Activities of Olle SCHMIDT related to 2011/2010(INI)
Shadow opinions (1)
OPINION on Insurance Guarantee Schemes
Amendments (22)
Amendment 7 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Recognizes that the new supervisory regime and the incoming Solvency II framework will further enhance consumer protection;
Amendment 10 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Acknowledges that the most realistic and useful approach at the moment is, after having assessed the impact of Solvency II and the new supervisory framework, could be the establishment of a coherent and legally binding framework of IGS protection based on minimum harmonisation, which should not undermine the protection already offered by some Member States, with a view to achieving maximum harmonisation at a later stage;
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 (new)
Paragraph -1 (new)
-1. Recognises that the new supervisory regime and the incoming Solvency II framework will further enhance consumer protection;
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Calls on the Commission after having assessed the impact of Solvency II and the new supervisory framework, to consider the need to come forward with proposals for a minimum harmonisation directive establishing a coherent and consistent cross-border framework for insurance guarantee schemes (IGS) across Member States;
Amendment 18 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Believes that future IGSs should be based on the home Member State principle and provide a high degree and equal level of consumer protection for all natural persons – whether policyholders or other beneficiaries – covered by all types of insurance contract (life and non-life), especially in the eventfunction as a last resort by providing adequate and high degree of iconsurmer bankruptcy, insurer or intermediary mis- selling, or fraudprotection and compensation for policyholders;
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Recognises that the scope of an IGS Directive needs to be carefully assessed and not go beyond what is necessary at EU level; believes that a rationale should be established in order to identify what insurance policies should be covered. Notes that the current EU regulation on deposit guarantee schemes and investor protection schemes cover only savings products; calls on the Commission to conduct a thorough investigation, on the basis of a public consultation with the stakeholders, concerning the scope of policies that should be covered by IGS;
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Welcomes the objectives, as put forward by the Commission, of any future European legislation: ensuring comprehensive and even protection for policyholders and beneficiaries, avoiding distortions of competition, ensuring cost efficiency and enhancing market confidence and stability;
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Underlines that any new European legislation should prevent regulatory arbitrage and promote a level playing field for insurance companies operating in different Member States;
Amendment 25 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Supports the adoption of the ‘home’ country principle – whereby alllife insurance policies written by an insurer, regardless of location of sale, are covered by the ‘home’ IGS – recognising both that: A) under Solvency II the cross-border provision of insurance services will increase; and, B) the failure of an insurer will be linked to the inadequacy of supervision by the ‘home’ supervisor, and thus the burden of responsibility for failure should be borne by the ‘home’ IGS;
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Insists that the model ofBelieves that in order not to endanger the efficient functioning of existing and possible future guarantee schemes, national IGS need to be designed according to national market conditions; insists that the design, functioning and funding models for national IGS be a matter of subsidiarity, reflecting the ‘home’ country principle of supervision and the divergence of models used by existing IGS; urges the Commission against advocating an ex-ante approach to funding given the absence of compelling arguments in favour of such an approach and the disruption it could cause;
Amendment 32 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Believes that funding arrangements for IGSs should be based on both ex-ante and ex-post funding; recognises that failing insuraex-post funding given the absence of companies should also have contributed to the contingency funding which should be in placeelling proves or arguments in favour of an ex-ante approach, and due to the disruption of the market int case of insurer failurould cause;
Amendment 34 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Acknowledges that subsidiarity in relation to choice of ex-ante or ex-post funding models can result in competitive distortions between Member States; believes that such distortions are of secondary concern compared with ensuringequal importance to consumer and taxpayer protection and that the Commission should take a cautious, long-term approach to addressing such distortions;
Amendment 36 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. Recognises that market concentration issues could place strains on the ability of an IGS to absorb all policyholder claims resulting from the bankruptcy of one or a number of insurers; believes that rules on IGS that could lead to further strains on concentrated markets must be avoided.
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses that the ‘home’ country approach to IGS can only be credible from a consumer perspective if there is consistency of consumer experience; calls on the Commission to require a single own-language process and point of contact for consumers within their national supervisor for alllife insurance guarantee claims regardless of the location of the ‘home’ IGS; recommends that EIOPA develop a harmonised approach for policyholder compensation claims on the basis of simplicity and best practice, if necessary through binding technical standards;
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Insists that new EU legislation should not result in the dilution of protection offered by existing IGS in Member States, and that consumers should not face any losses as a result of regulatory failure to adequately supervise insurers or intermediaries; calls consequently on the Commission to ensure that a European framework for IGS compensates policyholders for losses in full and without exception for all types of insurance products in the event of insurer bankruptcy, insurer or intermediary mis- selling, or fraud, within a set period of time, consistent throughout Member Statewill function as a last resort by providing adequate compensation to policyholders;
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Recognises that insurance undertakings are responsible for the conduct of their employees and that intermediaries are obliged to hold professional indemnity insurance there is no need to extend the scope of IGS to cover mis-selling; notes that fraud is a matter for criminal and tort law and should not be covered by prudential rules; recognises that rules on an IGS covering mis-selling and fraud could make supervisors less vigilant and willing to use supervisory powers, thus creating moral hazard;
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Recognises that market concentration issues could place strains on the ability of an IGS to absorb all policyholder claims resulting from the bankruptcy of one or a number of insurers; believes that in order to avoid taxpayer exposure to such claims it is incumbent upon the responsible ‘home’ supervisor to ensure the robustness of the national IGS, if necessary employing additional supervisory standards to account for additional risks, which may include establishing an ex-ante IGS or additional capital requirements for certain insurers; foresees an oversight role for EIOPA in coordinating market-specific stress testing by national authorities and in conducting Europe-wide stress testing of IGS, issuing recommendations where appropriate, and in conducting regular peer reviews to ensure sharing of best practice approachesrules on IGS that could lead to further strains on concentrated markets must be avoided;
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Recognises that market concentration issues could place strains on the ability of an IGS to absorb all policyholder claims resulting from the bankruptcy of one or a number of insurers; believes that in order to avoid taxpayer exposure to such claims it is incumbent upon the responsible ‘home’ supervisor to ensure the robustness of the national IGS, if necessary employing additional supervisory standards to account for additional risks, which may include establishing an ex-ante IGS or additional capital requirements for certain insurers; foresees an oversight role for EIOPA in coordinating market-specific stress testing by national authorities and in conducting Europe-wide stress testing of IGS, issuing recommendations where appropriate, and in conducting regular peer reviews to ensure sharing of best practice approachesrules on IGS that could lead to further strains on concentrated markets must be avoided;
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Foresees an oversight role for EIOPA in coordinating market-specific stress testing by national authorities and in conducting Europe-wide stress testing of IGS, issuing recommendations where appropriate, and in conducting regular peer reviews to ensure sharing of best practice approaches;
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Notes that in small and concentrated markets, the setting-up of an IGS with inappropriate funding mechanisms could create systemic risks by enhancing the interconnectedness between insurers, which would lead to an un-level playing field between smaller and larger markets, since smaller markets would have greater difficulties coping with the costs; notes that these difficulties need to be taken into account in order to avoid further strains on concentrated markets; calls on the Commission to take in to account the rules on funding and other design features of an IGS should be left to the Member States to adapt to national markets.