5 Amendments of Dimitar STOYANOV related to 2011/0361(COD)
Amendment 16 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
Recital 1
(1) Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies requires credit rating agencies to comply with rules of conduct in order to limitigat the possiblility of credit rating agencies operating and issuing ratings where there are conflicts of interest, ensure high quality and sufficient transparency of ratings and the rating process. Following the amendments introduced by Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has been empowered to register and supervise credit rating agencies. This amendment complements the current regulatory framework for credit rating agencies. Some of the issues addressed (conflicts of interests due to the issuer-pays model, disclosure for structured finance instruments) had been identified, but not fully resolved by the existing rules. The need to review transparency and procedural requirements specifically for sovereign ratings was highlighted by the current sovereign debt crisis.
Amendment 17 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 already provided a first round of measures to address the question of independence and integrity of credit rating agencies and their credit rating activities. The objectives of guaranteeing the independence of credit rating agencies and of identifying, managing and, to the extent possible, avoiding any conflict of interest that could arise were already underlying several provisions of that Regulation in 2009. Whilst providing a sound basis, the existing rules do not appear to have had a sufficient impact in this regard. Credit rating agencies still are not perceived as sufficiently independent actors. The selection and remuneration of the credit rating agency by the rated entity (issuer- pays model) engenders inherent conflicts of interest, which are insufficiently addressed by the existing rules. Under this model, there are incentives for credit rating agencies to issue complacency ratings on the issuer in order to secure a long-standing business relationship guaranteeing revenues or in order to secure additional work and revenues. Moreover, relationships between the shareholders of credit rating agencies and the rated entities may cause conflicts of interest which are not sufficiently dealt with by the existing rules. As a result, credit ratings issued under the issuer-pays model may be perceived as the credit ratings that suit the issuer rather than the credit ratings needed by the investor. Without prejudice to the conclusions of the report to be submitted by the Commission on the issuer-pays model by December 2012 pursuant to Article 39(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009, it is essential to reinforce the conditions of independence applying to credit rating agencies in order to increase the level of credibility of credit ratings issued under the issuer-pays model.
Amendment 21 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24
Recital 24
(24) Credit ratings, whether issued for regulatory purposes or not, have a significant impact on investment decisions. Hence, credit rating agencies have an important responsibility towards investors in ensuring that they comply with the rules of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 so that their ratings are independent, objective and of adequatehigh quality. However, in the absence of a contractual relationship between the credit rating agency and the investor, investors are not always in a position to enforce the agency's responsibility towards them. Therefore, it is important to provide for an adequate right of redress for investors who relied on a credit rating issued in breach of the rules of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. The investor should be able to hold the credit rating agency liable for any damage caused by an infringement of that Regulation which had an impact on the rating outcome. Infringements which do not impact the rating outcome, such as breaches of transparency obligations, should not trigger civil liability claims.
Amendment 24 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
Recital 27
(27) Regarding matters concerning the civil liability of a credit rating agency and which are not covered by this regulation, such matters should be governed by the applicable national law determined by the relevant rules of International Private Law. The competent court to decide on a claim for civil liability brought by an investor should be determined by the relevant rules on jurisdiction of International JurisdictionPrivate Law.
Amendment 25 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30
Recital 30
(30) In order to contribute to the issuance of up to date, objective and credible sovereign ratings and to facilitate users' understanding, it is important to regularly review ratings. It is also important to increase the transparency about the research work carried out, the staff allocated to the preparation of ratings, the methodologies used to establish ratings and the underlying assumptionsdata behind the credit ratings made by credit rating agencies in relation to sovereign debt.