BETA

6 Amendments of Othmar KARAS related to 2010/2008(INI)

Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas resilient derivative markets require a comprehensive collateralisation regulatory framework encompassing both central and bilateral clearing risk management standards,
2010/04/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)
Eb. whereas central clearing of eligible derivative contracts is necessary to increase the resilience of financial markets, access by trading venues to counterparty clearing facilities (CCPs) must be open and non-discriminatory to ensure markets remain fair and efficient
2010/04/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Considers that a distinction between financial institutions and corporates with respect to derivatives trading might not be appropriate and notes that there should be the same regulative regime for the same type of transaction irrespective of the company doing such business;
2010/04/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Insists that rules establishing central clearing between financial institutions for all eligible derivatives ensure non- discriminatory access of authorised trading venues to CCPs, including transparent and unbundled pricing of clearing services;
2010/04/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Notes that resilient derivative markets require effective central and bilateral clearing risk management standards. Considers insufficient focus has been given to date to bilateral clearing risk management. Urges the Commission to address bilateral clearing risk management standards as part of the forthcoming legislation on European markets infrastructure;
2010/04/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Insists that neitherCCPs must CCPsnot be organised by users, nor must and shall not compete on their risk management systems be in competition with each other. Calls for the CCP’s risk committee to be composed of representatives of participants and indirect participants, to take decisions independent of the management of the CCP or its shareholders, and to advise the CCP on arrangements that may impact the CCP’s risk management function, such as in the CCP’s risk model. Any decision by a CCP shall follow the advice of the risk committee approved by the competent authority;
2010/04/13
Committee: ECON