15 Amendments of Roberts ZĪLE related to 2017/0335(CNS)
Amendment 16 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 4
Recital 4
(4) Since tThere is greater interdependence among the Member States whose currency is the euro and hence increased susceptibility to spill-over effects from each other’s budgetary policies, i. In order to further enhance economic integration, convergence and coordination among them, a number of improvements to budgetary coordination and surveillance were introduced through Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council17 and Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council.18 _________________ 17 Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (OJ L 140, 27.5.2013, p. 1). 18 Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area (OJ L 140, 27.5.2013, p. 11).
Amendment 19 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) In order to maintain sound and sustainable public finances and to avoid excessive government deficits and debt levels as required by the TFEU, while at the same time improving the resilience of the euro area as a whole, there should be specific provisions in the national law of the Member States whose currency is the euro to strengthen their fiscal responsibility and their medium-term budgetary orientation beyond the provisions of Directive 2011/85/EU.
Amendment 20 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 7
Recital 7
(7) Since tThe economic and financial crisis has left a number of Member States with a legacy of high and often steady levels of public debt,. Thus a framework of numerical fiscal rules specific to each Member State and which aim at strengthening its responsible conduct of fiscal policy while effectively promoting compliance with the budgetary obligations deriving from the TFEU is instrumental in ensuring convergence of public debt to prudent and sustainable levels. Such a framework should operate in particular by setting a medium-term objective in terms of structural balance that is binding on the national budgetary authorities and their annual decisions. Medium-term objectives for the budgetary position allow the different public-debt-to-GDP ratios and sustainability risks of Member States to be taken into account, anchoring debt developments towards the reference value set out in Article 1 of Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the TFEU.
Amendment 25 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 8
Recital 8
(8) In order to achieve and maintain the medium-term objective in structural terms, it is necessary for Member States to set out a consistent adjustment path, based on variables under the control of the budgetary authorities. National fiscal planning underpinned by a government expenditure path adjusted for the impact of discretionary revenue measures favours effectiveness, transparency and accountability when monitoring fiscal developments. In order to tightly connect plans with the overall fiscal outcomes in the medium-term and to ensure an enhanced sense of national ownership of fiscal policy, a medium-term growth path of government expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures should be set for the whole term of the legislature as established by the constitutional legal order of each Member State. That path should be set as soonwithout undue delay as a new government takes office and annual budgets should adhere to it so as to bring about resolute convergence towards the medium-term objective.
Amendment 29 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) If they are not adequately addressed, significant deviations from the medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it hamper the credibility of the budgetary plans and risk derailing government debt developments and sustainability of public finances. To enhance the credibility of the Member States' commitment to the medium-term objective, a correction mechanism should be automatically activated in the event of a significant observed deviation. A credible correction mechanism should set out the measures which need to be implemented to correct the deviation over a defined period of time, taking account of the nature and size of the deviation. In particular, the correction mechanism should compensate for deviations from the medium-term growth path of government expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures.
Amendment 30 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) Independent bodies charged with monitoring public finances in the Member States are an essential building block of effective fiscal frameworks. In order to foster fiscal discipline and strengthen the credibility of fiscal policy, such bodies should carry out independent and non- partisan assessments of the framework of numerical fiscal rules, including notably the medium-term budgetary orientation, and should monitor compliance with that framework and the activation and operation of the associated correction mechanisms. There should be full transparency in the work and operations of such bodies. The independent bodies should be precluded from any normative policy-making responsibilities and refrain from passing judgement regarding issues outside the scope of their mandate.
Amendment 34 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 12
Recital 12
(12) Strengthened national fiscal responsibility and a binding multi-annual orientation of fiscal policy requires fiscal institutions to be independent, their mandates clearly defined and have their own resources for actively monitoring fiscal developments and providing recommendations throughout the medium- term bugdgetary cycle, including in particular where a significant deviation from the medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards is observed. In order to boost the credibility and enforceability of the medium-term objective, its underlying government expenditure path and the related correction mechanism in case of significant deviations, the budgetary authorities of the Member States should comply with the recommendations put forward in the assessments of the independent bodies or publicly justify the decision not to comply with them. Anchoring that principle in the national legal order can play a crucial role in that respect.
Amendment 39 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1
1. This Directive lays down provisions for strengthening fiscal responsibility and the medium-term budgetary orientation in the Member States to ensure compliance with obligations relating to the avoidance of excessive government deficits and public debt.
Amendment 43 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) 'independent bodies' means bodies with a clearly defined mandate that are structurally independent or bodies endowed with functional autonomy vis-à- vis the budgetary authorities of the Member State, and which are underpinned by national legal provisions ensuring a high degree of transparency in their work, functional autonomy and accountability.
Amendment 53 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) fiscal planning shall include a medium-term growth path of government expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures and consistent with the medium- term objective or the time-frame for convergence towards it. That path shall be set as soonwithout undue delay as a new government takes office in the Member State, for the term of the legislature as established by the constitutional legal order of that Member State, and shall be respected by the annual budgets throughout that period.
Amendment 61 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – introductory part
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – introductory part
4. Member States shall designate independent bodies for monitoring compliance with the provisions in paragraphs 1 and 2. The independent bodies shall provide objective and non- partisan public assessments to ascertain:
Amendment 69 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 7 – point a
Article 3 – paragraph 7 – point a
(a) are independent and non-partisan, established by a statutory regime grounded in national laws, regulations or binding administrative provisions; and are precluded from any normative policy- making responsibilities
Amendment 71 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 7 – point b
Article 3 – paragraph 7 – point b
(b) do not take instructions from the budgetary authorities or the incumbent government of the Member State concerned or from any other public or private body;
Amendment 74 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 7 – point c
Article 3 – paragraph 7 – point c
(c) have the capacity to communicate publicly in a timely manner to all relevant stakeholders;
Amendment 76 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 7 – point d
Article 3 – paragraph 7 – point d
(d) are made up of members who are nominated and appointed without reference to political affiliation, on the basis of merit and their experience and competence in public finances, macroeconomics and budgetary management, and by means of transparent procedures;