 1 capital ratio of a level that falls within a range of 8 % to 12%. (c) at all times during the period from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015: (i) a Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of a level that falls within a range of 8% to 10%; (ii) a Tier 1 capital ratio of a level that falls within a range of 10% to 12%. 2. In the event that systemically important institutions are unable to fulfil the recapitalisation requirements on their own, national governments shall provide support. In this case national governments shall ensure that the institutions are able to meet the requirements defined in Art 87. 3. Competent authorities shall: (a) determine the levels of the Common Equity Tier 1 and Tier 1 capital ratios in the ranges specified in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 that institutions shall satisfy; (b) publish the determination made in accordance with point (a).
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1550 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 481 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
By 31 December 2015, EBA shall report to the Commission on whether and how it would be appropriate to ensure that institutions use stable sources of funding, including an assessment of the impact on the business and risk profile of Union institutions or on financial markets or the economy and bank lending, with a particular focus on lending to small and medium enterprises and on trade financing, including lending under official export credit insurance schemes.
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1553 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 481 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
By 31 December 2016, the Commission shall, on the basis of these reports, submit a report, and if appropriate a legislative proposal to the European Parliament and Council.
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1567 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 482 – paragraph 1
1. TIn line with Recital 68 the Commission shall submit by 31 December 2016 a report on the impact and effectiveness of the leverage ratio to the European Parliament and the Council. Where appropriate, the report shall be accompanied byto the European Parliament and the Council by 31 December 2014 a legislative proposal on the introduction of one or more levels for the leverage ratio for on and off-balance sheet items that institutions would be required to meet, suggesting an adequate calibration for those levels and any appropriate adjustments to the capital measure and the total exposure measure as defined in Article 416.
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1570 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 482 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the EBA shall report to the Commission and the European Parliament by 31 October 20164 on at least the following:
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1579 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 482 – paragraph 2 – point g
(g) whether 35% would be an appropriate level for the leverage ratio based on Tier 1 capital and, if not, what level would be the appropriate one;
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1583 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 482 – paragraph 2 – point g a (new)
(g a) whether there is scope for introducing a differentiated leverage cap for different business activities;
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1584 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 482 – paragraph 2 – point g b (new)
(g b) whether it is justified that public development institutions can operate under a higher leverage compared to for- profit institutions;
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1585 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 482 – paragraph 2 – point g c (new)
(g c) whether it can be justified to exempt exposures in the calculation of the leverage ratio which have an assigned risk weight of 5% or less.
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1591 #

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 482 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
3. The report referred to in paragraph 2 shall cover at least the period from 1 January 2013 until 30 June 20164 and shall take account of at least the following:
2012/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 245 #

2011/0062(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 31
(31) In order to be in a position to understand the nature of the service, consumers should be made aware of what constitutes a personalised recommendation on suitable credit agreements for that consumer’s needs and financial situation ('advice') and when it is being provided and when it is not. Those providing advice should comply with general standards in order to ensure that the consumer is presented with a range of products suitable for his needs and circumstances. That service should be based on a fair and sufficiently wide-ranging analysis of the products available on the market, and on a close inspection of the consumer’s financial situation, preferences and objectives. Such an assessment should be based on up-to-date information and reasonable assumptions on the consumer’s circumstances during the lifetime of the loan. Member States may clarify how the suitability of a given product for a consumer should be assessed in the context of the provision of advice. However, this service shall not involve any further costs to the consumer.
2011/10/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 494 #

2011/0062(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. PMember States shall ensure that prior to the performance of any of the services listed in Article 3(e), a credit intermediary shall provide the consumer with at least the following information:
2011/10/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 543 #

2011/0062(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – title
Information concernChanges ing the borrowing rate
2011/10/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 545 #

2011/0062(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that the creditor informs the consumer of any change in the borrowing rate, on paper or another durable medium, before the change enters into force. The information shall state the amount of the repayments to be made after the entry into force of the new borrowing rate and, in cases where the number or frequency of the payments changes, particulars thereof. Should the change concerned not be the direct and exclusive result of the evolution of a reference rate, the creditor shall supply proof that the information was received by the consumer 30 days before the entry into force of the new borrowing rate.
2011/10/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 549 #

2011/0062(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 2
2. However, the parties may agree in the credit agreement that the information referred to in paragraph 1 is to be given to the consumer periodically in cases where the change in the borrowing rate correlates directly with a change in a reference rate, the new reference rate is made publicly available by appropriate means and the information concerning the new reference rate is also kept available in the premises of the creditor, provided there is no obstacle to the consumer being able at any moment to request the variant referred to in paragraph 1.
2011/10/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 550 #

2011/0062(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
Member States shall ensure that the creditor does not change the borrowing rate for reasons not related to the consumer's solvency, in particular non- subscription or cessation of products or services not directly related to the credit in question, even where contractual clauses exist to such an effect (in this case those clauses shall be considered null and void).
2011/10/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 637 #

2011/0062(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 1
1. For the purposes of this Directive, 'advice' constitutes a separate servicrvice which is separate from the granting of a credit and cannot be provided by bodies or individuals connected to any institution marketing credit agreements. Such a service can only be marketed as advice when the remuneration of the individual providing the service is transparent to the consumer.
2011/10/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 674 #

2011/0062(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Member States may provide that the exercise of the right referred to in paragraph 1 is subject to certain conditions. Such conditions may include time limitations, defined by the supervisor, on the exercise of the right, or different treatment depending ontermined exclusively by the type of the borrowing rate, or restrictions with regard to the circumstances under which the right may be exercised. Member States may also provide that the creditor should be entitled to fair and objectively justified compensation for potential costs directly linked to early repayment of the credit, although this shall not in any circumstances exceed 0.5% of the sum reimbursed. In any event, if the early repayment falls within a period for which the borrowing rate is fixed, exercise of the right may be made subject to the existence of a special interest on the part of the consumer.
2011/10/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 19 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
(1) Companies which seek to do business across frontiers within the Union encounter serious obstacles and market distortions owing to the existence of 27 diverse corporate tax systems. These obstacles and distortions impede the proper functioning of the internal market and foster tax competition and a race to the bottom. They create disincentives for investment in the Union and run counter to the priorities set in the Communication adopted by the Commission on 3 March 2010 entitled Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. They also conflict with the requirements of a highly competitive social market economy.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 38 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 5
(5) Since differences in rates of taxation do not give rise to the sameraise any obstacles, to the system (the Common Consolidated Corpofunctioning of the single market but allow and encouratge Ttax Base (CCCTB)) need not affect the discretion of Member States regarding their national rate(s) of company taxationcompetition, it is necessary to initiate a process of harmonisation of tax rates that should start by setting lower and upper limits and culminate in a single rate at European Union level.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 54 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 8
(8) Since such a system is primarily designed to serve the needs of companies that operate across borders, it should be an optional scheme, accompanying the existing national corporate tax systemit only makes sense to talk about tax harmonisation if it covers the whole of the European Union, it will have to be a mandatory scheme, applying to all Member States and companies.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 64 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
(11) Income consisting in dividends, the proceeds from the disposal of shares held in a company outside the group and the profits of foreign permanent establishments should be exempt. In giving relief for double taxation most Member States exempt dividends and proceeds from the disposals of shares since it avoids the need of computing the taxpayer's entitlement to a credit for the tax paid abroad, in particular where such entitlement must take account of the corporation tax paid by the company distributing dividends. The exemption of income earned abroad meets the same need for simplicity.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 66 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 12
(12) Income consisting in interest and royalty payments should be taxable, with credit for withholding tax paid on such payments. Contrary to the case of dividends, there is no difficulty in computing such a credit.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 70 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 15
(15) Taxpayers should be allowed to carry losses forward to the next year indefinitely, but no loss carry-back should be allowed. Since carry- forward of losses is intended to ensure that a taxpayer pays tax on its real income, there is no reason to place a time limit on carry forward. Loss carry back is relatively rare in the practice of the Member States, and leads to excessive complexity.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 74 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 16
(16) Eligibility for consolidation (group membership) should be determined in accordance with a two-part test based on (i) (i) control (more than 50% of voting rights) and (ii) ownership (more than 75% of equity) or rights to profits (more than 750% of rights giving entitlement to profit). Such a test ensures a high level of economic integration between group members, as indicated by a relation of control and a high level of participation. The two thresholds should be met throughout the tax year; otherwise, the company should leave the group immediately. There should also be a nine-month minimum requirement for group membership.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 81 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 21
(21) The formula for apportioning the consolidated tax base should comprise three equally weighted factors (labour, assets and sales). The labour factor should be computed on the basis of payroll and the number of employees (each item counting for half). The asset factor should consist of all fixed tangible assets. Intangibles and financial assets should be excluded from the formula due to their mobile nature and the risks of circumventing the system. The use of these factors gives appropriate weight to the interests of the Member State of origin. Finally, sales should be taken into account in order to ensure fair participation of the Member State of destination. Those factors and weightings should ensure that profits are taxed where they are earned. As an exception to the general principle, where the outcome of the apportionment does not fairly represent the extent of business activity, a safeguard clause provides for an alternative method.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 107 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 1
(1) 'taxpayer' means a company to which has opted to apply, the system provided for by this Directive applies;
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 112 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 3
(3) 'non-taxpayer' means a company to which is ineligible to opt or has not opted to apply the system provided for by this Directive does not apply;
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 126 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Chapter 3 – title
OPTING FORSCOPE OF THE SYSTEM PROVIDED FOR BY THIS DIRECTIVE
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 130 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – title
OptingApplication
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 132 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 1
1. A company to which this Directive applThis Directive, under the conditions provided for therein, shall apply compulsorily to companies which isare resident for tax purposes in a Member State may opt for the system provided for by this Directive under the conditions provided for thereinand which meet the requirements laid down in Article 2(1).
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 136 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 2
2. A company to which this Directive applThis Directive, under the conditions provided for therein, shall apply to companies which isare not resident for tax purposes in a Member State may opt for the system provided for by this Directive under the conditions laid down therein in respect of aand which meet the requirements laid down in Article 2(2) in respect of the application of the system to all permanent establishments maintained by it in a Member States.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 140 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 6
6. A company resident in a Member State which opts for the system provided for by this Directive shall be subject to corporate tax under that system on all income derived from any source, whether inside or outside its Member State of residence.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 141 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 7
7. A company resident in a third country which opts for the system provided for by this Directive shall be subject to corporate tax under that system on all income from an activity carried on through a permanent establishment in a Member State.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 148 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – point c
c) received profit distributions;deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 151 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – point d
d) proceeds from a disposal of shares;eleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 162 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Chapter 8 – title
PROVISIONS ON THE ENTRY INTO AND EXIT FROMFORCE OF THE SYSTEM PROVIDED FOR BY THIS DIRECTIVE
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 164 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 44 – paragraph 1
When a taxpayer opts to apply the system provided for by this Directive, aAll assets and liabilities shall be recognised at their value as calculated according to national tax rules immediately prior to the date on which it begins to apply the system, unless otherwise stated in this Directive.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 169 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 46 – paragraph 1
Revenues and expenses which pursuant to Article 24(2) and (3) are considered to have accrued or been incurred before the taxpayer opted intoentry into force of the system provided for by this Directive but were not yet included in the tax base under the national corporate tax law previously applicable to the taxpayer shall be added to or deducted from the tax base, as the case may be, in accordance with the timing rules of national law.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 171 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 46 – paragraph 2
Revenues which were taxed under national corporate tax law before the taxpayer opted intoentry into force of the system in an amount higher than that which would have been included in the tax base under Article 24(2) shall be deducted from the tax base.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 174 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 47 – paragraph 1
1. Provisions, pension provisions and bad- debt deductions provided for in Articles 25, 26 and 27 shall be deductible only to the extent that they arise from activities or transactions carried out after the taxpayer opted intoentry into force of the system provided for by this Directive.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 177 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 47 – paragraph 2
2. Expenses incurred in relation to activities or transactions carried out before the taxpayer opted intoentry into force of the system but for which no deduction had been made shall be deductible.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 178 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 47 – paragraph 3
3. Amounts already deducted prior to opting intothe entry into force of the system may not be deducted again.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 180 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 48 – title
Pre-entry lossesLosses prior to the entry into force of the system
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 182 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 48 – paragraph 1
Where a taxpayer incurred losses before opting intothe entry into force of the system provided for by this Directive which could be carried forward under the applicable national law but had not yet been set off against taxable profits, those losses may be deducted from the tax base to the extent provided for under that national law.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 185 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 49
General rule for opting-out of the system When a taxpayer leaves the system provided for by this Directive, its assets and liabilities shall be recognised at their value as calculated according to the rules of the system, unless otherwise stated in this Directive.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 187 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 49 – paragraph 1
When a taxpayer leaves the system provided for by this Directive, its assets and liabilities shall be recognised at their value as calculated according to the rules of the system, unless otherwise stated in this Directive.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 191 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 50
Fixed assets depreciated in a pool When a taxpayer leaves the system provided for by this Directive, its asset pool under the system provided for by this Directive shall be recognised, for the purpose of the national tax rules subsequently applicable, as one asset pool which shall be depreciated on the declining balance method at an annual rate of 25%.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 193 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 50 – paragraph 1
When a taxpayer leaves the system provided for by this Directive, its asset pool under the system provided for by this Directive shall be recognised, for the purpose of the national tax rules subsequently applicable, as one asset pool which shall be depreciated on the declining balance method at an annual rate of 25%.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 196 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 51
Long-term contracts on leaving the system After the taxpayer leaves the system, revenues and expenses arising from long- term contracts shall be treated in accordance with the national corporate tax law subsequently applicable. However, revenues and expenses already taken into account for tax purposes in the system provided for by this Directive shall not be taken into account again.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 198 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 51 – paragraph 1
After the taxpayer leaves the system, revenues and expenses arising from long- term contracts shall be treated in accordance with the national corporate tax law subsequently applicable. However, revenues and expenses already taken into account for tax purposes in the system provided for by this Directive shall not be taken into account again.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 201 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 52
Provisions and deductions on leaving the system After the taxpayer leaves the system provided for by this Directive, expenses which have already been deducted in accordance with Articles 25 to 27 may not be deducted again.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 205 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 53
Losses on leaving the system Losses incurred by the taxpayer which have not yet been set off against taxable profits under the rules of the system provided for by this Directive shall be carried forward in accordance with national corporate tax law.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 207 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 53 – paragraph 1
Losses incurred by the taxpayer which have not yet been set off against taxable profits under the rules of the system provided for by this Directive shall be carried forward in accordance with national corporate tax law.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 210 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 54 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Qualifying subsidiaries shall be all immediate and lower-tier subsidiaries in which the parent company holds the following rights:more than 50% of the voting rights and of the rights giving entitlement to profit.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 211 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 54 – paragraph 1 – point a
a) a right to exercise more than 50% of the voting rights;deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 213 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 54 – paragraph 1 – point b
b) an ownership right amounting to more than 75% of the company’s capital or more than 75% of the rights giving entitlement to profit.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 216 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 54 – paragraph 2 – point b
b) entitlement to profit and ownership of capital shall be calculated by multiplying the interests held in intermediate subsidiaries at each tier. OAll ownership rights amounting to 75% or less held directly or indirectly by the parent company, including rights in companies resident in a third country, shall also be taken into account in the calculation.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 221 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 57 – paragraph 2
2. When the consolidated tax base is negative, the loss shall be carried forward and be set off againstto the following year and be deducted from the next positive consolidated tax base. When the consolidated tax base is positive, it shall be shared in accordance with Articles 86 to 102.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 222 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 57 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. When the negative consolidated tax base corresponds to the taxpayer's first tax year, it may be carried forward to the following three years, being deducted from the respective positive tax bases, where they exist. When the negative consolidated tax base corresponds to the taxpayer's second tax year, it may be carried forward to the following two years, being deducted from the respective positive tax bases, where they exist.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 227 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 58 – paragraph 2
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, a taxpayer shall become a member of a group on the date when the thresholds of Article 54 areis reached. The thresholds must be met for at least nine consecutive months, failing which a taxpayer shall be treated as if it had never having become a member of the group.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 240 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 66 – paragraph 1 – point a
a) if the taxpayer remains in the system provided for by this Directive but outside a group, the losses shall be carried forward and be set off according to Article 43;
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 242 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 66 – paragraph 1 – point c
c) if the taxpayer leaves the system, the losses shall be carried forward and be set off according to the national corporate tax law which becomes applicable, as if those losses had arisen while the taxpayer was subject to that law.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 245 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 68 – paragraph 1
Where a taxpayer which is the economic owner of one or more self-generated intangible assets leaves the group, an amount equal to the costs incurred in respect of those assets for research, development, marketing and advertising in the previous five years shall be added to the consolidated tax base of the remaining group members. The amount added shall not, however, exceed the value of the assets on the departure of the taxpayer from the group. Those costs shall be attributed to the leaving taxpayer and shall be treated in accordance with national corporate tax law which becomes applicable to the taxpayer or, if it remains in the system provided for by this Directive, the rules of this Directive.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 251 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 72 – paragraph 1
Without prejudice to Article 75, revenue which is exempt from taxation under Article 11(c), (d) or (e) may be taken into account in determining the tax rate applicable to a taxpayer.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 254 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 73 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 11(c), (d) or (e) shall not apply where the entity which made the profit distributions, the entity the shares in which are disposed of or the permanent establishment were subject, in the entity’s country of residence or the country in which the permanent establishment is situated, to one of the following:
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 255 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 73 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) a tax on profits, under the general regime in that third country, at a statutory corporate tax rate lower than 420% of the average statutory corporate tax rate applicable in the Member States;
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 258 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 73 – paragraph 2
The average statutory corporate tax rate applicable in the Member States shall be published by the Commission annually. It shall be calculated as an arithmetic average. For the purpose of this Article and Articles 81 and 82, amendments to the rate shall first apply to taxpayers in their tax year starting after the amendment.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 260 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 75
Disallowance of exempt share disposals Where, as a result of a disposal of shares, a taxpayer leaves the group and that taxpayer has within the current or previous tax years acquired in an intra- group transaction one or more fixed assets other than assets depreciated in a pool, an amount corresponding to those assets shall be excluded from the exemption unless it is demonstrated that the intra-group transactions were carried out for valid commercial reasons. The amount excluded from exemption shall be the market value of the asset or assets when transferred less the value for tax purposes of the assets or the costs referred to in Article 20 relating to fixed assets not subject to depreciation. When the beneficial owner of the shares disposed of is a non-resident taxpayer or a non-taxpayer, the market value of the asset or assets when transferred less the value for tax purposes shall be deemed to have been received by the taxpayer that held the assets prior to the intra-group transaction referred to in the first paragraph.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 262 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 75 – paragraph 1
Where, as a result of a disposal of shares, a taxpayer leaves the group and that taxpayer has within the current or previous tax years acquired in an intra- group transaction one or more fixed assets other than assets depreciated in a pool, an amount corresponding to those assets shall be excluded from the exemption unless it is demonstrated that the intra-group transactions were carried out for valid commercial reasons.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 263 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 75 – paragraph 2
The amount excluded from exemption shall be the market value of the asset or assets when transferred less the value for tax purposes of the assets or the costs referred to in Article 20 relating to fixed assets not subject to depreciation.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 264 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 75 – paragraph 3
When the beneficial owner of the shares disposed of is a non-resident taxpayer or a non-taxpayer, the market value of the asset or assets when transferred less the value for tax purposes shall be deemed to have been received by the taxpayer that held the assets prior to the intra-group transaction referred to in the first paragraph.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 266 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 76 – paragraph 1
1. Where a taxpayer derives income which has been taxed in another Member State or in a third country, other than income which is exempt under Article 11(c), (d) or (e), a deduction from the tax liability of that taxpayer shall be allowed.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 267 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 76 – paragraph 4
4. In calculating the deduction, the amount of the income shall be decreased by related deductible expenses, which shall be deemed to be 20.5% thereof unless the taxpayer proves otherwise.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 268 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 76 – paragraph 5
5. The deduction for the tax liability in a third country may not exceed the final corporate tax liability of a taxpayer, unless an agreement concluded between the Member State of its residence and a third country states otherwise.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 272 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 81 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) a tax on profits is provided for, under the general regime in theat third country, at a statutory corporate tax rate lower than 420% of the average statutory corporate tax rate applicable in the Member States;
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 282 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 82 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) under the general regime in the third country, profits are taxable at a statutory corporate tax rate lower than 420% of the average statutory corporate tax rate applicable in the Member States, or the entity is subject to a special regime that allows for a substantially lower level of taxation than that of the general regime;
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 284 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 83 – paragraph 1
1. The income to be included in the tax base shall be calculated according to the rules of Articles 9 to 15. Losses of the foreign entity shall not be included in the tax base but shall be carried forward to the next tax year and taken into account when applying Article 82 in the subsequent years.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 285 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 83 – paragraph 4
4. Where the foreign entity subsequently distributes profits to the taxpayer, the amounts of income previously included in the tax base pursuant to Article 82 shall be deducted from the tax base when calculating the taxpayer’s liability to tax on the distributed income.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 288 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 86 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. The consolidated tax base shall be shared between the group members in each tax year on the basis of a formula for apportionment. In determining the apportioned share of a group member A, the formula shall take the following form, giving equal weight to the factors of sales, labour and assets: Apportioned share A = [1/3(A sales/group sales)+1/3(A payroll/group payroll)+1/3 (A assets/group assets)]*consolidated tax base
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 296 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 90 – paragraph 1
1. The labour factor shall consist, as to one half, of the total amount of the payroll of a group member as its numerator and the total amount of the payroll of the group as its denominator, and as to the other half, of the number of employees of a group member as its numerator and the number of employees of the group as its denominator. Where an individual employee is included in the labour factor of a group member, the amount of payroll relating to that employee shall also be allocated to the labour factor of that group member.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 297 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 90 – paragraph 2
2. The number of employees shall be measured at the end of the tax year.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 300 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 91 – paragraph 1
1. EThe payroll relating to employees shall be included in the labour factor of the group member from which they receive remuneration.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 301 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 91 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Notwithstanding paragraph 1, where employees physically exercise their employment under the control and responsibility of a group member other than that from which they receive remuneration, those employees and the amount of payroll relating to them shall be included in the labour factor of the former.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 302 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 91 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point b
(b) the payroll relating to such employees represents at least 5% of the overall number of employeestotal amount of payroll of the group member from which they receive remuneration.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 303 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 91 a (new)
Article 91a – Limits applying to statutory corporate tax rates Statutory corporate tax rates under general regimes shall be between 25% and 35% in all Member States.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 323 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 104
Notice to opt 1. A single taxpayer shall opt for the system provided for by this Directive by giving notice to the competent authority of the Member State in which it is resident or, in respect of a permanent establishment of a non-resident taxpayer, that establishment is situated. In the case of a group, the principal taxpayer shall give notice, on behalf of the group, to the principal tax authority. Such notice shall be given at least three months before the beginning of the tax year in which the taxpayer or the group wishes to begin applying the system. 2. The notice to opt shall cover all group members. However, shipping companies subject to a special taxation regime may be excluded from the group. 3. The principal tax authority shall transmit the notice to opt immediately to the competent authorities of all Member States in which group members are resident or established. Those authorities may submit to the principal tax authority, within one month of the transmission, their views and any relevant information on the validity and scope of the notice to opt.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 326 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 104 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
A single taxpayer shall opt for the system provided for by this Directive by giving notice to the competent authority of the Member State in which it is resident or, in respect of a permanent establishment of a non-resident taxpayer, that establishment is situated. In the case of a group, the principal taxpayer shall give notice, on behalf of the group, to the principal tax authority.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 328 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 104 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Such notice shall be given at least three months before the beginning of the tax year in which the taxpayer or the group wishes to begin applying the system.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 330 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 104 – paragraph 2
2. The notice to opt shall cover all group members. However, shipping companies subject to a special taxation regime may be excluded from the group.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 332 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 104 – paragraph 3
3. The principal tax authority shall transmit the notice to opt immediately to the competent authorities of all Member States in which group members are resident or established. Those authorities may submit to the principal tax authority, within one month of the transmission, their views and any relevant information on the validity and scope of the notice to opt.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 336 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 105
Term of a Group 1. When the notice to opt has been accepted, a single taxpayer or a group, as the case may be, shall apply the system provided for by this Directive for five tax years. Following the expiry of that initial term, the single taxpayer or the group shall continue to apply the system for successive terms of three tax years unless it gives notice of termination. A notice of termination may be given by a taxpayer to its competent authority or, in the case of a group, by the principal taxpayer to the principal tax authority in the three months preceding the end of the initial term or of a subsequent term. 2. Where a taxpayer or a non-taxpayer joins a group, the term of the group shall not be affected. Where a group joins another group or two or more groups merge, the enlarged group shall continue to apply the system until the later of the expiry dates of the terms of the groups, unless exceptional circumstances make it more appropriate to apply a shorter period. 3. Where a taxpayer leaves a group or a group terminates, the taxpayer or taxpayers shall continue to apply the system for the remainder of the current term of the group.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 338 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 105 – paragraph 1
1. When the notice to opt has been accepted, a single taxpayer or a group, as the case may be, shall apply the system provided for by this Directive for five tax years. Following the expiry of that initial term, the single taxpayer or the group shall continue to apply the system for successive terms of three tax years unless it gives notice of termination. A notice of termination may be given by a taxpayer to its competent authority or, in the case of a group, by the principal taxpayer to the principal tax authority in the three months preceding the end of the initial term or of a subsequent term.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 342 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 105 – paragraph 2
2. Where a taxpayer or a non-taxpayer joins a group, the term of the group shall not be affected. Where a group joins another group or two or more groups merge, the enlarged group shall continue to apply the system until the later of the expiry dates of the terms of the groups, unless exceptional circumstances make it more appropriate to apply a shorter period.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 344 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 105 – paragraph 3
3. Where a taxpayer leaves a group or a group terminates, the taxpayer or taxpayers shall continue to apply the system for the remainder of the current term of the group.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 347 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 106
Information in the notice to opt The following information shall be included in the notice to opt: (a) the identification of the taxpayer or of the members of the group; (b) in respect of a group, proof of fulfilment of the criteria laid down in Articles 54 and 55; (c) identification of any associated enterprises as referred to in Articles 78; (d) the legal form, statutory seat and place of effective management of the taxpayers; (e) the tax year to be applied. The Commission may adopt an act establishing a standard form of the notice to opt. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 131(2).deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 350 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 106 – paragraph 1
The following information shall be included in the notice to opt: (a) the identification of the taxpayer or of the members of the group; (b) in respect of a group, proof of fulfilment of the criteria laid down in Articles 54 and 55; (c) identification of any associated enterprises as referred to in Articles 78; (d) the legal form, statutory seat and place of effective management of the taxpayers; (e) the tax year to be applied.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 352 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 106 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the identification of the taxpayer or of the members of the group;deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 353 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 106 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) in respect of a group, proof of fulfilment of the criteria laid down in Articles 54 and 55;deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 354 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 106 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) identification of any associated enterprises as referred to in Articles 78;deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 355 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 106 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) the legal form, statutory seat and place of effective management of the taxpayers;deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 356 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 106 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) the tax year to be applideleted.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 357 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 106 – paragraph 2
The Commission may adopt an act establishing a standard form of the notice to opt. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 131(2).deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 361 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 107
Control of the notice to opt 1. The competent authority to which the notice to opt is validly submitted shall examine whether, on the basis of the information contained in the notice, the group fulfils the requirements of this Directive. Unless the notice is rejected within three months of its receipt, it shall be deemed to have been accepted. 2. Provided that the taxpayer has fully disclosed all relevant information in accordance with Article 106, any subsequent determination that the disclosed list of group members is incorrect shall not invalidate the notice to opt. The notice shall be corrected, and all other necessary measures shall be taken, from the beginning of the tax year when the discovery is made. Where there has not been full disclosure, the principal tax authority, in agreement with the other competent authorities concerned, may invalidate the original notice to opt.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 364 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 107 – paragraph 1
1. The competent authority to which the notice to opt is validly submitted shall examine whether, on the basis of the information contained in the notice, the group fulfils the requirements of this Directive. Unless the notice is rejected within three months of its receipt, it shall be deemed to have been accepted.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 366 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 107 – paragraph 2
2. Provided that the taxpayer has fully disclosed all relevant information in accordance with Article 106, any subsequent determination that the disclosed list of group members is incorrect shall not invalidate the notice to opt. The notice shall be corrected, and all other necessary measures shall be taken, from the beginning of the tax year when the discovery is made. Where there has not been full disclosure, the principal tax authority, in agreement with the other competent authorities concerned, may invalidate the original notice to opt.deleted
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 419 #

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 133 – paragraph 1
The Commission shall, five years after the entry into force of this Directive, review its application and report to the Council on the operation of this Directive. The report shall in particular include an analysis of the impact of the mechanism set up in Chapter XVI of this Directive and the national rates applied on the distribution of the tax bases between the Member States.
2011/12/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1 #

2011/0014(COD)

Proposal for a decision
Recital 5 a (new)
(5a) Article 8 of the Agreement establishing the EBRD provides that its resources are to be used exclusively to implement its purpose and carry out its functions, in accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Agreement, in Central and Eastern European countries. If the recipient countries of the EBRD's support is extended, the Agreement, which was approved by the Board of Governors, would have to be amended.
2011/04/05
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 2 #

2011/0014(COD)

Proposal for a decision
Article 1
The European Union shall subscribe 27 013 additional callable shares of EUR 10 000 each in the EBRD under the terms and conditions of Resolution 128 of the Board of Governors, the text of which is attached to this Decision. The Board and the President of the EBRD shall be accountable to the European Parliament for the use of the allocated funds in accordance with Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union and shall guarantee full transparency concerning financial intermediary lending for small and medium enterprises.
2011/04/05
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 321 #

2011/0006(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – point 4 – point -a (new)
Directive 2009/138/EC
Article 35 – paragraph 2 – point a – point i
-a) Paragraph 2(a)(i) is replaced by the following: ‘ i) at predefined periods, on the basis of the timely collection of information with a view to effective supervision;’
2011/09/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 323 #

2011/0006(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – point 4 – point ab (new)
Directive 2009/138/EC
Article 35 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
(ab) In paragraph 2, the following subparagraph is added: ‘Member States shall require insurance and reinsurance companies to supply the supervisory authorities with a full list of assets, detailed one by one.’
2011/09/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 328 #

2011/0006(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – point 4 – point -ac (new)
Directive 2009/138/EC
Article 35 – paragraph 4 – point c a (new)
(ac) In paragraph 4, the following indent is added: (ca) ‘it must observe a periodicity that is compatible with effective supervision, preferably quarterly.’
2011/09/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 408 #

2011/0006(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – point 29
Directive 2009/138/EC
Article 135 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the identification, measurement, monitoring, managing and internal reporting of risks arising from investments in relation to the first subparagraph of Article 132(2);
2011/09/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 409 #

2011/0006(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – point 29
Directive 2009/138/EC
Article 135 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) the identification, measurement monitoring, managing and internal reporting of specific risks arising from investment in derivative instruments and assets referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 132(4).
2011/09/23
Committee: ECON
Amendment 66 #

2010/2303(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Stresses that directors must devote sufficient time to the performance of their dutiesexercise their duties in full time, which should be monitored by national supervisory bodies;
2011/01/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 115 #

2010/2303(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 – point a (new)
24a. Calls on the Commission to change the current relationship between external auditors and financial institutions, which is required in order to solve a conflict of interest, insofar auditing firms provide a service that is paid by the audited firm; supervisors should select, and contract, external auditors and collect the cost of auditing from financial institutions;
2011/01/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 2 #

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas CRAs are information intermediaries, which aim to reducinge information asymmetries in the capital markets and facilitating global market access, reducing information costs and widening the potential pool of borrowers, thus providing liquidity to markets and helping find prices,
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 19 #

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas the industry’s key problem is lack of competition and the regulatory system’s key problem is dependency on external credit ratingsrelates to the reliability of its assessments, a problem which is worsened by its ologopolistic character,
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 27 #

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital Fa (new)
Fa. whereas the key problem of the regulatory system is its overdependence on external credit ratings,
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 31 #

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital I
I. whereas the recent developments in the euro crisis have highlighted the significant role of sovereign debt ratingating agencies' assessments of several EU Member States' sovereign debt have played a significant role in the evolution of the euro crisis and the increased burden on the taxpayer in various Member States,
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 46 #

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that, in the light of the change in the nature of credit ratings, where the issuer is rated to get a preferential treatment under a regulatory framework rather than to gain access to the global capital markets, the over-reliance of the global financial regulatory system on credit ratings has to be reduced as far as possible and in a realistic timeframe;
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. AskUrges the European Central Bank and the national central banks to review their use of external ratings, and urges them to build up expertise in devising their own models to assess the credit standard of eligible assets used as collateral for liquidity-providing operations, andin order to reduce their reliance on external ratings and ultimately, within a realistic time-frame, dispense with them;
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Calls for the establishment of a fully independent European Con the Commission to undertake an impact and viability assessment regarding the establishment of a European public foundation with the task of carrying out credit Rrating Foundation (ECRaF) whichs, which would be independent of the Member States, the Commission and the Council and would expand its expertise into all three sectors of ratingthe private ratings sectors;
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 90 #

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Believes that the start-up financing costs to cover the first three years of the ECRaF’s work need to be carefully calculated; that these initial costs should take the form of a lump-sum capital payment and should be provided by the financial services industry with the involvement of both users and issuers; asks the Commission to produce a detailed impact assessment and cost estimate for the necessary financing in this respect; considers that the new ECRaF should be fully self-sufficient after the three-year start-up period;Deleted
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 98 #

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Considers that, to ensure its credibility, the management, staff and governance structure of the new ECRaF need to be fully autonomous vis-à-vis the Member States, the Commission and all other public bodies;Deleted
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 112 #

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Sees a potential need to support the initial set-up of such a network but considers that the network ought to be self-sufficient and profitable from its own revenue; asks the Commission to assess the necessity and potential means of start-up financing and possible legal structures for this project;Deleted
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 154 #

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Considers that, as almost all inRecognises that ratings of sovereign debt are the outcome of a mixture of statistical analyses based on a country's record and the formulation on sovereigns is available in the public domain, larger and more sophisticated market players should use internal models to assess sovereign credif a subjective opinion on its future; the first are public and are available to investors who, in the case in point, have enough of an institutional dimension to make use of internal assessment methods; the second are subjective in nature and cannot be reduced to a calculus of probabilities. The Commission is therefore recommended to propose that the Member State should cease to resort to the private ratings sector for the assessment of their debt risksues;
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 3 #

2010/2300(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
2. Recalls that clearly defined, widely supported and closely monitored indicators are essential in order to demonstrate the concrete effects of budget support in third countries, and that the relevant budgetary authorities should be updated regularly on the indicators and guidelines that shape the decision-making process in relation to budget support; underlines that these indicators must be better tailored to the specific needs of partner countries in order to avoid the ‘one size fits all’ approach taken by the Commission, which is potentially counter-productive; underlines that indicators must be focused particularly on combating poverty and the fulfilling of the Millenuium Development Goals (using the MDGs indicators) including crosscutting themes as gender equity and access to universal energy and potable water; stresses the added value for Europe of a successful development aid which might have as a result important savings of EU funds when migration flows are reduced at the place of origin; emphasizes therefore that EU developement funds should first of all finance small local and regional projects as economic and infrastructure developments that support people directly;
2011/03/15
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 6 #

2010/2300(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
3. Takes the view that financing decisions on budget support must be driven not only by expected benefits but also by the short- and long-term risks, as for example, the possibility of political changes or consequences of climate change, incurred in both donor and partner countries; notes that the Court of Auditors, in its Special Report1 , is in full agreement with this assessment by highlighting that a sound risk management framework is still to be developed and implemented;
2011/03/15
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 10 #

2010/2300(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
4. Considers effective mutual accountability to be a cornerstone of budget support and a prerequisite for its sustainability: not only should governments in both donor and partner countries be fully accountable domestically, but it is equally important that governments, parliamentarians and citizens on both sides are accountable to their respective counterparts, whether the latter be donors or recipients; takes the view, in this connection, that further efforts should be made to enhance public awareness in donor and partner countries of the scope and results of budget support; and proposes therefore to install open and transparent mechanisms to ensure that every citizen, NSA or LA is able to monitor the budget during its realization;
2011/03/15
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 12 #

2010/2300(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
5. Is firmly convinced that a thorough analysis of the future of EU budget support to third countries must address the issue of budgetisation of the European Development Fund; is aware of the historical and institutional background to the current situation, but believes that the time has come for the Council, the Member States and the ACP countries to acknowledge that this state of affairs is detrimental to the efficiency, transparency and accountability of EU budget support; underlines the necessity of full transparency in order to ensure that EU development funds finance the intended programmes and to avoid that EU funds are turned aside; rejects fully that EU development funds are derived to support military actions;
2011/03/15
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 15 #

2010/2300(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
6. Calls on the Member States and the Commission, in line with the practice established in other policy fields, to improve the coordination of their respective budget support to third countries in order to avoid potential or existing overlaps, inconsistencies and incoherencies, which are all the more unacceptable in a context of scarce funding; maintains that a focus on specific areas offering the greatest added value should drive EU budget support throughout all phases of preparation and delivery; asks for a sound cooperation between the EP Committees to enhance the coordination of their policies concerning third countries to avoid inconsistencies as for example between trade restrictions, agricultural agreements and development aid; maintains that a focus on specific areas offering the greatest added value should drive EU budget support throughout all phases of preparation and delivery to create the personal, technological, infrastructural and financial capacity to eradicate poverty and start their (beneficiaries') independent sustainable development as soon as possible;;
2011/03/15
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 93 #

2010/2004(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
39. Emphasises that the systematic cuts made to these programmes by the other branch of the budgetary authority are unjustified and have a counterproductive effect on theonly become meaningful when linked with the negative assessment of programmes that affect development of a 'Europe for citizens’of citizens'; urges the Commission to provide detailed information about problems of content, execution or overlap in the different programmes subject of cuts;
2010/02/26
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 107 #

2010/2004(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44
44. Points out that the EU is currently mobilising all its resources, in addition to existing programmes, in order to support peace-building and reconstruction efforts in conflict zones, namely Georgia, Afghanistan, the Middle East and sub- Saharan Africa, and that it considers it unacceptable to trade existing priorities for new ones;
2010/02/26
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 5 #

2010/2003(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Reiterates its conviction that interinstitutional cooperation is essential to exchange best practices and explore further the scope for improving effectiveness and efficiency and, where possible and appropriate, finding savings and sharing resources better; believes that useful gains could also be made by extending this concept to other areas which have not so far been considered in this context, such as EMAS, non-discrimination policies, possibilities to use open software with sufficient safety guarantees and teleworking; points out that efforts should continue in areas already under consideration such as for example translation capacity and recruitment (EPSO); recommends that the Institutions consider introducing a centralised purchasing policy;
2010/02/25
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 8 #

2010/2003(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Stresses the fundamental challenge of managing a certain number of uncertainties for the 2011 budget, as indicated below, which will make precise forecasts and budgeting extremely difficult until the very late stages of the procedure when these have become better known; requests that its relevant bodies and the administration make available, in due time, a set of basic scenarios that can facilitate the final political decisions through a better understanding of the corresponding financial consequences;
2010/02/25
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 17 #

2010/2003(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Notes that, on the basis of the decision approved in the Manka report (A7-0037/ 2009), a report on the application of the system for travel reimbursements must be presented in time for it to be able to affect the budget for 2011;
2010/02/25
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 18 #

2010/2003(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Recalls that wider cost implications should always be assessed in relation to new measures introduced such as, for example, when deciding on staff and assistants schemes in both 2010 and 2011; underlines especially that if additional assistants were to be recruited in Brussels, this would have an impact on the situation regarding office space, which is already stretched; considers that the March presentation of the medium-term buildings strategy for its three places of work is crucial;
2010/02/25
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 24 #

2010/2003(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 c (new)
11c. Considers that the March presentation of the medium-term buildings strategy for its three places of work is crucial; underlines that the recruitment of additional assistants in Brussels will have an impact on the already very limited office space available;
2010/02/25
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 25 #

2010/2003(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 d (new)
11d. Stresses that a detailed case-by-case assessment of the buildings strategy must be made available to the competent budgetary authorities in time for them to be able to take the necessary decisions;
2010/02/25
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 42 #

2010/2002(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Notes, for the first time, the inclusion of payment appropriations for the European Globalisation Fund, and considers this an important element in the overall reflection on the management and visibility of this fund; notes that the use of a transfer for the EGF should mean a speedier process, and calls for the need for the further simplification of the practical modalities of the procedure, as mentioned on the report from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council on the functioning of the Interinstitutional Agreement on the Budgetary discipline and sound financial management of 27 April 2010;
2010/05/12
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 92 #

2010/2002(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 a new
36a. Notes with satisfaction the overall increase in payment appropriations for the fundamental rights and justice item, but regrets the reduction in payment appropriations for the budget heading on fundamental rights and citizenship in spite of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, the Union's obligation to accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the Commission's Green Paper on a Citizens' Initiative; notes furthermore the stagnation of the budget of the Union's Agency for Fundamental Rights Agency;
2010/05/12
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 93 #

2010/2002(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 b new
36b. Calls on the Commission and Council to allocate a specific budget - separate from that of the European Data Protection Supervisor - for safeguarding personal data and privacy, having regard to public awareness of this and to Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; very much deplores the fact that, despite the non-existence of a Commission legislative proposal, a budget heading has been introduced, with a significant funding allocation, albeit entered in the reserve, in order to establish an agency for the operational management of large-scale information technology systems;
2010/05/12
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 96 #

2010/2002(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
37. Takes note, in this respect, of the Commission's communication on an Action Plan to implement the Stockholm Programme, and welcomes, in the field of immigration and support for the integration of immigrants, the increase of the support for the integration of immigrants and the increase in CA for the DAPHNE programme (fight against violence) ; regrets the reduction of payment appropriations for the prevention and fight against crime and the lack of budgetary information on various measures and actions to protect children; deeply regrets that as the action plan of the Stockholm program proposed by the Commission the draft budget continues to focus on migration policies and on the monitoring and management of borders of the Union to the detriment of the promotion of justice and the protection and enhancement of civil liberties; regrets the proposed increase in CA for the External Borders Fund (254 million, +22 %) and the European Return Fund (114 million, + 29 %) ;
2010/05/12
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 105 #

2010/2002(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
39. DeplorNotes that pending the proposal for a Regulation on EUROPOL, EU agency financed on the Union's budget since 2010, foreseen in 2013, the level of appropriations for 2011 (82,9 million) is almost unchanged as compared to 2010 (79,7 million) although the Stockholm Programme called for a strengthening of EUROPOL;
2010/05/12
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 107 #

2010/2002(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
40. Notes that despite the timetable for development and entry into operation of the Schengen Information System II (SIS II) being uncertain, proposed CA decrease only slightly from 35 million to 30 million while payment appropriations increase from 19,5 million to 21 million; notes nevertheless satisfactorily the evolution compared to financial programming for SIS II and VIS (as planned in January 2010) when 112 million were programmed, whereas DB foresees only 51,2 million; deems necessary, as the perspective of a migration to SIS II grows unlikely and a replacement option is currently prepared, to hold in reserve a part of these funds instead pending further analysisand to conduct further precise analysis of the situation;
2010/05/12
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 138 #

2010/2002(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52
52. WelcomeRegrets the increase in appropriations for the CFSP to EUR 327.4 million (CA), as provided for in the financial programming and in line with the ever more ambitious role the EU wishes to play in zones undergoing a stabilisation process or affected by conflicts; takes note of the emptying of the budget line for EU Special Representatives, as provided for in connection with the setting up of the EEAS, and recalls that the specific provisions regarding the CFSP in the IIA will have to be substantially rethought in the framework of the negotiations on a revised IIA and of the adoption of a proposal on the EEAS;
2010/05/12
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 152 #

2010/2002(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 54
54. NoteRegrets that total administrative expenditure for all institutions is estimated at EUR 8 266.6 million, i.e. an increase of 4.5%, leaving a margin of EUR 149 million;
2010/05/12
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 55 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
(1) The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union, as provided for by the Treaty, should entail compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices has as its objectives sustainable growth, employment and high standards of social rights. These objectives are such as to justify economic coordination taking account of measures to contain inflation, sound public finances and monetary conditions, and a sustainablthe balance of payments.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 76 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3
(3) In particular, surveillance of the economic policies of the Member States should be broadened beyond budgetary surveillance to prevent excessive macroeconomic imbalances and help the Member States affected devise corrective plans before divergences become entrenched. This broadening of the economic surveillance framework should go in parallel with deepening of fiscal surveillancewithin the Union.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 96 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
(6) This procedure should rely onestablish an alert mechanism for early detection of emerging macroeconomic imbalances. It should be based on use of an indicative and transparent scoreboard combined with economic and social judgment.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 99 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
(7) TIf the scoreboard is to function effectively as a basis for better macroeconomic surveillance, it should consist of a limited set of economic and, financial and social indicators relevant to detection of macroeconomic imbalances, with corresponding indicative thresholds which should not be seen as economic policy imperatives. The composition of the scoreboard mayshould evolve in time, inter alia due to evolving threats to macroeconomic stability or enhanced availability of relevant statisticso as to take account of the evolutionary character of macroeconomic imbalances, notably via the introduction of new indicators or thresholds or the modification of the existing ones.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 109 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) The crossing of one or more indicative thresholds need not necessarily imply that macroeconomic imbalances are emerging, as economic policy-makinganalysis should take into account inter- linkages between macroeconomic variables. Economic judgment should ensure thatThe scoreboard should not be used mechanically: the interpretation of imbalances should make use of all pieces of information, whether they are from the scoreboard or not, areduly put in perspective and becommade part of a comprehensive analysis.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 115 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) Based on the multilateral surveillance procedure and the alert mechanism, the Commission should, by means of a preliminary assessment, identify the Member States to be subject to an in-depth review. The realisation of this review should not presume the existence of excessive macroeconomic imbalances or that their causes are purely internal to the Member States concerned. The in-depth review should encompass a thorough analysis of sources of imbalances inand the capacity of the Member State under review. It should be discussed to deal within the Council and the Euro Group for the Member States whose currency is the eurom. The preliminary assessment should be considered as a normal procedure at the diagnostic stage.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 127 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) When assessing imbalances, account should be taken of their causes, of their severity, of the degree to which they may be considered unsustainable and of the potential negative economic and, financial and social spillovers to other Member States. The economic adjustment capacity and the track record of the Member State concerned as regards compliance with earlier recommendations issued under this RegulationIt is necessary to determine whether the imbalances are structural or short-term in nature and whether their causes lie in national, Community or external factors. It is also necessary to take account of the interrelations between Member States' political choices and otheir recommendations issued under Article 121 of the Treaty as part of multilateral surveillance, in particularcollateral effects. Finally, also to be taken into account are the economic adjustment capacity and the track record of the Member State concerned as regards compliance with the broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union, should also be considered and the consequences of those recommendations.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 133 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11 a (new)
(11a) Assessment of imbalances should take account of the objectives of the growth and employment strategy, as well as the need to use that strategy as an instrument for sustainable internal cohesion, contributing to making the Union the world's most competitive economy. Account must be taken of the medium-term growth objectives and of those fixed for the primary current account balance.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 141 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) If macroeconomic imbalances are identified, recommendations should be addressed to the Member State concerned to provide guidance on, suggesting appropriate policy responsguidelines. The policy response of the Member State concerned to imbalancethose recommendations should be timely and should use all available policy instruments under the control of public authorities. It should be tailored to the specific environment and circumstances of the Member State concerned and cover the main economic policy areas, potentially including fiscal and wage policies, labour markets, product and services markets and financial sector regulationinvolve all the main interested parties at national level, notably the national parliament. In this dialogue, the parties should recognise the specific environment and circumstances of the Member State concerned and should aim at the medium- and long-term convergence of its macroeconomic policy, establishing objectives falling under a Union strategy for sustainable growth and employment.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 207 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2
2. The scoreboard shall be made up of an array of macroeconomic and, macrofinancial indicators for Member States. Tand social indicators and should permit the Ccommission may set indicative lower or upper thresholds fparison of short-, medium- and long-term trends between the different Member States. For these indicators, to serve as alert levels. The thresholds applicable to Member States whose currency ihe Commission shall set indicative and symmetrical thresholds twhe euro may be different from those applicable to the other Member Statere relevant, to serve as alert levels.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 221 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. The indicators shall reflect trends in the three main economic sectors in each Member State – goods and services, labour and capital – and their repercussions for social cohesion.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 232 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. The Commission shall adopt, by means of delegated acts, pursuant to Article 12a and subject to the conditions set out in Articles 12b and 12c, measures determining the list of relevant indicators which should be included in the scoreboard. This list shall include all of the following indicators: (a) internal imbalances, including private debt/public debt and their evolution; and the evolution of asset prices, with particular attention to property and the financial markets; (b) external imbalances, including the composition, present state and evolution of the current account balance; the evolution of the market share of exports on EU and third-country markets; and the net state of external assets; (c) the evolution of the internal market, including a mobile average of comparative real growth over a five-year period; an indicator of growth and employment trends, including product energy consumption and public and private R & D investment; and the flow of foreign direct investment in the EU and third countries; (d) social imbalances, including indicators for income inequality, the prevalence of low wages, workers under the poverty threshold, unemployment rates, the participation of wages in national income and unit profit rates.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 254 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2
2. The release of the updated scoreboard shall be accompanied by a Commission report containing an economic and, financial and social assessment putting the movement of the indicators into perspective, drawing if necessary on any other economic and financial indicator relevant to detection of imbalances. The report shall also indicate whether the crossing of lower or upper thresholds in one or more Member States signifies thea possible emergence of imbalances in the Member State in question, another Member State or the Union as a whole. All available information shall be taken into account and conclusions shall not be drawn from the scoreboard .
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 262 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 3
3. The report shall identify Member States that the Commission considers tomay be affected by, or at risk of, serious macro- economic and social imbalances.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 271 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1
1. Taking account of the discussions in the European Parliament, the Council and the Euro Group, as provided for in Article 4(4), the Commission shall prepare an in- depth review for each Member State it considers could be affected by, or at risk of, imbalances. This assessment shall constitute a standard procedure and shall include an evaluation of whether the Member State in question is affected by imbalances, and of whether these imbalances constitute excessive imbalances. are excessive and of how serious they are. The in-depth assessment shall be based on detailed investigation of the specific circumstances of each Member State and its links with the other Member States, and in a very broad spread of economic and social variables. This assessment shall be undertaken in conjunction with the surveillance missions to the country concerned in accordance with Article 12 and shall yield appropriate recommendations, taking due account of the principle of subsidiarity.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 282 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point a a (new)
(aa) the origin of the imbalances identified, including the deep trade and financial inter-linkages between the Member States and the spill-over effect of national economic policies on the Union and the euro area, in which case the Commission shall recommend appropriate measures, taking due account of the principle of subsidiarity.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 304 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. The Council shall decide whether it is necessary to make fresh recommendations, on the basis of a Commission report on the reply sent to it by the Member States concerned.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 318 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2
2. The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, may adopt recommendations in accordance with Article 121(4) of the Treaty declaring the existence of an excessive imbalance and recommendingsuggesting that the Member State concerned to take correctiveadopt an action plan. Those recommendations shall set out the nature of the imbalances and specify the corrective action to be taken in detail and the deadline within which the Member State concerned must take such corrective actionhat the Council thinks needs to be taken and the deadline within which it should be implemented. The Council may, as provided for in Article 121(4) of the Treaty, make its recommendations public.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 330 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1
1. Any Member State for which an excessive imbalance procedure is opened shall submit a corrective, after consulting its national Parliament, submit an action plan to the Council and the Commission within a deadline to be defined in the recommendations in accordance with Article 7. The corrective actionat plan shall set out the specific and concrete policy actionmeasures the Member State concerned has implemented or intends to implement and shall include a timetable for implementation thereof.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 333 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. The action plan shall be compatible with the pact on sustainable growth and employment and with the economic and social convergence programmes.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 343 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1
1. The Commission shall monitor implementation of the recommended corrective action and of the corrective action plan by the Member State concerned. For this purpose, the Member State shall report to the Council and the Commission at regular intervals in the form of progress reports whose frequency shall be established by the Council in the recommendation referred to in Article 7(2).
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 348 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Following a progress report by the Member State, the appropriate Commissioner and the Chair of the Euro Group (where appropriate) shall present a report to the European Parliament.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 359 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 3
3. The Commission may carry out surveillance missions to the Member State concerned to monitor implementation of the correctivthe action plan.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 374 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 4
4. Where it concludes that the Member State has not taken the recommended corrective acimplemented the Council's recommendations, the Councillatter, on a recommendation from the Commission, shall adopt or amend the revised recommendations in accordance with Article 7, on a recommendation from the Commission, setting another deadline for corrective action by when another assessment in accordance with this Article shall be conductedif necessary setting a new deadline.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 380 #

2010/0281(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 5
5. Where the Council, on the basis of the recommendation by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 4, concludes that the Member State has takenimplemented the recommended corrective actionations suggested or, if it has not done so, has presented satisfactory results as far as the correction of the imbalances is concerned, the excessive imbalance procedure shall be held in abeyance.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 74 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
(1) The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union, as provid is geared byto the Treaty, should entail compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices,objectives of sustainable growth, employment and a high level of social rights. These objectives mean that economic coordination should take account of controlling inflation and ensuring sound public finances and monetary conditions, and a sustainables well as a sound balance of payments.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3
(3) The Stability and Growth Pact is based on the objectivIn the name of sound governmentpublic finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for pricnd controlling inflation, the sStability and for strong sustainable growth underpinned by financial stability and conducive to employment creationGrowth Pact condemned the European Union to years of mediocre development, high levels of unemployment and a worsening of its internal imbalances.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
(4) The preventive part of thecurrent Stability and Growth Pact requires that Member States should achieve and maintain a medium- term budgetshould be replaced by a new Pact that places the creation of skilled jobs in the context of an economy that respects social rights and the environment at the centre of economic policy. The preventive paryt objective and submit stability and convergence programme to that effect. f this new Pact requires that the Union and Member States should coordinate their policies and channel public investment towards these objectives.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 94 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
(5) The content of the stability and convergence programmes as well as the criteria for their examination should further be adapted in the light of the expreation of a Sustainable Growth and Employment Pact entails the drawing- up of Economic and Social Converigence gained with the implementation of the Stability and Growth PactProgrammes in each Member State.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 121 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 a (new)
(5a) Until such time as the European Union has a Sustainable Growth and Employment Pact, a framework for enhanced economic governance will be created that is geared to achieving these objectives, and to preventing and correcting the appearance of excessive macroeconomic, macrofinancial and social imbalances within the Union. This framework will be based on the presupposition that the Member States regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and that they coordinate them among themselves. Given that this is a framework for shared governance, decisions will be adopted by the Council on a proposal from the Commission. Those institutions undertake to respect the principle of transparency, which means that their decisions must be reasoned and made public.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 122 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 b (new)
(5b) Strengthening economic governance should go hand in hand with reinforcing the democratic legitimacy of economic governance in the Union, which should be achieved through a closer and more timely involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments throughout the economic policy coordination procedures.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 123 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 c (new)
(5c) The European semester in which the Union's framework for economic governance is implemented should play a vital role in implementing the requirement under Article 121(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) that Member States regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and that they coordinate them accordingly. Transparency and independent oversight are an integral part of enhanced economic governance. The Council and the Commission should make public and set out the reasons for their positions and decisions at all stages of the framework for economic governance and of macroeconomic imbalance or excessive deficit procedures.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 125 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 d (new)
(5d) The framework for enhanced economic governance will be created as part of the 'European semester' and should: (a) define annual guidelines for a job- creating sustainable growth strategy across the Union, by formulating Broad Economic Policy Guidelines in accordance with Article 121(2) TFEU; (b) establish concerted action to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances under the amended Regulation (EU) No .../2011; (c) carry out the effective prevention and correction of excessive public finance imbalances under this Regulation (EC) No 1467/97; (d) organise enhanced financial market regulation and supervision, including macro-prudential supervision by the European Systemic Risk Board; (e) establish a permanent and credible financial crisis resolution mechanism that enables Member States to protect the revival of their respective economies, as well as social cohesion and convergence policies, against speculative attacks on their sovereign debts.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 126 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 e (new)
(5e) In the 'European semester', documents relating to the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the respective assessment should be debated by the European Parliament before being adopted by the Council. Likewise, the main documents originating from the Member States and containing national economic and budgetary policy commitments should be voted on by the respective parliaments before being submitted to the Council, in order to guarantee democratic legitimacy and the subsidiarity principle in a context of enhanced economic governance. By 31 December 2011 the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission will conclude a procedural agreement on parliamentary involvement that will be revised by 2014 in line with the experience gained.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 131 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
(6) Adherence to the medium-term budgetary objective of budgetary positions should allow Member States to have a safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP reference value in order to ensure rapid progress towards sustainability and to havensure sustainable public finances or clear progress in this direction. This objective should ensure room for budgetary manoeuvre, in particular to takinge into account the needs of public investment. The setting of prudent medium-term budgetary objectives should not prevent the adoption of an active budgetary policy where this may be necessary to combat a recession.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 143 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7 a (new)
(7a) More account should be taken of an assessment of the sustainability of public finances, in particular the debt level, the structure of debt duration and its dynamics when assessing the pace of convergence towards the medium-term budgetary objectives.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 147 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8 a (new)
(8a) National budgetary frameworks should be consistent with the objectives of multilateral supervision in the Union and should be integrated in an Economic and Social Convergence Programme previously assessed by the social partners and approved by the Member State parliament before being forwarded to the Commission.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 149 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) Prudent fiscal policy-making implies that the growth rate of government expenditure does normally, without interest payments on public debt, should not exceed a prudent medium-term growth rate of GDP, increases in excess of that norm are matched by discretionary increases in government revenues and discretionary revenue reductions are compensated by reductions in expenditure.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 167 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
(10) A temporary departure from prudent fiscal policy-making shouldwill be allowed in case of severe economic downturn of a general nature, or even recession, in order to facilitate economic recovery.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 171 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) In the event of a significant deviation from prudent fiscal-policy a warning should be addressed to the Member State concerned and in case the significant deviation persists or is particularly serious, a recommendation should be addressed to the Member State concerned to take the necessary corrective measures. . Where this deviation persists and can be explained by causes directly attributable to governance, a recommendation should be addressed to the Member State concerned to take action. The European Parliament may invite the Member State concerned to explain its decisions and policies in this respect before its competent committee.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 190 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) In order to ensure compliance with the fiscal surveillance framework of the Union for participating Member States, a specific enforcement mechanism should be established on the basis of Article 136 of the Treaty for cases where a persistent and significant deviation from prudent fiscal policy making prevails. Nevertheless, its application should take account of the current economic situation in the Member State concerned and all other relevant factors.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 192 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12 a (new)
(12a) This Regulation should enter into force as soon as possible after its adoption. When applying it, the Commission should take account of the current economic situation in the Member State concerned or the Union as a whole, and all other relevant factors.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 198 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point - 1 (new)
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 1
[Current text of Article 1(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97:-1. Article 1 is replaced by the following: 'Article 1 Article 1 This Regulation sets out the rules covering the content, the submission, the examination and the monitoring of stability programmes and convergence programmes as part of multilateral surveillance by the Council so as to prevent, at an early stage, the occurrence of excessive general government deficits and debt and to promote the surveillance and coordination of economic policies.]
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 209 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – 1 b (new)
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 2 –aa (new) (in Section 1-A)
Article 2 -aa The multilateral surveillance by the Council shall be conducted as part of the European semester for economic and social policy coordination. The semester shall be the period during which the institutions of the Union and the Member States coordinate the economic policy guidelines that they define and carry out their multilateral surveillance. The framework for enhanced economic governance to be implemented in the European semester shall: (a) define the outlines of a job-creating sustainable growth strategy across the Union, by formulating Broad Economic Policy Guidelines in accordance with Article 121(2) TFEU; (b) establish concerted action to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances under Regulation (EU) No .../2011; (c) carry out the effective prevention and correction of excessive public finance imbalances under Regulation (EC) No 1467/97; (d) organise enhanced financial market regulation and supervision, including macro-prudential supervision by the European Systemic Risk Board; (e) establish a permanent and credible financial crisis resolution mechanism. Without prejudice to the adoption of an active budgetary policy where necessary, the European Parliament and the national parliaments shall be duly involved in the semester in order to increase transparency, ownership and accountability in relation to the decisions taken and documents adopted. In order to ensure an adequate involvement of the European Parliament, a procedural agreement between the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the Commission shall be concluded by 31 December 2011. That procedural agreement shall be reviewed every three years and amended where appropriate.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 219 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 1 c(new) – point a (new)
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 2a – paragraph 1
[Current text of Article 2a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/971c. Article 2a is amended as follows: (a) the first paragraph is replaced by the following: "Each Member State shall have a differentiated medium-term objective for its budgetary position. These country- specific medium-term budgetary objectives may diverge from the requirement of a close to balance or in surplus position. They shall provide a safety margin with respect to the 3 % of GDP government deficit ratio; they shall ensureat objective shall provide a safety margin with respect to the 3 % of GDP government deficit ratio, without taking account of interest payments on debt. Each medium- term budgetary objective shall ensure the sustainability of public finances or permit rapid progress towards such sustainability and, taking this into account, they shallwhile allowing room for budgetary manoeuvre, considering in particular the needs for public investment.]"
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 230 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 1 d (new)
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Section 1A a (new)
1d. The following section is inserted: "SECTION 1Aa NATIONAL OWNERSHIP Article 2aa Participating Member States shall establish a medium-term budgetary framework, with a fiscal planning horizon of at least three years, which shall commit them to a medium-term budgetary objective. Each of the participating Member States shall submit proposals on the medium- term budgetary framework to their respective parliament. Where there has been no such parliamentary approval, this shall be specified in the Economic and Social Convergence Programme. Member States shall take into account guidance and recommendations from the Council and the Commission, in particular when preparing their budgets, and appropriately involve national parliaments in the economic policy coordination procedures. When submitting the draft budget to the national parliament, Member States shall also submit any opinions or recommendations issued by the Council or the Commission, in the event of significant deviation from prudent fiscal policy making as referred to in Article 5(1) of this Regulation."
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 235 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – subpoint a
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 3 – paragraph 1
1. Each participating Member State shall submit to the Council and Commission information necessary for the purpose of multilateral surveillance at regular intervals under Article 121 of the Treaty in the form of a stability programme, which provides an essential basis for price stability and for strongn economic and social convergence programme, which defines measures geared to the objectives of sustainable growth conducive to and employment creation.'
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 249 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – subpoint b – subpoint i c (new)
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 3– paragraph 2 – point b
[Current text of(ic) Article 3(2)(b) Regulation (EC) No 1466/97is replaced by the following: "(b) the main assumptions about expected economic developments and important economic variables which are relevant to the realisation of the stability programme, such as government investment expenditure, real gross domestic product (GDP) growth, employment and inflation.] Those assumptions must be consistent with the European System of Accounts."
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 270 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – subpoint c
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 3 – paragraph 3
3. The information about the paths for the general government balance and debt ratio, the growth of government expenditure, the planned growth path of government revenue at unchanged policy, the planned discretionary revenue measures, the growth path and the main economic assumptions referred to in paragraph 2(a) and (b) shall be on an annual basis and shall cover, the preceding year, the current year and at least the following three years.'
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 273 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Based on assessments by the Commission and the Economic and Financial Committee, the Council shall, within the framework of multilateral surveillance under Article 121 of the Treaty, examine the medium-term budgetary objectives and the expected path of the debt ratio presented by the Member States concerned, assess whether the economic assumptions on which the programme is based are plausible, whether the adjustment path towards the medium-term budgetary objective is appropriate and whether the measures being taken or proposed to respect that adjustment path are sufficient to achieve the medium-term budgetary objective over the cycle.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 282 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
The Council, when assessing the adjustment path toward the medium-term budgetary objective, shall examine if the Member State concerned pursues an appropriate annual improvement of its cyclically-adjusted budgetprimary balance, net of one-off and other temporary measures, required to meet its medium-term budgetary objective, with 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark. For Member States with a high level of debt or excessive macroeconomic imbalances or both, the Council shall examine whether the annual improvement of the cyclically-adjusted budgetprimary balance, net of one-off and other temporary measures is higher than 0.5% of GDP. The Council shall take into account whether a higher adjustment effort is made in economic good times, whereas the effort may be more limited in economic bad times.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 309 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4 – point b
(b) for Member States that have not yet reached their medium-term budgetary objective, the annual expenditure growth does not exceed a rate below a prudent medium-term rate of GDP growth, unless the excess is matched by discretionary revenue measures. The size of the shortfall of the growth rgrowth of its primary balance must be lower than thate of government expenditure compared to athe prudent medium-term rate of GDP growth is set in such a way as to. This difference between rates should ensure an appropriate adjustment towards the medium-term budgetary objective, with out prejudice to the implementation of an active budgetary policy when necessary;
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 314 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4 – point c
(c) discretionary reductions of government revenue items are matched either by expenditure cuts or by discretionary increases in other government revenue items or both.delete
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 327 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 6
When defining the adjustment path to the medium-term budgetary objective for Member States that have not yet reached this objective and in allowing a temporary deviation from this objective for Member States that have already reached it, under the condition that an appropriate safety margin with respect to the deficit reference value is preserved and that the budgetary position is expected to return to the medium-term budgetary objective within the programme period, the Council shall take into account the implementation of major structural reforms which have direct long-term cost- saving effects, including by raising potential growth, and therefore a verifiable impact on the long-term sustainability of public finances.delete
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 336 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 7
Special attention shall be paid to pension reforms introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar. Member States implementing such reforms shall be allowed to deviate from the adjustment path to their medium-term budgetary objective or from the objective itself, with the deviation reflecting the net cost of the reform to the publicly managed pillar, under the condition that the deviation remains temporary and that an appropriate safety margin with respect to the deficit reference value is preserved.delete
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 347 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 8
The Council shall furthermore examine whether the contents of the stabilityeconomic and social convergence programme facilitates the achievement of sustainedobjectives of convergence within the euro area, closer coordination of economic policies and whether the economic policies of the Member States concerned are consistent witmatch the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 362 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 2
2. The Council shall carry out the examination of the stabilitymmission shall examine the economic and social convergence programme within at most three months of the submission of the programme. The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission and after consulting the Economic and Financial Committee, shall, if necessary, deliver an opinion on the programme. Where the Council, in accordance with Article 121 of the Treaty,After consulting the Economic and Financial Committee, the Commission shall inform the Council. Should the latter considers that the objectives and the content of the programme should be strengthened with particular reference to prudent fiscal-policy making, ithe Council shall, in its opinion, invite the Member State concerned to adjust its programmect accordingly.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 378 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – first subparagraph
In the event of a significant deviation from prudent fiscal-policy making referred to in the fourth subparagraph of Article 5(1) of this Regulation, and in order to prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit, the Commission, in accordance with Article 121(4) of the Treaty may address a warning to the Member State concerned. This warning shall be made public and the European Parliament may invite the Member State concerned to appear before the appropriate parliamentary committee to justify the policies adopted. Two months after the warning, the Council shall adopt a recommendation, establishing a deadline for correcting the deviation, on the basis of a Commissi0on proposal, in accordance with Article 121 of the TFEU. The Council shall make public the position it has adopted. The Commission shall monitor the measures provided for in the recommendation, in the context of the surveillance visits carried out in accordance with Article 6A, and shall draw up a report for the Council. The report shall be made public. If the Member State concerned does not take action within the deadline laid down in the recommendation drawn up by the Council, the Council shall adopt a fresh recommendation, pointing out the Member State’s non-compliance. The Member State concerned must then adopt an action plan, endorsed by its parliament, putting forward action with a view to securing the results to which it committed itself in the framework of the European Semester. On a proposal from the Commission, the Council shall, at the same time, submit a formal report to the European Council The process, which began with the recommendation by the Council, shall conclude with the assessment of the results in the following European Semester.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 395 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
The deviation shall not be considered if the Member State concerned has significantly overachieved the medium- term budgetary objective, taking into account the presence of excessive macroeconomic imbalances, and the budgetary plans laid out in the stability programme do not jeopardise this objective over the programme period.delete
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 403 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 6 – paragraph 3
3. In the event that the significant deviation from prudent fiscal-policy making persists or is particularly serious, the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, shall address a fresh recommendation to the Member State concerned to take the necessary adjustment measures. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall make the recommendation public and the European Parliament may ask the Member State concerned to appear before the appropriate Parliamentary Committee to explain the decisions and policies adopted.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 411 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 6 – subpoint a
1. Each Member State with a derogation shall submit to the Council and the Commission information necessary for the purpose of multilateral surveillance of regular intervals under Article 121 of the Treaty in the form of a convergence programme, which provides an essential basis for price stability and for strongwill implement the measures aimed at achieving the objectives of sustainable growth conducive toand employment creation.'
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 436 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 6 – subpoint c
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 7 – paragraph 3
3. The information about the paths for the general government balance and debt ratio, the growth of government expenditure, the planned growth path of government revenue at unchanged policy, the planned discretionary revenue measures, the growth path and the main economic assumptions referred to in paragraph 2(a) and (b) shall be on an annual basis and shall cover the preceding year, the current year and at least the following three years.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 450 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
The Council, when assessing the adjustment path toward the medium-term budgetary objective, shall take into account whether a higher adjustment effort is made in economic good times, whereas the effort may be more limited in economic bad timesexamine whether the Member State concerned is pursuing an appropriate annual improvement of its cyclically adjusted balance, net of one-off and other temporary measures, required to meet its medium-term budgetary objective. For Member States with a high level of debt or excessive macroeconomic imbalances or both, the Council shall examine whether the annual improvement of the cyclically- adjusted budgetprimary balance, net of one-off and other temporary measures is higher than 0.5% of GDP. For ERM2 Member States, the Council shall examine if the Member State concerned pursues an appropriate annual improvement ofThe Council shall take into account whether a higher adjustment effort its cyclically adjusted balance, net of one-off and other temporary measures, required to meet its medium-term budgetary objective, with 0.5% of GDP as a benchmarkmade in economic good times, whereas the effort may be more limited in economic bad times.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 462 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4 – introductory part
Fiscal-policy making shall be considered prudent and thereby conducive to the achievement of the medium-term budgetary objective and its maintenance over time, without prejudice to the adoption of an active budgetary policy when necessary, if the following conditions are satisfied:
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 470 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4 – point a
(a) for Member States that have achieved the medium-term budgetary objective, annual expenditurthe rate of annual primary balance growth does not exceed a prudent medium-term rate of GDP growth, unless the excess is matched by discretionary revenue measures;
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 473 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4 – point b
(b) for Member States that have not yet reached their medium-term budgetary objective, the annual expenditure growth does not exceed a rate below a prudent medium- term rate of GDP growth, unless the excess is matched by discretionary revenue measures. The size of the shortfall of the growth rate of government expenditure compared to a prudent medium-term rate of GDP growth is set in such a way as to ensure an appropriate adjustment towards the medium-term budgetary objectivegrowth rate of their primary balance should be lower than the prudent medium-term rate of GDP growth. This difference between rates should ensure an appropriate adjustment towards the medium-term budgetary objective, without prejudice to the implementation of an active budgetary policy when necessary;
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 487 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 6
When defining the adjustment path to the medium-term budgetary objective for Member States that have not yet reached this objective and in allowing a temporary deviation from this objective for Member States that have already reached it, under the condition that an appropriate safety margin with respect to the deficit reference value is preserved and that the budgetary position is expected to return to the medium-term budgetary objective within the programme period, the Council shall take into account the implementation of major structural reforms which have direct long-term cost- saving effects, including by raising potential growth, and therefore a verifiable impact on the long-term sustainability of public finances.delete
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 495 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 7
Special attention shall be paid to pension reforms introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar. Member States implementing such reforms shall be allowed to deviate from the adjustment path to their medium-term budgetary objective or from the objective itself, with the deviation reflecting the net cost of the reform to the publicly managed pillar, under the condition that the deviation remains temporary and that an appropriate safety margin with respect to the deficit reference value is preserved.delete
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 544 #

2010/0280(COD)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 9
3. In the event that the significant deviation from prudent fiscal policy making persists or is particularly serious, the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, shall address a recommendation to the Member State concerned to take the necessary adjustment measures. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall make the recommendation public.'delete
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 33 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
The European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 35 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 d (new)
(1d) The economic governance framework should be compatible and be at the service of the Union's strategy for sustainable growth and job creation.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 41 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 e (new)
(1e) Strengthening economic governance should go hand in hand with reinforcing its legitimacy in the Union, which should be achieved through a closer and more timely involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments throughout the economic policy coordination procedures, in documents and in particular in decisions of principle.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 f (new)
(1f) The European semester in which the framework for economic governance is implemented should play a vital role in implementing the requirement under Article 121(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) that Member States regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and that they coordinate them in that respect. Transparency and independent oversight are an integral part of enhanced economic governance. The Council and the Commission should make public and state the reasons for their positions and decisions at all stages of the framework for economic governance.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 48 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
(1) The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union, as provided for by the Treaty, should entail compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices, is geared to the objectives of sustainable growth, employment and a high level of social rights. These objectives mean that economic coordination should take account of controlling inflation, and sound public finances and monetary conditions, and a sustainables well as balances of payments.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 57 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 c (new)
(1c) The framework for enhanced economic governance to be implemented in the European semester shall: (a) define the outlines of a job-creating sustainable growth strategy across the Union, by formulating Broad Economic Policy Guidelines in accordance with Article 121(2) TFEU; (b) establish concerted action to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances under the amended Regulation (EU) No .../2011; (c) carry out the effective prevention and correction of excessive public finance imbalances under Regulation (EC) No 1467/97; (d) organise enhanced financial market regulation and supervision, including macro-prudential supervision by the European Systemic Risk Board; (e) establish a permanent and credible financial crisis resolution mechanism that enables Member States to protect the revival of their respective economies, as well as social cohesion and convergence policies, against speculative attacks on their sovereign debts.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 60 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 a (new)
(1a) In the name of sound public finances and controlling inflation, the Stability and Growth Pact condemned the European Union to years of mediocre growth, high levels of unemployment and a worsening of its main internal imbalances.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 b (new)
(1b) Until such time as the European Union has a Sustainable Growth and Employment Pact, a framework for enhanced economic governance will be created that is geared to achieving these objectives, and to preventing the occurrence of excessive macroeconomic, macrofinancial and social imbalances within the Union. This framework will be based on the presupposition that the Member States regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and that they coordinate them among themselves. Given that this is a framework for shared governance, decisions will be adopted by the Council on a proposal from the Commission. Those institutions undertake to respect the principle of transparency, which means that their decisions must be reasoned and made public.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 62 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 g (new)
(1g) In order to ensure the transparency of the procedure for coordinating Member States' policies in the European semester and guarantee that the subsidiarity principle is respected, the European Parliament may invite a Member State to explain the decisions and policies adopted before its competent committee.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 63 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 h (new)
(1h) In the 'European semester', documents prepared by the Commission relating to the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the respective assessment should be debated by Parliament before being adopted by the Council. Likewise, the main documents originating from the Member States and containing national economic and budgetary policy commitments should be voted on by the respective parliaments before being submitted to the Council, in order to guarantee democratic legitimacy and the subsidiarity principle in a context of enhanced economic governance. By 31 December 2011 Parliament, the Council and the Commission will conclude a procedural agreement on parliamentary involvement, which will be revised by 2014 in line with the experience gained.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 64 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 i (new)
(1i) The annual policy recommendations by the Commission should be discussed in the European Parliament before being decided on in the Council.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 65 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 j (new)
(1j) Without prejudice to their rights and obligations under the TFEU, the Member States whose currency is not the euro should have the right to participate in the framework for economic governance and apply the corresponding legislation.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 88 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
(6) Enforcement of Regulation (EU) No […/…]4 should be strengthened by establishing fines for Member States whose currency is the euro in case of repetitive non-compliance with the recommendations to address excessive macroeconomic imbalances.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 98 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
(7) Macroeconomic imbalances are likely to generate undue fluctuations in public revenues and spending throughout the economic cycle, affecting headline figures and distorting the picture for fiscal planning and decision-making. Inappropriate fdistorting the assumed fiscal figures. Fiscal policy choicies based on distorted trendfaulty assumptions could weaken, and possibly compromise, the sustainability of public finances. If unchecked, fiscal and other macroeconomic imbalances have the potential to reinforce each other and possibly to jeopardise the proper functioning of economic and monetary union. For these reasons a system of correction of macroeconomic imbalances should contribute to the budgetary discipline ofthe creation of a framework for economic governance that makes it possible to coordinate the economic policies of divergent Member States should contribute to the mitigation of asymmetric shocks, to growth that creates jobs and to the sustainability of public finances, particularly in the Member States whose currency is the euro.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 101 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) Repeated failure to comply with Council recommendations to address excessive macroeconomic imbalances should, as a rule, be subject to a yearly fine, until the Council establishes that the Member State has taken corrective action to comply with its recommendations.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 107 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) Moreover, repeated failure of the Member State to draw up a corrective action plan to address the Council recommendations should be equally subject to a yearly fine as a rule, until the Council establishes that the Member State has provided a corrective action plan that sufficiently addresses its recommendations.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 115 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
(10) To ensure equal treatment between Member States, the fine should be identical for all Member States whose currency is the euro and equal to 0.1% of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the Member State concerned in the preceding year.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 123 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) The procedure for the application of the fines on the Member States which fail to take effective measures to correct macroeconomic imbalances should be construed in such a way that the application of the fine on those Member States would be the rule and not the exception.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 134 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) The collected fines should be distributed between Member States whose currency is the euro which are neither the subject of an excessive imbalance procedure nor have an excessive deficit.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 142 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) The power to adopt individual decisions for the application of the fine provided for in this Regulation should be conferred on the Council. As part of the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States conducted within the Council as specified in Article 121(1) of the Treaty, these individual decisions are an integral follow-up to the measures adopted by the Council in accordance with Article 121 of the Treaty and Regulation (EU) No […/…].deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 144 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
(14) Since this Regulation contains general rules for effective enforcement of Regulation (EU) No […/…], it should be adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure referred to in Article 121(6) of the Treaty.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 145 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
(15) Since an effective framework for detection and prevention of macroeconomic imbalances cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States because of the deep trade and financial inter-linkages between Member States and the spillover effects of national economic policies on the Union and the euro area as a whole and can be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in the same Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 151 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1
1. This Regulation sets out a system of fines for effective correction of macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 168 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3
A yearly fine shall be imposed by the Council, acting on a proposal by the Commission, if: (1) two successive deadlines have been set in accordance with Articles 7(2) and 10(4) of Regulation (EU) No […/…], and the Council thereafter concludes in accordance with Article 10(4) of that Regulation that the Member State concerned has still not taken the recommended corrective action, or if (2) two successive deadlines have been set in accordance with Articles 8(1) and 8(2) of Regulation (EU) No […/…], and the Council thereafter concludes in accordance with Article 8(2) of that Regulation that the Member State concerned has again submitted an insufficient corrective action plan.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 188 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
The decision shall be deemed adopted by the Council unless it decides, by qualified majority, to reject the proposal within ten days the Commission adopting it. The Council may amend the proposal in accordance with Article 293(1) of the Treaty.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 193 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2
2. The yearly fine to be proposed by the Commission shall be 0.1% of the GDP of the Member State concerned in the preceding year.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 204 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 3
3. By derogation from paragraph 2, the Commission may, on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned addressed to the Commission within ten days of adoption of the Council conclusions referred to in paragraph 1, propose to reduce the amount of the fine or to cancel it.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 211 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 4
4. If a Member State has paid a yearly fine for a given calendar year and the Council thereafter concludes, in accordance with Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) No […/…] that the Member State has taken the recommended corrective action in the course of the given year, the fine paid for the given year shall be returned to the Member State pro rata temporis.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 232 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4
Fines collected in accordance with Article 3 of this Regulation shall constitute other revenue, as referred to in Article 311 of the Treaty, and shall be distributed, in proportion to their share in the total gross national income (GNI) of the eligible Member States, between Member States whose currency is the euro and which are not the subject of an excessive imbalance procedure within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No […/…] and do not have an excessive deficit as determined in accordance with Article 126(6) of the Treaty.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 244 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1
For the measures referred to in Article 3, only members of the Council representing Member States whose currency is the euro shall vote and the Council shall act without taking into account the vote of the member of the Council representing the Member State concerned.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 248 #

2010/0279(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2
A qualified majority of the members of the Council mentioned in the previous paragraph shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 63 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
(2) The Treaty allows the adoption of specific measures in the euro area which go beyond the provisions applicable to all Member States, on the Functioning of the European Union and the Regulations relating to the Stability and Growth Pact established an excessive deficit procedure which is founded on a process of multilateral dialogue, in which supervision and surveillance are carried out by the Commission, which proposes recommendations to the Council. The experience acquired from the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure indicates that the Council and Commission should make their decisions public, in such a way as to ensure effective peer pressure, and likewise that there is a need for the European Parliament to invite Member States with budgetary difficulties to appear before the purpose of ensuring the proper functioning of economic and monetary unionrelevant committee and explain the decisions they have adopted Under the excessive deficit procedure, the Member States undertake to abide by their multilateral commitments with regard to the budgetary targets they undertook to meet, as well as the new targets in case of non-compliance. However, it is also understood that the commitment to the sustainable public finances objective does not prejudice the principle of subsidiarity, which means that the choice of policies and actions to achieve these objectives are the strict responsibility of the Member States.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 96 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3
(3) Additional sanctions are necessary to make the enforcement of budgetary surveillance more effective in the euro area. Those sanctions should enhance the credibility of the fiscal surveillance framework of the UnionThe European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 105 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
(4) The rules laid down by this Regulation should ensure fair, timely, graduated and effective mechanisms for compliance with the preventive and the corrective parts of the Stability and Growth Pact, in particular Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies and Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 125 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
(5) Sanctions for Member States whose currency is the euro in the preventive part of the Stability and Growth Pact should provide incentives for prudent fiscal policy-making. Such policy-making should ensure that the growth rate of government expenditure does not normally exceed a prudent medium-term growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP), unless the excess is matched by increases in government revenues or discretionary revenue reductions are compensated by reductions in expenditure.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 135 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
(6) Prudent fiscal policy-making should effectively achieve and maintain the medium-term budgetary objective. Adherence to the medium-term objective for budgetary positions should allow Member States to have a safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP reference value for the government deficit, to ensure rapid progress towards sustainability, and at the same time to have room for budgetary manoeuvre, in particular taking into account the needs for public investment.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 141 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
(7) In the preventive part of the Stability and Growth Pact, the incentive for prudent fiscal policy-making should consist of an obligation to lodge an interest-bearing deposit temporarily imposed on a Member State whose currency is the euro that is making insufficient progress with budgetary consolidation. This should be the case when, following an initial warning from the Commission, a Member State persists in conduct which, while not amounting to a violation of the ban on excessive deficits, is imprudent and potentially detrimental to the smooth functioning of economic and monetary union, and the Council therefore issues a recommendation in accordance with Article 121(4) of the Treaty.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 147 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) The interest-bearing deposit imposed should be released to the Member State concerned with the interest accrued on it once the Council has been satisfied that the situation giving rise to the obligation to lodge that deposit has come to an end.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 149 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) In the corrective part of the Stability and Growth Pact, sanctions for Member States whose currency is the euro should take the form of an obligation to lodge a non-interest-bearing deposit linked to a Council decision establishing the existence of an excessive deficit and the obligation to pay a fine in the event of non-compliance with a Council recommendation to correct an excessive government deficit. These sanctions should be imposed irrespective of whether or not an interest-bearing deposit has previously been imposed on the Member State concerned.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 150 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
(10) The size of the interest-bearing deposit, of the non-interest-bearing deposit and of the fine provided for in this Regulation should be set in such a way as to ensure a graduation of sanctions in the preventive and corrective parts of the Stability and Growth Pact and to provide sufficient incentives for the Member States whose currency is the euro to comply with the fiscal framework of the Union. The fine linked to Article 126(11) of the Treaty as specified in Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is composed of a fixed component that equals 0.2% of GDP and of a variable component. Thus, graduation and equal treatment between Member States are ensured if the interest- bearing deposit, the non-interest-bearing deposit and the fine specified in this Regulation are equal to 0.2% of GDP, the size of the fixed component of the fine linked to Article 126(11) of the Treaty.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 158 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) A possibility should be provided for the Council to reduce or to cancel the sanctions imposed on Member States whose currency is the euro on the basis of a Commission proposal following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned. In the corrective part of the Stability and Growth Pact, the Commission should also be able to propose to reduce the size of a sanction or to cancel it on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 163 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) The non-interest-bearing deposit should be released upon correction of the excessive deficit while the interest on such deposits and the fines collected should be distributed among Member States whose currency is the euro which do not have an excessive deficit and which are not the subject of an excessive imbalance procedure either.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 171 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) The power to adopt individual decisions implementing the sanction mechanisms set out in this Regulation should be conferred on the Council. As part of the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States conducted within the Council as specified in Article 121(1) of the Treaty, these individual decisions are an integral follow-up to the measures adopted by the Council in accordance with Articles 121 and 126 of the Treaty and Regulations (EC) No 1466/97 and (EC) No 1467/97.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 173 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
(14) Since this Regulation contains general rules for the effective enforcement of Regulations (EC) No 1466/97 and (EC) No 1467/97, it should be adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure referred to in Article 121(6).deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 175 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
(15) Since the objective to create a uniform sanction mechanism cannot be sufficiently achieved at the level of the Member States, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective,deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 187 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1
Subject matter and scope 1. This Regulation sets out a system of sanctions for enhancing the enforcement of the preventive and corrective parts of the Stability and Growth Pact in the euro area. 2. This Regulation shall apply to Member States whose currency is the euro.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 200 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2
Definitions For the purpose of this Regulation: (1) 'the preventive part of the Stability and Growth Pact' means the multilateral surveillance system as organised by Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of July 1997; (2) 'the corrective part of the Stability and Growth Pact' means the procedure for the control of Member States’ excessive deficit as regulated by Article 126 of the Treaty and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997; (3) 'exceptional economic circumstances' means circumstances where an excess of a government deficit over the reference value is considered exceptional within the meaning of the second indent of Article 126(2)(a) of the Treaty and as specified in Regulation (EC) No 1467/97.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 220 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3
Interest-bearing deposit 1. If the Council addresses to a Member State a recommendation in accordance with Article 121(4) of the Treaty to take the necessary adjustment measures in the event of persisting or particularly serious and significant deviations from prudent fiscal policy-making as laid down in Article 6(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, the lodging of an interest bearing deposit shall be imposed by the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission. The decision shall be deemed to be adopted by the Council unless it decides by qualified majority to reject the proposal within ten days of the Commission adopting it. The Council may amend the proposal in accordance with Article 293(1) of the Treaty. 2. The interest-bearing deposit to be proposed by the Commission shall amount to 0.2% of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the Member State concerned in the preceding year. 3. The deposit shall bear the interest rate reflecting the Commission credit risk and the relevant investment period. 4. By derogation from paragraph 2, the Commission, following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned addressed to the Commission within ten days of adoption of the Council recommendation referred to on paragraph 1, may propose to reduce the amount of the interest- bearing deposit or to cancel it. 5. If the situation giving rise to the recommendation referred to in paragraph 1 no longer subsists, the Council, on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, shall decide that the deposit and the interest accrued thereon are returned to the Member State concerned. The Council may amend the Commission proposal in accordance with Article 293(1) of the Treaty.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 246 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4
Non-interest-bearing deposit 1. If the Council decides in accordance with Article 126(6) of the Treaty that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the lodging of a non-interest-bearing deposit shall be imposed by the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission. The decision shall be deemed to be adopted by the Council unless it decides by qualified majority to reject the proposal within ten days of the Commission adopting it. The Council may amend the proposal in accordance with Article 293(1) of the Treaty. 2. The non-interest-bearing deposit to be proposed by the Commission shall amount to 0.2% of the GDP of the Member State concerned in the preceding year. 3. If the Member State has an interest- bearing deposit lodged with the Commission in accordance with Article 3, the interest-bearing deposit shall be converted into a non-interest-bearing deposit. If the size of the previously lodged interest-bearing deposit and of the interest accrued exceeds the size of the required non-interest-bearing deposit, the outstanding amount shall be returned to the Member State. If the size of the required non-interest- bearing deposit exceeds the size of the previously lodged interest-bearing deposit and the interest accrued thereon, the Member State shall make up the outstanding amount when it lodges the non-interest-bearing deposit. 4. By derogation from paragraph 2 of this Article, the Commission may, on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned addressed to the Commission within ten days of adoption of the Council decision in accordance with Article 126(6) of the Treaty, propose to reduce the amount of the non-interest- bearing deposit or to cancel it.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 264 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5
1. If the Council decides in accordance with Article 126(8) of the Treaty that the Member State has not taken effective action in response to a Council recommendation within the period laid down, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, shall decide that the Member State shall pay a fine. The decision shall be deemed adopted by the Council unless it decides by qualified majority to reject the proposal within ten days of the Commission adopting it. The Council may amend the proposal in accordance with Article 293(1) of the Treaty. 2. The fine to be proposed by the Commission shall amount to 0.2% of the GDP of the Member State concerned in the preceding year. 3. If the Member State has a non-interest- bearing deposit lodged with the Commission in accordance with Article 4, the non-interest-bearing deposit shall be converted into the fine. If the size of the previously lodged non- interest-bearing deposit exceeds the size of the required fine, the outstanding amount shall be returned to the Member State. If the size of the required fine exceeds the size of the previously lodged non-interest- bearing deposit, or if no non-interest- bearing deposit has been previously lodged, the Member State shall make up the outstanding amount when it pays the fine. 4. By derogation from paragraph 2 of this Article, the Commission may, on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned addressed to the Commission within ten days of adoption of the Council decision in accordance with Article 126(8) of the Treaty, propose to cancel or to reduce the amount of the fine.Fine deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 287 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6
Return of the non-interest-bearing deposit If the Council decides in accordance with Article 126(12) of the Treaty to abrogate some or all of its decisions, any non- interest-bearing deposit lodged by the Member State with the Commission shall be returned to the Member State concerned.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 288 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7
Distribution of the interest and fines The interest earned by the Commission on deposits lodged in accordance with Article 4 and the fines collected in accordance with Article 5 shall constitute other revenue referred to in Article 311 of the Treaty, and shall be distributed, in proportion to their share in the gross national income of the eligible Member States, among Member States whose currency is the euro which do not have an excessive deficit as determined in accordance with Article 126(6) of the Treaty and which are not the subject of an excessive imbalance procedure within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No […/…].deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 299 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8
Voting within the Council For the measures referred to in Articles 3, 4 and 5, only members of the Council representing Member States whose currency is the euro shall vote and the Council shall act without taking into account the vote of the member of the Council representing the Member State concerned. A qualified majority of the members of the Council mentioned in the previous paragraph shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 307 #

2010/0278(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9
Entry into force This Regulation shall enter into force on the [xx] day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the Member States in accordance with the Treaties.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #

2010/0277(NLE)


Recital 1 a (new)
1a. Experience gained during the first decade of functioning of the economic and monetary union shows a need for an improved economic governance framework in the Union, which should be built on a stronger national ownership of commonly agreed rules and policies and on a more robust governance at the Union level of national economic policies.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 85 #

2010/0277(NLE)


Recital 12
12. Considering the documented effectiveness of rules-based budgetary frameworks of the Member States in promoting budgetary discipline, strong national fiscal rules that are consistent with the budgetary objectives at the level of the Union must be a cornerstone of the strengthened budgetary surveillance framework of the Union. Fiscal rules are more likely to be effective if set at a national level, so as to take account of national considerations and ensure ownership. Best practices suggest that fiscal rules should avoid a backwards- looking perspective, which may not properly account for 'one-off' payments, or receipts, and therefore may not necessarily give an accurate indication of future behaviour. Strong fiscal rules should be equipped with well-specified target definitions together with mechanisms for effective and timely monitoring. In addition, policy experience has shown that for numerical rules to work effectively, consequences must be attached to non-compliance, where the costs involved may be simply reputational.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 119 #

2010/0277(NLE)


Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) numericational fiscal rules, which establish a permanent constraint on the conduct of fiscal policy expressed in terms of a summary indicator of budgetary performance, such as the government budget deficit, borrowing, debt, or a major component thereof;
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 145 #

2010/0277(NLE)


Chapter 4 – title
Numericational fiscal rules
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 146 #

2010/0277(NLE)


Article 5 – paragraph 1
Member States shall have in place numerical fiscal rules that effectively promote compliance with their respective obligations deriving from the Treaty in the area of budgetary policy. Such rules shall include in particular: (a) compliance with the reference values on deficit and debt set in accordance with the Treaty; (b) the adoption of a multi-annual fiscal planning horizon, including respect of the medium-term budgetary objectives.deleted
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 151 #

2010/0277(NLE)


Article 6 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Without prejudice to the Treaty provisions of the budgetary surveillance framework of the Union, numericational fiscal rules shall contain specifications on the following elements:
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 159 #

2010/0277(NLE)


Article 6 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Without prejudice to the provisions of the TFEU on the budgetary surveillance framework of the Union, national fiscal rules for participating Member States shall contain specifications that address the following elements: (a) the target definition and scope of the rules; (b) effective and timely monitoring of compliance with the rules, by independent national budget offices or institutions acting in the field of budgetary policy; (c) consequences in the event of non- compliance, including stricter public disclosure and public justifications; (d) escape clauses, setting out a limited number of specific and exceptional circumstances in which temporary non- compliance with the rule is permitted. The activation of escape clauses referred to in point (d) is to be disclosed and justified in a transparent and timely manner.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 161 #

2010/0277(NLE)


Article 7 – paragraph 1
The annual budget legislation of the Member States shall reflect the constraints imposed by their numericational fiscal rules in force.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 176 #

2010/0277(NLE)


Article 12 – paragraph 1
1. All sub-sectors of general government shall be covered by numericational fiscal rules.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 184 #

2010/0277(NLE)


Article 14 a (new)
Article 14a Three years after the transposition date referred to in Article 14 the Commission shall publish a general report assessing the implementation of provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. The report shall evaluate, inter alia, the effectiveness of: (a) the requirement for cash-based fiscal data to all sub-sectors of government; (b) the accuracy of macro-economic forecasts following ex-post evaluation; (c) the design and effectiveness of fiscal rules; (d) the design and effectiveness of fiscal institutes; (e) the general level of transparency of government finances.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 54 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 1
(1) The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States, as provid within the Union is geared byto the Treaty, should entail compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices,objectives of sustainable growth, job creation and a high level of protection and social rights. These objectives mean that economic coordination should take account of controlling inflation and ensuring sound public finances and monetary conditions, and a sustainables well as a sound balance of payments.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 70 #

2010/0276(CNS)

(3) The Stability and Growth Pact is based on the objective of sound government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for pricIn the name of sound public finances and controlling inflation, the sStability and for strong sustainable growth underpinned by financial stability and conducive to employment creationGrowth Pact condemned the EU to years of mediocre growth, high levels of unemployment and a worsening of its main internal imbalances.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 74 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 3 a (new)
(3a) Until such time as the EU has a Sustainable Growth and Employment Pact, a framework for enhanced economic governance will be created that is geared to achieving these objectives and to preventing and correcting the appearance of excessive macroeconomic, macrofinancial and social imbalances within the Union. This framework will be based on the presupposition that the Member States regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and that they coordinate them among themselves. Given that this is a framework for shared governance, decisions will be adopted by the Council on a proposal from the Commission.Those institutions undertake to respect the principle of transparency, which means that their decisions must be reasoned and made public.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 3 b (new)
(3b) The framework for enhanced economic governance will be created as part of the 'European semester' and should: a) define annual guidelines for a job- creating sustainable growth strategy across the Union, by formulating Broad Economic Policy Guidelines in accordance with Article 121(2) TFEU; b) establish concerted action to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances under the amended Regulation (EU) No .../2011; c) carry out the effective prevention and correction of excessive imbalances in public finances under this Regulation (EC) No 1467/97; d) organise enhanced financial market regulation and supervision, including macroprudential supervision by the European Systemic Risk Board; e) establish a permanent and credible financial crisis resolution mechanism that enables Member States to protect the revival of their respective economies, as well as social cohesion and convergence policies, against speculative attacks on their sovereign debts.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 76 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 3 c (new)
(3c) In the 'European semester', documents prepared by the Commission relating to the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the respective assessment should be debated by Parliament before being adopted by the Council. Likewise, the main documents originating from the Member States and containing national economic and budgetary policy commitments should be voted on by the respective parliaments before being submitted to the Council, in order to guarantee democratic legitimacy and the subsidiarity principle in a context of enhanced economic governance. By 31 December 2011 Parliament, the Council and the Commission will conclude a procedural agreement on parliamentary involvement, which will be revised by 2014 in line with the experience gained.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 77 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 4
(4) The common framework for enhanced economic governance requires to be enhanced, including with regard to budgetary surveillance, in line withimprovement in its budgetary aspect, in order to reflect both the lessons of the latest financial, economic and social crisis and the high degree of integration achieved by Member States economies within the European Union, and particularly in the euro area.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 111 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 5
(5) The rules on budgetary discipline should be strengthened in particular by giving a more prominent role to the level and evolution of debt and overall sustainability.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 120 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 6
(6) Implementing the existing excessive deficit procedure on the basis of both the deficit criterion and the debt criterion requires defining a numerical benchmark against which to assess whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pacehas been based on a numerical benchmark ratio for the deficit and debt aligned with gross domestic product; this criterion, applied mechanically, has proved to be counterproductive or simply unusable, especially in times of crisis and recession.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 125 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 7
(7) The establishment of the existence of an excessive deficit based on the debt criterion and the steps leading to it should not be based solely on non-compliance with the numerical benchmark, but always take into account the whole range of relevant factors covered by the Commission report under Article 126(3) of the Treaty.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 134 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 8
(8) In the establishment of the existence of an excessive deficit based on, the deficitning criterion and the steps leading to it there is a need to take iwill in future be the ratio between the primary currento account the whole range of relevant factors covered by the report under Article 126(3) of the Treaty if the government debt to gross domestic product does not exceed the reference valuebalance and GDP, with a view to preserving the necessary safety margins for public investment policy, especially in those Member States having to deal with major economic difficulties and/or tending to diverge from the majority of the macroeconomic thresholds included in the reference indicators scoreboard for economic governance in the EU.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 139 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 8 a (new)
(8a) In the establishment of the existence of an excessive deficit based on the criterion of the ratio of the primary balance to GDP and in the steps leading to such a decision, there is a need to take into account the whole range of relevant factors examined by the Commission under Article 126(3) of the Treaty.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 141 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 8 b (new)
(8b) The framework for monitoring public and private debt should, for its part, support long-term growth and, in periods of crisis, serve to stimulate the economy on a basis of respect for Member States' specific needs and priorities.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 150 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 13
(13) It is appropriate to step up the application of the financial sanctions envisaged by Article 126(11) ofThe excessive debt procedure shall be based on a multilateral dialogue process in which the surveillance and monitoring functions fall to the Commission, which makes recommendations to the Council. Member States shall comply with the multilateral agreements concerning the numerical objectives which they have accepted, as well as new targets in case of non-compliance. However, the choice of policies and actions for the Treaty so that they constitute a real incentive for compliance with the notices under Article 126(9). lisation of those objectives shall be entirely their responsibility. In the excessive debt procedure, the Council and Commission shall make their decisions public in order to ensure effective peer pressure; similarly, Parliament may invite the Member State concerned to explain its decisions to the relevant committee. The current excessive debt procedure will not involve applying the financial sanctions permitted under Article 126(11) of the Treaty, since this would worsen the problems it purported to resolve.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 152 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 14
(14) In order to ensure compliance with the fiscal surveillance framework of the Union for participating Member States, rules-based sanctions should be designed on the basis of Article 136 of the Treaty, ensuring fair, timely and effective mechanisms for compliance with the Stability and Growth pact rules.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 157 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 14 a (new)
(14a) The more economically and politically sensitive recommendations shall take due account of the structure of the deficit and the national debt, the economic cycle (with the objective of avoiding procyclical fiscal policies), and the structural composition of public revenue, while safeguarding expenditure which is essential for policies fostering sustainable growth.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 164 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1– paragraph 1
1. This Regulation sets out the provisions to speed up and clarify the excessive deficit procedure, having as its objective to detercorrect excessive government deficits and, ifwhere they occur, to furt. Ther prompt their correction, where compliance with theesent budgetary discipline is examined on the basis of the government deficit and government debt criteriaprimary current account balance and the reference values for government debt arising from an economic policy that is coordinated at European level.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 169 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point a
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
1. The excess of a government deficitive character of the primary balance/GDP ratio over the reference value shall be considered exceptional, in accordance with the second indent of Article 126 (2) (a) of the Treaty, when resulting from an unusual event outside the control of the Member State concerned and which has a major impact on the financial position of general government, or when resulting from a severe economic downturn.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 178 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point b
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1a
1-A. When it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) is to be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with Article 126 (2) (b) of the Treaty if the differential with respect to the reference value has reduced over the previous three years at an average rate of the order of one-twentieth per year. For a period of 3 years from [the date of entering into force of this Regulation - to be inserted], account shall be taken of the backward-looking nature of this indicator in its application.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 193 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point c
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3
3. The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) of the Treaty shall take into account all relevant factors as indicated in that Article. The report shall appropriately reflect developments in the medium-term economic position (in particular potential growth, prevailing cyclical conditions, inflation, excessive macroeconomic imbalances) and developments in the medium-term budgetary position (in particular, fiscal consolidation efforts in ‘good times’, public investment, the implementation of policies in the context of the common growth strategy for the Union and the overall quality of public finances, in particular, compliance with Councilthe Directive […] on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States). The report shall also analyse developments in the medium- term debt position as relevant (in particular, it appropriately reflects risk factors including the maturity structure and currency denomination of the debt, stock-flow operations, accumulated reserves and other government assets; guarantees, notably linked to the financial sector; liabilities both explicit and implicit related to ageing and private debt to the extent that it may represents a contingent implicit liability for the government). Furthermore, the Commission shall give due consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess in qualitative terms the excess over the reference value and which the Member State has put forward to the Commission and to the Council. In that context, special consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and to achieving Union policy goals, including financial stability.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 205 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point d
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2– paragraph 4
4. The Commission and the Council shall make a balanced overall assessment of all the relevant factors, specifically, the extent to which they affect the assessment of compliance with the deficitprimary balance and/or the debt criteria as aggravating or mitigating factors. When assessing compliance on the basis of the deficitbalance criterion, if the ratio of the government debtbalance to GDP exceeds the reference value, these factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit provided for in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of Article 126 of the Treaty only if the double condition of the overarching principle — that, before these relevant factors are taken into account, the general government deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary — is fully met.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 216 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point e
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2– paragraph 7
7. 'In the case of Member States where the excess of the deficit or the breach of the requirements of the debt criterion according to Article 126 (2) (b) of the Treaty reflects the implementation of a pension reform introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar, the Commission and the Council shall also consider the cost of the reform to the publicly managed pillar when assessing developments in EDP deficit and debt figures. In cases where the debt ratio exceeds the reference value, the cost of the reform shall be considered only if the deficit remains close to the reference value. For that purpose, for a period of five years starting from the date of entry into force of such a reform, consideration shall be given to its net cost as reflected in deficit and debt developments on the basis of a linear degressive scale. Additionally, irrespective of the date of entry into force of the reform, its net cost as reflected in debt developments shall be given consideration for a transitional period of five years from [date of entry into force of this Regulation, to be inserted] on the basis of the same linear degressive scale. The net cost as thus calculated shall be taken into account also for the decision of the Council under Article 126(12) of the Treaty on the abrogation of some or all of its decisions under paragraphs 6 to 9 and 11 of Article 126 of the Treaty, if the deficit has declined substantially and continuously and has reached a level that comes close to the reference value and, in case of non-fulfilment of the requirements of the debt criterion, the debt has been put on a declining path. Moreover, equal consideration shall be given to the reduction in this net cost resulting from the partial or total reversal of an above mentioned pension reform.'deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 231 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 3 – point c
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 4
4. The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) of the Treaty shall establish a deadline of six months at most for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit, which should be completed in the year following its identification unless there are special circumstances. In the recommendation, the Council shall request that the Member State achieves annual budgetary targets which, on the basis of the forecast underpinning the recommendation, are consistent with a minimum annual improvement of at least 0,5 % of GDP as a benchmark, in its cyclically adjusted balanc are compatible with a strategy for sustained GDP growth. These objectives shall be adjusted for cyclical variations and shall be net of one-off and temporary measures, in order to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit within the deadline set in the recommendation.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 246 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 3 – point e
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 5
5. If effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) of the Treaty and unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances occur after the adoption of that recommendation, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) of the Treaty. The revised recommendation, taking into account the relevant factors mentioned in Article 2(3) of this Regulation, may notabl may extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. The Council shall assess the existence of unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances against the economic forecasts in its recommendation. The Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) of the Treaty in case of a severe economic downturn of a general nature.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 255 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5 – point a
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1
1. Any Council decision to give notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures for thexcessive deficit reduction in accordance with Article 126(9) of the Treaty shall be taken within two months of the Council decision establishing that no effective action has been taken in accordance with Article 126(8). In the notice, the Council shall request that the Member State achieve annual budgetary targets which, on the basis of the forecast underpinning the notice, are consistent with a minimum annual improvement of at least 0,5 % of GDP as a benchmark, in its cyclically adjusted balanc ensure the preservation of a strategy for sustained GDP growth. The value proposed for the primary balance must be adjusted for cyclical variations and must be net of one- off and temporary measures, in order to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit within the deadline set in the notice. The Council shall also indicaterecommend measures conducive to the achievement of these targets, which the Member State may or may not follow, with its options being evaluated in the light of results.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 260 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5 – point b
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1a
1-A. Following the Council notice given in accordance with Article 126(9) of the Treaty, the Member State concerned shall report to the Commission and the Council on action taken in response to the Council notice. The report shall include the targets for the government expenditure and for the discretionary measures on the revenue side as well as information on the actions being taken in response to the specific Council recommendations so as to allow the Council to take, if necessary, the decision in accordance with Article 6 (2) of this Regulation. The report shall be made public. The report shall be made public, and Parliament may invite the Member State to present it to the competent committee.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 273 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 6
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 6 – paragraph 2
2. Where the conditions to apply Article 126(11) of the Treaty are met, the Council shall impose sanctions in accordance with Article 126 (11). Any such decision shall be taken no later than four months after the Council decision giving notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures in accordance with Article 126 (9).'deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 274 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 7
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 7
7. in Article 7, the reference to 'Article 4(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 3605/93' is replaced by the reference to 'Article 3(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 479/2009'.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 278 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 8
Any Council decision to intensify sanctions, in accordance with Article 126(11) of the Treaty, shall be taken no later than two months after the reporting dates pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009. Any Council decision to abrogate some or all of its decisions in accordance with Article 126(12) of the Treaty shall be taken as soon as possible and in any case no later than two months after the reporting dates pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009.'deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 284 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 11
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 11
Whenever the Council decides to apply sanctions to a participating Member State in accordance with Article 126(11) of the Treaty, a fine shall, as a rule, be required. The Council may decide to supplement this fine by the other measures provided for in Article 126(11) of the Treaty.'deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 287 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 12
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 1
1. The amount of the fine shall comprise a fixed component equal to 0,2 % of GDP, and a variable component. The variable component shall amount to one tenth of the difference between the deficit as a percentage of GDP in the preceding year and either the reference value for government deficit or, if non compliance with budgetary discipline includes the debt criterion, the general government balance as a percentage of GDP that should have been achieved in the same year according to the notice issued under Article 126(9) of the Treaty.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 293 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 12
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 2
2. Each following year, until the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit is abrogated, the Council shall assess whether the participating Member State concerned has taken effective action in response to the Council notice in accordance with Article 126(9) of the Treaty. In this annual assessment the Council shall decide, in accordance with Article 126(11) of the Treaty, to intensify the sancrecommendations, unless the participating Member State concerned has complied with the Council notice. If an additional fine is decided, it shall be calculated in the same way as for the variable component of the fine in paragraph 1achieved the reference values proposed in the Council notice.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 294 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 12
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 3
3. Any single fine referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exceed the upper limit of 0,5 % of GDP.'deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 301 #

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 14
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 16
Fines referred to in Article 12 of this Regulation shall constitute other revenue referred to in Article 311 of the Treaty and shall be distributed among participating Member States which do not have excessive deficit as determined in accordance with Article 126(6) of the Treaty and which are not the subject of an excessive imbalance procedure within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No […/…], in proportion to their share in the total gross national income (GNI) of the eligible Member States.'deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 9 #

2009/2002(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 after Heading On Lisbon Treaty
11. Welcomes the agreement with the Council on the European Economic Recovery Plan as a key objective of the 2010 budget, particularly that it enabled completing the second step of its financing in 2010, confirming that the EU budget is a tool that may helping to overcome the recent economic crisis; underlines the fact that the Parliament's action was aimed at putting European citizens first, proving that the European Union is not at the origin of the problem, but can be instrumental in the solution; welcomes the use of the tools provided for in the IIA in order to guarantee its financing, especially the use of the flexibility instrument according to point 27 of the IIA but hoped for further possibilities to be explored by the Commission; recalls, in this context, that the Council did not present its proposal on this issue in its 1st reading;
2009/11/27
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 23 #

2009/2002(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Welcomes the agreement with the Council on additional support for the milk- producing sector, currently in crisis, to reach the amount of EUR 300 million as requested by Parliament; considers Council's endorsement as application of the "spirit of the Lisbon Treaty" as this will place Parliament on an equal footing on agriculture expenditure; regrets the fact that the call of the Parliament for establishing a permanent EU Dairy Fund to help the sector through the readjustments was not retained; requests though that Commission re-examine the necessity of alternative or further measures in the light of the market evolution and the report of the High Level Expert Group on milk in order to support the restructuring process for milk producers; reiterates its request for the creation of a budgetary line, permanently establishing a Dairy Fundwas not retained; reiterates its request for the creation of a budgetary line permanently establishing a Dairy Fund with clear rules on its use and taking into consideration the stability of market prices, production costs, natural factors and support for small and medium-sized farms;
2009/11/27
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 26 #

2009/2002(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Stresses the importance of further funding being made available via the EU budget to manage legal immigration and integration of third country nationals while in parallel tackling illegal immigration in full respect of human fundamental rights, and strengthening border protection, including the strengthening of the European Return Fund and the European Refugee Fund to facilitate solidarity between the Member States;
2009/11/27
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 35 #

2009/2002(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
30. Continues to count on support for the peace process in Palestine and the reconstruction needs in Gaza Strip; calls on the Commission to communicate which measures it has taken to minimise the risks that projects and programmes financed under this budget line are used or diverted to terrorist organisations or acts of terrorism, orof misuse of this budget line and inefficient bureaucracy, and to specify whether part of the aid is aimed at rebuilding premises or infrastructure previously financed by the Union or its Member States and damaged by military action;
2009/11/27
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 41 #

2009/2002(BUD)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
37. Urges all institutions, as far as possible, to cover all administrative needs resulting from salaries and pensions adjustments within the appropriations now budgeted for each section;
2009/11/27
Committee: BUDG
Amendment 99 #

2009/0140(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) In order to increase their weight and legitimacy, such warnings and recommendations should be transmitted through the Councilmmission, and, where appropriate, the European Banking Authority established by Regulation (EC) No …/… the European Parliament and of the Council, the European Securities and Markets Authority established by Regulation (EC) No …/… of the European Parliament and of the Council, and the European Insurance or the Occupational Pension Authority established by Regulation (EC) No …/…of the European Parliament and of the CouncilSupervisory Authority (ESA).
2010/03/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 148 #

2009/0140(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point f a and subparagraph 1 a (new)
(fa) six independent persons who must be nominated by the General Board members with voting rights. The persons nominated under point (fa) shall not be members of the ESAs and shall be chosen on the basis of their general competence and commitment to the Union and their diverse backgrounds in academic fields or in the private sector, in particular in small and medium-sized enterprises, trade unions or as providers or consumers of financial services. At the time of their nomination, the General Board members shall indicate which person is designated also to serve on the Steering Committee. In carrying out their responsibilities, the persons nominated shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government, institution, body, office, entity or private person. They shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties or the performance of their tasks.
2010/03/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 151 #

2009/0140(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2
2. The following personsPresident of the Economic and Financial Committee shall be Ma members of the General Board without voting rights: (a) one high level representative per Member State of the competent national supervisory authorities; (b) the President of the Economic and Financial Committee.
2010/03/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 226 #

2009/0140(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 a (new)
Article 16a Action in emergency situations 1. In the event of adverse developments which may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the European Union, the ESRB in accordance with point (b) of Article 3(2), may issue warnings, on its own initiative or following a request by an ESA, declaring the existence of an emergency situation. 2. As soon as it issues a warning, the ESRB shall simultaneously notify the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the European Supervisory Authority. Or. en Justification
2010/03/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 133 #

2009/0099(COD)

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 9 a (new)
Directiva 2006/48/EC
Article 136 – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
(9a) In Article 136(1), the following point is inserted: "(ea) requiring credit institutions to limit variable remuneration as a percentage of total net revenues when it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base."
2010/03/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 168 #

2009/0099(COD)

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Annex I – point 1
Directiva 2006/48/EC
Anexo V – section 11 – point 22 – point f
(f) Fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced; the fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible bonus policy, including the possibility to pay no bonuspolicy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no variable remuneration components; in any event, the variable remuneration component does not exceed 25 % of the total remuneration of the individual concerned;
2010/03/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 178 #

2009/0099(COD)

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Annex I – point 1
Directiva 2006/48/EC
Annex V – section 11 – point 22 – point h a (new)
(ha) a substantial proportion of the variable remuneration component is made in shares or share-linked instruments of the credit institution, subject to the legal structure of the credit institution concerned, or, for non-listed credit institutions, in other non-cash instruments where appropriate, and this proportion is at least 50%; those shares, share-linked instruments and non-cash instruments are subject to an appropriate retention policy designed to align incentives with the longer-term interests of the credit institution, and the retention period is no less than three years, subject to the achievement of positive results during that period;
2010/03/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 182 #

2009/0099(COD)

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Annex I – point 1
Directiva 2006/48/EC
Annex V – section 11 – point 22 – point i
i) payment of the major part of a significant bonus is deferred for aa substantial proportion of the variable remuneration component is deferred over a sufficient period; the size of the deferred proportion and the length of the deferral period is established in accordance with the business cycle, the nature of the business, its risks, the activities of the member of staff in question and the achievement of positive results by the firm during the retention period; remuneration payable under deferral arrangements vests no faster than on ap propriate period-rata basis; at least 40 % of the variable remuneration component is deferred; and, is linked to the future performance of the firmn the event of a variable remuneration component of a particularly high amount, at least 60 % of the amount is deferred and the deferral period is no less than three years.
2010/03/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 186 #

2009/0099(COD)

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Annex I – point 1
Directiva 2006/48/EC
Annex V – section 11 – point 22 – point i a (new)
(ia) These principles are applied by financial institutions at group, parent company and subsidiary levels, including those established in offshore financial centres.
2010/03/31
Committee: ECON