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9 Amendments of Anni PODIMATA related to 2013/2277(INI)

Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas the Troika together with the Member State concerned is also responsible for the preparation of formal decisions of the EurogroupEurogroup formal decisions are based on the programmes agreed between the Troika and the Member State concerned;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium and long term aim wais to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term; whereas the programmes were not suited to comprehensively correctingachieve sustainable growth, fiscal sustainability and effective debt reduction in order to secure the return to normal market financing and repayment of financial assistance; whereas the programmes included also structural reforms to correct a number of macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated sometimes over decades;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 189 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Notes that, prior to the beginning of the EU-IMF assistance programme initiated in the spring of 2010, there was a dual fear associated with the ‘insolvency’ and ’non- sustainability’ of the public finances of Greece as a result of the constantly declining competitiveness of the Greek economy and decades of imprudent fiscal policy, with the government deficit reaching 15.7% of GDP in 2009, and the debt-to-GDP ratio continuing on an upward trend since 2003 when it stood at 97.48.3%, reaching 129.7% in 2009 and 156.9% in 2012;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 335 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Deplores that recommendations contained in MoUs mark a departure from the thinking initiated by the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategies); points out however that this can be partly explained, even if not fully justified, by the fact that programmes had to be implemented under considerable time pressure in a difficult political environment;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 421 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal; regrets the lack of progress in Greece despite unprecedented reforms having been undertakenwelcomes the unprecedented fiscal adjustment and correction of current account deficit in Greece and underlines that reforms have to continue and to be implemented more decisively and with stronger ownership;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 448 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Underlines that adequate economic models are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment programmes; deplores that adequate statistics and information were not always available; points out that in Greece large- scale fraud was happening in this respect in the years preceding the setting up ofthere have been many incidents of misreporting of statistics and mismanagement of the statistical system in the years preceding the programme; welcomes the decisive action by the Greek government to urgently and effectively address these programmeblems including by establishing the independent Hellenic Statistical Authority in March 2010;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 463 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; further notes that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run; also notes thatdespite certain shortcomings in decision-making, the financial assistance and adjustment programme in Greece have not prevetegrity of the eurozone has been guaranteed an orderly default nor contagion of the crisis to other Member Statesd is now irrevocable; deplores the economic and social downturn which became evident when the fiscal and macroeconomic corrections were put into place;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 476 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Regrets that decision-making at European level during the crisis has been at times fragmented, incoherent and delayed and notes that these shortcomings had a negative impact on crisis countries and facilitated spill-over effects;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 566 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
28. Stresses that national-level ownership is important, and that failure to implement agreed measures has consequences in terms of the expected results; notes also that wide political support for the goals of the programmes has been key for their successes and regrets that this has not always been the case in all crisis countries;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON