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Activities of Dimitrios PAPADIMOULIS related to 2015/0270(COD)

Shadow reports (1)

REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme
2024/04/23
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2015/0270(COD)
Documents: PDF(339 KB) DOC(117 KB)
Authors: [{'name': 'Othmar KARAS', 'mepid': 4246}]

Amendments (40)

Amendment 11 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 a (new)
(5a) The Banking Union has developed in an imbalanced way with considerable delays in progress on the third pillar of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, has left depositors unprotected and prolonged inequalities, with the peripheral Member States and the Member States most affected by the financial and economic crisis and their depositors as the main victims.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 15 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6 a (new)
(6a) The Banking Union, with progress only on the Single Resolution Mechanism and the Single Supervisory Mechanism and leaving EDIS behind, has resulted in a capital centralisation process and in several mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector of different Member States, resulting in further concentration of deposits and investments in the major financial centres, which magnifies the "too-big-to-fail" issue.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 16 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
(7) The existing absence of a homogenous level of depositor protection canhas already distorted depositors’ confidence. Further delays will distort competition and create dan effectivegerous barrier for the freedoms of establishment and free provision of services by credit institutions within the internal market. A common deposit insurance scheme is therefore essential for the completionofThe Banking Union as it functions today prolongs and exacerbates inequalities among Member States' banking systems and national DGSs and considerably delays steps which are absolutely necessary for the developmentof the third pillar on EDIS, leaving depositors unprotected mainly in peripheral Member States and the Member States most affected by the finternal market infinancial serviceancial and economic crisis. Only a timely, fully mutualised and fully insured EDIS could provide an effective framework to protect on an equal basis depositors throughout the Banking Union countries, stopping in that way the dependence between sovereign and banks.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) Although Directive 2014/49/EU significantly improves the capacity of national schemes to compensate depositors, more efficient deposit guarantee arrangements are urgently needed at the level of the Banking Union to ensure sufficient financial means to underpin the confidence of all depositors on an equal basis throughout the Banking Union countries and thereby safeguard financial stability. EDIS would increase the resilience of the Banking Union against future crises by sharing risk more widely and would offer equal protection for insured depositors, supporting the proper functioning of the internal market.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 23 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8 a (new)
(8a) The key objective of the EDIS is to enhance the effective deposit guarantee framework with a view to protecting depositors in an equal way against the consequences of deposits becoming unavailable. At the full insurance stage, the objective is to provide an equal level of protection to all depositors of credit institutions affiliated to the participating DGSs.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 35 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15 a (new)
(15a) It should also be possible for the DIF to go beyond a pure reimbursement function and to use the available financial means in order to prevent the failure of a credit institution with a view to avoiding the costs of reimbursing depositors and other adverse impacts. Those measures should, however, be carried out within a clearly defined framework including appropriate systems and procedures in place for selecting and implementing such measures and monitoring affiliated risks. The costs of the measures taken to prevent the failure of a credit institution should not exceed the costs of fulfilling the statutory or contractual mandates of the respective DIF with regard to protecting covered deposits at the credit institution or the institution itself.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 38 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
(17) EDIS should progressively evolve from a reinsurance scheme into a fully mutualised co-insurance scheme over a number of years. In the context of efforts to deepen the EMU, together with the work on the establishment of bridge-financing arrangements for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and on developing a common fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to reduce the bank/sovereign links in individual Member States by means of steps towards risk sharing among all the Member States in the Banking Union, and thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in achieving its key objective. However, such risk sharing implied by steps to reinforce Banking Union must proceed in parallel with risk reducing measures designed to break the bank-sovereign link more directly. Risks reduction measures are already supported by the SSM and SRM which aim to reduce the likelihood of bank failures and by the Banking Union single rulebook which establishes a wide range of prudential measures, taken in respect of banks, with the objective of strengthening supervision and crisis management, improving the amount and quality of capital, reducing concentration of exposures, fostering deleveraging, limiting pro-cyclical lending behaviour, reinforcing access to liquidity, addressing systemic risk due to size, complexity and interconnectedness, reinforcing depositor confidence and incentivising proper risk management via rules on governance.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20 a (new)
(20a) In addition, in order to ensure that all depositors in the Banking Union enjoy an equal level of protection, this Regulation establishes a fully mutualised European Deposit Insurance Scheme ('EDIS') in three successive stages: – a reinsurance scheme that, to a certain extent, provides funding and covers a share of the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes; – a co-insurance scheme that, to a gradually increasing extent, provides funding and covers losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes; – a full insurance scheme that provides the funding and covers the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes. EDIS shall be administered by the Board in cooperation with participating DGSs and designated authorities in accordance with Part IIa. EDIS shall be supported by a Deposit Insurance Fund (the 'DIF').
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30
(30) Ensuring effective and sufficient financing of the Deposit Insurance Fund is of paramount importance to the credibility and efficiencyof EDIS. The capacity of the Board to contract alternative funding means for the Deposit Insurance Fund should be enhanced in a manner that optimises the cost of funding and preserves the creditworthiness of the Deposit Insurance Fund. Immediately after the entry into force of this Regulation, the necessary steps should be taken by the Board in cooperation with the participating Member States to develop the appropriate methods and modalities permitting the enhancement of the borrowing capacity of the Deposit Insurance Fund that should be in place by the date of application of this Regulation. It is essential also to create a mutualised credit line via the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and an effective common fiscal backstop for the Banking Union to be used as a last resort.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 67 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 45
(45) The Commission should review the application of this Regulation in order to assess its impact on the internal market and to determine whether any modifications or further developments are needed in order to improve the efficiency and the, effectiveness and timely implementationof the EDIS.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 73 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
2. In addition, in order to ensure that all depositors in the Banking Union enjoy an equal level of protection, this Regulation establishes a fully mutualised European Deposit Insurance Scheme ('EDIS') in three successive stages:
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 105 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
(4) While some key steps have been made towards ensuring the efficient functioning of the Banking Union, with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (the 'SSM') established by Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201311 ensuring that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions in the euro area Member States and those non euro area Member States who choose to participate in the SSM (the 'participating Member States') is implemented in a coherent and effective manner and with the Single Resolution Mechanism (the ‘SRM’) established by Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 ensuring a consistent framework for the resolution of banks that are failing or likely to fail in the participating Member States, further essential steps are still needed to complete the Banking Union in a balanced way. __________________ 11 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 121 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 a (new)
(5a) The Banking Union has developed in an imbalanced way with considerable delays in progress on the third pillar of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, has left depositors unprotected and prolonged inequalities, with the peripheral Member States and the Member States most affected by the financial and economic crisis and their depositors as the main victims;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 123 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6 a (new)
(6a) the Banking Union, with progress only on the single resolution mechanism and the single supervisory mechanism and leaving EDIS behind, has resulted in a capital centralization process and in several mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector of different Member States, resulting in further concentration of deposits and investments in the major financial centres, which magnifies the "too-big-to-fail" issue;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 124 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
(7) The existing absence of a homogenous level of depositor protection canhas already distorted depositors’ confidence. Further delays will distort competition and create dan effectivegerous barrier for the freedoms of establishment and free provision of services by credit institutions within the internal market. A common deposit insurance scheme is therefore essential for the completion ofThe Banking Union as it functions today prolongs and exacerbates inequalities among Member States' banking systems and national DGSs and considerably delays steps which are absolutely necessary for the development of the third pillar on EDIS, leaving depositors unprotected mainly in peripheral Member States and the Member States most affected by the finternal market in financial services. ancial and economic crisis. Only a timely, fully mutualised and fully insured EDIS could provide an effective framework to protect on an equal basis depositors throughout the Banking Union countries, stopping in that way the dependence between sovereign and banks.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) Although Directive 2014/49/EU significantly improves the capacity of national schemes to compensate depositors, more efficient deposit guarantee arrangements are urgently needed at the level of the Banking Union to ensure sufficient financial means to underpin the confidence of all depositors on an equal basis throughout the Banking Union countries and thereby safeguard financial stability. EDIS would increase the resilience of the Banking Union against future crises by sharing risk more widely and would offer equal protection for insured depositors, supporting the proper functioning of the internal market.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8 a (new)
(8a) The key objective of the EDIS is to enhance the effective deposit guarantee framework with a view to protecting depositors in an equal way against the consequences of deposits becoming unavailable. At the full insurance stage, the objective is to provide an equal level of protection to all depositors of credit institutions affiliated to the participating DGSs.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 159 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15 a (new)
(15a) It should also be possible for the DIF to go beyond a pure reimbursement function and to use the available financial means in order to prevent the failure of a credit institution with a view to avoiding the costs of reimbursing depositors and other adverse impacts. Those measures should, however, be carried out within a clearly defined framework including appropriate systems and procedures in place for selecting and implementing such measures and monitoring affiliated risks. Implementing such measures should be subject to the imposition of conditions as defined in Directive 2014/49/EU. The costs of the measures taken to prevent the failure of a credit institution should not exceed the costs of fulfilling the statutory or contractual mandates of the respective DIF with regard to protecting covered deposits at the credit institution or the institution itself.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 165 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
(17) EDIS should progressively evolve from a reinsurance scheme into a fully mutualised co-insurance scheme over a number of6 years. In the context of efforts to deepen the EMU, together with the work on the establishment of bridge-financing arrangements for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and on developing a common fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to reduce the bank/sovereign links in individual Member States by means of steps towards risk sharing among all the Member States in the Banking Union, and thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in achieving its key objective. However, such risk sharing implied by steps to reinforce Banking Union must proceed in parallel with risk reducing measures designed to break the bank-sovereign link more directly. Risks reduction measures are already supported by the SSM and SRM which aim to reduce the likelihood of bank failures and by the Banking Union single rulebook which establishes a wide range of prudential measures, taken in respect of banks, with the objective of strengthening supervision and crisis management, improving the amount and quality of capital, reducing concentration of exposures, fostering deleveraging, limiting pro-cyclical lending behaviour, reinforcing access to liquidity, addressing systemic risk due to size, complexity and interconnectedness, reinforcing depositor confidence and incentivising proper risk management via rules on governance
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 196 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20
(20) As the Deposit Insurance Fund, in the re-insurance stage, would only provide an additional source of funding and would only weaken the link between banks and their national sovereign, without howeverOnly a fully mutualised Deposit Insurance Scheme would ensuringe that all depositors in the Banking Union enjoy an equal level of protection, the reinsurance stage should, after three years, gradually progress into a co-insurance scheme and ultimately into a fully mutualised deposit insurance scheme.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 200 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20 a (new)
(20a) In addition, in order to ensure that all depositors in the Banking Union enjoy an equal level of protection, this Regulation establishes a fully mutualised European Deposit Insurance Scheme ('EDIS') by 2024 at the latest in three successive stages: – a reinsurance scheme that, to a certain extent, provides funding and covers a share of the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes; – a co-insurance scheme that, to a gradually increasing extent, provides funding and covers losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes; – a full insurance scheme that provides the funding and covers the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes. EDIS shall be administered by the Board in cooperation with participating DGSs and designated authorities in accordance with Part IIa. EDIS shall be supported by a Deposit Insurance Fund (the 'DIF')."
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 224 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24
(24) The Deposit Insurance Fund should be financed by direct contributions from banks in order to reduce the sovereign bank link, the risk and the moral hazard. Decisions taken within the EDIS, requiring the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund or of a national deposit guarantee scheme should not impinge on the fiscal responsibilities of the Member States. In that regard, only extraordinary public financial support should be considered to be an impingement on the budgetary sovereignty and fiscal responsibilities of the Member States.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 258 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 1
1. Each year during the reinsurance and co-insurance period, the Board shall, after consulting the ECB, the EBA and the national competent authority and in close cooperation with the participating DGSs and designated authorities, determine for each participating DGS the total amount of ex-ante contributions that it may claim from the credit institutions affiliated to the respective participating DGS in order to reach the target levels provided for in Article 74b. The total amount of contributions shall not exceed the target levels provided for in Article 74b (1) and (2).
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 262 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30
(30) Ensuring effective and sufficient financing of the Deposit Insurance Fund is of paramount importance to the credibility and efficiency of EDIS. The capacity of the Board to contract alternative funding means for the Deposit Insurance Fund should be enhanced in a manner that optimises the cost of funding and preserves the creditworthiness of the Deposit Insurance Fund. Immediately after the entry into force of this Regulation, the necessary steps should be taken by the Board in cooperation with the participating Member States to develop the appropriate methods and modalities permitting the enhancement of the borrowing capacity of the Deposit Insurance Fund that should be in place by the date of application of this Regulation. It is essential also to create a mutualised credit line via the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and an effective common fiscal backstop for the Banking Union to be used as a last resort.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 267 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31
(31) It is necessary to ensure that the Deposit Insurance Fund is fully available for the purpose of ensuring the guarantee of deposits. Therefore, the Deposit Insurance Fund should primarily be used for the efficient implementation of deposit guarantee requirements and actions. Furthermore, it should be used only in accordance with the applicable deposit guarantee objectives and principles. Under certain conditions, the Deposit Insurance Fund could also provide funding where alternative measures are implemented, recalling that Article 11(3) of the Directive 2014/49/EU provides for strict prerequisites for a national DGS to be able to finance alternative measures, and these prerequisites should be taken into account when the DIF is used to fund alternative measures; or where the available financial means of a DGS are used in resolution in accordance with Article 79 of this Regulation.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 276 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 44
(44) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely setting up a more efficient and, effective and timely implemented deposit guarantee framework and ensuring the consistent application of deposit guarantee rules, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather be better achieved at the Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 277 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 45
(45) The Commission should review the application of this Regulation in order to assess its impact on the internal market and to determine whether any modifications or further developments are needed in order to improve the efficiency and the, effectiveness and timely implementation of the EDIS.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 281 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 46
(46) In order for EDIS to function in an effective manner as of [….]2024, the provisions concerning the payment of contributions to the Deposit Insurance Fund, the establishment of all the relevant procedures and any other operational and institutional aspects should apply from XXJanuary 2017.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 286 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 –subparagraph 4 – point f a (new)
(fa) the institution’s level of diversification of its sovereign exposures;
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 289 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
2. In addition, in order to ensure that all depositors in the Banking Union enjoy an equal level of protection, this Regulation establishes a fully mutualised European Deposit Insurance Scheme ('EDIS') in threeby 2024 at the latest in successive stages:.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 306 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 g a (new)
Article 74ga The Board shall contract for the DIF financial arrangements, including public financial arrangements as a mutualised credit line via the European Stability Mechanism in order to make immediate availability of additional financial means to be used where the amounts raised or available are not sufficient to meet the DIF obligations. A common backstop shall be developed during transitional period before setting a mutualised fund to facilitate borrowing by the DIF. The use of the common backstop shall be fiscally neutral in the medium term.
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 308 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 38 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 92 – paragraph 8 a (new)
38a. In Article 92, the following paragraph 8a is added: “8a. The Court of Auditors shall produce a special annual report which shall examine the efficiency and effectiveness of the SRF and the DIF.”
2024/03/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 441 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41h – paragraph 2
2. In case a participating DGS encounters a payout event or is used in resolution in accordance with Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU or Article 79 of this Regulation or is used for alternative measures, it may claim funding from the DIF for its liquidity need as defined by Article 41f of this Regulation. The strict prerequisites in Article 11(3) of Directive 2014/69/EU provides for a national DGS to be able to finance alternative measures should also be taken into account when the DIF is funding provision of alternative measures.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 487 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
article 41j – paragraph 1
1. A participating DGS shall only be reinsured, co-insured or fully insured by EDIS during the year following any of the dates set out below, if, by that date, its available financial means raised by contributions referred to in Article 10(1) of Directive 2014/49/EU amount to at least the following percentages of the total amount of covered deposits of all credit institutions affiliated to the participating DGS: - by 3 July 2017: 0.145%; - by 3 July 2018: 0.215%; - by 3 July 2019: 0.2835%; - by 3 July 2020: 0.2840%; - by 3 July 2021: 0.2635%; - by 3 July 2022: 0.205%; - by 3 July 2023: 0.115%; - by 3 July 2024: 0%.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 641 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 1
1. Each year during the reinsurance and co-insurance period, the Board shall, after consulting the ECB, the EBA and the national competent authority and in close cooperation with the participating DGSs and designated authorities, determine for each participating DGS the total amount of ex-ante contributions that it may claim from the credit institutions affiliated to the respective participating DGS in order to reach the target levels provided for in Article 74b. The total amount of contributions shall not exceed the target levels provided for in Article 74b (1) and (2).
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 712 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point f a (new)
(fa) the institution's level of diversification of its sovereign exposures;
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 754 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 g a (new)
Article 74ga The Board shall contract for the DIF financial arrangements, including public financial arrangements as a mutualised credit line via the European Stability Mechanism in order to make immediate availability of additional financial means to be used where the amounts raised or available are not sufficient to meet the DIF obligations. A common backstop shall be developed during transitional period before setting a mutualised fund to facilitate borrowing by the DIF. The use of the common backstop shall be fiscally neutral in the medium term.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 773 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 37
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 77 a – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. The strict prerequisites in Article 11(3) of Directive 2049/49/EU for a national DGS to be able to finance alternative measures should also be taken into account.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 775 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 37
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 77 a – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. The Board may allow the use of the DIF for alternative measures in order to prevent the failure of a credit institution provided that the conditions defined in the Article 11(3) of the Directive 2014/49/EU are met. The Board may decide that the available financial means may also be used to finance measures such as the transfer of assets and liabilities and deposit book transfer, provided that the costs borne by the DIF do not exceed the net amount of compensating covered depositors of the credit institution concerned in case of pay out.
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON
Amendment 779 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 38 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 92 – paragraph 8 a (new)
38a. In Article 92, the following paragraph 8a is added: “8a. The Court of Auditors shall produce a special annual report which shall examine the efficiency and effectiveness of the SRF and the DIF.”
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON