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18 Amendments of Marian-Jean MARINESCU related to 2023/0077(COD)

Amendment 270 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28
(28) According to Article 15(8) of Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Member States are to assess the regulatory and administrative barriers to long-term renewables PPAs, and shall remove unjustified barriers to, and promote the uptake of, such agreements. In addition, Member States are to describe policies and measures facilitating the uptake of renewables PPAs in their integrated national energy and climate plans. Without prejudice to that obligation to report on the regulatory context affecting the PPA market, Member States should ensure that instruments to reduce the financial risks associated to the buyer defaulting on its long-term payment obligations in the framework of PPAs are accessible to companies that face entry barriers to the PPA market and are not in financial difficulty in line with Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. Member States could decide to set up a guarantee scheme at market prices. Member States should include provisions to avoid lowering the liquidity in the electricity markets, such as by using financial PPAs. Member States should not provide support to PPAs that purchase generation from fossil fuel, unless the difficulty is determined by extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the buyer and of the Member States. While the default approach should be non- discrimination between consumers, Member States could decide to target these instruments to specific categories of consumers, applying objective and non- discriminatory criteria that are not based on consumption level of the off-taker. In this framework, Member States should take into account the potential role of instruments provided at Union level, for instance by the European Investment Bank (‘EIB’).
2023/05/25
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 273 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29
(29) Member States have at their disposal several instruments to support the development of PPA markets when designing and allocating public support. Allowing rRenewable energy project developers participating in a public support tender toshould reserve a share of the generation for sale through a PPA would contribute to nurture and grow PPA markets. In addition, as part of these tender evaluation Member States should endeavour to apply criteria to incentivise the access to the PPA market for all actors that face entry barriers, such as small and medium-sized enterprises (‘SMEs’),. Member States should take measures facilitating collective purchase of electricity through PPAs benefitting from guarantee schemes. Members should also givinge preference to bidders presenting a commitment to sign a PPA for part of the project’s generation from one or several potential buyers that face difficulties to access the PPA market.
2023/05/25
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 290 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 35
(35) Furthermore, Member States should ensure that the direct price support schemes, irrespective of their form, do not undermine the efficient, competitive and liquid functioning of the electricity markets, preserving the incentives of producers to react to market signals, including stop generating when electricity prices are below their operational costs, and of final customers to reduce consumption when electricity prices are high. Member States shouldall ensure that support schemes, irrespective of their form, do not constitute a barrier for the development of commercial contracts such as PPAs and shall include an obligation for producers under these schemes to sell at least 20 % of their electricity output through PPAs or other market-based instruments.
2023/05/25
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 311 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 39
(39) To support environmental protection objectives the CO2 emissions’ limit, set out in Article 22(4) of this Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council, should be seen as an upper limit. Therefore, Member States could set technical performance standards and CO2 emissions’ limits that restrictfacilitate participation in capacity mechanisms to flexible, fossil-free technologies in full alignment with the Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and energy27 which encourage Member States to introduce green criteria in capacity mechanisms. _________________ 27 Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and energy 2022 (OJ C 80, 18.2.2022, p. 1).
2023/05/25
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 320 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 40
(40) In addition, if Member States do not apply a capacity mechanism or if the additional criteria or features in the design of their capacity mechanism are insufficient to achieve national objective for demand response and storage investment needs they could apply flexibility support schemes consisting of payments for the available capacity of non- fossil flexibility such as demand side response and storage.
2023/05/25
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 357 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 53 a (new)
(53a) The European electricity market should be equipped with temporary measures, such as a price shock absorber mechanism, addressing high electricity prices in a harmonized manner, preserving the level playing field and market integrity, without affecting investment signals in new generation capacity. Stable, predictable and globally- competitive electricity prices preserve existing electro-intensive industrial production capacities while encouraging long-term investments and also sending the right investment signals to other sectors to electrify.
2023/05/25
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 358 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 53 b (new)
(53b) A price shock absorber mechanism would act as a temporary and voluntary relief valve designed to limit the ability of gas-fired generation to set wholesale electricity market clearing prices in case of high electricity prices, where the accumulated inframarginal rents reach a level that is no longer contributing to the EU electricity market’s objective to ensure electricity prices at globally competitive levels. While keeping the merit order curve, fundamental to the EU electricity market, a price shock absorber mechanism could combine ‘pay-as-bid’ and ‘pay-as-clear’ models. The final price would be set uniformly for all market participants and the lower power prices will be equally spread to all consumers.
2023/05/25
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 359 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 53 c (new)
(53c) The EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators shall be tasked to prepare a detailed assessment and modelling of such price shock absorber mechanism or other measures of equivalent effect for the purpose of ensuring the integrity and good functioning of the European electricity market and for preserving investment signals for new generation capacity. The assessment shall be accompanied by comprehensive guidance on the design and practical implementation of the mechanism, based on a non-exhaustive but cumulative list of principles to be observed for the purpose of safeguarding against market distortions, negative impact on security of supply or on cross- border electricity trade. The implementation of the mechanism shall not lead to increased electricity consumption and must not result in changed bidding behaviour of power generators and speculation.
2023/05/25
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 415 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 2, paragraph 80
(80a) ‘pay-as-cleared’ means a pricing system where all electricity generators get the same price for the electricity they are selling at a given moment. Electricity producers bid into the market at the price they are willing to produce. Once the full demand is satisfied, everybody obtains the price of the last producer from which electricity was bought. (Legal clarity purposes)
2023/05/25
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 421 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 2 – point 80b (new)
(80b) ‘pay-as-bid’ means a pricing system where electricity generators are paid according to their bidding price, regardless of the price at which the market clears. (Legal clarity purposes)
2023/05/25
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 423 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 2 – point 80c (new)
(80c) ‘price shock absorber’ means an additional market feature, temporary applicable when its triggering conditions are met.
2023/05/25
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 507 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Regulation 2019/943
Article 4, paragraph 7b
1a. The dedicated metering devices must satisfy the provisions of EU Measurement Instruments Directive (2014/32/EU).
2023/05/25
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 642 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regualation 2019/943
Article 9, paragraph 2
2. Member States shall ensure that instruments such as guarantee schemes at market prices or State guaranties, to reduce the financial risks associated to off- taker payment default or instruments to reduce other risks in the framework of PPAs are in place and accessible to customers that face entry barriers to the PPA market and are not in financial difficulty in line with Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, unless the difficulty is determined by extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the buyer and of the Member States. For this purpose, Member States shall take into account Union-level instruments. Member States shallmay determine what categories of customers are targeted by these instruments, applying non- discriminatory criteria.
2023/05/25
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 926 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 19 e – paragraph 1
1. Member States which apply a capacity mechanism in accordance with Article 21 shallmay consider the promotion of the participation of non-fossil flexibility such as demand side response and storage by introducing additional criteria or features in the design of the capacity mechanism.
2023/05/25
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 939 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 9 – paragraph 19 e
2. Where the measures introduced in accordance with paragraph 1 to promote the participation of non-fossil flexibility such as demand response and storage in capacity mechanisms are insufficient to achieve the flexibility needs identified in accordance with 19d, Member States may apply flexibility support schemes consisting of payments for the available capacity of non-fossil flexibility such as demand side response and storage.
2023/05/25
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 954 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 9 – paragraph 19 e
3. Member States which do not apply a capacity mechanism mayshall apply flexibility support schemes consisting of payments for the available capacity of non-fossil flexibility such as demand side response and storage.
2023/05/25
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 968 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 9 – paragraph 19 f
Flexibility support scheme for non-fossil flexibility such as demand response and storage applied by Member States in accordance with Article 19e(2) and (3) shall:
2023/05/25
Committee: ITRE
Amendment 970 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 9 – paragraph 19 f
(b) be limited to new investments in non-fossil flexibility such as demand side response and storage;deleted
2023/05/25
Committee: ITRE