BETA

154 Amendments of Olle SCHMIDT related to 2013/0253(COD)

Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
(2) Divergences in national resolution rules between different Member States and corresponding administrative practices and the lack of a unified decision making process at Union level for the resolution of cross-border banks contribute to this lack of confidence and market instability, as they do not ensure certainty and predictability as to the possible outcome of a bank failure. Resolution decisions taken at the national level only may lead to distortions of competition and ultimately to the undermining of the internal market.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 92 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
(6) Directive [ ] of the European Parliament and of the Council13 has harmonised to a certain extent national bank resolution rules and has provided for cooperation among resolution authorities when dealing with the failure of cross- border banks. However, the harmonisation provided by the Directive [ ] is not complete and the decision making process is not centralised. Directive [ ] essentially provides for common resolution tools and powers available for the national authorities of every Member State but leaves discretion to national authorities in the application of the tools and in the use of national financing arrangements in support of resolution procedures. Directive [ ] does not avoid the taking of separate and potentially inconsistent decisions by Member States regarding the resolution of cross-border groups which may affect the overall costs of resolution. Moreover, as it provides for national financing arrangements, it does not sufficiently reduce the dependence of banks on the support from national budgets and does not prevent different approaches by Member States to the use of the financing arrangements. __________________ 13 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. OJ C, , p. .
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 94 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
(7) Ensuring effective uniform resolution decisions for failing banks within the Union, including on the use of funding raised at Union level, is essential for the completion of the internal market in financial services. Within the internal market, the failure of banks in one Member State may affect the stability of the financial markets of the whole Union. Ensuring effective and uniform resolution rules and equal conditions of resolution financing across Member States is in the best interest not only of the Member States in which banks operate, but also of all Member States in general as a means to preserve competition and improve the functioning of the internal market. Banking systems in the internal market are highly interconnected, bank groups are international and banks have a large percentage of foreign assets. In the absence of a single resolution mechanism, bank crises in Member States participating in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) would have stronger negative systemic impact also in non-participating Member States. The establishment of the single resolution mechanism will increase stability of the banks of the participating Member States and prevent the spill-over of crises into non-participating Member States and will thus facilitate the functioning of the whole of the internal market. The mechanisms for cooperation regarding institutions established in both participating and non-participating Member States must be clear, and it is important to ensure that non-participating Member States are not discriminated against.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 96 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7 a (new)
(7a) Every current and new framework for banking recovery and resolution within the EU should solely be governed by the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (BRRD).
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 101 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) Whilst banks in Member States remaining outside the SSM benefit at national level from supervision, resolution and financial backstop arrangements which are aligned, banks in Member States participating in the SSM are subject to Union arrangements for supervision and national arrangements for resolution and financial backstops. This misalignment creates a competitive disadvantage for the banks in the Member States participating in the SSM compared to those in the other Member States. Because supervision and resolution are at two different levels within the SSM, intervention and resolution in banks in the Member States participating in the SSM would not be as rapid, consistent and effective as in banks in the Member States outside of the SSM. This has negative repercussions on the funding costs for these banks and creates a competitive disadvantage with detrimental effects for the Member States in which those banks operate and for the overall functioning of the internal market. Therefore, a centralised resolution mechanism for all banks operating in the Member States participating in the SSM is essential to guarantee a level playing field. It is of utmost importance to safeguard the functioning of the internal market. The creation of the SRM should not lead to discrimination against non-participating Member States, for example with regards to resolution of cross-border banks.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 109 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) A single bank resolution fund (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Fund’) is an essential element without which a single resolution mechanism could not work properly. Different systems of national funding would distort the application of uniform bank resolution rules in the internal market. The Fund should help to ensure a uniform administrative practice in the financing of resolution and to avoid the creation of obstacles for the exercise of fundamental freedoms or the distortion of competition in the internal market due to divergent national practices. The Fund should be financed directly by banks and should be pooled at Union level so that the resolution resources can be objectively allocated across Member States thus increasing financial stability and limiting the link between the perceived fiscal position of individual Member States and the funding costs of banks and undertakings operating in those Member States. The participating banks should contribute to the funding of one scheme, either national or the single resolution fund.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 112 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) A centralised application of the bank resolution rules set out in Directive [ ] by a single Union resolution authoritymechanism in the participating Member States can only be ensured where the rules governing the establishment and functioning of a single resolution mechanism are directly applicable in the Member States to avoid divergent interpretations across the Member States. This should bring benefits to the internal market as a whole because it will contribute to ensuring fair competition and to preventing obstacles to the free exercise of fundamental freedoms not only in the participating Member States but in the whole internal market.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 119 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
(16) The ECB, as the supervisor within the SSM, is the best placed to assess whether a credit institution is failing or likely to fail and whether there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector or supervisory action would prevent its failure within a reasonable timeframe. The Board, upon notification of the ECB, should provide a recommendation to the Commission. Given the need to balance the different interests at stake the Commission should decide whether or not to place an institution under resolution and should alsoECB decides whether or not to place an institution under resolution, based on triggers set out in the Directive (BRRD). The Board should decide on a clear and detailed resolution framework establishing the resolution actions to be taken by the Boardhome national resolution authority. Within this framework, the Board should decide on a resolution scheme and instruct the home and where appropriate additionally the host national resolution authorities on the resolution tools and powers to be executed at national level.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 125 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
(18) It is instrumental for the good functioning of the internal market that the same rules apply to all resolution measures, regardless of whether they are taken by national resolution authorities under Directive [ ] or within the framework of the single resolution mechanism The Commission will assess those measures under Article 107 of the TFEU. Where the use of resolution financing arrangements does not involve State aid pursuant to Article 107 (1) of the TFEU, the Commission should, in order to ensure a level playing field within the internal market, assess those measures by analogy to Art 107 of the TFEU. If a notification under Article 108 of the TFEU is not necessary as no state aid pursuant to Article 107 of the TFEU is entailed in the proposed use of the Fund by the Board, in order to ensure the integrity of the internal market between participating and non- participating Member States, the Commission should apply the relevant State aid rules under Article 107 of the TFEU by way of analogy when assessing the proposed use of the Fund. The Board should not decide on a resolution scheme until the Commission has ensured, by way of analogy with State aid rules, that the use of the Fund follows the same rules as interventions by national financing arrangements and in order to ensure the integrity of the internal market between participating and non- participating Member States, the Commission should apply the relevant State aid rules under Article 107 of the TFEU.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 128 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
(19) In order to ensure a swift and effective decision making process in resolution, the Board should be a specific Union agency with a specific structure, corresponding to its specific tasks, and which departs from the model of all other agencies of the Union. Its composition should ensure that due account is taken of all relevant interests at stake in resolution procedures. The Board should operate in executive and plenary sessions. In its executiveplenary session, it should be composed of an Executive Director, a Deputy Executive Director, and representatives of the Commission and representative of the ECB and representatives of each national resolution authority from all participating Member States. In its executive session, it should be composed of an Executive Director, a Deputy Executive Director, and a representative of the ECB. Considering the missions of the Board, the Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director should be appointed by the Council on a proposal from the Commission and after hearing the European Parliament. When deliberating on the resolution of a bank or group established within a single participating Member State, the executive session of the Board should also convene and involve in the decision-making process the member appointed by the Member State concerned representing its national resolution authority. When deliberating on a cross- border group, the members appointed by the home and all host Member States concerned representing the relevant national resolution authorities should also be convened and involved in the decision- making process of the executive session of the Board. However, home authorities and host authorities should have a balanced influence on the decision, so host authorities should have jointly one singletwo votes. The home authority should also have two votes. Observers, including a representative of the ESM and of the Euro Group, may also be invited to attend the meetings of the Board.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
(21) The Board and the Commission, where relevant, should replacshould coordinate the national resolution authorities designated under Directive [ ] in respect of all aspects related to the resolution decision-making process. The national resolution authorities designated under Directive [ ] should continue to carry out activities related to the implementation of resolution schemes adopted by the Board. In order to ensure transparency and democratic control, as well as to safeguard the rights of the Union institutions, the Board should be accountable to the European Parliament and to the Council for any decisions taken on the basis of this proposal. For the same reasons of transparency and democratic control, national parliaments should have certain rights to obtain information about the activities of the Board and to engage in a dialogue with it.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 142 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
(23) To ensure a uniform approach for institutions and groups the Board should be empowered to coordinate drawing up resolution plans for such institutions and groups. The Board should assess the resolvability of institutions and groups, and take measures aimed at removing impediments to resolvability, if any. The Board should require national resolution authorities to apply such appropriate measures designed to remove impediments to resolvability in order to ensure consistency and the resolvability of the institutions concerned.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 152 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
(27) In order to minimise disruption to the financial market and to the economy, the resolution process should be accomplished in a short time. The CommissionBoard should, throughout the resolution procedure, have access to any information which it deems necessary to take an informed decision in the resolution process. Where the CommissionECB decides to put an institution under resolution, the Board together with the home national resolution authorities should immediately adopt a resolution scheme establishing the details of the resolution tools and powers to be applied, and the use of any financing arrangements.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30
(30) When exercising resolution powers, the Commission and the BoardBoard and national authorities should make sure that shareholders and creditors bear an appropriate share of the losses, that the managers are replaced, that the costs of the resolution of the institution are minimised, and that all creditors of an insolvent institution that are of the same class are treated in a similar manner.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 165 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36
(36) The CommissionBoard together with national resolution authorities should provide the framework for the resolution action to be taken depending on the circumstances of the case and should be able to designate for use all necessary resolution tools. Within that clear and precise framework, the Board should decide on the detailed resolution scheme. The relevant resolution tools should include the sale of business tool, the bridge institution tool, the bail-in tool and the asset separation tool, which are also provided for by Directive [ ]. The framework should also make it possible to assess whether the conditions for the write- down and conversion of capital instruments are met.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 172 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 39
(39) An effective resolution regime should minimise the costs of the resolution of a failing institution borne by the taxpayers. It should also ensure that even large institutions of systemic importance can be resolved without jeopardising financial stability. The bail-in tool achieves that objective by ensuring that shareholders and creditors of the entity suffer appropriate losses and bear an appropriate part of those costs. To this end, statutory debt write down powers should be included in a framework for resolution as an additional optionthe first choice tool in conjunction with other resolution tools, as recommended by the Financial Stability Board.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 177 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 42
(42) It is not appropriate to apply the bail- in tool to claims in so far as they are secured, collateralised or otherwise guaranteed. However, in order to ensure that the bail-in tool is effective and achieves its objectives, it should be possible to apply it to as wide a range of the unsecured liabilities of a failing institution as possible. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to exclude certain kinds of unsecured liability from the scope of application of the bail-in tool. For reasons of public policy and effective resolution, the bail-in tool should not apply to those deposits that are protected under Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council15, to liabilities to employees of the failing institution, to covered bonds or to commercial claims that relate to goods and services necessary for the daily functioning of the institution. __________________ 15 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes. OJ L 135, 31.5.1994, p. 5–14.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 179 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 43
(43) Depositors that hold deposits guaranteed by a deposit guarantee scheme should not be subject to the exercise of the bail-in tool. The deposit guarantee scheme, however, contributes to funding the resolution process to the extent that it would have had to indemnify the depositors. The exercise of the bail-in powers would ensure that depositors continue having access to their deposits which is the main reason why the deposit guarantee schemes have been established. Not providing for the involvement of those schemes in such cases would constitute an unfair advantage with respect to the other creditors which would be subject to the exercise of the powers by the resolution authorityand the deposit guarantee scheme itself should not be subject to the exercise of the bail-in tool. The exercise of the bail-in powers would ensure that depositors continue having access to their deposits.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 182 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 44
(44) In order to implement the burden- sharing by shareholders and junior creditors, as required under State aid rules, the single resolution mechanism would be able to apply, by way of analogy, as of the entry into application of this Regulatione Directive (BRRD), the bail-in tool.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 184 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 45
(45) To avoid institutions structuring their liabilities in a manner that impedes the effectiveness of the bail in tool, the Board should be able to establish that the institutions hold an aggregate amount of own funds, subordinated debt and senior liabilities subject to the bail-in tool expressed as a percentage of the total liabilities of the institution, that do not qualify as own funds for the purposes of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council16 and of Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council17 , which institutions should have at all times and which is set out in the resolution plans. __________________ 16 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p.1. 17 Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 194 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 52
(52) In order to carry out its tasks effectively, the Board should have appropriate investigatory powers. It should be able to require all necessary information either directly or through national resolution authorities, and to conduct investigations and on-site inspections, where appropriate in cooperation with national competent authorities. In the context of resolution, on-site inspections would be available for the Board to effectively monitor implementation by national authorities and to ensure that the Commission and the Board take their decisions on the basis of fully accurate information.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 222 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 69
(69) Until the Board is fully operational, the Commissionnational resolution authorities should be responsible for the initial operations including collecting contributions necessary to cover administrative expenses and the designation of an interim executive director to authorise all necessary payments on behalf of the Board.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 240 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 a (new)
Article 2a The Single Resolution Board may, on its own initiative, address its instructions in line with this Regulation to any credit institution in participating Member States where it considers its failure may result in a serious disturbance to financial stability.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 264 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1
1. Where, by virtue of this Regulation, the Commission or the Board exercises tasks or powers, which, according to Directive [ ] are to be exercised by the national resolution authority of a participating Member State, the Board shall, for the application of this Regulation and Directive [ ], be considered to be the relevant national resolution authority or, in case of cross-border group resolution, the relevant group national resolution authority.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 270 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2
2. The Board, when acting as national resolution authority, shall act, where relevant, under authorisin consultation ofwith the Commission.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 277 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1
1. No action, proposal or policy of the Board, the Commission or a national resolution authority shall discriminate against entities referred to in Article 2, deposit holders, investors or other creditors established in the Union on grounds of their nationality or place of business.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 282 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. The following general principles shall apply to the Board. The Board shall: (a) act independently; (b) maintain a clear separation between supervisory competences and resolution; (c) have the necessary expertise on bank restructuring and insolvency; (d) be able to deal with large banking groups; (e) be able to act swiftly and impartially; (f) ensure appropriate account is taken of national financial stability, financial stability of the European Union and the internal market; and (g) be accountable to the European Parliament and the Council.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 285 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. When making decisions or taking action, which may have an impact in more than one participating Member State, and in particular when taking decisions concerning groups established in two or more participating Member States, the CommissionBoard shall give due consideration to all of the following factors:
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 299 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point e a (new)
(ea) Whether a participating Member State is a member of the single currency or not and whether a differentiated approach might be necessary in certain circumstances as a result of this.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 301 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 3
3. The CommissionBoard shall balance the factors referred to in paragraph 2 with the resolution objectives referred to in Article 12 as appropriate to the nature and circumstances of each case.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 310 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 4
4. No decision of the Board or the Commission shall require Member States to provide extraordinary public financial support.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 320 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1
1. The Board shall together with national resolution authorities draw up resolution plans for the entities referred to in Article 2 and for groups.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 325 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the national resolution authorities shall forward to the Board all information necessary to draw up and implement thegroup resolution plans, as obtained by them for institutions subject to direct supervision by the ECB, without prejudice to Chapter 5 of this Title. For other entities referred to in Article 2, national resolution authorities shall forward resolution plans drawn up in accordance with Articles 10 and 12(1) of Directive [ ], without prejudice to Chapter 5 of this Title.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 328 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 4
4. The resolution plan shall provide for the resolution actions which the Commission and the BoardBoard and national resolution authorities may take where an entity referred to in Article 2 or a group meet the conditions for resolution. The resolution plan shall take into consideration a range of scenarios including that the event of failure may be idiosyncratic or may occur at a time of broader financial instability or of system wide events. The resolution plan shall not assume any extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the Fund established in accordance with this Regulation.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 331 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. The resolution plan for each entity shall include all items set out in Chapter 2 of the Directive (BRRD).
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 332 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – introductory part
5. The resolution plan for each entity shall include all of the following:be prepared in accordance with, and contain all of the elements specified within Article 11 of Directive [..../...BRRD].
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 333 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – point a
(a) a summary of the key elements of the plan;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 334 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – point b
(b) a summary of the material changes to the institution that have occurred after the latest resolution information was fildeleted;
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 335 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – point c
(c) a demonstration of how critical functions and core business lines could be legally and economically separated, to the extent necessary, from other functions so as to ensure continuity upon the failure of the institution;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 336 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – point d
(d) an estimation of the timeframe for executing each material aspect of the plan;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 337 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – point e
(e) a detailed description of the assessment of resolvability carried out in accordance with Article 8;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 338 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – point f
(f) a description of any measures required pursuant to Article 8(5) to address or remove impediments to resolvability identified as a result of the assessment carried out in accordance with Article 8;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 339 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – point g
(g) a description of the processes for determining the value and marketability of the critical functions, core business lines and assets of the institution;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 340 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – point h
(h) a detailed description of the arrangements for ensuring that the information required pursuant to Article 8 is up to date and at the disposal of the resolution authorities at all times;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 341 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – point i
(i) an explanation by the resolution authority as to how the resolution options could be financed without the assumption of any extraordinary public financial support;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 343 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – point j
(j) a detailed description of the different resolution strategies that could be applied according to the different possible scenarios;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 344 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – point k
(k) a description of critical interdependencies;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 345 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – point l
(l) an analysis of the impact of the plan on other institutions within the group;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 346 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – point m
(m) a description of options for preserving access to payments and clearing services and other infrastructures;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 347 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – point n
(n) a plan for communicating with the media and the public;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 348 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – point o
(o) the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities required pursuant to Article 10 and a deadline to reach that level, where applicable;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 349 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – point p
(p) where applicable, the minimum requirement for own funds and contractual bail-in instruments pursuant to Article 10, and a deadline to reach that level, where applicable;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 350 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – point q
(q) a description of essential operations and systems for maintaining the continuous functioning of the institution's operational processes;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 351 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 5 – point r
(r) a description of the impact on employees of implementing the plan, including an assessment of any associated costs.deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 365 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1
1. When drafting resolution plans in accordance with Article 7, the Board, after consultation with the competent authority, including the ECB, and the resolution authorities of non-participating Member States in which significant branches are located insofar as is relevant to the significant branch, shall conduct an assessment of the extent to which institutions and groups are resolvable without the assumption of extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the Fund established in accordance with Article 64.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 395 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2
2. The minimum requirement shall be calculated as the amount of own funds and eligible liabilities expressed as a percentage of the total liabilities and own funds, excluding liabilities arising from derivatives, of the institutions and parent undertakings referred to in Article 2ccording to the rules set out in the Directive (BRRD).
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 396 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 3
[…]deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 400 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 4
4. The determination referred to in paragraph 1 mayshall provide that the minimum requirement of own funds and eligible liabilities is partially met on a consolidated orand an individual basis. The minimum requirement may be met through contractual bail-in instrument.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 405 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
The ECB or competent authorities of participating Member States shall inform the Board of any measure that they require an institution or group to take or that they take themselves pursuant to Article 13b of Council Regulation (EU)No[ ], pursuant to Articles 23(1) or 24 of Directive [ ], or pursuant to Article 104 of Directive 2013/36/EU.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 406 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
The Board shall notify the Commission of any information which it has received pursuant to the first subparagraph.deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 412 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1
1. When acting under the resolution procedure referred to in Article 16, the Commission and the Board, in respect of their respective responsibilities, shall have regard to the resolution objectives, and choose the tools and powers that, in its view, best achieve the objectives that are relevant in the circumstances of the case.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 428 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
When pursuing the above objectives, the Commission and the Board shall seek to avoid the unnecessary destruction of value and to minimise the cost of resolution.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 430 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 3
3. The Commission shall balance the objectives referred to in paragraph 2 as appropriate to the nature and circumstances of each case.deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 435 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. When acting under the resolution procedure referred to in Article 16, the Commission and the Board shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the resolution action is taken in accordance with the following principles:principles set out in the Directive (BRRD).
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 438 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the shareholders of the institution under resolution bear first losses;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 440 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) creditors of the institution under resolution bear losses after the shareholders in accordance with the order of priority of their claims pursuant to Article 15;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 442 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) management of the institution under resolution is replaced, except in those cases when the retention of the management, in whole or in part, as appropriate to the circumstances, is considered necessary for the achievement of the resolution objectives;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 444 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) in accordance with due process of law, individuals and entities are held accountable for the failure of the institution under resolution to the extent of their responsibility under national law;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 446 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) creditors of the same class are treated in an equitable manner;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 448 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point f
(f) no creditor shall incur greater losses than would have been incurred if the entity referred to in Article 2 had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings.deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 454 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2
2. Where an institution is an entity belonging to a group, the Commission, where applicable, and the Board shall apply resolution tools and exercise resolution powers in a way that minimises the impact on other entities belonging to the group and on the group as a whole and minimises the adverse effect on financial stability in the Union and particularly in Member States where the group operates.deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 459 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 3
3. Where the sale of business tool, the bridge institution tool or the asset separation tool is applied to an entity referred to in Article 2, that entity shall be considered to be the subject of bankruptcy proceedings or analogous insolvency proceedings for the purposes of Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/23/EC22 . __________________ 22 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses. OJL 82, 22.3.2001, p. 16.deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 461 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 1
1. The CommissionBoard shall take a resolution action in relation to a financial institution, when the conditions specified in Article 16(2et out in the Directive (BRRD) are met with regard to both the financial institution and with regard to the parent undertaking.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 466 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 2
2. The CommissionBoard shall take a resolution action in relation to a parent undertaking referred to in point (b) of Article 2, when the conditions specified in Article 16(2et out in the Directive (BRRD) are met with regard to both that parent undertaking and with regard to one or more subsidiaries which are institutions.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 470 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 3
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2 and notwithstanding the fact that a parent undertaking may not meet the conditions established in Article 16(2), the Commission may take resolution action with regards to that parent undertaking when one or more of the subsidiaries which are institutions comply with the conditions established in Article 16(2) and action with regard to that parent undertaking is necessary for the resolution of one or more subsidiaries which are institutions or for the resolution of the group as a whole.deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 476 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
When applying the bail-in tool to an institution under resolution, and without prejudice to liabilities excluded from the bail-in tool under Article 24(3), the Commission shall decide on, and the Board and the national resolution authorities of the participating Member States shall exercise the write down and conversion powers to claims following a reverse order of priority to the following order for normal insolvency procedures:the order set out in the Directive (BRRD).
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 484 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) claims related to eligible deposits and claims from deposit guarantee schemes;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 491 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) unsecured non preferred claims;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 496 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) claims subordinated other than those mentioned in points (d) to (f);deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 501 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) claims from senior executives and directors;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 506 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) claims related to additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 511 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point f
(f) claims related to common equity Tier 1 instruments;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 515 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
starting from point (f) and ending with point (a).deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 518 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1
1. Where the ECB or a national resolution authority assesses that the conditions referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 are met in relation to an entity referred to in Article 2, it shall communicate that assessment without delay to the Commission and the Board.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 524 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. On receiving a communication pursuant to paragraph 1, or on its own initiative, the BoardThe ECB shall conduct an assessment of whether the following conditions are met:
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 533 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 3
3. [...]deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 537 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 5
5. If all the conditions established in paragraph 2 are met, the Board shall recommend to the Commission that the entity be placed under resolution. The recommendation shall include at least the following: (a) the recommendation to place the entity under resolution; (b) the framework of the resolution tools referred to in Article 19(3); (c) the framework of the use of the Fund to support the resolution action in accordance with Article 71.deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 549 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 6
6. HIf all the conditions established in paragraph 2 are met and having regard to the urgency of the circumstances in the case, the CommissionECB shall decide, on its own initiative or taking into account, if any, the communication referred to in paragraph 1 or the recommendation of the Board referred to in paragraph 5recommendation of the Board, whether or not to place the entity under resolution, and. The Board shall decide on the framework of the resolution tools that shall be applied in respect of the entity concerned and of the use of the Fund to support the resolution action. The Commission, on its own initiative, may decide to place an entity under resolution if all the conditions referred to in paragraph 2 are met.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 560 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 7
7. The decision of the CommissionECB and the Board shall be addressed to the Board. If the Commissionnational resolution authorities. If the ECB decides not to place the entity under resolution, because the condition laid down in paragraph 2(c) is not met, the entity concerned shall be wound up in accordance with national insolvency law.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 571 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 8
8. Within the framework set by the CommissionECB decision, the Board shall decide on the resolution scheme referred to in Article 20 and shall ensure that the necessary resolution action is taken to carry out the resolution scheme by the relevant national resolution authorities. The decision of the Board shall be addressed to the relevant national resolution authorities and shall instruct those authorities, which shall take all necessary measures to implement the decision of the Board in accordance with Article 26, by exercising any of the resolution powers provided for in Directive [ ], in particular those in Articles 56 to 64 of that Directive [ ]. Where State aid is present, the Board may only decide after the Commission has taken a decision on that State aid.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 574 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 9
9. On receiving a communication pursuant to paragraph 1, or on its own initiative, if the Board considers that resolution measures could constitute State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU, it shall invite the participating Member State or Member States concerned to immediately notify the envisaged measures to the Commission under Article 108(3) TFEU.deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 576 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 10
10. To the extent that the resolution action as proposed by the Board involves the use of the Fund and does not entail the grant of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) of the TFEU, the Commission shall apply in parallel, by way of analogy, the criteria established for the application of Article 107 TFEU.deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 578 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 11
11. The Commission shall have the power to obtain from the Board any information which it deems relevant for fulfilling its tasks under this Regulation and, where applicable, Article 107 TFEU. The Board shall have the power to obtain from any person, in accordance with Chapter 5 of this Title, any information necessary for it to prepare and decide upon a resolution action including updates and supplements of information provided in the resolution plans.deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 581 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 12
12. The Board shall have the power to recommend to the Commission to amend the framework for the resolution tools and for the use of the Fund in respect of an entity placed under resolution.deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 588 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17
[...]deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 609 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) extraordinary public financial support is required by the entity or group, except in any of the circumstances set out in point (d)(iii) of Article 16(3).deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 615 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 5
5. The CommissionBoard, upon a recommendation of the BoardECB or on its own initiative, shall verify that the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 are met. The CommissionBoard shall determine whether the powers to write down or convert capital instruments shall be exercised singly or, following the procedure under Article 16(4) to (7), together with a resolution action.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 620 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 6
6. Where the CommissionBoard determines that the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 are met, but the conditions for resolution in accordance with Article 16(2) are not met, the Board, following a decision of the Commission, shall instruct the national resolution authorities to exercise the write down or conversion powers in accordance with Articles 51 and 52 of Directive [ ].
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 633 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 1
The resolution scheme adopted by the Board under Article 16(8) shall establish, in compliance with the decisions of the Commission on the resolution framework under Article 16(6) and with any decision on State aid where applicable by analogy the details of the resolution tools to be applied to the institution under resolution concerning at least the measures referred to in Articles 21(2), 22(2), 23(2) and 24(1) and determine the specific amounts and purposes for which the Fund shall be used.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 636 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 2
In the course of the resolution process, the Board may amend and update the resolution scheme as appropriate in light of the circumstances in the case and within the resolution framework decided upon by the Commission pursuant to Article 16(6).deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 639 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Within the framework decided by the Commission,Board the sale of business tool shall consist of the transfer to a purchaser that is not a bridge institution of the following:
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 641 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Within the framework decided by the CommissionBoard, the bridge institution tool shall consist of the transfer to a bridge institution of any of the following:
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 645 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Within the framework decided by the CommissionBoard, the asset separation tool shall consist of the transfer of assets, rights or liabilities of an institution under resolution to an asset management vehicle.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 657 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part
Within the framework decided by the CommissionBoard concerning the bail-in tool, the resolution scheme shall follow all relevant provisions set out in the Directive (BRRD) and shall establish in particular:
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 661 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
3. The following liabilities shallmay not be subject to write down and conversion according to the relevant provisions set out in the Directive (BRRD):
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 664 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 3 – point d
(d) liabilities to institutions, excluding entities that are part of the same group, with an original maturity of less than seven daysone month;
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 666 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Liabilities from derivatives that do not fall into the scope of paragraph 3 (b) shall be written down only after orderly close- out of the positions concerned and in line with the regulatory technical standards developed by ESMA and EBA in line with Article 44 of Directive [ ].
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 671 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
Where an eligible liability or class of eligible liabilities is excluded, or partially excluded, the level of write down or conversion applied to other eligible liabilities mayshall be increased to take account of such exclusions, provided that the level of write down and conversion applied to other eligible liabilities respects the principle laid down in point (f) of Article 13(1).
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 675 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 6 – introductory part
6. Where an eligible liability or class of eligible liabilities excluded or partially excluded, pursuant to paragraph 5, and the losses that would have been borne by those liabilities have cannot been passed on fully to other creditors without breaching the principle laid down in point (f) of Article 13(1), a contribution from the Fund may be made to the institution under resolution to:
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 702 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 14
14. Exclusions under paragraph 5 and according to the relevant provisions set out in Directive (BRRD) may be applied either to completely exclude a liability from write down or to limit the extent of the write down applied to that liability.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 716 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 1
1. The Board shall inform the Commission of any action it takes in order to prepare for resolution. With regard to any information received from the Board, the members of the Commission and Commission staff shall be subject to the professional secrecy requirement laid down in Article 79.deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 720 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 2
2. In the exercise of their respective responsibilities under this Regulation, the Board, the Commission, the ECB and the national competent authorities and resolution authorities shall cooperate closely. The ECB and the national competent authorities shall provide the Board and the Commission with all information necessary for the exercise of theirits tasks.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 722 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 3
3. In the exercise of their respective responsibilities under this Regulation, the Board, the Commission, the ECB and the national competent authorities and resolution authorities shall cooperate closely in the resolution planning, early intervention and resolution phases pursuant to Articles 7 to 26. The ECB and the national competent authorities shall provide the Board and the Commission with all information necessary for the exercise of their tasks.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 724 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 6
6. The Board shall co-operate closely with the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), in particular where the EFSF or the ESM have granted or are likely to grant, direct or indirect financial assistance to entities established in a participating Member State, in particular in those extraordinary circumstances referred to in Article 24(9).deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 728 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 2
2. The Board shall provide the Commission with any information relevant for fulfilling its tasks under this Regulation and, where applicable, Article 107 of the TFEU.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 730 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 1
Where a group includes entities established in participating Member States as well as in non-participating Member States, without prejudice to any approval by the CommissionBoard required under this Regulation, the Board shall represent the national resolution authorities of the participating Member States, for the purposes of cooperation with non- participating Member States in accordance with Articles 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 50, and 80 to 83 of Directive [ ].
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 734 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 1
The Commission and the Board within each of theirBoard within its respective responsibilities shall be exclusively responsible to conclude, on behalf of the national resolution authorities of participating Member States, the non- binding cooperation arrangements referred to in Article 88 (4) of Directive [ ] and shall notify them in accordance with paragraph 6 of that Article.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 748 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 38 – paragraph 1
1. A Single Resolution Board is hereby established. The Board shall be a European Union agency under the auspices of the ECB with a specific structure corresponding to its tasks. It shall have legal personality.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 764 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 39 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) a membn observer appointed by the Commission who shall not have access to confidential information relating to individual institutions;
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 786 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 39 – paragraph 2
2. The term of office of the Executive Director, the Deputy Executive Director and of the members of the Board appointed by the Commission and the ECB shall be five years. Subject to Article 53(6), that term shall not be renewable.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 788 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 40 – paragraph 1
The Board shall act in compliance with Union law, in particular with the Commission decisions pursuant to this Regulation.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 805 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 44 – paragraph 1
The Board shall have its seat in Brussels, BelgiumFrankfurt am Main, Germany.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 812 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 47 – paragraph 2
2. The Board in its plenary session shall hold at least two ordinary meetings a year. In addition, it shall meet on the initiative of the Executive Director, at the request of the CommissionECB, or at the request of at least one-third of its members.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 829 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 50 – paragraph 2 – point b – point i
(i) providing the Commission, as early as possible, with any relevant information allowing the Commission to assess and take a reasoned decision pursuant to Article 16(6);deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 855 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 51 – paragraph 2
2. When deliberating on a cross-border group, the Board shall take its decisions in its executive sessions by a simple majority of its participating members. The members of the Board referred to in Article 40(2) and the member appointed by the Member State in which the group level resolution authority is situated shall each have onetwo votes. The other participating members shall each have a voting right equal to a fraction of onetwo votes and the number of national resolution authorities of the Member States in which a subsidiary or entity covered by consolidated supervision is established. In case of a tie the Executive Director shall have a casting vote.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 878 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 55 – paragraph 2
2. The Board's administration budget shall be balanced in terms of revenue and expenditure.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 906 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 62 – paragraph 5 – introductory part
5. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated actEBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards on contributions in accordance with Article 82 in order to:
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 908 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 62 – paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards by (date) Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 913 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 64 – paragraph 1
1. The Single Bank Resolution Fund is hereby established. The Fund replaces the National Resolution Funds according to Directive [BRRD] for participating Member States.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 935 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 65 – paragraph 4
4. If, after the initial period of time referred to in paragraph 1, the available financial means diminish below the target level specified in paragraph 1, contributions calculated in accordance with Article 66 shall be raised until the target level is reached. Where the available financial means amount to less than half of the target level, the annual contributions shall not be less than one fourth of the target level, subject to the annual affordability limit set out in Article 67.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 937 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 65 – paragraph 5 – introductory part
5. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated actEBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards in accordance with Article 82 to specify the following:
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 939 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 65 – paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards by [date]. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 946 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 66 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
It shall be calculated using IFRS and at group level, adjusted in proportion to the risk profile of each institution, in accordance with the criteria specified in the delegated acts referred to in Article 94(7) of Directive [ ]. These criteria should be primarily based on objective and verifiable information such as credit ratings and other data.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 952 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 66 – paragraph 2
2. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target funding level specified in Article 65 may include payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the Board for the purposes specified in Article 71(1). The share of these irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 320% of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with paragraph 1.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 953 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 66 – paragraph 2
2. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target funding level specified in Article 65 may include cash, near-cash equivalents, assets eligible as high quality liquid assets under the liquidity coverage ratio or in payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the Board for the purposes specified in Article 71(1). The share of these irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 30% of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with paragraph 1.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 961 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 67 – paragraph 1
1. Where the available financial means are not sufficient to cover the losses, costs or other expenses incurred by the use of the Fund, the Board shall raise in accordance with Article 62 extraordinary ex post contributions from the institutions authorised in the territories of participating Member States, in order to cover the additional amounts. These extraordinary contributions shall be allocated between institutions in accordance with the rules set out in Article 66. These shall be subject to an annual affordability limit for individual institution contributions.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 968 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 67 – paragraph 3
3. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 82 to specify the circumstances and conditions under which an entity referred to in Article 2 may be partially or entirely exempted from ex post contributions under paragraph 2.:
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 969 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 67 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 (new)
(a) the circumstances and conditions under which an entity referred to in Article 2 may be partially or entirely exempted from ex post contributions under paragraph 2; and (b) the annual affordability limit as a percentage of pre-tax profits, which should roll over, should this limit not be met.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 970 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 68
[…]deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 974 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 70 – paragraph 1
1. The Board shall administer the Fund and may request the Commission to perform certain tasks relating toan appropriate third party to perform the administration and management of the Fund.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 975 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 70 – paragraph 2
2. The amounts received from an institution under resolution or a bridge institution, the interests and other earnings on investments and any other earnings shall benefit only the Fund. The Fund shall be managed with the core objective of capital preservation via investment in high quality liquid securities.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 981 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 70 – paragraph 3
3. The Board shall invest the amounts held in the Fund only in obligations of the participating Member States or intergovernmental organisations, or in highly liquid assets off the highest credit worthiness. Investments should be sufficiently geographically diversified. The return on those investments shall benefit the Fund.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 984 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) to make loans to the institution under resolution, its subsidiaries, a bridge institution or an asset management vehicle;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 985 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) to purchase assets of the institution under resolution;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 987 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) to pay compensation to shareholders or creditors if, following an evaluation pursuant to Article 17(5), they have received less, in payment of their credits, than what they would have received, following a valuation pursuant to Article 17(16), in a winding up under normal insolvency proceedings;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 989 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – point f
(f) to make a contribution to the institution under resolution in lieu of the contribution which would have been achieved by the write down of certain creditors, when the bail-in tool is applied and the resolution authority decides to exclude certain creditors from the scope of bail-in in accordance with Article 24(3);deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 993 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 71 – paragraph 3
3. The Fund shall notby no means be used directly or indirectly to absorb the losses of an institution or an entity referred to in Article 2 or to recapitalise an institution or an entity referred to in Article 2. In the event that the use of the resolution financing arrangement for the purposes in paragraph 1 indirectly results in part of the losses of an institution or an entity referred to in Article 2 being passed on to the Fund, the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Article 24 shall apply.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 997 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 73
[…]deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1015 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 78 – paragraph 3
3. In the case of non-contractual liability, the Board shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws concerning the liability of public authorities of the Member States, make good any damage caused by it or by its staff in the performance of their duties, in particular their resolution functions, including acts and omissions in support of foreign resolution proceedings.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1028 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 82 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Any delegated acts adopted shall be consistent with equivalent acts adopted under Directive [.../...BRRD].
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1035 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 85 – paragraph 1
From the date of application referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 88, the Fund shall be considered the resolution financing arrangement of the participating Member States under Title VII of Directive [ ]. From that date, the available financial means of national resolution financing arrangements in participating Member States already contributed by institutions shall be transferred to the Fund, in lieu of ex-ante contributions raised in accordance with Article 66. Once these available financial means have been transferred to the Fund, no participating Member State shall maintain a national resolution financing arrangement.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1039 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 85 – paragraph 1
From the date of application referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 88, the Fund shall be considered a part of the resolution financing arrangement of thefor credit institutions subject to this Regulation of each of participating Member States under Title VII of Directive [ ].
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1041 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 87 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. The CommissionECB shall be responsible for the establishment and initial operation of the Board until the Board has the operational capacity to implement its own budget. For that purpose:
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1051 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 88 – paragraph 3
Article 24 shall apply from 1 Januaruly 20186.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON