37 Amendments of Udo BULLMANN related to 2013/2277(INI)
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas, within the Troika, the Commission is responsible at technical level for negotiating the conditions for financial assistance for euro area Member States ‘in liaison with the ECB’ and ‘wherever possible together with the IMF’, the; whereas political responsibility for the Troika's programmes lies primarily with the European heads of state and government and with the relevant finance ministers; whereas that financial assistance is hereinafter referred to as ‘EU- IMF assistance’;
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the Troika is the basic structure for negotiation between the official lenders and the governments of the recipient countries, as well as for reviewing the implementation of adjustment programmes; whereas for the European side, the final decisions as regards financial assistance and conditionality are taken by the Eurogroupheads of state and finance ministers - thus, they are responsible for failures seen;
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the Troika together with the Member State concerned is also responsible for the preparation of formal decisions of the Eurogroup;
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is, by definition, an agreement between the Member State concerned and the Troika, which results from negotiations and whereby a Member State undertakes to carry out a number of actions in exchange for financial assistance; whereas, however, it is not public knowledge how negotiations have been conducted in practice between the Troika and the relevant Member State and, furthermore, there is no transparency as to the extent to which a Member State seeking assistance has been able to influence the outcome of negotiations; whereas it is stipulated in the ESM Treaty that a Member State requesting assistance from the ESM has also to address a request for assistance to the IMF;
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas the economic situation and recent developments in some Member States have, in particular in Member States seeking assistance, have seriously compromised the quality and volume of employment,. social protection and health and safety standards , this being the direct consequence of unbalanced austerity requirements without growth incentives or investment impetus; whereas the primary objective of the Troika's conditionality policy has been to cut pay and pension levels and to erode social achievements, such as workers' rights, but also, as in Portugal, for example, to privatise collectively owned assets, such as water;
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term; whereas the programmes were not suited todesigned for comprehensively correcting macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated sometimes over decades;
Amendment 175 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that the precise triggers for the crises differed in all four Member States; takes the view that in all four cases, however, the financial crisis caused by the financial services industry and the Troika's unbalanced austerity requirements must be regarded as factors aggravating the crisis;
Amendment 192 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Notes that, prior to the beginning of the EU-IMF assistance programme initiated in the spring of 2010, there was a dual fear associated with the ‘insolvency’ and ’non- sustainability’ of the public finances of Greece as a result of the constantly declining competitiveness of the Greek economy and decades of imprudent fiscal policy, with the government deficit reaching 15.7% of GDP in 2009, and the debt-to-GDP ratio continuing on an upward trend since 2003 when it stood at 97.4%, reaching 129,7% in 2009 and 156.9% in 2012;
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes that Greece entered recession in Q4 2008; notes that the country experienced six quarters of negative GDP growth rate in the seven leading to the assistance programme being activated; notes that there is a close correlation between the impact of the financial crisis and the increase in public debt, on the one hand, and between the increase in public debt and the cyclical downturn, on the other, with public debt increasing from EUR 254.7 billion at the end of Q3 2008 to EUR 314.1 billion at the end of Q2 2010; notes that, before the unbalanced austerity measures were implemented, the Greek debt mountain was lower than it is today and that it can be inferred from this that the cutbacks have made Greece's debt position worse and provided no remedy; notes that, as a result of the reluctance of important Member States to grant assistance - inter alia in the light of regional elections - and the resulting doubts as to euro zone cohesion, the costs of the crisis have risen;
Amendment 240 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Notes that the initial agreement between the Greek authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 2 May 2010 in the relevant MoUs containing , the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that, following five reviews and the insufficient success of the first programme, which was the result of a misconceived overemphasis on austerity, a second programme had to be adopted in March 2012, which has been reviewed three times since;
Amendment 250 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Notes that the initial agreement between the Portuguese authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 17 May 2011, partly because no alternative proposals were put forward, in the relevant MoUs containing the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that the Portuguese programme has since been reviewed regularly, leading to the combined eighth and ninth quarterly reviews of Portugal’s economic adjustment programme;
Amendment 276 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Deplores the unpreparedness ofNotes that the EU and international institutions, including the IMF, were not prepared for a sovereign debt crisis of a large magnitude inside a monetary union stemming from the most serious financial crisis since 1929;
Amendment 286 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
Amendment 319 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Regrets the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations; notes the necessity to evaluate whether formal documents were clearly communicated in due time to the national parliaments and the European Parliament; further notes the possible negative impact of such practices on citizens’ rights and the political situation within the countries concerned;
Amendment 330 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Deplores that recommendations contained in MoUs marke a departure from t odds withe thinking initiated by the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategies; points out however that this can be partly explained, even if not fully justified, by the fact that programmes had to be implemented under considerable time pree balanced modernisation policy drawn up in the form of the Lisbon strategy and with the consensus on this issure in a difficult political environmentthe knowledge society;
Amendment 352 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. RegretsCondemns the fact that the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal comprise a number of detailed prescriptions for health systems reform and expenditure cuts; regretsexpenditure cuts, particularly in the education, health and social security budgets as well as in funding to promote renewable energy; condemns the fact that the programmes are not bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Treaties, including Art. 168(7) TFEU;
Amendment 383 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Deplores that since 2008 the income distribution inequality has grown above average in the four countries and that cuts in social benefits and rising unemployment are raising poverty level, particularly among the younger generation, are raising poverty levels in a way that is shaming when set against a backdrop of European values;
Amendment 392 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Points to the highly unacceptable level of youth unemployment in the four Member States under assistance programmes; points especially to the sharp increase in youth unemployment in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal; and to the flow of young migrants from Southern Europe, prompted by poverty and a lack of prospects, that risks causing a brain drain from Southern European societies;
Amendment 449 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Underlines that adequate economic models are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient, economic expertise and a rejection of neo-liberal economic thinking are necessary in order to produce growth- promoting, balanced and democratically legitimate adjustment programmes; deplores that adequate statistics and information were not always available; points out that in Greece large- scale fraud was happening in this respect in the years preceding the setting up of the programme and that the authorities at European level, including Heads of State and Government, were not prepared to take appropriate measures to counteract the blatant fraud that was taking place;
Amendment 474 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; further notes that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run; also notes that the financial assistance and adjustment programme in Greece have not prevented an orderly default nor contagion of the crisis to other Member States; deplores the economic and social downturn which became evident when the fiscal and macroeconomic corrections were put into placeoccurred as a result of the misguided fiscal and macroeconomic measures;
Amendment 493 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Notes that, although from the onset the Troika published comprehensive documents on the diagnosis, the strategy to overcome the problems, a set of policy measures elaborated together with the national government concerned, and economic forecasts, all of which are updated on a regular basis, these documents did not permit the public to form an overall view of the negotiations;
Amendment 512 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Regrets that the reduction of structural deficits in all programme countries since the start of their respective assistance programmes has not yet led to a reduction in the ratios of public debt to GDP; underlines that, owing to the one-sided demands for savings, the ratio of public debt to GDP has instead sharply increased in all programme countries;
Amendment 538 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Points out that while the IMF’s stated objective in its assistance operations within the frame of the Troika is internal devaluation, the Commission has never clearly endorsed this objective; notes that the objective emphasised by the Commission in all four programme countries under enquiry has rather been fiscal consolidationto make one-sided budget cuts without growth stimuli;
Amendment 546 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Considers that too little attention has been given to alleviating the negative impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries, for example unemployment, social inequalities, and the fact that the burden has been placed mainly on lower income groups, whereas the highest income groups have been almost completely spared, and that there has been no political will to address these shortcomings in the Troika negotiations;
Amendment 562 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Stresses that national-level ownership is important, and that failure to implement agreed measures has consequences in terms of the expected results; also points out, however, that the failures to implement requirements are attributable in part to the Troika’s ill-conceived and socially severely lopsided programmes; maintains in addition that the conditions might have been accepted much more willingly within society if the higher income groups in the programme countries, as well as the financial industry, had been made, through a financial transaction tax, to bear a share of the costs brought about by the crisis and if resolute action had been taken at European level to stamp out tax evasion and fraud;
Amendment 597 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Notes that, in the Troika’eyes of citizens mandate has been perceived as being the national parliaments and the European Parliament, the Troika’s mandate has remained totally unclear and lackingdevoid of transparency;
Amendment 608 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Points out that due to its ad hoc natureone reason that there was no appropriate legal basis for setting up the Troika on the basis of Union primary law lay in its ad hoc nature, but another reason was that Heads of State or Government prefer intergovernmental arrangements to Community systems; points out that crisis machinery set up at intergovernmental level lies completely outside democratic control by the European Parliament;
Amendment 626 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
31. Notes the admission by the President of the Eurogroup before the European Parliament that the Eurogroup endorsed the recommendations of the Troika without considering their specific policy implications and without thoroughly addressing itself in the proper manner to the details of the programme proposals and the implications;
Amendment 660 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Notes that the ECB’s role is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in the ESM Treaty that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing the ECB’s role to that of a provider of expertise; further notes that the ECB mandate is limited by the TFEU to monetary policy as well as to stabilisation of the European economy and that the involvement of the ECB in any matter related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies is therefore on uncertain legal ground;
Amendment 673 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Points to the generaloverly weak democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level; notes however that this democratic accountability varies between countries, depending on the will of national executives;
Amendment 693 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Notes that formal decisions are made by both the Eurogroup and the IMF, which are consequently politically responsible for the Troika’s actions, with a crucial role now given to the ESM as it is the organisation responsible for deciding on financial assistance, thus puttingimplying that governments, including those of the Member States directly concerned, should be at the centre of any decisions taken;
Amendment 705 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Points toDeplores the fact that the ESM is intergovernmental by nature, is bound by the unanimity rule, and is subject to political influence exerted by finance ministers, heads of state and government as well as national parliaments;
Amendment 729 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
38. Reiterates its call for all decisions related to the strengthening of the EMU to be taken on the basis of the Treaty on European Union; takes the view that, just as they have done in the past, any departure from the Community method and increased use of intergovernmental agreements would divide and weaken the Union, including the euro area;
Amendment 781 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Stresses that the ESM should evolve towards Community-method management as provided for in the ESM Treatyinto a European Monetary Fund based on the Community method and demands that the ESM be made accountable to the European Parliament including with respect to decisions to grant financial assistance, in order to exert democratic accountability over the ESM; calls for the ESM financial machinery to be integrated into the European budget;
Amendment 806 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Calls for thegreater involvement of social partners in the appropriate form in the design and implementation of adjustment programmes, current and future;
Amendment 825 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Demands that the Troika take stock of the current debate on fiscal multipliers and consider the revision ofrevise the MoUs on the basis of the latest empirical results, with particular reference to growth stabilisers;
Amendment 847 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Is concerned, in particular, to improve the accountability of the Commission when it acts in its capacity as a member of the Troika; requests that the Commission representative(s) in the Troika should be heard in the European Parliament before taking up their duties and should be subject to regular reporting to the European Parliament; reform programmes on the European level (as MoU) should be legitimised by decisions of the European Parliament.