BETA

Activities of Sebastian Valentin BODU related to 2011/0361(COD)

Shadow opinions (1)

OPINION on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies
2016/11/22
Committee: JURI
Dossiers: 2011/0361(COD)
Documents: PDF(147 KB) DOC(424 KB)

Amendments (11)

Amendment 18 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
(15) The perception of independence of credit rating agencies would be particularly affected should the same shareholders or members be investing in different credit rating agencies not belonging to the same group of credit rating agencies, at least if this investment reaches a certain size that could allow these shareholders or members to exercise a certain influence on the agency's business. Therefore, in order to ensure the independence (and the perception of independence) of credit rating agencies, it is appropriate to provide for stricter rules regarding the relations between the credit rating agencies and their shareholders. For this reason, no person should simultaneously hold a participation of 510% or more in more than one credit rating agency, unless the agencies concerned belong to the same group.
2012/03/30
Committee: JURI
Amendment 19 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
(16) The objective of ensuring sufficient independence of credit rating agencies entails that investors should not hold simultaneously investments of 5 10% or more in more than one credit rating agency. Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market requests that those persons controlling 5% of the voting rights in a listed company results should disclose it to the public, because, inter alia, of the interest for investors to know about changes in the voting structure of such company. 5% of the voting rights is considered therefore to be a major holding capable of influencing the voting structure in a company. It is therefore appropriate to use the 5% or, preferably, 10% level for the purposes of restricting the simultaneous investment in more than one credit rating agency. This measure cannot be considered disproportionate, given that all registered credit rating agencies in the Union are non- listed undertakings therefore not subject to the transparency and procedural rules that apply to listed companies in the EU. Often unlisted undertakings are governed by shareholders' protocols or agreements and the number of shareholders or members is usually low. Therefore, even a minority position in an unlisted credit rating agency could be influential. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that purely economic investments in credit rating agencies are still possible, this limitation to simultaneously investments in more than one credit rating agency should not be extended to investments channelled though collective investment schemes managed by third parties independent from the investor and not subject to his or her influence.
2012/03/30
Committee: JURI
Amendment 23 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26
(26) It is important to provide investors with an effective right of redress against credit rating agencies. As investors do not have close insight in internal procedures of credit rating agencies a partial reversal of the burden of proof with regard to the existence of an infringement and the infringement's impact on the rating outcome seems to be appropriate if the investor has made a reasonable case in favour of the existence of such an infringement. However, the burden of proof as regards the existence of a damage and the causality of the infringement for the damage, both being closer to the sphere of the investor, should fully be on the investor.deleted
2012/03/30
Committee: JURI
Amendment 29 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 6a – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. A shareholder or a member of a credit rating agency holding at least 510% of the capital or the voting rights in that agency shall not
2012/03/30
Committee: JURI
Amendment 31 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 6 a – paragraph1 – point a
(a) hold 510 % or more of the capital of any other credit rating agency. This prohibition does not apply to holdings in diversified collective investment schemes, including managed funds such as pension funds or life insurance, provided that the holdings in diversified collective investment schemes do not put him or her in a position to exercise significant influence on the business activities of those schemes;
2012/03/30
Committee: JURI
Amendment 34 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 6 a – paragraph1 – point b
(b) have the right or the power to exercise 510% or more of the voting rights in any other credit rating agency;
2012/03/30
Committee: JURI
Amendment 40 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 20
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Title IIIa – Article 35 – paragraph 3
3. A credit rating agency acts with gross negligence if it seriously neglects duties imposed upon it by this Regulation.deleted
2012/03/30
Committee: JURI
Amendment 41 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 20
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Title III a – Article 35 – paragraph 3 a (new)
(3a) Any of the parties to a dispute may seek the opinion of ESMA regarding the relevant infringement. Any formal ESMA ruling on the matter at issue may be referred to by either of the litigants.
2012/03/30
Committee: JURI
Amendment 42 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 20
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Title III a – Article 35 – paragraph 4
4. Where an investor establishes facts from which it may be inferred that a credit rating agency has committed any of the infringements listed in Annex III, it will be for the credit rating agency to prove that it has not committed that infringement or that that infringement did not have an impact on the issued credit rating.deleted
2012/03/30
Committee: JURI
Amendment 43 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 20
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Title III a – Article 35 – paragraph 5
5. The civil liability referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be excluded or limited in advance by agreement. Any clause in such agreements unilateral expression of will. Any unilateral provision excluding or limiting the civil liability in advance shall be deemed null and void.
2012/03/30
Committee: JURI
Amendment 45 #
Proposal for a regulation
Annex 1 – point 1 – point b – point ii
(aa) a shareholder or member of a credit rating agency holding, directly or indirectly, 10% or more of either the capital or the voting rights of that credit rating agency or being otherwise in a position to exercise significant influence on the business activities of the credit rating agency, directly or indirectly owns a substantial share of the financial instruments of the rated entity or a related third party or has any other direct or indirect ownership interest amounting to 10% or more in that entity or party, other than holdings in diversified collective investment schemes, including managed funds such as pension funds or life insurance, which do not put him in a position to exercise significant influence on the business activities of the scheme;
2012/03/30
Committee: JURI