27 Amendments of Sharon BOWLES related to 2013/2277(INI)
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the Troika, consisting of the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), originated in the decision of 25 March 2010 by euro area Heads of State and Government to provide conditional bilateral loans to Greece, and has since also been operational in Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus; notes the significant involvement of Euro area finance ministers in the decisions concerning the detail of the bilateral loans;
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas the EU-IMF assistance was provided to the four Member States in different formulations, sometimes involving the use of community resources.
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the Troika ishas been to date the basic structure for negotiation between the official lenders and the governments of the recipient countries, as well as for reviewing the implementation of adjustment programmes; whereas for the European side, the final decisions as regards financial assistance and conditionality are taken by the Eurogroup;
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas the authorities of the MS concerned also sign a MEFP (Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies) which is to be aligned as closely as possible with the MoU;
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G b (new)
Recital G b (new)
Gb. whereas the Greek, Irish and Cypriot Parliaments ratified the MoUs negotiated by their respective State authorities and the Troika; however, the Portuguese Parliament was not part of the negotiation process and did not ratify the MoU;
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas the economic situation and recent developments in some Member States have significantly compromised the quality of employmentlife of a large number of European Citizens not least in respect of employment opportunities, access to credit, income levels, social protection and health and safety standards;
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
K. whereas, in its resolution of 20 November 2012, Parliament calls for high standards of democratic accountability at Union level to be applied to the Troika; whereas such accountability is imperative to the credibility of the assistance programmes and notably requires the Troika to be heard in the European Parliament before taking up its duties and to be subject to regular reporting to and democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament;
Amendment 242 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Notes that there was a promise by Member States that their banks would retain their exposures to the Greek bond markets, which they were unable to keep, and thus the net result of the bail-out was that Greece literally bought time to protect the private sector in other Member States;
Amendment 252 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Notes thatRecalls reported bilateral pressure from the ECB to the Irish Authorities prior to the initial agreement between the Irish authorities and the EU and IMF was adopted on 7 December 2010 in the relevant MoUs containing the policy conditionality for EU-IMF assistance. Notes the programme was largely based on the Irish Government's own National Recovery Plan 2011-2014 published on 24 November 2010; further notes that the Irish programme has since been reviewed regularly, leading to a twelfth and final review on 9 December 2013 marking the imminent completion of the Irish programmeand that the Irish programme was completed on December 15th 2013;
Amendment 256 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Notes that the initial request for financial assistance was made by Cyprus on 25 June 2012, but that differences of positions as regards the conditionality, as well as the rejection of an initial draft programme by the Cypriot Parliament, which included bail-in of insured depositors, delayed the final agreement on the EU- IMF assistance programme until 24 April (EU) and 15 May 2013 (IMF), respectively, and on 30 April 2013 the Cypriot House of Representatives finally endorsed the ‘new’ agreement; notes competing programme proposals in the case of Cyprus between different members of the Troika and highlights the lack of credible explanation how the inclusion of insured depositors was signed off by the European Commission and EU finance ministers. Furthermore, regrets that the Cypriot Authorities expressed difficulties in convincing the Troika representatives of their concerns during the negotiation process and that the Cypriot Government reported to have been forced into accepting the bail-in instrument on bank deposits under duress.
Amendment 271 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Deplores the lack of foresight and unpreparedness of the EU and international institutions, including the IMF,institutions for a sovereign debt crisis of a large magnitude inside a monetary union; and regrets the absence of a viable legal basis to deal with such a crisis.
Amendment 288 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Acknowledges, however, that the immense challenge the Troika faced leading to the crisis was unique as a result of the poor state ofpolicy and institutional failures, deficiencies in fiscal policy coordination, Member State reluctance to transfer sovereignty over macro-fiscal objectives to the EU level, loose regulation of financial services, large macroeconomic imbalances, and the fact that a number of instruments such as external devaluation were not available due to the constraints of monetary union; notes, moreover, that time was running out, legal obstacles had to be cleared, fear ofe considerable time pressure, legal obstacles, speculation around a melt-down of the euro area was palpable,, the necessity to reach political agreements had to be reached, the world economy was in a downturn, and that a number of countries which werethat intended to contribute financial support had seen their own public and private debt increase in alarming ways;
Amendment 300 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Expresses concern about the role of Emergency Liquidity Assistance and the level to which it is or is not overseen by the ECB.
Amendment 313 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. RegretDenounces the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations; notes the necessity to evaluate whether formal documents were clearly communicated in due time to the national parliaments and the European Parliament; further notes the possible negative impact of such practices on citizens’ rights and the political situation within the countries concerned;
Amendment 389 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Highlights the high levels of injustice perceived by many of the citizens of the four Member States that entered into economic adjustment programmes, which was exacerbated by a lack of transparency and reversals of policy measures in the decision-making process.
Amendment 390 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)
Paragraph 17 b (new)
17b. Is concerned that despite Treaty obligations for the independence of the central bank there appear to have been pressures for changes of central bank governors following changes of government.
Amendment 416 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal; regrets the lack of progress in Greece despite unp, the positive market reaction on January 7th 2014 to Ireland's first bond auction since the conclusion of the programme and the subsequent upgrade of credit ratings on Irish sovereign debt to investment status. Welcomes the unprecedented reforms undertaken in Greece to date and encourages Greecedented reforms having been undertaken; to continue its internal reform process to ensure Greece can enter into an investment phase. Also welcomes the expected end of the programme for Portugal;
Amendment 479 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Notes that when it came to PSI in Greece, knock on effects on the Cyprus banking system were not sufficiently considered despite the issue having been raised in good time and it is also suggested that assets relating to some larger Member States were again protected.
Amendment 513 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Regrets that the reduction of structural deficits in all programme countries since the start of their respective assistance programmes has not yet led to a reduction in the ratios of public debt to GDP; underlines that the ratio of public debt to GDP has instead sharply increased in all programme countries; notes that progression towards more sustainable levels of private debt is necessary for long- term stability.
Amendment 589 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Notes that thebecause of the evolving nature of the EU response to the crisis, the unclear role of the ECB in the Troika and the opaque nature of the Troika decision making process, Troika’s mandate has been perceived as being unclear and lacking transparency;
Amendment 615 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 a (new)
Paragraph 30 a (new)
30a. Calls on the Commission to take note of the complaint by some of the Member States' authorities that their discussions with the Troika would have benefitted from a lower turnover among Troika personnel.
Amendment 708 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 a (new)
Paragraph 37 a (new)
37a. Calls on the Troika to observe its duty of care for the Single Market and legislative intent in their current and future recommendations, operations and oversight of the economic adjustment programmes.
Amendment 727 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
38. Reiterates its call for all decisions related to the strengthening of the EMU to be taken on the basis of the Treaty on European Union; takes the view that any departure from the Community method and increased use of intergovernmental agreements would divide and weaken, weaken and challenge the credibility of the Union, including the euro area;
Amendment 829 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42 a (new)
Paragraph 42 a (new)
42a. Regrets that the burden has not been shared among all who acted irresponsibly and that the protection of bond holders was seen as an EU necessity in the interest of financial stability. Special consideration should be made in the Stability and Growth Pact for relevant legacy debt that is unfairly burdening Ireland under the flexibility provisions of the reformed pact. In the longer term the distribution of the costs should reflect distribution of the protected bond holders.
Amendment 830 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42 b (new)
Paragraph 42 b (new)
42b. Notes that thinking on bail-in evolved over time; in the case of Ireland in 2010, the bail-in of senior bondholders was not an option available to the Irish Authorities while in Cyprus in 2013, the bail-in of insured depositors was put forward as a policy measure. This has led to an unlevel playing field and to unequal treatment across the euro area.
Amendment 831 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42 c (new)
Paragraph 42 c (new)
42c. Points out that bail-in of a minimum of 8% of total liabilities in priority order beginning with shareholders since the conclusion of BRRD on December 11th is now mandatory and recalls the strengthened protection of depositors under Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive.
Amendment 832 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42 d (new)
Paragraph 42 d (new)
42d. Stresses that as the recovery in the EU picks up, all possibilities for relief for the Member States in programme countries should be explored, including the possibility of direct recapitalisation by the ESM.